Department of Economic and Political Studies University of Helsinki Finland Acta Politica 41 How Terrorist Campaigns End The Campaigns of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States Leena Malkki ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in the lecture room 5, University main building, on June 11, 2010, at 12 noon. Helsinki 2010 ISBN 978-952-10-6266-7 (pbk.) ISSN 0515-3093 Helsinki University Print Helsinki 2010 Abstract This study explores the decline of terrorism by conducting source-based case studies on two left-wing terrorist campaigns in the 1970s, those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. The purpose of the case studies is to bring more light into the interplay of different external and internal factors in the development of terrorist campaigns. This is done by presenting the history of the two chosen campaigns as narratives from the participants’ points of view, based on interviews with participants and extensive archival material. Organizational resources and dynamics clearly influenced the course of the two campaigns, but in different ways. This divergence derives at least partly from dissimilarities in organizational design and the incentive structure. Comparison of even these two cases shows that organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly, even when they share ideological orientation, are of the same size and operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from being more sensitive to this. The study also highlights that the demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, research should look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the life- span of a single organization. The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, a lens through which the participants interpreted all developments. On the other hand, it appears that the role of ideology should not be overstated. Namely, not all participants in the campaigns under study fully internalized the radical ideology. Rather, their participation was mainly based on their friendship with other participants. Instead of ideology per se, it is more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, themselves and their role in the revolutionary struggle. In both cases under study, the choice of the terrorist strategy was not merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the participants’ self-image. Indeed, the way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded closely with the forms of action that they got involved in. Countermeasures and the lack of support were major reasons for the decline of the campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community and the public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the authorities were relevant to the outcome of the campaigns. Acknowledgements This study started out with a simple idea about a topic and a method, as I state at the beginning of the introduction. It would not have evolved into a full-fledged study were it not for many people who helped me with the research in its various stages, as well as people and institutions that made it financially and socially possible to conduct it. That simple idea was born during one of the countless kitchen-table discussions I have had with my closest colleague Janne Malkki. He has been there for me every step of the way. For refining the idea into a research plan, I owe my heartfelt thanks to Jeff Kaplan. Were it not for his encouragement, the whole idea of doing a PhD would have probably never even crossed my mind. I am honored that he agreed to be my supervisor. I am also greatly indebted to my other supervisor Kyösti Pekonen. Conducting this research would not have been such a great experience without the support of several colleagues. Even though there are not many scholars interested in terrorism in Finland, there have been enough to provide me with an inspiring network of colleagues I have had a pleasure of working with. I am particularly grateful for the opportunity I have had to work with Jukka Paastela. With him and several colleagues from the University of Tampere, I had the pleasure of writing the textbook Terrorismin monet kasvot (Many Faces of Terrorism). It has also been a delight to cooperate with Teemu Sinkkonen, Kari Laitinen, Reetta Toivanen and Minna Saarnivaara. During the last couple of years, participating in the Europeanized Criminal Justice project led by Kimmo Nuotio has opened my horizons in many ways. I thank Kimmo Nuotio for trusting me enough to take me onboard and for all the support and encouragement he has shown towards me during the project. I also thank all my colleagues at the Department of the Economic and Political Studies and the Network for European Studies for providing me with a very comfortable and inspiring working environment. In particular, I wish to thank Tuija Lattunen who, in addition to all previous discussions and support, meticulously read the last draft of the entire manuscript. I owe my gratitude to all my colleagues and other contacts abroad who have helped me in different stages of the project. In particular, I want to thank Beatrice de Graaf, Giliam de Valk and Frans Dekkers who generously shared their insights and information with regard to the campaign of the Rode Jeugd. I have also benefited greatly from the wonderful collections of the Institutional Institute for Social History in Amsterdam and Regionaal Historisch Centrum Eindhoven. As to the case of the Symbionese Liberation Army, a large part of the media material I used in the study was collected at the Kenneth Spencer Research Library at the University of Kansas. Besides Becky Schulte and other members of the library’s personnel, I wish to thank Tim Miller and Laird Wilcox for their hospitality and company during my stay. Furthermore, Claude Marks from the Freedom Archives helped me a great deal in locating important research material. My research has also benefited also from my participation in the research project “Why Do Terrorists Stop?”, led by Timothy Naftali and financed by the Smith Richardson Foundation. I thank Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman and all the other members of the project for the discussions we had during our meeting in Washington D.C. in May, 2008. In the final stages of the research, I also benefited from insightful comments that the pre-examiners Bob de Graaff and John Horgan gave on the manuscript. My research would not have been possible were it not for the financial support from the Finnish Cultural Foundation, the Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation and the Network for European Studies. I warmly thank them all for their support for the project. Moreover, I wish thank the VAKAVA graduate school, the Department of the Economic and Political Studies and the Kenneth Spencer Research Library for funding my research travels. In a family of two researchers and two toddlers, there is often need for help. I owe my heartfelt thanks to our families for all the love and care they have shown towards our children and being always there for us. Last, but not least, I wish to express my appreciation for all the former participants of the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army who I had the pleasure of interviewing. This study would not have been possible without their cooperation and honesty. Leena Malkki Helsinki, May 10, 2010 Contents 1 Introduction 11 1.1 Theoretical background 11 1.2 Design of this study 18 1.3 Methods and sources 22 1.4 Case studies 27 2 The campaign of the Rode Jeugd 35 2.1 The protest phase 35 2.2 Split of the moderate wing 42 2.3 The resistance phase 46 2.4 Decline of the Rode Jeugd 52 2.5 New attempts for revolutionary armed struggle 56 2.5.1. The Rode Hulp 57 2.5.2. The Rood Verzetsfront 65 2.5.3 Henk Wubben, the RVF and the RAF 67 2.5.4 Joost van Steenis and the concept of small violence 69 3 The campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army 71 3.1 Formation of the Symbionese Liberation Army 72 3.2 Getting started 75 3.3. The murder of Foster 77 3.4. The arrest of Little and Remiro 80 3.5 The kidnapping of Patricia Hearst 82 3.6 Patty/Tania spectacle 89 3.7 Preparing for the inevitable 93 3.8 Regrouping 97 3.9 Attempts to revitalize the SLA 103 3.10 Aftermath 112 4 Comparison of the campaigns of the Rode Jeugd and the Symbionese Liberation Army 119 4.1 Strategy 119 4.2 Organization 122 4.3 Ideology and political objectives 126 4.4 Incentives and interests 131 4.5 External factors 134 5 Discussion: Ways forward in understanding the end of terrorist campaigns 145 5.1 When does a terrorist campaign end 145 5.2 Role of organizational resources and dynamics 147 5.3 Words and actions: Ideology and self-image as sustaining forces 152 5.4 Public support and countermeasures 157 5.5 Conclusion 162 References 165 List of tables Table 1: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of Rode Jeugd 120 Table 2: Terrorist acts, felonies and other violence incidents of the campaign of the Symbionese Liberation Army 121 Table 3: The organization of the SLA’s campaign 124 Table 4: Organization of the Rode Jeugd’s campaign 125 Table 5: Ideology and objectives of the Symbionese Liberation Army (1973– 1974) 127 Table 6: Ideology and objectives of Rode Jeugd (1971–1972) 127 10 1 Introduction This study started out as a simple idea about a topic and a method.