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Philosophical Ethics and the Improvement of Farmed Animal Lives

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Philosophical Ethics and the Improvement of Farmed Animal Lives Feature Article Philosophical ethics and the improvement of farmed animal lives Paul B. Thompson Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823 2004). Clare Palmer’s book Animal Ethics in Context articu- Implications lates an almost fully developed relational ethic in which she explains the basis for differential obligations to wildlife and do- • Philosophers have neglected the relationships that es- mesticated animals. In general, humans do not have positive tablish duties to farmed animals, especially in factory duties to extend care toward wild animals, while bringing an farms. animal into our home establishes duties of care that include • Many philosophers apparently assume that the condi- attending toward the creature’s biological and emotional needs tions in industrial facilities are so horrible that the very (Palmer, 2010). idea of discussing obligations to them is vitiated by the With a number of important exceptions, philosophers have unredeemable nature of the circumstances in which neglected the relationships that establish duties to farmed ani- they live. mals. This neglect is especially evident with respect to philo- • Even when widely read texts accurately describe wel- sophical studies of livestock being raised in concentrated fare deficits, they present a picture which is misleading animal feeding operations (CAFOs), or, colloquially, factory both as to the extent of these problems, and to diffi- farms (Figure 1). culty of making changes in response to them. While, again, there are exceptions, many philosophers ap- • Frequently cited welfare problems in factory farms parently assume that the conditions in industrial facilities are support a case for reform, but it is difficult to see how so horrible that the very idea of discussing obligations to them it would support the claim that what is done to farmed is vitiated by the unredeemable nature of the circumstances in animals is equivalent to torture. which they live. Robert McDowell compares advocacy for ameli- oration of suffering in CAFOs to claiming that Nazi concentra- tion camps would have been “a lesser evil” if only the prisoners Key words: animal welfare, animal integrity, CAFOs, industrial had received a little better treatment prior to being exterminated animal production, quality of life (Cavell et al., 2008, p. 131). The animal in a factory farm is a cast- off, thoroughly instrumentalized, dominated, abject. The humans Introduction who have placed them there cannot fulfill anymoral obligation to them without relieving them of the torturous conditions in Philosophical reflection on human beings’ morally which these animals live. If this is the assumption, however, it is grounded relationships with nonhuman animals has come a almost never articulated explicitly. Instead, the unspeakable na- long way since the animal welfare/animal rights debates of the ture of the lives that factory farmed lives is mentioned in passing, 1970s and 1980s. The basis for granting moral consideration as the author moves on to make more philosophically worthwhile to nonhuman animals expanded far beyond Peter Singer’s dis- points (Thompson, forthcoming). cussion of sentience (Singer, 1975) or Tom Regan’s view that Are animal ethicists right to view industrially housed ani- human obligation’s toward individuals from other species are mals with such disdain that ethical reflection on their quality grounded in their being “subjects of a life” (Regan, 1983). of life is simply not worthy of philosophical attention? The ar- Building on the work of Mary Midgley, a number of authors gument that they are not correct proceeds in stages. First, as have developed relational theories that interpret human obliga- noted, there are philosophers who discuss how CAFOs might tions to animals in terms of the specific relationships that we be changed to improve animals’ quality of life. A brief survey bear to them (Donovan, 1990; MacKinnon, 2004; Anderson, of some key themes in this literature brings the possibility for an alternative perspective into view. Next, the alternative per- © Thompson spective can be contrasted with claims by well-known animal This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), ethicists. Finally, these better known and highly influential which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any views can be rebutted through a detailed examination of ways medium, provided the original work is properly cited. that the lives of industrially farmed animals can be improved, doi: 10.1093/af/vfz054 even if improvement falls short of a full moral justification. January 2020, Vol. 10, No. 1 Figure 1. Sows in gestation crates in an indoor swine production system. Philosophy of Improving the Lives of Farmed recognized obligations to individual animals as opposed to Animals maximizing welfare (hence, he has a rights view), but he argues that we derive these obligations from an understanding of an It cannot hurt but to begin with the observation that ad- animals’ telos, which we understand as the needs and behav- vances since the Singer and Regan era notwithstanding, many ioral drives that are typical of creatures from a given species if not most academically employed philosophers still seem to (Rollin, 1991). In later work, it became clear that Rollin views fall into one of two camps. Reflection on nonhumans takes one telos as determined by an animal’s genetic constitution. While camp all the way to vegetarianism, while those in the other camp it is wrong to treat animals in ways that fail to respect their have so little interest in animal ethics that they are barely cogni- telos, there is nothing wrong with changing an animal’s genetics, zant of the developments in the field. It is, perhaps, natural to whether through breeding or genetic engineering, unless doing conclude that if you are already committed to vegetarianism, so leads to persistent suffering (Rollin, 1995a, 1998). there cannot be much reason to think about the condition of Rollin also carried out a sustained attack on the industrial animals being raised for food production (Olynk, 2012). Even conditions under which farmed animals were being raised among the “don’t care” camp, the stridency with which CAFOs (Rollin, 1995b). He argued that the growth in CAFOs was are condemned leads many to seek animal products from pre- the result of a conceptual shift in agricultural and veterinary sumably more humane sources: cage-free eggs, free-range or research. Where researchers had once stressed husbandry, a pasture-raised meats, organic producers, or family farms. Here concept with implicit ethical commitments, they shifted to- as with the vegetarians, these mildly proanimal types reach a ward animal science, adopting a positivist, value-free attitude stopping point. They have no reason to go on and think about toward their research subjects, who were, of course, animals the quality of life for animals being raised under the increas- capable of feeling, emotion and better, or worse states of well- ingly prevalent industrial conditions. Yet no relations of logical being (Rollin, 2004). Rollin’s work became influential in the entailment support such inferences. No relational theorist has animal and veterinary sciences, where the lack of fit between presented an argument showing that just because you person- an animal’s telos and the housing or husbandry began to be ally have no interest in eating animals, you therefore are dis- used as a guiding approach to applied animal behavior science charged of any reason or obligation to consider how their lives (Fraser, 1999; Rollin et al., 2012). might be improved (Thompson, 2015). Quite a few European philosophers have joined Rollin in In fact, a significant subgroup of philosophers writing in helping to determine how the lives of farmed animals might animal ethics do consider the questions that arise in efforts to be improved. Peter Sandøe has argued that Singer’s em- improve the lives of farmed animals. Contemporaneous with phasis on sentient experience can be a guide for husbandry the work of Singer and Regan, Bernard Rollin developed his (Lassen, Sandøe and Forkman, 2006) and animal breeding adaptation of Aristotelean telos as a criterion for evaluating (Sandøe et al., 1999). Others have advocated for animal integ- the quality of animal lives in a variety of settings, including rity. Like Rollin’s notion of telos, animal integrity is intended industrial livestock production. Rollin argued for a view that to convey the sense that each individual animal has status or 22 Animal Frontiers nature that derives from being the member of a species. It uni- When mainstream philosophers do mention industrial fies the animal’s cognitive experience of pain or pleasure with animal production, the pattern is a sentence or two noting more complex relationships that situate the individual within horrific conditions with at most a mention of the general pro- an evolutionary history. Unlike telos, integrity is meant to in- duction system, such as caged layers or gestation stalls for clude relationships that derive from the history of domestica- pigs. Description of these systems that link their elements to tion by humans and the association with human caregivers, animal welfare deficits are rare. Mainstream philosophers have as well as adaptive fit between genetics and the environments certainly read Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation, which was re- in which farmed animals have been
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