Animal Rights the International Library of Essays on Rights Series Editor: Tom Campbell

Home , Between the Species, Clare Palmer, David DeGrazia, Evelyn Pluhar

Animal Rights The International Library of Essays on Rights Series Editor: Tom Campbell

Titles in the Series:

Disability Rights Human Rights and Corporations Peter Blanck David Kinley

The Right to a Fair Trial Genocide and Human Rights Thom Brooks Mark Lattimer

Indigenous Rights Animal Rights Anthony J. Connolly Clare Palmer

Civil Rights and Security Social Rights David Dyzenhaus Lord Raymond Plant and Selina Chen

Children’s Rights, Volumes I and II Gender and Rights Michael D.A. Freeman Deborah L. Rhode and Carol Sanger

Language and Cultural Rights Health Rights Leslie Green Michael Selgelid and Thomas Pogge

Consumer Rights Theories of Rights Geraint Howells and Iain Ramsay C.L. Ten

Group Rights Bills of Rights Peter Jones Mark Tushnet Animal Rights

Edited by Clare Palmer Washington University in St Louis, USA © Clare Palmer 2008. For copyright of individual articles please refer to the Acknowledgements.

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Animal rights. – (The international library of essays on rights) 1. Animal rights 2. Human-animal relationships 3. Animal welfare – Law and legislation I. Palmer, Clare, 1967– 179.3

Library of Congress Control Number: 2007930998

ISBN: 978–0–7546–2741–8 Contents

Acknowledgements ix Series Preface xi Introduction xiii

PART I ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF ANIMAL RIGHTS

1 Peter Singer (1976), ‘All Animals Are Equal’, in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 73–86. 3 2 Tom Regan (1985), ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, in Peter Singer (ed.), In Defense of Animals, New York: Harper & Row, pp. 13–26. 17 3 Mary Anne Warren (1983), ‘The Rights of the Nonhuman World’, in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare (eds), Environmental Philosophy, St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, pp. 109–34. 31 4 James Rachels (1989), ‘Why Animals Have a Right to Liberty’, in Peter Singer and Tom Regan (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations (2nd edn), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 122–31. 57

PART II CRITICAL VIEWS ON ANIMAL RIGHTS – AND SOME RESPONSES

5 R.G. Frey (1977), ‘Animal Rights’, Analysis, 37, pp.186–89. 69 6 Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan (1978), ‘Animal Rights: A Reply to Frey’, Analysis, 38, pp. 32–36. 73 7 H.J. McCloskey (1979), ‘Moral Rights and Animals’, Inquiry, 22, pp. 23–54. 79 8 Evelyn B. Pluhar (1981), ‘Must an Opponent of Animal Rights also be an Opponent of Human Rights?’, Inquiry, 24, pp. 229–41. 111 9 Jan Narveson (1983), ‘Animal Rights Revisited’, in Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds), Ethics and Animals, Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 45–59. 125 10 Paul W. Taylor (1987), ‘Inherent Value and Moral Rights’, Monist, 70, pp. 15–30. 149 11 Peter Singer (1987), ‘Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?’, Monist, 70, pp. 3–14. 165 12 Dale Jamieson (1990), ‘Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance: A Critique of Regan’s Theory of Rights’, Ethics, 100, pp. 349–62. 177 13 Josephine Donovan (1990), ‘Animal Rights and Feminist Theory’, Signs, 15, pp. 350–75. 191 14 Mark Sagoff (1984), ‘Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce’, Osgood Hall Law Review, 22, pp. 297–307. 217 vi Animal Rights

15 Ted Benton (1993), ‘Animal Rights and Social Relations’, in Andrew Dobson and Paul Lucardie (eds), The Politics of Nature, London: Routledge, pp. 161–76. 229 16 Keith Burgess-Jackson (1998), ‘Doing Right by our Animal Companions’, Journal of Ethics, 2, pp. 159–85. 245

PART III ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN USES

17 Cora Diamond (1978), ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’, Philosophy, 53, pp. 465–79. 275 18 Tom Regan (1980), ‘Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, pp. 305–24. 291 19 Bernard E. Rollin (1991), ‘Social Ethics, Animal Rights, and Agriculture’, in Charles Blatz (ed.), Ethics and Agriculture, Moscow: University of Idaho Press, pp. 458–66. 311 20 Carl Cohen (1986), ‘The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research’, New England Journal of Medicine, 315, pp. 865–66. 321 21 Nathan Nobis (2004), ‘On Carl Cohen’s “Kind” Arguments For Animal Rights and Against Animal Rights’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 43–59. 327 22 Neil Levy (2004), ‘Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 213–17. 345 23 Deborah Slicer (1991), ‘Your Daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue’, Hypatia, 6, pp. 108–24. 351 24 David Degrazia (1999), ‘The Ethics of Animal Research: What are the Prospects for Agreement?’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 8, pp. 23–34. 369 25 Donald G. Lindburg (1999), ‘Zoos and the Rights of Animals’, Zoo Biology, 18, pp. 433–48. 381

PART IV POLITICAL AND LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS

26 Joel Feinberg (1978), ‘Human Duties and Animal Rights’, in Richard Morris and Michael Fox (eds), On The Fifth Day: Animal Rights and Human Ethics, Acropolis Books: Washington DC, pp. 45–69. 399 27 Gary L. Francione (2006), ‘Taking Sentience Seriously’, Journal of Animal Law and Ethics, 1, pp. 1–20. 425 28 Richard A. Epstein (2002), ‘Animals as Subjects, or Objects, of Rights’, in Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 143–61. 447 29 John Hadley (2005), ‘Nonhuman Animal Property: Reconciling Environmentalism and Animal Rights’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 36, pp. 305–15. 467 Animal Rights vii

30 Steven M. Wise (2001), ‘A Great Shout: Legal Rights for Great Apes’, in Benjamin B. Beck et al. (eds), Great Apes and Humans, Washington, DC and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 274–94. 479 31 Robert Goodin, Carole Pateman and Roy Pateman (1997), ‘Simian Sovereignty’, Political Theory, 25, pp. 821–49. 501

Index 531

Acknowledgements

The editor and publishers wish to thank the following for permission to use copyright material.

Blackwell Publishing for the essays: Tom Regan (1985), ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, in Peter Singer (ed.), In Defense of Animals, New York: Harper & Row, pp. 13–26; Tom Regan (1980), ‘Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9, pp. 305–24; Neil Levy (2004), ‘Cohen and Kinds: A Response to Nathan Nobis’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 213–17. Copyright © 2004 Society for Applied Philosophy; John Hadley (2005), ‘Nonhuman Animal Property: Reconciling Environmentalism and Animal Rights’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 36, pp. 305–15. Copyright © 2005 Blackwell Publishing; Nathan Nobis (2004), ‘On Carl Cohen’s “Kind” Argument For Animal Rights and Against Animal Rights’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 21, pp. 43–59. Copyright © 2004 Society for Applied Philosophy.

Cambridge University Press for the essays: Cora Diamond (1978), ‘Eating Meat and Eating People’, Philosophy, 53, pp. 465–79. Copyright © Royal Institute of Philosophy; David Degrazia (1999), ‘The Ethics of Animal Research: What are the Prospects for Agreement?’, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 8, pp. 23–34. Copyright © 1999 Cambridge University Press.

Copyright Clearance Center for the essays: Robert Goodin, Carole Pateman and Roy Pateman (1997), ‘Simian Sovereignty’, Political Theory, 25, pp. 821–49. Copyright © 1997 Sage Publications; Steven M. Wise (2001), ‘A Great Shout: Legal Rights for Great Apes’, in Benjamin B. Beck et al. (eds), Great Apes and Humans, Washington, DC and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, pp. 274–94.

Oxford University Press for the essay: Richard A. Epstein (2002), ‘Animals as Subjects, or Objects, of Rights’, in Martha Nussbaum and Cass Sunstein (eds), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 143–61.

Publishing Division of the Massachusetts Medical Society for the essay: Carl Cohen (1986), ‘The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research’, New England Journal of Medicine, 315, pp. 865–66. Copyright © 1986 Massachusetts Medical Society. Animal Rights

Springer for the essay: Jan Narveson (1983), ‘Animal Rights Revisited’, in Harlan B. Miller and William H. Williams (eds), Ethics and Animals, Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, pp. 45–59.

Taylor and Francis for the essays: H.J. McCloskey (1979), ‘Moral Rights and Animals’, Inquiry, 22, pp. 23–54; Evelyn B. Pluhar (1981), ‘Must an Opponent of Animal Rights also be an Opponent of Human Rights?’, Inquiry, 24, pp. 229–41.

Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity. Series Preface

Much of contemporary moral, political and legal discourse is conducted in terms of rights and increasingly in terms of human rights. Yet there is considerable disagreement about the nature of rights, their foundations and their practical implications and more concrete controversies as to the content, scope and force and particular rights. Consequently the discourse of rights calls for extensive analysis in its general meaning and significance, particularly in relation to the nature, location and content of the duties and responsibilities that correlate with rights. Equally important is the determination of the forms of argument that are appropriate to establish whether or not someone or some group has or has not a particular right, and what that might entail in practice. This series brings together essays that exhibit careful analysis of the concept of rights and detailed knowledge of specific rights and the variety of systems of rights articulation, interpretation, protection and enforcement. Volumes deal with general philosophical and practical issues about different sorts of rights, taking account of international human rights, regional rights conventions and regimes, and domestic bills of rights, as well as the moral and political literature concerning the articulation and implementation of rights. The volumes are intended to assist those engaged in scholarly research by making available the most important and enduring essays on particular topics. Essays are reproduced in full with the original pagination for ease of reference and citation. The editors are selected for their eminence in the study of law, politics and philosophy. Each volume represents the editor’s selection of the most seminal recent essays in English on an aspect of rights or on rights in a particular field. An introduction presents an overview of the issues in that particular area of rights together with comments on the background and significance of the selected essays.

TOM CAMPBELL Series Editor Professorial Fellow, The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), Charles Sturt University, Canberra

Introduction

Background: Animals and Moral Rights

Can animals be regarded as rights-holders? Should they be so regarded? Questions such as these have a long pedigree. In 1792 an anonymous satirical volume, The Vindication of the Rights of Brutes was published. This text intended to expose the ridiculous nature of arguments for the rights of women by maintaining that such arguments, followed to their logical conclusion, would support the idea that animals, too, have rights. Since that claim was so obviously absurd, plainly women did not have rights either. But this scathing discussion of animal rights was moving against a tide of interest in, and concern about, animal welfare and animals’ legal and moral status. Only a couple of years earlier Jeremy Bentham in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) maintained that:

The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full- grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason?, nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? (Bentham, 1789, p. 311)

By the late nineteenth century, arguments that animals can be thought of as having rights, and do in fact have them, were being proposed in more systematic form. Most well-known among these early advocates of animal rights is Henry Salt, whose book Animals’ Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress was published in 1894. Salt maintains that his object is to ‘set the principle of animals’ rights on a consistent and intelligible footing’ (Salt, 1894, Prefatory Note). To establish this footing, Salt begins his book by asking: ‘Have the lower animals “rights”? Undoubtedly – if men have’ (ibid., ch. 1). Forms of this claim – if humans have rights, then there are no consistent grounds for denying them to animals – have been central to arguments about animals’ rights ever since, the essays collected in this book being no exception. Although debates continued through the early twentieth century, the 1970s heralded a massive growth of interest in the moral status of animals. Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975) is often seen as the landmark text that generated an explosion of both popular and philosophical discussion about animals’ rights. Most importantly, for the purposes of this

I owe this reference to Peter Singer, who discusses it at the beginning of Animal Liberation (1975) and in his essay ‘All Animals are Equal’ , Chapter 1 in this collection. xiv Animal Rights collection, philosophical essays, both supporting and opposing the idea that animals might have rights, were published in journals and essay collections in the late 1970s and early 1980s. A number of essays from these discussions are reprinted here. A key contributor to this debate was Tom Regan, whose book The Case for Animal Rights (1983) laid out what is still the most systematic and widely discussed set of arguments for animal rights. (Although, obviously, this book could not be reproduced here, several essays by Tom Regan are included). By the mid-1980s the discussion of animal rights had expanded to include concerns about the kinds of right to which animals might be entitled, what the implications for human society might be of taking animals seriously as rights-holders and whether there should be legal changes to afford animals legal rights. (I will comment on this further later.) What became known as the ‘animal rights movement’ came into being, representatives of which engaged in activities ranging from philosophical argument and lobbying for changes in law and policy to more radical direct action on behalf of animals.

The Expression ‘Animal Rights’

The use of the terms ‘animal’ and that of ‘rights’ needs further explanation. First – as already will have become clear – the term ‘animal’ here is being used to mean ‘non-human animal’. But some find this problematic: it has been argued that the term ‘animal’ used in this way rests on an implicit denial that humans are themselves animals; and also that it functions to elide differences between non-human animals by grouping them all into one class. Alasdair MacIntyre (2001, p. 45), for instance, maintains that this use of ‘animal’ implies ‘that the differences between nonhuman species are of no importance, or almost no importance in any relevant respect’. However, while it is worth flagging up these worries, Henry Salt’s 1894 response still seems apposite: ‘my only excuse for using it [the term animal]…is that there is absolutely no other brief term available’(Salt, 1894, ch.1). A related concern does require further attention, though: what kinds of creature are included within the scope of ‘animal rights’? Insects, reptiles, mammals, or only some of these? The response to this question varies from author to author. Whether moral rights are attributed to some species of animal generally depends on (a) what kind of capacities a particular author thinks a being has to have in order to qualify as a rights-holder, and (b) which animals the author thinks actually possess those capacities. So, someone who thinks that, for example, (a) possessing sentience is sufficient for the attribution of moral rights, and (b) that reptiles are sentient, will attribute rights to a wider range of beings than someone who maintains that (a) possessing some idea of oneself as a being that persists over time is necessary for the attribution of moral rights and (b) that only great apes possess such an idea. In practice, though, a number of the essays in this collection do not explicitly discuss what kinds of animal they are picking out when they use the term ‘animal rights’. In these cases it’s usually safe to suppose that they at least mean ‘mammal rights’, and they may extend this to include fish, reptiles and amphibians (but rarely go beyond these groups).

See also Jacques Derrida (2002, p. 416) who (in more strident language) commented: ‘The confusion of all nonhuman living creatures within the general and common category of the animal is not simply a sin against rigorous thinking, vigilance, lucidity, or empirical authority; it is also a crime. Not a crime against animality precisely, but a crime of the first order against the animals, against animals.’. Animal Rights xv

What, then, of the use of the term ‘rights’? The expression ‘animal rights’ has been used to pick out somewhat different ideas. Two senses in particular have been important. The first takes ‘animal rights’ to be shorthand for the idea that animals have any kind of moral standing at all – David DeGrazia (2002, p. 15) calls this the ‘moral-status’ sense of animal rights. On this view, to say that an animal has rights is just to say that (for instance) it’s wrong for you to gratuitously hurt it, or to kill it without good reason, for animals are the kinds of being that should be taken directly into account when making moral decisions. There are different explanations as to why this might be the case (that animals feel pain is the most common) but, whatever the reason, to say that animals have rights in this sense is to say that they have moral status. The second sense of rights is narrower – a subset of the first. It refers to a particular kind of moral status, the kind oriented around rights theory, where rights theory is understood as one ethical tradition among others. This narrower sense of rights is the one generally used in philosophy and is the sense almost (but not quite) universally adopted by the authors in this collection. It’s important to recognize this distinction, not least because the denial of animal rights means something quite different in the two contexts. To deny that animals have rights in the ‘moral status’ sense means to deny that they are of direct moral concern at all. To deny that animals have rights in the second, philosophical sense need have no implications for whether animals should be thought of as having moral status. Many objections to animal rights in this sense are not objections to the idea that animals have moral status; rather, they are objections to the idea that rights theory is a good way to conceive of it. In order to untangle some of these issues a little further, I’ll outline some very basic (if simplified and contested) ideas, first about what rights in this narrower sense might be thought to be, and then about how rights theory relates to other moral theories. I’ll then say something about legal rights before moving on to outline the contents of this collection in more detail.

Moral Rights and Rights Theory

This collection brings together arguments about the moral and legal rights of animals. But what is a moral right? Wenar (2005) describes rights as ‘entitlements (not) to perform certain actions or be in certain states, or entitlements that others (not) perform certain actions or be in certain states’. What’s particularly important here is the idea that rights are entitlements. In many cases, rights can be best understood as claims against others. Although rights are widely agreed to be entitlements, there is considerable debate about the form of such entitlements. One distinction commonly – though controversially – made is that between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ rights. Negative rights are usually interpreted as entitlements a rights-holder has not to be interfered with. In this sense, for example, if one has a right to life, one is entitled not to have the continuance of one’s life interfered with – so, one has a right not to be killed. Positive rights, on the other hand, are usually interpreted as rights to provision, or to some kind of assistance from others. A right to life in this sense may mean a right to be assisted in staying alive, by, for instance, the provision of minimum subsistence. Negative rights are, generally, less controversial than positive ones; libertarians, for example, for whom the distinction is

This distinction is not intended to suggest that all rights must be either positive or negative. xvi Animal Rights particularly important, argue that only negative rights exist. It’s important to raise this issue here, because worries about whether rights-holding entails (or fails to entail) positive rights to assistance has particular relevance in the case of animals’ rights. We’ll see this concern emerge in Dale Jamieson’s essay ‘Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance’ reproduced as Chapter 12 in this collection. An important question – and one that arises in various different contexts in this book – concerns the justification for rights. On what basis can it be claimed that humans – or animals – have rights? One long-standing tradition is natural rights theory: the idea that humans have rights on account of their nature as human beings, an idea prominent in the work of John Locke. One strand of this tradition maintains that human rights are divinely bestowed; such a claim, obviously, makes explaining where rights come from relatively easy (if one accepts the divine as a premise!). Other more contemporary philosophical traditions take a broadly Kantian approach, maintaining that the possession of rights flows from ‘human dignity’ or from some other human capacity or capacities (although there is no consensus about what these capacities might be). However, the thought that rights are natural has long been controversial; Jeremy Bentham famously referred to the idea as ‘nonsense on stilts’. Others argue that rights are a set of entitlements negotiated between people – a kind of reciprocal, contractual arrangement. On some natural rights approaches, and on most contractualist views, being able to understand what rights are, being able to claim them and to respect others’ claims to them are central to possessing them: one must be ‘morally autonomous’ or a ‘moral agent’ to have rights (McCloskey and Cohen, Chapters 7 and 20 in this collection, take this view). Yet others – consequentialists, for whom bringing about the best overall consequences lies at the heart of morality – may adopt rights language on the basis that rights can have a consequentialist justification: for instance, that the affirmation of human rights maximizes human welfare or utility. However, none of the authors in this collection offers such a consequentialist justification; the philosophical rights advocates here are either natural rights theorists or contractualists. These differing ideas about the justification of rights have been particularly important for discussions about animals. Many ethicists – utilitarians, in particular – have argued that rights theory should not be adopted at all, for anyone, whether human or not. But advocates of animals’ rights have taken issue both with the idea that humans have natural human rights not available to animals and with the claim that rights are contractual agreement made between human beings, from which animals are excluded. More about how these arguments work will become clear later in this Introduction. Despite disagreements about the form and justification of rights, almost all of those who accept rights theory agree that to say something is someone’s right is to say that they have a very strong, perhaps an overriding, entitlement to it (or entitlement not to be deprived of it). Ronald Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously (1977) famously described rights as ‘trumps’. The strength of rights claims (in the narrower, philosophical sense) is one of the reasons

This positive/negative distinction is not unproblematic, as a number of authors make clear. See Shue (1996) and McCloskey, Chapter 7 in this volume. The Hohfeldian system for analyzing the form of rights is more careful and detailed than the division into positive and negative rights. It describes four forms of rights: privileges, claims, powers and immunities. Important though this Hohfeldian system is in discussions about moral and legal rights, it has not featured prominently in the debate over animals’ rights. Animal Rights xvii why the debate over animal rights has been so intense. While almost everyone is willing to accept that animals have some kind of moral status – that, for instance, as Nozick (1974, p. 37) maintains, there would be something morally problematic about smashing a baseball bat into a cow’s head just because one enjoyed this more than one would enjoy another form of exercise – to say that animals are rights-holders is to attribute to them extremely strong entitlements. For example, if animals have any rights at all, it’s at least arguable that they have a right to life. But, given the strength of rights claims, wide recognition of this right, even in negative form, would fundamentally change the fabric of virtually all human societies. For even if an animal’s right to life could be overridden in special circumstances (such as in a case where there is a conflict between the right to life of a human and an animal), overriding such a strong entitlement could surely not be justified for the workaday killing of millions of animals in slaughterhouses across the world. As a result, the argument that animals have rights has been particularly controversial because of the extremely strong nature of the duties to animals that seem to result. Rights theory, as noted above, is just one approach to moral theory. Some ethicists argue that rights theory encompasses the entire moral sphere: morality just is about rights. Others argue that rights are important, but that they constitute only one part of the moral sphere. So, for instance, it’s possible to argue that though the possession of rights is a special ‘high-level’ moral entitlement, one might still have some (albeit lesser) moral status without possessing moral rights – the kind of position argued for by Carl Cohen in Chapter 20. Alternatively, one might argue that rights theory – understood, at least, in terms of ‘natural’ rights or as part of a putative contract – is wrong-headed in itself. Representatives of several traditions critical of rights theory in this way are found in this collection. Consequentialists may accept, as we saw above, that rights language can be useful as a way of bringing about the best consequences. But what’s of primary interest for consequentialists are those consequences, not the respecting of rights in themselves. And for the consequentialists represented in this collection at least, if bringing about the best consequences would entail the violation of a right, so much the worse for the right. This debate between those who argue for rights, understood as very strong or inviolable claims, and those who argue that the aim of moral behaviour is to bring about the best consequences, is represented in the contributions by Tom Regan and Peter Singer to this volume. (I’ll say more about this debate below.) Those who advocate some form of feminist ethic, or ethic of care, also argue that a focus on rights is problematic. The idea of ‘having a right’ from these perspectives, care ethicists suggest, is oppositional and individualistic, reflecting a view of the world in which living beings are independent and self-sufficient, rather than embedded in relationship; and it neglects the importance of the emotions in the moral sphere. Here the idea of animal rights is problematic not because animals should be excluded from the moral sphere, but because care and the moral emotions such as sympathy give better guides as to how humans should treat animals than the more rigid dictates of rights theory.

Evelyn Pluhar (Chapter 8), drawing on a distinction made by Regan, describes rights in this tradition as being ‘non-basic rights’ as opposed to ‘basic rights’ – rights that are not related to consequences. There are, probably, rule consequentialists who argue that respecting animals’ rights can be seen as rule-following, which might make them close to basic. However, so far as I know, no one has advocated such a position. xviii Animal Rights

The idea that animals have rights, then, has been questioned for a number of different reasons. Some argue that animals have no moral status at all. Others argue that they do have moral status, but that they do not have rights (even though all or some humans do have rights). Yet others argue that they do have moral status, but that rights theory is the wrong way to conceptualize this status (both for humans and for animals). Essays representing all these views are included in this collection.

Legal Rights and Animals

So far, I’ve considered some basic ideas about animals and moral rights. There are also debates about whether legal rights – that is, rights protected by law and enforceable by the courts – should be extended to animals. While legal rights often track widely accepted moral rights, the two do not always coincide. The law in any particular country may not recognize what are widely thought to be human moral rights (indeed, the failure to do so may be the source of protest). And there might be a legal right to something to which it can at least be argued that there is no moral right (some maintain this to be the case in the USA with respect to accessing violent pornography). But those who argue that animals should have legal rights usually base their argument on the view that animals have moral rights, and maintain that those rights, like human rights, should be protected by law. Of course, many countries have had legislation to protect animals in place for decades, even for centuries. This legislation may regulate practices such as slaughter or experimentation, or may be more generally aimed at preventing cruelty. But whether this kind of legislation is adequate lies at the heart of a key debate between those who argue, in a legal context, for the promotion of animal welfare and those who argue for the promotion of animal rights. Those who argue for animal welfare seek increased legal protection for animals from human-inflicted pain and other kinds of suffering (for example, insufficient food and space). Animal rights advocates maintain that this welfare legislation does not go far enough. Welfare legislation accepts, they argue, that animals may be used by humans for food and as experimental subjects; it merely tries to curb the worst excesses of these practices (and is rather ineffective at that). The problem, on the rights view, is more fundamental than this: animals (or at least, members of some species of animal) are not the kinds of thing that humans should use in this way at all. The problem, therefore, is not one about treating animals inhumanely, but instead one about understanding them as human resources. The current legal status of animals as property is a particular concern for those arguing a case for the legal rights of animals. If animals are, or can legally be, someone’s property, then they lack legal status in their own right; property status provides a foundation for their use as resources. Several essays in this collection explore these questions with respect to the extension of legal rights to animals. The most well-known of the initiatives arguing for legal rights for animals – or some animals, at least – is the Great Ape Project. Its Great Ape Declaration maintains that great apes should be recognized – as are humans – as having the right to life, to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of liberty and to protection from torture. These moral rights, further, should be enshrined in law, removing great apes from the category of human property and giving them independent legal standing. The Great Ape Project and special issues (arguably) raised by great apes are discussed in several of the essays towards the end of this collection. Animal Rights xix

The Structure and Contents of this Collection

Following this Introduction, this book is divided into four main sections. Part I contains four influential essays that argue a case for animal moral rights, each putting forward a somewhat different view. Part II, which is longer, brings together essays that are, for different reasons, critical of arguments that animals have moral rights. Some direct responses to those critical essays are included. Some authors in this section argue that only humans, but not animals, can have moral rights; others are critical of rights theory in general and propose different ways of conceptualizing human moral relationships towards animals; others defend rights theory against these claims. Part III moves from general discussions about animals’ rights to more specific contexts in which questions about these rights arise and what those rights might mean in practice: for example, the eating of animals, animal experimentation, the keeping of animals in zoos. Even in these more specific contexts, though, general questions about what capacities underpin animal rights and whether rights is the best way to conceptualize what’s morally owed to animals continue to arise. (Indeed, some of these essays would be as comfortably located in Part II as in Part III). Finally, Part IV considers issues about animal rights in a legal and political context. It includes essays arguing in favour of, and against, the extension of legal rights to animals and concludes with two essays exploring the political and moral status of the great apes.

Arguments in Favour of Animal Rights

The first essay in this collection is Peter Singer’s ‘All Animals Are Equal’. First published in the journal Philosophic Exchange (1974), and closely followed by Singer’s book Animal Liberation (1975), this is one of the earliest – and subsequently most reproduced – essays in the modern debate about the moral status of animals. It should be noted that Singer’s essay does not advocate animal rights in the stricter, philosophical sense (as is made clear in his essay ‘Animal Liberation or Animal Rights?’ (Chapter 11)). Although he does use rights language occasionally here, Singer is a utilitarian, not a rights theorist. But the primary concern of this essay is not to advocate any particular moral theory, but rather to argue that animals should be taken equally into consideration with humans in moral decision-making. Singer argues that capacities such as IQ and the ability to communicate are irrelevant to moral status – after all, humans differ quite widely in these ways. Rather, ‘[t]he capacity for suffering and enjoying things’ (p. 8) is the only non-arbitrary basis for moral status: if you can suffer, you can have interests; things can go better or worse for you. On Singer’s argument, all beings that can suffer should be taken into account morally. Indeed, the suffering of any being should be taken into account equally with like suffering of any other being, no matter what the species. Since animals can suffer, as humans can suffer, failing to take animals’ interests equally into account reveals that one is a speciesist, a person who among other things ‘allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species’ (p. 9). This speciesist attitude, according to Singer, underpins the institutions of animal use in human societies, such as eating meat and animal experimentation. Singer’s essay flags up several key issues, debated by most of the subsequent essays. First, he focuses on sentience (using this term as shorthand for the capacity to feel pleasure and pain); this raises the question whether sentience is sufficient (a) to establish rights and (b) xx Animal Rights to ground equal moral consideration for humans and other animals. Second, he raises a very preliminary form of what has subsequently become called the Argument from Marginal Cases (AMC). He compares an animal with a human being that is in some sense ‘marginal’ – first, an orphaned infant, later ‘an imbecile’. An infant, or someone with a severe mental disability, lacks the mental complexity that is often argued to give humans special moral status. Singer’s orphaned infant also lacks the emotional connections that make the loss of a human life so painful for those left behind. So two of the characteristics often argued to separate humans from animals (mental complexity and emotional attachments) are missing. What, then, other than discriminatory speciesist prejudice, could justify experimenting on an animal, and not on a human, when the animal is at least as sentient as the human? As we will see, subsequent essays in this collection pick up, develop, explain and refute different versions of the AMC. Tom Regan, the author of the second essay in the collection, argues that animals have moral rights. The essay reproduced here, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’ (Chapter 2), shares a title with his 1983 book, and provides an introduction to the more detailed arguments contained in that book. Regan considers a variety of approaches to moral theory that he finds inadequate: moral contractarianism, a ‘cruelty-kindness view’ (p. 22), and utilitarianism. Moral contractarianism, Regan maintains (somewhat controversially), is inadequate for people, let alone animals, as it excludes all those who are not able to understand or agree to a moral contract. Equally, a morality based around cruelty and kindness is inadequate in the case of people: one could be a kindly racist, for instance. Utilitarianism, while having the advantage of focusing on egalitarianism, also fails. Its emphasis on aggregating consequences to arrive at the best outcome allows for individuals to be sacrificed or traded off in order to promote the greatest good. The most adequate kind of moral theory, Regan argues, is one that focuses on the inherent value of individuals – and rights theory, on his account, does just this. An individual has inherent value if it is an ‘experiencing subject of a life’ (p. 26), the kind of creature with a welfare, beliefs, preferences, memory, feelings and an experienced quality of life. And at least some kinds of animal, as well as humans, have these qualities. As such, they have inherent value, and those that have inherent value have at least some rights. Further, Regan insists, all who have inherent value have it equally. Regan’s account of animal rights in this essay is necessarily truncated (his book gives a much fuller account – though some argue, still not full enough). However, two central points emerge. First, to have inherent value – and hence rights – on Regan’s account, a creature must have quite sophisticated mental capacities – beyond sentience alone, which Singer argued to be both necessary and sufficient for moral status. Of course, Regan maintains that mammals such as cows and dogs do have such sophisticated capacities. But one way to attack Regan’s view is to attack his description of what animals are like (although, in doing so, one faces arguments about people who lack the same sophisticated capacities). Second, Regan argues that the real problem is not that humans make animals suffer, wrong though that is. It is something more fundamental: that humans treat animals as instruments, as resources, things they can use for their own ends. Inflicting suffering on them is a symptom of this deeper failure to recognize animals’ inherent value. Regan’s clear expression of this position has made a deep impact on the debate about animal rights – not only with respect to their moral rights, but also with respect to their status in law. The contributions of Singer and Regan, often thought of as the architects of the animal liberation/rights movement as it has emerged today, have been extremely significant. However, Animal Rights xxi they are not the only advocates of animal rights. The remaining two essays in Part I make somewhat different cases for animal rights. In Chapter 3 Mary Anne Warren argues that, on the basis of their capacity to feel pain and pleasure, animals should be thought of as having basic rights. However, she argues that (most) animals are sufficiently dissimilar to (most) humans that the kinds of right to which they are entitled are likewise different – and less extensive. For example, humans have sophisticated mental and imaginative lives, and long- term future-oriented desires, that make their interest in continuing to live greater than that of most animals. This, she suggests, gives humans more intrinsic value than most animals and means that a human right to life is usually stronger than that of an animal. In addition, Warren accepts some part of the contractualist rights theory rejected by Regan. While animals may have some weaker rights, ‘full and equal rights’ only exist between reciprocating members of a moral community – and such a community cannot include animals. This argument, of course, again raises the question whether ‘non-paradigm’ humans: (infants, people with disabilities) have lesser rights than ‘paradigm’ humans. Warren provides a series of (contentious) reasons as to why strong moral rights should be extended to these individuals but not to animals. She concludes by considering some objections to animals’ rights from various environmental perspectives, such as the view that if animal rights are to be respected, then (for instance) overpopulation by a sentient species could not be corrected by culling, because culling would fail to respect rights. Warren here appeals to the weak nature of the animal rights she endorses: they can be overridden for sufficiently serious causes – such as protecting threatened ecosystems. Her brief consideration of potential conflicts between some forms of environmental ethics and animal rights will be revisited elsewhere in this collection. The final essay in Part I is James Rachels’ ‘Why Animals Have a Right to Liberty’ (Chapter 4). Rachels’ method here is as follows: first, find a right we are confident that humans have, then ask whether there’s a relevant difference that justifies denying the right to members of a particular species of animal; if not, the animals have the right. On this basis, Rachels has no difficulty arguing that animals such as rabbits, pigs and monkeys have the right not to be tortured, but that no animal has the right to freedom of worship. He focuses on one particular human right – the right to liberty – and argues that the idea of ‘freedom’ makes sense not only in the context of ‘rational agents’, but also of any being that ‘is able to act as seems best to him without being subject to external constraints on his actions’ (Lucas, 1966, cited on p. 60). And animals are able to do this. In addition, being restricted in their activities can negatively impact animals’ interests: Rachels cites numerous cases in which, he maintains, restrictions on animals’ freedom of movement caused them distress. This, he argues, indicates that animals that suffer in captivity ‘have an interest in being free, and so at least a prima facie right to liberty’ (p. 63), although rights to liberty will vary between species. The four essays in Part I, then, all make a strong case for the moral significance of animals. Singer’s essay – while not, narrowly speaking, advocating animal rights – argues on the basis of animal sentience that animals and humans should be taken equally into consideration in moral decision-making. Regan argues that all creatures that are ‘experiencing subjects of a life’ – which includes many animals – have equal inherent value, and therefore rights; creatures with inherent value should not be treated solely as the instruments or resources of others. Warren argues that, on the basis of their capacities for pain and pleasure, animals do have moral rights, but that these rights are weaker than human rights and may be over-ridden for sufficiently serious reasons. Rachels maintains that, if we can be sure that humans have a xxii Animal Rights particular right, unless we can find a good reason why an animal should be denied that right, we should attribute it to the animal too; and argues, correspondingly that, the right to liberty is just such a cross-species right.

Critical Views on Animal Rights – and Some Responses

Part II contains a number of critical responses to the arguments for animal rights proposed in Part I. R.G. Frey is a long-standing opponent of animal rights (though he does, in other publications, accord moral status to animals). The essay reproduced here as Chapter 5 picks up on aspects of the Argument from Marginal Cases (AMC), which, as we saw in Part I, is central to arguments for animal rights. Frey portrays the AMC as working like this: each and every criterion that excludes animals from holding rights also excludes some ‘marginal’ humans (for example, babies or those with mental handicaps), but since these ‘marginal’ humans do have rights, none of the animal-excluding rights criteria succeeds. Frey offers two possible responses to this version of the AMC. First, perhaps ‘marginal’ humans don’t have rights. Second, the best arguments for attributing rights to ‘marginal’ humans would, if successful, separate them from animals – arguments from potential rationality (which would separate babies and animals), arguments from similarity (which would separate those with mental disabilities from animals) and arguments from immortal souls (possessed by all humans, but no animals). Frey doesn’t attempt to defend these arguments, merely to maintain that, due to them, the AMC fails, since either (a) marginal humans may not themselves be rights-holders or (b) there are criteria that would separate marginal humans from animals. In Chapter 6, Dale Jamieson and Tom Regan engage directly with Frey’s argument. They suggest that Frey’s is a ‘straw man’ argument: those who argue for animal rights don’t formulate the AMC in this way. Defenders of the AMC only maintain that some prominent criteria that exclude animals from rights-holding exclude some humans too, and, in any case, this is just one of a range of reasons for rejecting particular criteria as the basis for rights-possession. Further, Jamieson and Regan suggest, it isn’t clear that all animals would fail either Frey’s ‘potential rationality’ test or his ‘similarity’ test, depending on how those criteria were drawn up; and in any case, Frey fails to provide sufficient evidence for thinking that these arguments are, in fact, ‘the best’. Sentience, Jamieson and Regan suggest, is surely a good premise for rights-holding; but this is inexplicably missing from Frey’s account. For H.J. McCloskey (Chapter 7), rights form only one part of the sphere of morality: animals may have moral status, even if they are not rights-holders. However, given the particularly strong nature of rights claims, establishing whether or not animals have rights is nonetheless important. McCloskey argues that, to have rights, one must have the capacity for ‘rational, moral self-determination, moral autonomy’ (p. 88). Available evidence, McCloskey maintains, makes it unlikely that any animal has this capacity – and hence no animal has rights. Again, this runs up against the AMC. But McCloskey bites on some of the bullet. Humans that have no potential for moral autonomy don’t have rights. However (using one of the arguments proposed by Frey in Chapter 5) rights can be extended to infants on the basis of their potential for moral autonomy. Although McCloskey does not accept that animals do have rights, he nonetheless considers what rights they might have if they did. He responds to Rachels’ argument concerning animals’ right to liberty, as well as discussing, in passing, animals’ right to property (the subject of John Hadley’s essay in Part IV). He also maintains Animal Rights xxiii

– raising issues that recur in Jamieson’s ‘Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance’ (Chapter 12) – that the attribution of rights to animals would result in insuperable difficulties concerning incompatible demands: for example, the protection of one animal’s life from deadly aggression by another animal. In Chapter 8 Evelyn Pluhar defends animals’ rights against views of this kind, attacking those who maintain that, even though ‘nonparadigmatic humans’ (p. 111) – the ‘marginal cases’ – differ from paradigmatic humans in a variety of ways, there are still plausible arguments that separate permissible treatment for them from what is permissible for animals. An animal rights opponent who ‘fully accepts the consequences of his theory’ (p. 121, emphasis in original) would have to accept that, if animals lack rights, so too do non-paradigmatic humans. Thus, Pluhar maintains, someone who holds this view should accept that it’s morally permissible to treat non-paradigmatic humans like animals (by breeding them for food, experimenting on them and so on). If this conclusion is unacceptable, then it is time to reconsider arguments for animals’ rights. In Chapter 9 Jan Narveson (whose earlier views are also discussed by Pluhar) considers three possible groundings for rights: those emerging from libertarianism, utilitarianism and contractarianism. From none of these theoretical positions, he suggests, is it clear that animals have rights; or, if they do, it is not obvious that such rights should protect animals from, for instance, being eaten by people. Most interesting in Narveson’s account is his discussion of libertarianism and animal rights. First, he suggests, it’s unclear whether a libertarian view (such as that of Nozick) could attribute rights to animals at all. If it did, these rights would be purely negative rights – rights as side-constraints on our actions; rights, Narveson says, ‘not to be treated badly without one’s consent’ (p. 129). But perhaps, Narveson suggests, the importance of consent raises other questions. Animals are not able to give consent to be treated badly (or in any particular way at all). But is it unimaginable that a farm animal would hypothetically consent to a deal where it was treated well and slaughtered painlessly? Suppose the alternatives are non-existence (which of course, raises a whole series of further issues) or being turned out to fend for itself in the wild? Although Narveson’s answers raise more problems than they solve, these kinds of questions seem important and neglected. Humans bring livestock animals into being literally (they would not exist without human breeding practices) and in terms of their dependent, domesticated natures. What implications does this human role have for thinking about animals’ rights? Both Paul Taylor and Peter Singer, in Chapters 10 and 11 respectively, take on aspects of Regan’s rights argument. Taylor raises several concerns about arguments central to the internal structure of Regan’s position. First, he maintains that it’s perfectly coherent to accept that humans and animals both have inherent value, but that humans have more of it than animals (a view that Regan rejects). Second, he questions the link that Regan makes between inherent value, duties and rights. Regan, Taylor maintains, claims that rights are derived from duties – duties that one has towards beings because they have inherent value. But this is the wrong way round. Moral rights are ‘logically prior to the duties correlative to them’ (p. 159). We have duties because someone else has rights; they don’t acquire rights because we have duties. This is not, as Taylor makes clear, to deny the possibility that animals have rights; but rather to maintain that Regan’s route of getting to them is misguided. Singer, on the other hand – as has been already noted – opposes the rights approach in itself, for humans as well as animals. He unpicks the arguments Regan makes in Chapter 2 against utilitarianism, xxiv Animal Rights rejecting the claim that all forms of utilitarianism are committed to treating individuals as lacking in inherent value, and advocating maximizing consequentialism as the best way of making moral decisions. For a utilitarian to aim for the best outcome, Singer maintains, is not, contra Regan, the same as treating individuals merely as a means to an end, for everyone has been given equal consideration. Regan, Singer argues, provides no case ‘for attributing rights, rather than equal consideration, to animals’ (p. 175). Dale Jamieson’s complex and important essay (Chapter 12) raises several key difficulties with animal rights arguments (the target is Regan, but the problem is a broader one), though I’ll consider just one of his objections here. On Regan’s account, only moral agents can violate rights, since rights claims only exist against those who can recognize them; and where rights have been violated there are duties to assist. But this limits duties to assist to cases of rights violations, and allows Regan to maintain that, for example, humans have no duties to intervene between predators and prey animals, because predators, not being moral agents, cannot violate rights. However, as Jamieson points out, this restriction on duties to assistance has other worrying implications, in the human as well as in the animal sphere. So, for instance, there seems to be no duty to warn someone of a falling boulder (unless, perhaps, the boulder was deliberately dislodged by a murderous moral agent) since a boulder itself can violate no one’s rights. It’s difficult, Jamieson suggests, for Regan to deal with this problem; maintaining that there are, after all, non-discretionary duties to assist in the boulder case would reopen the problem of predation and is likely to be just an ad hoc addition to his overall theory. Jamieson argues that to resolve this problem (as well as others thrown up by clashes in rights) Regan will need to move closer to a more consequentialist moral theory. Josephine Donovan’s critical essay (Chapter 13) takes quite a different approach from those so far considered. She argues that animal rights (and, indeed, utilitarian) approaches emerge from, and are still immersed in, a world-view invested in rationalism, scientific knowledge and domination over, or control of, nature. According to Donovan, Regan, for example, emphasizes the necessity of having ‘complex consciousness’ to be ‘subject of a life’ (p. 196); he maintains that the recognition of animal rights is required on rational grounds and has no place for relationship or emotional attachment in his account of morality. His work privileges rationalism and individualism over emotion and relationship. Donovan argues that what is needed is a shift in world-view, a reorientation towards the sorts of perspective often revealed by women’s thinking and writing and currently manifest in cultural feminism. These perspectives emphasize empathy with and respect for nature, emotional engagement and the maintenance of caring relationships, in contrast to the ‘rigidity’ of rights theory. A ‘women’s relational culture of caring and attentive love’, rather than the rigidity of rights theory, provides the best basis for the ethical treatment of animals (p. 216). The individualist focus of animal rights arguments is not only a concern for those coming from a feminist perspective. The remaining three essays in Part II – albeit in somewhat different ways – all emphasize the need to think about animals in context and in relationship – and thus raise questions about the rights view. In Chapter 14 Mark Sagoff approaches animal rights from the perspective of ‘holistic’ environmentalism, raising questions similar to those considered by Mary Anne Warren in Chapter 3. Environmentalism, Sagoff argues, drawing on Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, concerns the protection of ecosystems and endangered species – the land community. Animal rights, however, focus on the protection of individual sentient animals. These two concerns are quite different: an animal rights view has no built- Animal Rights xxv in commitment to environmental protection; indeed, the two might be in opposition to one another. For, Sagoff (contentiously) argues, basic human rights include positive rights to security and subsistence. But if wild animals have these basic rights, then human intervention in ecosystems is mandated, for wild animals are constantly threatened and are often hungry. Should feedlots for wild animals be organized? Should wildernesses become managed for animal welfare? If so, this puts animal rights advocates and environmentalists at odds with one another. Animal rights advocates (problematically, on Sagoff’s account) emphasize the welfare of individuals; environmentalists are interested in the whole land community. Sagoff’s notorious essay pulls animal rights and environmentalism apart: although it should, perhaps, be read in the context of Jamieson’s essay (Chapter 12) since the two have quite different readings of what rights for wild animals might mean. Ted Benton’s essay (Chapter 15), written from a sociological perspective, focuses on the potential effectiveness of liberal-individualistic rights discourse in the case of animals. While those who advocate animal rights have been effective in getting the discourse widely recognized, in doing so, he maintains, they have lost potential allies amongst those sceptical of the rights tradition (in the human as well as the animal case). Relatedly, in failing to consider the broader context of power and social relationship in which humans and animals are located, they have failed to be practically effective in changing the situation for animals. Central to Benton’s argument is the claim that where societies are radically unequal in terms of power, wealth and accomplishment, claims to equal rights are likely to have ‘little de facto purchase on the realities of social life’ (p. 234). And animals are, as Benton rightly notes, ‘significantly less well placed than even the most disadvantaged humans’ (p. 235). When human property rights, the rights of hunters and the human right to health seem to conflict with animals’ rights, human rights will usually win out. Furthermore, in situations such as industrial farms, the mechanized and impersonal nature of human interactions with animals makes their recognition as ‘subjects of a life’ particularly unlikely. What’s especially interesting in Benton’s argument is his emphasis on the role that relations of power and dependency, affection and detachment can play both in understanding human relations with animals and in generating moral relationships with them. The final essay in Part III, by Keith Burgess- Jackson, develops this issue still further, in the context of exploring humans’ obligations towards their ‘animal companions’. A difficulty, Burgess-Jackson suggests, with the animal rights literature is that it assumes that ‘whatever obligations humans have to any animals are had to all animals’ (p. 247). This view, Burgess-Jackson argues, is inadequate as it fails to consider the special obligations individual humans have towards individual animals that they voluntarily bring into their lives. Bringing a companion animal home, he maintains, generates a responsibility to provide for it because, in doing so, one closes off other opportunities for it to fulfil its needs; rather like producing a child, both vulnerability and dependence are generated. Burgess-Jackson recognizes that animal rights theorists are made uneasy by such claims: they fear an emphasis on special responsibilities towards only some individuals. Further, on the rights view, all that seems to be relevant to moral status is the intrinsic properties of the being concerned, not the relationships in which it stands. But, as Burgess-Jackson maintains, one can acknowledge special responsibilities without denying general ones: relational properties may carry moral responsibilities, as well as intrinsic ones. Burgess-Jackson’s essay provides a bridge into Part III, inasmuch as he is concerned with animals in a particular context in relation to humans: in their homes. Part III considers ethical xxvi Animal Rights issues raised by human uses of animals in other contexts: as food, in laboratories, and in zoos.

Animal Rights and Human Uses

The first two essays in Part III concern the relationship of animal rights arguments to vegetarianism. In Chapter 17 Cora Diamond – while not opposed to vegetarianism – argues that a rights view is wrongheaded and simplistic, failing to ask enough questions about (for instance) why we don’t eat people – or pets – but do eat other animals. The reason why we don’t eat people – even dead ones – is not because they are perceived as having rights, but rather because of certain ideas we have about what it is to be human and certain relations in which we stand to our fellow humans. (Thus, this essay connects interestingly with several of those towards the end of Part II.) She suggests that, in order for animals to receive better treatment, we need to change the ways in which they are conceptualized and understood to relate to humans, rather than insisting on their rights. Seeing animals as ‘fellow creatures’ that appeal to our pity and ask us not to treat them callously and unrelentingly, she suggests, might provide more compelling grounds for not eating them than insistence on their rights ever could. However, the next essay by Regan, in contrast, reasserts a rights view. He claims that a rights view requires vegetarianism and that vegetarianism requires a rights view. This puts his essay implicitly at odds with Diamond’s and explicitly at odds with arguments for vegetarianism based on utilitarianism. Indeed, Regan carefully picks out differences between utilitarian and rights views, using vegetarianism as a test case. There’s no guarantee, Regan maintains, that the ‘best consequences’ on a utilitarian calculation will come up with vegetarianism, and none of Singer’s many arguments about equality can guarantee it either. Only a view that animals – and humans with disabilities – are, because of their capacities, the kinds of beings that have rights and that therefore there are some things that should not be done to them, including eating them, is strong and consistent enough to support the claim that humans should be vegetarians. Bernard Rollin (Chapter 19) does not engage directly with arguments for vegetarianism, but instead tackles more general questions about animals in agriculture, injecting a new note: the importance of animal natures. He does not just mean by this the capacities that make animals morally significant, but the ‘distinctive set’ of needs and interests – borrowing from Aristotle, the telos – that each species of animal manifests. It is the expression of a species member’s distinctive nature that animal rights should protect, just as human rights protect what is fundamental to being human. And this has particular implications for animal agriculture, even if we accept the idea that it’s permissible to raise animals for slaughter. Technological agriculture, with its features of confinement and its inappropriate social arrangements, frustrates animals’ telos. The moral ideal for animal husbandry should be to respect animals’ rights by allowing them to fulfil their natures in appropriate physical and social environments. The next group of essays moves from animal agriculture to animal experimentation – perhaps the most contested way in which humans use animals. Carl Cohen’s essay (Chapter 20) is well known and much cited. He maintains that animal experimentation is morally justified, inasmuch as two of the key arguments against it fail: that animals have rights and that animal experimentation inflicts avoidable suffering on animals. Like McCloskey (Chapter 7) Cohen Animal Rights xxvii maintains that rights-possession is contingent on moral autonomy and on being part of a community of reciprocal claims-makers. Animals are not morally autonomous, so they do not have rights. Research therefore cannot violate their rights. This does not mean that they have no moral status at all; but any obligations we do have do not arise from their rights. One obvious response to Cohen’s claims is the AMC. What about humans who lack moral autonomy? Cohen’s response here provokes the debate in the two essays that follow. He maintains that such humans are ‘of a kind’ with those humans that do have moral autonomy; the capacity for moral autonomy is not ‘a test to be administered to human beings one by one’ (p. 322). Thus, all humans, whatever their capacities, have rights and no animals do, for none of their ‘kind’ can be morally autonomous. Cohen’s essay emphasizes the gulf between humans and animals, affirming that speciesism is ‘essential for right conduct’ (p. 323). Since, he argues, the benefits of biomedical research to animals and humans vastly outweigh the cost in animal suffering, there are no good alternatives to animal research, and as animals lack rights, then animal experimentation is not only permissible, it is a duty. In Chapter 21 Nathan Nobis maintains that Cohen’s arguments are multiply flawed. Central is the problem of his idea of ‘a kind’. Does Cohen mean ‘normal’ humans are morally autonomous, so ‘marginal’ humans are too? Or perhaps that it’s ‘natural’ for humans to have these capacities, and ‘marginal’ humans are of a kind with natural humans? Nobis suggests a number of interpretative alternatives, arguing that none of these explanations of ‘kind’ works for Cohen. Even the argument that ‘kind’ means ‘human’ is problematic, since there’s no explanation why humanness should be picked out as the particularly relevant kind (as opposed to, say, ‘sentient being’). Neil Levy’s brief essay (Chapter 22), which follows, is a direct response to this part of Nobis’s argument. Levy maintains that there are natural kinds and that species is just such a natural kind, so organisms can be non-arbitrarily classified into kinds. Furthermore, he maintains, there are reasons for thinking that species membership is morally relevant. Thus, this part of Nobis’s argument against Cohen, Levy maintains, fails to stick. Nonetheless, he accepts that there might be other objections to animal experimentation, even if Nobis’s argument is flawed. Quite a different view on animal research is proposed by Deborah Slicer (Chapter 23), who develops the kind of arguments put forward by Donovan in Chapter 13. Rights and utilitarian views, she suggests, share similar qualities. They are both essentialist, selecting a key capacity – which she characterizes as the possession of interests – as the foundation for moral consideration. This, however, ignores relationships and contexts, fails to acknowledge difference and excludes those without this capacity from moral status at all. Further, there’s no acknowledgement of the context or affective relationships in which a being is located. In thinking about animal research, Slicer argues, we need to pay much more attention to context. The issue is not one of clear-cut abolition (and disregard for our human relations and contexts) or one of business as usual (as the animal research community seems to suggest). Echoing some of Benton’s arguments set out in Chapter 15, Slicer maintains that we need to think about animal experimentation in the context of human power and animal vulnerability and to extend the empathetic attention we pay to our loved ones to those beings that are more distant. The final essay on animal research, by David DeGrazia (Chapter 24), considers whether conflicts around animal rights and the use of animals in medical research might be resolved, or at least diminished. Within biomedicine, he points out, animal research is regarded as xxviii Animal Rights essential for progress, but almost all animal protection groups – including, but not confined to, those advocating animals’ rights – argue at least that current levels of animal research should be substantially reduced. How might these differing views be reconciled? DeGrazia’s strategy is to outline areas on which both sides, or most representatives of both sides, actually agree. He also notes support from both sides on questions where it’s often thought that there is disagreement – for instance, all agree that ‘the moral presumption against taking human life is stronger than the presumption against killing at least some animals’ (p. 375). And everyone considers that some animal research is, or should be, justified – for instance, where animals are not harmed or research is in an animal’s interest. There are, of course, points of substantial disagreement, particularly on how human and animal moral status is to be comparatively weighed. But, DeGrazia maintains, both sides should have enough in common for a more constructive dialogue to take place. Donald Lindburg, author of the final essay in Part III, tackles questions concerning zoos/aquariums and animal rights. Defenders of animal rights, such as Tom Regan, argue that zoos are morally impermissible. Lindburg argues that modern zoos do have an ethical justification, but one built on a different foundation from animal rights. Zoos advocate conservation, centred on the value of populations, processes, systems and species (rather like the position outlined by Mark Sagoff in Chapter 14). Whereas an animal rights perspective has no special interest in preserving species, this is one of the principal concerns of a ‘holistic’ or conservationist environmental ethic. Lindburg himself, influenced by the work of the philosopher Bryan Norton, urges the development of a more contextual, less rigid approach to animal/environmental ethics, arguing that such a view can justify taking individual sentient animals into captivity in order to protect their species. Lindburg’s essay provides an interesting link to Part IV. His discussion of animal rights extends beyond more abstract ethical commitments to its manifestation as a political movement – one that puts pressure on practice, policy and institutions. The essays in Part IV further explore the legal and political aspects of animal rights.

Political and Legal Rights for Animals

Joel Feinberg’s work on animal rights has been extremely important. The essay reproduced here (which could also have been located in Part I) outlines some key early (1978) arguments that animals have moral rights and should be assigned legal ones. Animals, Feinberg argues, cannot be moral agents; they are not responsible for their actions and they cannot therefore be legally punished. If these were the grounds for having moral or legal rights, animals would be disqualified. But this is not the view either morality or the law takes of human beings who are not moral agents – for example, infants and people suffering from senility. It’s also true that animals can’t represent themselves nor make claims on their own behalf, but, again, this is not the qualification for moral or legal rights in the case of, say, human infants. Humans unable to represent themselves can have a proxy representative, and this path is surely available to animals as well. Animals, Feinberg argues, are the kinds of beings that have interests, and as long as a being has interests, ‘moral or legal rights can be ascribed without conceptual absurdity’ (p. 409). If animals can be ascribed rights, do they actually have any and, if so, to what? Feinberg proposes ‘general legal rights to noncruel treatment derived from statutes designed to protect them’ (p. 411) and moral rights to not be treated cruelly. Their rights might Animal Rights xxix include, Feinberg speculates, something like property rights for wild animals; incursion on their space, which diminishes their wild flourishing, may be regarded as a form of cruelty. Feinberg is, however, uncertain whether animals have a right to life – if they do, the claim is a very weak one – and maintains that animals have no right not to be degraded, as humans do. Feinberg tentatively raises questions about animals and property rights. These questions loom large in the next three essays in Part IV. Gary Francione’s and Richard Epstein’s essays (Chapters 27 and 28) take opposing views on the question whether sentient animals should be viewed as legal property; John Hadley (Chapter 29) argues that animals should be able to legally own property themselves. Francione’s essay makes two central points: first, he argues that being sentient alone is sufficient for an animal to be a full member of the moral community. Second, he maintains that sentient animals are treated badly because of their status as property – this makes animals commodities and denies their inherent value, their full membership of the moral community. The status of animals as property makes them, essentially, slaves. Epstein, in contrast, argues for the retention of property status for animals and denies that they should be ascribed legal rights in themselves. He provides an overview of the historic evolution of human property rights in animals, maintaining that it was not denial of animal sentience that led to the evolution of these laws, but rather the belief that owning and using animals, however sentient, was necessary for human survival. And after all, Epstein notes controversially, human ownership of animals has, in at least some cases, improved their well-being in comparison what it would be in the wild. Rejecting Francione’s claim that there are parallels between animals as property and slave-holding, Epstein considers two possible reasons why partial human–animal parity should be enshrined in law: sensation and cognition. But neither basis, he argues, justifies legal rights for animals. While human relations with animals should be legally regulated, these regulations should not extend to ascribing them rights. Hadley’s essay picks up on a somewhat different question about property rights: not whether animals should be seen as property, but whether they should be able to own property themselves (unfortunately, there is no discussion in these essays about how these questions might relate to one another). Hadley argues that, even though animals are not able to understand issues relating to property rights, they could be adequately represented by human guardians who do. If wild animals were ascribed property rights to their habitat, this would provide a higher level of protection to that land than is currently possible, since property rights have high status and are likely to be respected. The ascription of property rights to wild animals would not only demonstrate recognition of animal interests and autonomy, but would also make it less likely that animals’ habitat could be redeveloped merely by relocating them, for relocation would constitute harm. Ascribing property rights to wild animals would thus have the effect, Hadley argues, of protecting ecosystems and hence should be supported by holistic environmental ethicists, as well as those concerned for animal rights. Further, Hadley maintains, animals’ property rights need not be construed as exclusive; they are likely to be compatible with at least some human uses of the land (animals might have usufructuary rights over land owned by humans). The final two essays in the collection concern a specific group of animals over which there has been much recent debate: the great apes. The Great Ape Project, mentioned by several essays in this collection, aims to widen recognition of the moral rights of great apes and to enshrine these rights in national law. Steven Wise’s essay defends the claim that great xxx Animal Rights apes should be thought of as legal rights-holders. He points out that all humans – however incompetent – are ascribed full legal liberty rights (he calls these dignity rights); cognitive ability has not been deemed to be necessary for human individuals to be legal rights-holders. But in the case of great apes, even though ‘their natures and interests would justify those rights if only they were us’ (p. 490), legal rights are denied. Wise proposes a number of arguments from consistency that if humans who lack full autonomy are ascribed legal rights, the same should apply to great apes; he rejects arguments (such as Cohen’s in Chapter 20) that group membership is sufficient for the ascription of rights, independent of the capacities of any particular individual. Great apes, Wise insists, should be recognized as legal persons; not to do so is ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, and unprincipled’ (p. 493). Finally, Robert Goodin, Carole Pateman and Roy Pateman (Chapter 31) focus on political, rather than moral, rights for great apes: in particular whether and how great apes could have political ‘sovereignty’ over their territory. Something like this, they suggest, seems to be implied by The Declaration on Great Apes. But how might such a claim for ‘simian sovereignty’ work? The authors explore a variety of different strategies, including something rather like the property ownership arrangement envisaged by Hadley: a kind of ‘trust territory’ to be owned by the apes and administered by trustees, giving great apes a kind of sovereignty over their territory. This essay, then, completes the move from the more abstract, philosophical claims for animal rights discussed in Part I of this book to considering a political, territorial implementation of animals’ rights in practice.

Conclusion

Debates about both the moral and legal rights of animals are hotly contested and are likely to remain so. Some recent – if relatively small-scale – legal changes suggest that, gradually, theoretical debates both in ethics and in law are having an impact on practice. So, for instance, in 2001, the US state of Rhode Island in House Bill 6119 introduced the title ‘guardian’ as interchangeable with ‘owner’ for someone ‘who possesses, has title to or an interest in, harbors or has control, custody or possession of an animal and who is responsible for an animal’s safety and well-being’, the first time the term ‘guardian’ had been used in this sense in law. In 2007 the Balearic Parliament announced its approval of a resolution to seek legal rights for great apes. Animal welfare legislation – if not animal rights – has been important in the development of agricultural policy in the European Union; for instance, battery cages for egg production will become illegal in the EU from 2012. These changes reflect ways in which concerns about the moral and legal standing of animals – their welfare, their interests, their status as property and what responsibilities humans may have towards them – have become more widespread and more significant since the upsurge in debate in the 1970s. As I write this Introduction, one of the news headlines of the day is that Masterfoods – the makers of Mars Bars, Snickers and other confectionary products – have retreated from the inclusion of non-vegetarian rennet in their foodstuffs, under pressure from a large consumer lobby, the Vegetarian Society UK, and with the support of 40 UK members of parliament. Whatever one

See http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/stusri2000housebill6119.htm for more details of this statute. Animal Rights xxxi may think about the moral and legal rights of animals, both the rational arguments and the fierce passions generated by this issue seem to be here to stay.

References

Bentham, Jeremy (1948) [1789], An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, New York, NY: Hafner. DeGrazia, David (2002), Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Derrida, Jacques (2002), ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, trans. David Wills, Critical Inquiry, 28(2), pp. 390–418. Dworkin, Ronald (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Frey, R.G. (1988), ‘Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism’, Between the Species, 4, pp. 191–201. Lucas, J.R. (1966), The Principles of Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacIntyre, Alistair (2001), Dependent, Rational Animals, Chicago: Open Court. Nozick, Robert (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books. Regan, Tom (1983), The Case for Animal Rights, London: Routledge. Salt, Henry (1894), Animals’ Rights: Considered in Relation to Social Progress, New York: Macmillan & Co. Text available online at http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-c/salt01.htm. Shue, Henry (1996), Basic Rights, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Singer, Peter (1975), Animal Liberation, New York: Avon Books. Wenar, Leif (2005), ‘Rights’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ rights/.

Name Index

Adams, Carol J. 201, 359 Callicott, J. Baird 45, 220, 389, 391, 393 Adams, John Quincy 488, 489 Carrighar, Sally 214 Adorno, Theodor 202, 203, 204 Carruthers, Peter 371, 372 Ahlquist, Jon 511 Carter, Janis 214 Allen, Paula G. 201, 211, 215 Cavalieri, P. 387 Anderson, Benedict 510 Cavendish, Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle Anthony, Susan B. 200 206, 207, 504 Aquinas, St Thomas 321, 427, 506 Cheney, Jim 354, 357 Aristotle 41, 42, 50, 195, 314, 427, 451, 453, Cherniak, C. 486 480, 485 Child, Lydia M. 200 Augustine, Saint 321, 506 Chopra, S.K. 483 Auxter, Thomas 50 Cigman, Ruth 38 Cobbe, Frances P. 193, 200 Bacon, Francis 204 Cohen, Carl xvi, xvii, xxvii, xxx, 321–6, 327–41 Baier, Annette 267 passim, 345, 347, 349, 492, 493 Basler, R.P. 483 Coke, Sir Edward 481 Baxter, William F. 49 Collard, Andrée 359, 360, 362, 363 Beauvoir, Simone de 209 Corea, Gena 360 Beethoven, Ludwig von 133 Correia, E.O. 484 Bekoff, M. 382 Benn, Stanley 14–16 passim D’Amato, A. 483 Bennett, J. 288 Darwin, Charles 222, 315, 434, 451 Bentham, Jeremy xiii, xvi, 7, 8, 32, 33, 150, Dawkins, M.S. 316 196–7, 224, 276, 292, 323, 385, 417–18, DeGrazia, David xv, xxviii, 369–80 428–9 passim, 433, 439, 440, 441, 442, de la Mare, Walter 283, 284, 285 444, 457 Descartes, René 205, 206, 315, 427, 505 Benton, Ted xxv, xxvii, 229–44 Diamond, Cora xxvi, 275–89 Berlin, Isaiah 483 Diamond, Jared 448 Beston, Henry 501 Donovan, Josephine xxiv, xxvii, 191–216 Birke, Lynda 241 Dworkin, Ronald xvii, 484 Blackstone, Sir William 481 Blackwell, Elizabeth 200, 208 Ehrenfeld, D. 383 Bordo, Susan 205 Ehrlichman, J. 243 Bostok, S. St C. 393 Einstein, Albert 485 Boysen, Sally 480 Eldredge, N. 489 Baracton, Henry de 481 Epstein, Richard A. xxix, 447–65 Bradley, F.H. 321 Eudey, A. 382 Britton, John 481 Broida, J.P. 385 Fascione, N. 381 Brophy, Brigid 39 Feinberg, Joel xxviii, xxix, 93, 399–423 Burgess-Jackson, Keith xxv, 245–71 Finch, Anne, Lady Conway 206, 207 Burns, Robert 284, 285 Finson, L. 384 532 Animal Rights

Finson, S. 384 Hitler, Adolf 13 Fleta 481 Hobbes, Thomas 503, 504 Fossey, Dian 214 Holmes, Oliver Wendell 480, 481 Foucault, Michel 207, 208 Horkheimer, Max 202, 203, 204 Fouts, Roger 480 Hume, David 202, 504 Fox, Michael 114, 115, 249–50, 336, 382 Husserl, Edmund 202 Francione, Gary L. xxix, 425–44, 447, 456, 460 Hutchins, M. 381, 382, 389, 390 Francis, Leslie P. 232, 233, 336, 354 Frankena, William 12 Isaacs, Susan 285, 286 French, Marilyn 201, 210, 215 Freud, Sigmund 485 Jackson, Justice 484 Frey, Ray G. xxii, xxiii, 69–72, 73–7 passim, James, William 419 91, 371 Jamieson, Dale xvi, xxii–xxv passim, 73–7, Frye, Marilyn 355 177–90, 382, 383, 385, 391, 392 Fuller, Margaret 199, 200 Justinian, Emperor 454, 481

Galdikas, Birute 480 Kader, D. 486 Geist, V. 385 Kalin, Jesse 115, 117 Gewirth, Alan 491 Kant, Immanuel 174, 194, 195, 196, 197, 224, Gibbons, E.F. Jr 382 307, 322, 427, 462, 485 Gilligan, Carol 215, 353, 356, 358 Katz, M.A. 480 Gilman, Charlotte P. 193, 199, 200 Kean, H. 387 Goldman, Emma 199 Keller, Evelyn F. 209, 214, 355 Goodall, Jane 214, 355, 435, 480 Kent, James 481 Goodin, Robert E. xxx, 501–29 Kheel, Marti 354, 355, 358, 359 Goodman, M. 489 King, Chrystos 201 Goodpaster, K.E. 389 King, Ynestra 201, 362 Gottlieb, Gideon 510 Kingford, Anna 200 Grandy, J.W. 382 Koontz, F. 389 Grant, Douglas 207 Krueger, P. 480 Gray, John C. 405, 407 Kull, A. 490 Griffin, Donald 438–9 Griffin, Susan 201, 212 La Mettrie, Julien O. de 205 Grimké 200 Langer, E. 485 Gunn, Alastair 48 Lansbury, Coral 208 LaPorte, J. 347 Hadley, John xxii, xxix, xxx, 467–77 Larson, E.J. 481 Hale, Sir Matthew 504 Lauter, Estella 212, 213, 215 Hamilton, Edith 482 Leakey, Richard 489 Haraway, Donna 510 Legge, Jane 282–3, 284, 287 Hardin, Garrett 226, 297 Leopold, Aldo xxiv, 31, 32, 47, 217, 219–20 Harding, Sandra 360 passim, 225, 226, 389 Hare, R.M. 96 Levy, Neil xxvii, 345–9 Hargrove, E.C. 389, 391 Lewin, R. 489 Harlow, Harry 62 Lewis, C.S. 413 Harrison, Ruth 294, 415 Lincoln, Abraham 479 Hartley, David 504 Lindburg, Donald G. xxviii, 381–96 Hegel, Georg W.F. 321 Lindburg, L.L. 394 Herman, B. 485 Linzey, Andrew 73–4 passim Herzog, H.A. 383, 384, 385, 387 Livingston, J.A. 393 Animal Rights 533

Locke, John xvi, 59–60, 106, 194, 414, 427 Orwell, George 287 Lovejoy, Arthur 453, 459 Lucas, J.R. xxi, 60 Pacheco, Alex 384 Paine, Thomas 505 McClintock, Barbara 214 Palmer, Clare McCloskey, H.J. xvi–xxiii passim, xxvii, 40, Passmore, John 49, 516 79–110, 114, 115 Pateman, Carole xxx, 501–29 Machiavelli, Nicoló 208, 209 Pateman, Roy 501–29 MacIntyre, Alasdair xiv Patterson, Francine 214 MacKinnon, Catharine A. 205, 206 Patterson, O. 483 McManamon, R. 393 Peacock, Thomas Love 505 McPherson, J.M. 483 Perdue, Frank 223 Mahler, Gustav 181 Perry, Ralph B. 419 Mansfield, Lord 481 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 13 Maple, T. 394 Pinckney, Henry L. 488 Marx, Karl 234 Pitkin, Hanna F. 208, 209 Mason, Jim 241–2 Plato 50, 427, 480, 485 Melden, A.I. 98 Plous, S. 385 Merchant, Carolyn 201, 202, 204–5, 360 Pluhar, Evelyn B. xvii, xxiii, 111–23, 371 Midgley, Mary 192, 358 Price, Richard 80 Mill, John Stuart 32, 100, 101, 131–2 passim, Prichard, H.A. 322 276, 351, 415, 461 Miller, W.L. 488, 489 Rachels, James xxi, xxii, xxiii, 57–66, 101, 106, Minow, Martha 488 345, 486, 488, 492 Mithen, S. 489 Rashi 480 Mommsen, T. 480 Ratcliffe, Herbert 61, 62 Monboddo, Lord 504, 505 Rawls, John 21, 136, 167 Monroe, M.C. 390 Regan, Tom xiv, xvii, xx–xxiv passim, xxvi, Montaigne, Michel de 206 xxviii, 27–30, 34, 35, 42, 44, 112, 114, Moore, G.E. 80 116, 118, 120, 149–51 passim, 152, Morey, D.F. 387 153–5 passim, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, Morgan, Robin 358 163, 165, 168–9 passim, 170, 171, 172–5 Morrison, A.R. 385 passim, 177–90 passim, 192, 194, 195, Murdoch, Iris 214, 355 196, 198–9 passim, 205, 206, 215, 230, 231, 258, 259, 260, 275, 276, 277, 278, Narveson, Jan xxiii, 115–17 passim, 125–48, 306 281, 291–310, 328, 349, 351, 352, 354, Nelson, L. 93–4 355, 356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 371, Newkirk, Ingrid 324, 384 381, 382, 385–6 passim, 388, 389, 390, Newton, Isaac 202 391, 392, 486 Nino, C.S. 488 Remmert, Hermann 469–70 Nobis, Nathan xxvii, 327–43, 345, 346–7 Ritchie, D.G. 45, 46, 221, 224, 294 passim, 348, 349 Rodd, Rosemary 371 Norman, Richard 232, 233, 336, 354 Rollin, Bernard xxvi, 240, 311–19, 371 Norton, Bryan G. xxviii, 381, 385, 387, 389, Rolston, H. III 389, 390 391, 392, 393 Rose, Steven 232, 239 Noske, B. 387, 393 Ross, W.D. 80, 99 Nozick, Robert xvii, xxiii, 118, 126, 127–30 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 197, 205, 504 passim, 261, 456, 457, 460 Rowan, Andrew N. 383, 384, 385 Nussbaum, Martha C. 494 Ruddick, Sara 214, 215, 358 534 Animal Rights

Ruether, Rosemary R. 201, 209, 210–11, 215 Swisher, C.C. 489 Rumbaugh, Duane 480 Russell, J. 486 Tattersall, I. 489 Ryan, Agnes 200 Taylor, Paul W. xxiii, 149–64 Ryder, Richard D. 240, 275, 276, 292 Taylor, Thomas 4, 5, 505 Teleki, Geza 480 Sagoff, Mark xxiv, xxv, xxviii, 217–27 Thomas, Keith 195, 207 Salamone, Constantia 192, 201 Toone, W.D. 392 Salleh, Ariel K. 354 Tribe, Laurence W. 217–18, 224, 225, 490, 493 Salt, Henry xiii, xiv, 165 Santayana, George 419 van Vyer, J.D. 484 Sapontzis, Steve 371, 375 Varner, G.E. 383, 390 Savage-Rumbaugh, Sue 480 Sayer, K.M. 389 Walker,Margaret 354, 357 Scheler, Max 202–3 Wallace, N.P. 392 Schmidtz, David 336 Walzer, Michael 501, 502, 509 Scruton, Roger 332 Ward, Elizabeth S.P. 200 Shakespeare, William 345 Warren, Karen 354, 355, 357, 359 Shaw, George Bernard 362 Warren, Mary Anne xxi, xxiv, 31–56 Sibley, Charles 511 Wasserstrom, Richard 57, 158 Sidgwick, Henry 7, 507, 508 Watson, Alan 480 Simons, K.W. 490, 491 Weil, Simone 214 Singer, Peter xiii, xvii, xix, xx, xxi, xxiii, xxiv, Wellman, C. 491, 492 xxvi, 3–16, 33, 34, 42, 47, 63, 64, 96, Wemmer, C. 382, 389, 390 103, 107, 114, 118–20, 150, 165–76, Wenar, Leif xv 182, 187, 191–2 passim, 193, 196, Wennberg, Robert 336 197–9 passim, 206, 218, 219, 220, 224, Westermarck, Edward 402 258, 259, 260, 263, 275, 276, 277, 278, White, Alan 333 291–305 passim, 310, 323, 351, 353, White, Caroline E. 200 355, 356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 371, Willard, Frances 200 382, 387, 390, 391, 440, 441, 442 Wise, Steven M. xxix, xxx, 447, 450, 451, 453, Slicer, Deborah xxvii, 351–67 458–9 passim, 461, 479–99 Socrates 131, 480 Witham, L. 481 Soulé, M.E. 381 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 202 Sperlinger, D. 240 Wollstonecraft, Mary 4, 200, 505 Spira, Henry 369, 378 Woodhull, Victoria 200 Stalin, Josef 13 Woolf, Virginia 193 Stanton, Elizabeth C. 200 Woozley, A.D. 156 Stepney, R. 240 Wrangham, Richard 480 Stone, Christopher 217, 218, 226 Wright, W.A. 486 Stone, Lucy 200 Stowe, Harriet B. 200 Zak, S. 387 Swift, Jonathan 279 Zaretsky, Eli 203