Who Governs? Guatemala Five Years After the Peace Accords

Rachel Sieder Megan Thomas George Vickers Jack Spence

January 2002

Hemisphere Initiatives Cambridge, Massachusetts Copyright 2002 Hemisphere Initiatives The contributions of the authors were roughly equal. In addi- CONTENTS tion to researching and drafting particular sections each reviewed the entire draft. The final edit is the responsibility of Introduction 1 Jack Spence, George Vickers, and Hemisphere Initiatives. The Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 4 listing of the authors recognizes the long-standing research The Growing Influence of experience in Guatemala of Rachel Sieder and Megan Thomas. Fuerzas Ocultas 7 Rachel Sieder is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the Institute The Weakening of Traditional of Latin American Studies, University of London. She has Power-Brokers 11 worked on Central America for over a decade and her Civic Actors 16 recent research has concentrated on rule of law and indige- nous rights. She wrote the section on the Justice System. Uncharted Paths for the Mayan Movement 21 Megan Thomas has worked in Guatemala as a journalist, Electoral Barriers to Consolidating political analyst, human rights activist, and development Democracy 25 worker for over twenty years. She is currently studying at Parties 26 Smith College. She wrote the sections on Civic Actors and Voter Turnout 30 the Mayan movement. Reforming the Justice System 32 George Vickers is Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Legal Reforms 33 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). He has con- Remaining Weaknesses 34 ducted research on Central America for over twenty years, Underwriting Impunity—Los and as Executive Director of WOLA made many trips to Poderes Paralelos 36 Guatemala since the signing of the peace accords. He wrote the sections on the current government, traditional actors, Failing To Rescue Police Reform 39 the police, and the conclusion. Economic And Social Exclusion 42 Jack Spence is President of Hemisphere Initiatives and Land and Poverty 48 Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of The Difficulty of Raising Taxes 50 Massachusetts Boston. He has conducted research on Central Conclusion 53 America for over twenty years. He wrote the sections focusing on elections and the economy and drafted the introduction and conclusion. Translator: Carlos Flores Graphic Artist: Nick Thorkelson We are extremely grateful to PRODECA for funding this report. WOLA provided for Vickers’ travel and time, and handles distribution of the report. Ralph Fine, Interim Executive Director of WOLA, made arrangements for distrib- ution. Susan Peacock and Adriana Beltrán of WOLA provid- ed valuable research assistance. In addition Susan made detailed comments on the draft. We thank Edelberto Torres- Rivas and Patricia Ardón for commenting upon the draft in the midst of very busy schedules. Copies of this report and other Hemisphere Initiatives reports (see inside back cover) can be obtained from: Hemisphere Initiatives 608 Franklin Street Cambridge, MA 02139 http://www.geocites.com/hem_init/ [email protected] Washington Office on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue NW Washington, DC 20009 202 797 2171 [email protected] Who Governs? Guatemala Five Years After the Peace Accords

INTRODUCTION

he Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace civil society the negotiations produced an agree- signed on December 29, 1996 by the ment of ambitious scope. Implementation of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad accords became the centerpiece of Guatemalan T 2 Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) politics and international support. concluded thirty six years of armed conflict, Five years later, the accords have lost much and a seven year peace negotiation process that of their political force. Some have blamed this spanned three governments. on an overly ambitious document (over 300 The armed conflict decimated Guatemalan provisions) that created a highly fragmented society. The 1979 population of Guatemala was implementation process. But the central prob- 6.8 million. The Commission for Historical lem is neither the architecture of the accords Clarification (CEH), a product of the peace nor their rhetoric. By the 1990s the war was accords, documented 42,275 deaths. Almost confined to remote areas, so few Guatemalans three-quarters were arbitrary executions and were affected. Many civil society activists forced disappearances. Indigenous populations viewed the accords as an agreement between constitute about half of total population (esti- the governing party (Partido de Avanzada mates vary) but they suffered 83% of the Nacional, or PAN), the URNG and the United deaths. The CEH estimated that total deaths Nations, and expressed fears that implementa- were 200,000, which is almost four times the tion would strengthen the signatories while number of U.S. combat deaths in Vietnam. marginalizing more representative voices.3 Violence forcibly displaced 1 to 1.5 million There was little sense of ownership of the people, including some 50,000 who became accords by organized civil society. Despite ini- refugees in Mexico. Thousands of grassroots tial enthusiasm for many of the reforms in the leaders were killed.1 accords, failure to produce measurable change When serious peace negotiations began in the lives of ordinary citizens has further around 1990 the intensity of the war had weakened already tepid public support. A declined and the URNG was militarily weak recent poll found that 53% of Guatemalans with little demonstrable national base of sup- thought the accords had brought no benefits port. Human rights conditions had improved whatsoever.4 from the horrific levels of the early 1980s. A The administration of President Álvaro Arzú troubled transition to civilian rule had been (1995–1999) was the fourth civilian government underway since 1984, following thirty years of since the return to civilian rule in 1985. This direct military rule. Despite the power imbal- followed thirty years of military rule, which ance between the negotiating parties, with the began in the wake of the 1954 CIA-organized help of international mediators and groups from coup that overthrew the elected government of 2 Who Governs?

Jacobo Arbenz. While Arzú supported the peace ernment’s support for the judicial and police negotiations and made efforts to implement reforms mandated in the accords was also weak some key accords, he was reluctant to yield and ineffectual. executive power to the wide array of imple- Civil society organizations (CSOs) had been menting commissions or to push through con- active in shaping the accords and were slated to stitutional reforms and fiscal reforms. As the be major players in the implementation 1999 elections approached, Arzú’s party, PAN, process, principally through their membership faced the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco on specific commissions. Yet, despite their for- (FRG), no friend of the accords. Eroding popu- mal role in the process and considerable, albeit lar support for the accords and mounting oppo- sometimes tardy, international financial sup- sition by sectors that felt threatened by key port, CSOs encountered a daunting array of reforms combined to diminish the administra- problems. These included organizational weak- tion’s implementation efforts. ness, fragmentation, and difficulties in meeting An indicator of diminishing governmental the multiple requirements that came with support was the lukewarm endorsement the donations. Even when CSOs developed consen- PAN gave to constitutional changes called for sus proposals they were unable to bring grass- in the accords. During the peace process in roots pressure to bear on the government to neighboring El Salvador, important constitu- ensure their adoption. The executive branch tional changes agreed upon during negotiations and the Congress often seemed to ignore their were adopted by the legislature within 24 proposals, and it was hard to fight back with hours of submission by the executive branch, more than arguments. and prior to a final, comprehensive peace The FRG and its founder, former military dic- accord. In Guatemala, by contrast, the PAN- tator General Efraín Ríos Montt, had been, at dominated congress spent more than two years best, very reluctant supporters of some aspects of after the signing of a comprehensive agreement the peace agreements. Ríos Montt’s highly con- debating constitutional reforms agreed to in tingent offer of support for the constitutional the accords. The congress finally submitted a amendments was in exchange for an additional confusing and complex package, containing amendment that would sweep away constitu- some 54 different amendments divided into tional provisions that prevented him from run- four broad categories, to a national referendum. ning for the presidency. When the FRG won the Many of the proposed amendments were not elections with a robust congressional majority even directly related to the peace accords. These and the presidency, it did not augur well for con- were defeated in a May 1999 referendum tinued implementation of the accords. marked by a well-financed and highly effective International actors have played a significant campaign against the amendments, and by role. The international community pledged more extremely low voter turnout.5 than $3.2 billion in aid, of which about 68% was The Arzú administration also resisted mak- in the form of grants. The various agencies of the ing a series of fiscal and tax reforms called for UN, and the UN’s oversight organization MIN- by the accords to provide increased revenue for UGUA, have doggedly pushed for implementa- social spending. And even though Arzú had tion, but they have a mandate limited in scope begun his term by asserting control over the and time, and also lack any political base in military through the calculated use of promo- Guatemalan society. Inevitably, other events on tions, as his term in office progressed the exec- the international stage compete for attention and utive became increasingly reluctant to confront funds, and MINUGUA has experienced dramatic key elements of the military/intelligence estab- cuts in budget and personnel over the last two lishment. Despite political pressure and finan- years. As implementation has stalled, interna- cial support from international actors, the gov- tional donors seem unsure how to re-invigorate Introduction 3 the reform process and are re-assessing their ment, which in turn undermines support for future role and support. A meeting of donors new taxes to pay for increased social spending. scheduled for February, 2002 (after several earlier The report argues that low spending on securi- postponements), may give some indication of ty, education, and health will tend to reduce future support. participation, particularly when the main vic- Any attempt to assess the problems of tim of the low social spending is a large, ethnic democratization in Guatemala and the population that has suffered from long-stand- prospects for further implementation of the ing discrimination. These characteristics sound peace accords must begin, however, by recog- a lot like Guatemala.6 nizing the magnitude and the complexity of The present problem is not that the peace the challenge. It is not easy for any nation to accords have been rudely shoved off the stage reform an entire legal culture, build a new by powerful actors focused on other agendas. police force, or develop a multilingual school The problem has more to do with the general system. It is particularly hard for Guatemala weakness of the various political actors. All because powerful interests have such high public players seem weaker in recent years, and stakes in maintaining the centuries-old status there has been only marginal progress in build- quo of high economic inequality, discrimina- ing stronger democratic institutions. Civil soci- tion against the indigenous, impunity, and a ety organizations, and among them Mayan weak, under-financed state. organizations, are weaker than they were in Guatemala has a long history of low rates of 1996. So are political parties. Even the FRG is tax collection, low social spending, and high weaker since the 1999 election. Important inequality relative to other nations in Latin institutions such as those that maintain securi- America. Economic differences between regions ty and process criminal and legal disputes, the and ethnic groups are extreme. Rural areas Congress, business groups, and even the once where concentrations of indigenous people live all-powerful military are increasingly fragment- have by far the worst conditions of poverty, ed, although not all have lost power to the education, health, and land shortages. same extent. Institutions of public security and the judicial The PAN suffered a stinging defeat in 1999, system are weakest in those areas, and govern- and its bench has since badly divided. Leftist ment spending is proportionally low in rural groups, including the URNG, have been areas. These same areas have the lowest partici- marked by division and show few signs of pation in elections, in part because it is diffi- expanding their electoral base. The FRG has cult to register and vote. internal divisions and has been embarrassed by In a recent report the Inter-American scandal. Polls show large declines in popularity Development Bank (BID) examined national of both President Alfonso Portillo and Ríos data from around the world in an attempt to Montt, who is 75 years old and the party’s relate the quality of government (obviously a kingpin. The Congress displays many institu- difficult thing to measure) with other political tional weaknesses. The military has been able features. It found an association between low to protect its core interests, but its institutional quality of government (low capacity to comply political influence has declined. The military with laws and contracts, high corruption, low budget declined (in real terms) during the Arzú efficiency in provision of public services, and administration, although it increased signifi- distorting regulations), low political participa- cantly in 2001. There have been indictments tion, and high ethnic diversity. The report sug- and even convictions (in the Gerardi case) of gests that low political participation creates military officers accused of major human rights openings for high corruption. High corruption abuses, albeit not very many . Those elements contributes to low public confidence in govern- within the armed forces who want a more mod- 4 Who Governs? ern, corruption-free institution are trapped by current political environment it is difficult to loyalty to the institution and the brotherhood legislate and even more difficult to implement of silence. Elements in the military have been policy. Instead, the current environment makes able to maintain, despite the mandate of the it easier to veto, easier to slow down initiatives, accords, the powerful, secretive Estado Mayor and easier to evade existing policies. Presidencial (EMP), a center of military intelli- Guatemala is at a perilous moment. A pow- gence and covert actions operating out of the erful legacy of social and political exclusion and Presidential palace. If the military continues to repression has inhibited and limited the extent be a major political player, it is not clear what and depth of democratic reforms, although institutional aims it is pursuing. reforms (and the changing world environment This does not mean that there is a power vac- in which Guatemala finds itself) have been suf- uum that threatens an imminent return to ficient to weaken the power of the two main authoritarian government. There were credible traditional pillars of political decision-mak- rumors of a military coup in early 2000, and ing—the private sector and the military. The such an outcome cannot yet be ruled out in resulting political drift and fragmentation pro- Guatemala, but it is a far less likely scenario vides openings for greater influence by criminal that it might have been ten years ago. Opinion elements and other illegitimate actors, which polls indicate Guatemala has a comparatively in turn erodes and inhibits democratic institu- large segment of the population that is sympa- tional reform. As donor interest wanes and thetic to the idea of a strong authority figure in Guatemala fails to make the changes needed to government.7 But there is no obvious organized become an accepted player in an increasingly group or individual poised to take over. “globalized” world, the likelihood is growing Rather, the “all parties weakened” scenario is that Guatemala’s future may be more like its one of political drift and fragmentation. In the past—and that is a gloomy prospect indeed.

GUATEMALA’S HYDRA-HEADED GOVERNMENT

he inauguration of Alfonso Portillo as To give flesh to these bold promises, he Guatemala’s new President on January announced that he was abolishing the Estado T14, 2000 began on a high note. In a Mayor Presidencial and appointed a former guer- powerful acceptance speech, Portillo set forth rilla, Ricardo Marroquín Rosada, to head the his basic goals: to consolidate democracy and new civilian body that would replace the EMP. the rule of law, accepting the obligation of the He named prominent civil society and indige- state to fully implement the peace accords; to nous activists to important positions, and—most decentralize government by delegating powers dramatically—bypassed the military chain-of- and resources to local governments; to gener- command to name a Colonel as the new defense ate sustainable economic growth based on minister, which required all higher-ranking offi- clear rules that would increase private invest- cers to submit their resignations. ment, free trade, competition and respect for A closer look at the full range of Portillo’s labor rights and eliminate privileges that fos- initial cabinet appointments, however, revealed ter concentration of wealth, monopoly and a much more complex political balance than inefficiency; to reduce social, ethnic and gen- these highly visible moves suggested. In addi- der inequality; and to eradicate impunity and tion to Vice-President Francisco Reyes López, corruption. hard-core FRG activists or supporters were Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 5 named as ministers of Foreign Affairs, Econo- Ríos Montt and the hard-core FRG activists. my, Health, Energy and Mines, and to the posts They did both share an antipathy to the tradi- of General Secretary and Executive Secretary of tional economic elite, and the FRG received lit- the Presidency. Former Christian Democrat tle financial help from that sector. In 1995, FRG activists, most of them personal friends of political support was particularly strong in rural Portillo, were named as ministers of Agricul- areas (especially where there had been strong ture, Finance, Labor, and Education, and as civil patrol units allied with the military during Private Secretary and Secretary of Planning in the counterinsurgency period of the 1980s), the Presidency. Prominent human rights while the PAN drew its support mostly from activists were named as Minister of Culture and urban dwellers. By 1999, the FRG also drew Sports, and Secretary of Strategic Analysis. Ex- significant support from poor and middle-class guerrillas were named to head the Secretariat of voters in urban areas. Administrative and Security Affairs (SAAS, In addition to antipathy toward the orga- established to replace the EMP) and the nized private sector, Ríos Montt and the FRG Secretariat of Peace (SEPAZ, responsible for were hostile to sectors within the military that implementing the peace accords). Analysts dis- had supported his overthrow in 1983. These agreed as to whether the ministers of Com- tensions were reflected in the initial cabinet munication and Interior (Gobernación) were appointments, which marginalized the military closer to the FRG or to Portillo. and representatives of the organized private sec- The political diversity of the cabinet reflect- tor (as we describe later). The diverse ideologi- ed the somewhat odd makeup of the winning cal makeup of Portillo’s initial cabinet posed political ticket in 1999. The FRG was founded the risk that distinct and conflicting agendas by retired General Efrain Ríos Montt, who would make it difficult for the government to served as President of Guatemala from 1981 to develop and implement policies in a unified 1983 after seizing power through a military and coherent manner. coup against the previous military government. The past two years have demonstrated how Ríos Montt, in turn, was overthrown by a mili- real was that risk. It quickly became clear that tary coup in 1983. During his presidency some the FRG bench in Congress, headed by Ríos of the most massive killings of the civil war Montt, was not taking its lead from the execu- took place. Ríos Montt was prevented from tive branch. A number of key bills sent by running for President after the return to civil- Portillo to Congress, including ones dealing ian rule by a provision of the 1984 constitution with salary raises and school curriculum were that barred candidates who had seized power by completely changed in the legislature. During means of force. the first eight months of Portillo’s government, During the early 1990s, the FRG tried several not a single bill related to peace accord imple- times to challenge this provision of the constitu- mentation was approved (although some were tion and to repeal it. When FRG efforts to name pending). Leading FRG members of Congress Ríos Montt as the party’s presidential candidate were openly critical of several cabinet members. in 1995 were rejected after exhausting all legal Right after the election, some Guatemalan ana- avenues, the party surprised everyone by offering lysts estimated that of the 63 FRG deputies, 47 its nomination to Alfonso Portillo. Portillo was a were loyal to Ríos Montt and 16 to Portillo. former leftist who spent much of the nineteen- Since then, however, Ríos Montt’s control has eighties in Mexico, and when he returned to seemed much more absolute. Guatemala after the restoration of civilian rule Lack of clarity about who is running things he had joined the Christian Democrats. An effec- was reinforced by Portillo’s style of governing. tive campaigner with strong populist rhetoric, He spent much time making sweeping promis- Portillo seemed a strange ideological partner for es with tough-guy talk at campaign-style ral- 6 Who Governs? lies and ceremonial occasions. What seemed to mer winning most of the battles. The General be more important presidential duties such as (as Ríos Montt is often referred to in the press) announcing policies, presiding over inter- has not emerged unscathed, however. In June of agency policy-making bodies, or meeting with 2000, Congress approved a law establishing key foreign dignitaries, were often left in the new taxes on alcoholic beverages. When the hands of Vice President Reyes. law was published, however, the tax rates were Continuing frequent personnel changes only half what had been approved. Critics seemed to reflect ongoing political struggles charged that the FRG leadership had illegally within the administration and between the altered the law under pressure from the power- administration and congress. In early May ful distillery industry, while Ríos Montt 2000, Portillo announced that he was replacing claimed that the law had been legally amended armed forces chief of staff, Col. César Augusto in a separate Congressional session. All records Ruiz Morales, with Col. Eduardo Arévalo Lacs. of this separate session mysteriously disap- Ruiz Morales was seen by some analysts as close peared, but Prensa Libre obtained an audio tape to Ríos Montt because they belonged to the of the session that demonstrated that no same church. Unlike Ruiz Morales, Arévalo had changes to the law were discussed. The result- been part of the same training class at the mili- ing “Guategate” scandal led to criminal investi- tary academy as defense minister Juan de Dios gations of the congressional leadership and Estrada Velásquez, and the change was seen as filled the press for the better part of the next strengthening Portillo’s hand. A few days later, year. In the end, prosecutors decided not to however, the defense minister announced indict anyone. The scandal put the FRG on the changes in the leadership of military intelli- defensive, however, and further weakened pub- gence that seemed to reduce the influence of lic confidence in Congress. Portillo’s top security aide and effective head of The ongoing internal struggles within the the EMP, Jacobo Salán Sánchez. The EMP, con- administration and with Congress have slowed or trary to Portillo’s promise, had not (and has not prevented the adoption of effective policies to yet) been replaced. carry out most of the promises Portillo made in After mounting criticism of the govern- his inaugural speech, and have fostered public ment’s failure to bring the skyrocketing crime disenchantment with the FRG and Portillo. A rate under control, in early July 2000 Portillo November 2000, poll found, for example, that replaced the Minister of Gobernación. Portillo support for political parties had plummeted, told foreign diplomats that he would name the with the FRG favored by 22%, the PAN 9%, aforementioned head of the SAAS, Ricardo and all others 3%. The most popular party pref- Marroquín, to the post. Days later, however, he erence was “Ninguno” (none), favored by 48%. named FRG deputy Byron Barrientos to the Only 16% thought that Congress was doing a position. The contrast could not have been good job, whereas 29% thought it was doing more dramatic. Barrientos had been forced out a bad job; only 19% thought Portillo was doing a of the military in 1989 after participating in a good job and 32% said he was doing a bad job.8 failed coup plot against the first civilian gov- Despite the frequent paralysis and continued ernment. He immediately appointed other for- infighting, the current government has mer coup-plotters to be in charge of immigra- responded to heavy pressure from the interna- tion and as deputy director of police. He also tional community (especially the United States replaced the police chief. That made three and international financial institutions) and police chiefs in seven months! approved new laws to protect intellectual prop- The press portrayed the jockeying over poli- erty rights, to combat money laundering, and cies and appointments as an ongoing struggle to criminalize tax evasion, along with a new between Ríos Montt and Portillo, with the for- labor code. It also approved new taxes to meet Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 7 some of the fiscal targets called for in the peace als by preventing thorough criminal investiga- accords (and also to mitigage a severe cash cri- tions and intimidating judges and witnesses. sis). And in the most notorious outstanding They see evidence of this network’s handiwork human rights case, the murder of Bishop Juan in several prominent assassinations and attacks Gerardi, three military officers were convicted of human rights activists and offices. They often of carrying out the crime. refer to this network as a poder parelelo, or paral- These achievements have done little to stem lel power. The Guatemalan press and some gov- the public disenchantment. On the contrary, ernment officials, including president Portillo, the tax reforms have fostered an unusual (and have echoed these concerns and talked about uncomfortable) alliance between labor unions fuerzas ocultas–hidden forces–that are manipulat- and civil society groups opposed to increases in ing events and fostering instability. sales taxes, and the powerful private sector In addition, there have been a number of cor- lobby (CACIF) opposed to the criminalization ruption scandals involving embezzlement of of tax evasion and new taxes that affect specific government funds and charges of favoritism in sectors of commerce. Human rights activists political appointments and in the awarding of view the Gerardi case convictions as primarily government contracts, and a number of govern- due to extraordinary international pressure, and ment officials have been indicted, fired or remain focused on continuing (and unsolved) forced to resign from office. Most recently, in incidents of mysterious attacks on human November 2001, a high-ranking official of the rights workers. They also are alarmed by the Ministerio de Gobernacón was implicated in the apparent continuing political influence of ex- embezzlement of 90 million Quetzals (Q90 military officers who were part of military million, more than $11 million). This scandal intelligence organs that carried out wide-scale helped force the resignation of Byron human rights abuses. Guatemalan media, the Barrientos as interior minister (Ministro de largest of which are owned by prominent mem- Gobernación) at the end of November. bers of the business elite, have carried out a In one sense, of course, these allegations relentless campaign to publicize allegations of don’t represent anything new in Guatemalan corruption against the government and to politics. During the long internal conflict and denounce the fiscal reforms. long after the return to civilian rule, clandes- After two years of the FRG-Portillo govern- tine military intelligence structures carried out ment, the political panorama is one of continu- assassinations of individuals perceived to be ing scandal, ongoing infighting within the cab- threats to “national security” or “national sta- inet and between the executive and legislature, bility”, and hindered investigations by intimi- and mounting mobilization by sectors margin- dating witnesses and judges. This continued alized or excluded from formal power. And in well into the Arzú administration.9 Previous this context, there is rampant speculation over administrations have also been plagued by cor- which groups or individuals really are making ruption scandals and charges of political decisions. favoritism. Perhaps the most significant difference about THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF the corruption allegations against the current FUERZAS OCULTAS administration is that the most vociferous crit- Elsewhere in this report we describe allegations ics are representatives of the private sector and by Guatemalan human rights activists about the Guatemalan media closely allied with the pri- existence of a clandestine network that origi- vate sector. During the Arzú administration the nates in military intelligence structures and governing PAN party was closely identified operates throughout the justice system and pub- with the private sector, and the major media lic security forces to protect powerful individu- did little to publicize, investigate or denounce 8 Who Governs? alleged corruption. The FRG government now Alvarado MacDonald is one of the richest in power has few ties to the organized private men in Guatemala, and controls at least 100 sector and has actively pushed a package of new companies ranging from banks to sugar produc- taxes and fiscal reforms that are bitterly ers to milk to the Mercedes Benz franchise. He opposed by CACIF, the powerful lobbying arm was an important financial supporter and advi- of the private sector. sor to presidents Vinicio Cerezo and Jorge In addition to the private sector critics, a Serrano, and in 1996 supported the losing cam- number of ex-military officials associated with paign of Alfonso Portillo. Alvarado MacDonald the “institutionalist” faction within the armed provided financial support and employment to forces, have exposed and denounced the alleged Portillo after his defeat, and again was a major political influence of other ex-military officers contributor to Portillo’s successful second cam- connected to military intelligence that were paign in 1999. After Portillo’s victory, Alvarado part of a hard-line group that opposed the MacDonald was the guarantor for Portillo on a democratization process. Many of these critics house the new President rented for $5,000 per have close personal and career ties to Otto Pérez month, and loaned him a Mercedes Benz.11 Molina, a leader of the institutionalist faction His support did not go unrewarded. Portillo who was forced into retirement by Portillo’s appointed his eldest son to a management posi- leadership changes in January 2000. While this tion in the President’s office where he played a gives rise to suspicions that the charges reflect highly visible role arranging meetings and rep- an effort to settle old scores, it is notable that resenting the executive branch. His younger son Pérez Molina’s son, daughter and wife were tar- was put in charge of the Secretaría de Asuntos gets of armed attackers in separate (and Particulares in the Presidency. Both remained unsolved) incidents in 2000 and 2001. The actively involved in running Alvarado children and their families subsequently left MacDonald’s banks, and were forced to resign the country. their government positions when the banks Viewed from one perspective, then, the scope failed. At least eight government agencies had and public attention devoted to charges of cor- deposits in the failed banks amounting to Q470 ruption and favoritism by the current govern- million (nearly $60 million), of which at least ment simply reflects the fact that the two most Q176 million were in interest-free accounts. In powerful institutions in Guatemalan addition, state agencies provided Q434 million society–the private sector and the armed in credit to the banks. When auditors discov- forces–have lost influence and their traditional ered the extent of problem loans at the banks,12 access to state power. Conflicts that were for- the Guatemalan central bank (Banguat) provid- merly resolved through elite negotiations ed Q1.2 billion more to restore liquidity. behind closed doors are now being fought in While details about Alvarado MacDonald’s public and through social mobilization. influence became the subject of press scrutiny as That does not mean, however, that there is a result of the bank failures, much less is known no substance to the allegations. One of those about the influence of Jacobo Salán Sánchez, a alleged to have behind-the-scenes influence on cashiered army colonel who headed Portillo’s government decisions is Francisco Alvarado personal security detail from 1996 until 2001, MacDonald, a banker and close friend of presi- and ex-General Luis Francisco Ortega Menaldo, dent Portillo. During 2001, details about a former head of the EMP with extensive con- Alvarado MacDonald’s influence became public nections in military intelligence. Both are ex- with the collapse of two of his banks and a army officers who were cashiered in 1996 lending company, Banco Metropolitano because of their alleged involvement with a (Bancomet), Banco Promotor (Promobanco) and criminal gang engaged in widespread contra- Financiera Metropolitana (Fimesa).10 band (see below), and both had lengthy careers Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 9 in military intelligence and the EMP. After It is impossible to answer that question with being forced out, Salán Sánchez became the any degree of certainty, but an ongoing crimi- head of a personal security detail for Portillo. nal investigation that dates back to the early When Portillo became President, he became the days of the Arzú administration has produced de facto head of the EMP. The U.S. pressed damning testimony about extensive and strongly for his removal because of allegations lengthy ties between organized crime elements, that he has ties to drug traffickers, and Portillo military officers who directed military intelli- eventually gave him a less prominent position. gence organs in the nineteen-eighties and It is unclear, however, whether his influence has nineties, and the top political leaders of the diminished with his title. current government–including president Ortega Menaldo has not held any govern- Portillo and Congress president Rios Montt. ment position since Portillo was elected. During the Romeo Lucas government in the The Grupo Salvavidas. In September 1996, late nineteen-seventies and early eigties, he Guatemalan police announced that they had worked in military intelligence out of an office broken up a criminal gang that was allegedly in the Public Finance agency (the agency that stealing as much as 30 percent of the duties collected revenues). Ortega Menaldo became collected by the country’s customs apparatus. sub-director of military intelligence (D-2) in They arrested the alleged head of the gang, a little-known customs official by the name of 1986, and director from 1987 to 1990. Salán Alfredo Moreno Molina. In his house they dis- Sánchez served under him as chief of the coun- covered documents identifying the names of terintelligence section of D-2. From 1991 to many government officials allegedly involved 1993, Ortega Menaldo was head of the EMP, in the gang’s operations. Among these were and allegedly supported the attempted coup by other customs officials and high-ranking police president Serrano. and military officers, including the Vice- Much of the public speculation about Ortega Minister of Defense. Menaldo’s influence with Portillo is based on On the basis of the information obtained dur- his past connections to many top officials ing Moreno’s arrest, eighteen officials of the mil- appointed by Portillo. For example, the newly itary, police, Guardia de Hacienda and Customs appointed Minister of Defense, Álvaro Méndez were fired. In addition to the vice-minister of Estrada, was third in command of the EMP defense (General César Augusto García when Ortega Menaldo was its chief. Former González), the army officers who were removed interior minister Byron Barrientos, Deputy included General Ortega Menaldo and Colonel Director of the PNC Elmer Aguilar Moreno, Salán Sánchez, along with two other colonels, a and former head of Migración Luis Mendizábal, lieutenant colonel, two majors and a navy cap- were all cashiered from the army after partici- tain.13 pating in an attempted coup against the first One of those swept up by the investigation civilian government of Vinicio Cerezo in 1989, was a little-known former customs official, and all are alleged to have ties to Salán Sánchez Francisco Javier Ortiz Arriaga, who had acted and Ortega Menaldo. as a key aide to Moreno and handled many pay- While there is plenty of circumstantial evi- ments to others involved in the network. He dence of the influence Salán Sánchez and agreed to cooperate with the investigators, and Ortega Menaldo have with the Portillo admin- over the next two years provided extensive istration, what is more difficult to fathom are details on how the ring was structured and on the origins and precise nature of their influ- its operations. His testimony has not yet been ence. Is it simply influence based on reciprocal made public, and it is not clear when, if ever, it favors, or is there a more sinister and organic will be formally presented. Five years after relationship involved? Moreno’s arrest the case has still not come to 10 Who Governs? trial. In mid-2001, the court agreed that is no question that Ortiz was high up in the Moreno could be freed on bail by posting Q1 Moreno operation, and that he provided very million. He was released from jail on December detailed information about specific payoffs, 11, 2001. events and activities that can be independently According to Ortiz, the Grupo Salvavidas, as verified, some of the most politically sensitive the gang called itself, had an extensive net- allegations are harder to confirm. work within the military and customs appara- It is not at all uncommon for criminals seek- tus.14 Among those alleged to be part of the ing to make a deal with the prosecution to try military network by Ortiz was retired General to improve their bargaining position by impli- Manuel Antonio Callejas y Callejas, who cating public figures or others they believe the directed the army’s section of intelligence (G- prosecutors may be more interested in convict- 2) from 1980 to 1982 and served as chief of ing than themselves. At the time the deposi- staff of the armed forces from 1987 to 1989. tion was given (May 1999) a national election In 1990 and 1991, Callejas y Callejas was campaign was underway and polls suggested Director General of Customs. Ortega Menaldo that Portillo and the FRG had a substantial worked for Callejas y Callejas when the latter lead. Ortiz may have believed that prosecutors headed military intelligence, which in the appointed by a PAN government would reward early nineteen-eighties worked out of offices him for damaging testimony against their on the eighth floor of the Ministry of Public opponents. Finances. According to Ortiz, in 1981 and For this reason, we caution against any quick 1982 Moreno headed the illegal operations in acceptance of Ortiz’ allegations about the customs and reported to Ortega Menaldo at involvement of Portillo and Rios Montt. We do the ministry. 15Ortiz says that he was told in know that at least one other witness in the 1981 that the gang also controlled illegal Moreno case also implicated Portillo as being operations in the Treasury Police (Guardia de involved with the gang, but with much less Hacienda), Public Ministry, Comptroller detail and without asserting that he had a lead- General’s office (Contraloría General de Cuentas) ership role.17 It is also a matter of public record and other state agencies. that Portillo knew and was friendly with While many of the names identified by Ortiz Moreno.18 as alleged members of the military network There is even less supportive evidence linking have been included in press speculation about Ríos Montt to the gang. Two civilians that the Moreno case from the beginning,16 his far Ortiz identified as part of the leadership of the more dramatic allegations involve the supposed gang have recently been involved with the scan- involvement of prominent civilians. In particu- dals surrounding the current Congress: Mario lar, he claimed that both Portillo and Ríos Augusto Morales Mazarriegos and Ramón de Montt were members of the gang. According to Jesús Sáenz . In 2000, Morales presented a writ Ortiz, Portillo was deeply involved with the of amparo in defense of the FRG and the Third gang. Every two weeks he allegedly received Vice-President of Congress in the case of the law Q50,000 from the customs at Valle Nuevo and on alcoholic beverages. Jesús Sáenz was appoint- Q20,000 from the customs at Pedro de ed by the Ministerio Público to investigate Alvarado. The Q50,000 was for the FRG and alleged alterations to the law on alcoholic bever- the remaining Q20,000 for Portillo. He also ages, and in April of 2001 he asked the court allegedly acted as a “control” over another par- not to bring charges against Ríos Montt in con- ticipant in the criminal network. nection with the supposed alteration.

Character assassination or criminal conspiracy? A familiar pattern. There is historical prece- The allegations made in Ortiz’ deposition can- dent for the merging of clandestine counterin- not be taken simply at face value. While there surgent structures that developed during the Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 11 internal conflict with organized criminal extensive networks in a political context of gangs. After the peace accords were signed in weak public institutions and weak civic actors. El Salvador in 1992, there was a dramatic There is a kind of vicious circle in which weak increase in common and organized crime that institutions create opportunities for the spread overwhelmed Salvadoran law enforcement of corrupt networks, which in turn seek to fur- institutions. There were also a series of ther weaken institutional capacity to combat killings and acts of intimidation of witnesses corruption. and judges that could have been politically motivated and that were potentially destabi- THE WEAKENING OF TRADITIONAL lizing. POWER-BROKERS Part of the reason for the increase in crime in After the 1954 CIA-sponsored overthrow of El Salvador was the dismantling of the old Jacobo Arbenz, state power and policies in repressive apparatus, the fragility of nascent Guatemala were largely dominated by two politi- democratic institutions, a weak economy that cal actors—the armed forces and the organized could not provide jobs, and the abundant sur- private sector. For most of that period formal plus of weapons and people who knew how to political power was exercised by military officers use them. What was harder to account for in or their surrogates, but government economic purely non-political terms, however, was the policies, if not always designed by the private sec- political past of some victims and evidence that tor, were heavily influenced by its interest groups. some perpetrators of crimes had been part of When conflicts developed within or between the clandestine paramilitary structures during the two institutions, these were resolved through elite internal conflict. The United Nations estab- negotiations behind closed doors. lished a special unit to investigate a number of The transition to civilian elected govern- such cases, and that unit concluded that there ments in 1985 changed the formal rules of the had been a metamorphosis of some death squad game, but did not immediately alter the de networks into organized criminal activity.19 facto exercise of power by the military and pri- A similar phenomenon seems to be taking vate sector. During the peace negotiations, place in Guatemala, but it seems to have pene- however, the strategic interests of the two trated much more thoroughly and at much institutions began to diverge in certain crucial higher levels. The relative weakness of political respects and the final peace accords contained parties in Guatemala and the failure to purge provisions which each of them found distaste- the old security apparatus would make it easier ful and threatening. While each of them has for organized criminal gangs rooted in clandes- tried to prevent implementation of the provi- tine counterinsurgency structures to maintain sions they find most troublesome, their efforts and extend their political influence in the post- have sometimes worked at cross-purposes and conflict period. While the primary motivation the accords created opportunities for other of these groups may be personal gain, they have actors (often backed by international pressure) a vested interest in maintaining impunity and to erode the historical political dominance of preventing the development of more effective both. law enforcement and judicial institutions, both Fifteen years after the formal transition from to protect their members (some of whom were military to civilian rule in Guatemala, the implicated in human rights violations during political power of the Guatemalan military as the conflict) and to ensure their continuing an institution seems to be declining, even as it ability to operate freely. continues to resist the diminished role and What is most worrisome about this pattern resources projected for it by the peace accords. is that it is difficult to develop effective strate- The political influence of the military began to gies to expose and eradicate such organized and decline during the Arzú administration. The 12 Who Governs? current government has exercised strong con- from a counterinsurgency force to a democrat- trol over military appointments and promo- ic army. It confirmed the subordination of tions, even as it has restored much of the bud- military to civilian authority, removed internal getary reductions made under Arzú. security from the Army’s mission, mandated a While the political clout of the organized new police force under civilian direction, and private sector has not declined as significantly required a one-third reduction in troop as that of the military, with the triumph of the strength and demobilization of hundreds of FRG in 1999 the private sector has found itself thousands of civil defense patrollers (PACs) both excluded from formal power and unable to drafted into part time service by the military. shape policies behind closed doors to the same The military budget was to be reduced by extent as it did during the years of military 33% (as a proportion of GDP) from 1995 lev- rule. One consequence is that many of the con- els by 2000. The accord also required the pres- flicts that were formerly resolved through elite ident to replace the EMP with two civilian negotiations behind closed doors are now being intelligence agencies, one organized in the fought in public, in the media and, recently, ministry of Gobernación to combat organized through social mobilization. crime, the other, the SAE, to function directly

20 under the presidency. The Military. In an earlier HI report, we Balconi had been directly involved in the described in detail how the transition from negotiations, and his appointment seemed to military dictatorship to elected civilian govern- ensure that the accords would be implement- ment was a carefully managed process from ed. Instead, the military became caught up in 1985 through 1995, with the armed forces a series of intrigues that pitted the institution- playing a central role.21 Arzú began to exercise greater independence and even some degree of alist faction against sectors allied with the control over the military. He initially refused to EMP and military intelligence, as well as ex- take up residence in the presidential palace in military officers involved in organized crime. an obvious effort to lessen the influence of the Arzú seemed more interested in asserting his EMP. Then Arzú quickly ordered sweeping personal control over the military than in changes in the military high command, offi- ensuring the implementation of the accord, cially justified as necessary to relieve the gener- and in July 1997, he replaced Balconi and ational bottleneck. These changes, in January Camargo with Gen. Hector Barrios Celada as 1996, seemed to strengthen an “institutional- defense minister and EMP head Espinosa as ist” faction of the army, including new defense chief of staff. Espinosa’s brother-in-law became minister Julio Balconi Turcios and chief of the the new head of the EMP. Espinosa was later general staff Sergio Camargo Muralles. promoted to defense minister. Military recon- By contrast, those consigned to limbo version stalled. (“disponibilidad”) included seven more hard- Portillo initiated a new wave of turmoil in line generals led by the outgoing chief of staff, the armed forces with his declaration that he Gen. Carlos Enrique Pineda Carranza.22 The would abolish the EMP, and the appointment nomination of air force Gen. Marco Tulio of Marroquín to head its replacement and of Espinosa as new EMP head appeared, at the progressive Edgar Gutiérrez to head the SAE. time, to signal a downgrading of that body, as When he named Col. Juan de Dios Estrada air force officers traditionally have little influ- Velásquez as defense minister he forced the ence over Guatemala’s ground-based army retirement of thirteen generals! structure. Throughout the first half of his presidency, The section of the 1996 accords on Portillo continued to make abrupt changes in strengthening of civilian power provided a military leadership. As mentioned, he removed blueprint for re-conversion of the military chief of staff Ruíz Morales in favor of Arévalo Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 13

Lacs, and also replaced most of the leadership of 1999. Although the approved military budget military intelligence. Arévalo Lacs later for 2001 was Q837 million, through a variety replaced Estrada Velásquez as defense minister of transfers actual military spending was closer (after a disastrous performance by the latter in to Q1.14 billion, amounting to about 0.8% of an official visit to Washington), and Álvaro GDP. Projections of revenue shortfalls for 2002 Leonel Méndez Estrada became the new chief of led the FRG block in congress to pledge to staff. At the end of November 2001, Arévalo reduce Portillo’s proposed 2002 budget by 8%, Lacs resigned and was named as the new minis- but the FRG leadership said that education and ter of Gobernación, while Méndez Estrada defense budgets would be protected from cuts. moved up to become defense minister. Based on congressional committee actions, the One effect of all these changes was to turn the approved military budget for 2002 will be military inward and away from any focus on try- about Q1.1 billion. ing to manage larger institutional processes of The current situation, then, is one in which democratic reform and consolidation. For most the military continues to have very significant officers, survival in career terms became the institutional resources, but no longer seems to chief preoccupation. At the same time, the mili- be controlling or directing political decision- tary became a fertile playing field for external making by civilian government as it did from actors seeking to use the institution to advance 1985 through 1995. their own interests. Since the new government The declining institutional influence of the took over, for example, Ríos Montt’s son has military as a political actor does not mean, twice been promoted over more senior offi- however, that civilian political institutions have cers—first, he was put in charge of the army’s become much stronger. There is no clear or finances, and later promoted to command of a coherent agreement among civilian government brigade. And the new defense minister, Álvaro officials about what role the armed forces Méndez Estrada (a protégée of Ortega Menaldo), should play. Instead, there is resort to employ- has had an even more dramatic rise. ing the armed forces on an ad hoc basis to assist Méndez Estrada, as chief of staff, tried to with critical tasks that civilian institutions are counteract the sense of drift and defensiveness incapable of performing. And there is ongoing in the officer corps by proposing a new five- jockeying and competition among ex-military year plan for the “modernization and profes- officers, politicians and even criminal elements sionalization” of the armed forces that reaffirms (these are not mutually exclusive categories) to the military’s traditional role in internal securi- curry favor with, and exercise influence over, ty, in contradiction of the peace accords, and different factions within the armed forces. projects an active role for the military in While some civil society actors, focusing on national development and protection of the the continuing political influence of clandes- environment. While it is not clear how much tine networks with ties to military intelligence, support he enjoys within the military, during deny that the institutional political power of 2001 the role of the army in police functions the military has declined, others fear that the and other activities not contemplated by the abrupt disruptions to the chain of command peace accords (e.g., transporting fertilizer to and institutional integrity of the armed forces farmers) increased significantly. pose significant dangers to the democratization What is clear is that the reductions in the process. For the past two years, Bernardo military budget that occurred during the Arzú Arévalo de León of the Facultad Latinoamericana administration, as called for by the accord, have de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO) has facilitated a been reversed under the current government. process of dialogue between key civil society From 0.99% of GDP in 1995, military spend- actors, ex-military officers, and government ing steadily declined to reach 0.68% of GDP in officials including active-duty military officers, 14 Who Governs? aimed at developing a consensus about the a municipal property tax; restore lands usurped future role of the armed forces.23 The process is from peasants or compensate them; promote ongoing, and has produced several framework rural development with a Q300 million annual documents of agreement. fund; create a Lands Trust Fund for financing land purchasing; and promote legal changes to The private sector: from inside to out- enforce labor laws.26 side. The Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Despite agreeing to the socio-economic Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras accord, CACIF spent most of the remainder of (CACIF), founded in 1957, is the peak organi- the Arzú administration resisting, by and zation of Guatemalan business. Business elites large successfully, implementation of several of have generally not participated in party poli- its key components. It was particularly tics; rather they have operated through CACIF, opposed to the fiscal and tax reforms. Unlike or at crucial times through ad hoc committees his predecessor, interim president (following of the most powerful enterprises. If they have Serrano’s coup attempt) Ramiro de León not always been able to get exactly the policies Carpio, in whose cabinet CACIF was not they want, they have been able to veto the ones directly represented, Arzú had appointed sev- they don’t want, particularly increases in taxes. eral prominent younger private sector repre- CACIF steadfastly opposed increases in tax sentatives to high positions. These included rates and wholly or partially thwarted four economist Richard Aitkenhead, ASIES head major attempts since the mid-1980s to raise Raquel Zelata, and businessman Peter the national tax quotient. J. Fernando Valdez Lamport (who had headed a CACIF peace and Mayra Palencia have recounted this long commission). As pressure from the interna- history of tax resistance in a penetrating analy- sis. Comparing lobby groups in the U.S. to tional community to carry through with the Guatemala, the authors find in Guatemala a agreements mounted, Lamport was transferred highly concentrated interest group in fiscal pol- from his position as Ambassador to the United icy that has amounted to an informal system of States to become Minister of the Economy, co-government.24 It also staunchly opposed where he successfully re-negotiated target measures that might attack poverty through a dates for implementation (see below). direct redistribution of wealth, and has been The triumph of the FRG in the 1999 elec- powerful enough to keep land reform off the tions led to a dramatic change in CACIF’s agenda. CACIF’s effectiveness has held through access to power. The FRG did not have strong military dictatorships and civilian govern- ties to traditional private sector power-brokers, ments.25 which had strongly backed the PAN in the During the peace negotiations CACIF was elections, although it did have some business invited to join the Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil support from sectors not represented by CACIF. (ASC) a coalition of civil society organizations Ríos Montt also believed that CACIF had sup- that was making proposals to shape the accords, ported the constitutional provision that pre- but it declined. In contrast to the ASC, CACIF vented him from running for President. During has been a tight-knit, well-organized and the campaign and after taking power, the FRG extremely powerful organization with a capaci- promised to eliminate the special privileges of ty for rapid political maneuver. CACIF focused the traditional economic elite. its attention during the peace negotiations on CACIF’s initial response was to revert to its the socio-economic themes in the accords. The traditional strategy of demanding that the accord committed the government to: raise the government adopt policies designed by health and education budget and tax revenue CACIF, but it found itself isolated when the by 50% (relative to GDP) by the year 2000 international community (in particular, the with a globally progressive tax system and with International Financial Institutions or IFIs) Guatemala’s Hydra-Headed Government 15 sided with the government. It grudgingly and wealthy individuals were of little concern to agreed to participate in UN-mediated negotia- most Guatemalans, CACIF began a massive tions with other social sectors that led, in the campaign focusing on the increase in the VAT, a May 2000, to consensus on a Fiscal Pact. sales tax increase that affected most citizens. While the pact was hailed as a breakthrough CACIF, trade unions from the center and the by international donors (see section on social left (Unión General de Trabajadores, or UGT; and and economic exclusion), key signatories Central General del Trabajadores de Guatemala,or including CACIF dragged their feet on agree- CGTG), and students, (Asociación de Estudiantes ing to detailed measures to implement the Universitarios, or AEU) mounted a demonstra- broad agreements. tion of some 20,000 protestors in early August, When the government, under international and a few days later CACIF led a national strike pressure and threatened by a fiscal crisis, sud- that effectively shut down almost all businesses. denly raised the value-added tax (VAT) and In some respects it was quite a cynical move, other taxes and threatened strong enforcement since businesses were not directly affected by measures in mid-2001, CACIF denounced the the VAT increase—they can pass along the new measures and tried to resurrect the strategy increase to customers. Protestors called for a it had employed in 1998 to renegotiate target rollback of the VAT, transparency in govern- dates rather than negotiate reforms. Two top ment spending, an end to government corrup- leaders of CACIF traveled to Washington to tion, and a national dialogue. They demanded enlist the Bush administration’s support and to that the government return to negotiations convince the IFIs to be flexible. Much to their within the framework of the fiscal pact, where surprise, they found the U.S. solidly behind the CACIF and its allies could prevent agreements measures and a unified position among the with which they disagreed. international donors insisting on implementa- Despite the successful flexing of muscles by tion. the unlikely alliance, the government refused to The failure of its traditional strategy of elite roll back the tax reforms. CACIF has continued negotiations led the private sector toward a to pursue a strategy of multi-sectoral alliances, strategy of coalition and confrontation. CACIF and through the fall of 2001 joined with repre- shifted its longstanding, unilateral approach sentatives from labor and other civil society orga- and began to build alliances with traditional nizations to demand a “national dialogue” with adversaries who were also opposed to specific the government. It has continued to demand a components of the fiscal reforms. Recognizing freeze on further implementation of tax reforms that the criminalization of tax evasion and the as a pre-condition for such a dialogue (see targeted taxes that most concerned big business Conclusion). CIVIC ACTORS

ecades of counterinsurgency war deci- In the early years of the transition from mili- mated organized civil society and tary dictatorship to elected civilian govern- Dweakened government institutions. ments, the main protagonists tended to be The impact of this is still being felt as new civil grassroots human rights organizations (mostly society organizations (CSOs) struggle to push representing relatives of the disappeared) that forward the main goals of the peace accords: an had emerged during the nineteen-eighties, end to repression, strengthened democracy, and along with new labor and peasant organizations. greater possibilities for socioeconomic develop- Indigenous organizations emerged, as did the ment. There is widespread disenchantment in widespread use of the term Maya to denote the civil society with the slow progress in advanc- contemporary indigenous population. The first ing these goals, but CSOs are having difficulty women’s organizations also demanded their developing a clear strategy to move the process place in the public sphere. In contrast with the forward. Many activists doubt whether it is highly organized and mobilized grassroots possible to recover the lost momentum in the movement of the late 1970s, civil society dur- peace process. Others question whether this is ing the transitional period from 1985 to 1996 even worth attempting, as government and was fragmented into sectors, with each sector other powerful actors appear to have moved on developing expertise and advocacy around spe- to different agendas. cific issues. By emphasizing conflict resolution Although veteran civic actors remain in the and negotiation rather than protest and mobi- national arena, there has been a proliferation of lization, civil society made former “popular” new civic actors with different expectations and organizations acceptable and non-threatening to different strategies. Strategies and tactics that the military, the oligarchy, and the government, once forced government decision-makers to which were each engaged in their own transi- compromise often no longer produce the desired tions. This process opened political space in the results. In addition, hierarchical, top-down context of lingering terror. decision-making practices within CSOs that Many of these organizations became social once were accepted as necessary in the context of interlocutors in the early phases of the peace counterinsurgency war, now generate resent- process and eventually came together in the ment and foster fragmentation. The agenda-set- Civil Society Assembly (Asamblea de la Sociedad ting process for Guatemalan CSOs is further Civil, or ASC), along with research institutes, complicated by the diverse priorities and work- journalists, religious representatives and politi- styles of international development agencies and cal parties. The ASC was politically something other international donors whose financial sup- of a hybrid, in that it brought together inde- port is critical for organizational survival. pendent civil society organizations and others that were organically linked to the URNG. The war’s impact on civil society. The protago- While this led to frequent disputes over the nists of the social movements of the 1970s were substance of proposals, the ASC played an peasant organizations with majority indigenous important role in channeling civil society con- membership, labor unions, government cerns and interests into the negotiating process. employees, university and secondary school stu- dents, Catholic grassroots activists and other Demands placed on civil society by the peace “popular” actors. For the most part, selective accords. Both in spirit and letter, the peace repression and military counterinsurgency cam- accords promote civil society participation in paigns destroyed this movement in the late implementing the agreements. The accords 1970s and early 1980s. called for establishment of over a dozen commis- Civic Actors 17 sions, each including civil society organizations, European development NGOs, supported pro- to make concrete proposals for implementation. grams for developing the technical capacity of These included commissions on strengthening CSOs, while shying away from the political the judiciary, fiscal reform, resettlement of aspects of civil society activism. But the multi- groups uprooted in the war, education reform, plicity of international actors and their varying women, and indigenous issues. There were eight agendas mirrored and contributed to the orga- separate commissions on indigenous issues, nizational complexity and lack of cohesion including: making indigenous languages official; among civil society actors. Moreover, despite sacred sites; education reform and cultural diver- the influx of aid, resources have been scarce, sity; participation and legal reform; indigenous spurring competition among civil society rights and access to land; women; constitutional groups and among individual leaders. reform; and customary law. This has required CSOs to play unfamiliar Unrealistic expectations lead to mutual disen- roles in new scenarios for which they were tech- chantment. Much of the initial enthusiasm nically and politically ill-prepared, and that surrounding the peace accords wore down dur- required strategies for which there were no clear ing the first couple of years of misunderstand- blueprints. They had to decide who would par- ings, learning processes, and funding delays. ticipate in the commissions, find resources to This was accelerated by government decision- making processes that took advantage of the support their participation, develop specialized fragmentation and often left civil society actors expertise on the range of issues covered by the out in the cold, ignoring their proposals or accords, and much more. For example, although overriding them, perhaps after giving them a the Historical Clarification Commission did not polite audience. directly include civil society groups, its work To take but one example, a representative necessarily involved exhaustive efforts by spectrum of women’s organizations was orga- human rights groups that had long recorded nized to design the Foro Nacional de la Mujer, human rights abuses. Similar challenges were called for in the accords. Rather than operate posed by the Electoral Reform Commission on the basis of proposals coming out of this (which was composed of political party repre- process, however, the government unilaterally sentatives and officials from the Supreme named Aracely Conde de Paiz, a politician with Electoral Tribunal, or TSE), and by the per- no ties to the women’s movement, to direct the ceived need by some CSOs to advocate police Foro. This dampened enthusiasm and created an and judicial reforms, as well as reform of the adversarial relationship. military in a democracy. Through active organizing efforts, the Sector The scope and complexity of the demands de Mujeres soon became the most representative placed on CSOs by the accords reinforced spe- and active civil society actor in the Foro, but its cialization and fragmentation. Mayan cultural work was often hampered by a lack of funding. issues and demands were separated from While the Sector was expected to speak for a campesino and land issues, and those from constituency, the resources for travel, work- women’s issues. In responding to demands for shops and organizing throughout the country specialized expertise, CSOs have had little time were not forthcoming. By the time these issues to devote to the “broader picture.” were ironed out, sufficient resources were avail- These tendencies have also been reinforced able and lessons learned from early efforts were by the funding priorities of international assimilated, many of the constituent groups donors, who recognized that CSOs needed new were caught up in the 1999 election campaign resources in order to meet the challenges posed and never fully returned to peace process work. by the accords. Donors like USAID, UNDP, Many CSOs perceived a double agenda in the IDB, the European Union (EU), and numerous PAN government. They saw the PAN paying 18 Who Governs? lip service to the accords, but in practice saw say when given a seat. Moreover, the prolifera- the Arzú government promoting pro-business tion and fragmentation of civil society organi- economic policies and downsizing government zations placed ever-expanding demands for in ways that went against the spirit and the let- resources on a government structure with ter of the accords. exceedingly limited capacity. In the view of The disenchantment has deepened under the government actors, CSOs of dubious represen- current government. The Portillo-FRG govern- tative character and weak institutional capacity ment never picked up on negotiations where hardly seemed ideal counterparts. the Arzú administration left off, and basically They had a point. Many of the new CSOs discontinued peace-process related dialogue. have been successful at institution building and During the protests against proposed tax fundraising, but less so at developing long term increases in mid-2001, the government ignored strategies and concrete policy proposals. In a UN call for a national dialogue, in part response to donor pressure, many today are because it did not believe the CSOs could legally registered entities, with a formal hierar- mobilize a constituency. chical structure that has little or no account- Congress has also been unwilling to engage ability beyond reporting to donors.27 in consultation and dialogue with civil society. Institutional directors —like political lead- When legislators finally produced an electoral ers— do not tend to move on voluntarily, nor reform bill in mid-2001, they did not consult do the mechanisms exist for change. Yet these relevant CSOs. CSO suggestions to the elec- organizations develop policy proposals and toral reform commission were ignored by the negotiate with government in the name of FRG-dominated Congress, which had also broad social sectors that, for the most part, have alienated the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. not been consulted or even informed. The disenchantment is not one-sided. Many CSOs were born with ties to the Government actors saw civil society demanding URNG and received much of their political a place at the table while often having little to analysis and decision-making from party cadre.

WOMEN ON THE MOVE

Women’s rights and issues have come a long way. Women’s on to national and international prominence. But the groups, mostly based in Guatemala City, have regional, Mayan female human rights activists were often at odds continental and international links. These have born fruit with women’s groups, as neither actively supported the in increasingly professional staff and activism. other’s issues. Many groups trace their origins to the late 1980s, when first The 1990s found more women in high-level government lady Raquel Blandón de Cerezo was an ardent advocate. She positions and elected to office than ever before. A daily San founded Fundación Guatemala, a group that promotes partici- Carlos University radio program, Voces de Mujeres on the San pation and education of women. Activists exiled in Costa Carlos University radio discusses health, politics, arts, and Rica, Nicaragua, Mexico and the United States were exposed culture. La Cuerda, a monthly feminist publication, has to women’s issues, and they began, in the context of a new been running for five years. It is inserted into the large cir- civilian government, to return to Guatemala and formed culation daily el Periódico. Asociación Mujer Vamos Adelante, Tierra Viva and Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres (GGM), both has a project called “The role of rural women in the consol- core groups in the women’s movement. Women in labor idation of democracy” (Norwegian and IDB funds), and unions began to organize their own chapters. another on violence against women (USAID support). Mayan female leadership also emerged from the violence, as While none of the urban-based women’s groups have a widows like Rosalina Tuyuc, or young survivors like grassroots base, it is increasingly possible to speak of a con- Rigoberta Menchú, acquired political experience and went stituency. Women’s issues, groups, and projects have Civic Actors 19

The URNG, for its part, hitched its political and indigenous organizations that were set up wagon to the peace accords and so has been by URNG organizations to concentrate and thoroughly absorbed by implementation-relat- strengthen their influence during the peace ed activities. It has little to show for its efforts, process. While both continue to exist on paper, and did not have the organizational resources to and have seats on the directorate of the larger simultaneously build an effective political party Mayan umbrella group COPMAGUA, in prac- and maintain strong working relations with tice many member groups are not active, have most CSOs. As a result, CSOs have become broken ties with the URNG, and their leaders increasingly independent — a positive develop- have gone on to other activities. ment perhaps but one also contributing to the Fragmentation led to a pattern of short-lived fragmentation. Key party cadre formerly dedi- alliances and little grassroots work. Indigenous cated to the movement have jumped into the issues are left to Mayan organizations, and political arena and are now mayors, congress- women must move their agenda on their own. men or government officials,28 or they simply But both sectors feel strongly that their issues left the party. This is particularly true at the should be taken on by society as a whole. The local level, where activists became involved in problem, as many activists see it, is that the community development issues about which sum of sector demands does not necessarily add the URNG has had little to say. up to a more inclusive, egalitarian and democ- Today, many civil society organizations sur- ratic society. At the same time, in their view, vive in name only, with a skeleton crew and fragmentation means that few, if any, of the sec- seats at some negotiating tables, and continued toral demands are met. funding from an international donor or URNG sponsorship. For example, the Instancia de Where is civil society headed? Despite these Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM) and the problems, civil society organizations remain Unidad del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala important vehicles for advancing and deepen- (UPMAG) are two umbrella groups for peasant ing popular participation in Guatemala’s fragile become widespread, and umbrella groups like the Sector de Recently, young and often university-educated Mayan Mujeres have educated, trained, and organized women women formed Kaqla, a group that debates cultural and throughout the country. Activists developed a loose, gender issues. Kaqla has provided a safe haven for intellec- nationwide network of women’s groups that in some cases tual, activist women in a male-dominated Mayan move- was built up from the community level and had multieth- ment, which still emphasizes the role of women in the home nic representation. and in the preservation of indigenous language and culture. Huehuetenango is a multiethnic, mountainous department Women’s groups have become increasingly adept at advo- in the western highlands. The Foro de la Mujer chapter cating, in unified fashion, a public policy agenda around there was painstakingly built throughout the department, issues of health, intra-family violence, education, and polit- ical participation. As a result of effective lobbying and in some instances along ethnic lines, and drawing on alliances with women politicians across the political spec- Mayan women who had acquired organizing experience in trum, there is now legislation providing services to women refugee camps in Mexico. The chapter organized work- and protecting women in cases of domestic and other forms shops, networked, and members traveled regularly to of gender-based violence. Another gain came when Portillo Guatemala City for additional training, all activities for- set up the governmental Secretaría de la Mujer to follow merly unheard of. While the chapter has been weakened by through on international commitments pertaining to strains between indigenous and ladino women, the loss of women. While the Secretaría fell short of the demand for an energy in the national Foro de la Mujer, and decreases in independent, government-funded institute, its head, Lily funding, the experience has changed the lives of innumer- Caravantes, has considerable experience and close ties to able women, even in very remote communities. many women activists. 20 Who Governs? democratic institutions. For example, CSOs are These successful efforts have not, however, playing a crucial role in strengthening partici- overcome the growing doubts among many pation in electoral processes and fostering an civil society actors about the basic strategy of understanding of democratic culture, tasks that specialization and policy advocacy. Frustrated political parties are failing to address. In the by government intransigence, some civic actors 1999 electoral campaign, numerous non-party question the concept of civil society. Activists activists worked to promote women’s registra- grapple with the implications of “leaving tion, to get out the vote, and to organize behind” the people and popular movement organiza- debates to get candidates to commit to specific tions in exchange for civil society and civil society issues. Sí vamos por la paz (sponsored by a organizations. Terms such as social movements are Canadian agency) Kuchuj — Voz Ciudadana making a comeback. Increasingly, organizations (sponsored by USAID), the Coordinación de face a tension between strategies that would ONG y Cooperativas, CONGCOOP (sponsored emphasize organizing and mobilizing a grass- by UNDP) and Acción Ciudadana (also USAID roots constituency around issues — and what to sponsored), developed overlapping and compet- have such grassroots supporters do — and nego- ing campaigns. Together they had far more tiating agendas and proposals with elites from money than the left-electoral coalition, Alianza government and other civil society organiza- Nueva Nacion (ANN), had for its campaign. tions. The environmental movement appeared in In these conditions, activists increasingly the 1980s and now has a generation of sea- speak of drawing the line between popular soned, often highly trained, and visible interests and demands, and those of the oli- activists. The emphasis has been on working to garchy, raising the specter of the more class- preserve forests and protected areas, and more conscious and conflictive recent past. During a recently on the controversial issues of economic donor-organized colloquium on strengthening development and the environment (such as oil civil society, a participant stated that “…the drilling in protected areas). elites are one of the main obstacles to democra- Many development NGOs that were impor- cy and development in the region. The elites in tant actors with wartime displaced population these countries are resistant to change. They and refugee resettlement projects have moved have acted this way throughout history, and on to focus on rural development, local govern- their conduct remains invariable.”29 ment, and citizen participation. The Foro de The divergent forces and factors shaping the ONGs forged alliances with peasant groups capacity of Guatemalan civil society to play a negotiating land issues, and is charting a grow- decisive role in pushing forward the democratic ing role in advocacy and technical support for option for the country can be seen clearly in the local development projects. They are also pio- experience of indigenous organizations over the neering efforts to integrate Mayan views. last decade. UNCHARTED PATHS FOR THE MAYAN MOVEMENT30

he Mayan Movement appeared as the ris- Electoral reforms considered in mid-2001 did ing social movement in Guatemala in not even consider the Commission’s proposals Tthe 1990s. It profile was significantly on such key issues as redrawing electoral dis- heightened by the peace accords. It developed a tricts along ethnic and linguistic lines, or belligerent agenda based on the writings of allowing civic committees to become perma- Mayan intellectuals. It staged creative actions nent, regional political forces.32 to call attention to the United Nations Decade The AIDPI Commission on Education for Indigenous Peoples (1994), and then skill- Reform does have a seat on the National fully advocated for congressional approval of Consultative Commission on Education and, in the International Labour Organization (ILO) practice, its members serve as advisors and Convention 169 on indigenous rights.31 High allies to Vice-Minister of Education and key hopes for change, and widespread energy, were Mayan intellectual, Demetrio Cojtí. Mayan palpable and had an exemplary and multiply- educators currently manage the Ministry of ing effect. Education’s bilingual education program, but Mayan organizations in the ASC fought vig- the Ministry’s political and financial support orously for the Accord on Indigenous Rights remain uncertain. Non-indigenous teachers and the numerous teacher unions covertly or overtly and Identity (AIDPI), and grew in strength and oppose bilingual education because they regard stature during the negotiations. Forming COP- it as a threat to their civil service status and MAGUA, the largest umbrella group of Mayan wage scale. Some progress has been made in organizations, was considered a crucial step for curricular reform, but political inertia and gov- Mayan unity. The peace accords recognized ernment infighting does not bode well for COPMAGUA as an official counterpart of the implementation. government in peace implementation. These The Land commission had success in getting developments made many feel that the time of the Fondo de Tierras, or Land Fund established. the Maya had finally arrived. There was much The Fund provides credit for land purchases self-sufficiency and even haughtiness. Interna- and technical assistance to landless peasants. tional donors inadvertently stimulated this by Commission delegates sit on the Fund’s board. pouring funds into often badly conceived and Nonetheless, Mayan and ladino peasant groups technically unsound projects. Few non-Mayans outside the Commission have played the more had a voice on AIDPI issues, stretching the belligerent and central role in actually organiz- divide between indigenous and ladinos, rather ing and mobilizing landless peasants. The Land than strengthening the movement through Fund’s resources are significant, but woefully alliances. small in comparison to the size of the problem Five years later, the AIDPI commissions sur- (see below). vive as official entities of the peace accords, but CNOC, the national coordinating body of they are severely diminished because Congress peasant organizations,33 gets most of the credit has shelved their proposals and the executive for successfully negotiating the Land Fund. But branch pays them little heed. The Commission the strongest member organization is no doubt on Participation’s proposed reforms to the CONIC,34 because of its extensive work at the Municipal Code have the support of president grassroots with needy peasants, regardless of eth- Portillo, for example, but it appears unlikely nicity or political affiliation, and its ability to that the FRG-dominated Congress will pass mount pressure, sometimes through land inva- them, if and when they take up the issue. sions. Over the last decade, CONIC has orga- 22 Who Governs? nized and provided legal support for peasants pable of protesting government inaction. Both who were practically attached to a large owner’s Mayan organizations and frustrated donors have land in a servile relationship. Throughout the backed off from COPMAGUA, which has prac- 1990s, owners and “their” peasants hammered tically ceased to function and has virtually lost out agreements whereby the owner/peasant its counterpart status with the government. servile relationship was severed. In Alta Verapaz, Dozens of activists formerly on its payroll are and to some extent in the Costa Cuca in either unemployed or barely surviving in other Quetzaltenango Department and other parts of organizations. None of the National Permanent the Pacific coffee-growing region, peasants got Commissions (CNPs) set up in 1996 by a mas- land instead of cash severance pay, and planta- sive COPMAGUA general assembly (and man- tion owners ceased to have the responsibility for dated to negotiate and monitor implementa- providing basic services and use-rights to farm- tion of the AIDPI) survive in practice.35 Nor do land. CONIC articulates the demand for land COPMAGUA’s regional offices, established in within the framework of Mayan rights and iden- 1998 and 1999 to develop national coverage. tity. Reports coming out of CONIC’s latest None of the other large umbrella groups are national congress indicate that they are becom- operational, save perhaps COMG.36 ing increasingly radical on Maya cultural issues. Why has the Mayan Movement stalled? The Despite these partial gains, the prevailing weakened state of the Mayan Movement is fre- sense in the Mayan movement is one of frustra- quently attributed to infighting, failure to tion, not unlike what is happening among non- develop the necessary technical and political Mayan CSOs. Government inaction has meant skills, and absence of clearly prioritized goals that activists have little to show for the time and strategies. While these criticisms have devoted to developing policy proposals and merit, the same holds true for much of civil negotiating. The May 1999 defeat of the con- society and the government as well. The greater stitutional reforms left many Mayan activists frustration around the shortcomings of the and voters with a sense of defeat, confirming Mayan movement probably arises from roman- their long-held belief that beyond the confines ticized views of the Maya, and unrealistic of their communities, Guatemala continues to expectations. be hostile or, at best, indifferent to ethnic and In the context of very fast-paced political cultural demands. Furthermore, the lessons dynamics, the movement tended to go from one from this first indigenous attempt to change stage and issue to the next without consciously the constitution have neither been discussed incorporating the previous work experience into nor assimilated, as activists moved right into new initiatives. This resulted in a lack of conti- the 1999 electoral campaign immediately fol- nuity. Backsliding has occurred in areas where lowing the referendum. some significant gains had been achieved. For In 2001, Mayan organizations and leaders example, there was a failure to monitor govern- were practically absent from the national scene ment compliance with Convention 169. This because they were often incapable of getting meant that legal spaces for furthering indige- their issues on the agenda and because the nous rights went unused. Instead, organizations Congress and administration have chosen to that had previously worked on this plunged ignore them. International funding is drying into working on the numerous Commissions up, and what remains comes with many more called for in the AIDPI. political and administrative conditions Perhaps the most significant problem is the lack attached. Many leaders now work for interna- of capacity to implement changes that the move- tional agencies or the government. ment itself has recognized as necessary. Like many The highly visible Mayan movement of the CSOs, COPMAGUA carried out numerous self- peace process appears to be at a standstill, inca- evaluations; it came up with an adequate picture of Uncharted Paths for the Mayan Movement 23

A HISTORY OF CONFLICT

The Spanish conquistadores encountered multiple ethnic installed 70 Ixil families around the perimeter, all of whom groups each with their own territory, language, and were members of the military’s civil patrols. rulers. There were often conflicts among them, a condi- The Chiules returned to Los Cimientos in the early 1990s, tion the conquistadores seized to their advantage. Linguistic as part of the refugee resettlement process, and established differences and conflicts remain, and the non-indigenous continue to take advantage. makeshift homes on the outskirts of the community, with the support of international agencies. Despite the inter- The community of Los Cimientos, in the area of the Ixil vention of numerous governmental and non-governmental indigenous group (perhaps the group most damaged by the institutions, several studies and endless recommendations, war), is a tragic illustration of conflict further aggravated by no measures were taken to diffuse the potential conflict. In the military. In the late 19th Century, the government allot- June 2001, Ixil former civil patrollers raided the Chiul ted land in the depths of Ixil territory to a Quiché indige- community, raped at least two women, wounded several nous group community from the locality of Chiul, who men and forced the entire population to flee. became known among the Ixiles as Chiules, outsiders who had settled in their midst. Cohabitation for the better part of Conflict also exists within ethnic groups, as in the case of a century was uneasy at best, but in 1981, the Guatemalan Quiché communities fighting over forest rights in military attacked a community in the heart of guerrilla ter- Argueta, Totonicapán. In northern Huehuetenango, there ritory (Los Cimientos), destroying homes and crops and forc- has been ongoing strain between urban (the main town) ing the Quichés to flee. The army set up a military base and and rural (the outlying villages) Chuj people. its own strengths and weaknesses and with well- the COPMAGUA directorate was hammered grounded recommendations. Most were never out secretly. After it was established, the URNG implemented. There are many reasons for this fail- often used its three-to-two majority to make ure, with political conflict foremost among them. unilateral decisions that were more in line with Political problems were present from the start. URNG priorities than with the needs and hopes The COPMAGUA directorate was appointed by of Mayan activists. This contributed to consider- five so-called second-tier organizations, coordi- able internal strife, backstabbing and discontent. nating bodies that encompassed a significant As internal differences within the URNG fes- number of existing Mayan organizations engaged tered and went unresolved, problems were played in development, education, Mayan rights advoca- out in COPMAGUA, as well as in other settings. cy and local power work. Three of the five were During a meeting at Proyecto INCIDENCIA, a heavily influenced by the different former guer- USAID civil society project, some 30 civil society rilla groups that made up the URNG confedera- leaders and project staff heard two Mayan men, tion, the EGP, the FAR, and ORPA: Instancia de one a URNG member and another a dissident, Unidad y Consenso Maya (IUCM) was an umbrella claim to hold the UPMAG seat on the COP- for EGP-influenced organizations; Unidad del MAGUA directorate. Similar fallings-out took Pueblo Maya de Guatemala (UPMAG) for groups place in IUCM, and they expelled their represen- inclined to FAR; while Tukum Umam represent- tative on the Constitutional Reform Commission. ed groups that were, for the most part, sympa- Conflict got considerably worse during the 1999 thetic to ORPA. The other two directorate mem- elections, when the Frente Democrático Nueva bers were COMG, an umbrella for politically Guatemala (FDNG), the leftist coalition that ran diverse Mayan cultural organizations, and in the 1995 elections, did not join the URNG-led ALMG, the semi-official government-funded coalition ANN. Academy of Mayan Languages. The latter two COPMAGUA staffing decisions, from the placed greater emphasis on Mayan cultural rights onset, were often made on the basis of political and identity than on general political issues, and affiliation rather than technical capacity. COP- tended to ignore key issues such as the land. MAGUA was showered with 30 million Quetzals The agreement that led to this composition of between 1995 and 1999, money that was not 24 Who Governs? always adequately monitored nor dispensed for gual education in local private schools set up to technically and politically sound projects. The circumvent government passivity, are providing directorate managed the funds, while member leadership in numerous communities. Religious organizations complained to donors about their leadership and activism in rural areas is more lack of access to decision-making and funds. indigenous, with foreign priests and missionaries The eight national permanent commissions increasingly a thing of the past. In some indige- (CNPs) formed by the umbrella group to monitor nous areas, local ladino elites and business owners the accords had significant autonomy to develop who fled the violence have been replaced by their own work plans, projects and funding sources. Mayans, quite often using start-up capital from Soon, however, the CNPs were at odds with each relatives who are working in the U.S. other, duplicating work and competing for Attempts to build Mayan political parties resources. Today the CNPs have no funding and are continue, as does the debate on whether to par- not developing any projects. Nonetheless, many ticipate in mainstream ladino political ventures. individual members of CNPs are active in the cor- Two-time Quetzaltenango Mayor Rigoberto responding commission set up by the AIDPI. Quemé is spearheading a project to build a pluricultural political party with Mayans and Where is the Mayan Movement headed? Despite the problems, the Mayan cause and ladinos who share common values and outlooks. 37 activism by Mayan people continue to grow. Ten Alfredo Tay Coyoy, member of a wealthy years’ experience and its frustrations have fos- Quiché family in Quetzaltenango and the first tered a new generation of national and local Mayan to head a government ministry, is leadership that is sophisticated, although still rumored to be forming a political party. relatively young and inexperienced. This has Mayans are also actively participating in gov- tended to break the traditional barrier of partici- ernment at local and national levels. Portillo pation confined to the local town. The move- appointed Otilia Lux de Cojti, formerly a member ment has helped develop new understandings of of the Historical Clarification Commission, long- Guatemala’s ethnic diversity. Most important, it has made significant advances in forging a MAYAN LANGUAGE IN GUATEMALA AND shared sense of Mayan identity for the twenty APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF SPEAKERS. ethnic groups of Maya ancestry that inhabit Guatemala. It has articulated values and Q’ECHI’ (361,000), POQOMCHI’ (50,000), demands, and served as a voice for the formerly POQOMAM (31,000) silent and ignored indigenous population. While (from the K’iche’ branch) K’ICHE’ (926,000), the vision of change outlined in the AIDPI has SIPAKAPENSE (3,000), SAKAPULTEKO not materialized, much has changed, often in (21,000), TZ’UTUJIL (80,000), KAQCHIKEL directions not contemplated in the accords. (405,000), USPANTEKO (2,000) Mayan people are developing a broad array of (from the Mam branch) MAM (686,000), TEK- forms of political participation. As traditional TITEKO (2,500), AWAKATEKO (16,000), IXIL community social structures break down, Mayan (71,000) activists, and some local governments, are (from the Q’anjob’al branch) POPTI (32,000), attempting to re-design traditional functions. AKATEKO (20,000), Q’ANJOB’AL (112,000), Local leaders are organizing the Mayan commu- TOJOLABAL (58,000), CHUJ (29,000) (from the nity for dialogue with local government and par- Chol branch) CH’ORTI’ (52,000) (from the ticipation in municipal development projects. Yukateca branch) MOPAN (5,000), ITZA (3,000) Mayan women increasingly participate beyond There are Chalchitecos in Uspantán who claim theirs the confines of their homes in spaces opened up is a separate language. There are small numbers of by the women’s movement and the peace speakers of non-Mayan tongues: Garífuna and Xinca. accords. New Mayan teachers, trained in bilin- Uncharted Paths for the Mayan Movement 25 time educator, Virgilio Alvarado, from the promi- ed government intelligence agency. At regional nent Mayan NGO, CDRO, and Mayan intellectu- levels, Mayans are leaders in government bilingual al Demetrio Cojtí, to high level positions. education and health programs. Conservative Haroldo Quej, a Mayan-Kekchí is a Many in these new areas of Mayan activism protégé of Ríos Montt. He was mayor of San support the Mayan movement’s demands for Pedro Carchá, then was elected to Congress, and recognition of their rights and identity. But the later was appointed by Portillo to head the new support has not yet translated into reconstructed, Ministry of the Environment, before being sent stronger Mayan organizations, or into votes or back to Congress. As the controversial, U.S edu- general mobilization. There is little articulation cated, neoliberal Mayan political analyst Estuardo between cultural demands and pressing socio- Zapeta asked in the daily Siglo XXI, “Who ever economic issues. Despite the difficulties, Mayan decreed that in order to be a true Mayan you must activists believe it is only a matter of time before be a leftist?” Some Mayan activists were even the Mayan movement generates the necessary recruited to work in the SAE, the civilian-operat- new organizations, structures, and leadership.

ELECTORAL BARRIERS TO CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY

emocracy and elections are not the same Assembly drafted a constitution, and general thing. While elections are a necessary elections followed in 1985. But leftist groups Dingredient, the notion of procedural were outlawed. Critics charged that the military democracy requires the right of citizens to partic- ran the new government and virtually controlled ipate in an equitable manner in leadership choice, the daily calendar of President Vinicio Cerezo. in policy formation and implementation. It Human rights abuses continued unabated.38 requires the rule of law and an institutional Despite these inauspicious beginnings civilian structure to support these processes. More ample elections continued, and have helped build the conceptions of democracy, pertinent to expectation that governments will change through Guatemala, take into account social inequality the ballot box. Contesting parties have accepted among class and ethnic groups, and poverty lev- results, with few exceptions. Although observers els, conditions which can only undermine democ- have not found evidence of serious election-tam- racy by preventing the real practice of democracy pering, large segments of the public (40%) believe regardless of the formal rule structure. elections in Guatemala are fraudulent.39 Elections contribute to the consolidation of The stability of civilian elections cannot yet be democracy when important decisions are actual- taken for granted. There were two coup attempts ly made through the electoral process, and with during the Cerezo regime. His successor, President ample participation. Elections can help build Jorge Serrano attempted a coup with some mili- political stability and a culture of support for tary support. This failed, after an outcry by CSOs, democratic values. This does not happen when international pressure, and eventual opposition some social sectors are severely disadvantaged by from military “institutionalists.” Former leading the electoral process. presidential candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle was The recent evolution of electoral democracy in assassinated in 1993. As recently as early 2001, Guatemala began in 1984, thirty years after the there were coup rumors of sufficient credibility to CIA-sponsored overthrow of the elected govern- warrant a visit and statements by the Secretary ment of Jacobo Arbenz. An elected Constituent General of the Organization of American States. 26 Who Governs?

The Guatemalan Congress has been an obsta- around parties. Continuity provides voters with cle to successful democratic consolidation. at least a symbolic meaning. A stable party sys- President Serrano’s main justification for tem does not represent or channel demands attempting a coup was rampant corruption in from the public as well as ideal versions of Congress, and the charges were valid. In the wake democracy would wish, but they seem to do so of the failed coup, many of the corrupt were pres- better than unstable party systems.42 sured to resign. Even so, subsequent legislatures During the past 15 years Guatemala has had have been slowed by severe weaknesses: a weak extreme party turnover, even by comparison research capacity, internal rules that contribute to with other countries that have irregular, fluid, lack of consistency, high turnover and inexperi- or “inchoate,” party structures (such as Bolivia, ence, and little institutional memory. The Brazil, and Ecuador).43 It is common in coun- Congress so confused the 1999 constitutional tries that use proportional representation for amendment process that it contributed to the ref- small parties to disappear after an election or erendum defeat. The “Guategate” scandal under- two. But in Guatemala large parties have just as mined the legitimacy of Congress. There has quickly disappeared or declined to the point of been a welter of splits in party benches and for- irrelevance. In 1995, it almost seemed as mation of new parties. A citizen who voted for though the country was beginning again with a the PAN congressional slate has seen its congres- whole new collection of parties. The PAN, sional bench halved by defections.40 1995’s big winner, declined sharply by the next Municipal governments have more power and election. And the FRG has suffered a sharp budget than before, but there has been high decline in popularity since the 1999 election. turnover. And a few mayors have been violently thrown out following charges of corruption. The Christian Democrats. The Democracia However there have been municipal bright spots Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG) won big in 1985. It including increased elections of indigenous can- was seen by Guatemala’s right wing as dangerous- didates, and more ample forms of participation. ly leftist, but its ideology was centrist or center- Citizens have higher regard for municipal gov- right. As happened in other parts of Central and ernment than any other government institution, South America, Christian Democrat parties were though a recent poll showed some decline.41 positioned as a centrist alternative to Marxist These general weaknesses are part of a vicious insurgents and right-wing military dictatorships circle that includes three significant electoral (sometimes with U.S. support). The DCG had suf- elements. Political parties have little perma- fered from severe repression at the hands of nence. Thus they are not able to “represent,” Guatemala’s right-wing death squads. Presidential and voters face new groups with short track candidate Vinicio Cerezo won 70% in the runoff, records. Second, voter turnout, by comparative and the DCG won 51 of 100 congressional seats, standards, has ranged from low to extremely more than double its closest opponent. low, though there was some improvement in But it was crushed in 1990. It received only 1999. Finally, the system disadvantages women, 40% of the number of presidential votes it had in the indigenous, and rural dwellers, a pattern 1985. It dropped to less than one quarter of the mirrored in the economic sphere. deputies. In 1995, the DCG had to ally with the Unión del Centro Nacional (UCN), but still fin- ished a distant third. The DCG won three con- PARTIES gressional seats and another two in coalition. By In many countries television campaigning and 1999 it was barely alive. other factors have reduced the importance of political parties. But there is general agreement The Unión del Centro Nacional. The UCN was that electoral democracy works better with a largely a personal vehicle for the political ambitions stable system of parties. Elections are organized of its founder and leader, Jorge Carpio Nicolle. A Electoral Barriers to Consolidating Democracy 27 member of the Guatemalan elite, Carpio owned a num- TABLE 1: CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT PARTY ber of businesses including a Deputy Seats President President Municipal newspaper. The UCN in Vote won 2nd round wins 1990 won the largest bench of deputies (41 of 116) in a 1984*** 16.4% 20 of 80 NA NA NA legislature in which 5 parties 1985 34.5% 51 of 100 38.6% 68.4% 182 had twelve or more seats. It 1990 17% 27 of 116 25.7% NA 81 won 127 municipalities and 1995 12.8%* 3 of 80** 12.8%* NA 42** finished second in another 86. No other party, apart 1999 4% 2 of 113 NA NA 9** from the DCG, won more * Ran in coalition in some constituencies. ** The DCG shared 2 more seats in that two dozen municipali- 1995 and 13 more municipalities, and three more municipalities in 1999. ties. After a close first round *** Constituent Assembly election. of the presidential election, Carpio lost 2:1 to Jorge Serrano of the Movimiento de TABLE 2: UCN VOTE Acción Solidaria (MAS). After Deputy Seats President President Municipal Carpio’s assassination in Vote won 2nd round wins 1993, the party declined dra- 1984 13.7% 21 of 80 NA NA NA matically. 1985 21.4% 22 of 100 20.2 31.6 68 The Movimiento de Acción 1990 22% 41 of 116 25.7 31.9 127 Solidaria. The MAS was a 1995 12.8% 2 of 80** 12.9 NA 27 ** new party in 1990 that tar- geted its appeal to the 1999 2% 0 1 growing number of evan- ** See above for DCG. gelical Christians. It, too, relied heavily on its candi- date, Jorge Serrano. It won TABLE 3: MAS VOTE 8 deputies on the national Deputy Seats President President Municipal list, and only ten other Vote won 2nd round wins deputies from 7 of 23 dis- tricts. The UCN, by con- 1990 14% 18 of 116 24% 68% 20 trast, won at least one deputy in every Department. Following the The Partido de Avanzada Nacional. The PAN attempted coup by Serrano the MAS disappeared. was a new party in national elections in 1990, drawing much of its support in Guatemala City with heavy TABLE 4: PAN VOTE backing from “modernizing” Deputy Seats President President Municipal leaders of the private sector. In Vote won 2nd round wins 1990, the PAN won 15 seats 1985 1 and 18 municipalities, includ- 1990 15% 12 of 116 17.3% NA 18 ing Guatemala City. In 1995, Álvaro Arzú (a leading busi- 1995 34.3% 43 of 80 36.6% 51.2% 105 nessman) won after a close sec- 1999 27% 37 of 113 30.3% 31.7% 108 ond-round runoff against the FRG’s Alfonso Portillo. The 28 Who Governs?

PAN won 43 of the 80 congressional seats and ally by large margins, in every department. The 105 municipalities, including Guatemala City FRG won a comfortable congressional majority again. However, 1999 spelled disaster. PAN’s and over half of the municipalities. presidential candidate, Oscár Berger, mayor of Guatemala City, trailed by almost 400,000 votes The left. Leftist parties were able to enter the in the first round and even lost by 30,000 votes in electoral arena in 1995 for the first time in nearly Guatemala City. half a century. The coalition Frente Democratico Nuevo Guatemala (FDNG) with minimal cam- The Frente Republicano Guatemalteco. The paign funds won six seats. After the peace founder and main leader of the party was ex- accords, the URNG guerrilla coalition morphed into a legal political party. Following fractious pre-elec- TABLE 5: FRG VOTE tion politics, it ran in the Deputy Seats President President Municipal 1999 elections as part of the Vote won 2nd round wins Alianza Nueva Nacion (ANN) 1990 13% 12 0f 116 NA NA 18 coalition, but not with the 1995 20% 19 of 80 22.1% 48.8% 47 FDNG. ANN won the same proportion of seats as the 1999 42% 63 of 113 47.7% 68.3% 151 FDNG in 1995. The FDNG won in five municipalities in 1999. Its 3% of the national General and former dictator, Efraín Ríos list vote was not enough to win a seat. Montt. The FRG did about as well as the PAN At the local level, Civic Committees were in 1990, but unlike the PAN, the strength of numerous (174 in 1999), but they have had the FRG was in rural areas, and the party made only modest success. In 1999, civic committees a concerted effort to recruit ex-members of civil won in 25 municipalities and finished second patrols. It also had the support of many ex-mil- in 14 others.44 itary officers. Though he showed well in opin- ion polls Ríos Montt has been constitutionally Past as prologue? Three major parties have disap- prevented from running for president. peared. Their dire fate does not predict, however, In 1995, Ríos Montt chose Alfonso Portillo, that the PAN’s sharp decline in 1999 will lead it a former leftist who spent much of the 1980s in down a similar path to oblivion. Cynical Mexico before returning and joining the Guatemalan voters will not necessarily throw out Christian Democrats, as presidential candidate. the last party to win. The strange alliance proved quite shrewd, and The PAN’s decline was not as steep as that of the Portillo narrowly lost the second round to DCG in 1990, or as the UCN in 1995. The decline Arzú. The party won 19 congressional seats and and fall of the DCG, the UCN, and the MAS were 47 municipalities. In 1999, Portillo won, usu- each marked by particular historic circumstances. The DCG’s 1990 defeat fol- lowed a Latin American trend TABLE 6: THE LEFT VOTE: FDNG IN 1995 AND ANN in which parties that won fol- ( DIA-URNG) 1999 lowing the return to limited Deputy Seats President President Municipal civilian rule lost in the next Vote won 2nd round wins round, because they failed to 1995 9.1% 6 of 80 7.7% NA 0 meet economic expectations generated by the turn toward 1999 11% 9 of 113 12.4% NA 13 electoral democracy. The MAS disappeared because of its dis- Electoral Barriers to Consolidating Democracy 29 graced leader. The most visible leader of the UCN them. The electoral system has made it relatively was assassinated, even in violent Guatemala an easy for a large party to capture a majority in the unusual circumstance. Congress. With only about one third of the vote, However, the decline of each of these parties can the DCG won 51 of 100 seats, and the PAN 43 of also be attributed to other factors that remain very 80. The FRG, in 1999, got 42% of the vote and much present. None made a significant dent in 56% of the seats.46 In the early elections medium- improving the economic fortunes of the vast major- sized parties also did well and, in the case of the ity of poor people. Neither did the PAN, nor has PAN and the FRG, were able to become large par- the FRG thus far. The decline of these early parties ties. That was not true in 1995 and 1999. In 1985 was precipitated, in part, by perceptions of ram- the third and fourth place parties totaled almost pant corruption. Polls still show that the Congress one-quarter of the seats; in 1990 the 3rd, 4th, and and political parties do not get much respect.45 An 5th place parties won over one-third of the seats. April 2001 poll found 67% of respondents saying However in 1995 and 1999 the 3rd and 4th place that the Portillo administration is the most corrupt parties combined seats were only ten percent. So since the transition to civilian elections, while 80% there is no apparent challenger. One possibility, said that Ríos Montt is corrupt and dishonest. given the “all parties weakened” scenario, could be Moreover, the existing parties show signs of frag- a congress divided among several medium and mentation. The PAN bench divided after the 1999 small parties, with no majority party. election, when 16 of its 37 deputies broke away to Serious doubts remain as to whether the begin the Unionists Party. Two deputies left the URNG will advance to become a major electoral FRG, leaving it with 61. Then there were more force. The long-standing tendency toward inter- splits. The PAN was left with 18 deputies and the nal bickering included a bruising fight over Unionists 13. The left coalition ANN (with the selecting a vice-presidential candidate in 1999. URNG) lost its 1999 presidential candidate, The URNG managed to pass up the opportunity Álvaro Colom, who formed a new party (the Union to run a highly respected, internationally known Nacional de la Esperanza—National Union of Hope Mayan woman, Rosalina Tuyuc, perhaps in the —or UNE). The UNE reduced the ANN bench belief that a woman Mayan candidate would from 9 to 8, and attracted six other deputies from hurt their chances of winning. Signs of internal PAN and the Unionists. Two other members of the fighting were evident late into 2001. PAN declared themselves independent. And four There are no clear signs yet of the formation other deputies remain with 3 small parties. These of a unified Mayan party, or of a tendency for Mayans to vote as a block. However their num- developments, no doubt bewildering to bers could make them an extremely powerful Guatemalan citizens, left a fragmented congress voting block. Given the current scene of two and serious questions about the lasting significance divided, conservative, ladino-dominated parties, of casting a vote for a party and about the cohesive- a large block of Mayan votes could either decide ness of the parties as future electoral vehicles. the fate of the ladino parties, or potentially win Although the FRG is relatively more powerful, an election, or a sizeable chunk of congressional given the divisions in other parties, there are clear seats. But there are many divisions, and Mayans signs of weakness. Ríos Montt was, despite his are under represented on voter registration lists. acquittal in the Guategate scandal, considerably weakened by a year’s worth of press stories about it. He is now 75. When he coyly demurred a year VOTER TURNOUT ago about running for another term as head of the Large numbers of Guatemalans do not vote, or Congress, party members argued that the party cast null ballots. would fall apart without him. They could be right. Turnout in the two constitutional referenda However, should the PAN and FRG decline fur- was 16% and 18% of registered voters. Some ther, it is not at all clear what or who might replace argued that a massive campaign in 1999 against 30 Who Governs? the amendments generated a big “no” vote. Seen theory, wish to vote in a new government. But from the perspective of the turnout problem, for those so lacking it is also hardest to be however, the campaign was ineffective, because informed, hardest to register, and hardest to vote. the margin of defeat was only 75,000 votes. To register one needs a residency card and to That’s about 1% of the voting age population get that one needs a birth certificate. Most rural (VAP) — hardly a massive vote mobilization.47 births are not in medical institutions, so many rural people must travel to the municipal center In a comparison of voter Barriers to turnout. to obtain one. The process for getting a birth cer- turnout (as percent of VAP) in 20 Latin American tificate and then a residency card can be compli- countries, Guatemala was last (see Chart 1). Turnout did increase in the 1999 general election, cated and expensive for a rural poor person. With owing to effective campaigns by the electoral these two documents one then goes to the munic- authorities and civil society organizations. For this ipal center to be inscribed on the voter rolls. positive trend to continue, the government needs Finally, one must go back again, at some difficult to make registering and voting easier. to determine time, to pick up the voting card. It is difficult for large numbers of Guate- Voting takes place only at municipal centers. malans to register and vote, particularly the rural This involves considerable travel for hundreds of poor, those lacking information, those who are thousands of rural voters. Lehouc and Wall, in a illiterate, women, and Mayans. Those lacking study of voting turnout using municipal level data most in services from the government might, in over three elections, discovered that the geograph-

MEASUREMENT OF TURNOUT.

Measuring turnout by percent of registered voters • Registration is a two step process, and the list con- underestimates and distorts the nature of the problem. tains those who have inscribed themselves (step 1) A principle cause of the distortion, argue Horacio but do not yet have the necessary voting card (step Boneo and Edelberto Torres-Rivas in ¿Por qué no votan 2). In 1999 that amounted to 8.6% of those on the los guatemaltecos?, lies in inaccuracies in the voter reg- lists, some 382,000 people. 48 istration list. The authors conclude that the percent of those of vot- • There is no systematic method of removing the ing age not effectively registered, (not on the list, names of the dead - a distortion that would magni- lacking a card, or away from their municipality) was fy each year. They estimate rolls contain 300,000 not 19% as estimated by the TSE but rather 36%. deceased citizens or 6%. This means that the abstention of those effectively registered is relatively small at 18%.49 Abstention • The lists contain uncounted thousands who have measured by voting age population (VAP) is much migrated to the U.S. and cannot vote (given lack of higher. absentee ballot measures even for Guatemalans The voter registration lists contain data on gender, inside Guatemala). The authors cite migration esti- age, and literacy, which can be used to help determine mates of 450,000 people (including children) who among the registered voters tends to vote. between 1985 and 1995, with perhaps another Comparison with 1994 census data (not free from 120,000 in the next four years. problems, but relatively good data at the departmen- • If a voter moves to a new municipality the voter tal level) provides a basis for estimating which sectors must either return to the old one to vote, or go of the population tend to not be registered and actual through an arduous process of registering again. turnout. The authors estimate that another 8% to 11% of To take an illustrative, though perhaps extreme, the list have moved and not re-registered. In addi- example, 1999 turnout of 18-19 year olds as measured tion a November election date means hundreds of by percent of those registered was 60.5%. However, thousands are away from “home” working the crop turnout measured as a percent of VAP of that age harvests. group was 22.7%. Electoral Barriers to Consolidating Democracy 31

est voting rate in the CHART 1: TURNOUT AS PERCENT OF VOTING AGE country for the gener- POPULATION 1990-1997 (Source: IDEA, 1998, 17) al elections of 1990, 100 1995, and 1999 (measured as percent 80 of registered voters).52 According to one 60 Boneo and Torres-

40 Rivas survey, voter registration rates rose

20 (though not evenly) according to educa- 0 tion. The extreme

Chile Brazil Belize Peru cases according to Ecuador Guyana Mexico Bolivia Uruguay Panama Surinam Honduras ParaguayColombia Costa Rica Argentina Nicaragua El Salvador Venezuela Guatemala Boneo and Torres- Rivas contrast non- ic size of the municipality negatively correlated indigenous men with at least primary education with turnout at statistically significant levels. The with indigenous women who have not been to Boneo and Torres-Rivas study included two large, school. Of the former, 81% said they had voted. In though not nationally representative, polls in the latter group 51% said they had voted.53 which 77% to 81% of non-voters said they would vote if voting centers were brought to their com- The null and blank factor. Guatemala has also munity. In a 1999 national survey by Borge and had high rates of voters casting null and blank Associates, 53% or respondents said it took over ballots. Null and blank votes might signify 20 minutes to go from home to voting places and protest, lack of interest, or lack of education and 5% said it took 1 to 3 hours.50 For example, in confusion about the balloting process — issues Santa Cruz del Quiché 2/3 of the population of that have conceptual overlap with the turnout 30,000 live in 62 population centers, 38 of which problem. In virtually every election since 1984, range from five to twenty miles from the munici- except second round presidential elections, the pal center. In Santa Eulalia 80% of 30,000 people combination of null and blank votes as a percent live outside the municipal centers in 57 locations, of total votes has been in double digits. some 20 of which are 25 to 40 miles distant.51 By contrast, in El Salvador (another post war Registration difficulties result in lower voting country with low education, centralized voting, for some groups. If those under 35 voted at the same rates as those between 35 and 55, turnout TABLE 7: NULL AND BLANK would rise ten points. Women abstain at a rate Election N+B % 50% higher than men. If women voted at the 1984 Constituent Assembly 22 same rate turnout would rise 11 points. Once reg- 1985 President round 1 12 istered, the indigenous population votes at about 1985 President round 2 9 the same rate as the non-indigenous population, 1990 Deputy (national list) 11 and seemed to vote at a higher rate in the 1999 1990 President round 1 14 constitutional referendum. The surveys done in 1991 President. round 2 5 the Boneo and Torres-Rivas study suggest that 1995 Deputy (national list) 14 1995 Deputy (district lists) 13 registration is lower among the indigenous by ten 1995 President round 1 11 points (53–44% in two surveys). There is varia- 1999 Deputy (national list) 12 tion, however, in turnout rates in different depart- 1999 President round 1 8 ments with large indigenous populations. Sololá, 1999 President round 2 4 with a 94% indigenous population, had the high- 32 Who Governs? and high abstention rates) the proportion of institutions is relatively low. A 1999 study of blank, mismarked and spoiled ballots in the political culture found little overall change in con- March 2000 deputy elections was 3.7%. During fidence since 1993, although some changes were the Salvadoran war these rates were higher, per- noted with respect to particular institutions.55 haps because of guerrilla calls to boycott elec- The same study found a modest increase in a tions. In 1988 the rate was 14%, and dropped to measure which combines support for the sys- 7.4% in the first post war 1994 deputy elections. tem and support for political tolerance between In Guatemala, the null and blank rate is much 1993 and 1999 (from 22% to 28%), suggest- higher in rural departments. In national list con- ing slight growth of a political culture support- gressional elections from 1990 to 1999, the 22 ive of democracy. This was countered, however, electoral districts outside of Guatemala City had by an increase since 1993 of those who wanted a null and blank rate of 14% or more in most a “strong hand” (mano dura ) government from elections (35 of 66). During the 1999 deputy 48% to 60%. Those who preferred “participa- elections, 45% of Guatemala’s 330 municipali- tion for all” fell from 40% to 29%.56 ties had null and blank rates of 14% or higher. Recent comparative data are also not encour- Relatively better support for local government aging. In Latinobarametro studies of Latin may explain why the null and blank vote rate in American countries between 1996 and 1998, 1999 was at 8.5% in local elections. Guatemala finished toward the bottom (along If one imagined that there were a political with 5 other countries) in preference for party in Guatemala called the Null and Blank democracy (about 55% compared to a regional Party its “votes” in the 1999 deputy elections average of 63%) and in a second place tie (with would have been sufficient to win 7 of the 13 Mexico) in expressions of preference for author- seats that were not won by the PAN or the itarian government (about 25%).57 FRG.54 “Null and Blank” would have been the It may be, however, that changes in the rules third largest party in Congress. will increase participation. Congress has consid- ered but not passed an electoral reform law. The Turnout and political culture. Not all of the draft legislation ignores many of the issues pro- turnout problem can be attributed to inconve- posed by various civic groups, but does call for niences of the system. In the Boneo and Torres- decentralization of the voting process. However, Rivas study, one survey asked why citizens had not the electoral tribunal will not have the capacity registered, and 24% said they had no interest in or time to implement the law (if approved) voting or in politics. Confidence in government without considerable additional resources.

REFORMING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM*

ost Guatemalans have rightly tended were resolved by extra-judicial mechanisms that to see the law as something that oper- resorted to extreme violence.58 The CEH assert- Mates for the benefit of the powerful ed that the judicial system failed to check the rather than as a resource to protect their funda- military’s de facto exercise of power and system- mental rights. During the armed conflict the atic abuse of human rights by the state, and military controlled the judiciary. Often disputes thereby actively facilitated the violence.59 In

* Rachel Sieder thanks Federico Andreu, Albane Prophette, Luis Ramírez, Jack Spence and Tracy Ulltveit-Moe for their helpful comments and aid with bibliographical materials. Reforming the Justice System 33 addition, the military regime of Ríos Montt ly punitive legal tradition. It sought moderniza- (1982–3) adopted a ‘quasi-legal’ form when tion of the judicial system, peaceful judicial res- summary justice was dispensed through the tri- olution of conflicts, accountability of state offi- bunales de fuero especial; military-run courts that cials and institutions, and respect for human failed to meet the most elementary guarantees rights and due process guarantees. The accords of due process. Despite important attempts in insisted on the official recognition of the early 1990s to modernize the justice system, Guatemala’s multicultural and multiethnic it continued to be under-funded, inefficient, and nature. This meant free access to impartial and inaccessible — particularly to indigenous peo- efficient justice; and the right to be judged in ple, women, children, and the poor.60 It was one’s own language and to use alternative, cul- plagued by corruption, lack of independence, turally appropriate conflict resolution mecha- and was staffed by poorly trained, under-moti- nisms, or indigenous customary law. This vated functionaries who were subject to the required a reform of the 1985 constitution, influence of elite groups. However, the relative specifically of Article 203, which gave the lack of rule of law also affects elite groups and courts the exclusive right to exercise jurisdic- the functioning of the economy by creating tion. Such changes would amount to fundamen- incentives for personal deal-making and bribes, tal transformation of Guatemalan legal culture. rather than reliance on impersonal contracts The accords mandated doubling budget allo- enforced by an efficient judiciary. cations to the justice sector by the year 2000 By the mid 1990s, the justice system was (compared to 1995 levels). Under the accords, being overwhelmed by a vertiginous rise in in 1997 the multi-sector Commission for the crime. While state violations of civil rights Strengthening of Justice was set up, undertook declined,61 armed robbery, car-theft, kidnap- a unique process of consultation with civic and ping,62 child abduction for illegal adoption, professional groups, and made proposals to 66 drug trafficking, homicides, rape, gang vio- address these themes. lence, and money laundering are now common. Official figures are notoriously unreliable, but LEGAL REFORMS one source estimated that the total number of Like many other Latin American countries in reported crimes increased by 50% between the 1990s, Guatemala reformed its Penal 1996 and 1998.63 Surveys taken in 17 Latin Procedures Code (Código Procesal Penal or American countries revealed that Guatemala CPP) to establish due process — particularly had, by far, the highest rate (55%) of those the presumption of innocence, habeas corpus, polled who declared that a member of their and the right to legal defense with an family had been a victim of crime sometime in autonomous public defenders service. Judges the previous year.64 The annual rate of violent had been responsible for investigations, reach- death was estimated at 77 per 100,000 people ing a verdict and guaranteeing civil rights – in 1998, second only in the region to El multiple functions that often resulted in con- Salvador (82 per 100,000), and compared to flicts of interest. The CPP assigned investiga- approximately 10 per 100,000 for the U.S.65 tion and prosecution exclusively to the Public The crime wave is linked to socio-economic Ministry (Ministerio Público). Previously, trials inequality, the growth in drug trafficking, and had been secretive affairs dominated by docu- the involvement of former members of the ments where the accused was often not aware of armed forces and military intelligence networks. the charges until the sentencing stage. The Organized crime is one of the main reasons why CPP introduced public, oral proceedings. It judicial reforms have not yielded greater results. established the right to be heard in one’s own The 1996 peace settlement aimed to trans- language. It allowed other civic actors to take form an authoritarian, discriminatory, and high- part in criminal cases, such as relatives of vic- 34 Who Governs? tims or non-governmental organizations comunitario or tribunal comunitario) avoided recogni- (NGOs), which became co-plaintiffs (querel- tion of existing indigenous dispute resolution lantes adhesivos) in key human rights cases. institutions and practices by superimposing the Additional new reforms include a law that reg- new court in a handful of indigenous municipali- ulates judicial training, a Council of Judicial ties with little consultation.73 Nonetheless, these Training, and a disciplinary body for judges to pilot courts have had some success in providing enforce a Code of Judicial Ethics. Still needed are access to more culturally appropriate, bilingual reforms to university training and to the selection conflict resolution, and have in some places coordi- process of judges, public prosecutors, defenders, nated with traditional and municipal authorities. and lawyers, in order to deal with nepotism. These will take many years to achieve.67 REMAINING WEAKNESSES Access to the justice system has improved, Expanded court coverage has been unable to ful- particularly for the indigenous, with consider- fill hopes of enforcing the rule of law and able help from international donors such as the responding to the crime wave, because more World Bank, the Organization of American thorough institutional reform is needed and so is States (OAS), the UNDP, USAID, the an effective effort to tackle impunity. The judi- European Union (EU) and MINUGUA. Since cial culture continues to be marked by ineffi- 1996 there are 102 new courts with 35 posts ciency, routine violation of due process, and gen- for legal interpreters, and justices of the peace der, ethnic and class bias. CPP implementation (juzgados de paz), which covered only two-thirds is uneven. Many judges, public prosecutors and of the national territory, in all 330 municipali- defenders lack training, despite significant ties. Between 1994 and 1999, the total number international donations. Others are simply of judges and magistrates increased from 400 reluctant to innovate. to 753.68 In January 2001 Hugo Maúl, the Meanwhile, the CPP has come under attack President of the Supreme Court, announced a because of the crime wave, with proponents of plan to build another 83 Offices of Justices of hard-line measures denouncing its rights pro- the Peace.69 tections. The issue is complex. Defense lawyers Between 1995 and 1998, MINUGUA estab- do create excessive delays through use of the lished pilot projects for multilingual justice constitutional right of amparo — an appeal to administration in the six departments with the Constitutional Court that claims a judicial large indigenous populations. The program decision has violated the rights of the accused. trained ninety interpreters and held public The Constitutional Court hears all such workshops. Unfortunately, the UN suspended appeals, whatever their merit, so recourse to the program following internal conflicts over amparo is often formalistic or inaccurate. its direction.70 USAID provided $10 million to The use of amparo is often an effective delay- the Rafael Landívar University to train legal ing tactic. For example, in the cases against translators, and supported a program of “justice civil patrollers for the 1982 massacres at Agua centers” to coordinate police, prosecutors, Fría, El Quiché and Río Negro, Baja Verapaz, judges, public defenders, lawyers and local civil defense lawyers lodged amparo writs and suc- society groups and provide alternative dispute ceeded in delaying the process for years. resolution (ADR) and interpreters in specific Convictions finally came in November 1998. areas.71 They were subsequently acquitted, retried, and The original ADR proposal recognized indige- reconvicted in October 1999. The case remains nous rights to customary law, as mandated in the caught up in a lengthy appeals process, and peace accords. However, PAN deputies were suspi- accusations against another 45 patrollers and cious, and they vetoed this clause in 1997.72 military personnel implicated in the massacres Instead a new ‘community court’ (juzgado de paz have yet to be resolved.74 In 2001, the Reforming the Justice System 35

Constitutional Court received approximately months passed before the PM began to investi- five petitions of amparo a day.75 gate charges of corruption and embezzlement Access to bilingual justice remains low. Many against Portillo’s close ally, Francisco judicial employees are deeply suspicious of adopt- Alvarado.79 ing multicultural legal procedures. The new pub- The PM and the National Civilian Police lic defenders service remains acutely weak; its (PNC) rarely coordinate their efforts. Although employees have been criticized for lack of moti- the Code clearly states that the PNC is subordi- vation.76 The 1999 rejection of the constitutional nate to the PM in investigations, inefficiency reforms in the referendum dealt a massive set- and professional rivalries beset the relationship. back to efforts to multiculturalize justice. Many The PNC are poorly trained in evidence collec- of the proposals can be advanced through ordi- tion and analysis, and often lack adequate tech- nary legislation, but the effective recognition of nical facilities. indigenous customary law is impossible without constitutional amendment, particularly of Article Corruption and intimidation. Judges, lawyers, 203, which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the and public prosecutors are vulnerable to intimi- judiciary. Undoubtedly the coordination of state dation, interference, and corruption. A recent laws and indigenous customary law is complex. study by the Instituto de Estudios Comparados However, the failure to incorporate into the en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala (ICCPG) Constitution this internationally recognized legal found that 25% of judges and 87% of public right was the loss of an historic opportunity to prosecutors acknowledged they had been pres- create a more accessible and legitimate judicial sured by their superiors or influential parties.80 structure.77 Given current levels of resistance to The Supreme Court and the highest echelons of such a change and the weakness of the organized the judicial apparatus control promotions and Mayan movement, progress on this issue in the can thus bring pressure to bear. However, many medium term appears unlikely. judges who denounce Supreme Court interfer- ence have themselves been investigated on The Public Ministry. The PM, or public prose- charges of corruption. For example, Judge cutor’s office, is weak. In Guatemala City alone Delmy Castañeda was dismissed following the PM receives 90,000 cases a years, according accusations that she had let drug traffickers off to a 1999 USAID study. Reception clerks, the hook.81 unguided by official criteria, dismissed over one Low salaries and poor training foment corrup- third of these in the belief that they were without tion. Disciplinary procedures remain inadequate merit. About half of the remaining cases were and officials charged with corruption rarely face dropped because the complainant failed to clearly criminal prosecution. A section of the PM creat- identify the alleged guilty party. The remaining ed in April 2000 to deal with corruption, has cases were divided between 35 prosecutor teams. filed charges in only 13 cases out of 2,200 com- Only about 1,100 of these resulted in court fil- plaints, and achieved convictions in a mere two ings. A sample of cases showed that close to 100 cases. Constant harassment and threats mean per cent of the victims and witnesses eventually that many officials are scared to testify, investi- recanted their testimony or refused to cooperate gate, or judge impartially. A new office within with investigators, perhaps due to threats. Of the the PM to protect justice sector workers (Fiscalía 90,000 criminal complaints filed, successful de Amenazas) had accumulated a case load of 55 prosecution approached the rate of zero.78 within two months of its inauguration.82 During the Portillo administration the PM In May 2001 the UN Special Rapporteur on has conspicuously failed to initiate proceedings the Independence of Judges and Lawyers con- against government officials and agencies demned recent intimidation against judges and accused of corruption or illegal acts. In the prosecutors, including assassinations, attacks and notorious, aforementioned bank scandal, death threats. Between September 1996 and June 36 Who Governs?

1999 the Myrna Mack Foundation documented ough criminal investigations and pressuring 158 cases of threats, intimidation and attacks judges. Suborning justice happens, particularly — against judges, prosecutors, lawyers and others though not exclusively— in cases where military linked to the justice system.83 At least thirteen officers are implicated in human rights violations. judges were killed between March 2000 and This network, often referred to as “parallel pow- March 2001. Organized criminals, police, army, ers” (poderes paralelos), originates in military intelli- and ex-civil patrollers carry out these attacks; gence structures and is supported by members of investigations and prosecutions are rare. Despite the PNC, the PM, and the courts. It carries out the recommendation of the Commission for parallel investigations;89 hides, alters or invents Strengthening Justice, state protection for judi- evidence; bribes police, prosecutors and judges; cial personnel or witnesses is wholly inadequate. and finds ‘fall guys’ to take the rap. When neces- Judges and magistrates are considered such high sary, witnesses and officials are threatened or mur- risks that they cannot obtain life insurance.84 dered. These networks have entrenched interests in criminal gangs. High profile cases, such as the The prison system.85 The prison system is in Gerardi trial (see box), have revealed methods such crisis. A 1999 survey found that 67% of the as using common criminals to gather information prison population had not been sentenced.86 and to threaten and attack their targets. Pre-trial detention often exceeds the maximum The progress of high profile human rights sentence that would have been served had a con- cases through the courts indicates the contin- viction been secured. Despite the creation of the ued success of the military in obstructing the public defense service most detainees still have judicial process: little or no access to defense lawyers. The CPP • The trial of 25 soldiers charged with gunning provides for alternatives to incarceration, such as down 11 unarmed civilians in the Xamán bail or house arrest, but these are under-uti- community of returned refugees in Chisec lized. The tendency toward tougher sentencing Alta Verapaz in October 1995 took over four is exacerbating overcrowding and thus poor years and was condemned by international hygiene. Prisoners are subject to physical and observers as a travesty of justice. Hearings sexual abuse and extortion. No attempt is made were repeatedly delayed, the military with- to rehabilitate them, so recidivism is high. The held vital information, and pressure was corruption of prison officials also means that brought to bear on witnesses, including bribes breakouts are frequent — between June 1996 and death threats. The judge maintained that 87 and June 2001 some 203 prisoners escaped. the soldiers had been provoked into firing, When 78 highly dangerous prisoners escaped in and convicted them on the lesser charge of June 2001, some commentators argued that the manslaughter. He sentenced them to between military should control the prisons. Ten of the four and five years in prison, but then permit- 78 turned up dead, pointing to the use of extra- ted them to commute their sentences at a rate judicial execution.88 of Q5 (US$0.67) a day, enabling their freedom to be bought for around $1000 each. UNDERWRITING IMPUNITY—LOS • In April 2000, the Guatemalan state accepted PODERES PARALELOS responsibility for the 1982 massacre of over The Myrna Mack Foundation, the Catholic 300 people at Dos Erres, Petén before the Church’s Human Rights Office (Oficina de Derechos Inter-American Human Rights Commission Humanos del Arzobispado, ODHA) and other and offered to pay compensation to the vic- human rights activists have repeatedly argued that tims’ families. Some of the families rejected a clandestine network operates throughout the such efforts and continued to pursue justice justice system and the public security forces to through the domestic courts, where progress protect powerful individuals by preventing thor- has been painfully slow. Death threats have Reforming the Justice System 37

been made against individuals and human • Anthropologist Myrna Mack was murdered in rights organizations supporting the prosecu- 1990. Over ten years of tenacious efforts by tion. In April 2001 the Constitutional Court her sister Helen Mack have failed to achieve annulled arrest warrants against 19 military justice. In 1993 a low-ranking member of the officers accused of the killings on the basis EMP, Noel Jesús de Beteta, was convicted for that the court issuing the orders had failed to carrying out the murder. Yet efforts to prose- allow the officers to apply for amnesty under cute three high-ranking military officers, Juan the terms of the 1996 National Reconciliation Valencia Osorio, Juan Guillermo Oliva Law. On December 10, 2001, president Carrera and General Edgar Augusto Godoy Portillo awarded Q14.5 million to 176 rela- Gaitán, for ordering and planning the killing tives of those who were killed. have been hampered for years as the PM has

THE GERARDI CASE The notorious investigation into the murder of the EMP. Repeated dearth threats forced Galindo Catholic Bishop Juan Gerardi Conadera illustrates, into exile in October 1999. according to MINUGUA and the ODHA, a pattern used by illegal security corps and clandestine struc- • In January 2000, the case appeared to take a new tures to obstruct justice.91 Gerardi was killed on 26 turn. President Portillo had pledged in his cam- April 1998, two days after he had presented the paign to resolve the murder. Three weeks after he Catholic diocese report Guatemala: Nunca Más, The assumed office (ex) Colonel Byron Lima Oliva, his Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI), a detailed son Captain Byron Lima Estrada and military spe- account of human rights abuses committed during the cialist Obdulio Villanueva Arévalo of the EMP were 36-year armed conflict. The report held that the army arrested. Their trial finally began in March 2001. was responsible for over 90 per cent of gross violations. The night before the trial hand grenades were Despite unprecedented domestic and international thrown at the home of one of the judges; other pressure on the Arzú government to resolve the case, judges and the prosecutor, Leopoldo Zeissig, the following occurred: received death threats. Those called to give testimo- ny included former Ministers of Defense, Generals • The crime scene was contaminated and crucial Héctor Barrios Celada and Marco Tulio Espinosa, forensic evidence was destroyed or lost by the PM. and Portillo’s Secretary for Strategic Analysis, Edgar EMP operatives entered the crime scene and pho- Gutiérrez. In an unprecedented ruling, the judges tographed those present. found the three defendants guilty of the execution of the Bishop, and sentenced them to thirty years’ • Nine witnesses or potential witnesses were mur- imprisonment. Father Orantes was found guilty as dered. Others were forced into exile and repeated an accessory and received a sentence of twenty years. threats obliged judges and public prosecutors to resign from the case. It was the first time that military officers were convict- ed for a politically motivated killing. Lima Oliva was • The second public prosecutor mislaid crucial evi- head of military intelligence (G2) under the de facto dence and spent a year chasing rumors circulated by government of General Lucas García (1978-82) and is military intelligence that the killing was a crime of the highest-ranking military officer to be convicted of passion committed by Father Mario Orantes, the human rights violations in a domestic court. At the priest who shared a house with the Bishop.92 time of writing the convictions were due to go to appeal. Charges were still being investigated against • In January 1999 public prosecutor Celvin Galindo other military officers in the EMP, but no attempts took over the case and pursued the theory that the have been made to investigate who ordered Gerardi’s motive was political, a position maintained by the murder. It is unlikely that the outcome would have co-plaintiffs, the ODHA, who also received anony- been the same without exceptional domestic and inter- mous threats throughout. Galindo ordered DNA national pressure to resolve the case. A month after the tests to be carried out in the U.S. on blood samples verdict prosecutor Zeissig went into exile after receiv- found at the scene, and subpoenaed the logbooks of ing death threats. 38 Who Governs?

contested the applicable jurisdiction and lost Tough stances on crime are electorally popu- or mislaid crucial evidence.90 Over two lar, though there is no proof that they solve the dozen judges have resigned or been removed problem. The Arzú government extended the from the case. Witnesses and prosecution death penalty to include kidnapping convic- advocates have been subject to constant tions. In May 2000 Congress rescinded the law harassment and death threats. Only private allowing the President to grant pardons in cap- resources and the support of the international ital cases, violating both the American Conven- community have permitted the case to con- tion on Human Rights and the International tinue. In May 2001, after 20 months of Covenant on International and Civil Rights.94 deliberation, the Constitutional Court ruled A month later, two convicted kidnappers were that the three military officers should stand executed on national television — thereby pro- trial in a civilian court. However, in the same viding an accessible demonstration of punitive month it was ruled that the case should be justice for would-be lynchers (see below). sent back to a lower court on a technicality. Lawyers who have appealed against death sen- A trial date was set for October 2001, but tences have received death threats.95 the defense brought three amparos and Only ten per cent of all homicide cases are delayed the proceedings yet again. Activists sent to trial, and very few result in convic- hold out little hope of a swift resolution. tions.96 Ineffective efforts to combat the crime • In April 1999, an appeals court revoked the wave have led to a proliferation of private securi- 30 year sentences of two former civil ty firms, gun ownership, vigilantes and extra- patrollers from San Pedro Jocopilas, El judicial executions—so-called ‘social cleansing’ Quiché, convicted in 1997 of murdering and lynchings. opposition presidential candidate and journal- In June 2001 the Association of Private ist Jorge Carpio Nicolle in 1993. Repeated Security Firms reported that some 85 private attempts by Carpio Nicolle’s family to re- security firms were legally registered, compris- open charges against senior former govern- ing some 45,000 agents; in 1999 MINUGUA ment officials suspected of ordering or cover- estimated that some 200 private security firms ing up the assassination have been mired in were in operation.97 Private security guards bureaucratic delays. Prosecutors have received outnumber the police by 3 to 1.98 These indi- death threats, and the military have been accused of withholding relevant evidence. In viduals often lack training or supervision, and April 1999 the court of appeals revoked the have been involved in acts of violence. And sentences against the two civil patrollers for some groups have been linked to organized lack of evidence. In October 1999 Carpio crime. Their use reinforces inequalities. The Nicolle’s widow presented the case to the rich can buy their own security and therefore Interamerican Commission, alleging justice have less incentive to pay taxes to improve the was denied through the Guatemalan courts. public security services. All social classes have engaged in extra-judi- Disenchantment and the privatization of justice. cial executions. One recent study found that A 1997 survey found that 62% of the popula- homicide rates in Guatemala are much higher tion had little confidence in the courts and in the capital and coastal departments and 18% no confidence whatsoever. A 1998 survey lower in the mainly indigenous highlands.99 found that 94% of the population thought that Yet collective mob executions or “lynchings” of the justice system only favored the rich and suspected criminals by indigenous communi- powerful, while another survey by ASIES in ties have dominated the headlines. 2000 concluded that only six per cent of the Between 1996 and 2000, 337 lynchings and population felt their basic rights were fully attempted lynchings occurred, leaving 187 protected by the legal system.93 people dead and 448 injured.100 Not only sus- Reforming the Justice System 39 pected criminals have been the targets – in short, rapid deployment has taken prece- March 2001 a local judge was killed by a mob dence over deeper measures needed to in Alta Verapaz after he rendered an unpopular ensure the long-term professionalism, and verdict.101 Lynchings stem from the recent vio- efficacy of the PNC.104 lent history. The war broke down community Two years later, there has been little progress structures, contributed to lack of confidence in in remedying the deficiencies outlined in the state institutions, and undermined any under- WOLA report. Frequent changes of political standing of due process rights. Torture and and institutional leadership have inhibited the summary execution were common, and the development of systematic planning: there have military forced whole communities to watch been three ministers of Gobernacíon ( the min- and even participate in atrocities. An entire istry that controls the police) and four police generation of Mayan men had to participate in chiefs since the new administration took office. civil patrols and became schooled in violent The primary focus has remained on increasing resolution of conflicts. Many instigators of the size of the police force, rather than on lynchings have been identified as former civil improving its quality. The original target was 102 patrol leaders. to increase the force to 20,000 police by the end of 1999. By April 2001, there were 18,314 FAILING TO RESCUE POLICE REFORM agents and it is likely that the original target In January 2000, the Washington Office on will have been reached by the end of 2001.105 Latin America published a report entitled, There remain significant deficiencies with Rescuing Police Reform: A Challenge for the New recruitment and selection, education and train- Guatemalan Government.103 Aimed at the ing, leadership, internal and external controls, incoming administration of President Alfonso and criminal investigations. Portillo, the report reviewed progress made Recruitment of during the prior administration of President Recruitment and selection. civilians for the PNC remains a serious prob- Alvaro Arzú toward implementing public lem, with little publicity given to course open- security reforms called for by the 1996 peace ings at the training academy. The principal accord on Strengthening of Civilian Power and form of publicity is an announcement in the the Role of the Military in a Democratic official bulletin of the PNC. Of the more than Society. While noting that significant progress 19,000 students who have passed through the had been made in expanding the number of academy, some 11,000 were recycled police police, improving public perceptions of the from the prior force. Because of the low pool of force, and somewhat improving police effec- candidates, standards have been lowered and tiveness in combating crime, the report con- there have been continuing problems of influ- cluded that: ence-peddling and favoritism in the selection ...police reform in Guatemala remains a process. These problems have continued with deeply flawed process that will require the selection of students for the most recent much greater attention and political will by (10th) course. the government and the international com- One positive step taken during 2000 was the munity. The Arzú government took short- establishment of the Unidad de Verificación de cuts that may contribute to long term prob- Antecedentes (UVEA) to review and verify the lems with discipline, corruption, brutality, credentials of applicants. The unit is funded by and criminality within the force. The MINUGUA and the Institute for Criminal reform process has been marked by serious Investigation Training and Assistance Program deficiencies in recruitment, selection, train- (ICITAP), and during 2001 it suspended 979 ing, leadership, and internal discipline. In applicants for the eighth course and 1028 40 Who Governs? applicants for the ninth course because of falsi- Internal discipline and external controls. The fication of documents. internal disciplinary system of the PNC was There has also been some progress toward designed by advisors from the Spanish Civil broadening the multiethnic character of the Guard, and is modeled on the system used by police. While the percentage of indigenous the Spaniards. It assumes a highly militarized police is only about 18% of the total, in 2001 police force, and is notable for permitting abuse the training academy began offering a module of police personnel by superiors while failing to aimed at broadening understanding of indige- provide adequate channels for handling citizen nous customs. It also opened three pilot offices complaints. The system is also quite confusing, to reach out to indigenous communities in in that it provides three different procedures for Cobán, Quetzaltenango and the Petén. different types of misconduct. The procedure for handling minor violations Education and training. The WOLA report gives superior officers the power to initiate, noted that the requirement of the peace accord investigate and resolve accusations. The proce- that cadets be given six months basic training dure also permits preventative detention of had been interpreted by the Arzú administra- accused officers and denies them the right to tion to apply only to new recruits. Recycled counsel for lesser offenses. One result is that police from the old force were given only a few officers appeal their sentences, since they three-month course, and some specialized units have already served all or most of the period of received even less training. There were also detention imposed. problems with the quality of instruction, with The Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias most of the emphasis on theoretical training Penales de Guatemala studied the internal disci- and very little operational practice. There has plinary system, and found that few police under- been no real improvement in these areas, and in stand the regulations, and that the procedures its April 2001, report on the police, MIN- stipulated by the regulations are often not fol- UGUA again expressed serious reservations lowed at the local level.106 They found that about the quality of training. supervisors tend to view regulations solely as a tool for maintaining strict discipline. While the Leadership. The frequent changes at the ministry PNC would not provide current statistics to the and at the head of the police have been accompa- Instituto, an examination of data from the adop- nied by similarly frequent changes at lower levels. tion of the regulations in 1997 through 1999 The Guatemalan Congress has still not approved a found that not a single complaint initiated by a career law (ley de carera) to regulate processes of member of the public resulted in punishment, promotion and advancement, and this has created and no punishment imposed was for abuse of a an aura of uncertainty and fear of arbitrariness citizen. Most cases that did result in punish- among officials and agents. During the tenure of ment were initiated by superiors and were for Lécsan Mérida as police chief there were numerous violations of discipline or for not going through allegations of high-level police officials requiring proper channels. Alternative dispute resolution kickbacks or bribes in exchange for appointments mechanisms provided for in the regulations were to command positions, which in turn encouraged not used. corruption on the part of the officials appointed to On the positive side, the Instituto’s researchers recover the funds they had to pay out. interviewed samples of the general public in Morale of police officers has also been hurt by wealthy and working class areas of Guatemala poor equipment, unpleasant schedules and abuse City and in rural Huehuetenango, and found by superiors. MINUGUA reported some that those interviewed in all areas believed that improvement in the work schedules, but the treatment of the public by the police had other problems continue to inhibit better morale. improved since the PNC was formed. None of Reforming the Justice System 41 those interviewed had any knowledge of what Remilitarization. The short-term response of the are the internal disciplinary procedures. government to weaknesses in the PNC has been With respect to external oversight of the to steadily increase reliance on the armed forces police, the peace accords called for the creation to perform police functions, in violation of the of an Advisory Council on Security that would peace accords. In June 2000, the Guatemalan include representatives of civil society. Five congress approved a law authorizing the execu- years after the signing of the accords, the coun- tive branch to call upon the army to assist the cil has still not been established. police, and Portillo has done so with increasing frequency. In early 2001, the minister of Criminal investigations. The Criminal Gobernación, Byron Barrientos, announced a “sat- Investigation Service (Servicio de Investigación uration plan” aimed at reassuring the populace Criminal, SIC) has been plagued by insufficient by dramatically increasing the visible presence of personnel, inadequate training and poor proce- police and soldiers patrolling the streets of dures. At the beginning of 2000, the SIC had Guatemala City. After a major jailbreak later in about 500 investigators, which was approximate- the year, tens of thousands of soldiers were ly one-third of the number needed for effective ordered to carry out policing functions. national coverage. By April of 2001 that number During the Arzú administration, there was had increased to 742, and it was deployed in 14 also army assistance to the police. These were departments. In its April report, MINUGUA technically called “joint patrols”, in which found that serious weaknesses in planning and army units served under the command of police investigation continued, and that inadequate officers. At first these were frequently made up crime scene procedures and poor documentation of one relatively low-ranking police officer and procedures by SIC investigators continue to an army squad under the command of a lieu- inhibit effective investigation and prosecu- tenant, but by the end of Arzú’s term the more tion.107 ICITAP has been providing a training common pattern was to have one police officer course for SIC recruits, but has had continuing and on army officer on joint patrol. Under the difficulty in ensuring adequate evaluation and current government, there is little pretense that screening of entrants in the course because of the police are in command. poor cooperation from the ministry of Human rights activists are properly worried Gobernacion. In late 2001, ICITAP instructors about this “re-militarization” of police func- were temporarily withdrawn from Guatemala tions, and tend to see it as part of a larger trend after they received death threats.108 of re-militarization of government. On the As mentioned above, there also continue to be other hand, interviews with army officers sug- serious failures of institutional cooperation gest that the armed forces do not like being between the PNC and the Public Ministry. assigned to policing functions. And everyone Investigators from the Public Ministry are often admits that the scale of crime is still beyond slow to arrive at crime scenes and when they do the capacity of the PNC to effectively control. arrive they order SIC investigators to leave the Popular sentiments seem to support the use of scene. the army to assist the police, at least thus far. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

ocial and economic exclusion were major the most part. However, until mid-2001, both causes of the internal armed conflict in the Arzú and Portillo administrations showed SGuatemala. The consequences of that little willingness to increase taxes. In mid- exclusion continue to inhibit processes of 2001, congress approved a package of tax- democratization and modernization in the reforms that included raising the value added country, and undermine efforts to carry out the tax (VAT) rate from 10% to 12%, amidst provisions of the peace accords. There is a large-scale protests and a looming fiscal crisis. vicious cycle in which the consequences of Working class groups protested because of the exclusion inhibit the development of the kind regressive nature of the VAT, while the private of strong institutions needed, both in govern- sector objected to sector-specific taxes and ment and civil society, in order to carry out reforms that penalized tax-evasion. All the reforms capable of reducing the severity and opponents argued that tax increases would scope of exclusion. only fuel rampant government corruption. One measure of the severity of social exclu- Some opponents on the right claimed that sion and inequality in Guatemala is that, proposed tougher collection methods amount- despite the common practice of international ed to “fascism.”110 financial institutions to pressure countries to The protests underscored the difficulty of cut the size of government and slash spending, carrying out fiscal reforms in Guatemala, and these same institutions have been urging the extent to which the state is viewed as part Guatemala to increase social spending and tax of the problem rather than part of the solu- revenues. Indeed, Guatemala has been success- tion. Without fiscal reforms, however, it is dif- fully resisting World Bank suggestions to ficult to see how Guatemala can begin to increase tax revenues for decades, as indicated reduce the vast disparities that foster polit- by a 1978 World Bank report.109 During peace ical polarization and inhibit democrati- accords negotiations, the World Bank, the zation. Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) and the IMF CHART 2: TAX REVENUES AS PERCENT OF GDP, 1996 were influential in (Source: World Bank, 1998/1999, Table 14) getting agreement 30 on provisions for 50% increases in 25 health and educa- tion spending, and 20 equivalent increases in tax revenues to 15 pay for the myriad of reforms set out in 10 the accords. The tar- get date for achiev- 5 ing these increases was 2000. 0 Chile Peru Guatemala did Brazil Bolivia Mexico Uraguay Panama Ecuador Colombia Nicaragua Costa Rica Venezuela ArgentinaEl Salvador Guatemala meet the annual Dominican Rep. spending goals for Economic and Social Exclusion 43

Domestic Products CHART 3: GDP PER CAPITA (IN DOLLARS PPP), 1999 (GDP) per capi- (Source:UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, Table 1) ta.111

14000 In comparison with other coun- 12000 tries in the hemi- sphere, Guatemala 10000 has spent little on

8000 education and health, and it suf- 6000 fers the conse- quences.112 Public 4000 expenditures on 2000 education in Guatemala were 0 about 1.7% of

Chile Brazil Peru Haiti Mexico Ecuador Bolivia GDP in 1997, the Uraguay Panama Colombia Paraguay Honduras Argentina Costa Rica Venezuela El SalvadorGuatemala Nicaragua Dominican Rep. same as in 1980 and about the low- est in the region. In fact, the fiscal reform goals of the peace Four countries with educational spending rates accords are quite modest when one looks at at least twice those of Guatemala had smaller comparisons with other Latin American coun- GDP per capita figures. Guatemala has the tries. And those most disadvantaged by the cur- second highest rate of illiteracy, (31.9%), and rent fiscal structure in Guatemala tend to be the largest disparity between women and men. rural dwellers, the indigenous, and women— Its illiteracy rates are at least twice as high as precisely the groups disadvantaged by the elec- fourteen countries (see Chart 5).113 toral system.

Guatemala and CHART 4: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION AS PERCENT Latin America. OF GDP IN 1980 AND 1997 Among 16 Latin (Source: World Bank 2000/2001, Table 6) American countries, 9 Guatemala’s 1996 8 tax coefficient was 1980 by far the lowest, at 7 1997 7.7% of GDP (see 6

Chart 2). Chile, the 5 star model in neolib- eral circles, had a tax 4 coefficient of 18.3%. 3 Guatemala’s tax 2 coefficient was lower than at least three 1 countries 0 Brazil Peru Chile Bolivia Mexico Ecuador (Nicaragua, Bolivia, Colombia Panama Honduras Uruguay Paraguay NicaraguaCosta RicaVenezuela Argentina El Salvador Guatemala Ecuador) that had Dominican Rep. lower Gross 44 Who Governs?

In 1980, Guate- mala had the sec- CHART 5: MALE AND FEMALE ILLITERACY AS PERCENT OF ond smallest per- POPULATION OVER 14, 1998 (Source:World Bank 2000/2001, Table 2) centage of high school aged chil- 60 dren in secondary 50 Male school, and by Female 1997 it had wors- 40 ened to become the 30 smallest, with Honduras and El 20 Salvador doing 10 about as badly. 0 In public health Chile Brazil Peru Haiti Ecuador Mexico Bolivia Uruguay Colombia PanamaParaguay Honduras spending, Guate- Argentina Costa Rica Venezuela El Salvador NicaraguaGuatemala mala is bunched Dominican Rep. with five countries in the bottom tier CHART 6: NET ENROLLMENT IN SECONDARY EDUCATION AS and significantly PERCENT OF RELEVANT AGE GROUP, 1980 AND 1997 (Source: World Bank above only Haiti. If 2000/2001, Table 6) one combines pub- 90 lic and private 80 1980 expenditures on 70 1997 health, Guatemala 60 ranks only slightly 50 ahead of Haiti 40 (4.4% to 4.2%), 30 and ahead of 20 Ecuador (3.7%). 10 Measuring spend- 0 ing on health per Chile Peru Brazil Mexico Ecuador Bolivia Uruguay Colombia Panama Paraguay Honduras capita shows Argentina NicaraguaVenezuela Costa RicaEl Salvador Guatemala Dominican Rep. Guatemala, at $155 CHART 7: HEALTH SPENDING AS PERCENT OF GDP, 1998 per capita (PPP) to (Source: UNDP, 2001, Table 6) 14 be markedly ahead of only Haiti, and 12 Government spending well below its poor- 10 Government and private spending er cousins

8 Honduras ($210) and Nicaragua 6 ($266) (see Chart 4 8). 2 The social conse- quences of low 0 spending on health Brazil Chile Peru Haiti Bolivia Ecuador Colombia Panama Honduras Uruguay Paraguay Nicaragua Costa Rica Argentina El SalvadorVenezuela Guatemala are evident. While Dominican Rep. Guatemala’s infant Economic and Social Exclusion 45 mortality rates improved dramati- CHART 8: HEALTH SPENDING IN DOLLARS (PPP) PER CAPITA, 1998 cally in the last third (Source: UNDP, 2001, Table 6) of the century, from 1400 115 per 1000 in 1200 1970 to 45 per 1000 1000 in 1999, its record in 1999 was not as good 800 as most, including 600 Honduras and Ni- 400 caragua. The proba- 200 bility in Guatemala 0 of dying before age Chile Brazil Peru Haiti Bolivia Ecuador Uruguay Colombia Panama Paraguay Honduras 40 was recently Argentina Costa Rica El Salvador NicaraguaVenezuela Guatemala 15.6%, much better Dominican Rep. than Haiti, but only slightly better than Honduras (16%) and CHART 9: INFANT MORTALITY PER 1000 LIVE BIRTHS, 1999 Bolivia (18.4%), (Source: UNDP, 2001, Table 8) whose GDP per 90 capita is some 80 $1300 less than that 70 of Guatemala. 60 The UNDP cal- 50 culates a national 40 Human Develop- 30 ment Index (HDI) 20 that combines mea- 10 sures of education, 0 Chile Brazil Peru Haiti Ecuador Mexico Bolivia Uruguay Panama Colombia ParaguayHonduras life expectancy, and Costa Rica ArgentinaVenezuela El SalvadorNicaragua Guatemala standard of living. Dominican Rep.

In the 2001 edition, CHART 10: PROBABILITY AT BIRTH OF NOT SURVIVING TO AGE 40 Guatemala was (PERCENT OF COHORT), 1995–2000 (Source: UNDP, 2001, Table 3) ranked 108th,

35 bunched with other small Latin Ameri- 30 can countries. In an 25 effort to relate the 20 HDI rank to the 15 size and power of a

10 nation’s economy, the UNDP sub- 5 tracts HDI country 0 ranking from the Chile Peru Haiti Mexico Brazil Bolivia per capita GDP Uruguay Panama Paraguay Colombia Ecuador Honduras Costa Rica Argentina Venezuela El Salvador Nicaragua Guatemala Dominican Rep. country ranking. A negative ranking 46 Who Governs?

poverty (40%) was CHART 11: UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RANK MINUS GDP nearly six times the PER CAPITA RANK (Source: UNDP, 2001, Table 1) urban rate (7%). 20 The poverty rate

15 among indigenous peoples (74%) was 10 almost double that 5 of non-indigenous (41%). Fifteen per- 0 cent of non-indige- -5 nous live in ex-

-10 treme poverty com- pared to 39% of -15 indigenous.114

Chile Peru Haiti Brazil Ecuador Bolivia Mexico As shown in Table Panama Uruguay Colombia HondurasParaguay Venezuela NicaraguaArgentina Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Dominican Rep. 8, far more indige- nous live with only means that human development lags behind the a dirt floor, even in rural areas. Fewer have elec- size of the economy. Among all Latin tricity, piped water or sewage connections, tele- American countries, Guatemala and the phone, or TV. As indicated by the last two Dominican Republic had the two worst rankings rows, the differences are only partially (-16). explained by the greater percentages of indige- nous that live in rural areas. Poverty and inequality. Guatemala’s poverty In education, there have been notable gains rate declined from 1989 (63%) to 1998 (57%), in reducing, though far from eliminating, the but in 1998 there were half a million more gap between groups. The literacy rate was people below the poverty line (though on aver- 63.1% in 1989 and 68.7% in 1998. However, age they were not quite so far below the line as as in the case of poverty, that gain would leave was the case in 1989). The rate of extreme about the same absolute number of illiterates as poverty also declined, but the absolute num- in 1989.115 bers remained the same — 2.8 million people. The 1989 literacy rate for indigenous women The rural poverty rate was nearly 3 times the of 28.1% was below abysmal, and indicates, urban rate (77% to 29%), and 4 times that of with one statistic, a profound legacy of five Guatemala City. The rural rate of extreme centuries of ethnic and gender discrimination.

TABLE 8: HOUSING AND COMMUNICATIONS CONDITIONS. PERCENT BY HOUSEHOLD HEADS, 1998 Only a No No No piped No piped No No No dirt floor electric electric water water sewage phone TV 1998 1989 1998 1989 1998 1998 1998 1998 Indigenous 60.4 74.6 49.1 45.4 44.8 81.2 95.3 63.5 Non indigenous 26.7 36.6 25.2 30.9 29.6 56.3 76.6 28.2 Urban 18.2 13.2 8.8 12.8 10.4 26.7 67.1 15.3 Rural 60.0 72.8 56.6 50.4 56.4 98.6 99.0 66.0 Indigenous. Rural 72.6 84.9 62.4 52.3 56.3 99.3 99.6 77.2 Non Ind. Rural 43.7 62.5 49.2 48.7 56.0 97.6 98.3 51.6 Source: La fuerza incluyente, Tables 3.22, 3.25, 3.26, 3.28, 5.8 Economic and Social Exclusion 47

the population that has health insurance.119 In TABLE: 9 LITERACY ETHNIC AND GEOGRAPHIC rural areas the health infrastructure cannot pro- 1989 1998 vide quality, or in some cases any, services. More than one-third of the rural population Indigenous 40.9 57.5 must walk an average of 7.2 miles to find a Non Indigenous 76.0 78.6 health center. Once at the center, the chances Urban 81.5 84.5 are high that equipment will not be functional Rural 52.2 57.4 and extremely high that there will be no doctor Ind Rural 36.5 50.9 120 Non Ind. Rural 65.6 66.2 or professional nurse. Between 700,000 and one million Guate- Source: La fuerza incluyente, Table 5.4 malans are forced to migrate for harvest work from November to April. PAHO found health problems in 80% of migrant families. There is TABLE 10: LITERACY little or no health or educational infrastructure 1989 1998 for migrant workers.121 Men 71.2 74.7 As these numbers demonstrate, the scope of Women 55.5 63.1 the challenge facing Guatemalan authorities is Rural Men 61.8 66.0 enormous. The United Nations estimates that Rural Women 42.8 49.1 in order to reduce poverty and extreme poverty Indigenous Men 53.2 67.3 in Guatemala by ten percentage points (and Indigenous Women 28.1 48.5 making no change in inequality), the country Non Indigenous Men 81.3 81.1 would need economic growth sufficient to Non Indigenous Women 71.0 76.2 increase income per capita by 24%. Actual Source La fuerza incluyente, Table 5.4 GNP growth per capita for 1998/1999 was half of one percent (.5%).122 Even with a 20-point gain, indigenous women Although inequality fell somewhat between in 1998 were still thirty points behind the non- 1989 and 1999, Guatemala has one of the indigenous. Two departments with indigenous highest levels of inequality in the world, in a populations approaching 95% (Sololá and dubious race for first place with South Africa Tontonicapán) had lower rates of illiteracy by and Brazil. The UN estimates that if inequality 15 points than the three worst departments in were reduced to the level of Costa Rica (with- the country.116 out any change in the relative size of the Many children have to work. The situation economies), the poverty rate would drop by seems to have worsened in the last half-decade, thirteen percentage points.123 when the percent of children working went These findings suggest that focusing on eco- from 28.6% in 1994 to 36.7% in 1999.117 nomic growth, alone, is unlikely to have signif- Rural school dropout rates are over twice as icant impacts on reducing poverty in high as urban rates. Females attend school at Guatemala. While economic growth is impor- lower rates than males. In two rural depart- tant, policies aimed at reducing the extreme ments with high indigenous populations levels of inequality must be an essential compo- (Quiché and Alta Verapaz), only 40% of stu- nent of any strategy to reduce poverty. That dents are female.118 logic is at the root of the social and economic According to the Pan American Health provisions of the peace accords, and shaped the Organization (PAHO), about 80% of the very modest spending targets agreed to in those nation’s doctors practice in Guatemala City. accords. Over three-quarters of private hospitals and private clinics are in the metropolitan area. Social spending. Between 1995 and 1999, the They serve primarily the small proportion of Guatemalan government more than met the 48 Who Governs?

12% in 1999, and this might have made TABLE 11: 1999 SPENDING AND implementation of programs more effi- TARGETS AS PERCENT OF GDP cient.124 1995 1999 1999 While lack of political will and bad spending spending target faith seem part of the reason for contin- Health & social assistance .88 1.40 1.19 uing imbalances in social spending and Education 1.66 2.43 2.32 high levels of poverty and inequality, Public Security .34 .73 .48 institutional weaknesses are also a sig- Judicial .18 .30 .25 nificant factor. In 1997, the World Bank Public Ministry .11 .15 .15 warned that the size of government National Defense .99 .68 .66 plans for spending and investing in Source: La fuerza incluyente, 234. health was probably bigger than the capacity of the health ministry to spending goals set out in the peace accords. absorb. In 1996, for example, the health min- The largest annual increases in overall spend- istry under-spent its budget by 44%. In educa- ing and social spending were in 1999, an elec- tion, under-execution was 21%.125 Changing tion year, and they were financed in part from the organizational culture and administrative proceeds from privatization — not a stable capacity of government institutions is very dif- source of financing. They were also financed by ficult, and normally takes a long time. declines, in real terms, in military spending. However, the increases are based upon very LAND AND POVERTY low starting points—a reflection of Guatemala’s Lack of access to land is the foundation of rural history. For example, in education the increase poverty. From the colonial era on the indige- was 48%, from Q157 to Q233 per capita. If one nous lost lands that the Spanish conquerors had were to want to practice one’s new reading abili- “granted” them to more powerful land grab- ty by purchasing the newspaper every day, the bers, a process that accelerated, despite orga- Q76 increase would last about 6 weeks. nized opposition by the indigenous, during the Spending of government agencies was sup- late 19th century coffee boom. And colonial posed to be redirected toward poorer regions of forms of labor coercion were replaced by other the country, but the record has been mixed. forms, such as vagrancy laws and forced indebt- The percentage of social spending going to edness.126 metropolitan Guatemala City was reduced from Guatemala’s earlier elected governments from 56% to 44%, while that going to regions with 1945–1954 ruptured the historical pattern. the lowest Human Development Index President Juan Jose Arévalo regulated agrarian increased from 24% to 32%. However, in per rents and sponsored labor legislation that capita terms the metropolitan area (with 23% brought more freedom for union organizing. of the population) was still getting far more President Jacobo Arbenz legislated an agrarian than the three poorest regions (with 47% of the reform that permitted expropriation of large population). lands that were not being utilized, with com- There has also been a general decentraliza- pensation based on previous property tax values. tion of funds toward the municipal level, but it Some 600,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres) is not clear that municipalities are giving were expropriated, including over 300,000 poverty reduction a high priority. Financing to hectares from foreign estates, mainly the U.S. municipal governments went from Q464mil- based United Fruit Company. The government lion in 1995 to Q1.3 billion in 1999. Monies also made available 280,000 hectares from large assigned to 8 social funds increased as a propor- coffee estates it had expropriated during World tion of GDP from 4% in 1996 to just over War II from German expatriate owners. Economic and Social Exclusion 49

An estimated 100,000 families benefited, Baumeister also found a large increase in the about one sixth of the population. After the amount of land being put to agricultural use CIA-sponsored overthrow of Arbenz, the agrar- since 1979, about 1.1 million hectares. A bit of ian reform was reversed, and portions of the this increase (from 36,000 hectares to 69,000 former German estates were privatized in large hectares) was in small farms growing non-tradi- parcels to individual owners.127 tional crops for export, perhaps 140,000 pro- This history provides a baseline for evaluat- ducers averaging 1/2 hectare, who might well ing what has been done since. Landholding pat- make more income than those growing basic terns today are similar to the time just before grains. The big increase was frontier forestlands Arbenz. Current government programs are (872,000 Hectares), mostly in the Petén. But comparatively small. these are mostly cattle grazing farms, and they employ few people.134 Nonetheless, this Stagnation. A pre-agrarian reform 1950 land increase provided some help to the expanding census found that 72% of the farm land in rural population at the cost of widespread envi- Guatemala was controlled by 2% of the farm- ronmental destruction. ing units, while 88% of the farming units con- Another economic and social “safety valve” 128 trolled only 14% of the land. A 1979 census has been increased migration of Guatemalans to showed that a mere 2.5% of farms controlled the U.S. The aforementioned estimate was 65% of agricultural land, while 88% of farms 570,000. The World Bank estimated that in accounted for only 16%. The 1979 study found 1998, Guatemalans in the U.S. sent home $456 that over 400,000 owners averaged only1.63 million, equivalent to about 13% of hectares of lands. Another 164,000 rural fami- Guatemala’s export earnings or $42 per capita. lies had no access to land. The practice of com- munities to hold communal lands for farming These significant amounts are not in the same had shrunk from 12.3% of farmed land in 1950 league as neighboring El Salvador, a world to 1.1% in 1979. A 1982 AID study found leader in remittances. In 1998 Salvadorans 135 that 31% of farms possessed less than 0.7 remitted $1.338 billion or $228 per capita. hectare.129 The Gini index for landholding However, these safety valves and migration inequality in Guatemala was the highest in to the cities have not come close to solving the Latin America.130 Land shortages fed the plan- problem of rural poverty. The rural population tation’s need for cheap labor, with the resultant increased almost as fast as the urban population mass migrations during the harvest seasons.131 (1.86 million rural increase compared to 1.936 There has not been a comprehensive land million urban increase), and stood at 58% of survey since 1979. Several smaller studies indi- the population. The rate of urbanization is rela- cate significant shifts, but also suggest that tively low in Guatemala.136 acute inequality and land poverty are worse It is hard to make the case that the large that in 1979. Eduardo Baumeister has summa- plantations used to grow traditional export rized the findings.132 The proportion of rural crops or cattle for export have amounted to a families involved in agriculture but with no savior of the national economy. Growth in agri- direct access to land (either as owners or cultural production was very high between renters) increased between 1979 and 1998 from 1965 and 1980, averaging 5.1%.137 In the 22% to 33%. The proportion of families that 1980s, largely because of the conflict, agricul- owned land declined from 61% to 49%, and tural growth was stagnant. It made a slight those that rent land increased from 8% to 17%. recovery to 2.7% annual growth in the first (Baumeister found significant variations half of the 1990s, but this was less than the between regions.) Case studies indicated that population growth rate. Much of the increase the size of lands owned or rented by small was due to small and medium-sized family farmers went down.133 farm non-traditional exports.138 50 Who Governs?

Land programs and the accords. Insecurity of families in micro parcels averaging .65 land tenure is substantial, especially for the hectares.141 indigenous. There are layers of conflicting A similar program for returning war refugees property claims. Some returning refugees found acquired, between 1992 and 1999, 34 farms others on their former lands. In the 1960s and totaling 57,840 hectares for 4,665 families. 1970s, military regimes carved up areas of the (Some 43,000 refugees returned from Mexico Petén and the Northern Tranverse Strip among in organized groups.) Many of the farms lacked high-ranking officers. The property registers basic infrastructure and could not be rapidly are a mess. Perhaps 40% of property holdings put into production.142 Virtually nothing has are unregistered. The problem has been partic- been done for the estimated 1 to 1.5 million ularly severe in the Petén, where new occupants who fled war zones for other regions of eviscerated private and government property Guatemala. rights.139 The Land Fund described in the Civic Actors The peace accords call for speedy procedures section has been more significant. In addition to resolve land conflicts. Significant interna- to purchase of private lands and sale and financ- tional support has come to support a cadastral ing of these and government lands to organized survey. And the government formed an agency, groups of the land poor, the Land Fund is to CONTIERRA, to mediate the many land dis- take back illegally acquired lands in the Petén putes. Both efforts, in their initial stages, and Transversal strip. In its first 26 months of engendered considerable controversy. Some operation, up to March 31, 2000, the Land argue the land survey will protect the rights of Fund had financed the acquisition of 13,408 small holders, but leaders of peasant organiza- hectares for 2476 families (or 5.41 hectares per tions fear that the survey will lock in past family). usurpations. CONTIERRA was faulted for low However, the Land Fund had received organizational resources and a greater ability to requests from 531 groups representing 35,457 hear disputes than to resolve them.140 families. At the then average rate of just under The accords also called for the use of state 100 families per month it would take nearly lands and idle land to alleviate land poverty, but three decades to meet these requests, and esti- this provision will be difficult to implement. It mates suggest the demand from organized is not clear that the Guatemalan government groups is between 55,000 and 60,000 families. possesses much land suited for agriculture. And there are many more landless people not in organized groups.143 Experts believe that the systematic expansion of export crops in recent years means that large plantations, apart from cattle ranches, contain THE DIFFICULTY IN RAISING REVENUES little idle land. However, even if all the idle While there has been a fair amount of success land held by large landlords were carved up into in meeting social spending targets (which were parcels, these would not suffice to provide a relatively modest), the government has been solid economic base for the increased numbers much less successful in adopting measures to of landless and near-landless rural population. raise revenues. The problem is both lack of A series of land purchase programs have political will on the part of political actors, and made small dents in the overall problem. stubborn resistance from those most affected by Before the peace accord, a government land any increases. bank purchased large estates and resold them, The revenue target in the peace accords was to with financing, at market prices to organized raise tax revenues from about 8% of GDP to groups of those suffering from land poverty. 12% of GDP by 2000. The accords did not spell But by 1992 only 18 farms totaling 16,000 out, however, the specific strategies and actions hectares had been purchased. These went to the government would take to achieve the tar- Economic and Social Exclusion 51 get. The Arzú administration tried to focus on Guatemalans and persistent international actors increasing the efficiency of tax collection, a long- to convoke representative groups, to initiate standing problem and less controversial than dialogue and negotiate themes, goals, and con- raising taxes.144 However, in the international crete agreements over a sustained period was a community there was general consensus that real accomplishment in the democratization more efficient collection would not solve the process. problem. A World Bank study found that, Political factors were also crucial, however. “Between 1995 and 1998 the tax ratio increased The preparatory commission working to by about 1% of GDP — barely one fourth of the advance a fiscal pact did not present its propos- Peace Accords target — and this increase was als until after the 1999 elections, and most of partly due to a temporary asset tax.”145 In 1998, the serious negotiating took place after the new the government did create the Superintendent of government came to power. Taxes (SAT), to try to improve collections. A skilled analysis of the details of the process The challenges facing any effort by the gov- was published a year later in a handsomely ernment to increase taxes were on display in designed and photographed book, la Guatemala 1997, when the Arzú administration tried to Posible: la senda del pacto fiscal, which celebrated increase taxes on rural properties. The proposed the process. The book was financed by MIN- change would have abandoned the absurd prac- UGUA, which had played a key role in facili- tice of allowing property owners to self-assess tating the process, so in a sense the book was the value of their properties, and imposed a both an analysis and a culmination of the modest, progressive tax. There was an explosion process.146 However, as the peace accords have of protest, with the FRG leading the opposi- demonstrated, implementation of an agreement tion and organizing demonstrations in some is hardly guaranteed. rural areas. Arzú hastily withdrew the proposal, A year after the Fiscal Pact, MINUGUA also and shifted his tactics to delaying the deadline published (in a quite modestly designed book- until after his administration left office. let) an Informe de Verificación: El Pacto Fiscal un In October 1998, the signatories to the año después. Its central finding was that very lit- accords agreed to extend the 12% deadline to tle had changed. Of 60 agreements, two had 2002 as part of a larger negotiation on an array been completed, another 7 were well along, and of tax-related issues regarding expenditures, 22 had had at least some action (including 6 administration, enforcement and internal debt. that involved the annual budget process). No A year and a half later these negotiations, progress had been made on 29 others. The study which included a variety of groups from civil found that of 802 cases brought to court to society, resulted in the Fiscal Pact of May 2000. enforce compliance with tax laws, only 3 had The pact set forth sixty agreements about tax resulted in sentences (58 others had resulted in increases, reduction of tax exemptions and indi- orders to seize an automobile) and the sentences vidual privileges, improved administration and had been commuted. The recommendations of collection, and spending and budget trans- the document exceed the normal legalistic, parency. objective, and calm prose of the UN. The The achievement of the Fiscal Pact, in many Informe has sentences in bold-faced print ways, mirrored the processes in the final stages “exhorting” the parties about the “indispens- of the negotiation of the peace accords. able,” or “transcendental importance.”147 The Participation was extended to an array of CSOs. document reflects MINUGUA’s frustration after There was considerable international support over five years of tax process with few results. (amid some skepticism) and informal media- Failure to implement the pact put the govern- tion was constant. ment in an increasingly serious fiscal crunch. The process resulted in a complex, multifac- International financial institutions and bi-lateral eted agreement. This example of the ability of donors made it clear that new assistance would 52 Who Governs? not be forthcoming until fiscal reforms CHART 12: VALUE ADDED TAX AS PERCENT OF INCOME BY were implemented, HOUSEHOLD INCOME DECILES, 1998 (Source: Gamboa and Trentavizi, 2001, 28) and the government 4% was literally run- 3.61 ning out of money. 3.53 3.47 3.5% 3.37 Added to this fiscal 3.28 imbalance was what 3.03 3% the World Bank referred to as 2.66 2.5% Guatemala’s “bat- 2.29 tered banking sys- 1.98 tem.” In 2001 this 2% 2.14 included two failed banks (with consid- 1.5% erable corruption D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 analyzed above). The government bailed out the banks. Finally, has become the main revenue earner, by far. growth rates were declining. From 1997–1998, From 1995 through 1999, taxes increased from GDP growth averaged 4.5%, but in 1999 it was 7.96% to 9.85% of GDP. During that time the 3.6%. At the end of 2000, GDP growth for VAT increased from 2.86% of GDP to 4.62%, 2000 was estimated to be 3.3%. And by mid- and represented 93% of the total increase. All 2001, (that is before September 11th) the pro- other taxes, save those on oil, decreased relative jection for 2001 was 3.0%.148 to GDP.151 This combination of factors forced Portillo’s Although the government has not given in hand. He proposed and Congress approved an to opposition demands to roll back the tax increase in the VAT from 10% to 12%, along reforms, the reforms are unlikely to relieve the with other measures to stiffen penalties for eva- severe economic crisis anytime soon. Post sion, to tax phone calls, imported used cars, and September 11th GDP growth estimates for some financial transactions. The reaction of 2001 were 2.2%. Even before September 11th, CACIF to these measures was described earlier in exports were off over the previous year by about the chapter on traditional power-brokers.149 6%. Coffee production was predicted to be Leftist opposition to the VAT increase was rooted 15% less than 2000. Tourism, a source of for- in the (mostly correct) argument that it is a eign exchange exceeding even that of coffee, regressive tax, although the actual impact is a bit had faced a decline in receipts of 15%, and after complicated. Chart 12 indicates that the VAT is September 11th hotels reported 40% cancella- progressive for the first six deciles, and then is tions. These developments led the government regressive particularly for the richest group.150 to decrease proposed spending for 2002 to the The problem faced by Portillo, or any levels of 2001.152 Guatemalan government seeking to quickly Thus, the vicious cycle seems still to be generate additional revenues, is that the VAT working. CONCLUSION

uatemala is at a difficult crossroads. participated as individuals, and not as represen- The process of democratization has tatives of their organizations. Gweakened the monopoly on political At about the same time, Monsignor Rodolfo power formerly exercised by the armed forces Quezada Toruño, recently appointed and the traditional economic elite, but more Archbishop of Guatemala, began a process of representative and democratic alternatives have consultation with some fifty civil society lead- not become notably stronger. Political parties ers to explore ideas about the desirability and are weak, civil society actors are weak, and gov- possibility of some kind of national dialogue. ernment institutions lack both capacity and the Both of these first efforts to open a debate political will necessary to deepen the process of about the need for a national dialogue reflected democratic reform without increased social a recognition that three conditions were neces- support and political pressure. sary in order for such a dialogue to have a The result is growing popular frustration, chance of success: increased political fragmentation, and renewed • there must be agreement on the agenda for a polarization. The peace accords, which offered a dialogue, and the agenda must be neither so negotiated national agenda for consolidating narrow that it won’t have broad support nor democracy and modernizing the state, have so wide that it will be impossible to reach failed to develop the broad social base of sup- agreements; port needed to ensure their implementation. • there must be agreement about who participates in Instead, sectoral and particularistic agendas the dialogue, and the participation must be broad compete for momentary advantage and tran- enough to give agreements legitimacy while small sient gain. enough to actually permit dialogue and resolution In this context of weakness and fragmenta- of disagreements; tion, there are growing calls for a new “nation- • there must be agreement about who will al dialogue” to forge a broader consensus on mediate the dialogue, and the mediator must what Guatemalan society should look like and have both the trust of those involved and the on how to get there. The notion of such a dia- skills to help resolve disputes. logue seems appealing as a way out of the cur- In the public debate during July and August rent morass, but a careful look at the debate there appeared to be substantial agreement that over dialogue reveals a number of very funda- Monsignor Quezada Toruño should be the mental obstacles that will be difficult to over- mediator. Major newspapers with close ties to come. big business heralded his consultative process Calls for a new national dialogue began to be (while significantly misrepresenting it) and heard in the mid-2001, as conflict over the fis- publicized favorable comments by prominent cal reforms began to reach a peak. In July, a citizens. Both Portillo and leaders of Barómetro group of prominent individuals that included privately indicated support for him to play the academics, human rights activists, business role of mediator, as well. leaders, think-tank leaders and other intellectu- The support was both personal and institu- als and civil society activists reflecting diverse tional. The Church was severely weakened by political tendencies formed the Grupo the war. Catholicism is no longer hegemonic, Barómetro, and called upon the government to with some 40% of the population estimated to enter into a dialogue about economic policy, have joined other Christian denominations. The strengthening the leadership and democratic Church is also less centralized than before, with character of government institutions, and root- two archbishops, a decision-making Bishops’ ing out corruption. The members of Barómetro Conference, and increasingly independent dio- 54 Who Governs? ceses. Nonetheless, it remains a strong institu- Although there has been significant progress tional force and can be an important player in toward initiating a formal process of national helping to bridge differences between sectors dialogue, it is far from clear that the essential and build popular support for any agreements. conditions have really been met. For one thing, Monsignor Quezada is, at 69 years, an experi- in November Ríos Montt announced that any enced administrator and mediator capable of agreements reached through such a dialogue navigating the troubled national and ecclesias- would not be binding on the legislature. tical waters. In the early stages of the peace CACIF and the Foro have continued to demand negotiations he was a key mediator. a rollback of the fiscal reforms as a pre-condi- It was less clear how much agreement existed tion for participating in any dialogue, and the over the other conditions. The idea behind government has not agreed to do so. And it is Barómetro was that a fairly representative group still not at all clear that the Foro will be able to of individuals would be more manageable and speak with one voice. The evidence to date sug- have an easier time forging agreements than gests that it is more likely that there will be would a structure based on formal organiza- many different, and divergent, voices. The tional or sectoral representation. Portillo agreed announced themes for the dialogue are very to meet with representatives of the group, but broad, and the test will come in trying to agree they asked that Ríos Montt and Vice-President on a much more detailed and specific agenda. Reyes also participate to ensure that any agree- The hope offered by a new national dialogue ment reflected the entire government and not is that it will, like the peace negotiations and just part of the executive branch. Portillo the fiscal pact negotiations, help forge a multi- agreed. sectoral consensus on specific policies to deepen When the meeting took place, Ríos Montt democratization and reduce social exclusion. did not appear and Reyes proceeded to lecture The risk of a new national dialogue is that, as them about how they were unrepresentative with the peace accords and the fiscal pact, there and the government didn’t need to have a dia- will not be the political will or capacity to logue with a group of individuals.153 It became implement any agreements that emerge. There clear that the Barómetro strategy for resolving is also the likely prospect that some partici- the participation question would not work. pants will use the very existence of a dialogue In response to Reyes’ criticisms, a new group as an argument for freezing in place any steps was formed to press demands for national dia- to implement provisions of the peace accords or logue. The Foro Guatemala, unlike Barómetro, fiscal pact until new agreements are reached. has a representative character. Members formal- Remember that the fiscal pact negotiation ly represented their organizations, although the process lasted more than a year and a half! Foro encompassed basically the same sectors and Thus, a new process of national dialogue may groups reflected in the membership of be able to break the growing paralysis of Barómetro. CACIF is a member, and the modera- Guatemala’s political system, but it may also tors of the Foro are the rectors of the universi- reinforce that paralysis. Which occurs will ties. Portillo agreed in November to establish a depend heavily on the good will of those partic- formal dialogue with the Foro, and named Edgar ipating, yet over the past several years good Gutiérrez to organize it and head the govern- will has been in scarce supply. ment team. In December, Gutiérrez announced In the absence of good will, it appears that that the dialogue would begin the second week Guatemala may be heading into a period of in January and would address three themes: eco- increased social conflict and social mobilization nomic reactivation and combating poverty; by new multi-sectoral “fronts” that work out- transparency and the fight against corruption; side of the electoral framework. There is a grow- and strengthening democracy. ing sense in some parts of civil society, as Conclusion 55 described in the chapter on civic actors, that transcend sectoral or personal interests. There is narrowly focused policy advocacy will not be little trust in the good will or good faith of successful in advancing sectoral interests. At the others, and getting even often takes precedence same time, there is a growing recognition of the over getting ahead. political weakness of most civic actors and of There is no “quick fix” to these problems. the need to make alliances with other actors to There are, however, some strategic priorities develop sufficient clout to win demands. And that ought to guide long-term efforts to there is a growing belief among a quite diver- address them. Multi-sectoral dialogue and gent range of non-governmental actors (includ- negotiation should be encouraged, and agree- ing the private sector) that the current govern- ments reached through such processes must be ment is either unwilling or unable to negotiate promptly implemented. Leadership develop- or implement policy agreements. ment and institutional capacity-building are It may well be too late to avoid a scenario of critical needs for all sectors, but fostering increased social conflict, and it is important to democratic values (and practices) and tolerance understand clearly the key factors pushing the for diversity must be essential components of country in that direction. First, the political technical assistance programs aimed at meeting system has failed to provide effective institu- these needs. The institutional reform process tional mechanisms for citizens to participate in begun under the peace accords must continue shaping policies. The party system is unstable and accelerate, and greater attention must be and fickle. Citizens don’t know what they are devoted to insulating those reforms from parti- getting with their vote and the party system san political (or personal) influence. does not provide effective channels for balanc- Strengthening government institutions and ing divergent or conflicting interests. The strengthening civil society should not be posed intricate web of competing political and per- as competing strategies, both are essential. sonal interests represented in the current gov- Separation of powers is less a concern for ernment has produced policy paralysis rather strengthening Guatemalan democracy than is than negotiated compromise. developing more effective checks and balances Second, successive governments have simply between powers, and redressing the imbalance failed to deliver the goods in terms of jobs and requires society-wide strategies, not just gov- effective steps to reduce poverty and inequality. ernmentally-focused ones. The ongoing This is due to a combination of bad luck (changes impunity of the “fuerzas ocultas” and the “poderes in the world and regional economy that impact paralelos” undermines all of these priorities. negatively on Guatemala), bad faith (in particu- Finally, it is important to avoid focusing so lar, the refusal of the traditional economic elite to much on the problems of the moment that one honor the commitments it made in the peace loses a sense of historical process. Viewed from accords), bad capacity (weak institutions inca- one perspective, the institutional weaknesses pable of designing policies and delivering ser- and political fragmentation that characterize vices), and bad history (the severity of social and Guatemalan politics today are a predictable economic exclusion in Guatemala was so great legacy of almost fifty years of exclusion and that significant increases in social spending have repression. From another perspective, these relatively minor short-term impact). same characteristics reflect a partial leveling of A third, more intangible, factor is the cul- the extreme imbalance of power that was domi- tural legacy of Guatemala’s history of exclusion nant during the periods of military dictator- and repression. There is no tradition of resolv- ship. The challenge is to take advantage of ing conflicts through negotiation followed by more equal powers by reaching consensus of implementation of agreements. There is little sufficient strength to guarantee rapid imple- identification with any national interests that mentation. ENDNOTES

1 For population, World Bank, World Development Report 13 Prensa Libre, 16 September 1996. 1980, Table 1. Guatemala: Memory of Silence: Report of the 14 The information presented here about Ortiz’ testimony is Historical Clarification Commission and Recommendations (here- taken from a deposition he gave to prosecutors in May 1999. inafter CEH), 1999. HI has a copy of the deposition. Some of the information has 2 For a full description of the peace accords and the chal- also appeared in Guatemalan media. See, for example, “Otorgan lenges of implementation, see, Jack Spence, David R. Dye, libertad a Alfredo Moreno,” in Prensa Libre, 12 December 2001. Paula Worby, Carmen Rosa de Leon-Escribano, George Vickers 15 Deposition of a former customs officer, 26 May 1999. HI and Mike Lanchin, Promise and Reality: Implementation of the has a copy of the deposition. Guatemalan Peace Accords, Hemisphere Initiatives, Cambridge, MA, August 1998. 16 Other key members of the military network, according to Ortiz, were General Roberto Eduardo Letona Hora (also a for- 3 For a fuller discussion of civil society reactions see, mer chief of staff of the armed forces), Colonel José Luis Promise and Reality…, op. cit. Fernández Ligorría (another former chief of staff of the armed 4 Vox Latina, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, April 2001. forces), Colonel Giovanni Valerio Cárdenas, Colonel Hugo 5 Conservative opposition groups delayed with court Francisco Morán Carranza, Colonel Rolando Augusto Diaz injunctions, so the voting date was set only a few weeks before Barrios, Colonel Mario Roberto García Catalán (implicated in the vote. Educating voters was thus a formidable task. Voters in the killing of Michael Devine), Major Luis Alvarado Bátres, the predominantly indigenous western highlands approved the and Captain Romeo Guevara Reyes. The latter four, along with indigenous reforms. See Cynthia Arnson (ed.), The Popular Ortega Menaldo, were fired for their involvement with Moreno. Referendum (Consulta Popular) and the Future of the Peace Process in 17 Ortiz deposition, op. cit. Guatemala, Working Paper No.241, Woodrow Wilson Center 18 See, for example, the photograph of Portillo and Moreno Latin American Program, Washington DC 1999; Susanne together at a soccer match in La Pedrera stadium two days after Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process, Westview Portillo’s electoral defeat in 1996, published in El Periodico, 15 Press, Boulder and London 2000, chapter 8; Victor Ferrigno, November 2001. Moreno and Portillo also visited Disney ‘La nación a debate: constitución y derechos indígenas’ in Jueces para World together. la Democracia, Libro blanco sobre la Independencia del Poder Judicial y la Eficacia de la Administración de Justicia en Centroamérica, San 19 For a fuller discussion of the background of the cases in José Costa Rica 2000, 261-302. El Salvador and the work of the UN unit, see Jack Spence and George Vickers, A Negotiated Revolution? A Two Year Progress 6 Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Desarrollo: Más Allá Report on the Salvadoran Peace Accords, Hemisphere Initiatives, de la Economia: Progresso económico y social en América Latina: 1994. Also see, Jack Spence, George Vickers and David Dye, Informe 2000 (hereinafter BID 2000), 2000, 205-212. The Salvadoran Peace Accords and Democratization: A Three Year 7 BID 2000, 185-186 illustrating Latinobarómeter polls Progress Report and Recommendations, Hemisphere Initiatives, that showed showed that Guatemala, among 17 Latin 1995. American countries, had the third highest preference (about 20 Promise And Reality, op. cit. 27%) for autocracy and a relatively low preference for democ- racy. For analysis of the different meanings attached to “firm 21 For a detailed analysis of the military’s role in govern- hand” preferences and the increasing number of them in ment and then in shaping the transition to democracy, see Guatemala see Development Associate, Inc., University of Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Pittsburgh and Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Called Democracy, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998. Sociales (ASIES), La Cultura Democrática de los Guatemaltecos, 22 Crónica, “Purga en el ejército,” 6 February 1996. The (4th Study, 1999), (hereinafter ASIES 2000) Guatemala, purge aimed at eliminating resistance to the negotiations of the 2000, 114-120. civil power accord, as Balconi confirmed, referring to the 8 Prensa Libre, 13 November 2000. The poll was conducted changes as “a restructuring that has much to do with what is by CID-Gallup. discussed at the negotiating table…” See interview with Balconi, “El ejército está en sintonia con Álvaro Arzú,” Crónica, 9 See, for example, the discussion of the “Mincho” case in 26 January 1996. Promise and Reality..., op. cit., 59-62. 23 He has also written an excellent analysis of the 10 The newspaper Siglo Veintiuno, in particular, published a Guatemalan military since the transition to civilian rule. See, lengthy series of investigative articles in July 2001, that Bernardo Arévalo de León, Transición Democrática y Reconversión detailed the complex financial network of Alvarado MacDonald Militar en Guatemala: limitacciones y retos de un proceso inconcluso, and examined ties between state agencies and entities that were FLACSO, 2001. part of that network. 24 J Fernando Valdez and Mayra Palencia Prado, Los 11 See, “Ingeniero de infortunios y presidentes,” Siglo Veintiuno, 2 Dominios del Poder: La Encrucijada Tributaria, FLACSO, 1998. July 2001. Also, “Las Chamuscas del poder,” Siglo Veintiuno, 6 July 2001. 25 For a different view that analyzes positively the role of business elites in the transition to democracy, see Rachel M. 12 Of Q488 millions in loans by Promobanco, for example, McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent auditors concluded that Q448 million would be “difficult to Revolution, University Press of Florida, 1999. Her account of recover.” Of Q509 millions in loans by Bancomet, auditors the Serranazo is compelling. concluded that Q376 million was “not recuperable,” Q64 mil- lion was “doubtful,” and only Q69 million “perhaps is recuper- 26 For a description of CACIF’s role and positions during able.” Siglo Veintiuno, 10 July 2001. The same article reported the peace negotiations, see Promise And Reality, op. cit., 46-56. that of Q580 million in loans by Fimesa, 99.3% were to busi- 27 Non-profit, civil associations are required to have a board nesses associated with Alvarado MacDonald. of partners or directors, as well as an executive director. Only a Endnotes 57

few organizations actually have a working board, so executive Doubleday 1982 (republished by Harvard University Press in directors run the organizations with little, if any oversight. 1999); Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan 28 Pablo Ceto, an Ixil Maya and one of two Mayas on the Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, Princeton URNG directorate, was elected to Congress as part of the University Press, 1991. On the late 1980s transition see ANN. He played a key role in setting up COPMAGUA and Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, directed much of the behind-the scenes decision-making. He and U.S. Power, Westview Press 1991; Robert Trudeau, was absorbed by his role in Congress, leaving behind both Guatemalan Politics: The Popular Struggle for Democracy, Lynne FUNDAMAYA, the organization he founded after the Peace Rienner, 1993; Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil, South End Press, Accords, and his close involvement in COPMAGUA. Edgar 1984; Inforpress, Guatemala 1986: The Year of Promises, Palma Lau, a member of ORPA and the URNG directorate, Guatemala City, January 1987. became the head of the governmental CONTIERRA, a conflict 39 See 1997 poll data in René Poitevin and Rodolfo Cerdas, resolution office for land disputes. “En Busca de un Camino: Gobernabilidad Democrática y 29 Manfredo Marroquín, director of Acción Ciudadana a Reforma del Estado,” in IDEA, Democracia en Guatemala: La USAID funded organization that monitors Congress and works Misión de un Pueblo Entero, (hereinafter IDEA 1998) Stockholm, on issues of transparency and citizen participation. AC is con- 1998, 61-63. (Forty per cent said elections are fraudulent com- sidered one of the more modern CSOs, headed by a younger pared to 30% who said they were clean.) generation that did not participate in the war. The World 40 Ibid., 64-71. Lutheran Federation hosted the colloquium, and will publish 41 ASIES 2000, op. cit., 31-54. the dialogue as part of a debate series on civil society in Central America. 42 The fundamental source is Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in 30 The term “Mayan Movement” is used in the sense that Latin America, Stanford University Press, 1995. Its case studies Mayan activists themselves apply it in Guatemala. do not include transitions in the context of war and post-war. 31 For overviews see, Las Organizaciones Mayas a finales de 43 Ibid., 8-21. 1996, Guatemala, FLACSO mimeo, 1996, and Víctor Gálvez Borrel and Alberto Esquit Choy, The Mayan Movement and 44 In 1995 civic committees won in 22 municipalities and Mayan Organizations, Danish Association for International finished second in 32. Small political parties (those not specifi- Cooperation, MS Central America, 1997. For an analysis of cally named in the text) won n 38 municipalities that year and Mayan movement intellectuals see Kay B. Warren, Indigenous in 17 in 1999. Data from TSE and Sistema de Naciones Unidas Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala, en Guatemala, Guatemala: la fuerza incluyente del desarrollo Princeton University Press, 1998. See also Richard Wilson, humano, 2000 (hereinafter la fuerza incluyente) 184. Maya Resurgence in Guatemala: Q’eqchi’ Experiences, University of 45 ASIES 2000, op. cit., 32. Oklahoma Press, 1995. 46 Fifteen of the 23 districts have three or fewer seats. Small 32 Civic Committees can run candidates for municipal gov- parties will not win much there. In larger departments the ernment only, and cease to exist legally after the election. Only method of apportioning the seats among the parties, while national-level political parties can run candidates for Congress. roughly proportional, tends to favor the largest party and to The Mayan movement and many other civil society actors argue weed out the smallest. Compare Guatemala’s method with that that Civic Committees with a broader mandate could improve of El Salvador to see the difference. the quality of regional and ethnic political participation and 47 On the 4 packages of reforms, the margins of defeat representation. ranged from 39,000 votes (53%-47% on Question 1 regarding 33 CNOC, the Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones definitions of the nation and indigenous peoples) to 107,000 Campesinas, also is headed by cadre from organizations influ- (58% to 42% on Question 2, regarding the Congress. In enced by each one of the URNG members. Arnson, op. cit., see the voter analysis by Dinorah Azpuru. 34 CONIC, Consejo Nacional de Organizaciones Indigenas y 48 The book, published in February 2001 by the TSE, Campesinas, originated in a split-off from the Comite de Unidad UNDP, and the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Campesina, CUC, in the early 90s, precisely over the issue of Assistance, is obligatory reading. political autonomy and the priority accorded to Mayan cultural demands. 49 Ibid., 58. 35 These National Permanent Commissions are not the same 50 Fabrice Lehoucq and David L. Wall, Institutional or as the Commissions set up by the peace accords. COPMAGUA Sociological? Explaining Voter Turnout Rates in New Democracies, established 8 CNPs (3 more than the commissions in the April 24, 2001, unpublished. (Contact David Wall at AIDPI) to channel indigenous participation in implementa- [email protected].); Boneo and Torres-Rivas, op. cit., tion. The CNPs themes: Education, Land, Participation, 136-139. Spirituality and Sacred Sites, Official Recognition of Mayan 51 Fundación Centroamericana de Desarrollo (FUNCEDE), Languages, Indigenous Women, Customary Law, and editor, of four studies: Diagnostico y plan de desarrollo del muncipio Constitutional Reform. de Santa Cruz del Quiché and San Gaspar Ixchil and Jacaltenango 36 COMG, the Council of Mayan Organizations of and Santa Eulalia, 1995. In Jacaltenango the study estimated Guatemala, founded 1990, grouped development and cultural- that 40% left during the harvest. ist organizations. 52 Boneo and Torres-Rivas, op. cit., 181 and IDEA, 1998, 37 Alfredo Tay Coyoy was Minister of Education during the op. cit., 33, 61–73. Ramiro de León Carpio administration, 1993-1995. 53 Ibid., 92-97. 38 On the CIA overthrow see Richard Immerman, The CIA 54 The hypothetical “Null and Blank Party” would have in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, University of reduced the ANN (DIA-URNG) bench from 9 to 5, and elimi- Texas Press, 1982; Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, nated the Christian Democrats’ two seats, and one of the two Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, seats won by very small parties. 58 Who Governs?

55 ASIES 2000, op. cit., 18,32, 40-47. 72 The original proposal insisted that the “alternative mech- 56 ASIES 2000, 25-40, 116; Mitchell A. Seligson and Joel anism” of indigenous dispute resolution should not violate con- M. Jutkowitz, Guatemalan Values and the Prospects for Democratic stitutional or international human rights guarantees, and pro- Development, Development Associates, Inc., March 1994, 58. posed that all customary rulings should be validated by an state However in 1993 those who combined the opposite — lack of judge. See Luis Ramirez, Justo Solorzano and Mario Caxaj, support for the system and lack of political tolerence — were in Informe: Tribunales Comunitarios, draft document, INECIP, 1999. notably higher pecentages than other Central American coun- 73 In 1998 five pilot community courts were established in tries and 7 times that of Costa Rica. five departments, with three ‘justices of the peace’ (jueces de paz) 57 BID 2000, op. cit., 186-187. — two people from the community and the local justice of the peace. Procedures had to be in accord with the CPP. In practice, 58 For a thorough analysis of the counterinsurgency state’s however, they dealt with all kinds of cases, including family legal apparatus see Alberto Binder et al., ‘Informe sobre la partici- conflicts, which were not within their legal remit. See Luis pación del sistema judicial en la violación de los derechos fundamen- Ramirez, Justo Solorzano and Mario Caxaj, Informe: Tribunales tales durante el enfrentamiento armado,’ draft prepared for the Comunitarios, draft document, INECIP, 1999; Jorge Murga CEH, on file with author. Armas, Análisis del funcionamiento de los Juzgados de Paz 59 CEH Report, op. cit. Comunitarios. Reformas al Código Procesal Penal, draft document, 60 Reforms had been promoted by domestic elements and PNUD, Guatemala 1999. international donors such as USAID, BID, the World Bank, 74 Central America Report, 4 February 2000. and UNDP. See Hugh Byrne, ‘Trials and Tribulations of Justice 75 Prensa Libre, 26 August 2001. Reform in Guatemala’, paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association conference, March 2000, 7-9 and WOLA, 76 In 2000 there were only 91public defenders permanently La reforma judicial en Guatemala, 1997-1998: Una guía básica employed, plus a pool of 78 defense lawyers in the capital and 25 sobre los problemas, procesos y actores, Guatemala, May 1998, 28- in eight regional departments. MINUGUA, Suplemento al décimo 38. informe sobre derechos humanos de la Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala: Funcionamiento del sistema de justicia, 61 In April 1998 the UN Human Rights Commission January 2000, 10. See Luis Pásara, et. al., op. cit., and Aylín excluded Guatemala from the list of countries singled out for Ordóñez, ‘Investigación sobre accesso a la justicia en la República de systematic violations of human rights. Guatemala’ in IDB-IIDH, Acceso a la justicia y equidad: Estudio en 62 One UNDP study found that the 1997 kidnapping rate siete países de América Latina, Instituto Interamericano de approximated that of Colombia; about 17 per 100,000 inhabi- Derechos Humanos, San José Costa Rica 2000. tants; PNUD Proyecto Regional de Justicia, Acceso a la justicia 77 The International Labour Organization’s Convention 169, en Centroamérica: seguridad juridical e inversion, 2nd edition, San approved by the Guatemalan Congress in 1995, recognizes the José Costa Rica 2001, 45. right of indigenous peoples to their customary law. 63 Charles T. Call, Sustainable Development in Central America: 78 Hendrix, ‘Guatemala “Justice Centers,” op. cit., 837. The Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity, Central America 2020 Working Paper No.8, Hamburg 2000, 9. 79 The PM took action only after considerable public pres- sure. The PM’s shortcomings have been repeatedly pointed out 64 BID 2000, 14-15. Only Panama and Uruguay had fewer by MINUGUA and the Human Rights Ombudsman than 30% say their families had been victims. Neighboring El (Procurador de Derechos Humanos, PDH), the latter observing Salvador was second at 46%. Other studies with more restrict- that ‘the progress of criminal cases is slower and more delayed ed questions have found lower frequencies. A 1997 survey by every day, bogged down in a web of corruption.’ MINUGUA, Cultura Democrática found a frequency of 22.5%. A 1999 Suplemento al décimo informe…, op. cit; Report of the Procurador Borge and Associates poll found frequencies of 42% in urban de los Derechos Humanos (PDH) cited in ASIES, Informe combi- areas and 27% in rural areas. For further analysis see ASIES nado sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Guatemala durante 2000, 86-89. Latin America had in the 1990s, by far, the high- 1999, at http://www.asies.org.gt/informe-combinado.htm est homicide rate in comparison with six other regions. 80 Central America Report, 17 August 2001. 65 Call, op. cit., 9. 81 Central America Report, 17 August 2001; Prensa Libre 22 66 Comisión de Fortalecimiento de la Justicia, Una nueva August 2001. justicia para la paz: Informe Final, Guatemala 1998. 82 Central America Report, 17 August 2001. 67 On the weaknesses of public prosecutors see Luis Pásara , 83 Fundación Myrna Mack, Hechos que afectan la independencia Manuel Garrido, Antonio Maldonado and Karin Wagner, judicial y administración de justicia en Guatemala: amenazas, intim- Funcionamiento del Sistema de Justicia en Guatemala: un análisis de idaciones y atentados contra jueces, fiscales y abogados, FMM, August comportamientos institucionales, MINUGUA, Guatemala 2000. 1999, Guatemala. 68 PNUD, Guatemala: Informe del Desarrollo Humano 2000, 84 Ibid. Insurance companies establish clauses, which rule 109. out payment in the case of death by firearms. 69 Prensa Libre, 5 January 2001. 85 Despite the intentions of penal reformers in the early 70 MINUGUA, Ninth Report on Human Rights of the UN 1990s, no new Penitentiary Code has been approved to date. Verification Mission in Guatemala, 1 April 1998 to 31 December 86 PNUD Proyecto Regional de Justicia, Acceso a la justicia 1998, 10 March 1999, 3. en Centroamérica: población privada de libertad, San José Costa 71 AID has a broader initiative to train Mayan leaders. For a Rica, 2000, 87. detailed discussion from an AID perspective see Steven E. 87 El Periódico, 19 June 2001. Hendrix, ‘Guatemalan “Justice Centers”: The Centerpiece for Advancing Transparency, Efficiency, Due Process, and Access to 88 Central America Report, 31 August 2001. Justice’, American University International Law Review, 2000, 89 The existence of investigative structures parallel to the v.15, no.4, 813-868. official judicial process came to light during the Arzú adminis- Endnotes 59

tration when families of kidnap victims, frustrated with the MINUGUA, April, 2001. In June, 2001, the Comisión de inability of the police and criminal justice system to secure Acompañamiento recommended a prioritization of expenditures their release, turned to military intelligence, revealing a net- by the executive branch for 2001 that included funds necessary work run out of the Presidency that co-ordinated operations to meet the 20,000 target. between the Public Ministry and the Estado Mayor Presidencial 106 Mecanismos de control sobre la Policía Nacional Civil, (EMP). See declarations of Hugo Ordoñez Porta in the Ordoñez Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Porta kidnapping and murder, Prensa Libre, 13 August 2000. Guatemala, 2001. 90 Commenting on the Mack case, the Lawyers Committee 107 MINUGUA. La Policia Nacional Civil..., op. cit. for Human Rights notes that ‘it took four years to obtain an order directing the courts to investigate the defendants’ possi- 108 According to a U.S. Embassy official in November 2001. ble involvement; fifteen additional months to initiate that 109 World Bank, Guatemala: Economic and Social Position and prosecution; two years to determine which procedural code Prospects, August 1978, 48-57, Table 4.2; World Bank, should be applied; and more than a year to resolve two identical Guatemala: Building Peace with Rapid and Equitable Growth, but separate amnesty petitions…that, against all logic, the (hereinafter WB 1996) April 26, 1996, 6-16. defendants were permitted to interpose.” Lawyers Committee 110 Siglo XXI, 5 June 2001, 12. for Human Rights, Advocacy Alert. Update/Guatemala, October 111 The World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 1999. www.lchr.org/121/mack1099.htm (hereinafter WB 2000/2001) had no tax data for Guatemala so 91 Prensa Libre, ‘Laberinto de la impunidad,’ 13 August 2000. the data are from World Development Report 1998/1999, Table 92 The prosecutor, Otto Ardón, went on to take up a post in 14. GDP/capita data are from the UNDP Human Development the Ministry of Defense. Prensa Libre, 13 August 2000. Report 2001, (hereinafter UNDP 2001) Table 1. 93 ASIES, La cultura democrática de los guatemaltecos, 112 Latin America ranks below Southeast Asia, and Eastern Guatemala 1997. A 1997 UNDP study found that 50% of the Europe in literacy, average years of education, and secondary population had no confidence in the judiciary and 60% no con- education matriculation, and below the Middle East on the lat- fidence in the police, levels found elsewhere in Central ter measure. BID 2000, 10-12. America. See PNUD Proyecto Regional de Justicia, Acceso a la 113 UNDP 2001, Table 3. justicia en Centroamérica: seguridad juridical e inversion, 2nd edi- 114 La fuerza incluyente op. cit., 42-45. The UN estimated it tion, San José Costa Rica 2001, 44. The 1998 data cited are in would take for each year nearly 13 billion Quetzals to extin- Luis Pásara, ‘La justicia en Guatemala’, Diálogo, FLACSO, No.3 guish poverty in 1998 or about 4% of GNP (PPP). (2) 1998, p.4; ASIES, ‘La cultura democrática de los guatemal- tecos’ cited in ; PNUD, Guatemala: Informe del Desarrollo 115 Population increased from 8.7 million to 10.6 million. Humano 2000, 112. Not taking age cohorts into account a rough calculation yields 3.2 million illiterates in 1989 and 3.3 million in 1998. 94 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Guatemala, 4. 116 IDEA, 1998, op. cit., 27-33. See Harry Anthony 95 Amnesty International, Guatemala Annual Report 2001, 4. Patrinos, “Differences in Education and Earnings across Ethnic 96 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Groups in Guatemala, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Independence of Judges and Lawyers Param Cumaraswamy, Finance, v. 37, no. 4, 1997, 809-821. For example in 1989 March 2000, cited in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Ladino male workers averaged 6+ years of schooling; the Guatemala at www.hrw.org/wr2k1/americas/guatemala.html. Quiché had 2.9 years, and Kekchí averaged 3.7 years. Kekchí 97 Prensa Libre, 17 June 2001; MINUGUA, Noveno Informe had the highest indigenous earnings (only 73% of Ladinos). de Derechos Humanos de la Misión de las Naciones Unidas para However, Quiché males earned more than “other” indigenous Guatemala, Guatemala 1999. groups, though their education averaged .6 years less. 98 In June 2001 the PNC had 18,314 operatives; Sexto 117 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., data from Table 5.16. Informe del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas sobre la 118 Ibid., 136-138. Verificación de los Acuerdos de Paz de Guatemala, Guatemala June 119 PAHO, Health of the Americas 1998, Washington, D.C., 2001. At www.minugua.guate.net. 302. 99 This study includes a useful cross-regional statistical 120 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 180-182. comparison of homicides. See Carlos Mendoza, ‘Collective vio- 121 PAHO, op. cit., 296; La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 165- lence: an answer to the absence of justice and security in 166. Guatemala’, draft paper, Stanford University, April 2001. 122 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 48-49; World Bank 2000/2001, 100 MINUGUA, ‘Los linchamientos: un flagelo contra la dignidad op. cit., Table 1. humana,’ December 2000. At www.minugua.guate.net. 123 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 49-50. The income of the 101 Prensa Libre, 1 April 2001. richest 10% in 1989 was 20-23 times that of the poor, and 16 102 For a detailed consideration see Marta Gutiérrez and Paul to 17 times higher in 1999. Kobrak, Los linchamientos: pos conflicto y violencia colectiva en 124 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 194-200; Word Bank, Huehuetenango, Guatemala, Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo de la Guatemala: Expenditure Reform in a Post-Conflict Country, (here- Frontera Occidental de Guatemala (CEDFOG), inafter WB Expenditure Reform) Report No. 19617-GU, Huehuetenango, 2001. February 4, 2000, 4-6, 29-44. 103 Hugh Byrne, William Stanley and Rachel Garst, Rescuing 125 World Bank, Guatemala: Investing for Peace: A Public Police Reform: A Challenge for the New Guatemalan Government, Investment Review, Report No. 16392-GU, July 15, 1997, 8, Washington Office on Latin America, January, 2000. 18-21. 104 Ibid., 2. 126 See essays in J. C. Cambranes ed., 500 años de lucha por la 105 The 18,314 figure is reported by MINUGUA in, La tierra, Guatemala, Flacso, 1992; J.C. Cambranes, Coffee and Policia Nacional Civil: un nuevo modelo policial en construcción, Peasants: The Origins of the Modern Plantation Economy in 60 Who Governs?

Guatemala, 1853-1897, Plumstock Mesoamerican Studies, recurso para atender la añej demanda de tierra en Guatemala, both South Woodstock, Vermont; David McCreery, Rural Guatemala, Inforpress Centroamericana, 1998; MINUGUA, Informe de 1760-1940, Stanford University Press, 1994. Verificación: La situación de los compromisos relativos a la tierra en los 127 Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, University of Acuerdos de Paz, May 2000, 13-23; and CONGCOOP, El cata- North Carolina Press, 1994, 92-95. See also data from José stro: Instrumento para el desarrollo nacional, febrero 2001. Aylwin,”El acceso de los indígenas a la tierra en los ordenamientos 141 Aylwin, op. cit., 58. jurídicos de América Latina: el caso de Guatemala, MIN- 142 Aylwin, op. cit., 68. UGUA,2001. 143 MINUGUA, “...compromisos relativos a la tierra,” op. cit., 128 Handy, Revolution..., op. cit., 82-83. 10-12. 129 Aylwin, op. cit., 56-58. Data on the landless and commu- 144 In decorous language a 1996 World Bank report referred nal lands data are from Eduardo Baumeister, “Formas de to “discontinuous support for…tax administration reform” and Accesso a la Tierra y al Agua en Guatemala,” Cuardernos de a “tax code [that] discourages tax payer compliance.” WB Desarrollo Humano, Sistema de Naciones Unidas en Guatemala, 1996, op. cit., 14-16. 2001, 19, 9. The AID study is cited in MINUGUA, La 145 WB, Expenditure Reform, op. cit., 9. Problemática de la tierra en Guatemala, 1995, 6. 146 Nuria Gamboa and Barbara Trentavizi, la Guatemala Posible: 130 World Bank, Guatemala: An Assessment of Poverty, April 17, la senda del pacto fiscal, Asociación Centroamericana Hombres de 1995, 11. Maíz, Guatemala City, April 2001. MINUGUA sources informed 131 Aylwin, op. cit., 57. HI that Juan Pablo Corlazzoli, MINUGUA’s Deputy Chief of 132 Baumeister, op. cit. Mission invested immense amounts of time over a year in the nego- tiations. Regarding international skepticism, Gamboa and 133 Ibid., 7-14. In a mixed ecological region of Cuchumatanes, Trentavizi quote economist Alex Segovia, in August 2000, who Huehuetenango 32% of farms were .7 Hectares in1979 and characterized the international financial organizational attitude as 38.7% were in 1994. In Tontonicapán the number of farms less follows: “we have been in Guatemala 25 years and they never com- than .7 hectares increased from 20,701 to 36,000. ply, so why should be believe that now you would comply.”), 32-33. 134 Ibid., 5-7. 147 See pages 19-22, 27-35. 135 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 170-171; World Bank 148 WB 4 February 2000, 9-15, Annex B; Latin American Development Indicators 2000 (CD-Rom) 1998 figures. For a Monitor, Central America, August 2001. caveat on remittance data, see Jack Spence, Mike Lanchin, and 149 MINUGUA, El Pacto Fiscal un año después, May 2001, 32, Geoff Thale, From Elections to Earthquakes: Reform and 36. Participation in Post-War El Salvador, April 2001. 150 Gamboa and Trentavizi, op. cit., cite José I. Larios, ‘Como 136 In Central America, only El Salvador had urban growth se distribuye la carga tributaria por clase deingreso en Guatemala,’ en rates lower than Guatemala, and El Salvador has had much Comisión Preparatoria del Pacto Fiscal, ed., La Política Fiscal en larger emigration. World Bank, World Development Report 1997, Guatemala, 2000. MINUGUA’s El Pacto Fiscal, op. cit., also Table 9. cites Larios’ work for the overall tax burden, which is mildly 137 WB, 1996, op. cit., 28-29. progressive roughly through the 9th decile, and then declines 138 WB, 1996, op. cit., 28. sharply, so that its tax burden is about equal to the 7th decile. At 13% it is a very light burden. 139 Charles Clark, “The Delegitimation and Evolution of Land Tenure in Tropical Petén, Guatemala,” paper presented at 151 La fuerza incluyente, op. cit., 192-193. the LASA convention, Chicago, April 1998. 152 Latin American Monitor, Central America, November 140 Rosalinda Hernández Alarcón, La Tierra en los Acuerdos de 2001, 3-4. Paz: Resumen de la Respuesta Gubernamental, and ¿A quién servirá 153 Interview with a participant in the meeting, 14 November el catastro? Las difficultades para convertir el censo territorial en un 2001. Endnotes 61 Hemisphere Initiatives has published the following reports. Please send requests to Hemisphere Initiatives c/o Jack Spence, [email protected] or [email protected]. Establishing the Ground Rules: A Report on the Nicaraguan Electoral Process, Jack Spence, George Vickers, Ralph Fine and David Krusé,August, 1989. Nicaragua’s Elections:A Step Towards Democracy?, Ralph Fine, Jack Spence, George Vickers and David Krusé, January 1990. *Endgame:A Progress Report on Implementation of the Salvadoran Peace Accords, George Vickers and Jack Spence with David Holiday,Margaret Popkin and Philip Williams, December 3, 1992, 16,500 words. Justice Impugned:The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, Margaret Popkin with Vickers and Spence, June 1993, 11,000 words. *The Voter Registration Tangle, Madalene O’Donnell with Vickers and Spence, July 1993, 11,000 words. Risking Failure:The Problems and Promise of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador, Bill Stanley with Vickers and Spence, September 1993, 15,000 words. *Voter Registration and the Tasks Ahead, Madalene O’Donnell with Vickers and Spence, November 1993, 11,000 words. *Toward a Level Playing Field?: A Report on the Post-War Salvadoran Electoral Process, Jack Spence and George Vickers, January 1994, 15,000 words. *A Negotiated Revolution? A Two Year Progress Report on the Salvadoran Peace Accords, Jack Spence and George Vickers with Margaret Popkin, Philip Williams and Kevin Murray,March 1994, 24,000 words. *Rescuing Reconstruction: The Debate on Post-War Economic Recovery in El Salvador, Kevin Murray, with Ellen Coletti, and Jack Spence, and Cynthia Curtis, Garth David Cheff, René Ramos, José Chacón, Mary Thompson, May 1994, 35,000 words. *El Salvador’s Elections of the Century: Results, Recommendations, Analysis, Jack Spence, David Dye, and George Vickers with Garth David Cheff, Carol Lynne D’Arcangelis and Ken Ward, July 1994, 25,000 words. Justice Delayed:The Slow Pace of Judicial Reform in El Salvador, Margaret Popkin with Jack Spence and George Vickers, December 1994, 12,000 words. The Salvadoran Peace Accords and Democratization: A Three Year Progress Report and Recommendations, Jack Spence, George Vickers and David Dye, March 1995, 25,000 words. *Contesting Everything,Winning Nothing:The Search for Consensus in Nicaragua, 1990–1995, David R. Dye. Judy Butler, Deena Abu-Lughod, Jack Spence, with George Vickers, November 1995, 24,000 words. *Chapúltepec Five Years Later: El Salvador’s Political Reality and Uncertain Future, Jack Spence, David R. Dye, Mike Lanchin, and Geoff Thale, with George Vickers, January 1997, 28,000 words. Democracy and Its Discontents, Judy Butler, David R. Dye, and Jack Spence with George Vickers, October 1996, 24,000 words. *Democracy Weakened: A Report on the October 20, 1996 Nicaraguan Elections, Jack Spence, November 1997, 15,000 words.A co-production of Hemisphere Initiatives and the Washington Office on Latin America. *Promise and Reality: Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords, Jack Spence, David R. Dye, Paula Worby, Carmen Rosa de Leon-Escribano, George Vickers, and Mike Lanchin, August 1998, 37,000 words. Patchwork Democracy: Nicaraguan Politics Ten Years After the Fall, David R. Dye with Jack Spence and George Vickers, December 2000, 28000 words.

* available in Spanish Hemisphere Initiatives is a research and analysis organization specializing in peace processes, conflict resolution, and democratization. Formed in 1989, it was the first organization in the field to begin a then unprecedented nine-month process of monitoring the historic 1990 election in war-torn Nicaragua. The United Nations, the Organization of American States and the Carter Center joined the process soon thereafter. Hemisphere Initiatives has monitored the peace and electoral processes in El Salvador since the signing of the Chapúltepec Peace Accords. It has published thirteen full reports, almost all in Spanish and English, on various aspects of the accords and elections. Since 1995 it has published four reports on institutional crises and electoral processes in Nicaragua in English and Spanish. And in 1998 it published a full analysis of the first year of implementation of the Guatemalan peace accords. Hemisphere Initiatives is currently working on reports of electoral and institutional reform in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Members of Hemisphere Initiatives visit the region regularly, document events, and meet with an array of political actors covering the political spectrum, independent observers, journalists and representatives of international organizations. It enlists the research and writing skills of known experts on various topics, all of whom have long term commitments to and experience with these countries. Hemisphere Initiatives reports aim to air views of a diverse group of political actors, to make its own independent analysis, and to offer recommendations. The reports, in Spanish and English, serve an audience of national and international policy makers, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals and academics, and activist groups. The efforts of Hemisphere Initiatives have been supported by grants from foundations, international NGOs, and private individuals.