No Half Measures Power Vacuums and Military Occupations

Joseph B. Karle

Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Planning, Governance, and Globalization

Ariel I. Ahram Giselle Datz Mara E. Karlin Joel Peters

11 May 2020 Arlington, VA

Keywords: power vacuum, military occupation, total destruction, insurgency, counterinsurgency, nation building, international affairs, and civilian deaths

[Copyright 2020 by Joe Karle. All rights reserved.]

No Half Measures Power Vacuums and Military Occupations

Joseph B. Karle

ABSTRACT

This project analyzes the relationship between military occupations and power vacuums. Specifically, it seeks to understand why some military occupations result in power vacuums while others do not. Pundits and policymakers have written extensively about the possibilities that the end of US occupations might yield dangerous power vacuums. These vacuums would create regional turmoil by inviting hostile actors and causing state failure. Based on these assumptions, many commentators caution against the withdrawal of forces.

But what exactly is fearful about a power vacuum remains unclear. The concept of a power vacuum lacks defined parameters and scope, and why military occupations might lead to power vacuums is unknown. Much of the current analysis derives from familiar and recent cases of occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. David Edelstein has the most comprehensive work on military occupations, but his work does not directly address the outcome of power vacuums. This project uses a mix multimethod research design to examine which factors cause power vacuums to emerge following occupations. It uses a comprehensive dataset of occupations since 1943. It will begin with a medium-n QCA and then proceed with case studies. The ultimate goal is to identify the conditions likely to lead to power vacuums and develop policy recommendations about how to avoid them.

This project theorizes that a high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying military is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory. Shortened, this project calls this theory total destruction equals total buy-in. High levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier pacify the occupied population, while simultaneously delegitimizing the occupied state’s previous regime. High economic destruction, which is defined as the decline of a state’s per-capita GDP and overall population, is not the sole factor in preventing a power vacuum. Combinations of other conditions help influence the advent or absence of a power vacuum, but economic destruction inflicted by the occupier is the only condition that must be present in order to prevent a power vacuum.

No Half Measures Power Vacuums and Military Occupations

Joseph B. Karle

GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

This project examines how, when, and why power vacuums emerge at the end of military occupations. Power vacuums evoke fear from pundits and policymakers, as hostile actors can exploit power vacuums to sow instability. Yet there remains no clear definition of what constitutes a power vacuums or substantive research on their etiology and impact. Policy discussions typically look to recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan to evaluate how the end of military engagement and occupation can create power vacuums. Thus risk of a power vacuum is often cited as justification to prolong military operations.

To rectify this, this project will complete a replication and extension using David Edelstein’s seminal dataset on military occupations. The dataset includes well-known cases such as the Allied occupations of Western Germany and Japan and lesser-known occupations like the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Using a combination of within-case process tracing and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the project seeks to elucidate what combination of conditions generate power vacuums following military occupations.

The theory this project argues is that a high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying military is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory. The crux of this theory is that occupiers that engage in protracted conflict, inflicting widespread damage on a state before occupying it, are more likely to prevent a power vacuum from occurring. This widespread damage creates “breathing space” for the occupier to establish indigenous security forces (ISF) and a friendly government without having to worry about nationalist resistance from the occupied population.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dedicated to Harbaugh my German Shepherd, who spent nearly every second by my side (or in the yard chasing squirrels) while I worked on this damn thing. Too bad you can’t read it…you would likely hate it.

There are too many people to thank who contributed to this research project, so I apologize to those I might leave out. A debt of gratitude, which cannot ever be repaid, must go to my old Third Platoon mates. They took every opportunity to make fun of me, support me and remind me that if I could not explain it to them…then I was doing something wrong. They also serve as a constant reminder that the burden of war is unevenly carried by a small number of men and women. I am eternally grateful to Dr. Ariel Ahram and my committee, who always made themselves readily available to me. A special thank you to Dr. Mohammad Tabaar and Dr. F. Gregory Gause at Texas A&M University, both of whom encouraged me to pursue a PhD.

Special thanks to my “brain trust” of NAME REDACTED, Sezaneh, Moon, Martin, Greg, Bryan, John and Ambassador Barr. All of you served as valuable resources and trusted friends. And of course, a special thanks to my wife Sarah, whose love and support cannot be quantified. Without you I would have quit long ago.

iv

Note About Citations:

The Maddison Data set specifically requested that citations be done:

Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10.

According to this request, this will be done. However, to differentiate between the Rebasing document and the actual database, when specifically referencing the database I will identify each before the citation begins.

Example: Database: Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10.

Rebasing Document: Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10 Pg. Number (When applicable).

Maddison Project Rebasing 2018. Pg. Number

Maddison Database, 2018.

Archival documents were done Chicago Style as demonstrated below:

Organization, Title, Publishing Department (If Available). Document Number, State Published in: Archive Name, Year, Page Number of Document (If Listed on Document). Link to Archival Document (If Available). (Access Date).

Example: CIA, The Current Situation in Italy, National Intelligence Estimates. DOC_0000009589, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1947, Pg. 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000009589.pdf. (Accessed October 28, 2019).

The Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database (database) was provided via zip drive by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). Please reach out to the author for directions about how to obtain the declassified version of this. CAA was cited as:

v Codebook: Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database (Codebook). Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2008. Pg. iii.

Database: Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database (Database). Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2008. Pg. iii.

CAA Database.

vi Table of Contents CHAPTER 1 1 Introduction 1 CHAPTER 2: Literature Review 5 Significance of Research 5 Power Vacuum Scholarship 7 Occupation Literature 8 Impacts and Importance of Studying Power Vacuums 10 CHAPTER 3: Methods 12 Application of Methodology 12 Mixing Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Case Studies 14 Advantages of QCA and FSQCA 18 Source Collection 21 Case Studies 23 CHAPTER 4: Retesting the Literature 26 What is a Threat Environment? 31 CHAPTER 5: Defining Conditions 34 Defining Conditions 37 Economic Destruction 37 ISF Scores 40 Insurgency 44 Power Vacuum 45 CHAPTER 6: Conditions Justification 47 Coding The Data 47 Italy 47 West Germany 51 East Austria 55 West Austria 58 Japan 62 The Ryukyus 65 North Korea 67 South Korea 71 West Bank and Gaza 74 Cambodia 78 Syria in Lebanon 82 Israel in South Lebanon 85 Bosnia 88 Kosovo 92 Afghanistan 95 Iraq 99 CHAPTER 7: Interpreting the Data 102 Testing Our New Data 103 Results 103 High Destruction= No Power Vacuum 105 Combination of Conditions 107 High Frequency Causal Combinations 112

vii Where Do These Finding Differ from Edelstein? 113 Agreeing with Edelstein 114 Difference 115 CHAPTER 8: Italian Case Study 120 CHAPTER 9: Policy Recommendations 133 Policy Lesson One: Total Destruction is a Necessity 133 Policy Lesson Two: ISF are Weak 135 Policy Lesson Three: Power Vacuums Matter 136 CHAPTER 10: Conclusion 139 Conditions for a Power Vacuum 139 Do Power Vacuums Matter? 141 Total Destruction Equals Total Buy-in Theory: Practicality and Morality 141 Concluding Thoughts 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY 145

viii CHAPTER 1 Introduction This project analyzes the relationship between military occupations and power vacuums.

Specifically, it seeks to understand why some military occupations result in power vacuums, while others do not. Pundits and policymakers have written extensively about the possibility that the end of US occupations might yield dangerous power vacuums. They argue that these vacuums would create regional turmoil by inviting hostile actors and causing state failure. Based on these assumptions, many commentators caution against the withdrawal of forces.

But what exactly is frightening about a power vacuum remains unclear. The concept of a power vacuum lacks defined parameters and scope, and why military occupations might lead to power vacuums is unknown. Much of the current analysis derives from the familiar and recent cases of the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. David Edelstein has the most comprehensive work on military occupations, but his work does not directly address the outcome of power vacuums.1 This project uses mixed multi-method research design to examine which factors cause power vacuums to emerge following occupations. It uses a comprehensive dataset of occupations since 1943. It will begin with a medium-n QCA and then proceed with a case study.

The ultimate goal is to identify the conditions likely to lead to power vacuums and to develop policy recommendations about how to avoid them.

This project theorizes that a high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying military is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory.

Shortened, this project calls this theory total destruction equals total buy-in. High levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier pacify the occupied population, while

1 Edelstein, David. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations succeed or Fail." International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49-91. Edelstein, David M. Occupational Hazards. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.

1 simultaneously delegitimizing the occupied state’s previous regime. High economic destruction, which is defined as the decline of a state’s per-capita GDP and overall population, is not the sole factor in preventing a power vacuum. Combinations of other conditions help influence the advent or absence of a power vacuum, but economic destruction inflicted by the occupier is the only condition that must be present in order to prevent a power vacuum.

High levels of economic destruction are usually present in states that are subjected to military occupation. This is often because war precipitated the occupation. Of the sixteen military occupations since 1943, only the occupations of North Korea and South Korea were not preceded by conflict. The occupation of the West Bank was preceded by the shortest duration of conflict, with the Six-Day War only lasting…six days. The occupation of Cambodia, although preceded by a relatively short war, was plagued by years of the brutal genocide of the Khmer

Rouge.2 So the presence of economic destruction in an occupied territory is not unusual.

However, this project argues that who inflicted that destruction and what level it reached is what really matters.

The crux of this theory is that occupiers that engage in protracted conflict, inflicting widespread damage on a state before occupying it, are more likely to prevent a power vacuum from occurring. This total destruction creates a “breathing space” for the occupier to establish indigenous security forces (ISF) and a friendly government without having to worry about nationalist resistance from the occupied population. It also makes the occupied population completely dependent on the occupier for goods and services. This breathing space is very important because ISF and newly formed governments often struggle to find their footing in the early years of the occupation. Conventional wisdom often argues that ISF and a legitimized

2 Mydans, Seth. "DEATH OF POL POT; Pol Pot, Brutal Dictator Who Forced Cambodians to Killing Fields, Dies at 73." The New York Times, April 17, 1998.

2 strong government are the keys to preventing a power vacuum. This project points out the backwardness of this augment, maintaining that a strong ISF and legitimate government are unattainable if the occupied population is not coerced into accepting them.

Other conditions like length of occupation, troop-to-civilian population ratio, presence of an insurgency, threat environment, geography, and others all play a part in determining the outcome of an occupation. This theory does not exclude or even downplay the presence of these factors. In fact, this project acknowledges and even highlights other important conditions that impact the outcome of an occupation. Military occupations are events that are influenced by many factors inside and outside of the occupier’s control. It would be naïve to believe that only one single condition determines the course of a military occupation.

However, this theory argues that the total destruction condition is more impactful than other conditions. Unpacked, this means that if an occupier expects to prevent a power vacuum, the occupied state must suffer near or total destruction by the occupier before the occupation begins. Total destruction is a necessary condition for an occupation to pacify the occupied population and assert a monopoly on violence. Without it, the occupier cannot establish that they and they alone have a monopoly on violence; this means that segments of the population can and will stir up nationalist reactions to the occupation. Furthermore, total destruction delegitimizes the regime that previously controlled the now-occupied state. States exercise or maintain legitimacy on a number of levels, but a state is “more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power.”3 While this definition of legitimacy is defined in terms of degrees, “as a continuous variable,” like all definitions of state legitimacy

3 Gilley, Bruce. "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries." European Journal of Political Research 45 (2006): 499-525. Pg. 500.

3 it assumes some basic principles.4 Specifically, it assumes that a state provides security, basic goods, and services. It also assumes that the state’s citizens do not seek to overthrow it. Pierre

Englebert expands upon this, arguing that state legitimacy is found in “developmental capacity,” meaning a government’s ability to “design and implement economic policies for growth that provide good governance to their societies and markets.”5 Guaranteeing the rule of law, enforcing contracts, and investing in education and infrastructure all help build the foundation of legitimacy.6 However, state legitimacy is destroyed when an occupying force inflicts total destruction. As the state can no longer provide even basic goods and services, it can’t provide any semblance of security.

The most prominent examples of this are with Germany and Japan, as the Nazis and the

Imperial Government of Japan were widely seen as legitimate by German and Japanese citizens.

Both regimes initially provide security and basic goods and services, which (for a time) allowed

Germany and Japan to flourish economically. However, the war that precipitated the occupation led to widespread economic ruin and massive loss of life, destroying the legitimacy of both governments. When something like this occurs, the population’s willingness to fight is also broken. The war weary population “consents” to foreign occupation because they do not have the political will to resist it. In cases of total destruction, the occupied population is not accepting of the occupiers, but they have no alternative than to accept it.

4 IBID. 5 Englebert, Pierre. State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 2000. Pg. 17. 6 Englebert, 2000.

4

CHAPTER 2: Literature Review Significance of Research Why are power vacuums and military occupations so important to understand? The answer resides in the fact that policymakers, pundits, academics, and the broader national security community have emphasized the impact of power vacuums in US national security. The threat of power vacuums is even codified in official US national security assessments and directives. The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment to the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) refers to the threat of power vacuums several times, arguing that US adversaries like Russia will seek to exploit them in order to undermine the US-led international order.7 The White House National Security

Strategy specifically highlighted power vacuums, saying that “rival states are filling vacuums created by state collapse and prolonged regional conflict.”8 Former Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice said that a withdrawal of US commitments would lead to a “power vacuum filled by extremists, civil wars, and Russia.”9

Outside of government, members of the national security establishment have emphasized similar points about the withdrawal of forces leading to a power vacuums. For example, after

President Donald Trump announced the total withdrawal of US troops from Syria and partial withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, politicians, news commentators, and the national security establishment were awash with debate about power vacuums. The New York Times

7 "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment." Directorate of National Intelligence. Last modified January 29, 2019. Accessed June 5, 2019. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. PDF Pgs. 32, 37. 8 "National Security Strategy of the United States of America." The White House. Last modified December, 2017. PDF Pg. 49. 9 Behre, Robert. "Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stumps for Lindsey Graham." The Post and Courier. Last modified May 18, 2014. Accessed June 6, 2019. https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/former-secretary-of-state-condoleezza-rice-%20stumps-for-lindsey- graham/article_ce9054ce-25c7-524c-bc82-f7df1f80c1f6.html

5 columnist Bret Stephenson argued that a power vacuum would develop after the withdrawal of

US troops, and US adversaries like ISIS and Iran would fill that vacuum.10 US-supported Syrian

Democratic Forces released an official statement saying that an American withdrawal would

“create a political and military vacuum...leaving its people between the claws of hostile parties.”

Dr. Colin P. Clarke and Dr. Ariane M. Tabatabai wrote in Foreign Affairs that without a US presence, adversaries like Iran will “prosper and grow, taking advantage of the power vacuum to extend Tehran’s influence throughout the region, long an objective which has been kept in check by the deployment of US troops to Iraq from 2003-2011.”11

Furthermore, many within the foreign policy community argue that only a perpetual US presence can prevent a power vacuum from occurring. In the case of Iraq, Max Boot claimed that a strong US presence is the only way to “ensure the security of a nascent democracy in such a rough neighborhood.”12 Foreign Policy’s James Traub argued a similar point, claiming that the great lesson from Iraq is “the U.S. absence has turned out to be even more toxic than the US presence.”13 Boot and Traub do not use the term power vacuum directly; however, like many others, they are referencing the widely-held assumption that every time the US withdrawals from a state or a region, a vacuum is created and quickly filled by actors hostile to US national security interests.

10 Concha, Joe. "Bret Stephens: Pulling US troops from Syria will create a vacuum." The Hill. December 18, 2018 Accessed January 15, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/media/423085-bret-stephens-pulling-us- troops-in-syria-will-create-a-vacuum 11 Clarke, Colin P., and Ariane M. Tabatabai. "Withdrawing From Syria Leaves a Vacuum That Iran Will Fill." Foreign Affairs. Last modified January 8, 2019. Accessed June 5, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2019-01-08/withdrawing-syria-leaves-vacuum-iran-will-fill 12 Boot, Max. " The United States Should Embrace an Imperialistic Role in Iraq." The Weekly Standard. Accessed April 15, 2018. https://www.weeklystandard.com/maxboot/imperialism 13 Traub, James. "The Mess Obama Left Behind in Iraq." Foreign Policy. October 7, 2016 Accessed April 7, 2018. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/07/the-mess-obama-left-behind-in-iraq-surge-debate/

6 Power Vacuum Scholarship

Scholarly contributions specifically focused on power vacuums are scant. Power vacuums are referenced in broad, general terms, with little attention to defining them and their broader impact. Instead, most literature tends to focus on related subjects, like failed states and the danger they pose. Susan L. Woodward talks at length about the role of failed states in the

Westphalia State system, arguing that failed states can help create a power vacuum “that opens the door to movements for regional autonomy or secessions.”14 Robert I. Rotberg argues that strong states control their territories and provide political goods to citizens; when these goods are no longer provided to citizens, state failure looms.15 Similar to Rotberg, Seth Kaplan talks about the unpredictability of fragile and failed states, arguing that they function “according to a different set of sociopolitical dynamics.” 16 He spends little time diagnosing or analyzing power vacuums, only stating that power vacuums can unleash “a society’s emotions with unparalleled force.”17

Non-scholarly books like The Occupation of Iraq, COBRA II, and Endgame discuss the concept of power vacuums by examining America’s occupation of Iraq.18 The themes of these books contend that the removal of Iraq’s indigenous government in 2003 created a vacuum that brought in a series of violent actors competing for power. This process repeated itself after the

US withdrew from Iraq in 2011, forcing the US to re-intervene in 2014. The lesson gleaned from

14 Woodward, Susan L. "Failed States: Warlordism and "Tribal" Warfare." Naval War College Review 52, no. 2 (Spring1999): 55-68. Pg. 59. 15 Rotberg, Robert I. "Failed States in a World of Terror." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 4 (July/August 2002): 127-41. Pg. 131. 16 Kaplin, Fred. "Identifying Truly Failed States." The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 49-63. Pg. 49. 17 IBID.; Pg. 53. 18 Allawi, Ali A. The Occupation of Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard Trainor. COBRA II. New York: Vintage Books, 2005. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard Trainor. The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama. New York: Vintage Books, 2012.

7 this appears to be that a power vacuum occurs when an outside power occupies a territory but fails to implement a central authority capable of exercising a monopoly of violence over that territory. The lessons from the occupation of Iraq are often assumed to be absolute, but this is problematic because researchers do not define and analyze power vacuums comparatively.

Solely relying on the lessons of Iraq creates blind spots in decision-making for future occupations and withdrawals of military forces. To combat this, it is critical to examine how power vacuums occur after occupation in a wide range of cases.

Occupation Literature

There is growing academic research on military occupations, and much of it is based off of Edelstein’s literature (Edelstein 2004; 2008).19 Edelstein creates a clear definition of what constitutes an occupation and uses a dataset to carry out a comprehensive study of more than twenty different occupations. A number of studies build off of Edelstein’s research, including his own research on developing studies focused on foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC).

Much of this literature analyzes FIRC’s impact on different aspects of postwar stability. Some argue that FIRC and occupations rarely create a stable relationship between the imposed regime and the foreign imposer.20 They maintain that when foreign forces withdraw from the territory, the “indigenous government left in its place may struggle to consolidate power given the delegitimizing effect the presence of foreign troops has had on its regime.”21 Further research has analyzed the impacts of domestic states experiencing FIRC, finding potential devastating effects on the internal instability of an occupied country, as “extended occupations by foreign troops

19 Edelstein, David. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations succeed or Fail." International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49-91. Pg. 49-51; Pg.90-91. Edelstein, David M. Occupational Hazards. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008 20 Downes, Alexander, and Lindsey O'Rourke. "You Can’t Always Get What You Want:Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations." International Security 41, no. 2 (October 2016): 43-89. 21 IBID.; Pg. 54.

8 may also trigger nationalism opposition.”22 Further studies explored the relationship between

FIRC and the onset of civil war.23 One study showed that FIRC makes civil wars “more likely” when the imposer changes the host nation’s political institutions.24

None of these scholarly works have analyzed the relationship between military occupations and power vacuums. Understanding if a power vacuum developed after an occupation is vitally important because their development is the one metric which conclusively identifies that a military occupation has failed. Furthermore, it is the one metric that policymakers, pundits, and official US national security directives identify as a threat to US national security. Instead, much of the research tends to focus on more arbitrary and subjective metrics. For example, many deem the US occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 a failure.25 The occupation was lengthy, costly, and had few benefits for Haiti.26 The goals of the occupation were to protect the entrance to the Panama Canal from Germany, secure the interest of US bondholders, and create stable institutions in Haiti.27 The US achieved one of its most important overarching foreign policy goals at the time--protecting the Panama Canal from European control--yet the occupation is often coded as a failure.28 This highlights the vagueness of determining success or failure. One could argue that by securing the entrance to the Panama

Canal, the US achieved partial success, and the occupation cannot be deemed a failure. Edelstein seems to unknowingly acknowledge that measures for determining success or failure are often

22 Downes, Alexander B. "CATASTROPHIC SUCCESS? FOREIGN-IMPOSED REGIME CHANGE AND CIVIL WAR1." Prepared for the International Studies Association annual meeting, New Orleans LA (February 17, 2010). IBID.; Pg. 13. 23 Peic, Goran, and Dan Reiter. "Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power and Civil War Onset, 1920-2004." British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (July 2011): 453-75. 24 IBID.; Pg. 454. 25 Edelstein, David. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations succeed or Fail." International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49-91. Pg. 49-51. Pg. 85. 26 IBID. 27 IBID. 28 Herman, Arthur. 1917: Lenin, Wilson, and the birth of the new world disorder. New York: Harper Perennial, 2017. Pg. 48.

9 not efficiently weighted. Proof of this resides in how he chooses to code the outcome for occupations. His 2004 International Security article lists the US occupation of the Philippines as a failure; however, in his 2008 book, which utilizes the same case studies (actually adding two cases), he no longer classifies the Philippines as a failure and upgrades the outcome to mixed.29

This highlights how coding can be inconsistent, involving multiple factors which impact how success or failure is determined.

Impacts and Importance of Studying Power Vacuums

This project contributes to international relations literature and to policymakers in a number of ways. First, it develops a rigorous framework for understanding and defining power vacuums. This project will be the first large-scale study to create a conceptual clarification of power vacuums. Accomplishing this creates a structure for future studies about the subject. To date the only substantive research about power vacuums defines power vacuums as a “situation in which a contingency impedes the exercise of systemic power; the environment confronts the actors with a new situation while they are not able to mobilize the necessary resources to deal with it.”30

Using this definition as a guide, this project defines a power vacuum as when a state or central authority cannot exercise systematic power or deal with challengers. Examples include non-state actors challenging the state from exercising a monopoly of violence over a territory within the state, another state invading and displacing the current state without asserting a monopoly of violence over the territory, or a coup where several rival factions within the

29 Edelstein, David. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations succeed or Fail." International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49-91. Pg. 84. Edelstein, David M. Occupational Hazards. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Pg. 178. 30 Avelino, Flor, and Jan Rotmans. "Power in Transition: Power in Transition: An Interdisciplinary Framework to Study Power in Relation to Structural Change." European Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 4 (2009): 543-69. Pg. 555.

10 government compete to control the government. These are by no means the only examples applicable to the development of a power vacuum. Since this project is specifically looking at power vacuums in occupations, the central authority can be the occupier or the government the occupier puts into place after it has occupied the territory. In all cases where a power vacuum occurs, neither the state’s central authority nor any single actor maintains total sovereignty over the territory.

The enhanced definition is critical because it allows us to operationalize and identify power vacuums. This project is the first attempt in political science or international relations literature at developing a rigorous framework for understanding and defining what constitutes a power vacuum. It is not redefining boundaries; rather, it defines them by creating an explicit definition of what is and is not a power vacuum.

Second, this project contributes to reassessing military occupations, arguing that occupation territories that develop power vacuums can be more definitively labeled as failures because the occupier has not only failed to transform the political system, but also has failed to prevent the territory from becoming a source of instability. The impact of this argument on the study of military occupations is wholly unique because it is the first large-scale study specifically addressing the relationship between power vacuums and the end of an occupation. No other research has ever sought to determine whether the end of a military occupation will lead to the development of a power vacuum.

11 CHAPTER 3: Methods

This project uses a mixed methodology of medium-n Qualitative Comparative Analysis

(QCA) and intensive case studies to examine the causes of power vacuums after occupation, and it can offer a more nuanced understanding of why occupations fail and how power vacuums develop. It improves specificity and provides clarity to the concept of power vacuums in international relations literature while simultaneously addressing a major concern of the US foreign policy community. To accomplish this task, Edelstein’s datasets will undergo reanalysis and replication.31 Using all of Edelstein’s datasets will create a new layer of depth of understanding if power vacuums develop after US and non-US occupations; ultimately, it will offer better guidance about the likely outcomes of ending military occupations and the challenges that develop after an occupation has ended.

To test this hypothesis, we will utilize QCA methodology to look for the presence and absence of different conditions in sixteen different occupations, testing to see what combination of conditions leads to the development of a power vacuum.

Application of Methodology

The methodology consists of two parts. Part one is to standardize the variables Edelstein has deemed most important to an occupation, followed by a replication and re-analysis of

Edelstein's dataset using QCA. Part two is to retest Edelstein’s dataset, but this time using a new set of standardized conditions to determine which combination of newly identified conditions impacts the development of a power vacuum. Part two will utilize Fuzzy Set Qualitative Case

Study Analysis (fs/QCA).

31 Edelstein, David. "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations succeed or Fail." International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 49-91. Pg. 84-91.

12 Part One: Retest Using QCA

First, standardizing Edelstein’s conditions and then retesting his dataset will add clear guidelines and transparency, allowing researchers to trace how each outcome is determined.

QCA will retest Edelstein’s theory about occupations by looking for the presence and absence of binary conditions and their causal combination. Edelstein’s dependent variable (DV) is the occupation outcome (coded as successful occupation, a mixed success occupation, or a failed occupation). Here, Edelstein’s DV will remain the same, and the conditions used will be ones that Edelstein has identified himself (as laid out in his 2004 International Security dataset beginning on page 84 of the article).32

These conditions include: Security occupation, comprehensive occupation, common external threat, mutual recognition of occupation, internal threats (insurgency, civil war, ethnic violence, etc.), credible guarantee of leaving, occupation force size over 50,000 troops, and lengthy occupation (over five years). Although his work is seminal, it does present some issues.

Specifically, there are conceptualization and measurement problems, as it is difficult to understand how he determined the presence and absence of some conditions. More importantly, the concept behind Edelstein’s formulation of the DV is problematic. In short, there are not enough weighted measurables to determine what constitutes a successful occupation, a mixed success occupation, or a failed occupation. Standardizing his conditions and testing for their impact will alleviate some of these issues. However, it will not completely rectify the fact that the DV is largely superficial. For this we need to replace his DV entirely.

Step Two: New Conditions with fs/QCA

32 These variables, or a version of them, are listed in Appendix 1 of Edelstein's Occupational Hazards (International Security peer reviewed article pages 84-91 ) and his 2008 book by the same name (Pgs. 175-192). Often these variables can be inferred from reading the table. For example, length of occupation as a variable can be inferred from the fact that Edelstein lists the length of every case study and refers to the “length” several times when referring to the failures of occupations (Appendix one occupations referencing length: China, Egypt, Philippines, Haiti, Ryukyus-Japan, Lebanon and Iraq).

13 For the second step in the process, this project will standardize new conditions and replace Edelstein’s outcome DV with a power vacuum (did one occur or not occur). Rather than using binary conditions, they will be ratios. To account for the ratio, we will use fs/QCA to test for the presence and absence of newly identified conditions and their causal combinations, but this time the DV will be the ratio occurrence or absence of a power vacuum. Fs/QCA will allow us to examine how a combination of different conditions produces (or does not produce) a power vacuum at the end of each occupation case. Because a fuzzy set allows for more variation, we will utilize a five-value fuzzy set: 1 (fully in), .75 (more in than out), .50 (crossover, neither in nor out), .25 (more out than in) and 0 (fully out). This is especially important when examining conditions that are not totally binary.

In Part II, variables (otherwise known as conditions) will be defined and rated. The score each condition receives will be accompanied with an in-depth justification. For example, if we are looking at the German case study and we assign the Indigenous Forces (ISF) condition a .4, attached to it will be a detailed justification. Attaching a detailed explanation to each assigned condition creates more transparency and a better understanding for the reader as to why each rating was assigned.

By retesting and critiquing the dataset, this project will remedy some of Edelstein’s shortcomings and advance scientific knowledge and understanding about the conditions that affect occupations. Through this we will better understand how military occupations can lead to the development of power vacuums. QCA, fs/QCA, the justification behind this methodology, and the newly identified conditions are explained further below.

Mixing Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Case Studies

Using QCA in Medium-N Analysis

14 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is an analytic technique that uses Boolean algebra to implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the qualitative study of macro social phenomena. Typically, qualitatively-oriented scholars examine only a few cases at a time, but their analyses are both intensive--addressing many aspects of cases-- and integrative,examining how the different parts of a case fit together, both contextually and historically. By formalizing the logic of qualitative analysis, QCA makes it possible to bring the logic and empirical intensity of qualitative approaches to studies that embrace more than a handful of cases--research situations that normally call for the use of variable-oriented, quantitative methods. Boolean methods of logical comparison represent each case as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. These combinations can be compared with each other and then logically simplified through a bottom-up process of paired comparison. Computer algorithms developed by electrical engineers in the 1950s provide techniques for simplifying this type of data. The data matrix is reformulated as a "truth table" and reduced in a way that parallels the minimization of switching circuits.33 These minimization procedures mimic case-oriented comparative methods but accomplish the most cognitively demanding task--making multiple comparisons of configurations--through computer algorithms. The goal of the logical minimization is to represent, in a shorthand manner,the information in the truth table regarding the different combinations of conditions that produce a specific outcome.

QCA can work with either crisp (dichotomous) or fuzzy sets. In crisp sets, a case is either "in" or "out" of a set. A conventional set is comparable to a binary variable with two values, 1 ("in") and 0 ("out"). A fuzzy set, by contrast, permits membership in the interval between 0 and 1 while retaining the two qualitative states of full membership and full non-

33 Ragin, Charles. The Comparative Method Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, With a New Introduction. Okland: University of California Press, 2014.

15 membership. The fuzzy set could include individuals who are "fully in" the set (fuzzy membership = 1.0), some who are "almost fully in" the set (membership = .90), some who are neither "more in" nor "more out" of the set (membership = .5, also known as the "crossover point"), some who are "barely more out than in" the set (membership = .45), and so on down to those who are "fully out" of the set (membership = 0). It is up to the researcher to specify procedures for assigning fuzzy membership scores to cases, and these procedures must be both open and explicit so they can be evaluated by other scholars.34

QCA is uniquely suited to this project for a number of reasons. First, the number of cases of interventions is limited (n= 16). Standard regression struggles with limitations of micro- numerosity (i.e., the “degrees of freedom” problem). Standard regression results are likely to be imprecise and have inflated error terms when there are less than ten data points per variable.35

Secondly, QCA uses an approach based on the logic of necessary and sufficient conditionality that is different from the linear additive functions of standard regression.36 Sufficiency means that every instance of a purported cause is associated with a specific outcome. The arithmetic calculation of sufficiency derives from the following equation:

Consistencysufficiency (Yi ≥ Xi)= ∑ (min(Xi, Yi))/ ∑ (Xi). The closer to one, the greater the consistency for sufficiency The arithmetic calculation of necessity is the following equation: Consistencynecessity (Yi ≤ Xi)= ∑ (min(Xi, Yi))/ ∑ (Yi). The software also computes the coverage of a solution, the number of cases with both the causal condition, and the outcome divided by the number of cases with the outcome.

34 Skaaning, S. E. (2011). Assessing the robustness of crisp-set and fuzzy-set QCA results. Sociological Methods & Research, 40(2). Pg. 391-408. 35 Peduzzi, P., Concato, J., Kemper, E., Holford, T. R., & Feinstein, A. R. (1996). A simulation study of the number of events per variable in logistic regression analysis. Journal of clinical epidemiology, 49(12), 1373-1379 36 Ragin, Charles. Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Ragin, Charles C. "Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage." Political Analysis 14 (June 5, 2006): 291-310. Rihoux, B., & Lobe, B. (2009). The case for qualitative comparative analysis (QCA): Adding leverage for thick cross-case comparison. The Sage handbook of case-based methods, 222-242. Rohlfing, I., & Schneider, C. Q. (2013). Improving research on necessary conditions: formalized case selection for process tracing after QCA. Political Research Quarterly, 220-235.

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Mixing QCA and Case Based Analysis in Multi-Method Research

New advances in multi-method research have suggested ways to nest intensive case studies within a larger comparative QCA approach. This mirrors similar advances in nested analysis that use regression analysis to identify cases for more intensive case study. Special attention is necessary to ensure the logic consistency between the necessary/sufficient conditionality identified in the comparative QCA version and the case study.37 Beach and

Rohlfing (2018) show several decision points in the development of a multi-method analysis using QCA and case study.38 Diagram 1 demonstrates a protocol for set-theoretical multi- method research that starts with cross-case analysis.39

37 Rohlfing, I., & Schneider, C. Q. (2013). Improving research on necessary conditions: formalized case selection for process tracing after QCA. Political Research Quarterly, 220-235. Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Pedersen. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013. 38 Beach, Derek, and Ingo Rohlfing. “Integrating Cross-Case Analyses and Process Tracing in Set-Theoretic Research: Strategies and Parameters of Debate.” Sociological Methods & Research 47, no. 1 (January 2018): 3–36. 39 Beach and Rohlfing 2018. Pg. 15.

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Diagram 1: Set-theoretic multi-method research starting with cross-case analysis (Beach and

Rohlfing 2018)

Once a cross-case causal pattern is established, researchers must decide whether to adopt a mechanism-centered approach or a condition-centered approach. A mechanism-centered approach would require only examination of typical or modal cases. The aim is to identify specific mechanisms connecting an antecedent condition and outcome in a typical case. If mechanisms are missing in an examination of the typical case, then the QCA findings are questionable. In contrast, a condition-centered approach is interested in the configuration of variable conditions, not their mechanism. This necessitates sequential examination of first the typical and then deviant case. Examining the deviant case can help identify variables and conditions omitted in the initial QCA.

Advantages of QCA and FSQCA Fs/QCA and QCA are the right methodologies for this project ,as they allow us to examine how a combination of different conditions produces a specific outcome. Unlike

18 regression analysis, QCA and fs/QCA do not try to “discover the effect a variable has on some outcome.”40 While QCA and fs/QCA focus on the combination of causal conditions which create an outcome, “[r]egression gives us the magnitude and direction of effect of a variable, net of other variables included in the model.”41 Thus, QCA is not about independent effects but rather combined effects. Furthermore, by using QCA we are acknowledging that the “same outcome may be generated by different configurations of attributes.”42 The creation of a power vacuum is brought on by several different causes, which means that our methodology must be able to deal with multiple causations. QCA can process multiple causations, however, “conventional regression-based methods can only deal with complex causation very clumsily through the insertion of interaction terms.”43

Analyzing Potential Omitted Variables with fsQCA

The fsQCA portion of the study will incorporate a number of potentially substantial variables. These conditions, expanded upon in the case study section, were chosen based on their constant reoccurrence throughout the literature analyzing occupations and power vacuums. In many cases, authors argued that these conditions played a critical role in understanding different aspects of occupations and power vacuums. Thus it is important to see whether these conditions create a causal combination that positively or negatively impacts an occupation. The most frequently occurring conditions were insurgency, economic destruction, strength of ISF, and the size of the occupation force. The relevancy of these conditions is briefly explained below.

40 Elliot, Thomas. "FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS." https://www.socsci.uci.edu/~sgsa/docs/fsQCA_thomas_elliot.pdf. Pg. 1. 41 IBID. 42 Warren, Jon, Jonathan Wistow, and Clare Bambra. "Applying Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to evaluate a public health policy initiative in the North East of England." Policy and Society 32 (2013): 289-301. Pg. 289. 43 IBID. Pg. 291.

19 Insurgency: Describes whether or not an insurgency developed during the occupation, or existed before the occupation took place. An insurgency is an unpacked and more specified version of

Edelstein’s internal threat condition. However, an insurgency is easier to diagnose and signals that an internal threat is malleable because it is violent by nature.

Economic Destruction: Classifies the decline in a state’s GDP-per-capita and population as a result of the conflict that led up to the occupation. Much of the literature on military occupations argues that rebuilding a robust economy is far easier than building one from scratch. Often states that are wealthier or industrialized are much less likely to lapse into instability or civil war.44

Thus occupied territories that lack historical wealth and economic development cannot afford to provide basic public services or maintain security. As a result, implementing a new government becomes difficult for the occupier, as it is easier for anti-government groups to recruit “because there are so few legitimate economic opportunities.”45

Despite this focus on the need to rebuild the economy, very little attention is given toward understanding how different levels of economic destruction hurts or helps an occupation.

On its surface, it may appear as though limited economic destruction serves the occupiers interests, as it will be easier for them to rebuild the occupied territory. This assumption was made by the US during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Here, the US believed it could use precision strikes to inflict limited damage to Iraq’s economy and infrastructure, the theory being that by killing less civilians and inflicting less damage, the US would be greeted as liberators and would only have to devote limited resources to rebuilding Iraq.

Strength of Indigenous Forces: Analyzes the effectiveness of indigenous security forces that are built and supported by the occupier. Since the occupier has no intention of annexing the

44 Downes, Alexander. 2010. “Catastrophic Success: Foreign Imposed Regime Change and Civil War.” Conference Papers—International Studies Association, 1. PDF. Pg. 5. 45 IBID.; Pg. 16.

20 territory and would like to end the occupation as quickly as possible, building up institutions like indigenous security forces (ISF) is imperative. ISF, unlike occupying forces, will stay in a territory long after the occupation ends and understand cultural conditions like history, local politics, and even tribal codes--something that would be difficult for occupying forces to grasp.

If the territory is beset by internal strife, such as an insurgency, developing capable ISF to support the occupiers’ interests becomes even more necessary. Given the prolonged nature of insurgencies, which often last from 11-20 years, it is unreasonable to expect the occupier to stay for the full duration.46 Furthermore, the quality of ISF has historically “impacted the outcome of past counterinsurgencies.”47 Well-trained, effectively organized and motivated ISF are critical to occupiers because they can provide intelligence and legitimize actions among the locals, providing a unique set of mechanisms in their knowledge of social-cultural codes.48

Occupation Size: How many foreign troops, relative to the occupied state’s population size, were utilized for the occupation. The size of an occupation force matters, as it can affect the occupier’s ability to implement and maintain security. Since one of the underlying goals of any occupation is to prevent the territory from becoming a threat or destabilizing factor, the first step to accomplishing this is to establish security using an appropriately sized security force.

Source Collection

In order to test for the presence of these conditions, we must gather supporting evidence.

For Edelstein’s conditions, this will be straightforward. It will involve utilizing the dataset (listed below) Edelstein has already built and utilizing the data he has collected. For the newly-formed

46 Jones, Seth. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. RAND Counter Insurgency Study Vol. 4. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008. Pg. 10. 47 IBID.;Pg. 9. 48 Souleimano, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. "Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya." Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (October 2014): 678-703. Pg. 678.

21 conditions defined in the section above, this will involve gathering archival evidence and building upon existing literature, think-tank projects, recently declassified directives, policy memos, news articles, research papers, and multiple datasets. This project also relied on declassified government documents, which often gave assessments of emerging political conditions. Often, these archival documents provided consistent and reliable information on particular subjects. Now-declassified CIA and OSS documents assessed the strength of ISF security forces in post-war Europe. More importantly, some case studies lacked robust academic literature, meaning declassified State Department cables and CIA intelligence reports are critical to filling in these “knowledge gaps.”

Databases are also useful tools for supplementing research. Most prominently, this project utilized the Maddison Project database and the Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database

(ACID). The Maddison database was utilized to determine GDP and population growth of a state over time. Created by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA), it is a large and detailed database on irregular warfare that was never published. The purpose of this database was to provide

“information to Army leadership that aids in decisions regarding force structure and understanding characteristics related to outcomes of irregular wars.”49 Upon request, a declassified version of the database was made available for this research project. This database served as a valuable source when determining force size utilized in different occupation case studies. These sources will be used to help assign a membership score for these newly minted conditions when using fs/QCA.

In the name of transparency, because fs/QCA involves assigning a score based on a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence, this project will have an entire chapter specifically

49 Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database (codebook). Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2008. Pg. iii.

22 devoted to justifying every score assigned to a condition. Known as the Conditions Justification chapter, this chapter will serve two key purposes. First, it will explain and justify each score that is assigned to each variable for each case study. Often, a researcher will run an analysis and explain what the output says, but give little indication as to why they assigned a given variable a certain score. This project will rectify this, thus allowing fellow researchers to confirm or even dispute scores that have been assigned to each variable. This furthers the ability of other researchers to build off and expand upon this research project. Secondly, the case study section serves as a kind of quick reader for those looking to better understand each case and the conditions that affected it. For example, while finding literature on the insurgency in Iraq is easy, finding literature on the insurgency in Cambodia during the Vietnamese occupation is not. There is no quick source or abbreviated history about the subject for a layperson or a policymaker

(short on time) to grab and quickly skim. The case study section helps rectify this problem for these sixteen cases. It is not meant to be a substitute for in-depth research on the subject, but it can serve as a jumping off point for some.

Case Studies

This project draws a distinction between an occupation and an intervention, annexation, or colonization. Thus it will use Edelstein’s definition of what constitutes an occupation: “the temporary control of a territory by a state that makes no claim to permanent sovereignty over that territory.”50 We will utilize the Edelstein dataset where each case study fits this narrowly defined definition.51 This project will use all occupation cases from the dataset that begins after 1945.

The US and UK occupation of Italy is the only exception to this rule, as part of this occupation began in 1943.

50 Edelstein 2008. Pg. 3. 51 This project will use 16 of 26 cases, beginning to evaluate case studies that began after WWII.

23 Country Occupier Years

Italy US, UK 1943-47

Austria (East) USSR 1945-55

Austria (West) US, UK, France 1945-55

West Germany US, UK, France 1945-52

Japan US 1945-52

Ryukyus US 1945-72

North Korea USSR 1945-48

South Korea US 1945-48

West Bank & Gaza Israel 1967- present

Cambodia Vietnam 1979-89

Lebanon Syria 1976-2005

South Lebanon Israel 1982-2000

Bosnia NATO 1995- present

Kosovo NATO 1999- present

Afghanistan NATO 2001- present

Iraq US, UK 2003-11

Each of these case studies and their conditions will be coded and tested as explained in the methodology section. After this, we will analyze trends in casual combinations, examining what conditions and combinations of conditions appeared throughout the dataset. From here we will be able to see where the norm of distribution lies and whether each case study fits within it

(or out of it). This will allow us to see what conditions are necessary, or necessary and sufficient,

24 for the presence or absence of a power vacuum. This will also allow the research project to compare its findings with Edelstein’s occupation literature. Where do these findings align and where do they differ? What new lessons can be deduced from these causal combinations of conditions?

After this, we will examine the Italian Occupation case study, taking an in-depth look at the mechanisms of the Italian occupation and process tracing the impact of three different conditions: Indigenous Security Forces, the Threat Environment, and Total Destruction. Doing this will demonstrate which condition had the greatest impact on the outcome of the occupation, thus confirming or denying the theory of total destruction.

25

CHAPTER 4: Retesting the Literature

In seeking to develop a better understanding of power vacuums and military occupations, this project must build on the research of others. However, before we can build on this research, it’s important to test the foundations we are building on. This means retesting Edelstein’s argument that successful occupations usually have the presence of three conditions: recognition by the population of the need to be occupied, perception of a common external threat by the occupier and the occupied, and credible guarantee that the occupier will return sovereignty in a timely manner.52 Note the premium Edelstein places on the interactional relationship between occupier and occupied. Furthermore, he maintains that the presence of these three conditions leads to a positive threat environment. For the purposes of this exercise, we will call these three conditions his “threat environment conditions.”

Edelstein acknowledges that there are other conditions influencing success or failure, but maintains that the threat environment conditions are the most important. We will be able to determine the validity of this argument using a simple QCA truth table, as it will demonstrate which causal combination results in a successful or failed occupation (according to Edelstein’s standard of success). In essence, the point of this exercise is to validate, invalidate, or even find some new information about Edelstein’s arguments.

Edelstein’s conditions are as follows: security occupation, comprehensive occupation, mutual recognition of the need to be occupied, common external threat, credible guarantee of leaving, internal threat in the occupied territory, occupation size, length of occupation, and

52 Edelstein, 2004, Pg. 51.

26 multilateral occupation.53 “Security occupations” are occupations that seek to prevent the occupied territory from becoming a threat to the occupier or the region.54 “Compressive occupations” are the same, but they go a step further as the occupier tries to “create a certain political system and productive economy” during the occupation.55 In essence, every occupation is a security occupation, but some are also compressive occupations. “Common external threat” means the occupier and the occupied share a common threat from outside the occupied territory.56 “Credible guarantee of leaving” means the occupier shows credible signs that they are willing to “withdraw from the territory in a timely manner.”57 “Mutual recognition of the need to occupy” is when the occupied population is convinced that the occupation will benefit them.58

“Internal threat” is when the occupied territory suffers from an internal disruption like an insurgency. “Occupation size” is the number of troops the occupying power uses to occupy the territory.59 “Occupation length” is determining if the occupation lasted five years or longer, and

“multilateral occupation” is when several states work in conjunction to occupy a single state.

For the purpose of the QCA application, we need to assign a score to each of the conditions. A condition receiving a score of one means the condition is present, while a score of zero indicates that the condition is absent. When the dependent variable receives a score of one, this means that the occupation is coded as a success. A score of zero means failure.

53 These conditions are listed throughout the 2004 international security article and 2008 book Occupational Hazards. 54 IBID. Pg. 53. 55 IBID.; Pg. 54. 56 IBID. Pg. 61-62. 57 IBID. Pg. 65. 58 IBID.; Pg. 58-60. 59 In order to assign a score of one or zero, this project deduced that 50,000 troops or more should be coded as a one.

27

TABLE 4.1: Edelstein’s Conditions

Table 4.1 shows how every post-WWII case was coded with a one or a zero, based on the indications Edelstein gave in his research. The outcome of Bosnia and Kosovo were originally coded as uncertain. However, it has been twenty years since these occupations began, and more than a decade since Occupational Hazards was published. Today, both Bosnia and Kosovo are relatively stable and not a threat to neighboring states, meaning both can be deemed a success.

Afghanistan and Iraq follow a similar pattern, as both were coded initially as “uncertain.” In

2020, we can confidently label both as failed occupations. As such, Bosnia and Kosovo are coded as a one, while Afghanistan and Iraq receive a zero.

If we run a simple truth table analysis, the results do not give us any clear indications about the impact of each condition. Specifically, there is only one combination that appears at a frequency of one or more. This causal combination is Security Occupation*~Comprehensive

28 Occupation*~Mutual Recognition*~Common External Threat*~Credible Guarantee of

Leaving*Internal Threats*~Occupation Size more than 50,000*Occupation Length Five Years

Plus*~Multilateral results in a failed occupation. In simplified terms, an occupation that were security based--where there was not a mutual recognition of the need to be occupied, no common external threat, no credible guarantee of leaving, and where the occupation suffered from internal threats, the occupier used less than 50,000 troops, stayed for over five years, and was unilateral in nature--resulted in failure for three different cases. These three cases were the West

Bank/Gaza, Lebanon, and South Lebanon. This combination tells us a little about failed occupations but almost nothing about successful occupations.

All other causal combinations appeared at a frequency of one, which means that our ability to learn anything from these causal combinations is limited. To rectify this, we can retest the dataset but limit the number of conditions. Using a QCA truth table, but this time only keeping Edelstein’s three threat environment conditions, we see that when isolated, these three conditions do appear to influence the success or failure of an occupation. Demonstrated by Table

4.2 and 4.3, there are two causal combinations that appear at a frequency of five. Table 4.2 is the truth table that lists all possible combinations, while Table 4.3 highlights which cases the causal combinations represent.

29 Table 4.2: Truth Table Casual Combinations

TABLE 4.3: Frequency of Success (Green) and Failure (Red)

There are two sets of causal combinations that appear at a frequency of five, while every other combination appears at a frequency of one. The first set has none of the conditions present and the occupations end in failure. These cases are the West Bank/Gaza, Lebanon, South

30 Lebanon, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. The second causal combinations are successful occupations where all three threat environment conditions are present. These cases are Germany,

Italy, West Austria, Japan, and the Ryukyus Islands. This truth table analysis seems to confirm part of Edelstein’s theory that a favorable threat environment is needed for a successful occupation. Of the sixteen occupations analyzed for this project, seven were successful, and five of those had the most favorable threat environment possible, meaning all three of the threat environment conditions were present in those five cases. Furthermore, the successful occupation of Kosovo had two of the threat conditions present (mutual recognition and common external threat). Only the successful case of Bosnia had less than two of the conditions present, as Bosnia only had the mutual recognition condition.

Edelstein’s theory is further reinforced by the cases he deems failed occupations. Of the failed occupations, only East Austria has a favorable threat environment, while only two cases--

South Korea and Lebanon--had the presence of any threat conditions.60

What is a Threat Environment? The previous tests seem to validate Edelstein's threat environment theory. In almost all successful occupations, the occupation had a favorable threat environment (meaning at least two of his threat environment conditions were present), and five cases had the most favorable threat environment (the presence of all three conditions). While the previous tests seem to confirm

Edelstein’s theory about what determines the success or failure of an occupation, these results are problematic. Specifically, we need more clarity about how he determines the presence or absence of each threat environment condition. How can we be assured that an occupied state

60 Furthermore, it could be argued that East Austria’s threat environment was unfavorable (not favorable as it is coded), as Austrians eventually voted not to accept communism. Meaning that in fact, they might have actually never seen the need to be occupied. Switching Austria from a favorable to an unfavorable threat environment would mean that in none of the cases coded as a failure was there a favorable threat environment.

31 recognizes the need to be occupied? How can we determine if both the occupied population and the occupier believe they have a common external threat? And what signs demonstrate that an occupier is determined to leave the occupation in a timely manner?

With the absence of survey data, it’s difficult to determine how an occupied population, on average, might feel about the need to be occupied. Lack of a viable insurgency could be a sign that the population recognizes the need to be occupied...or it could be a sign that the occupier removed support structures that might enable an insurgency to flourish. Determining if the occupier and the occupied have a common threat is difficult as well. Iraq and Iran have been historical enemies, even fighting a brutal ten-year war from 1980-1988. The US and Iran have also shared an adversarial relationship since 1979. However, in the case study of Iraq, the US and Iraq are not coded as having a common external threat. In addition, “credible guarantee of leaving in a timely manner” is very difficult to quantify. This is because even in cases where the occupier returned sovereignty, occupation forces still remained in the territory. In some cases, the occupier retained control over the state’s security forces.61 Thus it’s difficult to understand how an occupier could give credible guarantees of leaving when they stay in the territory for decades.

The main issue with the threat environment conditions is that Edelstein seems to indicate that their presence is binary. They were present or they were absent; they did not occur on a ratio scale. Furthermore, Occupational Hazards does not go into great detail justifying the presence or absence of each condition in each individual case. At the end of the book and the International

Security article, each case study is summarized. Although helpful, many of these summaries leave much to be desired about how the presence and absence of each condition is justified.

61 Germany, Japan, and the Ryukyus are the most apparent cases. German military forces fell under the control of NATO, while Japanese and Ryukyus were not allowed to have a military.

32 To rectify this issue, this project will retest these sixteen case studies, but this time we will be using conditions that receive in-depth analysis and justification. Doing this will add a new layer of understanding and transparency to military occupations and power vacuums. It will also demonstrate the validity of our theory that total destruction equals total buy in, while simultaneously eliminating the need for readers to guess how and why each condition was coded.

33

CHAPTER 5: Defining Conditions As mentioned earlier, four conditions were chosen based on their prevalence within occupation literature. The first two conditions, Insurgencies and the role of ISF, are some of the most frequently-cited conditions in occupation literature. Authors often argue that the development of an insurgency is critical to determining the outcome of an occupation. This is because supporting an insurgency is a way for populations to resist foreign occupation, since local conventional military forces are often disbanded or destroyed. Much of the prominent

COIN literature details how insurgencies, like occupations, tend to last a long time. Prominent

COIN expert Seth Jones emphasizes this, stating that of the 90 documented insurgencies since

1945, the average lifespan was 14 years.62 James D. Fearon builds off this, explaining in his article Why do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others? that several factors contribute to the prolonged nature of insurgencies. These factors include an inability to reach a negotiated settlement between warring parties, terrain which makes it difficult for the counterinsurgent to extract the insurgent from the population, insurgent influence and control over the population, and the host nation’s inability to build effective governing institutions.63

Additionally, the need to plan for a substantial and prolonged troop presence is a common theme in COIN literature. How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict

Termination Dataset by Joakim Kreut addresses this theme, arguing that foreign troops kept in a country for a prolonged period of time helps mitigate the revival of an insurgency.64

62 Jones, Seth. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Rand Counter Insurgency Study Vol. 4. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2008. Xii. 63 Fearon, James D. "Why do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?." Department of Political Science Stanford University. Accessed December 1, 2017. https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/workingpapers/dur3.pdf. 64 Kreutz, Joakim. "How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset." Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243-50. Pg. 243.

34 COIN literature often argues that ISF must be utilized to pacify the population. Building a pro-occupier ISF is advantageous because the ISF can take advantage of socio-cultural codes that would be unknown to a foreign force.65 The belief in the power of ISF as a tool of the occupier is so strong that it is often seen as the cornerstone to establishing security within an occupied territory.66 The failure of US and NATO forces to build viable ISF is seen as one of the notable reasons, if not the most notable reason, why the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan have floundered.67

Economic destruction is the third condition we are testing for in this project. While economic development is often discussed in studies analyzing military occupations, specific studies looking at the role and level of economic destruction in occupations are not widespread.

Much of the literature assumes that large amounts of violence and destruction by the occupation force leads to violence being socialized into the political order. Thus it does not benefit the occupier in the long run. One reason for this is that “violence may be the dimension of power that people first encounter” when an occupation begins to take place, as the occupier often initiates the occupation with some type of violent action to assert control.68 If violence is not used to initiate the occupation, the occupier still uses the military (an institution whose main tool is the application of violence) to displace the sitting government and consolidate territorial

65 Souleimano, Emil A., and Huseyn Aliyev. "Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya." Journal of Strategic Studie 38, no. 5 (October 2014): 678-703. Lyall, Jason. "Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War." American Political Science Association Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 1-20. 66 Biddle, Stephen. "Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency." Daedalus (October 2017): 126-38. 67 "Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction: Lessons Learned." Reconstruction the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons From the US Experience in Afghanistan, Arlington, VA: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, 2017. 68 Tripp, Charles. The Power and the People. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.Pg. 20.

35 control.69 70 Hence the use of violence or the threat of violence becomes ingrained into the newly established political order.

It becomes further ingrained within the political order when the occupier uses violence to underpin its actions during its occupation. Examples of this include the Israeli occupation of the

Palestinian territories, in which the Israelis used “continuing dispossession, land appropriation, building demolitions and restrictions that favour the occupying power.”71 72 When the occupier is without external restraints, this increases the chances that violence will become a generative force for two reasons. The first is that the occupied have learned that violence is an acceptable means within the political order to protect and achieve its own political interests. The second is that the occupied have little alternative, since there is no external restraint on the occupier to prevent them from carrying out violence. These two factors lead to violence becoming a generative force, where the occupier and the occupied continue to use violence, at an exponential rate, to coerce and punish one another.73 Using economic destruction instead of violence provides a similar but more comprehensive condition that can be measured and coded by using widely accepted economic indicators like GDP per capita and population growth. Measuring violence is difficult, as body counts and war-related deaths are often unreliable.74

The final condition used, troop-to-civilian population ratio, appears in most literature that discusses how to secure an occupied territory. The optimal number is often debated among

69 IBID., Pg. 21. 70 This idea is generated by Tripp (page 21). Although he is referencing European colonization of the Middle East, the premise of this idea is applicable to occupations post-1945. 71 IBID., Pg. 38. 72 Favor is spelled favour within the text. 73 Summarizing R.A. Pape and J.K. Feldman: Collard-Wexler, Simon, Costantino Pischeda, and Michael G. Smith. "Do Foreign Occupations Cause Suicide Attacks?" Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 4 (2014): 625-57 74 Body Count: Casualty Figures after 10 years of the "War on Terror". Washington DC, Berlin, Ottawa: International Physicians for Social Responsibility, 2015.

36 scholars and policymakers alike.75 Most literature argues that a fixed number of troops is an inefficient way to pacify a territory. Instead, many promote the idea that there is a “positive relationship between manpower and outcome in insurgencies,” and troop-to-civilian population ratios are an accurate way to determine the number of troops needed.76 Definitions of appropriate manpower ratio vary greatly, as ratios are influenced by a variety of factors.77 There is even a subset of literature which argues that ratios do not matter nearly as much as the fact that troops should be dismounted, moving among the general population at all times.78 Supplementing this literature is volumes of US government-funded studies focusing on how many troops have been historically used to pacify a population.79 As a result of this heavy emphasis on troop ratios, it only makes sense that this project includes troop-to-civilian population ratio as one of its conditions.

Defining Conditions

This section provides a definition of each condition and then explains how each was coded. This was done to provide scope and parameters for each condition. The necessity of this will become apparent as the research project progresses.

Economic Destruction

75 Thiel, Joshua. "COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges ." Small Wars Journal. Last modified January 15, 2011. Accessed September 22, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin- manpower-ratios-debunking- the-10-to-1-ratio-and-surges. 76 Woodford, Shawn R. "Manpower and Counterinsurgency." Small Wars Journal. Accessed January 2, 2020. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/manpower-and-counterinsurgency 77 Thiel, Joshua. "COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges ." Small Wars Journal. Last modified January 15, 2011. Accessed November 15, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin- manpower-ratios-debunking- the-10-to-1-ratio-and-surges 78 Lyall, Jaason, and Isaiah Wilson. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars." International Organizations 63 (Winter 2009): 67-109. 79 Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database (codebook). Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2008.

37 This project defines economic destruction as the decline in a state’s economic wellbeing as incurred by various actor(s). Scores were assigned using a combination of qualitative and quantitative data. Economic data was often difficult to find, as countries beset by war often lack the resources to collect and report reliable data. In a perfect world, this study would utilize data compiled by The World Bank. However, The World Bank did not publish data before 1960. As a result, most case studies for this project utilized the Maddison Project Dataset, which

“provides the broadest coverage of comparative income data and is amongst the most widely used sources of economic data in the world.”80 The dataset judiciously combines “estimates of comparative levels of real GDP per capita in recent periods with long-term time series of growth.”81 Most importantly, it calculates this data for periods before 1950 and calculates GDP per capita during wartime.82 This is important since eight of our cases began before 1950. The

Maddison Project also estimates yearly population size, which is especially important because population size serves as an indicator of the overall health of an economy.

Furthermore, using a single dataset creates a level of standardization when comparing each case study. Using the Maddison Project population size also acts as a supplement to help us better understand the level of destruction to and health of a state’s economy. A state that has experienced high levels of population decline due to war and occupation can no longer muster the human capital to grow its economy. As such, a decline in GDP per capita and population in the first year of the occupation and the preceding years before it began indicates that the occupier has levied high levels of economic destruction on the occupied state.

80 Maddison Database: Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10. Pg.2. 81 IBID. 82 There are some exceptions including Korea and Kosovo.

38 Qualitative data will be used to help inform and code each case study, as quantitative data does not always paint a complete picture. Qualitative data, for example, helps us understand how the occupier contributed to the economic destruction. As with every condition, each is assigned a score of 1, .8, .6, .4, .2 or 0. Scores 1-.8 have high levels of economic destruction, and that economic destruction was almost entirely created by the occupier. For example, Germany has a high score of 1, meaning it saw a steep decline in GDP per capita and loss of population.83

Furthermore, that economic destruction was created by the Allied occupation forces, which used sweeping military force to destroy Germany and its economy.84 Scores with a .6 or .4 have medium to high levels of economic destruction, but the occupying power had a limited contribution to that destruction. Coded as a .6, Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia serves as an example of this. Cambodia had stagnated economic growth (growing some years and falling others) in the lead up to the occupation and during the first two years of the occupation. This was coupled with Cambodia having a massive decline in population.85 However, Vietnam played a limited role in this economic destruction. Instead, the genocide of the Pol Pot regime was the main factor behind the economic struggles and population decline. Occupations with a score of

.4 have medium economic destruction, with the occupier contributing almost no military force to influence the economic score. For example, Korea was largely untouched by WWII. Instead,

Korea’s economic struggles came from US and Soviet agreements to divide the peninsula in

83 Database: Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10 84 For a complete history of the Allied Air Campaign (which was only part of the military expedition) see: Hanson, Randall. Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942-45. New York: Dutton Caliber, 2009. 85 Maddison Database. Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10 For a more detailed analysis see the Cambodia section on economic destruction.

39 1945. This division entailed no military force, but it did damage the Korean economy.86 0-.2 means the territory had little to no economic damage before the occupation began. It should be noted that no case studies were coded as 0-.2.

ISF Scores

When coding an ISF, it’s important to view their capability and capacity to maintain internal and external security over an extended period of time. If this project were to analyze an

ISF 18 months after an occupation began, we would likely see weak ISF in almost every case.

This is because ISF are damaged, destroyed, or even disbanded once an occupying force moves in, meaning that many ISF are built from scratch. Thus it would be unfair to label an ISF weak if they have been given a limited time to develop.

It’s also important not to give ISF an indefinite time period to develop before coding them. To paraphrase what a colleague once said (paraphrasing) about assessing a train-and-equip program designed to build a foreign nation’s forces, “we should not always be in year two of the rest of our lives” when determining if the program is working. This means to say that it should not take fifty years to make an assessment. As such, scores will be assigned looking at data from a five to ten year window after the occupation began. This five to ten year window is long enough to ensure that all ISF have been given enough time to develop. It is also short enough to see if ISF are standing on their own or if the presence of the occupier is masking ISF deficiencies.

A score of 1 is the best possible score ISF can receive. A score of 1 means the occupied state has ISF (military and police) which secure a monopoly on violence throughout the occupied territory. ISF ensures internal and external security on their own. They are relatively free of

86 See Korean economic destruction section.

40 corruption and under state control. They have been tested and can (or have) put down revolts with no assistance from the occupying power. Scores of a .8 are considered good. These mean the ISF are largely capable of standing on their own. ISF can ensure internal and external security on their own. They receive large sums of training and equipment from the occupier but are capable of deterring internal and external threats on their own. They are under state control.

They maintain a monopoly of violence over most of the territory. A score of .6 means ISF are efficient or untested. Scoring a .6 means ISF are capable of securing internal or external security

(sometimes both) with large amounts of military assistance from the occupier. Sometimes this assistance comes in the form of an occupier’s presence, i.e. if the occupier and ISF conduct joint patrols and operations together. These ISF may engage in limited exploitation of the local population. Additionally, the occupier’s continued presence may have deterred any actors from testing the ISF’s true capabilities.

Scores of .4 are considered weak, and .4 is also the cutoff at which we consider ISF serviceable by any standards. ISF forces receiving a .4 have a mixed record of securing internal and external security. They need substantial assistance from the occupier in putting down internal revolts. External security is guaranteed by the presence of the occupying force. In many cases ISF have struggled to put down revolts. ISF may be partisan and loyalty to the state is not certain. Scores of .2 means the ISF is considered very weak. The occupied state’s ISF cannot maintain a monopoly of violence or the occupier has made little attempt at building an ISF.

Internal and external security is maintained by the occupying power. The ISF needs large amounts of assistance from the occupying force to function. Oftentimes the ISF exploit the local population and are seen as highly partisan. The state has a difficult time in asserting total control over their function. A score of 0 means the occupier has made no attempt to build or rebuild ISF.

41 Occupation Size87

For this condition we are concerned with the ratio of occupation troops to the estimated population size (troop:population). Sizes of an occupation force matter, as they can affect the occupier’s ability to implement and maintain security. Since one of the underlying goals of any occupation is to prevent the territory from becoming a threat or destabilizing factor, the first step in accomplishing this is to provide security. This often falls upon the occupier “since the local institutions necessary to provide this security are often lacking” or destroyed during pre- occupation conflict.88

The size of the occupation force often indicates how assertive or passive these forces are at maintaining security. A larger footprint indicates the occupier is heavily involved in trying to establish security, while a small footprint indicates the inverse (or that there are few internal security threats). Force size does not assume effectiveness, as an ineffective and overly intrusive force could stir up nationalist feelings.89 Furthermore, a large security force engaging in nation building may be overly ambitious. However, these security forces may still be able to succeed in state building by at least imposing the rule of law.90 Hence, a large security force could be able to prevent the emergence of a power vacuum from developing.

87 Note about numbers: Troop numbers and population data are at times difficult to ascertain, since both change over the course of an occupation. Therefore, these are rough estimates. All troop numbers were lifted from Edelstein’s database on occupations, with the exception of Afghanistan (since Afghanistan had a notable uptick in troops after the dataset was published). All population data after 1960 is from the World Bank Datasets. Population data before 1960 is from government documents, academic analysis papers, and census data. In many cases, varying estimates were found. In these cases, the author has highlighted and identified different population estimates in the footnotes sections (in an effort to be transparent). In the main body of research the author identifies which estimate they used for the troop to population calculations. 88 Edelstein, David M. “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar State building.” In The Dilemmas of State building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, edited by Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk. London: Routledge, 2009. Pg. 81. 89 IBID.; Pg. 90. 90 Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2003. Pg. 363.

42 When calculating this variable, this project drew on several sources to establish troop size and population size. Unless indicated otherwise, occupation force size was drawn from the numbers indicated in Edelstein’s International Security article and book. This was done in an effort to help standardize the data being collected, since it is difficult to determine the exact number of troops used during occupations. This is due to the fact that troop numbers often fluctuate over time and exact numbers (for more recent occupations) are often classified. The population size for occupations after 1960 (the first year publically available) were determined using data compiled by the World Bank. Years before 1960 were calculated using declassified government documents and academic articles that assessed a state’s population during the years of the occupation. Population data for post-WWII occupations are often rough estimates, as the war created an inordinate number of displaced persons.

Determining Troop:Population Scores

While assigning each variable a score is relatively straightforward, determining what actually constitutes a score of one or zero (or any of the numbers in-between) is more complicated. This is because there is a wide variety of ideas about what constitutes an appropriate troop:population ratio.

Score Ratio

1 50:1000

.8 40:1000

.6 30:1000

.4 20:1000

.2 10:1000

0 Less the 1:1000

43 A 1995 study suggests a variety of troop numbers based on population density, ability of the occupier to sustain prolonged deployments, and terrain.91 The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual suggests 20:1000 as the minimum force needed to pacify a population.92 Other publications suggest that force size must be dictated by insurgency size.93 However, using this metric assumes that every occupation coincides with an insurgency. As a result, we will use 50:1000 (1:20) as the upper range of the variable. This number is derived from a US Department of Defense study that sought to give senior leadership a “rough idea of the capabilities and limitations of the programmed ground force structure to conduct stability operations in a broad range of countries.”94 The study found that 40-50:1000 ranges gave a probability of success at 83%.95 Therefore, any occupation with a 50:1000 (1:20) or greater will be assigned a score of 1. From here, we will decrease the troop size by 10 for every ratio interval. Insurgency

An insurgency is a “protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives.”96 This condition describes if an insurgency developed during the occupation. An insurgency is a more specific version of Edelstein’s internal threat condition. However, an insurgency is easier to diagnose, and signals that the internal threat is violent.

A score of .2 means that the insurgency is almost non-existent. Crime may be prevalent for a time, but organized violent resistance never develops. A .4 means that an insurgency exists, but it is limited and weak in nature. Organized resistance exists, but it cannot or chooses not to inflict widespread violence on the occupier. .6 means a viable insurgency existed at some point during the occupation, but its effectiveness was eventually curtailed. Organized resistance has seriously challenged the occupier’s ability to maintain peace and security. However, over time,

91 Quinlivan, James T. "Force Requirements in Stability Operations." Parameters 23, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 59-69. 92 Goode, Steven M. "A Historical Basis for Force Requirements in Counterinsurgency." Parameters 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 45-57. Pg. 46. 93 Thiel, Joshua. "COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges." Small Wars Journal. Last modified January 15, 2011. Accessed October 5, 2019. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-manpower- ratios- debunking-the-10-to-1-ratio-and-surges 94 Kneece, R. Royce, David A. Adesnik, Jason A. Dechant, Michael F. Fitzsimmons, and Mark E. Tillman. Force Sizing for Stability Operations Main Report. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 2010. Pg. iii. 95 IBID.; Pg. 4. The study determined success as a win or indecisive if the COIN force was able to prevent a military win for the insurgency. 96 Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Pg. 2.

44 the insurgency has beens eliminated through coercion or it being co-opted. Insurgencies receiving a .8 are robust, diverse, and never fully eliminated. They actively challenge the occupier and control wide swaths of territory. They are not always monolithic in nature, but the insurgent group(s) maintain the same goal of evicting the occupier and the newly formed government from the territory. An insurgency movement receiving a 1 means the insurgency encompasses all the factors listed in the .8 score, but the insurgency is able to evict the occupier.

Furthermore, the government or other actors the occupier has put into power are forced out once the occupier withdraws.

Power Vacuum

Chapter 2 defined and expanded upon what a power vacuum is, so using that as a guide, we can define the ratios that are assigned to this condition. A .2 means that a power vacuum does not occur on any notable level during the occupation or after it ends. Non-state actors may exist, but they do not control any sections of territory; nor are they able to threaten the occupation forces. The territory never becomes a source of instability to the region or its neighbors. A .4 score means a power vacuum does occur during the course of the occupation but not after the occupation ends. The power vacuum is also limited to a minority of the occupied territory, and once the occupation ends, the territory is not a source of instability for the former occupier, neighboring states, or the region. A score of .6 means a power vacuum does occur after the occupation begins. The state and the occupier are the strongest actors in the occupied territory.

However, at times, their power becomes displaced throughout large sections of territory. The territory serves as a constant source of instability for the region while the occupation is going on.

A case study that receives a power vacuum score of .8 means that a power vacuum develops either during or after the occupation ends, and the state is never able to mobilize the

45 necessary resources to withstand it. The state that was put into place by the occupier still exists, but it exists on life support from the former occupier. It maintains notional control over much of its territory, while multiple other actors (state and non-state) compete for control over other large sections of territory. Both during and after the occupation has ended, the territory serves as a constant source of instability. A perfect score of 1 means that a power vacuum occurs and completely displaces the occupier and the state the occupier put into place (if the occupier even tried to put one in place). Once this displacement happens, no single actor is able to control the territory for at least five years. While occupation is going on and after it ends, the territory serves as a source of instability for the former occupier, its neighbors, and the region.

46

CHAPTER 6: Conditions Justification Coding The Data

The Conditions Justification chapter codes each individual condition for each individual case. Each case score is accompanied with an in-depth justification, which details why each individual condition received a certain score. Presenting the evidence in this manner allows the reader to understand the circumstances surrounding each case. In essence, this section presents all of the evidence up front to the reader, while simultaneously demonstrating that total destruction equals total buy-in.

Italy ISF Rating: .4 Post-Fascist security forces were weak in Italy. The armed forces lacked sufficient morale, equipment, and training. This was made worse by the fact that they were widely unpopular among the Italian population. Rebuilding these forces was made more difficult by the fact that American and British officials disagreed over the ways and means to rebuild Italian security forces.

Italian armed forces were seen as less legitimate and less capable than partisan groups operating inside of Italy at the time. In fact, different sects of the local population saw many partisans as an “experienced and highly capable alternative” to the state's security forces.97 The strength of the partisans served to undermine the rebuilding and rebranding of the Italian state, as many of the strongest and better-organized partisan forces were communist. This caused the

97 Miller, James E. The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. Pg. 143.

47 Allies to fear that Italy could move into the communist camp.98 These fears were supplemented by communist Yugoslavia’s brinkmanship with Allied Forces along the Italian-Yugoslav border.99 Here, Yugoslavian forces constantly threatened to invade parts of northern Italy.

Rebuilding Italy’s armed forces initially fell to Great Britain. This task was nearly impossible from the beginning, as neither Britain nor Italy had the financial resources to build effective security forces. Although victorious, Britain had seen her coffers drained by the war, while Italy was beset by economic ruin and sporadic violence even after the war ended.100 By mid-1946, three years after the occupation began, Italian security forces were so ineffective they could not deter partisan groups from stirring up strikes and violence. The ineptitude of Italian security forces reached a peak when a crowd of twenty to thirty thousand stormed the Interior

Ministry in Rome. In response, “police fired on the mob, killing 2 and wounding 119.”101

Security force weakness was made worse by the fact that Italian Foreign Minister Count Carlo

Sforza rejected proposed British missions to aid in the reconstruction of Italian police forces.102

Eventually the US would take over Italian military assistance and aid programs. Unlike

Britain, who sought to train and equip Italian armed forces in a manner that kept them within the scope of the post-war peace treaty, the US had no qualms about violating the treaty. It encouraged Italy to buy and sell military equipment that openly subverted the peace treaty.103

This “Anglo-American” policy split allowed the US to increase its influence in Italy, while simultaneously precipitating a decline in British influence. Despite this increased US involvement, Italian armed forces would remain weak for years, including when the US signed a

98 Pedaliu, Effie. "Britain and the Reconstruction of the Post-Fascist Italian Armed Forces 1943-48." Cold War History 2, no. 1 (October 2001): 39-68. Pg. 44. 99 IBID.; Pg. 44-45. 100 Miller, 1986. Pg. 192. 101 IBID 102 Pedaliu, 2001. Pg. 54. 103 IBID.; Pg. 57.

48 mutual defense agreement with Italy in 1949, when Italy became an original member of NATO.

A 1947 CIA report most adequately summarizes the state of Italian security forces, describing them as loyal and generally anti-communist, but “incapable of major military operations…would be hard pressed if required simultaneously to defend the frontier and suppress internal insurrection.”104The Italian armed forces would remain under the tight control and advisement of the US until the 1970s.105

Insurgency Rating: .4

The insurgency in Italy was limited and weak in nature. Different partisan groups remained heavily armed during much of the occupation. Communist partisans led by the PCI were routinely able to undermine the newly established Alcide De Gasperi Italian government.

However, much of the internal agitation came in the form of strikes and riots rather than a robust insurgency.

In the early stages of the occupation, Italian anti-fascist partisan groups not only actively assisted Allied efforts to weed out German and Fascist resistance, but also controlled large swaths of territory.106 Although working with Allied forces, these groups exercised a large degree of independence, often ignoring Allied directions to satisfy their own political objectives.

This included ignoring Allied demands to turn over prisoners to the American Military

Government. Partisan groups ignored these demands (among others) and carried out summary

104 CIA, The Current Situation in Italy, National Intelligence Estimates. DOC_0000009589, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1947, Pg. 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000009589.pdf. (Accessed October 28, 2019). 105 Pedaliu, 2001. Pg. 58. 106 Office of Strategic Services, Political Results of the Liberation of North Italy, Current Intelligence Study Number 18. 0000709789, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1945. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000709789. (Accessed September 28, 2019).

49 executions of prisoners on a wide scale (including the hanging of Mussolini).107 This was made worse by the fact that the communist groups were the largest and most organized.108

Despite early efforts to demilitarize partisan groups, many of them simply ignored Allied calls, leaving many former partisan groups still highly armed and capable.109 Proof of this came from the early sporadic violence against occupation.110 The strength of the communist partisans gave rise to Western fears that the communists were planning a “coup d’etat.”111 Armed partisans retreated to the hills in 1946 to protest government policies, and massive riots in

October 1946 seemed to confirm the growing influence of communist agitation (both of which

Italian security forces proved incapable of dealing with).112 However, this would be the height of violence within Italy.

Communist failures to use all-out violence to move Italy into their camp were largely for lack of effort, not because of the lack of strength of Italian security forces. Italian communist leaders like Palmiro Togliatti had seen the devastation of the Spanish Civil war firsthand, making them reluctant to use widespread violence to achieve their political goals.113 Furthermore, Allied actions in Greece against communist forces and open threats towards Yugoslavia to not intervene in Italy served as a warning that the British and American occupiers would use force to deter communist threats.114

Occupation Size Rating: .4

107 IBID. 108 IBID. 109 Miller 1986. Pg. 139-140. 110 Pedaliu, Effie. "Britian and the Reconstruction of the Post-Fascist Italian Armed Forces 1943-48." Cold War History 2, no. 1 (October 2001): 39-68. Pg. 44. 111 IBID. 112 Miller, 1986. Pg. 192. 113 Pedaliu, 2001 Pg.44. 114 Pedaliu, 2001.Pg. 44.

50 Over 100,000 troops occupied a population of 45 million, equating to a ratio of 1:45.115

Economic Destruction Rating: .8

Italy suffered from widespread destruction. Its real GDP per capita saw a steady downturn after 1939, which would remain in decline until 1946.116 Italy’s population growth would remain relatively stagnant throughout much of the war and the early years of the occupation. The war sapped most of Italy’s capital and foreign currency, making rebuilding the country’s infrastructure and resuming foreign trade a near impossible task.117 Italy’s death count of 457,000, although high, was relatively small compared to Italy’s Axis counterparts Germany and Japan.118

Power Vacuum Rating: .2 A very limited contingency impeded the state’s ability to exercise power over its sovereignty. Partisan groups remained strong for a time but never really fought to displace the

Italian government or seriously challenge occupation authorities. Although it appeared as though communist groups could have posed a serious challenge to the state during the early years of the occupation, this never came to fruition.

West Germany ISF Rating: .4

115 CIA, Estimated Population of The Sino-Soviet Bloc and NATO Countries Selected Years, 1938-75, Redacted, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1961. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP81S00999R000100190001-4.pdf (accessed October 28, 2019). 116 Maddison Database 2018. 117 Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002. Pg. 162. 118 Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II." The National WWII Museum. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research- starters-worldwide- deaths-world-war.

51 West German security forces were weak. Fears about rearmament, shared by American and Western European leaders, kept Germany from building effective security forces during much of the occupation. This meant that the French, British, and American occupiers guaranteed internal and external security.

Allied fears about rearming Germany were not isolated to the rebuilding of the German

Army. Even local police forces were neutered, evidenced by the fact that they were not allowed to carry firearms until 1947.119 The absence of a fully functioning police force meant occupation forces “investigated and resolved many cases themselves.”120 Furthermore, for much of the occupation, Germany had no federal police force to speak of, and local police forces could not have withstood a major crisis as they lacked the organization and equipment to do so.121 Allied determination to prevent a strong, centralized West German police force from being established stemmed from lessons learned after WWI, “when Germany was authorized to train one hundred thousand soldiers, principally for maintaining order locally in Germany.”122 President Harry

Truman himself believed that these hundred thousand served as the catalyst for revanchist Nazi

Germany.123 He penned memos to the Secretary of State, warning that “that hundred thousand

119Knowles, Christopher. WINNING THE PEACE: THE BRITISH IN OCCUPIED GERMANY, 1945-1948. London: PhD Thesis Kings College, 2014. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/33449326/2014_Knowles_Christopher_1069327_ethesis.pdf. Pg. 174 120 IBID.; Pg. 240. 121 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV; “The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State;” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 862A.511/5–450: Telegram. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d363 122 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV; “Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State;” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1: NSC 71 Series. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d367 123 IBID.

52 was used for the basis of training the greatest war machine that ever came forth in European history.”124

Insurgency Rating: .2

The German population remained largely passive towards the Allied occupation. German resistance during the occupation was largely placated by the presence of Allied forces and the large toll the war had taken on the German population.

Allied occupation planners had anticipated a German resistance during the occupation.125

American soldiers were even discouraged from interacting with the civilian population.126

Despite initial beliefs, German soldiers and civilians showed signs that they would not fanatically contest a Western Occupation. In many cases, only two or three American soldiers were needed to guard hundreds of captured German soldiers.127

Violent crime, social disorder, and a burgeoning black market was pervasive in the early stages of the occupation.128 However, civilian criminality and crime by the American occupation forces was rapidly brought under control by the new Allied military government.129 By July

1945, General Clay (head of the American occupation in Germany) reported that “‘German masses seem totally unpolitical, apathetic and primarily concerned with everyday problems of food, clothing and shelter. … There is no evidence of an attempt to organize a Nazi

124 IBID. 125 Dobbins, James, and John G. McGinn. America's Role In Nation-Building. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. Pg. 4. 126 Davidson, Eugene. The Death & Life of Germany: an account of the American occupation. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999. Pg. 49. 127 IBID. 128 Kehoe, Thomas. "Control, Disempowerment, Fear, and Fantasy: Violent Criminality During the Early American Occupation of Germany, March-July 1945." Australian Journal of Politics and History 62, no. 4 (December 2016): 561-75. Pg. 562. 129 For a complete history of civilian criminality and American military abuses see: Kehoe, Thomas. "Control, Disempowerment, Fear, and Fantasy: Violent Criminality During the Early American Occupation of Germany, March-July 1945." Australian Journal of Politics and History 62, no. 4 (December 2016): 561-75.

53 underground.’”130Allied occupation efforts were aided by German fears of an external Soviet threat. In the East, Soviet occupiers imposed a brutal occupation, engaging in an estimated 1.9 million rapes. Furthermore, the Soviet occupation was far less effective at bringing everyday stability to the East.131 As one American official described the situation, “The German hatred of the Soviets and Communism and fear of their power provide a basis for cooperation with the west.”132 As a result, predictions of a SS-led insurgency turned out to be largely false.133

Occupation Size Rating: 0

400,000 forces occupied and controlled a West German population of 50,003,000 (1950).134 This equated to a troop to population ratio of 1:125.

Economic Destruction Rating: 1

Germany was suffering from massive economic destruction by the start of the occupation in 1945. The country suffered from a refugee crisis, massive food shortages, and a collapsed economy.135 Germany’s GDP per capita was in free fall by 1945, and by 1946 the GDP per capita had fallen to its lowest level since 1886.136 Although Germany was not subject to nuclear

130 Hudson, Walter M. Army Diplomacy: American Military Occupation and Foreign Policy after World War II. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2015. Pg. 179. 131 Kehoe. Pg. 574. 132 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV; “Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Deputy Director of Policy Planning Staff (Butler);” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 762A.5/3–950. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d359 133 Hudson. Pg. 180. 134 CIA, The Effects of Migrations into and Out of East Germany on the Labor Situations in East and West Germany, Economic Intelligence Report. CIA-RDP79R01141A000300030001-3, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1954. Pg. 41. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP79R01141A000300030001-3.pdf (Accessed October 16, 2019). 135 Dobbins 2003. Pg. 6 136 Maddison Database 2018. Maddison Project Database, version 2018. Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2018), “Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”, Maddison Project Working paper 10

54 attacks like Japan, it was partitioned by the Allied powers, leading to further economic destruction. This was supplemented by the decline in the German population, which began in

1943 and continued until 1947. Germany also suffered from an estimated 6-8 million war deaths.137

Power Vacuum Rating: .2

No serious contingency impeded the newly formed West German state or the Allied occupier’s ability to exercise systemic power over West German sovereignty. Communist agitators were never able to move beyond disruptive strikes and riots, while rumors of Nazi

“Werewolf” resistance was more myth then substance. The organization was small and collapsed soon after the war ended, with the group’s leader Hans-Adolf Prutzmann committing suicide.

The remaining die-hard members faded into obscurity.138

East Austria ISF Rating: .2

The Soviets had limited to no involvement in building Austria’s security forces. Much of this was because of the independent nature of the Austrian central government. Instead, the

Soviets viewed Austrian security forces as an obstacle to communist domination of Austria’s political system. As a result, the Soviets spent most of their efforts trying to frustrate and undermine Austria’s Western-backed internal security forces.139

137 Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II." The National WWII Museum. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters- worldwide-deaths-world-war. 138 Mowzer, Mark. Hitlers Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe. New York: Penguin Books, 2008. Pg. 546. 139 Bader, William B. Austria between East and West: 1945-1955. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1966

55 At the start of the occupation, the Soviet Union believed that controlling Austria’s security forces would be an effective way to assert communist influence within the Austrian government.140 However, by 1947 it became clear that the Soviets had lost all control over real positions of power within Austria’s internal security system.141 Initially, the British were the driving force behind building a centralized Viennese police force “whose officers were to act across the city, irrespective of the Allied Zone to which they were appointed.”142 In addition to losing key posts (which were once filled by communists), the Soviets realized that Western security forces were attempting to militarize Austria’s internal security forces. In doing this,

Western occupation forces were trying to build an independent Austrian security force that could withstand an offensive operation by the Soviet Union in the event that the Soviets decided to permanently partition the county.143

In response to this, the Soviets focused on weakening Austria’s internal security forces.144

This included dismissing Austrian police officials that operated within the Soviet Occupation zone, lobbying against arming Austrian police, and even creating an armed communist group

(known as the Werkschutz) to be used to guard Russian-controlled industries within Austria.145

146 Instead of helping to maintain order, the well-armed Werkschutz actively undermined

Pg. 98-99. 140 IBID.; Pg.77. 141 IBID.; 98. 142 "The Real Third Man: Policing Postwar Vienna." History Today 69, no. 2 (February 2019): 40-53. Pg. 52. 143 Kurth, Audrey E. The Great Powers and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955. Ph Thesis. DOxford: University of Oxford, 1984. Pg. 106. 144 Bader, 1966. Pg. 98. 145 IBID. 146 Kurth, Audrey. Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pg. 110.

56 Austrian state-sponsored internal security forces, and many believed they would be used in an attempted coup.147

Insurgency Rating: 0

There was no insurgency against the Soviet’s sphere of occupation in Eastern Austria.

Austria had elected an independent government in 1945, where communists and right wing extremists fared poorly. Most of the crimes in Eastern Austria were not committed by right wing extremists, displaced persons, or remnants of the German Army. Instead, the Soviet soldiers themselves committed widespread crimes against the Austrian population.148

Occupation Size Rating: 1

The Soviets had a force size of 200,000, while Austria had an estimated population size of 1.7 million.149 This equates to a ratio of 1:17.

Economic Destruction Rating: .8

Austria suffered from large-scale devastation by the end of WWII. Austria suffered a similar fate as Germany, with the per-capita GDP suddenly falling off a cliff in 1945.150 Part of this was due to the fact that Nazi Germany had totally integrated the Austrian economy into

Germany’s.151 By 1945, the average calorie intake for an Austrian living in Vienna was 600,

147 IBID.; 101. 148 Hudson 2015. Pg. 216-217. 149 Hillhouse, Raelynn J. "A Reevaluation of Soviet Policy in Central Europe: The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria." Eastern Europen Politics and Societies 3, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 83-104. Pg.85. 150 Maddison Database 2018. 151 Bader, 1966. Pg. 158.

57 “well below the necessary minimal human requirement.” 152 Austria’s population growth remained relatively flat as a result of the war and during the occupation.153 Austria also had a refugee problem, but suffered from a much smaller number of total war deaths (384,700) than neighboring Germany or any of the Allied powers that would occupy her.154

Power Vacuum Rating: .2

Austria was a unified state, which had occupying Armies in the East and West. Upon the withdrawal of occupation forces, both Soviet and American, no power vacuum developed.155

West Austria ISF Rating: .4

Austria’s security forces were weak during the US, UK, and French occupation of

Western Austria. The Western Allies sought to train internal security forces that could prevent internal communist subversion and hold off an external Soviet invasion. However, Austria’s ability to deter these two threats was largely due to the presence of Western occupation forces, which remained until both Western and Soviet forces agreed to withdraw from a non-aligned

Austria in 1955.

The prospect of a communist coup and the poor state of public safety left Austria in need of a “protective military force.”156 However, Soviet objections to building one made this a difficult task. Western forces began secretly training Austrian security forces at a rate of two

152 IBID. 153 Maddison Database, 2018. 154 Research Starters: Worldwide Deaths in World War II." The National WWII Museum. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters- worldwide-deaths-world-war. 155 See Western Austria section for a more complete explanation. 156 Carafano, James. Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002. Pg. 179.

58 hundred per week; US forces would do most of the training and equipping during the occupation.

157 158 Despite these efforts, the US did not believe Austrian forces could undertake any major operations on their own. Despite five years of occupation, by 1950, the US was still convinced that only a multi-level occupation could support and sustain an independent government in

Austria, thus preventing the Soviets from taking over or partitioning the country.159 Austrian security forces could handle minor internal disorders, but major internal uprisings proved another matter.160 The 1950 Austrian general strikes, organized by local communists, highlighted the

“lack of effectiveness of Austrian police.”161 Austrian security forces struggled to bring the unrest under control, even telling the US that it may need to intervene.

As a result, the deterrence of internal communist threats and prevention of the Soviets partitioning the country was largely a product of American determination to not let either happen. The US believed that a premature withdrawal of Western occupation forces would precipitate a power vacuum, in which Austrian communists supported by the Soviet Union would attempt to take power.162 163 164 Furthermore, Austria’s geo-strategic importance to Europe

157 IBID.; 180. 158 IBID.; Pg.183. This would fall under the America’s Mutual Defense Assistance Program. 159 Foregin Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Volume IV; “Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay);” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 38 Series. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d192 160 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III; “The Minister n Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State;” S. Everett Gleason, Fredrick Aandahl and Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 863.20/2–749. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v03/d620 161 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Volume IV; “The Charge in Austria (Dowling) to the Secretary of State;” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 863.062/10–150: Telegram https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d202 162 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume III; “The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers;” S. Everett Gleason, Fredrick Aandahl and Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 740.00119 Control (Austria)/6–1649: Telegram. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v03/d626

59 meant US officials were prepared to use direct military force to prevent any part of Austria from becoming a communist bloc state.165

Insurgency Rating: .2

Like Germany, Austria lacked an effective police force, yet had no real insurgency. A general strike in 1950 was spurred on by communist agitators, but never led to a sustained widespread campaign of violence.

The presence of Allied forces helped deter Soviet incursions into Western Austria, while simultaneously preserving Vienna’s independent government. Although Austria lacked a strong internal security apparatus, this did not benefit communist groups operating inside of Austria.

Communist groups inside of Austria suffered from a lack of legitimacy brought about Soviet rapes, murders, and the removal of Austrian industrial plants during the Soviet Occupation.166

Evidence of this was demonstrated by the 1945 elections in Austria, where the Austrian communist party only gained 5.42%of the popular vote.167 Extremist parties on the right

163 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Volume IV; “The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Keyes) to the Department of the Army:” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 703.00/10–450: Telegram. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d203 164 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Volume IV, “Directive for he United States High Commissioner for Austria,” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), Vienna Post Files: Lot 55 F 125: 320–US Policy. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d208 165 There was a consensus within the US government that Austria was so important that containment rested on largely on the military element. George F. Kennon, who had become critical of the Truman Doctrine’s overt focus on military content, believed that Austria, was one of the few “isolated spots” in which the “accent of containment rested on the military element.” Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards. The First Cold Warrior : Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism. The University Press of Kentucky, 2006. Pg.114. 166 Mueller, Wolfgang. "Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War, 1938–53/55." Cold War History 6, no. 1 (February 2006): 63-84. Pg. 68. 167 IBID.

60 (composed of pan-German Nationalists) also routinely struggled during elections, failing to find any widespread popular support.168

The 1947 food riots and a general strike in 1950 highlighted Soviet assistance to local

Austrian communist agitators.169 However, these would prove to be the high point of internal disturbance. Combined with the unpopularity of the Soviets, Allied determination to keep the

Austrian government independent and the country free from partition ensured that transforming

Austria into a “people’s republic” was all but impossible after 1945.170

Occupation Size Rating: .2

100,000 forces occupied approximately 5.2 million Austrians, giving the occupation a ratio of 1:52.171

Economic Destruction Rating: .4

Austria was not divided until after the end of WWII. As a result, the economic destruction levied on Austria is coded the same in both the East and West.

Dependent Variable: Did a Power Vacuum Develop? Rating: .2

168 CIA, Outlook for an Independent Austria. National Intelligence Estimate Numbers 25-55. CIA- RDP79R01012A005500030004-6, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1955. Pg. 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp98-00979r000200730001-9

169 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, Volume IV; “The Charge in Austria (Dowling) to the Secretary of State;” eds. Fredrick Aandahl and William Z. Slany (Washington: Government Printing Office, ebook generated 2018), 863.062/10–150: Telegram https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v04/d202 170 Mueller 2006. Pg. 72. 171 CIA estimates put the total population of Austria in 1951 (most accurate census data available) at 6,933,900. Estimates in the Soviet zone put the population of Austrian’s under Soviet occupation at 1.7, meaning US, UK, and French occupiers controlled roughly 5,233,900 people. CIA, Austria-Landscape, Economy, and Population Location, Boundaries, Size, General CIA Records. CIA-RDP81- 01043R001400130003-5, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1957. Pg. 318. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81-01043R001400130003-5.pdf. (Accessed September 28, 2019).

61 Similar to West Germany, Western Austria experienced riots and communist agitations.

Despite a large Soviet force occupying Eastern Austria, it never became large enough to impede the new Austrian government or the Western Allied occupier’s ability to exercise systemic power over Austria. After voters rejected communism, the Soviets withdrew from the country, choosing to leave Austria independent rather than fighting to partition it. The Allied government also withdrew, and the Austrian government remained in power. Despite the aforementioned rioting in 1947 and 1950, the Austrian government maintained sovereignty over its territory. As a result, no power vacuum developed in Austria.

Japan ISF Rating: .6

Japan’s ISF were effective at maintaining internal security. Although article nine of the

Japanese constitution demilitarized the state, Japanese police forces were largely effective at suppressing any potential internal threats. External security was assured by a close alliance with the US and US bases located within Japan.

Early on in the occupation, Japan suffered massive food shortages, unemployment, and crime. Coupled with large amounts of unemployed soldiers, this gave rise to wide-reaching black markets, bloody gang wars, and a drug epidemic.172 Furthermore, one of the first steps US occupiers took was to weaken the control of Japan’s internal security forces over daily Japanese life. This was done by abolishing secret police and destroying the military gendarmerie.173

However, by 1952 Japan’s police size was drastically expanded from what it had been before the

172 Kingston, Jeff. Contemporary Japan: History, Politics, and Social Change since the 1980s. Malden, MA: Wiley- Blackwell, 2011. Pg. 6 173 Wildes, Harry E. "The Postwar Japanese Police." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 43, no. 5 (1953): 655- 71. Pg. 655.

62 war, and174 the creation of the National Police Reserve (NPR) helped strengthen Japanese security forces.175

Because Japan’s external security was maintained by the US, Japan’s security forces were largely concerned with internal communist forces. Internal Japanese security forces proved more than capable dealing with internal threats, helping to restore order during strikes and riots.176

Insurgency Rating: .2

Japan suffered from limited internal disorder during the US occupation. Crime and a rampant black market did plague Japan for a time after the US occupation began, but this was largely fueled by food shortages. Communist sympathizers were numerous, numbering as high as

150,000 in 1949. However, their scope and impact was limited.

The fierce fighting on Okinawa and Iwo Jima fed fears that a resistance movement would plague the US occupation.177 Instead, the early months of occupation suffered from crimes related to humanitarian issues like food and medicine shortages, not resistance to US occupiers.

Eventually, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and its “military policy” became the premier internal threat to Japan and served as a catalyst for the creation of the NRA. 178 179 Under

174 IBID.; Pg. 656. 175 Douglas MacArthur told the Senate special investigation panel that the NPR could be excellent ground troops. IBID.; Pg. 666. 176 Jenkins, Phillip. "Policing the Cold War: The Emergence of New Police Structures in Europe 1946-1953." The Historical Journa 31, no. 1 (March 1988): 141-157. Pg. 153. 177 Willard-Foster, Melissa. "Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany and Japan." Journal of Interdisciplinary History XL, no. I (June 2009): 33-56. Pg. 37. 178 French, Thomas. National Police Reserve: The Origin of Japan's Self Defense Forces. Boston: Leiden: Brill, 2014. Pg. 41. 179 French’s book has a full history of the creation of the NRA and its use to combat communist threats in postwar Japan.

63 instructions from Moscow and Peking, the JCP organized a guerilla force in Japan “to train its members in subversive activities and terrorism.”180

However, these efforts failed dramatically, as the terrorist attacks actually undermined much of the popular support the JCP had gained during the 1949 elections (gaining 9.7% of the total vote and electing 35 members to the lower house of the Diet).181 Furthermore, the JCP was largely rendered inadequate by the effectiveness of the NRA, and electoral support and JCP membership shrank to 20,000 by 1955.182

Occupation Size Rating: 0

A force size of 450,000 occupying a population of approximately 78 million (1945) gives the US occupation a ratio of 1:173.183

Economic Destruction Rating: 1

Japan suffered from extreme devastation. Population growth severely slowed and even declined from 1944 to 1945.184 The war cost Japan three million people, “including 800,000 killed mostly by American carpet-bombing over almost all major cities and the two atomic attacks.”185 GDP per capita also fell, peaking in 1940 and declining at an exponential rate.186 By

1946, occupied Japan’s GDP per capita had fallen to a level not seen since 1915. American

180 Kim, Hong N. "Deradicalization of the Japanese Communist Party Under Kenji Miyamoto." World Politics 28, no. 2 (January 1976): 273-99. Pg. 275. 181 IBID. 182 IBID. 183 Population was estimated to be 78-million in 1945. By 1950 Japan’s population is estimated to be 84-million. Cole, Allen B. "Population Changes in Japan." Far Eastern Survey 15, no. 10 (May 22, 1946): 149-50. Pg. 149. Statistics Bureau of Japan. Statistical Handbook of Japan 2019. Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 2019. Pg. 10. 184 Maddison Database, 2018. 185 Beretta, Silvio, Axel Berkofsky, and Fabio Rugge, eds. Italy and Japan: How Similar are They? A Comparative Analysis of Politics, Economics, and International Relations. New York: Springer, 2014. Pg. 31 186 Maddison Database, 2018.

64 blockades and attacks contributed to this, as Japan lost its access to imported energy and material.187 In the end, Japan lost 25% of its total physical assets.188

Power Vacuum Rating: .2 The US occupation force and the newly formed Japanese government were always able to exercise systemic power and mobilize resources to prevent any contingency from impeding the state's authority. The JCP’s militancy policy was the only real threat that might have created a power vacuum, but Japan’s ISF were able to neutralize it without much US support.

The Ryukyus ISF Rating: .6 or .2

The Ryukyus ISF could be considered efficient or very weak.189 The occupation of the

Ryukyus Islands was unique, as the US always intended to give the islands back to Japan.

However, the legitimacy of this was undermined by the fact the US continued to occupy the islands well after the occupation of Japan had ended. Furthermore, the size of the US presence and the historically passive nature of the local population made building a strong ISF a low priority for the US occupiers.

The islands’ geo-strategic location resulted in the US maintaining almost total control until 1972. In 1952, Japan regained its independence and “‘residual sovereignty’” over the

Ryukyu Islands, but the US still retained administrative authority.190 This meant that all essential

187 Ohno, Kenichi. THE HISTORY OF JAPANESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: Origins of Private Dynamism and Policy Competence. New York: Routledge, 2018. Pg. 118 188 IBID. 189 During the fsQCA portion, the Ryukyu Islands were coded as .6. Unlike other cases, there is a large amount of ambiguity about the effectiveness of the ISF. This is largely because of the overriding size and strength of the occupied forces compared to the general population, meaning it’s very difficult to tell where the strength of the ISF begins and the strength of the occupying forces ends. 190 CIA, Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa). NONE LISTED. DOC_0000460178, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1960. Pg. 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000460178.pdf (accessed October 14, 2019).

65 powers still rested with the US Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). 191

American Military Police and local island police maintained security during the occupation.

During the initial phases of the occupation, petty larcenies from Army supply installations comprised most of the crime.192 By the end of the occupation, peaceful base protests and crimes by US military personnel constituted the only real disturbances.193

Insurgency Rating: 0

The Ryukyus Islands had no insurgency, but the often overbearing American presence led to large and usually peaceful protests. Many within the US military wanted to annex the islands, but this idea was eventually dismissed.194 The US maintained control over the islands because it maintained it was critical for the defense of Japan and for discouraging the “revival of military aggression on the part of Japan.”195 However, American military bases used a large amount of arable land on the island of Okinawa.196 This was just one of the few points of contention between the US and the occupied population. The height of discontent came in 1970, when a riot broke out that damaged an American-owned car and some US military property.197

198

Occupation Size Rating: .4

191 IBID 192 Fisch Jr., Arnold G. Military Government in The Ryukyu Islands 1945-1950. Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1988. Pg. 119. 193 AP. "Crimes by Marines on Okinawa Prompt Outcry." The New York Times, March 20, 1983. 194 Sarantakes, Nicholas. Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and US-Japanese Relations. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000. Pg. 26. 195 IBID.; Pg. 44. 196 CIA, Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa). NONE LISTED. DOC_0000460178, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1960. Pg. 4. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000460178.pdf (accessed October 14, 2019). 197 IBID.; Pg. 176. 198 UPI. "Rioting Okinawans Invade U.S. Base, Burn 80 Vehicles and a School." The New York Times, December 21, 1970.

66 US force size averaged 20,000, with an estimated population of 822,000.199 This gives a force-to- population ratio of 1:41.

Economic Destruction Rating: 1

The Ryukyus were part of Japan and not separated until after the occupation began. As a result, its high economic destruction is linked with and considered the same as Japan.200

Power Vacuum Rating: 0

The Islands had no power vacuum. Protests never impeded the occupation authorities’ ability to exercise systemic power over the Island’s sovereignty, and security forces were able to easily mobilize the necessary resources to quell the 1970 riot.

North Korea ISF Rating: .8

North Korea exerted a high level of internal and external security. When faced with internal opposition, North Korean forces were able to suppress it. Before the outbreak of formal war, South Korean forces routinely tested the defense of North Korea in border skirmishes.201

199 Population estimates after WWII vary between 800,000 and 900,000, as is evidenced by the CIA assessment of the Islands in 1958 and those of Joseph Ballantine (Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 1944-1945 and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1945-1947), putting the population at 822,000 and 917,000 respectively. CIA, Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa), OCB Briefing. CIA-RDP79R00890A000900060027-3, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1958. Pg. 2. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA- RDP79R00890A000900060027-3.pdf (accessed October 16, 2019). Ballantine, Joseph W. "The Future of the Ryukyus." Foreign Affairs 31, no. 4 (July 1953): 663-74. Pg. 669. 200 The Battle of Okinawa (which is part of the Ryukyus Islands) resulted in almost total destruction of the island’s economy and population, with 90,000 Japanese being killed and an estimated 150,000 Okinawan civilians being killed. "Iwo Jima and Okinawa: Death at Japan's Doorstep." National WWII Museum. Last modified July 10, 2017. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/iwo-jima-and-okinawa-death-japans-doorstep 201 Matray, James I. "Revisiting Korea Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War." Prologue Magazine 34, no. 2 (Summer 2002). Accessed September 20, 2019. https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/korean- myths- 1.html

67 However, North Korean military superiority was evidenced by the fact that they nearly pushed the South Korean Army off the peninsula in 1950.

Soviet occupation forces alienated many of the local Koreans by showing hostility towards religious groups and by plundering Korean factories.202 The power vacuum that was created after the Japanese capitulated caused communist and democratic parties to vie for power and influence in the North. The outbreak of student protests and violence in Sinauiju convinced the Soviets and North Korean communists that they had to crack down on internal dissent.203 The

North Korean regime would create a large internal security apparatus with “some twelve thousand regular policemen, a large number of ‘political thought police,’ and around five thousand secret police, the latter modeled on the Stalin-era NKVD.”204 A centralized police force was effective at making sure North Koreans conformed to the communist party line, as one of their main roles was to eliminate political opposition.205

The North Korean Army was far superior to the South Korean Army. It was better equipped for offensive operations and many of its soldiers had combat experience, as the North

Korean army was a merger of two anti-Japanese forces--one loyal to Kim Il Sun and another loyal to Kim Tu-Bong (leader of the Korean Volunteer Army or KVA). The KVA fought alongside Chinese communists during the Chinese civil war, essentially using the civil war as a training ground.206 As a result, “by 1949 when the Chinese civil war ended, tens of thousands of

202 Cathcart, Adam, and Charles Kraus. "Peripheral Influences: The Sinauiju Student Incidnet of 1945 and the Impact of Soviet Occupation in North Korea." The Journal of Korean Studies 13, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 1-27. Pg. 4 & 5. 203 IBID.; Pg17. 204 Armstrong, Charles K. The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. Pg. 207. 205 IBID. Pg. 206-210. 206 Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Pg. 411-414.

68 crack Korean troops were available to form the main shock units of the Korean People’s

Army.”207

Insurgency Rating: .2

North Korea had limited resistance, as Soviet forces and local communist groups were able to put down early revolts and neutralize groups that could cause internal disruptions.

Early on, Soviet occupiers cracked down on anti-communist nationalist groups, religion, and religious parties.208 Anti-communist student protests in November 1945 were put down by police and Soviet troops, who killed 23 and wounded 700.209 In 1946, Kim Il Sun would begin a series of party purges. This would include eliminating rival communists and nationalist rivals, even those who had been part of the communist-nationalist policy.210 Those opposed to Soviet plans, such as Cho Man-Sik, were labeled “reactionaries” and thus had to be purged from North

Korea.211

The “Ten-Point Program” was adopted in February 1946 to confiscate the lands of supposed Korean landholding elites.212 The program led to varying degrees of resistance throughout North Korea.213 This included terror attacks against Korean and Soviet leaders, coupled with student protests. However, by the spring of 1946, Soviet forces had managed to paralyze “the forces of reaction” and cripple the non-communist resistance.214

207 IBID. 208 Cathcart, Adam, and Charles Kraus. "Peripheral Influences: The Sinauiju Student Incident of 1945 and the Impact of Soviet Occupation in North Korea." The Journal of Korean Studies 13, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 1-27. Pg. 5. 209 Scalapino, Robert A., and Chong-Sik Lee. Communism in Korea Part I: The Movement. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972. Pg. 336. 210 Van Ree, 1989. Pg. 151. 211 Scalapino and Lee 1979. Pg. 339 212 Van Ree, Erik. Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy. Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989. Pg. 151. 213 IBID.; Pg. 152-154. 214 IBID.

69 Occupation Size Rating: 0 An occupation force of 40,000 oversaw a population of approximately 9 million living above the

38th Parallel. This gives the occupation a ratio of 1:228.

Economic Destruction Rating: .4

The economic devastation to Korea was limited but not negligible, as the US and Soviet division of Korea inadvertently caused economic harm. Japan had colonized all of Korea beginning in 1910 and abdicated Korea during its surrender to Allied forces in 1945. Although

Japan was far from a benevolent colonizer, Japan’s presence helped Korea modernize and advance its economy. These advancements included an advanced transportation network, better integration with the world economy, a highly articulated bureaucracy, and an increase in modern skills among the Korean population.215 The colonization of Korea by Japan also opened up the

Japanese market for Korean firms, thus drastically increasing the amount of Korean exports to

Japan.216 Although the Soviets and the US would not wage war on the Korean peninsula before the occupation, partitioning the country served as a setback for Korea. Upon its division, the

Korean economy became disjointed and divided.217 Additionally, the Japanese surrender inadvertently severed the close economic ties between Japan and Korea.218

Power Vacuum Rating: .2

In North Korea, nothing seriously impeded the state’s ability to exercise systemic power over its sovereignty. Non-communist forces never materialized enough resistance to seriously

215 Cummings, 1981. Pg. 66-67. 216 Nakajim, Kentaro. "Economic division and spatial relocation: The case of postwar Japan." Journal of Japanese and International Economics 22 (2008): 383-400 Pg. 386. 217 Cummings, 1981. Pg. 66-67. 218 Nakajima, 2008. Pg. 386.

70 challenge the central state’s authority to deal with it. Strong ISF and robust intelligence apparatuses were mobilized to effectively deal with any threats to Kim Il Sun’s control over the country.

South Korea ISF Rating: .4

By the end of the American occupation, South Korea had built a viable internal security force, but external security forces were intentionally ill equipped and weak, as the US believed the South would invade North Korea if given the opportunity. As a result, South Korean forces were easily overrun when North Korea invaded in 1950.

For much of the occupation, warring parties and internal strife plagued South Korea.

Largely unconcerned with democracy, the US provided local police and right-wing groups with surplus equipment, with the hope that a strong conservative government could precipitate a quick

American withdrawal.219 In September 1947, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended a

US withdrawal from Korea, but a major uprising in October 1948 which “was repressed with about 2,000 causalities” forced the US to push back the withdrawal date.220 221 This uprising had been preceded by the April 1948 Jeju uprising, where an armed insurgency spurred on by falling living standards and police brutality was ruthlessly put down by anti-communist police.222 223

219 Matray, James I. "Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea 1945-1948." Korean Studies 19 (1995): 17- 38. pg. 8 and 10. 220 "Modern Korean History Portal." Wilson Center. Accessed September 23, 2019. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/theme/modern-korean-history-portal. 221 Matray, James I. "Revisiting Korea Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War." Prologue Magazine 34, no. 2 (Summer 2002). Accessed September 20, 2019. https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/korean- myths- 1.html 222 Shim, Elizabeth. "South Korea Jeju Massacre haunts the memories of survivors." United Press International, June 20, 2019. Accessed September 23, 2019. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/06/20/South- Korea-Jeju-Massacre-haunts- the-memories-of-survivors/1491561083862/ 223 Merrill, John. "The Cheju-do Rebellion." Journal of Korean Studies 2 (1980): 139-97. Pg. 140.

71 Despite these massive disturbances, by 1950 “South Korea had nearly eliminated guerrilla activities threatening internal order.”224

Although indigenous forces had established internal security, South Korean defense forces were largely incapable of deterring an external threat. Despite the strength of the North

Korean army, the US refused to provide the South’s military with vital military equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, and combat planes.225 This was because the US believed that

South Korean leader Syngman Rhee’s government would launch an invasion of the North in an attempt to unify the peninsula.226 The most obvious consequence of this is the South’s failure to put up a viable resistance when North Korea invaded on June 25, 1950, and its regime was only saved by the United Nations intervention.

Insurgency Rating: .6 South Korea had a viable insurgency that, at times, challenged the authority of the US occupation forces and South Korea’s Rhee government. Despite this, guerrilla forces were largely eliminated by 1950.

Early American occupation forces received limited guidance about how to proceed with the occupation.227 As a result, US occupation officials often left Japanese officials in place after the occupation began, alienating Koreans who responded with mass, violent protest.228 Although the US reversed this position, the US made another critical mistake by quickly aligning itself with Koreans who had ties to American missionary groups (who were also advantaged by the

224 Matray, James I. "Revisiting Korea Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War." Prologue Magazine 34, no. 2 (Summer 2002). Accessed September 20, 2019. https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/korean- myths- 1.html 225 IBID. 226 IBID. 227 Matray, James I. "Hodge Podge: American Occupation Policy in Korea 1945-1948." Korean Studies 19 (1995): 17- 38. Pg. 21. 228 IBID.; Pg. 22.

72 fact that they spoke English).229 As a result, the US inadvertently aligned itself with the wealthy upper echelons of Korean society (many of which had collaborated with the Japanese) at the same time mass protests were sweeping the country demanding social, economic, and political reform.230

The autumn uprisings of 1946 were widespread and highlighted the failures of the US occupation, as “strong political forces competed for hegemony in the provinces.”231 South

Korean internal security forces brutally suppressed riots, beginning with the Taegu Slaughter in

1946.232 Occupation authorities saw these uprisings as driven by communist agitators residing in the South (which was partially correct). Beginning as a workers’ strike on September 23, 1946, they eventually turned violent, evolving from the overrunning of a police station in early October to widespread and indiscriminate violence across the South a few days later. The initial uprisings culminated in 200 policemen killed and untold number of civilian deaths. 233 Uprisings and widespread spread violence would continue throughout the occupation, culminating in the Yeosu

Mutiny and Jeju uprisings of 1948. The violence pushed back the initial US withdrawal date and convinced the US that it needed to support the conservative Rhee government to prevent communists from operating in the South from taking over. By the start of the Korean War in

1950, the Rhee government had been able to suppress most guerilla activity.234

Occupation Size Rating: 0

229 IBID. 230 IBID. 231 Cuming 1981. Pg. 351. 232 McCune, George. Korea Today. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. Pg. 85 233 For detailed history see: Cummings 1981. Chapter 10. 234 Matray, James I. "Revisiting Korea Exposing Myths of the Forgotten War." Prologue Magazine 34, no. 2 (Summer 2002). Accessed September 20, 2019. https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/2002/summer/korean- myths- 1.html

73 45,000 forces occupied a population of approximately 20 million in South Korea.235 That makes their ratio 1:444.

Economic Destruction Rating: .4 As was the case with Austria and the Ryukyus Islands, South Korea was divided after the war ended. As with the other cases, its economic destruction is coded the same as North Korea.

Power Vacuum Rating: .6

The invasion of North Korea was a large-scale contingency which impeded the Rhee government’s ability to exercise systemic power over its sovereignty. South Korea could not mobilize the necessary resources to deal with the North’s invasion. Only the intervention of UN forces restored the South's sovereignty after three years of fighting.

West Bank and Gaza ISF Rating: .2

Security forces were exceptionally weak for most of the Israeli occupation. Even when

Israel was able to curb the threats emanating from the occupied territories, it was not because

Palestinian security forces maintained a monopoly on violence. Palestinian security forces could not prevent a power vacuum from developing in the occupied territories; at best, local

Palestinians saw them as ineffective Israeli subcontractors.

The ISF of the West Bank and Gaza were complicated in nature, which contributed to the inability to build a well-organized and efficient security forces for the occupied territories.

During the initial stages of the occupation, guerilla forces exerted a large amount of influence

235 CIA, Intelligence Memorandum: Population and Manpower of Korea 1954, Office of Research and Reports. CIA- RDP79T00935A000300030001-8, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1954. Pg.1. Trewartha, Glenn T., and Wilbur Zelinsky. "Distributions and Change in Korea 1929-1949." Geographical Review 45, no. 1 (January 1955): 1-26. Pg. 3.

74 and control over the Gazans’ lives.236 To maintain security during the occupation, Israel used

Palestinian officers serving in the Israeli police force to help maintain law and order.237 Their ineffectiveness was highlighted when large numbers of them quit during the first intifada. These massive resignations were triggered when the PLO-guided Unified National Command of the

Uprising (UNC) threatened the officers and demanded that they resign.238

The next attempt at building a legitimate security force came after the 1993 Oslo

Accords. The Oslo accords dictated that the security forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA) were expected to maintain internal security in the West Bank and Gaza while simultaneously protecting Israeli security (Israel would maintain external security).239 In reality, PA security forces never maintained a monopoly on violence. In 2002, the PA security forces were devastated after clashes with Israeli security forces (a series of incidents had heightened tensions between the two groups).240 This diminished capacity created a power vacuum, allowing non-PA security actors to flow in, most notably Hamas.241 By 2007, PA security forces had been pushed out of Gaza, only maintaining tentative control over the West Bank.242

Insurgency Rating: .8

Insurgent movement and resistance were high throughout much of the occupation of the

West Bank and Gaza. Although always persistent, the violence peaked during the two intifadas.

236 Lia, Brynjar. A Police Force without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1999 Pg. 32. 237 IBID.; Pg. 41. 238 IBID.; Pg. 41-42. 239 Tartir, Alaa. "The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces 1993–2013." International Journal of Security & Development 4, no. 1 (2015): 1-20. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gi. PDF Pg.1. 240 IBID.; PDF Pg. 6. 241 IBID. 242 Simon, Steven. "A Violent Uprising in the West Bank Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 25." Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified July 28, 2015. Accessed September 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/report/violent- uprising-west-bank

75 Although several groups operated within the occupied territories, the PLO and later Hamas became the largest antagonists to Israel.

The PLO had long attempted to build a Mao-style insurgency in the West Bank and Gaza but had limited success.243 The cost of occupation was never “judged excessive by Israeli governments” until the first intifada broke out in 1987.244 In the twenty years leading up to it, the

PLO had built an extensive network of support among different groups and the population in the

West Bank and Gaza.245 This resulted in the protests and deadly riots spreading quickly. The violence resulted in nearly 600 Palestinian and 100 Israeli deaths from 1987-1990.246

Beginning in September 2000, the second intifada led to even more widespread violence, as organizations like al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the Tanzim, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic

Jihad carried out violence, resulting in the deaths of 649 Israeli civilians.247 The second intifada also demonstrated how well-organized and influential Hamas had become inside of Gaza248, as

Hamas’s military power now equaled that of the Palestinian Authority.249 Hamas’s increased popularity as a legitimate resistance movement (in the eyes of Palestinians) was cemented with the group’s landslide victory in the Palestine Legislative elections in 2006.250

Occupation Size Score: 0 or .2

243 Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: an epic history of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present. New York: Liverright Publishing, 2013.. Pg. 462. 244 Quandt, William B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967. Third Edition. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005.Pg. 274. 245 IBID. 246 Boot 2013, Pg. 468. 247 IBID.; Pg. 471. 248 Miskel, James F. "The Palestinian Intifada: An Effective Strategy?" World Policy Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2004/2005): 48-56. Pg.52. 249 Hroub, Khaled. Hamas : A Beginner's Guide. London: Pluto Press, 2010. Pg. 51 250 IBID.; Pg. 76.

76 Troop numbers varied at an extreme rate during the occupation, meaning numbers are difficult to determine and assess.251 During the first intifada, Israel committed 13,000 of its armed forces to police the situation.252 During the second intifada, armed forces ranged as high as 186,500 in 2000.253

Ratio One: 13,000 forces occupying 6,329,500 equates to 1:487. Score: 0

Ratio Two: 186,500 forces occupying 9,518,300 equates to a ratio of 1:51.254 Score: .2.

Economic Destruction Rating: .4

The Palestinian territories suffered medium devastation, as both territories were largely underdeveloped before the war and occupation began. Israel’s occupation was unusual in that the war leading up to the occupation only lasted six days. However, in 1966 the Gaza per-capita

GNP ranked at eighty dollars, “one of the lowest in the world.”255 The West Bank was not much better, having lagged well behind Jordan’s East Bank.256 Once the occupation started, GDP per capita slipped by all measures in 1967, only to rebound and steadily improve for the next twenty years.257 The GNP of the West Bank and Gaza combined equaled 2.6% of Israel’s GNP at the time of the occupation, yet by 1980 it had grown to 5.2%.258 Population growth followed a similar path, steadily increasing (with a few exceptions) until 1986. 259

251 For the purpose of the fsQCA section, this condition was coded as .2 252 Analysis of Counter-Insurgency Database (database). Fort Belvoir, VA: Center for Army Analysis, 2008. 253 IBID. 254 Both data points were calculated using the CAA database that also identifies population estimates. 255 Benvenisti, Meron. The West Bank Data Project. Washington: The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984. Pg. 9. 256 IBID, Pg.8. 257 Maddison Database, 2018. 258 Benvenisti, 1984. Pg. 9. 259 Maddison Database, 2018.

77 Power Vacuum Rating: .6

The first and second intifada were large contingencies that impeded Israel’s ability to exercise systemic control over the West Bank and Gaza’s sovereignty. At times, Israel was unable to mobilize the necessary resources to deal with large-scale riots. Palestinian authorities were also unable (or unwilling) to mobilize resources to prevent these contingencies. Actors such as Hamas routinely utilized these contingencies to challenge Fattah and Israel’s control over the

West Bank and Gaza.

Cambodia ISF Rating: .4

The ISF loyal to the pro-Hanoi People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) needed substantial assistance and support from Vietnam. They struggled to operate on their own, and the successes against anti-PRK forces were largely due to the efforts of the Vietnamese military.

For much of the occupation, the PRK’s forces performed poorly and were politically unreliable.260 Known as the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF), they were created with the primary objective of establishing internal security. However, nearly six years into the occupation, Vietnamese forces still shouldered most of the fighting, unable to build a PRK force that was technically and tactically proficient enough to take the lead.261 Their weakness stemmed from the fact that the KPRAF was “overstretched and understaffed and could neither cope with the sustained guerrilla activity of the CGDK insurgents, nor prevent their

260 CIA, Cambodia: Vietnamese Strategy and the New Realities, National Intelligence Estimate. CIA- RDP87T00495R001001040001-4, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1985. Pg. 3-9. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00495R001001040001-4.pdf (accessed October 25, 2019). 261 IBID.

78 infiltration into Cambodia from Thailand, nor patrol the country’s extended coastline.”262 This was despite the fact that Vietnam and the Soviet Union gave large amounts of aid; at one point

40-50% of Vietnam’s military budget went towards the war in Cambodia.263

Although the PRK controlled major population centers, main lines of communication, and some of the most fertile rice growing areas, this control was tenuous.264 By the late 1980s, this tenuous control was underwritten by 140,000 Vietnamese troops, not by the KPRAF, as the situation in Cambodia could at best be described as fighting insurgent forces to a stalemate.265

This was despite the fact that the insurgency seemed to fight one another just as much as they fought the PRK.

Insurgency Rating: .8

The occupation of Cambodia saw a robust and diverse insurgency that challenged the

Vietnamese occupation. A variety of groups challenged the occupation, with the most organized and coherent resistance coming from the former regime of Pol Pot. The Vietnamese were never able to definitively defeat the insurgency, essentially fighting to a stalemate in different parts of the country.

After being pushed out of power, the Khmer Rouge leaders quickly began to carry out an insurgent campaign against Vietnamese forces and the new Cambodian government.266 The new guerilla force quickly renamed itself the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) in

262 Ed. Ross, Russell R. Cambodia: A Country Study. 3rd ed. Washington DC: Library of Congress. Federal Research Division, 1990. Pg. 279. 263 IBID.; Pg. 296. 264 IBID. 265 IBID.; Pg. 268. 266 Ed. Ross, Russell R. Cambodia: A Country Study. 3rd ed. Washington DC: Library of Congress. Federal Research Division, 1990. Pg. 266.

79 an effort to improve its image.267 The Khmer Rouge was no stranger to the guerilla role, having waged insurgent warfare within Cambodia during the 1960s. The NADK benefited from the

Sino-Soviet split, leveraging China’s strained relationship with Vietnam and Vietnam’s shift towards the Soviet Union. After the Vietnamese invasion, China came to see the war as part of a larger geo-political “struggle for or against Soviet ‘social imperialist’ expansion.”268 As a result, the Chinese support for the NADK gave much-needed life support to the group and ensured that

Vietnamese occupation would be bogged down in “protracted war.”269

Other anti-Vietnamese insurgent movements sprung up across the Cambodian countryside, some communist and some non-communist in nature. Insurgents found the most success in the nonwestern provinces of Cambodia (Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar Meachey), where they engaged in successful raids and ambushes against isolated outposts. 270

By 1987, the NADK was largely assumed to be the only effective fighting force against the occupation.271 As the occupation wore on, non-communist guerrillas struggled to find success, and Vietnamese sweeps largely neutralized their offensive capabilities.272 Despite this success, the Vietnamese and their Cambodian communist allies were never able to fully eliminate them or control all of the countryside.

Occupation Size Rating: .4

267 IBID.; 269. 268 Morris, Stephen J. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War. Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 1999. Pg. 233. 269 IBID.; Pg. 234 270 Ross 1990.; Pg. 268 271 Ross 1990.; Pg. 268. 272 CIA, Cambodia: Vietnamese Strategy and the New Realities, National Intelligence Estimate. CIA- RDP87T00495R001001040001-4, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1985. Pg. 10. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87T00495R001001040001-4.pdf (accessed October 25, 2019).

80 A force size of 180,000 with an estimated population of 6,770,396 (1979) equates to a ratio of

1:38.

Economic Destruction Rating .6

Cambodia receives a mixed devastation score because the war leading up to the occupation did not result in widespread devastation. However, the policies of the Pol Pot regime towards its own people had left the country largely in ruin by the time Vietnam went to war and occupied Cambodia, meaning the invasion and ensuing occupation by

Vietnam did not result in widespread economic devastation. In fact, the Cambodian economy continued to improve as it had since 1975 (although slowly).273 This was likely due to the large amount of Chinese aid the country was receiving.274 Cambodia had experienced poor rice harvests in the years leading up to the occupation, and there was a severe food shortage in 1979.275 The country’s population, which had been in free fall because of the brutal genocide, began to see growth by the second year of the occupation.276

Power Vacuum Rating: .6 The ongoing insurgency impeded the Vietnamese and their Cambodian counterparts’ ability to pacify parts of Cambodia. As a result, the rural parts of Cambodia were plagued by a power vacuum for much of the occupation. Various insurgent groups openly competed for influence throughout much of the countryside, waging full-scale violence on Vietnamese forces and the PKK while openly challenging their ability to govern. The PKK routinely failed to

273 Madison Database, 2018. 274 Ed. Ross, Russell R. Cambodia: A Country Study. 3rd ed. Washington DC: Library of Congress. Federal Research Division, 1990. Pg. 152. 275 IBID., Pg. 155. 276 Maddison, 2018.

81 mobilize the necessary resources to exercise control over its sovereignty, as guerrilla forces seemed to cross into Cambodia from Thailand at will. Most successes against the guerrilla forces were underwritten by Vietnamese forces, who propped up the PKK.

Syria in Lebanon ISF Rating: .6

The occupation of Lebanon did not build traditional indigenous security forces to help stabilize Lebanon. However, Syria used the occupation to help build Hezbollah into a viable proxy to benefit Syrian interests. With Syria’s assistance, Hezbollah has grown into the strongest actor in Lebanon, while simultaneously becoming one of the stronger actors in the Middle East as a whole.

Syria’s support for Hezbollah was far more successful than Israel’s support for the

Southern Lebanese Army (SLA). Hezbollah has only grown stronger since Syria’s withdrawal in

2005. Syria’s support for the group has not brought stability to Lebanon, but it has given Syria permanent and lasting influence within Lebanon. This is evidenced by the fact that Hezbollah is not simply a militia group anymore; with Syrian and Iranian assistance, it has become a major player in Lebanese politics.277 Although they do not control all of Lebanon, Hezbollah is substantially stronger militarily than the Lebanese Armed Forces, which have largely refused direct confrontation with Hezbollah.278

277 Hezbollah is now represented in parliament and at the cabinet level in Lebanon. Source:Nerguizian, Aram. "The Lebanese Armed Forces and Hezbollah: Military Dualism in Post- War Lebanon." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . Accessed October 1, 2019. https://carnegie- mec.org/2018/10/30/lebanese-armed-forces-and-hezbollah-military-dualism-in- post-war-lebanon-pub-77598. 278 IBID.

82 The relationship has not always been positive, though, and “has been characterized by periods of mutual distrust and conflicting goals.”279 However, the long-term success of the relationship is most evidenced by the Syrian civil war, where Hezbollah’s involvement has played a critical part in allowing the Assad regime to regain control of large swaths of rebel-held territory.280

Insurgency Rating: .8

Insurgent activity and sectarian violence dominated Lebanon throughout much of the occupation, as several groups violently vied for influence during the occupation. Throughout the course of the occupation, Syria would support and oppose many of these groups, as the conflict was characterized by constantly shifting alliances.

During the occupation of Lebanon, various groups aligned themselves with each other

(including Syria and Israel) on an ever-changing basis. This helped contribute to Lebanon’s decades-long sectarian conflict. Syria supported and opposed various groups as it saw fit. One example of these ever-changing relationships is Syria’s support for the Lebanese National

Movement, which has been marked by mutual cooperation and violence since 1976. When

Kamal Jumblatt (leader of the Lebanese National Movement) was assassinated in 1977, it was largely assumed that this was done by the Syrians. However, Kamal’s son Walid would soon take over the movement and then form an alliance with Syria,281 continuing to receive aid and support from the Syrians at different times during the occupation.

279 Ali, Mohanad H. "Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . Accessed October 2, 2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/29/power-points-defining-syria- hezbollah-relationship-pub-78730. 280 Sullivan, Marisa. "Hezbollah in Syria." Institute for the Study of War. Middle East Security Report 19 (April 2014). Pg. 4. 281 Glass, Charles. "The lord of no man’s land: A guided tour through Lebanon’s ceaseless war." Harper's Magazine, November 11, 2019, 2007, 47-56 Accessed June 17, 2016. http://www.charlesglass.net/the-lord-of-no-mans- land-a-guided-tour-through-lebanons-ceaseless-war/

83 Syria’s relationship with Hezbollah also highlights its complicated relationship with different insurgent groups, as the two went through periods of mutual distrust, which often strained the relationship during the occupation.282 For example, Hezbollah’s war with rival and

Syrian-supported AMAL placed Hezbollah’s existence in question, with Syria only refraining from wiping out Hezbollah because Iran pressured Damascus to “show restraint.”283

Disagreements between Syria and Hezbollah did not prevent the two from working together, as

Syria leveraged its relationship with Hezbollah in the early 1990s to maximize its influence in

Lebanon.284 In turn, Hezbollah has become the most influential party in Lebanese politics.

Occupation Size Rating: .2 A force size of 40,000 with a population of 2,596,405 equates to a ratio of 1:65.

Economic Destruction Rating: .8

Lebanon receives a high score because of the high levels of economic destruction inflicted by the civil war. This destruction was only accelerated by the Syrian occupation. The

Syrian intervention and occupation in 1976 devastated the economy, causing a drop in GDP per capita of nearly 60%.285 The Israeli occupation in 1982 caused a drop in GDP per capita of nearly 40% but the Lebanese economic situation had already suffered several setbacks in the years preceding it. Furthermore, Lebanon’s worst economic year on record coincided with the beginning of the Syrian occupation.286

282 Ali, Mohanad H. "Power Points Defining the Syria-Hezbollah Relationship." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace . Accessed October 2, 2019. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/29/power-points-defining- syria-hezbollah-relationship-pub-78730 283 For a short history of this, read Kenneth Pollack’s statement before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs for a brief history of the evolution of Hezbullah’s tactics: Pollack, Kenneth. "Testimony: Facing the Iranian Challenge in the Middle East ." American Enterprise Institute. Last modified October 4, 2017. Accessed October 19, 2019. https://www.aei.org/research- products/speech/testimony-facing-the- iranian-challenge-in-the-middle-east/. 284 Leverett, Flynt. Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. Pg. 43. 285 Maddison Database, 2018. 286 Maddison Database, 2018.

84 Power Vacuum Rating: 1 Lebanon became engulfed in a full power vacuum, with no true state authority being able to mobilize the necessary resources to deal with it. The country was continually plagued by sectarian violence throughout the length of the occupation, with no single group able to exercise systemic power over Lebanon’s sovereignty. Outside actors like Israel, the US, and France continually violated Lebanon’s traditional notions of sovereignty, each holding different degrees of power and influence in Lebanon.

Israel in South Lebanon ISF Rating: .4

Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon was purely security based, but they still attempted to invest in indigenous security forces. Most notably, the Israelis tried to align themselves with a militia group called the South Lebanese Army (SLA). The militia faced heavy casualties and mixed combat effectiveness, and it fell apart after Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.

The militia was born out of Major Sa’ad Haddad’s Free Lebanon forces, and were

“trained and financed by Israel.”287 288 The SLA manned outposts within the security zone in an attempt to guard against Iranian-backed Hezbollah.289 Under Israeli guidance, the SLA emerged as an “organized, hierarchical militia with an IDF-like structure,” which was fully subordinated to the Israeli security establishment.290 Maintaining the security zone proved costly for the SLA, as they would lose 621 fighters (compared to the 250 IDF members that were killed).291

Note: Recorded means all of the data collected by Maddison Database. For Lebanon this dates back to 1820, with several years missing, until 1950 where data became regularly cataloged. 287 Ruebner, J. South Lebanon Army (SLA): History, Collapse, Post-Withdrawal Status. Pg. 1 288 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's Wars: A history since 1947. 4th ed. London And New York: Routledge, 2016 Pg. 266. 289 IBID. 290 Editors: Miodowinik, Dan, and Oren Barak. Nonstate Actors in Intrastate conflicts. Philadelphia:

85 Additionally, the SLA was largely unpopular among villages residing in the security zone, evidenced by the fact that locals often provided intelligence and safe havens to Hezbollah fighters.292 Throughout the occupation, the IDF routinely assessed the SLA as weak, and the

SLA was wholly dependent on IDF support.293 Many within the IDF believed the group had loyalty issues, as many of its Shia members had links to Hezbollah and began to desert in droves once rumors of an IDF pullout began to circulate in 2000.294 295 Almost as soon as the IDF pulled out of the security zone, the SLA collapsed and abandoned its outposts.

Insurgency Rating: 1

Israel faced high levels of resistance during its occupation of southern Lebanon, most notably from Hezbollah. The group inflicted high levels of casualties on IDF forces, and even after Israel withdrew the group continued to effectively wage war against Israel.

Although several insurgent groups operated within the Israeli security belt in South

Lebanon, Hezbollah would be the most effective and ambitious. Originally calling itself Islamic

Jihad, the group received extensive backing from Iran and Syria. The group perfected the art of the suicide bomb, kicking off its campaign against Israel by ramming a vehicle laced with explosives into the IDF headquarters in Tyre Lebanon.296 IDF forces were regularly preoccupied with countering and containing Hezbollah during and after the occupation.

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pg. 149 291 Ruebner, J. South Lebanon Army (SLA): History, Collapse, Post-Withdrawal Status. Pg. 2. 292 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's Wars: A history since 1947. 4th ed. London And New York: Routledge, 2016. Pg. 270. 293 Editors: Miodowinik, Dan, and Oren Barak. Nonstate Actors in Intrastate conflicts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. Pg. 150. 294 IBID. 295 Bregman, Ahron. Israel's Wars: A history since 1947. 4th ed. London And New York: Routledge, 2016. Pg. 281. 296 Boot 2013, Pg. 504.

86 In 1996 the IDF launched the Grapes of Wrath operation to counter Hezbollah.297

Despite these efforts, Hezbollah persevered and even flourished. As the group became more successful, it continued to evolve on and off the battlefield. On the battlefield, it moved away from suicide attacks towards more complex tactics.298 Off the battlefield, the group transformed itself into the strongest and most influential party in Lebanese politics. During the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah easily took over SLA positions and continued to attack

Israel across the border.299

Occupation Size Rating: 0

Israel occupied the southern security belt with approximately 1,200 soldiers, covering a population of 150,000.300 This gives the occupation a ratio of 1:125.

Economic Destruction Rating: .6

Lebanon receives a mixed score because the Lebanese Civil War had largely contributed to the economic destruction and had been raging for nearly a decade before Israel officially intervened. Israel undoubtedly helped contribute to Lebanon’s economic destruction before the

1982 occupation began, as it provided as much as $50 million a year to Lebanese militia groups.

297 "Hezbollah's Influence in Lebanon." Counter Extremism Project. Last modified April , 2018. Accessed November 1, 2019. https://www.counterextremism.com/hezbollah-in-lebanon. PDF. Pg. 5. 298 For a short history of this, read Kenneth Pollack’s statement before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs for a brief history of the evolution of Hezbullah’s tactics: Pollack, Kenneth. "Testimony: Facing the Iranian Challenge in the Middle East ." American Enterprise Institute . Last modified October 4, 2017. Accessed October 19, 2019. https://www.aei.org/research- products/speech/testimony-facing-the- iranian-challenge-in-the-middle-east/. 299 Ruebner, J. South Lebanon Army (SLA): History, Collapse, Post-Withdrawal Status. Pg. 3-5. 300 Edelstein, Occupational Hazards 2004, Pg. 88. Hirst, David. "South Lebanon: The War That Never Ends." Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 5- 19. Pg. 13. Richard Norton, Augustus, and Jillian Schwedler. "(In)Security Zones in South Lebanon." Journal of Palestine Studies 23, no. 1 (September 1993): 61-79. Pg. 61-62.

87 The initial shock of the Israeli occupation further entrenched Lebanon in economic struggles.301

However, other actors like Syria (beginning its occupation in 1976) and the PLO contributed far greater sums of patronage money to warring parties within Lebanon, and their activities had a far greater impact on the level of economic destruction Lebanon would endure.302 In the leadup to the Civil War, Lebanon’s economy had been growing, only to take a sharp downward spiral by the second year of the war.303 Israel’s occupation of the south in 1982 created another economic downturn.304 Population growth during this time period is difficult to determine, seeming to remain relatively steady throughout much of Lebanon. However, many towns in Southern

Lebanon had registered citizens, but very few residents. The town of Marj’uyun, for example, officially had 35,000 citizens, but only had 600 residents choosing to reside there year-round.305

Power Vacuum Rating: 1 Like the Syrian case study, the Israeli occupation resulted in a power vacuum. Israeli forces and their local allies were never able to mobilize the necessary resources to ever exercise any systemic power over Southern Lebanon. At no time did occupation forces or any other single

IDF-supported actor maintain a monopoly on violence. Hezbollah and other factions routinely exploited the vacuum to attack Israel inside and outside of Lebanon. with Hezbollah even setting up alternate government structures to provide goods and services to the local population.

Bosnia ISF Rating: .6

301 IBID.; Pg. 63. 302 IBID.; Pg. 64. 303 Madison Database, 2018. 304 Maddison Database, 2018. 305 Hirst, David. "South Lebanon: The War That Never Ends?" Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 5- 18. Pg. 13.

88 There have been mixed results for Bosnia’s indigenous security forces. NATO and EU intervention played a large role in bringing peace and stability to Bosnia, while attempts to reform the military and police have had mixed success.

Nearly five years after the occupation began, the Bosnian security environment was considered by many as artificially stable because of the presence of EU and NATO forces.306

Despite this, the number of NATO forces continued to decline, until the NATO-led stabilization force withdrew and was replaced by a small EU force in December 2004. Since then, levels of violence have remained low, but attempts to restructure and centralize the security forces have achieved only mixed success.307 Attempts to centralize the police force have been blocked by

“ethnically based political parties.”308 However, the armed forces of Bosnia have had more success at integration. In 2005, the Bosniak-Croat Army of the Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serbs' Army of Republika Srpska combined into one entity--the

Bosnia and Herzegovina Armed Forces.309 This in and of itself was a significant accomplishment which has allowed for NATO to consider accepting Bosnia as a member state.310 Another success of the military was the downsizing of former armies, whose previous size was financially unsustainable and unjustifiable given the stable security environment.311

306 Edited by Schnabel, Albrecht, and Hans-Georg Ehrhart. Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Ritsher, Allison. Chapter Six: Democratization in Bosnia. New York: United Nations University Press, 2005. Pg. 125. 307 Berg, Louis-Alexander. "From Weakness to Strength: The Political Roots of Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina." International Peacekeeping 21, no. 2 (2014): 149-64. Pg. 149. 308 IBID.; Pg. 150. 309 Rauschenberg, Kurt. "Bosnia and Herzegovina armed forces celebrate Armed Forces Day, marking 13 years of unified military." Army.mil. Accessed October 14, 2019. https://www.army.mil/article/214528/bosnia_and_herzegovina_armed_forces_celebrate_armed_fo rces_day_marking_13_years_of_unified_military 310 Sito-Sucic, Daria. "U.S. backs NATO membership for Bosnia, dismisses Serb opposition." Reuters. Accessed October 6, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-usa-nato/us-backs-nato-membership-for-bosnia- dismisses-serb-opposition-idUSKBN1OG238. 311 Perdan, Slobodan. "Security sector reform: The building of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 2 (June 2006): 179-209. Pg. 189.

89 Today, Bosnian security forces are under state control and have achieved most of

NATO’s reform benchmarks required for NATO membership.312 However, it is not entirely clear how effective Bosnia’s armed forces really are. They have always had the luxury of having the presence of NATO or EU forces and have never faced a major internal test since the occupation began. Furthermore, cracks may be showing in this multi-ethnic force. Nationalist Serbian leaders have consistently opposed membership in NATO and demanded that the Serbian

Republican Army become more independent of the armed forces.313

Insurgency Rating: .2

Bosnia suffered from limited resistance and no real insurgency. Although the armies of the ethnic groups remained in place, there was limited resistance towards occupation authorities.

The presence of NATO and the EU occupation forces was largely able to pacify the warring parties. Part of this might simply be because three years of brutal ethnic cleansing had allowed battle lines to harden, and warring parties may have been burned out from fighting one another. Despite the perceived shortcomings of the Dayton Accord, violence has stopped and

Bosnia remains in a state of peace.314 One of the key successes of the occupation was the fact that NATO forces were able to convince the warring armies to withdraw from the front lines.315

Although Bosnia was initially left with three separate militaries and the state did not maintain total control over them (the ISF section of this paper has a more detailed discussion), no military moved to create a viable resistance to the occupation.316 This was despite the fact that

312 IBD.; Pg. 193. 313 Sito-Sucic, Daria. "EU peacekeepers warn Serb leader against dividing Bosnia's armed forces." Reuters. Last modified May 14, 2019. Accessed October 15, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-eufor- dodik/eu- peacekeepers-warn-serb-leader-against-dividing-bosnias-armed-forces-idUSKCN1SK1SN 314 Dobbins, 2003. Pg. 95. 315 IBID.; Pg. 96. 316 For a discussion of Bosnia’s three militaries and its security sector reform, see:

90 for several years after the occupation began, these militaries remained postured against each other, maintaining “‘active intelligence gathering and order-of-battle doctrines to fight against one another.’” 317

Occupation Size Rating: .2

A force size of 60,000 with an estimated population of 3,829,050 (1995) equals a ratio of 1:63.

Economic Destruction Rating: .6 Bosnia receives a mixed score, as NATO and EU forces played little part in the economic destruction. Bosnia was in ruin because of the sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing.

Population growth dropped from 1991-1995, with the population falling from 4.45 million to

3.35 million.318319 The loss of human capital was devastating to the point that economic recovery would become entirely dependent on the international community.320 Missing and confirmed deaths ran over 150,000, affecting the quantity and quality of human capital available for economic growth.321 Bosnia’s economy declined in terms of real GDP per capita as the sectarian bloodletting created massive population displacement.322 Much of this ended once

NATO intervened, and the presence of NATO troops acted to pacify the violence and did not inflame sectarian tensions.

Perdan, Slobodan. "Security sector reform: The building of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 2 (June 2006): 179-209. Pg. 189. 317 Edited by Schnabel, Albrecht, and Hans-Georg Ehrhart. Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. Ritsher, Allison. Chapter Six: Democratization in Bosnia. New York: United Nations University Press, 2005. Pg. 125. 318 Maddison Project 319 Zupcevic, Merima, and Fikret Causevic. CASE STUDY: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. Sarajevo: Centre for Developing Area Studies – McGill University and the World Bank, 2009. Pg. 13-14. 320 IBID.; Pg. 13. 321 IBID.; Pg. 13. 322 Maddison Database, 2018. Note: From 1992-1994 real GDP per capita (for growth comparisons) declined. But it should be noted; real GDP per capita (multiple-bench marks) it remained relatively stagnate.

91

Power Vacuum Rating: .2 Bosnia never saw a real power vacuum develop after NATO occupation forces arrived.

Occupation forces were able to establish a monopoly on violence, and they built ISF that were able to largely do the same. Bosnia’s competing armies were eventually downsized and largely placed under state control. Occupation forces remain partially in place, but no contingency has ever impeded their or the Bosnian state’s ability to exercise systemic power over their sovereignty.

Kosovo

ISF Rating: .8 Kosovo’s indigenous security forces are highly professionalized and effective. Although

Kosovo lacked an army during the occupation from 1999-2008, the police forces have been able to maintain internal security with low levels of corruption and high levels of public trust. Much of the success can be attributed to the high levels of planning, preparation, and clear objectives occupation forces developed for the ISF before the occupation began.

The presence of NATO forces in Kosovo (KFOR) has largely maintained Kosovo’s external security since 1999, while local police forces have been the lead actor in maintaining internal security. They have high rates of legitimacy among the local population, consistently polling as one of the state's most trusted institutions.323 They have been successful at lowering the crime rate after the occupation began in 1999, and since Kosovo independence in 2008, they have remained an effective non-political security force. The high levels of public trust serves as

323 Skendaj, Elton. Creating Kosovo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pg. 99.

92 the biggest indicator of their effectiveness, since they were often seen as an instrument of

Serbian repression of the Albanian majority during the Milosevic years.324 Milosevic purged the ethnic Albanians from the police in 1989, replacing them with ethnic Serbs.325

Pre-occupation planning was essential to building an effective and trusted police force.

Using lessons gleaned from Bosnia and East Timor, occupation forces arrived in the country with a detailed plan about how to rebuild a police force that would adhere to international norms on policing.326 This included developing institutions that could monitor police conduct.

Furthermore, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had a sustained presence that allowed police forces to be built up at a steady pace, with a gradual handover of responsibility.327

Insurgency Rating: .4

Kosovo had sporadic violence and resistance during the occupation, but nothing that seriously challenged the NATO occupations. Much of the violence was sectarian-motivated, with different ethnic groups engaging in reprisal attacks on one another.

KFOR’s main task was to ensure that local forces complied with the phased withdrawal so that KFOR could quickly replace them and prevent a security vacuum from developing in contested areas.328 Inevitably this meant KFOR and UNMIK would have to devote time and energy to protecting the Serbian minority from reprisals by the newly-freed Albanian majority ethnic group. Most notably, sectarian violence erupted in the town of Mitrovica in 2000 and

2004.

324 IBID.; Pg. 100. 325 Greene, Morgan, Jonathan Friedman, and Richard Bennet. "Rebuilding the Police in Kosovo." Foreign Policy. Last modified July 18, 2012. Accessed October 10, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/18/rebuilding-the- police-in- kosovo/. 326 IBID. 327 IBID. 328 Dobbins, 2003. Pg. 117.

93 In 2000, French security forces struggled to maintain order in the town as sectarian violence flared up. At times, violence was directed against occupation forces within the area.329

In 2004, KFOR and UNMIK “failed catastrophically in their mandate to protect minority communities.”330 Ignited by a drive-by shooting of a Serb teenager, sectarian-motivated riots resulted in thousands fleeing, 19 deaths, and 900 wounded.331 Although only lasting for 48 hours, the violence was widespread. Furthermore, some of the violence was not sporadic and reactionary. Instead, some of it was well organized, in a well-coordinated effort by local elites to forcefully expel large numbers of the Serbian community.332

Occupation Size Rating: .6 A force size of 60,000 with an estimated population of 1,762,000 (1999) gives us a ratio of 1:29.

Economic Destruction Rating: .8

Kosovo receives a .8 because the 11-week NATO bombing campaign helped contribute to the high levels of destruction. The biggest sign of economic destruction was the severe drain placed on Kosovo’s population and infrastructure. Approximately 45 percent of Kosovar

Albanians (pre-war population) fled because of the conflict, while half the Serbian population left Kosovo.333 This was compounded by the fact that nearly “two-thirds of all homes in Kosovo were damaged or destroyed.”334 Key industries, which had been struggling before the war because of the breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, were largely destroyed by the

329Gall, Carlotta. "British Troops Replace French in Riot-Torn Kosovo Town." The New York Times, 2000. 330 "Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo." Human Rights Watch. Last modified March , 2004. https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/07/25/failure-protect/anti-minority-violence-kosovo-march-2004#page. 331 Skendaj, Elton. Creating Kosovo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. Pg. 56. 332 IBID. 333 Dobbins, 2003. Pg. 113. 334 IBID.

94 time the NATO bombing campaign ended.335 Furthermore, the country was made unlivable by the fact that 40 percent of water resources were contaminated, and large swaths of land were filled with landmines.336

Power Vacuum Rating: .2 Despite the fact that sectarian violence erupted in 2000 and 2004, state and occupation forces were always able to eventually mobilize the necessary resources to deal with it. Sectarian factions never controlled large swaths of territory, and the occupation forces (and then the

Kosovo government) always maintained total sovereignty. Since the occupation, Kosovo has not been a source of instability for neighboring countries or the region.

Afghanistan ISF Rating: .2

Afghan indigenous security forces have proven exceptionally weak, corrupt, and inept.

Despite massive US investment for nearly twenty years, Afghan security forces are incapable of establishing any real sense of security throughout the country.

Since 2002, the US has spent more than $70 billion in security sector assistance to the

Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).337 In 2009, the US surged combat forces into Afghanistan in a dual track strategy designed to diminish Taliban influence and create security conditions the ANDSF could handle.338 Despite US battlefield successes, Afghan security forces were never able to find their footing. Instead they have been plagued by political

335 Demekas, Dimitri G., Johannes Herderschee, and Davina F. Jacobs. Kosovo: Institutions and Policies for Reconstruction and Growth. Washington DC: The IMF, 2002. Pg. 5. 336 IBID. 337 RECONSTRUCTING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY FORCES: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. Arlington, VA: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan, 2017. Pg. 1. 338 IBID.; Pg. 70.

95 interference, with some estimates claiming that 90 percent of key ANDSF positions are filled with “political and nepotistic appointments.”339

In 2014, the US switched to a strict “‘advice and assist role,’” despite the fact that Afghan forces cannot operate without direct US support.340 Security forces also suffer from an inability to learn basic strategy and tactics taught to them by ISAF forces.341 These issues are compounded by widespread illiteracy rates and the fact that 35% of the ANDSF do not return every year.342 Afghan security forces also die at an exceptionally high rate, with an estimated

45,000 killed since 2014.343 Afghan National Police have long suffered from “corruption, understaffing and training shortfalls.”344 To date, Afghan forces do not control large swaths of the country, with much of the country heavily contested or under Taliban control.345

Insurgency Rating: .8

The NATO occupation of Afghanistan has seen heavy resistance and a robust insurgency.

NATO forces and the Afghan government have been unable to deter Taliban and Al-Qaida insurgents, struggling to control large swaths of the country.

After being pushed out of Afghanistan by US forces in 2001-2002, the Taliban and Al-

Qaida have seen an exponential revival across much of the country. A 2009 US government assessment stated that the insurgency was growing and there was a “crisis of confidence” among

339 Mujaddidi, Ghulam. "Decoding Afghan Security Forces’ Failures." The Diplomat. Last modified June 23, 2017. Accessed October 1, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/decoding-afghan-security-forces-failures/

340 Roggio, Bill, and Alexandra Gutowski. "Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan." Long War Journal. Accessed October 7, 2019. https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan. 341 Authors observations during Deployment and interviews with senior US officials. 342 Thomas, Clayton. Afghanistan: Background and US Policy In Brief. Washington DC: The Congressional Research Service, 2019. Pg. 10. 343 IBID. Pg. 8. 344 Government Accounting Office. "Afghanistan Security." Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives (October 2018). Pg. 17. 345 Roggio, Bill, and Alexandra Gutowski. "Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan." Long War Journal. Accessed October 7, 2019. https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan.

96 the Afghan population in the credibility of the Afghan government and the international community.346 In response to this, NATO infused nearly 40,000 troops into the country. The successes of Afghan “surge” were short-lived, as Afghan security forces quickly lost control of gains made once US forces drew down numbers.

Like previous countries that had invaded Afghanistan, US and NATO forces found it difficult to control the country's border with Pakistan. The Durand line, a 1,640-mile border with

Pakistan, has protected fleeing insurgents, allowing them to move freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan.347 The Pakistan borderland of Waziristan served as the “‘plague spot of the frontier’” a century earlier during the British incursion into Afghanistan, and has played the same role for NATO forces.348 The Pakistan Taliban allied with al-Qaeda, and this allowed free flow and safe haven for al-Qaeda in the border region.349 This safe haven has allowed insurgent groups to escape NATO forces and refit in the winter months, only to return for “fighting season” in the summer.

Furthermore, since 2014 Afghanistan has seen a sharp uptick in the activity and strength of a new insurgent group, ISIS. Since its arrival, the group has shown sophistication in its ability to carry out large attacks against the Afghan government.350

Occupation Size Rating: 0

346 The report mentioned above is the leaked “McChrystal Report,” that published by the Bob Woodward of the Washington Post in September 2009. Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, COMISAF’S Initial Assessment, Stanley A. McChrystal. Confidential REL NATO/ISAF, Washington DC: Headquarters ISAF, 2009. Pg. 1-1 347 Loyn, David. In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation. New York: Palgrave MaCmillan, 2009. Pg. 214. 348 IBID. 349 IBID. 350 Kelly, Mary. "A Look At The ISIS Presence In Afghanistan." NPR. Last modified August 20, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/08/20/752882671/a-look-at-the-isis-presence-in-afghanistan.

97 Force size in Afghanistan has varied, peaking around 100,000 during the surge from

2010-2012.351 Using World Bank Data, we can estimate that Afghanistan’s population in 2011 was 30,111,413.352 This gives us a ratio of 1:300.

Economic Destruction Rating: .6

The fact that the NATO operations did not induce widespread destruction in Afghanistan and that the Taliban government, on its own accord, “curbed” the economic growth of the country gives Afghanistan a medium score. US Special Forces teams embedded with Northern

Alliance forces and utilized NATO air superiority to easily drive out the Taliban government.

These operations only took a few months. The Taliban’s self-imposed exile from the world was made worse by the fact that the country had been in continual war since 1979 and was plagued by its worst drought in years.353 Unlike other occupations, where the economy usually suffers during the first year of the occupation, the Afghan economy grew by nearly 60% during the first year of occupation.354 355

Power Vacuum Rating: .8 Afghanistan is experiencing a power vacuum where the state cannot mobilize the necessary resources to deal with insurgent groups challenging its monopoly on violence. Afghan government authority is disputed throughout the country by insurgent groups (ISIS, Al-Qaida,

351 US Department of Defense. "Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country (Updated Quarterly)." Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet. Defense Manpower Data Center. Accessed October 18, 2019. https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. Kurtzleben, Danielle. "CHART: How The U.S. Troop Levels In Afghanistan Have Changed Under Obama." NPR, July 6, 2016. Accessed October 28, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484979294/chart-how-the-u-s-troop- levels-in- afghanistan-have-changed-under-obama. 352 "Data: Afghanistan." World Bank. Accessed October 28, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan. 353 David, 2009. Pg. 202. 354 Maddison Dataset, 2018. 355 The occupation of Afghanistan began in mid-December 2001, meaning that it would it would not make sense to consider 2001 the first year of the occupation. Thus when evaluating the first year of the occupation, this project will use 2002 for Afghanistan.

98 and different factions of the Taliban), and neither the government nor the occupation forces have ever been able to exercise systemic power over state sovereignty. Afghanistan continues to be a source of instability that threatens its neighbors and the region.

Iraq ISF Rating: .4

Iraqi indigenous security forces were largely unable to stand on their own and continue to suffer from widespread corruption. Although they did have some successes, the heavy politicization of the police and military made them largely ineffective during and after the occupation.

Despite having a functioning military and police force, the US disbanded many of these elements when the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Orders 1 and 2. This forced the US to try and rebuild and retrain security forces in a combat environment. The rebuilding of the security forces could not keep up with the budding insurgency, which was a problem compounded by the fact that Iraqi security forces were plagued by “desertion, corruption and militia infiltration.”356 The CPA also placed an emphasis on short-term needs at the expense of the long-term goals of institutional building for security forces.357 Many of the security forces became dominated by politics and sectarianism. This was most apparent with Shia-dominated

Iraqi National Police, as many Iraqi Sunnis came to see the police as nothing more than an organization carrying out state-sponsored violence against them.358

356 Boot, Max. Invisible Armies: an epic history of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the present. New York: Liverright Publishing, 2013. Pg. 539. 357 "Rebuilding Security Forces and Institutions in Iraq." RAND Corporation. Accessed September 4, 2019. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9134/index1.html 358Killcullen, David. Out of the Mountains: the coming age of the urban guerrilla. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pg, 21.

99 Even when violence fell dramatically during the 2007-2008 “Surge,” Iraqi security forces were still inept and absent on a large scale. A 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found low levels of operational readiness among most Iraqi security forces.359 After some modest success from 2007-2011, the training and readiness of Iraqi security forces began to deteriorate once US forces left the country, as Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki replaced competent battlefield commanders with political loyalists. 360 By mid-2014, Iraqi security forces, although well equipped, collapsed in the face of ISIS fighters.

Insurgency Rating: .8

High levels of insurgent violence plagued the US occupation of Iraq. The US spent most of the occupation trying to suppress a variety of insurgent groups--some aligned with al-Qaida, others receiving support from Iran.

Al-Qaida exploited the US occupation by setting up the franchise known as Al-Qaida in

Iraq (AQI). In 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formally pledged the loyalty of his group (formerly called al-Tawhid wal Jihad) to al-Qaeda, formally giving life to AQI.361 The Jordanian wreaked havoc on coalition forces, local Iraqi Shia, and anyone who opposed AQI. Zarqawi’s tactics were so brutal that they earned a rebuke from al-Qaida’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, who believed that AQI was turning the Muslim world against their cause.362

Shia militia groups also created a large-scale insurgency in Iraq during the US occupation. Shia groups like the Mahdi army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, openly challenged and

359 Government Accountability Office. "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq." GAO Report to Congressional Committees. Last modified June, 2008. Pg. 27-28. 360 Schmitt, Eric, and Michael R. Gordon. "The Iraqi Army Was Crumbling Long Before Its Collapse, U.S. Officials Say." The New York Times, June 12, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/world/middleeast/american- intelligence-officials-said-iraqi-military-had-been-in-decline.html#. 361 Mendelsohn, Barak. "After Disowning ISIS, al Qaeda is Back On Top." Foreign Affairs. Accessed October 1, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-02-13/after- disowning-isis-al-qaeda- back-top 362 Weaver, Mary Anne. "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." The Atlantic . Accessed October 20, 2019. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab- al-zarqawi/304983/

100 waged war against Coalition and Iraqi government forces. 363 These groups operated with large amounts of Iranian support, helping to inflict heavy Coalition casualties while controlling large swaths of territory at different times.

Violence levels fell drastically by the end of the US occupation in 2011 (Zarqawi being killed in June 2006 and al-Sadr fleeing to Iran in 2008). However, Iraq experienced a rebirth of

AQI as the group reformatted and rebranded itself as ISIS, eventually breaking off from al-

Qaeda all together. Shia militant groups followed a similar path, often openly operating as

Iranian proxy groups inside of Iraq. Both of these occurrences serve as proof of how embedded

Iraq’s insurgency had become in the fabric of Iraq.

Occupation Size Rating: 0

A force size of 150,000 with an estimated population of 28, 385,746 (Iraq 2008) gives

Iraq a 1:189 troop-to-population ratio.364

Economic Destruction Rating: .6

The US invasion of Iraq damaged Iraq. However, US forces prioritized bypassing towns and using precision air strikes, meaning many cities and towns in Iraq were left untouched by invading forces. Furthermore, the invasion lasted just over a month, as US forces achieved their objective of “sprinting” to Bagdad, limiting the physical damage US forces were able to inflict.365 The Iraqi economy had been growing slowly in the leadup to the occupation, but

363 For an examples read Gordon and Trainor’s Endgame (specifically Pgs. 67-71) Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama. New York: Vintage Books, 2012. 364 "Data: Iraq." World Bank. Accessed October 19, 2019. https://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq. 365 For a complete history see:

101 slumped backwards during the first year of the occupation.366 However, since 2004, Iraq’s economic condition has steadily improved. Much of Iraq’s prewar struggles could be attributed to the isolation placed on Iraq by the US and the international community. Iraq’s costly wars with Iran and Kuwait had drained many of its resources, and this was made worse by the international sanctions placed on Iraq. As a result, its economy, infrastructure, health care system, and public education had been largely eroded by the start of the war in 2003.367

Power Vacuum Rating: .8

Iraq suffered from a power vacuum during and after the occupation ended. From 2003-

2007, US forces and the Iraqi government were constantly challenged by non-state actors. The

2007 “surge” allowed US forces and the Iraqi government to mobilize the necessary resources to reduce the effectiveness of these non-state actors, evidenced by the fact that violence had plummeted by June 2011, thus allowing the Iraqi government to exercise systemic power over its sovereignty.368 However, the US withdrawal precipitated a power vacuum throughout much of

Iraq. ISIS fighters captured major city centers, and the Iraqi government was physically displaced throughout many parts of Iraq. Furthermore, aided by Iran, Shia militia groups began to once again find more traction throughout Iraq. Today, Iraq is far from stable and still a source of instability within the region.

CHAPTER 7: Interpreting the Data

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard Trainor. COBRA II. New York: Vintage Books, 2005. 366 Maddison Database, 2018. 367 Allawi, Ali A. The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. Pg. 128-130. 368 Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Testing he Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007." International Security 37, no. 1 (April 2012): 7-40.

102 Testing Our New Data

Using fsQCA, we will be able to determine which combinations of conditions are present in all sixteen case studies. Once this is accomplished, we will be able to see if our “total destruction equals total buy-in” theory is present in any of the cases. Furthermore, this will allow us to draw comparisons or differences between these findings and those of other research projects, such as Edelstein’s Occupational Hazards.

Results Before using fsQCA, it’s important to take a brief look at some surface level analysis and basic observations. The first observation is that the condition economic destruction (.6-1) is prevalent in eight cases where no power vacuum occurs. These cases are Italy, Germany, East

Austria, West Austria, Japan, Ryukyus, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Economic destruction also appears in five cases which have a power vacuum; these are Cambodia, Lebanon, South Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Only in the case of North Korea were there no high levels of economic destruction and no power vacuum present. The high occurrence of economic destruction in both power vacuum and non power vacuum conditions is not surprising, as high levels of economic destruction occur in thirteen of the sixteen cases. Only North Korea, South Korea, and the West

Bank did not experience high levels of economic destruction.

103 TABLE 7.1: Truth Table

Before conducting a more in-depth analysis of the economic destruction condition, it’s important to summarize some general trends in the conditions that can be easily observed in the table above.

General Observation One

ISF are generally weak, even in cases where no power vacuum occurs. In ten of the sixteen cases studied, ISF scored a .4 or worse, meaning at best they have a poor record of securing internal and external security. Even during the post-WWII occupations, which are widely considered to be successful by any standard, ISF remained weak for years after the occupation began. Only the cases of North Korea and Kosovo scored a .8 or higher, meaning they could largely maintain internal and external security on their own.

General Observation Two

As mentioned earlier, high economic destruction is prevalent in almost every case study.

However, who was responsible for that destruction is different in each case study. In many cases, pre-occupation internal conflict or the actions of another state was responsible for causing

104 the economic damage. In eight cases the occupier largely created the destruction, while five cases had economic destruction created by sources other than the occupation force.

General Observation Three

Most occupations do not meet the theoretical standard occupation force size needed to pacify an insurgency. With the exception of two cases, West Austria and Kosovo, occupying states did not use a force size that theoretically would give them a higher rate of success (.6 or above). As a result, most cases had a ratio of 10:1000 (troops: population) or less in the sixteen cases surveyed.

High Destruction= No Power Vacuum Now that we have made some basic observations without fsQCA, we can utilize the fsQCA truth table to see if there are any observable trends in the combination of conditions and how they led to the presence or absence of a power vacuum. The first and most obvious basic combination is the presence of economic destruction and absence of an insurgency, resulting in no power vacuum. As stated earlier, high levels of economic destruction do not automatically mean the absence of a power vacuum. However, a closer observation reveals that when economic destruction is almost entirely a product of the occupier (scoring a .8 or 1), this is positively correlated with no power vacuum developing.

In eight cases, the occupier was almost entirely responsible for the widespread destruction inflicted upon the occupied state. These occupations are Italy, West Germany, East

Austria, West Austria, Japan, the Ryukyus, Lebanon, and Kosovo. In Italy, Germany, East

Austria, West Austria, Japan, the Ryukyus, and Kosovo, no power vacuum occurred--the Syrian occupation of Lebanon is the exception. Furthermore, an insurgency only occurred in the case of

Lebanon; all seven other cases did not have a viable insurgency. This means that occupations

105 with high levels of occupier-inflicted destruction are associated with low levels of insurgent group activity, usually resulting in no power vacuum developing.

The most obvious example of this is post-WWII occupations by the US and Soviet

Union. In each case, the occupying force inflicted high levels of destruction on the occupied state before the occupation even began. When bombing Japan, the US specifically targeted the highly skilled factory workers with massive aerial raids, using incendiary bombs to burn down industrial Japanese cities and killing hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians.369 One raid killed over eighty thousand civilians and left more than a million Japanese homeless.370 Bombing campaigns against Germany followed a similar pattern, and the Soviet style of war emphasized maximum destruction on a state’s economy and the general population.371 372 The NATO air campaign over Kosovo is not equal to that of previously aforementioned cases, but it was prolonged, widespread, and indiscriminate at times.373 Furthermore, it unintentionally forced

“800,000 Kosovars across the border into Albania and Macedonia as their homes and villages were looted and torched, and as many as 10,000 were killed.”374

This surface-level analysis indicates that high levels of destruction inflicted by the occupier may be a necessary condition, meaning it is a condition that must be present for a power

369 Serle, Thomas R. ""It Made a Lot of Sense to Kill Skilled Workers": The Firebombing of Tokyo in Marh 1945." The Journal of Military History 66, no. 1 (January 2002): 103-33. Pg. 103. 370 IBID. 371 IBID. Pg. 105-109 372 The Soviets inflicted mass destruction on most of Eastern Europe during their push towards Berlin. States like Hungry experienced “unbridled destruction, including murder, rape, and looting” as Soviet troops pressed into new territory. Source: Borhi, Laszlo. Dealing with Dictators: The United States, Hungary, and East Central Europe, 1942-1989. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2016. Pg. 58. For a complete history of Soviet destruction of Germany see: Beevor, Antony. The Fall of Berlin, 1945. New York: Viking, 2002. 373 "Independent International Commission on Kosovo: The Kosovo Report." University of Michigan Law. Accessed December 25, 2019. https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/drwcasebook/Documents/Documents/The%20Kosovo%20Report%20and%20U pdate.pdf. 374 Wippman, David. ""Kosovo and the Limits of International Law." Fordham International Law Journal 25, no. 1 (November 2001): 129-50. Pg. 134.

106 vacuum not to occur. However, because economic destruction is not the only condition being tested, we also need to study the causal complexity of combined conditions. In other words, how do other conditions combine with the presence or absence of economic destruction to impact the creation or prevention of a power vacuum? Furthermore, because high levels of economic destruction are found in Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, this means that economic destruction is not necessary and sufficient, as a condition that is necessary and sufficient would always result in a given outcome. In this case, that given outcome would always result in the absence of a power vacuum.

Combination of Conditions Using fsQCA allows us to see if there is equifinality in our dataset. In layman's terms, are there multiple paths to the same solution? Using our fsQCA truth table, we can see that there are three separate causal combinations of conditions that result in a power vacuum or in no power vacuum that occur at a frequency of three or higher. Looking at these three sets of combinations, we can begin to determine if the patterns identified above hold true in the most commonly occurring combinations. Furthermore, it will also give us an indicator of what condition(s) combined with high economic destruction can result in the absence of a power vacuum.

TABLE 7.2: PV & No PV Frequently Occurring Cases

107 ~ISF*EconDes*Insurgency*~OccupationSize=PV occurs at the highest frequency, occurring in four different cases. Meaning in four cases, local security forces were weak (0-.4), there were high levels of destruction (.6-1), a vibrant insurgency existed (.6-1), and there was a small occupation force compared to the size of the general population (0-.4). This combination of conditions resulted in a power vacuum. These four cases highlighted in red are Cambodia, South

Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Three of these cases (South Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan) scored a .8 or a 1 for a power vacuum, meaning that the occupier and the state that was put into place by the occupier was either pushed out entirely or only maintained notional control over the territory. In South Lebanon, the SLA folded once the Israelis withdrew, allowing a power vacuum to develop that Hezbollah largely filled.375 In Iraq, the US withdrew in 2011 and created a power vacuum that ISIS and other groups fought to fill, with ISIS capturing major city centers and large parts of the country.376 Afghanistan follows a similar path as Iraq, with the Afghan government only holding notional control over the country. Or, as one former US official opined in 2016, “We invade violent countries to make them peaceful and we clearly failed in

Afghanistan.”377 In Cambodia, the government “controlled” all of the major city centers, but throughout the occupation the pro-Vietnamese Cambodian government could not pacify provinces in the countryside.378 Although all four cases scored high on economic destruction, they also scored at .6, meaning that the high levels of economic destruction were not a result of

375 Ruebner, Joshua. "The South Lebanon Army (SLA): History, Collapse, Post-Withdrawal Status." CRS Report for Congress (June 10, 2000). Pg. 4. 376 "Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State." The Wilson Center. Last modified October 28, 2019. Accessed January 2, 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state. 377 Declassified Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report interviewing Ambassador James Dobbins. First cited in the Washington Post Afghan Pentagon papers report. All documents available through the Washington Post: Whitlock, Craig. "The Afghanistan Papers: A secret history of the war." The Washington Post, December 9, 2019. Accessed January 12, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan- papers/afghanistan-war- confidential-documents/. Declassified document Cited: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Report, Interview of Ambassador James Dobbins. Washington DC: SIGAR declassified documents, January 16, 2016, Pg. 43. 378 Ross, 1990. Pg. 268.

108 the occupier. Cambodia had suffered widespread destruction due to the genocide inflicted by Pol

Pot. South Lebanon had been plagued by civil war since the early 1970s; Syria’s intervention in

1976 further contributed to Lebanon’s economic destruction. Iraq’s economic struggles were largely a product of international sanctions and two failed wars, and the American occupiers’ doctrine of “‘Rapid Dominance’” was designed to limit damage while somehow simultaneously

“‘shock and awe’ the government and the people of an entire nation-state into submission.”379

Casual Combinations at a Frequency of Three

Occurring at a frequency of three (highlighted in green and blue), there are two different combinations of conditions that resulted in no power vacuum developing. The first combination is ~ISF*EconDes*~Insurgency*~occupation size=NoPV. These cases include Italy, Germany and Eastern Austria. These cases lacked strong indigenous forces and had high levels of economic destruction, limited to no insurgent movement, and a relatively small occupation force.

The second set of combinations that occur at a frequency of three was Japan, the Ryukyus

Islands, and Bosnia. In each of these cases, the occupied state had a strong ISF, high levels of economic destruction, no insurgency, and a small occupation force.

If we unpack these combinations a little further, it reveals some basic trends we need to be aware of. Most notably, all but one case had high levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier. Secondly, one set of conditions had strong ISF, while the other had weak ISF.

Highlighted in blue, the first combination

(~ISF*EconDes*~Insurgency*~OccupationSize=NoPV) (case studies: Italy, Germany and East

Austria) reveals that all conditions scored low except for economic destruction. Italy registered the highest level of insurgency activity at a .4, but the other cases had almost no semblance of

379 Sepp, Kalev I. "From ‘Shock and Awe’ to ‘Hearts and Minds’: the fall and rise of US counterinsurgency capability in Iraq." Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 217-30. Pg. 217.

109 resistance. Furthermore, economic destruction had a level of .8 or 1 in each case. Highlighted in green, the second set of combinations (Japan, Ryukyus and Bosnia) also had high levels of economic destruction, with only Bosnia scoring lower than a .8. Meaning, like the previous set of combinations, Japan and the Ryukyus had high levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying force (in this case the US). Although the Ryukyus was split off from Japan and occupied separately, it still suffered from widespread destruction during the war. American bombers began targeting the chain of islands in September 1944, and by the conclusion of the battle of Okinawa, the islands suffered widespread food shortages with most of the infrastructure destroyed.380Although Bosnia was afflicted with widespread damage, this was not due to NATO and EU forces. Instead, damages from the 1991-1995 war and ethnic cleansing caused most of the damage.381

Unlike the first set of combinations (Italy, Germany, East Austria) the cases of Japan,

Ryukyus, and Bosnia had efficient security forces scoring a .6. Japan’s forces never faced a real external threat, as American occupation forces assured external security. However, Japan’s NPR successfully combated internal communist guerrilla activities.382 Like Japan, the Ryukyus ISF did not have an external threat due to the large US presence. However, ISF never failed to supplement US imposed internal security.383 Bosnia’s ISF is perhaps the weakest of the three.

Despite this, they are under state control, not sectarian-controlled, and they continue to meet the reform benchmarks established by NATO.384 Given that all three cases were coded as .6, this

380 Fisch Jr., Arnold G. Military Government in The Ryukyu Islands 1945-1950. Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1988. Pg. 38-54. 381 See Bosnia Section. 382 See Japan Section. 383 See Ryukyus section. 384 Sito-Sucic, Daria. "U.S. backs NATO membership for Bosnia, dismisses Serb opposition." Reuters. Accessed October 6, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-usa-nato/us-backs-nato-membership-for-bosnia- dismisses-serb-opposition-idUSKBN1OG238

110 means ISF is efficient or untested. In these cases, it is apparent that ISF was not tested by an external threat, since the occupying force maintained a prolonged presence. The US still maintains a presence in Japan and the Ryukyus today, despite having officially ended the occupation in 1952 and 1972 respectively. Meanwhile, EU peacekeeping forces, which relieved

NATO forces, also still maintain a small presence in Bosnia today. Thus a prolonged presence indicates that ISF may be efficient, because the presence of the occupation force gives the ISF

“space to grow.” “Space to grow” gives ISF time to fill their ranks, develop doctrine, and professionalize a cadre of forces capable of maintaining a monopoly on violence.

Casual Combinations Appearing at a Frequency of Two

This leads us to our next set of causal combination:

~ISF*~EconDes*Insurgency*~OccupationSize=PV, which occurs in two cases: South Korea and the West Bank. Unlike the other three causal combinations listed above, economic destruction was limited. The Korean peninsula suffered limited damage in the leadup to the occupation, and what destruction it did suffer was a result of losing Japan as a market (after the

Japanese surrender) and because the division of Korea at the 38th parallel left the state economically disjointed.385 The West Bank was so underdeveloped before the occupation that the six-day conflict had limited lasting economic impact. Both cases were also plagued by an insurgency, with South Korea having widespread uprisings in 1946 and 1948.386 The West Bank had seemingly continual insurgent violence for years, with the most pronounced violence coming during the first and second intifada. Both of these groups had weak ISF as well. Although the

South Korean ISF was able to pacify most of the insurgency, they were completely unprepared to maintain external security, evidenced by their performance during the opening month of the

385 IBID. See Section on Economic destruction of South and North Korea. 386 IBID. South Korea Section.

111 Korean War. In the lead up to the first intifada, West Bank ISF was exceptionally weak, refusing to even challenge the PLO.387

After this, all combinations of conditions only occur at a frequency of one. Thus, these combinations are less valuable, because causal combinations that have a larger N size can help identify trends in the data. Since the dataset is n=16, the most useful cases occur at a frequency of three or more. In other words, it’s important to see if there are any trends in the ten cases, which fell into the three causal combinations that occur at a frequency of three or more.

High Frequency Causal Combinations This section analyzes trends in high frequency causal combinations, meaning they appear at a frequency of three or greater. The most obvious of these trends is that high levels of economic destruction occurs in every single one of them, which is to be expected since high levels of economic destruction occurs in all but three of our sixteen case studies. However, what is unique is that of the six no power vacuum cases, five of them had high levels of destruction where the occupying state was responsible for that destruction. Furthermore, in only three cases is there a presence of both high economic destruction and viable ISF (Japan, the Ryukyus, and

Bosnia, as cited earlier). Another notable trend that holds true for these ten cases is that in all the cases that resulted in a PV, none of them had high levels of economic destruction levied on them by the occupier.

TABLE 7.3 High Frequency Cases Only

387 IBD. See West Bank ISF Section.

112 Furthermore, of our high frequency cases, there were no instances where the occupier inflicted high levels of economic destruction and a viable insurgency existed. Along a similar trend line, of the five cases that did not have widespread occupier-inflicted economic destruction, all but one had a vibrant insurgency. Most importantly, of all the high frequency combinations that resulted in no power vacuum developing, except for Bosnia, they all had occupier-inflicted economic destruction (meaning they scored 0.8 or higher).

This trend confirms our project theory, which is that a high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupying military is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory. Combinations of other conditions help influence the advent or absence of a power vacuum, but economic destruction inflicted by the occupier is the only necessary condition. Furthermore, economic destruction inflicted by the occupier also impacts the presence of other conditions, most notably an insurgency.

Where Do These Finding Differ from Edelstein? These findings do not discredit or dismiss other literature on occupations. In fact, they build upon the previous work of others, especially David Edelstein’s Occupational Hazards. As demonstrated earlier through QCA, Edelstein’s threat environment theory holds weight when these three conditions are studied in isolation. However, Edelstein’s threat environment assumes that threat environment conditions are inherent to the occupation. The total destruction equals total buy-in theory disputes this assumption, arguing that an occupier can shape the threat environment, provided the occupier is willing to inflict large amounts of economic destruction.

In essence, Total Destruction Theory argues that the occupier can create a positive threat environment as long as they are willing to engage in a sweeping destruction of the occupied territory.

113 Agreeing with Edelstein There are some key principles that this project agrees with Edelstein on. First, occupations are lengthy, even the most successful ones.388 Every occupation that prevented a power vacuum lasted at least five years; most lasted much longer. Building off Edelstein, length does not mean success, as occupations that do not have a power vacuum often lasted at a long time as well.

Second, Edelstein argues that occupations are more likely to be successful if they have followed a destructive war.389 In part, this assertion is true. As described earlier, economic destruction and the prevention of a power vacuum have a direct correlation. However, Edelstein does not take an extended look at this condition, only noting that it can benefit the occupier. He also does not appear to deem economic destruction as a necessary condition for success. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, economic destruction itself plays a very important role in preventing the emergence of a power vacuum. However, total destruction theory argues that this condition cannot simply be binary in nature. Instead, in order to prevent the development of a power vacuum, this condition must be widespread, and it has to be inflicted by the occupier.

Third, the occupier rebuilding the occupied state helps ensure success. This condition was not evaluated in depth by this research project. However, the 2004 Occupational Hazards

International Security article identified this as a relevant factor. A cursory examination of this factor seems to validate it as relevant. In the cases of Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan, the Rykuys,

North Korea, Bosnia, and Kosovo, large sums of aid were injected into rebuilding these states by the occupying force. In all cases, no power vacuum developed. Edelstein maintains that this helps solidify the first condition--consent to be occupied--as the occupied population recognizes

388 Edelstein 2004. Pg. 51 389 IBID.; Pg. 59.

114 that it needs assistance in rebuilding itself. Total destruction Theory does not dispute the fact that engaging in nation-building can help pacify the occupied state. However, total destruction theory argues that this aid is usually only useful after the occupier has inflicted widespread destruction.

Reconstruction aid helps, but it cannot assure success. The Vietnamese attempted to rebuild Cambodia, and the US poured billions of dollars into Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet all three occupations developed a power vacuum and would be deemed a failure by Edelstein. The reason for this? Each country suffered from high economic destruction, but that destruction was not produced by the occupying power. The occupied population was not coerced into accepting the occupation nation-building aid, thus limiting the impact of the reconstruction efforts.

Difference One of the key departures from Edelstein’s research is in regards to his claim that a fundamental challenge of an occupation is to convince the occupied population not to resist it.

This research project argues that coercing--not convincing--the occupied population is what is necessary. “Hearts and minds” only matters after the population has experienced extreme devastation. Edelstein assumes that a positive threat environment cannot be shaped. In essence this is the point of his second condition-- external threat to the occupier and the occupied--which he argues is a necessary condition for success. He also argues that occupiers can co-opt different wartime institutions.390 This argument is flawed, as it assumes the population or the wartime institutions have a choice. An outside actor threatening the occupier and the occupied is more of a convenience than a necessary condition. North Korea had no outside threat; nor did Bosnia and

Kosovo. Yet these are all successful occupations, and they developed no power vacuum. His threat environment theory also assumes that the battle space cannot be used to shape the

390 IBID.; Pg. 60.

115 occupation conditions, meaning the way in which war is waged carries less weight than the three threat environment conditions that are inherent to the occupation.

For example, Edelstein would argue that the Allied occupation of Germany had the presence of all three threat environment conditions: consent to be occupied, common external threat, and expectation that the occupation would end. This project generally agrees that all three conditions existed and does not dispute the fact that the presence of these conditions benefited the occupier. However, this project argues that the favorable occupation environment was shaped by the wholesale economic destruction levied on Germany. The massive economic destruction coerced the population into Edelstein’s first threat environment condition (consent to be occupied). This widespread economic destruction also suppressed any potential nationalist feelings, evidenced by the fact that the German “werewolves” never gained any traction. The common external threat condition was present, and this benefited western occupiers. However, the expectation that the occupation would end is a weak condition, since US forces never actually left Germany. After the occupation of Germany ended, if you were a common German citizen with no working knowledge of international law or political science, it might be difficult for you to ascertain if occupation forces were actually ever planning to leave, especially since you still saw American GIs running around your country. The average German citizen could not tell the difference between a status of forces agreement and a military occupation. The massive amounts of destruction levied by Allied forces likely gave them the impression that Allied forces would leave whenever they wanted to leave, and Germany had little to say in the matter.

In Japan and Italy, the common external threat variable carries weight, but not as much as in Germany. In fact, the external threat was more of a threat to the US than to Japan or Italy. In

Japan, the Soviet Union may have been a threat, but not to the degree that it was in Germany or

116 Austria, or even to the degree that Edelstein argues. The JCP won nearly twenty percent of the vote in some elections and had large numbers of members. It was not until the JCP turned to a policy of militancy in the later years of the occupation did it become a public pariah.391 In Italy, communism was not seen as a threat to a vast majority of the population, unlike how it was by

Italy’s Western occupiers. The Italian communists were the strongest of the partisan groups and had wide-ranging support in Italy.392 Much of their poor showing in elections can be attributed to heavy American involvement. It was in Italy where the CIA manipulated its first election in order to prevent a communist election at the polls.393 American officials also created a massive campaign to get Italian Americans to write letters urging their relatives back in Italy to vote against the communists.394 Much like in Germany, the third condition is present in Italy and

Japan, but to what degree it’s difficult to tell.

As stated earlier, this project does not dispute the presence or absence of the threat environment conditions highlighted in Occupational Hazards. However, it does dispute the weight they carry, specifically arguing that these conditions are dependent on high levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier. Total Destruction Theory argues that populations are not accepting of occupations but rather preceding conflict offers populations no other choice.

Furthermore, common external threat needs to be measured as a ratio, not as a binary condition as Occupational Hazards treats it. The threat of communism may have been real, but to what degree the occupied population saw it as a threat can easily be disputed. In the case of Austria, it’s readily apparent that Austrians viewed the Soviet Union as a threat, evidenced by the fact

391 See Japan ISF and Insurgency Section. 392 See Italian ISF and Insurgency Section. 393 For a complete description and discussion of this, see the Italian Case Study Chapter. 394 Corke, Sarah-Jane. "George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare." Journal of Conflict Studies 26, no. 1 (2006): 101-20. Pg. 104.

117 that communists won barely five percent of the vote in 1945.395 However, communists enjoyed widespread support in other occupation territories like Italy and Japan, and in some cases it took heavy Allied involvement to prevent them from coming to power through elections.

Additionally, credible guarantee of leaving is a difficult condition to assess, especially when the occupier never actually leaves the country. For legal purposes the occupation may have ended, but this likely means little to the average citizen.

The point of this section was not to poke holes in Occupational Hazards or even to discredit its findings. Instead, the objective was to build upon this literature and demonstrate how new data highlights a new necessary condition. Since the article publication in 2004 (and the book publication in 2008), new data has become available that allows us to reevaluate different conditions and their impact on the military occupations. More importantly, four case studies

Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are now at least twenty years old, meaning they can definitively be marked as a success or a failure. Initially, Edelstein marked these cases as incomplete; however, Bosnia and Kosovo have not developed a power vacuum, while Iraq and

Afghanistan have. As a result, this project was able to collect new available data on each case study and make a definitive assertion about what helped prevent and deter a power vacuum in each.

Applying a reanalysis and replication approach to these sixteen cases studies allowed this project to formulate the total destruction equals total buy-in theory. This theory’s main contention is that the threat environment is not inherent, but instead can be shaped to the occupier’s favor, provided the occupier is willing to inflict widespread destruction on the

395 See Austrian Section listed earlier.

118 occupied territory before beginning the occupation. In other words, total destruction is a morally dubious but necessary condition.

119

CHAPTER 8: Italian Case Study Total Destruction Leads to Total Buy-In For Italy

FSQCA has demonstrated the validity of Total Destruction Theory by demonstrating its presence in cases that did not develop a power vacuum. However, as this project has acknowledged, other conditions play a vital role in determining the outcome of an occupation, meaning other conditions could be more impactful than economic destruction. The strength of the ISF and threat environment are two conditions that come to mind, and both were explored at length earlier in the project. ISF strength was evaluated during the fsQCA section, and the threat environment was explored when Edelstein’s dataset was retested. Both of these conditions are impactful in determining the outcome of an occupation, but unlike total destruction, neither of them is a necessary condition. To demonstrate this, we need to take an in-depth look at the mechanisms of a case study and process trace what we should expect to see if one or both of these conditions were more impactful than economic destruction. Similarly, we need to evaluate what mechanisms we should see if total destruction is the most impactful condition.

To accomplish this, we will use Italy as our case study. Italy was chosen because it is regarded as one of the most successful cases of military occupation in modern history. Today,

Italy is a stable democratic state, not a threat to its former Western occupiers or the region as a whole. In fact, it became an original member of NATO and a strong Western ally against the

Soviet Union.

According to Edelstein, the cornerstone of this successful occupation was a positive threat environment, where “Italy benefited from two successive commonly perceived external

120 threats.”396 Furthermore, Italy’s ISF are considered some of the more efficient and capable forces in Europe, having participated in NATO’s mission to Afghanistan.397 Thus, if the two conditions were necessary for preventing a power vacuum, we should expect to find evidence of them in the

Italian case study. However, both conditions are largely absent. Despite Edelstein’s assertion,

Italy did not have a positive threat environment, because many Italians did not view communism as a threat. Additionally, Italian security forces were exceptionally weak during the occupation and for decades after it ended. However, what is apparent is the impact total economic destruction had on Italian society. By destroying the Italian state, the Western Allies destroyed the rule of law, any sense of security, and basic goods and services provided by the former state.

As such, this gave them a “trump card” which could be wielded in the form of food, security, and economic aid. This made the Italian population completely dependent on the Western Allies and those they chose to empower.

Positive Threat Environment

As mentioned earlier, Edelstein argues Italy was successful because Western occupiers were operating in a positive threat environment. The cornerstone of the positive threat environment argument is that the occupied and the occupier share a common external threat.

Having a common external threat means the population consents to be occupied. In this case study, the common external threat is communism. If this is accurate, the Italian general population should demonstrate a genuine fear of Soviet-inspired communism taking hold in

Italy. Thus we would expect to see a clear rejection of communism and the Soviet Union. This would be demonstrated though archival evidence and at the ballot box, where Italians would

396 Edelstein 2008. Pg. 183. 397 For a more complete picture of the current state of Italian police forces read: Barbagli, Marzio, and Laura Sartori. "Law Enforcement activists in Italy." Journal of Modern Italian Studies 9, no. 2 (2004): 161-85.

121 have the opportunity to vote against the Italian communist party. In other post-WWII occupations, this anti-communist positive threat environment condition is clearly articulated at the ballot box. For example, in Austria, local communists performed poorly during post-war elections, despite a large Soviet occupation in Eastern Austria. Thus it is easy to ascertain that

Austria and her Western Allied occupiers (who resided in Western Austria) shared a common fear of communism and the Soviet Union. As such, we should expect to see a similar trend in

Italy’s elections.

However, unlike in Austria, Italians had a rather positive view of communism and the

Soviet Union. Beginning in WWII, Italy’s experience with communism came from interactions with Italian communist partisan groups. These groups were highly organized and fought well against Fascist elements in Italy.398 In 1944, the Italian communist party (PCI) was estimated to have 100,000 members and “in a single day was known to have received more than 100,000 lire in legitimate subscriptions, to which most were ‘almost certainly’ added subsidies from the

Soviets.”399 The PCI was so popular and well-organized that the first election the CIA ever manipulated was the 1948 Italian national elections.400

Unlike the occupations in Germany and Austria, where Western occupiers were concerned about the advance of Soviet forces, in Italy the US believed that communists could come to power through the ballot box. If this happened, the US decided that it would mobilize forces to send to the region, providing financial and military assistance to support an Italian

398 Corke, Sarah-Jane. "George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare." Journal of Conflict Studies 26, no. 1 (2006): 101-20. 399 Ellwood, David W. Italy 1943-1945. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1985. Pg. 90. 400 Corke, Sarah-Jane. "George Kennan and the Inauguration of Political Warfare." Journal of Conflict Studies 26, no. 1 (2006): 101-20. Pg. 101-104.

122 anticommunist underground movement. 401 These fears were so significant the National Security

Council (NSC) recommended that American agencies operating inside of Italy “escalate their anti-communist operations ‘by all feasible means.’”402 The US even tried to coordinate with members of the Italian military to conduct a potential coup d’état should the communist win electoral victory. This highlights another issue with the positive threat environment thesis.

Specifically, if there was a common external threat, we would not see the US using covert activities to ensure that communists did not take control through popular support. Rather, you would expect to see the US taking active measures to ensure that communist agents were unable to actively undermine a free and fair election. Instead, what you see is the opposite–the CIA taking active measures that help create a predetermined outcome. Furthermore, the US begins to publicly and privately signal that it will only provide aid to Italy if anti-communist parties are elected. The fruits of these signals were successful, as the pro-Western Christian Democratic party won the national elections in 1948. In turn, the US overtly gave $1.5 billion in aid to the pro-Western De Gasperi government to help rebuild Italy’s economy after the 1948 election.403

Despite this aid and covert intervention, communist popularity continued to grow. The

CIA assessed that pro-communist groups were growing stronger, “polling 31 percent of the total vote in the 1948 elections and about 35 percent in the 1951 and 1952 local elections.”404

Meanwhile, pro-Western parties like the Christian Democrats saw their share of the vote

401 Landa, Ronald D. Shots from a Luce Cannon: Combatting Communism in Italy, 1953-1956. 4th Draft. Washington DC: DECLASSIFIED Defense Department History, 2011. Declassified in 2016. Pg. 5. Document Posted by the National Security Archive: Landa, Ronald D. "CIA Covert Aid to Italy Averaged $5 Million Annually from Late 1940s to Early 1960s, Study Finds." National Security Archive. Last modified February 7, 2017. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing- book/intelligence/2017-02- 07/cia-covert-aid-italy-averaged-5-million-annually-late-1940s. 402 Boghardt, Thomas. "By All Feasible Means." The Wilson Center. Last modified May 1, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/all-feasible-means. 403 CIA, Italian National Elections. CIA-RDP80R01443R000100140007-0, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1953, Pg. 1. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01443r000100140007-0 (Accessed March 24, 2020). Note about citation: 1953 is not indicated on the document nor on the archival website. 1953 is inferred from reading the document. 404 IBID.

123 plummet from 63-percent in 1948 to 51 percent in 1952.405 Simultaneously, anti-American feelings were growing in Italy “as the result of US tariff restrictions and Italy’s political and physical relations with NATO.”406

As the Italian public became increasingly more supportive of communist efforts, the US worried about the Soviet Union’s growing influence in Italy. An NSC memo warned that “if the

Soviet Union gained control of Italy, it ‘could dominate the Western Mediterranean and could apply substantial military power against the Balkans and Western Europe.”’407 To combat this, the US created the Psychological Strategy Board (PBS), later becoming the Operations

Coordination Board (OCB), with the objective of weakening communism in Italy.408 The idea behind the OCB was to help supplement overt aid with covert political funding to support anti- communist activists in Italy.409 Covert political funding to Italy became so large that William

Colby maintained that the program was the CIA’s largest-ever political action program.410

However, these efforts did not prove fruitful, as Italian communists polled increasingly well and positive views of the Soviet Union continued to grow across Italy. President

Eisenhower wrote a letter to the US Ambassador in Italy lamenting this problem, saying that he found it “odd that of all the countries in which we have been opposing Communism, we have had less success in Italy then in any other.”411 He went on to say that despite large sums of US aid and support, “every new report from Italy bears evidence of an increasing resentment against

405 IBID.; Pg.2. 406 CIA, The Continuing Strength of the Italian Communist Party, Office of Current Intelligence. CIA- RDP91T01172R000200300041-3, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, May 28, 1953, Pg. 2. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia- rdp91t01172r000200300041-3 (Accessed March 24, 2020). 407 Landa , 2011. Pg.1. 408 IBID.; Pg. 1-2. 409 IBID.; Pg. 57-59. 410 IBID.; Pg. 58. 411 IBID.; Pg. 14.

124 us [the US] and increased respect for the Soviets.”412 Despite the popularity of communism, a largely positive view of the PCI, and the public knowledge that De Gasperi was largely dependent on the US, a majority of Italians never supported the PCI. Furthermore, after 1947 the

Christian Democrats refused to form a government that included PCI, even when the PCI and the

Christian Democrats aligned on several key issues.

Italian Security Forces

This leads to our second argument: that ISF is the most impactful condition in determining the outcome of an occupation. If this were true, we should expect to see Italian security forces combating internal and external threats to Italy. A strong and capable Italian security force deterring Yugoslavian advances into northern Italy would demonstrate evidence of this. Furthermore, Western occupiers should demonstrate confidence in the ISF’s ability to combat any internal communist threats, which may use violence and disorder to gain power.

However, US officials had little faith that Italian security forces could maintain internal security and secure the border with Yugoslavia. 413

In the case of Yugoslavia, Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito had long claimed sovereignty over the city of Trieste and the hinterlands around Italy’s northern border.414 Thus the threat of

Yugoslavia invading Italy’s northern border was constant. Western occupiers deterred this by occupying a portion of Trieste, which would become known as Zone A. In 1945, the US was determined to prevent an attack by Tito. George Marshal ordered General Eisenhower to

“assemble his armored divisions and prepare them for a rapid movement” to support Allied

412 IBID.; Pg 15. [the US] was added to provide clarity to the quote. 413 Mistry, Kaeten. 2014. The United States, Italy and the Origins of Cold War : Waging Political Warfare, 1945– 1950. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg.137. 414 Pedaliu, 2001. Pg. 44-45.

125 forces along the Yugoslav-Italian border.415 This order came at the same time the US needed to divert manpower for the planned invasion of Japan.416 This border contention began before

WWII ended, so it’s unreasonable to expect war-torn Italian security forces to have protected their own borders at the onset of this confrontation. However, this potential flashpoint over

Italy’s northeastern border was kept in check by the presence of Western Forces for years, as they were deployed directly across from Yugoslav Forces until 1954.417

In 1953, the US decided to announce plans to withdraw from Trieste, at which point the

Italians would administer Zone A.418 If Italian security forces were strong, Western forces would have felt confident to let it control Zone A to deter Yugoslav forces. However, a lack of trust in the Italian security forces is evidenced by the plan being shelved following Yugoslavia’s

“[threat] to use military force to prevent Italian armed forces from entering the zone.”419 More importantly, Yugoslavia knowingly made this threat without Soviet support. The Tito-Stalin split happened in 1948, and Yugoslavia had been on the wrong side of aggressive support for Greek communists during the Greek civil war.420 Meaning when Yugoslavia made this threat against

Italy’s forces, it was not doing so from a position of preeminent strength.

The Western Allies’ refusal to let Italian forces hold Zone A of Trieste signifies just how little those forces had progressed since the occupation began in 1943. Despite the large sums of aid distributed to Italian forces over the years, Western allies had little confidence that they could

415 Miller, 1986. Pg.165. 416 IBID. 417 Pedaliu, Effie. "Britain and the Reconstruction of the Post-Fascist Italian Armed Forces 1943-48." Cold War History 2, no. 1 (October 2001): 39-68. Pg. 44-45. Landa, 2011. Pg. 12-13. 418 Landa, 2011. Pg.13. 419 IBID. 420 Mehta, Coleman. "The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951." Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 (2011): 101-45. Pg. 108. Tito initially gave strong support to Greek communist (DA-Democratic Army of Greece), but after the split with Stalin the DA decided to side with Stalin over Tito.

126 operate independently. A few months before this, in March 1953, a National Intelligence

Estimate (NIE) indicated that Italian Armed Forces had received extensive aid, but by themselves they “are presently capable of no more than a short-term delaying action in the event of a major attack.”421 Furthermore, Italy’s Armed Forces would likely not meet its NATO goals and “for the foreseeable future Italy will remain one of the weaker members of the coalition and will likely rely heavily on continued US support.”422 Consider this in addition to a 1947 CIA report that assessed Italian security forces as incapable of major military operations.423 These two assessments are striking; the assessments are nearly six years apart, yet Italian security forces have made little if any progress. If ISF are responsible for the success of an occupation, we should expect to see highly classified reports indicating ISF have made significant strides over the years. Yet these reports are absent, even a decade after the occupation began. Instead, Italian security forces are consistently assessed as weak and incapable of standing on their own.

Riots broke out across Italy shortly after the US shelved its plan to withdraw from

Trieste, further validating the lack of confidence in the Italian Security Forces.424 These riots were concerning because historically Italian security forces were unable to subdue communist- led riots.425 As a result, the riots drove Italy into a widening crisis of instability. The situation became so dire that the US Ambassador advocated increasing “US covert financial support” to combat the expanding power of communism within Italy.426 In response to the crisis, the US

421 CIA, Probable Developments in Italy, National Intelligence Estimates. DOC_0000009589, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, March 31, 1953, Pg. 4. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia- rdp79r01012a002400020001-4 (Accessed March 28, 2019). 422 IBID. 423 CIA, The Current Situation in Italy, National Intelligence Estimates. DOC_0000009589, Washington DC: CIA Reading Room, 1947, Pg. 3. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000009589.pdf. (accessed October 28, 2019). 424 Landa, 2011. Pg 13 425 Miller, 1986. Pg. 192. 426 Landa, 2011. Pg. 14.

127 would continue its covert political action program in Italy for years to come. Furthermore, the weakness of Italian security meant they had to remain under tight control and tutelage of

American military and Christian Democratic party until the 1970s.427

The Presence of Total Destruction

The one condition which is undeniably present is total destruction. The war had wreaked complete destruction on almost all aspects of Italian society. It decimated Italy’s GDP per capita, foreign currency, and human capital. Despite the popularity of communism and the weakness of security forces, it was the Western Allies that held the ultimate “trump card” of food, money, supplies, and military force.428 Here, Allied forces could distribute benefits to whomever they chose, giving them the unique ability to decide which political groups could provide goods and services to the general population. In essence, this made the Western occupiers kingmakers. This trump card only became available to the Western occupying forces once they destroyed the state and all the support systems it provided. It created a situation where the population would be completely beholden to whoever could provide the aid and reestablish basic tenets of food and security.

The presence of economic destruction is easy to quantify--much more so than ISF or threat environment conditions. The Italian section in chapter six goes into quantitative and qualitative detail about the destruction of Italy. However, determining the weight of its impact compared to other conditions is a more nuanced task. In effect, we must look for indicators that demonstrate how the basic needs of the Italian population coerced them into accepting the occupation. Thus we should expect to see qualitative data and archival evidence that shows how fully the support structures of the state had been destroyed.

427 For a more complete analysis see the earlier Italian ISF section. 428 Ellwood, 1985. Pg. 236.

128 The most apparent example of how the state had collapsed was through food insecurity in

Italy. The conflicts had caused Italy’s agricultural production to plummet in all regions of the country, and livestock production fell by 55%.429 By 1944 and 1945, most of the population was subject to relocation, and the average food consumption fell.430 As food became scarce, nutritional standards fell, leading to an increase in the infant mortality rate.431 Journalist Alan

Moorehead said in Italy he was witnessing “the moral collapse of a people:”

They had no pride any more, or dignity. The animal struggle for existence

governed everything. Food. That was the only thing that mattered. Food for the

children. Food for yourself. Food at the cost of any debasement and depravity.

And after food a little warmth and shelter.432

This meant the Italian population was completely subservient to whoever the Western Allies chose to empower. As such, successive aid plans would go to Italy, but only if pro-Western anti- communist regimes were in power. Most prominent among these aid plans was the Marshall

Plan, which was specifically tied to the elimination of communist influences within the Italian government.

The US publicly warned moderate pro-Western political parties that aid would not be provided if they worked with the PCI. In April 1947, De Gasperi wrote Truman a letter suggesting that he could not dismiss the PCI from participating in his government, but he could try to lessen its impact.433 The US responded with a series of private and public pronouncements directed at De Gasperi and the Italian people, demanding an Italian government free of the PCI

429 Daniele, Vittorio, and Renato Ghezzi. "The Impact of World War II on nutrition and children's health in Italy." Economic History Research 15 (2019): 119-31. Pg. 120. 430 IBID.; Pg. 121-123. 431 IBID.; Pg. 124. 432 Alan Moorhead quoted in: Ellwood, David W. Italy 1943-1945. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc., 1985. Pg. 49. 433 Miller, 1986. Pg. 228.

129 or Italy would suffer the consequences. These consequences included withholding aid to any government that included the PCI and US support for anti-communists groups that would subvert any PCI government that came to power.

In a meeting with De Gasperi, Ambassador James C. Dunn told him that any American aid depended on Italians “‘putting their homes in order.’”434 This meant the Italian government had to rid itself of the PCI. De Gasperi responded by resigning and forming a one-party minority government, effectively expelling the PCI from the government.435 Shortly after, the State

Department released a public statement applauding this move.436 On the heels of this announcement, George C. Marshall announced the Marshal plan in a speech at Harvard

University.437 This aid gave financial resources and “promised jobs and a better life to Italy’s people,” something the PCI could never match.438 The timing of this announcement was not a coincidence. It sought to leverage the strength of pro-Western leaders like De Gasperis that had purged communist from their governments. Several months earlier, President Truman addressed

Congress, pledging that the US would provide aid to “free people” fighting communism around the world.439 This signified the birth of the Truman doctrine, but more importantly it signaled

America’s “no-compromise solution” to dealing with communism in the Greek Civil War.440 In

Greece, the US would support bloody crackdowns against Greek communists. Furthermore, the

Greek Civil War served as a warning to Italy. Although PCI leader Togliattie had private

434 Miller, James E. "Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948." Diplomatic History 7, no. 1 (Winter 1983): 33-55. Pg. 40. 435 Miller, 1986. Pg. 229. 436 Miller, 1986. Pg. 230. 437 IBID. 438 Miller, 1983. Pg. 40 439 IBID.; Pg. 38. 440 Nachmani, Amikam. "Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49." Journal of Contemporary History, 25, no. 4 (1990): 489-522. Pg. 499.

130 reservations about dragging Italy into a civil war, the US did not.441 This is evidenced by the US reaching out to members of the Italian military about starting an underground resistance in the event of a PCI electoral victory.442 More tellingly, the US delayed the withdrawal of American occupation troops from Italy and then conducted a massive air and naval show of force when they finally left.443 The US initiated a unified command in Norfolk, Virginia to coordinate a possible intervention should a civil war break out in Italy.444 The command and these plans became publicly known, which should have advantaged the PCI. Though the PCI tried to use the information to stir up nationalist feelings against the US, it gained little traction.

By publicly announcing the Marshall plan and US support for De Gasperi forcing the PCI out of the government, De Gasperi was directly linked to US aid. De Gasperi never shied away from this. The Soviets inadvertently reinforced this narrative when they walked out of the Paris conference during the first session on the Marshall plan.445 However, the US message was clear.

Aid was tied to anti-communist governments, and communist influences would be subverted by any means necessary.

The fact that the Italian population was willing to go along with American strong-arm tactics highlights the impact and significance of total destruction. By effectively destroying the state, Western allies had coerced the population into accepting its edicts. As Moorehead stated earlier, “The animal struggle for existence governed everything.” This crude statement demonstrates how desperate the Italian population had become for food and security. Although

Italian communists were well-organized and seen as capable by the general population, they

441 Landa, 2011. Pg. 44. 442 Boghardt, Thomas. "By All Feasible Means." The Wilson Center. Last modified May 1, 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/all-feasible-means. 443 Miller, 1983. Pg. 43-45. 444 Miller, 1983. Pg.45. 445 Miller, 1986. Pg. 231.

131 could not provide massive amounts of aid like the US. In most cases, heavy foreign intervention should spur nationalist resentment among a population. But Italy had experienced extreme devastation and thus was willing to subjugate itself to Western occupiers who could provide relief. In fact, it was the PCI that tried to stir up nationalist reactions to De Gasperi’s open embrace of American intervention. Communists campaigned against “subservience to America,” yet this mattered little.446 The US could provide things the PCI and even the Soviets never could, such as a $100-million Export-Import Bank loan.447

The US could fill the vacuum of power left by the collapsed Italian State with military force and aid to alleviate the suffering of the average Italian. For the most part, Togliatti and the

PCI could only offer Leninist ideals. Many Italians viewed the PCI in a positive light. Its strength was evident by the minority support it received at the polls and the ease at which they subverted

Italian security forces when inciting riots and strikes. However, the majority of the Italians were never willing to mortgage their future on the PCI. Italy, a country wreaked by war, food shortages, infrastructure damage, loss of human life, and poverty would accept American aid and the strings attached to it, because it provided the surest route out of total destruction.

446 O'Hare McCormick, Anne. "The Danger to Italy Is Not Communism but Chaos." The New York Times, June 5, 1953. 447 Miller, 1983. Pg. 38.

132

CHAPTER 9: Policy Recommendations

This study yields three key lessons about power vacuums and military occupation. These lessons are that there is a need to apply total destruction, that indigenous forces take years to become viable, and that power vacuums keep the occupier in the territory for decades.

Policy Lesson One: Total Destruction is a Necessity Total destruction prevents a power vacuum from developing. This is unfortunate because it involves large losses of human life and the destruction of infrastructure. However, before deciding to occupy a state, policymakers must be prepared to inflict wide-scale destruction to prevent a power vacuum from developing. For example, in Germany and Japan, Allied forces did not limit themselves to bombing military targets. Instead, they expanded their war campaign to wreak total destruction on these states. America so committed itself to the destruction of Japan that it ordered high-altitude B-29 bombers to fly low altitude missions. This exposed the B-29 to

Japanese anti-aircraft defenses, but it maximized the damage they could inflict on Japanese cities.448 These raids resulted in thousands of Japanese civilians killed and the destruction of most Japanese infrastructure. The Allied bombing of Germany followed a similar pattern, killing thousands of German civilians and destroying German infrastructure. 449 In both cases, no power vacuum developed. Despite the fact that Allied occupation forces struggled early in the occupation, the total destruction suppressed any resistance, allowing them to time to develop an effective occupation strategy.

Furthermore, total destruction is the most effective way to pacify the population and prevent an insurgency from developing. This is important because in every case where a power

448 Barnes, Trevor. "War by Numbers: Another Quantitative Revolution." Geopolitics 20, no. 4 (2015): 736-740. Pg. 737. 449 Beevor, Antony. The Fall of Berlin, 1945. New York: Viking, 2002. Pg. 83.

133 vacuum developed, a viable insurgency was present at some point (.6-1). However, in every case where no power vacuum developed, there was never an insurgency. Even if the insurgency was defeated, a power vacuum often developed once the occupation ended. Building an ISF that can help defeat an insurgency does not ensure the absence of a power vacuum after occupation forces leave. This is because the insurgency weakens the new government to the point that a power vacuum eventually becomes inevitable.

South Korea and Iraq serve as the best examples of this. Both cases suffered from viable insurgencies during the occupation, but in both cases the insurgency was pacified. The Rehee government brutally stamped out most resistance by 1947-48, and Iraq had seen insurgent activity plummet to low levels by the US withdrawal in 2011. However, in both cases a power vacuum developed after the occupation ended. After the occupation, South Korea and Iraq continued to receive large sums of aid from the US. Yet both new governments could not prevent a power vacuum from developing. In both South Korea and Iraq, the ISF performed poorly in the ensuing years after the occupation. South Korea crumbled in front of North Korean forces, and

Iraqi forces fell apart in the face of ISIS fighters.

Applying the lesson of total destruction cannot be confused with a quick and easy occupation. Nor should it be confused with a hard peace, meaning the occupier should not exact harsh reparations from the occupied population. In each case, where no power vacuum developed, the occupier spent large sums of time and money rebuilding the occupied state. In reality, policymakers should avoid military occupations at all costs. But if an occupation is inevitable, there can be no half measures. Wage war to prevent the emergence of a power vacuum.

134 Policy Lesson Two: ISF are Weak Building ISF is a long and slow process that is usually met with failure. Even in occupations where no power vacuum developed, ISF remained weak for significant periods of time. It is therefore unrealistic to expect ISF to maintain internal or external security for at least the first five years of occupation. This means that the burden of preventing a power vacuum must go to the occupying forces. In the sixteen cases since 1943, only four ISF could be considered “capable,” while only two cases (North Korea and Kosovo) could be considered

“good.”450

Building a new ISF is difficult for a host of reasons. The first among these is that the ISF are essentially being built from the ground up, as a state’s military and police forces are often destroyed or disbanded at the onset of an occupation. This means an occupier builds a new ISF from scratch. In the two successful cases, the ISF was built to mirror the occupier’s own security structure. North Korea modeled themselves after the Soviet centralized police force and the

NKVD.451 The North Korean army also had the distinct advantage of using China as a training ground for its military. This training ground allowed North Koreans to hone their tactics and doctrine. Kosovo ISF succeeded because occupation authorities came into the occupation with a detailed plan on how to rebuild Kosovo’s security forces.452 The playbook cultivated and applied the lessons learned from building security forces in East Timor and Bosnia.453 Mirroring many

NATO member states, the plan focused on building Kosovo’s security forces into a non-partisan independent arbitrator of law and order.

450 One of these “capable” ISF is Hezbollah. For all intents and purposes it is debatable if they fit traditional notions of ISF, since the group actively undermines security as much as it tries to establish it. 451 Armstrong, Charles K. The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002. Pg. 207. 452 Greene, Morgan, Jonathan Friedman, and Richard Bennet. "Rebuilding the Police in Kosovo." Foreign Policy. Last modified July 18, 2012. Accessed October 10, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/18/rebuilding-the- police-in- kosovo/. 453 See Section on Kosovo Security Forces.

135 However, having a preoccupation plan for building an ISF does not guarantee success. In

Germany and Iraq, occupation authorities had pre-occupation plans to build a new ISF. In both cases, these plans turned out to be ill-fitted for the occupation. In Germany, pre-occupation plans indicated that German ISF should remain weak, but this proved ineffective for the occupation security environment. The German army was rebuilt and rearmed under the control of NATO because allied occupiers believed Germany could be a bulwark against the Soviet Union.454 In

Iraq, pre-occupation plans called for downsizing and restructuring the Iraqi army, not eliminating it.455 However, in the ensuing days after the occupation, the Iraqi army “scattered.”456

Eventually, occupation authorities would disband the Iraqi army and police forces. In the case of

Germany, the pre-occupation plan was not adequate, but occupation authorities shifted to a new plan which eventually bore fruit. Iraq was the less fortunate case. The pre-occupation plan for

ISF was a failure, and the decisions made after the plan never enabled an ISF capable of operating without occupier support.

There is no evidence to suggest that a viable ISF can be built quickly during an occupation. Even in cases where no power vacuum developed, ISF remained weak for a prolonged period of time. In sum, before any military occupation begins, policymakers cannot expect ISF to maintain security for the first five years of occupation. This means that security is the responsibility of the occupation forces.

Policy Lesson Three: Power Vacuums Matter Formerly occupied territories that develop power vacuums almost always force the occupier to re-intervene. Since 1945, there have been sixteen military occupations, and seven of

454 Dobbins, 2003. Pg. 11-12. 455 Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. New York: Haper Perennial, 2009.Pg. 431-432. 456 IBID.

136 them have precipitated a power vacuum. In almost all cases, the occupier was forced to re- intervene. Re-intervention highlights the occupation’s inability to prevent the territory from becoming a threat. As a result, the occupier will likely deal with the power vacuum for years.

The power vacuums in Iraq, Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza, South Lebanon, and

South Korea forced the occupier to re-intervene with military forces. In South Korea, the US was forced to re-intervene in 1950 to prevent the complete destruction of South Korea. The US was also forced to do the same with Iraq in 2014. In the case of Afghanistan, the US has never been able to leave. Every few years the US draws down the number of troops, only to be forced to re- intervene by adding additional troops to combat the power vacuum and support the recognized

Afghan government. Since the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, Israel has constantly re-intervened with military force. Since withdrawing from South Lebanon in 2000, Israel has consistently used military force to re-intervene in Lebanon, even fighting a war in 2006.

On average, the occupier physically stays in the occupied territory for at least a decade.

Even in cases where the occupation has technically ended, the occupier still keeps forces within the “formerly” occupied territory. Only in the case of North Korea did occupation forces withdraw and stay withdrawn in under ten years.457 In cases like Italy, Germany, Japan,

Ryukyus, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where no power vacuum developed, the occupier left a sizable residual force that persists to this day.458

457 In the case of South Korea, US forces would return and stay in Korea until today. Thus, they exceed the ten year period. In the case of Austria, Soviet and American occupation forces stayed from 1945-1955. 458 US Department of Defense. Defense Manpower Data Center. Last modified December, 2019. Accessed April 1, 2020. https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. "NATO KFOR Key Facts and Figures." NATO. Last modified April , 2020. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/pdf/2020-04-KFOR-Placemat.pdf. "About: EUFOR." European Union Force in BiH. Last modified February 24, 2020. http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php/about-eufor.

137 Thus before entertaining the possibility of an occupation, policymakers should understand that it likely comes with twenty years of forward-deployed forces, power vacuum or no power vacuum. This is not inherently a negative consequence. A prolonged troop presence can allow the occupier to stabilize a region. However, if an occupier embarks on the occupation with the expectation of it being quick…this will not happen. More importantly, policymakers must understand that leaving does not absolve the occupier from any power vacuum. Power vacuums force re-intervention or the extension of an occupation. Power vacuums do not only pull in different groups competing to control the territory. They pull in occupiers that have either left the territory or are desperately trying to leave.

138

CHAPTER 10: Conclusion

This research project has created a conceptual framework for understanding power vacuums while simultaneously showing that high levels of economic destruction inflicted by an occupying power is a necessary condition for preventing a power vacuum. Known as total destruction equals total buy-in, or abbreviated as Total Destruction Theory, this argument appears draconian. However, its empirical weight is undeniable. Furthermore, this theory does not claim total destruction is morally feasible or is by itself a recipe for success. The Syrian occupation of Lebanon serves as an example of this. Occupations are difficult, and a power vacuum is the ultimate metric of failure. However, engaging in total destruction before an occupation begins gives the occupier “breathing space” to build a new government and an indigenous force. However harsh total destruction may seem, it is effective.

Conditions for a Power Vacuum Conditions that influence the presence or absence of a power vacuum are endless. One task of this research project was shifting through hundreds of conditions and distilling them into four conditions. Appearing frequently in the literature, these conditions are: Insurgency, economics, number of troops used, and indigenous forces.

Like other studies, RAND’s America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq cites a territory’s pre-occupation level of industrial development as a key factor in the outcome of an occupation. However, most studies do not examine how levels of economic destruction impact the outcome of an occupation. To his credit, Edelstein argues more study is needed in this subject area.459 In the process of doing just that, this study found that a high level of economic

459 Edelstein 2008. Pg. 169.

139 destruction is necessary to prevent a power vacuum. Furthermore, its impact greatly outweighed that of other conditions.

Conditions like ISF and insurgency played a part in pacifying a territory, but their impact is limited. In most cases, ISF remained weak for at least five years after the occupation began.

Even in cases that did not result in a power vacuum, the ISF struggled for most of the occupation. In Germany, Austria, and Italy, security forces were strong during the previous regime, but rebuilding them proved to be a challenge for the occupier.

Furthermore, cases of occupier-inflicted destruction almost never resulted in an insurgency. This is not a spurious correlation. High levels of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier coerce the occupied population into accepting the occupation. It delegitimizes the previous regime and blunts any nationalist feelings. It also gives newly established ISF “space to grow.” This “space to grow” gives ISF time to recruit competent members, establish doctrine, and even make mistakes. In Austria, Germany, Italy, and Kosovo, the ISF struggled to bring riots under control. However, these riots never spread into large, coordinated resistance. This is because large sections of the populations were still coerced into accepting the occupation, and the presence of occupation forces served as a backstop for the struggling ISF.

Total destruction is not an infinite condition. It does have an expiration date, and it must be established before the occupation begins. If an occupier inflicts high levels of economic destruction on a territory while occupying it, they undermine their own legitimacy. For example, if the US were to inflict total destruction on Afghanistan today (in 2020), it would undermine US efforts to support the Afghan government. Total destruction today would further reinforce the belief among Afghans that the current regime of Ashraf Ghani cannot protect them.

140 Do Power Vacuums Matter? Given the increased attention power vacuums have received, it is important to understand if they actually matter. The answer to this question is not binary, and it depends on an occupier’s perceived threats. In sixteen cases studies, those with a power vacuum saw high rates of occupier re-intervention. By definition, re-intervention means the occupier perceived the power vacuum as a threat to their security or interests. To this day, Israel proper faces consistent rocket attacks from Southern Lebanon.460 The US perceived ISIS to be a threat to its security and interests, re-intervening in 2014 to combat ISIS in Iraq.

However, this begs the question: is re-intervention really necessary? Are these power vacuums really threatening a former occupier’s security? With the exception of a few ISIS

“inspired” attacks on US soil, direct ISIS attacks on the US are almost negligible. Furthermore, no ISIS action against the US has ever come close to replicating the 9/11 attacks. Real threat versus perceived threat is an endless rabbit hole that this research project does not have the time or resources to address. Thus we can only evaluate the threat of a power vacuum on three criteria: Was the occupier forced to re-intervene, did an attack on the former occupier originate from the formerly occupied territory, and did the power vacuum destabilize the region. In every case study with a power vacuum, at least one of these criteria occurred.

Total Destruction Equals Total Buy-in Theory: Practicality and Morality

Total Destruction Theory does not come without glaring issues--specifically, the morality and practical application of it in 21st century warfare. While the data is clear about Total

Destruction Theory, the practice should give moral pause to policymakers wishing to apply it.

460 Baker, Aryn. "Missiles from Lebanon are Landing in Israel—But Hizballah Isn't the Suspect." Word. Time, July 17, 2014. Accessed March 1, 2020. https://time.com/3001569/rockets-attacks-from-lebanon-in-israel- hizballah/.

141 Quoting General Curtis LeMay, Robert McNamara said that when discussing their role in engineering the firebombing of Tokyo, “if we'd lost the war, we'd all have been prosecuted as war criminals.”461 In essence, McNamara and LeMay are acknowledging that the most effective warfare is fraught with moral ambiguity. The war against Japan was justified, but it still killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians. Japanese civilians were often not accidental bystanders, but instead direct targets of Allied bombing raids. Despite this, it is difficult to determine what other course of action McNamara and LeMay should have or could have taken to defeat Japan and prevent the emergence of a power vacuum. In reality, as McNamara and

LeMay most likely determined, the application of total destruction is the best option of bad options.

The practicality of applying total destruction to future military occupations is difficult.

The advent of the Internet and globalization means real-time imaging of any conflict is easily accessible to the world. This is something McNamara and LeMay never dealt with or had access to when devising plans to firebomb Japan. However, it is something McNamara would struggle with as Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War. Incessant images of war and death can sway the public against a conflict. Thus the practicality of total destruction is difficult in today’s world.

This means policymakers should avoid military occupations at all costs. Not only are they expensive, expansive, and protracted in nature, but the only necessary condition needed to prevent a power vacuum, total destruction, is difficult to trumpet. In essence, the best occupation is the one that never happens.

461 McNamara, Robert. Fog of War. Directed by Errol Morris, 2003; United States: Sony Pictures, 2003. DVD.

142 Concluding Thoughts

A high level of economic destruction inflicted by the occupier is a necessary condition for the absence of a power vacuum in the occupied territory. This is the most salient argument about how to prevent a power vacuum. It is also the most ignoble. However, the data is clear; occupations that do not suffer from high levels of occupier-inflicted economic destruction are likely to develop a power vacuum. These vacuums create regional turmoil by pulling in hostile actors, causing the occupier to re-intervene in the territory after they have withdrawn. Or worse yet: the occupier is forced stay in the occupied territory for an infinite period of time.

The cornerstone of total destruction theory--occupiers that engage in protracted conflict, inflicting widespread damage on a state before occupying it, are more likely to prevent a power vacuum from occurring--is a morally ambiguous theory that many policymakers may find distasteful. It rests heavily on coercion. The occupied population is not accepting of the occupiers; instead, they are submitting to them. As such, it highlights just how hard military occupations are. This means that policymakers must consider all possible alternatives before engaging in a conflict that might necessitate a military occupation.

However, the “advantages” of this total destruction are clear. Total destruction creates

“breathing space” for newly established ISF and the new government by tempering nationalistic resistance. As demonstrated earlier, occupier-inflicted destruction had a direct correlation to the absence of an insurgency developing. Breathing space is critical, as ISF and the newly formed governments almost always struggle in the early years of the occupation. Strong ISF and a new government cannot become legitimized if they are immediately faced with nationalist resistance.

Length of occupation, troop-to-civilian population ratio, presence of an insurgency, threat environment, geography, and others all play a part in determining the outcome of an occupation.

143 However, total destruction is more impactful, and total destruction is the only necessary condition to prevent a power vacuum.

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