Who Governs? Guatemala Five Years After the Peace Accords Rachel Sieder Megan Thomas George Vickers Jack Spence January 2002 Hemisphere Initiatives Cambridge, Massachusetts Copyright 2002 Hemisphere Initiatives The contributions of the authors were roughly equal. In addi- CONTENTS tion to researching and drafting particular sections each reviewed the entire draft. The final edit is the responsibility of Introduction 1 Jack Spence, George Vickers, and Hemisphere Initiatives. The Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 4 listing of the authors recognizes the long-standing research The Growing Influence of experience in Guatemala of Rachel Sieder and Megan Thomas. Fuerzas Ocultas 7 Rachel Sieder is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the Institute The Weakening of Traditional of Latin American Studies, University of London. She has Power-Brokers 11 worked on Central America for over a decade and her Civic Actors 16 recent research has concentrated on rule of law and indige- nous rights. She wrote the section on the Justice System. Uncharted Paths for the Mayan Movement 21 Megan Thomas has worked in Guatemala as a journalist, Electoral Barriers to Consolidating political analyst, human rights activist, and development Democracy 25 worker for over twenty years. She is currently studying at Parties 26 Smith College. She wrote the sections on Civic Actors and Voter Turnout 30 the Mayan movement. Reforming the Justice System 32 George Vickers is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Legal Reforms 33 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). He has con- Remaining Weaknesses 34 ducted research on Central America for over twenty years, Underwriting Impunity—Los and as Executive Director of WOLA made many trips to Poderes Paralelos 36 Guatemala since the signing of the peace accords. He wrote the sections on the current government, traditional actors, Failing To Rescue Police Reform 39 the police, and the conclusion. Economic And Social Exclusion 42 Jack Spence is President of Hemisphere Initiatives and Land and Poverty 48 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of The Difficulty of Raising Taxes 50 Massachusetts Boston. He has conducted research on Central Conclusion 53 America for over twenty years. He wrote the sections focusing on elections and the economy and drafted the introduction and conclusion. Translator: Carlos Flores Graphic Artist: Nick Thorkelson We are extremely grateful to PRODECA for funding this report. WOLA provided for Vickers’ travel and time, and handles distribution of the report. Ralph Fine, Interim Executive Director of WOLA, made arrangements for distrib- ution. Susan Peacock and Adriana Beltrán of WOLA provid- ed valuable research assistance. In addition Susan made detailed comments on the draft. We thank Edelberto Torres- Rivas and Patricia Ardón for commenting upon the draft in the midst of very busy schedules. Copies of this report and other Hemisphere Initiatives reports (see inside back cover) can be obtained from: Hemisphere Initiatives 608 Franklin Street Cambridge, MA 02139 http://www.geocites.com/hem_init/ [email protected] Washington Office on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue NW Washington, DC 20009 202 797 2171 [email protected] Who Governs? Guatemala Five Years After the Peace Accords INTRODUCTION he Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace civil society the negotiations produced an agree- signed on December 29, 1996 by the ment of ambitious scope. Implementation of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad accords became the centerpiece of Guatemalan T 2 Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) politics and international support. concluded thirty six years of armed conflict, Five years later, the accords have lost much and a seven year peace negotiation process that of their political force. Some have blamed this spanned three governments. on an overly ambitious document (over 300 The armed conflict decimated Guatemalan provisions) that created a highly fragmented society. The 1979 population of Guatemala was implementation process. But the central prob- 6.8 million. The Commission for Historical lem is neither the architecture of the accords Clarification (CEH), a product of the peace nor their rhetoric. By the 1990s the war was accords, documented 42,275 deaths. Almost confined to remote areas, so few Guatemalans three-quarters were arbitrary executions and were affected. Many civil society activists forced disappearances. Indigenous populations viewed the accords as an agreement between constitute about half of total population (esti- the governing party (Partido de Avanzada mates vary) but they suffered 83% of the Nacional, or PAN), the URNG and the United deaths. The CEH estimated that total deaths Nations, and expressed fears that implementa- were 200,000, which is almost four times the tion would strengthen the signatories while number of U.S. combat deaths in Vietnam. marginalizing more representative voices.3 Violence forcibly displaced 1 to 1.5 million There was little sense of ownership of the people, including some 50,000 who became accords by organized civil society. Despite ini- refugees in Mexico. Thousands of grassroots tial enthusiasm for many of the reforms in the leaders were killed.1 accords, failure to produce measurable change When serious peace negotiations began in the lives of ordinary citizens has further around 1990 the intensity of the war had weakened already tepid public support. A declined and the URNG was militarily weak recent poll found that 53% of Guatemalans with little demonstrable national base of sup- thought the accords had brought no benefits port. Human rights conditions had improved whatsoever.4 from the horrific levels of the early 1980s. A The administration of President Álvaro Arzú troubled transition to civilian rule had been (1995–1999) was the fourth civilian government underway since 1984, following thirty years of since the return to civilian rule in 1985. This direct military rule. Despite the power imbal- followed thirty years of military rule, which ance between the negotiating parties, with the began in the wake of the 1954 CIA-organized help of international mediators and groups from coup that overthrew the elected government of 2 Who Governs? Jacobo Arbenz. While Arzú supported the peace ernment’s support for the judicial and police negotiations and made efforts to implement reforms mandated in the accords was also weak some key accords, he was reluctant to yield and ineffectual. executive power to the wide array of imple- Civil society organizations (CSOs) had been menting commissions or to push through con- active in shaping the accords and were slated to stitutional reforms and fiscal reforms. As the be major players in the implementation 1999 elections approached, Arzú’s party, PAN, process, principally through their membership faced the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco on specific commissions. Yet, despite their for- (FRG), no friend of the accords. Eroding popu- mal role in the process and considerable, albeit lar support for the accords and mounting oppo- sometimes tardy, international financial sup- sition by sectors that felt threatened by key port, CSOs encountered a daunting array of reforms combined to diminish the administra- problems. These included organizational weak- tion’s implementation efforts. ness, fragmentation, and difficulties in meeting An indicator of diminishing governmental the multiple requirements that came with support was the lukewarm endorsement the donations. Even when CSOs developed consen- PAN gave to constitutional changes called for sus proposals they were unable to bring grass- in the accords. During the peace process in roots pressure to bear on the government to neighboring El Salvador, important constitu- ensure their adoption. The executive branch tional changes agreed upon during negotiations and the Congress often seemed to ignore their were adopted by the legislature within 24 proposals, and it was hard to fight back with hours of submission by the executive branch, more than arguments. and prior to a final, comprehensive peace The FRG and its founder, former military dic- accord. In Guatemala, by contrast, the PAN- tator General Efraín Ríos Montt, had been, at dominated congress spent more than two years best, very reluctant supporters of some aspects of after the signing of a comprehensive agreement the peace agreements. Ríos Montt’s highly con- debating constitutional reforms agreed to in tingent offer of support for the constitutional the accords. The congress finally submitted a amendments was in exchange for an additional confusing and complex package, containing amendment that would sweep away constitu- some 54 different amendments divided into tional provisions that prevented him from run- four broad categories, to a national referendum. ning for the presidency. When the FRG won the Many of the proposed amendments were not elections with a robust congressional majority even directly related to the peace accords. These and the presidency, it did not augur well for con- were defeated in a May 1999 referendum tinued implementation of the accords. marked by a well-financed and highly effective International actors have played a significant campaign against the amendments, and by role. The international community pledged more extremely low voter turnout.5 than $3.2 billion in aid, of which about 68% was The Arzú administration also resisted mak- in the form of grants. The various agencies of the ing a series of fiscal and tax reforms called for UN, and the UN’s oversight organization