NO. 22 MAY 2018 Introduction

Secession or Solidarity Catalonia Will Not Get Both Simultaneously Sabine Riedel

Since the arrest of the former head of the Catalan government, Carles Puigdemont, a solidarity movement has emerged that paints him as a victim of the justice sys- tem. However, even if the German government prevents his extradition this is hardly likely to influence the trials against his colleagues remanded in custody in Madrid. The Spanish public prosecutor’s office accuses them not only of rebellion, but also of embezzling money from the autonomous communities’ liquidity fund (FLA) for their independence campaign. Since the 2012 financial crisis, Madrid has had to subsidise heavily indebted regions, including Catalonia, with loans. Barce- lona annually receives between 6.7 billion (2012) and 11.1 billion euros (2015). This financial dependence motivates Catalans to bid for independence, in the expecta- tion that it will lead to direct access to the European Central Bank (ECB). Europeans need to reflect on who should be given their solidarity. A Catalan state would be born with a mountain of debt, which the other Spanish regions and the European taxpayer would ultimately have to shoulder.

On 27 October 2017, the Spanish central also wish for more financial self-administra- government suspended Catalonia’s autono- tion. my under article 155 of the Spanish consti- Madrid’s offer may have come relatively tution. Even Madrid knew that the conflict late, but it was an olive branch nonetheless. over secession would not be resolved via Carles Puigdemont and his deposed regional this measure. Instead, new elections were government have still not grasped it. In- supposed to give all participants the chance stead they signed Catalonia’s declaration to save face and re-engage in dialogue. of independence on the very same day to On 10 October 2017, Prime Minister demonstrate that the only thing they were Mariano Rajoy had already agreed to ap- willing to negotiate was statehood. From point a commission, as proposed by the So- their perspective, all bridges connecting cialist leader Pedro Sánchez, to draw up a them to central government had already concept for modifying the Spanish system been destroyed; negotiations could only of autonomy. Among Spain’s 17 so-called tackle the terms and conditions of seces- autonomous communities, several others

sion. These talks are supposed to quickly di- the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA). They too vide up an economic area that has coa- strive for independence for their (Belgian) lesced over centuries. region of Flanders. However, their appar- ently spontaneous solidarity with the Cata- lan separatists is based on many years of co- Puigdemont in European “Exile” operation. The N-VA is part of a Europe- wide network of separatist parties which in- Thus far, the Catalan regional government cludes the Republican Left of Catalonia lacks both the necessary legal basis and the (ERC) – the party of the imprisoned for- democratic legitimacy to secede. It relies ex- mer finance and economy minister Oriol clusively on its sense of justice and the Junqueras – and which calls itself the Eu- vague conviction that Europe predominantly ropean Free Alliance (EFA). It currently has considers its movement for independence 11 MEPs in the European Parliament. justified. The EU institutions’ silence in the The EFA’s members of parliament have run-up to the controversial referendum on not only granted Puigdemont and his min- 1 October 2017 could, indeed, be interpreted isters “asylum” since late October 2017; as covert solidarity. European Council Presi- from Brussels they have also organised re- dent Donald Tusk did not address the Cata- sistance to his removal from office. Their lan parliament until ten days later, on rhetoric tries to shake the European pub- the day that Catalonia’s declaration of inde- lic’s confidence in the Spanish justice sys- pendence was signed. However, he then tem. They describe Spain as a “neo-Fran- called on its members to drop their plans coist” system and demand that it be ex- and instead seek a constitutional solution cluded from the EU (EFA, 1 October 2017) or through dialogue with Madrid. talk of “Erdoganisation” (EFA, 24 March It seemed as if this plain speaking gave 2018), ascribing to Mariano Rajoy and his the Catalan Premier Puigdemont pause for minority government a breadth of powers thought. He hesitated before finally declar- equal to the Turkish president’s, and draw- ing independence, knowing perfectly well ing parallels with the latter’s policy towards what legal consequences were looming at the Kurds. The EFA chairman, the Corsican the European level: by seceding from Spain, François Alfonsi, has demanded an EU in- Catalonia would inevitably also leave the tervention, calling on the European Council EU. This is why, to date, the separatists to stop ongoing proceedings against the de- have still not implemented their declara- tained Catalan politicians immediately be- tion of independence. Behind their inaction cause they are “political prisoners”. In other lies a strategy to bring the crisis to a head, words, he wants precisely what he accuses so as to obtain a special status for Catalonia his opponents of: political influence over from the EU. They want Brussels to accept ongoing lawsuits, despite the fact that only the secession without their newly-created independent judges can verify the charges. state having to leave the Union. This ex- If Spain had remained a dictatorship af- plains why Madrid never received a reply ter Franco’s death in 1975, there would from the Catalan leadership to its question have been no early parliamentary elections of whether independence was actually go- in Catalonia. The Spanish government even ing to be put into effect or not. After 17 allowed the imprisoned and exiled politi- days, the Spanish government ended the cians to stand for re-election as frontrunners uncertainty by rescinding autonomy tempo- despite the fact that they had not dropped rarily and by suspending the regional gov- their unconstitutional bid for Catalonia’s ernment. secession. On election night (21 December Puigdemont escaped arrest by fleeing 2017), they were able to portray this as a the country for Belgium with several of his victory. In fact, the separatist camp lost ministers. The only politicians to welcome two seats. The hardliners from the Popular the escapees with open arms were from Unity Candidacy (Cat. Candidatura d’Unitat

SWP Comment 22 May 2018

2 Popular, CUP), an anarchist-nationalist party, sued European arrest warrants for six for- even forfeited six of their ten seats. The mer members of the Catalan government – real winners that evening were Cuidadanos/ including Carles Puigdemont – who were Cuitadans (The Citizens – Party of the Citi- in Belgium, the UK and Switzerland. The zenry). Their 36 members of parliament move thwarted the CUP’s plans to create a fight for Catalonia to remain part of Spain “Council of the Republic” (Consell de la and to reform the autonomy system (Riedel República in Catalan) as a “government in 2018, p. 1). exile” (CUP 28 February 2018). The plan was for Puigdemont as Catalan premier to con- tinue promoting the independence project The CUP Remains the Kingmaker from the Belgian municipality of Waterloo, a suburb of Brussels. Nevertheless, the CUP’s remaining four members in the regional parliament con- tinue to be kingmakers. In early 2016 Puigdemont Pulls the Strings the CUP’s parliamentarians had already en- in Berlin sured that Puigdemont replaced Artur Mas as premier. They have remained faithful to Given that Puigdemont was arrested at the their idol to this day, and are determined to Danish-German border on 25 March 2018, reinstate him as head of government. Once he had to change his plans and prepared it became known in early February 2018 himself for possible new elections from Ber- that Puigdemont could not be elected in ab- lin, not Brussels. In a first clue, immedi- sentia, the CUP successfully prevented the ately after he was released from Neumün- election of compromise candidates from ster prison, he called on his allies in Barce- Puigdemont’s own party, JxCat (Cat. Junts lona to make Jordi Sànchez the new per Catalunya, Together for Catalonia): premier. This appeal could not be taken se- first Elsa Atardi, the party’s spokeswoman, riously: Sànchez is also in custody. Moreo- and then Jordi Turull, spokesman of the de- ver, this former president of the Catalan Na- posed regional government. tional Assembly or ANC (Assemblea Nacional The CUP’s decision not to support Jordi Catalana in Catalan) is the ideological leader Turull in the initial vote on 22 March 2018 and organiser of the independence move- was at first hard to understand: like Puig- ment. His nomination had to be interpreted demont, Turull is one of the accused mem- as a further provocation aimed at Madrid bers of the independence movement. His and an attempt to delay new elections. arrest shortly after the voting defeat, almost Germany would certainly be better suited straight out of parliament, further fanned as a political stage than Belgium. In Brus- the flames of the Catalan victim myth. sels, the Flemish allies of the Catalan sepa- However, the CUP did not wish to provide ratists, the N-VA, are currently the biggest the central government with an opportunity parliamentary party and under great pres- for immediately dissolving the regional par- sure. The multi-party coalition led by the liament if Turull was elected. It seemed to N-VA could collapse if the party openly sup- be boycotting the formation of a govern- ported the Catalan demands for independ- ment as part of a delaying tactic: the vote ence, tipping the country into a govern- triggered a legal waiting period of 60 days. mental crisis. In Germany, by contrast, the Only then can new elections be called – if parties of the EFA network historically have no new regional premier has been elected hardly any influence: the Bavaria Party, the in the meantime. Frisians and the South Schleswig Voters’ As- While Turull was being remanded in cus- sociation (SSW) all cannot pass the 5% tody, the examining magistrate of the Span- threshold to obtain representation in the re- ish Supreme Court, Pablo Llarena, is- gional parliaments. They are represented

SWP Comment 22 May 2018

3 only because of exception clauses. Their de- leader in the Catalan parliament, Inés Arri- mands for statehood, whether made openly madas of Cuitadanos, that Torra might only or covertly (Bavaria Party, 3 October 2017), be a Puigdemont puppet. are either not noticed or judged to be irrele- vant. After all, German federalism already grants the regions and local authorities ex- A “Judicialisation” of the Conflict? tensive rights of self-government. On the other hand, this means that the Contrary to the allegations made by the sep- German public attaches significant weight aratists, there are no such fundamental cul- to regional self-administration and is tural and social differences between the au- touchy about solo efforts by federal or state tonomous communities of Spain: Catalonia governments. Nevertheless, this does not has been self-administered for about 40 explain the broad sympathy for the Catalan years. Its regional government already bears separatists that is apparent in the media. the majority of the responsibility for the so- Alongside the Basques, Catalans already cial and economic development of Catalo- have more autonomy than any other region nia, even where cutbacks are concerned. in Spain – the myth of Spanish hegemony Since 2012, the year of the Spanish crisis, cannot be substantiated by references to Catalan finance and economy ministers Catalonia’s statute of autonomy. Rather it have had to slash expenses. Thus Oriol Jun- arises out of hostility to the state itself. The queras of the Republican Left (ERC) ex- institutions of the central state in particular plained at a recent business congress that are viewed not as legitimate but as instru- the regional government had made cuts to- ments of oppression. talling 3.91 billion euros, a record within This is what the CUP means when it re- Spain (Ara, 30 May 2017). fers to the “national and social liberation of Because the three allied separatist parties the Catalan countries” (CUP 2018). It posits represent the entire political spectrum, they as uncontroversial the status of Catalonia as find it difficult to criticise the central gov- a separate nation and contrasts it with ernment in specific policy areas, such as fi- Spain’s existing nation-state and regional nancial policy. Consequently, the separat- structures. This argument is also used by ists’ demands for independence contain Quim Torra, who, on Puigdemont’s sugges- hardly any factual arguments. Instead, the tion, was elected Regional President on 14 defenders of statehood emphasise the politi- May. He likewise claims that Catalonia is cal “legitimacy” of their regional govern- oppressed and financially extorted by the ment. Opposing them, Madrid will not be Spanish state (The Telegraph, 11 May 2018). swayed from its course of keeping separa- In his parliamentary speech, he promised to tism at bay by all legal means. It thus insists push ahead with the secessionist agenda: “A on the “legality” of political decisions taken Catalan republic means looking towards Eu- within the framework of the current consti- rope” (El País, 14 May 2018). tution. This explains in part why the con- Quim Torra sees his role as being strictly flict over secession has shifted from the po- an interim president for as long as Puig- litical to the legal level. Since this shift demont cannot be selected in absentia – it plays into the hands of those who want to will take months before the Constitutional preserve the nation state, the separatist par- Court examines the Catalan Law of 4 May, ties deplore the “judicialisation of politics” which should pave the way for his election. (“judicialización de la política”, La Vanguar- Meanwhile, Torra has proclaimed that he dia, 18 October 2016). plans to establish a constituent assembly Their criticism obfuscates the fact that to write the constitution for a new Catalan the independence movement has also re- republic and to "create a state council in ex- sorted to “judicialisation”. The start of this ile", obviously in Berlin. These statements strategy can be traced back to the former reinforce the suspicions of the opposition Catalan Premier Artur Mas. In the autumn

SWP Comment 22 May 2018

4 of 2012, Mas dissolved the regional parlia- organisations joined forces to found the ment early in order to turn the elections Catalan Civil Society (Societat Civil Catalana, thereby triggered into a plebiscite. He SCC) to give a voice not bound by party af- promised to lead Catalonia into independ- filiation to those who advocate Catalonia ence by 2020. In early 2013, after re-elec- remain part of Spain. tion, he founded a 15-strong legal council, the CATN (Consell Assessor per a la Transició Nacional in Catalan), whose task it was to Catalonia: Boycott Instead of prepare the transferral of central-govern- Dialogue ment competences to the region. This aimed to create a legal framework for the The separatists’ accusation that Madrid “ju- envisaged referendum on independence, dicialises” the Catalonia conflict thus re- but it failed. As a consequence, the vote of bounds on them. Moreover, the term is 9 November 2014, declared unconstitutional, meant to distract from the fact that, in this was re-categorised into a non-binding popu- conflict, the separatists are the ones who lar vote (Riedel 2014, p. 11). disregard democratic values as soon as the When Carles Puigdemont was elected latter stand in the way of their goal, mean- premier in early 2016, he continued his ing Catalonia’s secession. This is why their predecessor’s strategy. His declared objec- demands have neither the necessary “legal- tive was now to use the region’s legislative ity” nor – within the framework of a dem- competence to create parallel structures for ocratic judicial system – the required polit- a quasi-state. In an interview, Puigdemont ical “legitimacy”. explained (Die Welt, 5 June 2016): This was also true of the preparation and execution of the 1 October 2017 refer- “We have emancipated ourselves from endum on independence. It was only with Spain and make our own laws. We are the support of the CUP that Puigdemont’s currently building the structures for the government was able to pass a referendum new state because we need legal security, law in early September, with a scant major- we need to take into consideration inter- ity in a single parliamentary session. Ac- national treaties, meaning over 3,000 cording to Catalonia’s statute of autonomy, agreements are valid for us also.” a quorum of at least two thirds should have been required (Statute of 19 July 2006, Arti- The plan was eventually to pass “dissocia- cle 222). The result of the vote also seems tion laws”, on the basis of which new struc- questionable. It was neither checked nor tures – for example Catalonia’s own social- confirmed by independent observers – nor security system and foreign ministry – were 90 percent of votes in favour enough would be created. Since the governing coali- to legitimise the declaration of independ- tion has such a small majority, this re- ence on 10 October 2017 when voter turn- quired a change in the standing orders out was only 42.3 percent. of the Catalan parliament. Whilst the three separatist parties insist Since that parliamentary reform was that they are willing to engage in dialogue, passed on 6 April 2017, the regional govern- they have in fact been dictating terms since ment has been able to push through the autumn of 2012: their concern is no its draft bills in only one reading. The oppo- longer to expand autonomy, but to estab- sition has in effect been neutralised (EiTB, lish the terms and conditions for secession. 26 April 2017), and now has to rely on the This was made clear by newly elected Re- support of Spain’s Constitutional Court to gional President Quim Torra in his parlia- defend its democratic right to co-determina- mentary address on 14 May. He and his al- tion. However, the hitherto silent minority lies demand that central government en- has increasingly resisted independence out- gage in a dialogue which would question side of parliament as well. In 2014 various

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5 the constitutional order. However, the elec- concept of the nation as an ethnic-national- torate has not given Rajoy a mandate for ist one and further inflame the dispute over this. Madrid can only offer the Catalan re- existing regional borders and the recogni- gional government financial-reform negoti- tion of official languages (Riedel 2018, p. 7). ations along with Spain’s 16 other autono- Since the election of the hardliner Quim mous communities; it did just that during Torra, Cuitadanos, the Socialists (Span. Par- the autonomous communities’ annual Con- tido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) and the ference of Presidents (Sp. Conferencia de Presi- ruling Spanish People’s Party (Span. Partido dentes) in mid-January 2017. After long hard Popular, PP) have come closer together negotiations with the central government, again. They promised to jointly protect the the regions’ presidents decided on a “new constitutional order of Spain and put the model of regional financing” (El País, 17 Jan- Catalan separatists in their place. It is there- uary 2017). However, the premiers of Cata- fore doubtful that Catalonia’s autonomy lonia and the Basque country, Carles will come into force under the new regional Puigdemont und Íñigo Urkullu, refused to government. They face a certain amount join the talks and boycotted the meeting. of pressure: according to recent surveys, So far, the Catalan and Basque govern- Catalan voters are increasingly turning away ments have also avoided cooperating with from them. The defenders of the Spanish the parliamentary commission which is state will be able to reassure them only if currently examining the Spanish autonomy they present convincing reforms of the au- system and drawing up proposals for re- tonomous system. Their success depends form. The first meeting of this so-called ter- very much on the Parliamentary Commis- ritorial commission (Sp. comisión territorial) sion. in mid-November 2017 took place without the 17 deputies of the Catalan separatists in the Spanish central parliament. It is still Basque Self-Interest possible for the commission to reach the two-thirds majority required to drive a new The work of the territorial commission financial order between Madrid and the re- has also been overshadowed by another gions through the Spanish parliament. conflict, namely the new federal budget for However, in situations as tense as this, 2018. Prime Minister Rajoy heads a minor- party-political differences of opinion ity government and must compromise. quickly have a negative effect. The Social- However, this year he can no longer depend ists thus view this project as their chance on the support of the five deputies from to establish a much more fundamental con- the Basque Nationalist Party (Span. Partido stitutional reform while the governing Con- Nacionalista Vasco, PNV). They have declared servatives tend to curb such hopes. their solidarity with the Catalan separatists The commission experienced a setback and demand the reinstatement of the stat- in late March 2018, when Albert Rivera, the ute of autonomy (El Mundo, 2 April 2018). chairman of Cuidadanos, ended his party’s Only political concessions would make cooperation. He has accused the Socialists, them change their minds. who want to turn the Spanish nation into a The Basques’ alignment with the de- “nation of nations” (Diario de Ibiza, 20 March posed Catalan regional government is not 2018), of making concessions to Catalan na- one of solidarity in the sense of a political tionalism. According to the Socialists, Cata- or economic link between the two regions. lonia should be given nation status along- The Basques are mainly concerned with side the Spanish nation. Rivera is concerned their own financial advantage, which might that this would divide Spaniards, a commu- ultimately increase if they also follow the nity of shared political values, into groups road to statehood in the slipstream of Cata- differentiated along linguistic-cultural lan separatism. In 2003 the then-Basque lines. It would indeed redefine the political Premier Juan José Ibarretxe had already

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6 submitted a political plan for making the economic area that has coalesced over cen- Basque country an independent state. As turies would be divided up. a first step, the PNV demanded that the The close interlinking of Spain’s autono- Basques be recognised as an independent mous communities can be seen particularly nation (El País, 19 December 2003). Only in regional revenue sharing. Since the re- three years later, the Catalans followed the gions have been unable to agree on a com- same agenda by submitting a new statute mon reform, the 2009 system continues to of autonomy to the central government in be valid. Under this, half the tax revenues which they described themselves as a sepa- raised – for example from income tax and rate nation (Statute of 19 July 2006, Pream- ble). This and other modifications later Illustration 1 turned out to be unconstitutional. Payments from the liquidity fund of Spain’s Barcelona also looks to the Basques for autonomous regions (FLA) to Catalonia an example of financial self-administration. (2012–2017, in millions of euros) During the post-1975 democratisation pro- cess, the Basque country and Navarre were able to secure privileges vis-à-vis the other regions. Their autonomy is based on cus- tomary rights (fueros), which include finan- cial and fiscal sovereignty. By contrast, the other autonomous communities first have to pay the tax revenue they have raised to the central state before they receive funds back as part of regional financial equalisa- tion. This special status is the reason why the Basque and Catalan regional govern- ments show scant interest in a countrywide reform project: they fear that any modifica- tion of the asymmetrical autonomy system will leave them worse off than before. And yet federal models exist with win-win solu- Source: author’s own compilation based on “Fondo de tions for all under the umbrella of a joint Liquidez Autonómica” [Regional liquidity fund], Wikipe- Spanish nation (Riedel 2016). dia, https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fondo_de_Liquidez_Auton %C3%B3mica; Los expertos urgen al Estado a cortar el grifo de liquidez a las comunidades [Experts call on the state to European Solidarity, reduce the communities’ liquidity], in: El País, 3 February But with Whom? 2018, https://elpais.com/economia/ 2018/02/03/actualidad/ 1517679470_452325.html (both accessed 27 April 2018).

As a result, reforming the Spanish autonomy system is currently wishful thinking. And VAT – flow back to the regions to fund yet there is no reasonable alternative. If Cat- public services, such as education, health alonia or the Basque country seceded, great and social-security systems. However, since economic harm would be caused to all. Ad- the regions’ financial needs are far greater, vocates of secession like to minimise this they accrued debts with private lenders un- problem. However, as the Brexit negotia- til, in the crisis year of 2012, the financial tions demonstrate, an economic divorce can markets shut down the money supply. be far more expensive than initially de- Since then, the communities have borrowed picted. And Brexit is “only” about the the necessary financial resources at low in- United Kingdom leaving the European in- terest rates from central government. The ternal market. In the case of Catalonia, an total amount of loans has grown to about

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7 232 billion euros in the past six years. Cata- Further Reading lonia’s share alone is 70.9 bn, representing 30 percent of the total (El País, 17 February Paluzie i Hernández, Elisenda, “Das Poten- 2018). This is a higher proportion than Cata- tial eines eigenständigen Kataloniens”, lonia’s contribution to Spain’s gross domes- in: Die Übersetzung der Unabhängigkeit. Wie tic product, which stands at 19 percent die Katalanen es erklären, wie wir es verstehen, (IfW 2017, p. 15). Illustration 1 shows Cata- ed. Krystyna Schreiber (Dresden, 2015), lonia’s annual financial requirements from 185–202. the regional liquidity fund (FLA), which is an Riedel, Sabine, “Katalonien im Brennglas estimated total of 9.4 bn euros for 2018. der EU-Krisen. Das Patt nach den Regio- © Stiftung Wissenschaft If Catalonia secedes, the new state would nalwahlen vom 21.12.2017 ist ein Signal und Politik, 2018 have a mountain of debt. Without national an Europas Reformer”, Forschungshorizonte All rights reserved assistance, it would rely entirely on exter- Politik & Kultur (online), January 2018. nal lenders. If the independence move- Riedel, Sabine, “Separatismus: Katalonien This Comment reflects ment’s plan was fulfilled, Catalonia would ist nur der Anfang… Steigendes Konflikt- the author’s views. ideally obtain a special status enabling it potential von Unabhängigkeitsbewegun- The online version of to remain in the EU and receive loans from gen in der Europäischen Union”, For- this publication contains the ECB (Paluzie i Hernández 2015, p. 199). schungshorizonte Politik & Kultur (online), functioning links to other In other words, the separatists hope for August 2017. SWP texts and other relevant both solidarity from the other EU members Riedel, Sabine, Föderalismus statt Separatismus. sources. and a creative interpretation of the EU Politische Instrumente zur Lösung von Sezessi- SWP Comments are subject Treaty and the Maastricht criteria limiting onskonflikten in Europa, SWP-Studie to internal peer review, fact- government debt. 5/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und checking and copy-editing. Even if Catalonia could receive such Eu- Politik, April 2016). For further information on ropean support, a separation from Madrid Riedel, Sabine, Die Befragung zur Unabhängig- our quality control pro- would not be by mutual consent, but ac- keit Kataloniens (9.11.2014). Ergebnisse, Hin- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- companied by disputes over the division of tergründe und Herausforderungen für Eu- berlin.org/en/about-swp/ the pan-Spanish debt. If Catalonia refuses ropa, SWP-Arbeitspapier, Global Issues quality-management-for- any debt obligations, as the former finance Division (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft swp-publications/ and economy minister Oriol Junqueras has und Politik, November 2014). already threatened, Spain’s government SWP debt would increase from its current 100 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik percent to 124 percent of gross domestic German Institute for product. The modest successes of the auster- International and ity policy during the past few years would Security Affairs be obliterated (Wirtschaftswoche, 9 September 2017). To prevent a relapse into economic Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin and financial crisis, salaries and social-secu- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 rity benefits would need to be cut further. Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Ultimately, the European taxpayer would www.swp-berlin.org also be forced to shoulder the risks of new [email protected] ECB loans. Then, if not before, the solidarity

ISSN 1861-1761 of EU citizens would be exhausted. Europe’s politicians should therefore make it clear to Translation by Tom Genrich the Catalans that they bear a great responsi- bility as members of the euro zone, and (Updated English version that they have a duty first and foremost to of SWP-Aktuell 25/2018) national solidarity, before they can expect solidarity from Europe.

Prof. Dr. Sabine Riedel is a Senior Associate in the Global Issues Division at SWP.

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