America's Global Retreat and the Ensuing Strategic Vacuum

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SPECIAL REPORT America’s Global Retreat and the Ensuing Strategic Vacuum

September 2020 America’s Global Retreat and the Ensuing Strategic Vacuum By Ariel Cohen Contents The Post-Cold War Hegemony and its hortly after President Donald Trump ordered Discontents Executive Summary 3 a U.S. retreat from Syria and Afghanistan in SOctober 2019, events in the region drew U.S. Foundations of U.S. Power 3 forces right back in. The administration’s decision to target Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the The Trump Doctrine 5 Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, triggered tit-for-tat retaliation between Washington Middle Eastern Challenge 8 and Tehran at the opening of 2020, bringing bilateral tensions to their highest levels since the 1979 When Great Powers Withdraw 8 hostage crisis. Despite these actions in the region, Washington is still seeking to retreat from its security The Costs of the Global System – and commitments in the Greater Middle East and Central of Retreat 9 Asia. While there are financial and political benefits to reducing America’s footprint abroad, a reduced The Lessons of the 20th Century: Imperial presence in this geopolitically critical part of the Collapse, Chaos, and Conflict 10 world could also create a strategic vacuum with dire diplomatic, economic, and security consequences. After the Empire Departs: Case Studies 10

The specters of a resurgent Russia and rising China Partition and the Indo-Pakistani Wars 11 raise the question of how a U.S. withdrawal from the world stage could harm Washington’s long-term Arab-Israeli War 13 strategic interests. The best approach to analyzing such a scenario is through the realpolitik perspective, Post-Soviet Civil Wars in Tajikistan, Chechnya, wherein countries strive to safeguard and expand and Nagorno-Karabakh 13 their own strategic interests. By definition, strategic interests are power-based, yet they don’t exclude The 21st Century: Iraq and Syria 15 policies to uphold doctrines of democratization, state building, or liberal values, especially if raison d’etat Beware of Unintended Consequences 16 dictates it. Realist Wisdom 18 In true realist fashion, the Trump administration is concerned primarily with American economic and COVER: U.S. troops from the Combined Joint Task Force talk security interests – and domestic politics. Yet the high with Iraqi soldiers during a handover ceremony at an Iraqi base in Mosul, northern Iraq. The base was turned over to Iraqi forces Continued on next page on March 30. (Photo by Zaid AL-OBEIDI / Getty Images)

2 SEPTEMBER 2020 Continued from previous page countries and beyond, sends a very different message from the costs of maintaining a U.S.-centric international system and American one the United States is projecting diplomatic and military presence abroad brings a tremendous return: a (Ma, 2020). guaranteed place atop the international security architecture designed by the United States and its allies after World War II. Foundations of The term “strategic vacuum” refers to a situation in the international U.S. Power system whereby a regional or global hegemon withdraws from an area, leading to an imbalance of power which eventually becomes filled. The United States’ dominance has Geopolitics – like nature – abhors a vacuum. History is replete with been predicated on, among other examples that demonstrate how the rapid depressurization of a power factors, the deployment, mainte- pulling out from a region too quickly or too soon can lead to instability nance, and actions of the military in the form of civil wars, military coups or genocide. This paper argues around the world. From the Navy’s that U.S. disengagement from the Middle East and beyond would create protection of international shipping a strategic vacuum portending systemic and regional instability while lanes to the U.S. Army’s presence undermining American liberal hegemony. Other opportunist contenders in Afghanistan and Iraq since the for great power status, such as Russia and China, or even intermediate early 2000s, U.S. military assets powers such as Turkey and Iran, may view such a retreat as a strategic have played a key role in maintain- opportunity to bolster their hard and soft power around their periphery ing relative global stability. U.S. at the cost of American influence and power projection. global power is also dependent on an array of alliances in Asia and Europe, which are fraying under numerous stresses, including the lack of an agreed-upon enemy (a COVID-19 pandemic have high- role the Soviet Union used to fill), The Post-Cold War lighted the United States’ internal U.S. nationalist economic policies, Hegemony and its crises. These events may indicate and Europe’s perceived inability to Discontents how untenable this hegemony pay up for NATO defenses. Only could be if the United States does nine countries were able to meet The United States maintained a not maintain a healthy and robust the 2% of GDP share goal that U.S. position of seemingly unmatched social compact, which predicates President Barack Obama and the economic and military strength an active foreign policy. NATO leaders agreed upon at the relative to its global peers from the Wales summit and which Trump Soviet collapse until the 2010s. Trump’s ill-considered decision to doubled down on in July 2018 Despite the so-called “rise of the halt funding for, and quit, the World (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, rest” – namely the emergence of Health Organization in the middle 2014; Haltiwanger, 2019). China as a near-peer competi- of a pandemic ceded ground to tor, the re-emergence of Russian Beijing and projected the image of The current U.S. administration be- international ambitions beyond its a disinterested superpower turn- lieves that energy resources should near abroad, and the appearance ing inward, while China has been be wielded as a foreign policy tool, of regional powers like Turkey and actively trying to escape criticism a strategy familiar to Russian Pres- India – the United States and its for being the source of the virus. ident Vladimir Putin (Guliyev, 2020). allies enjoyed a Pax Americana for China’s new “mask diplomacy,” Trump criticized the infamous Nord 30 years. However, racial protests which involves sending planeloads Stream 2 pipeline between Germa- across the country and Wash- of medical personnel and protec- ny and Russia as counter to NATO ington’s delayed response to the tive equipment to Belt and Road defense objectives, as the 55 billion

3 SEPTEMBER 2020 cubic meter pipeline encourages Energy diplomacy reinforces the ical objectives are achieved and greater European economic de- sound strategic notion of building regional allies are empowered. pendence on Moscow. The White stability through careful econom- The Congressional decision to halt House alternative is to sell the ic and military alliances, with the aid to South Vietnam in 1973, for United States’ plentiful liquefied deployment of troops on foreign example, led to the emboldening of natural gas to Europe, extending a soil reserved only as a last resort in the North Vietnamese and brought lifeline to Eastern European coun- achieving U.S. foreign policy aims. about the eventual fall of Saigon tries like Poland, Ukraine, and the According to the realist credo, (Kissinger, 2003). Iraqi security Baltic States, which are particu- endless wars should be avoided. forces were similarly abandoned in larly vulnerable to Russian energy In the extreme cases where a the aftermath of Operation Endur- coercion. Energy diplomacy with force deployment is necessary, ing Freedom, which allowed ISIS Europe should become a lynchpin history shows that these forces to rise from the ashes of al Qaeda, of U.S. foreign policy in the region. should not be removed until polit- despite stark warnings from State

4 SEPTEMBER 2020 Department and Defense Depart- Group, 2019). It is indeed time to lasting defeat of ISIS in Syria by ment officials in Iraq (Brands & stop endless wars, but not without “developing enduring coalitions” Feaver, 2017). leaving a stable situation in both (Mattis, 2018). The decision to Iraq and Syria. move out of Syria and essentially Trump’s order to withdraw some abandon the Kurdish forces goes troops from war-torn Syria in The Trump Doctrine against the 2018 National Defense October 2019 follows the pattern Strategy but, it could be argued, of “mission accomplished”: the Trump’s National Security Strate- is more in line with Trump’s 2017 premature U.S. withdrawals from gy, laid out in 2017, promoted an National Security Strategy. Iraq under President George W. “America First” approach based Bush (2008), and from Afghani- on “preserving peace through Trump has yet to articulate a stan (2014) and Iraq (2011) under strength” (Trump, 2017). The specific foreign policy doctrine Obama. At minimum, it highlight- document stressed that the Trump under his presidency, but excerpts ed the acceleration of an existing administration would keep a from his White House address on trend toward U.S. disengagement necessary military and economic Oct. 23, 2019, shed insight on his from the Middle East and possibly presence in the Middle East to position: from Europe. While the Trump pres- maintain regional stability and idency has neutralized ISIS leader emphasized the importance of bol- “I am committed to pursuing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Iran’s stering vulnerable partners in the a different course, one that Soleimani, suggesting a proactive region against Iran and the scourge leads to victory for America.” stance in defense and counterter- of violent extremism. A peaceful rorism activities, these actions are resolution to the Syrian civil war is “As a candidate for president, still taking place in the context of a another primary U.S. foreign policy I made clear that we needed broader U.S. retreat from the vast objective – one that is far from be- a new approach to American areas to which the United States ing met. The strategy does, howev- foreign policy, one guided has been committed since Sept. er, note that U.S. security challeng- not by ideology but by expe- 11. The withdrawal of the 2,000 es and interests in the Middle East rience, history, and a realistic troops from Syria also holds more are far too many to expect success understanding of the world … symbolic importance: It sends a on all fronts. A little realism never when we commit American message of disinterest and lack of hurt anyone. troops to battle, we must do resolve to Kurdish allies and espe- so only when a vital national cially to the resurgent Russia. The Pentagon’s National Defense interest is at stake and when Strategy encourages greater U.S. we have a clear objective, a The lesson the United States involvement in the world and plan for victory, and a path out should have learned from Vietnam increased military spending, fo- of conflict.” was that suddenly withdrawing cusing less on renegotiating old troops and aid in the midst of an geostrategic deals and much more “Our whole basis has to be unstable political situation will on improving U.S. military and the right plan, and then we will eventually result in the enemy com- technological advantages. The only win. Nobody can beat us.” ing back stronger. Leaving Syria at Department of Defense is adamant “The job of our military is not this stage – and deserting the Unit- that the previously uncontested to police the world. Other ed States’ Kurdish allies – allows U.S. military now faces competition nations must step up and do ISIS to consolidate and regroup, on every front. It prioritizes pre- their fair share — that hasn’t just as the group’s predecessor did paredness for war in the face of the taken place.” after a hasty U.S. withdrawal under rogue Iranian regime and especially Obama in 2010 (International Crisis emphasizes working to ensure the

5 SEPTEMBER 2020 “The United States paid to defend Europe from Soviet aggression for over 70 years, as well as to thwart terrorism and transnational bad actors. Today, just a handful of NATO members are meeting the agreed-upon spending obligations. ”

Under this “doctrine,” the United objectives for achieving the nation- the president believes that local States will not engage in military al interest (Dimitriu, 2018). “Endless or regional powers must bear the conflict without clear objectives wars” may blunt the American burden, not the United States. That and an overwhelming probability of voters’ commitment to supporting may explain Trump’s permissive success. This philosophy is shared the troops, create costly foreign attitude toward Turkish President by the Weinberger Doctrine (Correll, policy endeavors, and lead to hasty Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s unprec- 2014) and its corollary, the Powell disengagements with unpredict- edented incursion into Syria in Doctrine, which advocate for clear able consequences to the global October 2019 (Speckhard, 2019). and achievable goals in any U.S. security system. This reflects an overarching Trum- military intervention (Hoffman, pian policy of making regional 2014). The Weinberger Doctrine When it comes to the role U.S. allies “pay their fair share” to secure derives itself from the Clausewit- troops should play to help stabilize Western interests (Riechmann, zian principle of strategy, i.e., clear global hotspots like Syria and Iraq, 2019). The urge to diminish global

6 SEPTEMBER 2020 commitments is understandable. threat to global peace and stability U.S. policymakers and academics The United States paid to defend that the USSR did. The domestic believe to be inevitable. The fulfill- Europe from Soviet aggression for mistrust from the president’s GOP ment of commitments between over 70 years, as well as to thwart base toward globalism further allies helps to deter would-be chal- terrorism and transnational bad cements the Trump administra- lengers and attracts new partners. actors. Today, just a handful of tion’s stance toward American In fact, NATO Article 5 was invoked NATO members are meeting the military commitments. only once, after 9/11, where it agreed-upon spending obligations served as the legal base for the (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, However, if the United States European allies supporting U.S.-led 2019), and without a common wishes to maintain its superpower operations in Afghanistan. At the galvanizing threat, as was provided status and prevent more unruly same time, it was a coalition of the by the Soviet Union after World War spaces like Afghanistan and Syria willing that conducted operations II, the justification for Washington from emerging, it must preserve alongside the United States in Iraq. to meet its alliance commitments its carefully crafted alliance struc- NATO as such did not conduct op- is arguably minimized. And China, tures. In the event of an emerging erations, as France and Germany, despite its numerous economic challenger – be that China or a mili- two key members, refused to sup- and ideological differences with tant transnational Islamist move- port the United States in the war the United States and the Western ment – a violent conflict could against Saddam Hussein’s regime. world, does not yet pose the same ensue, a phenomenon that many

7 SEPTEMBER 2020 Middle Eastern oil, which must be After three decades of resistance, Middle Eastern safeguarded not just in the inter- the United States has finally al- Challenge ests of the world’s largest crude lowed a resurgent Russia to regain consumer – the United States – a foothold in the Middle East. Reducing the U.S. military footprint but for the sake of global markets, Indeed, Moscow is expanding its in the geostrategically critical Mid- including those in Asia. bases in the port cities of Tartus dle East not only hurts American in- and Latakia in Syria, which are the terests; it also signals weakness to More devastating attacks, like base of operations for the Russian the United States’ foes and sends those Iran conducted against the navy in the Mediterranean and a message of apathy to U.S. allies. Abqaiq and Khurais oil fields in can house Russia’s largest nucle- The United States has a longstand- Saudi Arabia on Sept. 14, 2019, ar-powered vessels. ing interest in Middle East affairs must be prevented. The Abqaiq founded in energy security, anti-ter- strikes took half of Saudi oil pro- While neither Obama nor Trump rorism, and global stability. After duction temporarily offline and wanted another war in the Mid- 9/11, the United States fought to could have plunged the world into dle East, there was an additional protect the world from terrorist a supply crisis. However, in March consideration: Weakening Bashar groups. The battle to defeat al Qae- 2020, only seven months after the al-Assad’s position meant chaos da and ISIS, both sworn enemies attack, Trump withdrew U.S. Patriot and lawless zones, creating more of the United States, continues missiles from Saudi Arabia. The space for extremists like ISIS. It on Iraqi and Syrian soil. Yet as the Pentagon attributed this move to was in the United States’ interest importance of oil declines, and the “routine asset circulation,” but was that the Assad regime not collapse. perceived threat of China’s domi- no doubt influenced in some part The United States could not do nance grows, the United States is by the Kingdom starting an oil price business with the Syrian govern- shifting its security focus eastward war with Russia during the pan- ment for obvious reasons, but the toward China and the Pacific. This demic (Hannah & Bowman, 2020) Russians could, giving Moscow its pivot has, to some extent, been in an attempt to drive up prices. first victory in the Middle East since justified, but it would be a strate- the collapse of the Soviet Union. gic blunder to neglect the security When Great Powers and economic importance of the The very real cost for Washington’s Middle East. Withdraw reluctance to stay committed to There is a price for American strategic regions is that other great Protecting the strategic waterways withdrawals, and it is often paid powers fill the vacuum, to the det- of the Strait of Hormuz and the Ara- by non-Americans. Obama’s pre- riment of U.S. allies and interests. bian Sea, through which over 20% cipitous pullout from Iraq cost the The United States needs to face of the world’s oil exports transit, is lives of tens of thousands of Arabs, the consequences of a withdrawal still paramount despite increased Kurds, Yazidis, and others (Schmitt and bring in coalitions of the willing U.S. oil production. The United et al., 2019). The abandonment of to fill the vacuum, calculate the States is not self-sufficient in oil; it America’s Kurdish allies in Syria in cost-benefit balance of a strategic produces about 12 million barrels particular still reverberates in and competitor moving in, or decide not per day and consumes around beyond the region. Trump’s deci- to leave in the first place. 20 million barrels per day (Energy sion left a perception of weak U.S. Information Administration, 2020). Deserting Kurdish allies in Syria not resolve to protect Middle Eastern Saudi Arabia still accounts for 25% only resulted in a military setback allies from national (Iranian, Rus- of U.S. oil imports. The post-World but also makes other allies right- sian) and transnational (violent War II global economy that Wash- fully question America’s reliability. extremism, paramilitary forces, ington helped build is reliant on From Tokyo to Taipei, and from piracy, etc.) threats.

8 SEPTEMBER 2020 Jerusalem to Jeddah, the United control treaties, such as the Inter- never rest on its laurels (Mear- States’ reputation as an unwaver- mediate-Range Nuclear Forces sheimer, 2001), nor can it expect to ing partner is being undermined. Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, remain unchallenged. The United and is likely not to prolong the States must continue to adjust The Costs of the Global START 3 Treaty. This regression the global architecture it created may come back to haunt U.S. na- in the aftermath of World War II, System – and of Retreat tional interests (Gordon & Salama, and needs to go the extra mile to Trump’s realpolitik brand of for- 2019). Trump would argue these minimize threats to global stability eign policy includes scuttling actions do not constitute “retreat” – and to its strategic dominance. wide-reaching trade agreements but rather the reassertion of U.S. in- like the Trans-Pacific Partner- terests in a system biased against The U.S.-led global architecture we ship and the Transatlantic Trade those interests. Other actors will be live in today is the product of four and Investment Partnership, forced to respond (e.g., NATO allies generations of work, paid for by which were designed to bind the on defense spending, Russia with thousands of American lives and Pacific Rim and Europe with the catching up in the nuclear race, and trillions of dollars in investments. United States. China on trade sanctions). It is more liberal, democratic, and free trade-oriented than anything Washington is also in the process This is the ultimate tragedy of great that existed before, and what of pulling out of a number of arms power politics: The hegemon can may come after it may be more

9 SEPTEMBER 2020 authoritarian and mercantilist. ture Ukraine, the Trans-Caucasus providers. NATO also helped safe- However, the existing foreign policy (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), guard the United States’ position framework’s undeniable success and Central Asia. Again, millions as the lone superpower upon the has kept the United States safe were killed or displaced. dissolution of the Soviet Union in and prosperous since 1945. Great 1991. Today, this status is chal- powers place a high premium on Since the late 1980s, the United lenged by the growing Chinese survival, and a responsible he- States has etched out a relatively economic and military might, and gemon does not and should not stable international order to replace Russian truculence. disregard this strategic calculus the tense confrontation of the Cold (Mearsheimer, 2001). War, when the Soviet Union was a But this was not always the case. global military, political, and ideo- Until World War II, Great Britain was The Lessons of the logical challenger. Today, although the premier global power, albeit in the United States has not created a decline after World War I. The Brit- 20th Century: Imperial formal empire, a precipitous global ish people were bled white by the Collapse, Chaos, U.S. withdrawal could generate a Great War, and the empire lacked and Conflict strategic vacuum leading to chaos the funds to maintain its naval and and conflict, as the following histor- air power deterrence against its The 20th century provides numer- ical examples may suggest. German and Japanese challengers. ous examples of chaos and local Without U.S. and Soviet support, wars ensuing upon imperial disinte- After the Empire the British would have faced defeat gration or withdrawal. A collapsing at the hands of the Nazis and the Departs: Case Studies empire, like an imposing building Japanese. The United States under going down, leaves rubble after its Upon winning World War II, inherit- President Franklin Delano Roos- demise – a natural phenomenon, ing the mantle of the British Em- evelt and his successors – Harry which policy makers should re- pire, and finally triumphing against S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisen- member. We will examine a num- the Soviet Union in the Cold War hower – achieved global domi- ber of those, including the collapse during the USSR’s collapse in 1989- nance through realist thinking, not of the Russian, and British Empires, 1991, the United States painstak- pure idealism. and the disorder they left behind. ingly put together a system of alliances, international organizations, After the war, London, broke and The emergence of a multipolar and military bases which made the exhausted, made a reluctant stra- order often brings chaos after world safe and gave U.S. business- tegic decision to withdraw from the the relative stability of a unilateral es an advantage. Indian subcontinent by 1948, as hegemon (Rubin, 2019). After the well as from the Middle East after collapse of the Ottoman, Russian, This new global order was carved the 1956 Suez crisis. The British Austro-Hungarian, and German em- out deliberately wherever the abandoned Africa by the early pires, a number of conflicts erupt- United States made its presence 1960s, as reflected in British Prime ed, driven by nationalism and great felt across the globe to limit Soviet Minister Harold Macmillan’s “Winds power competition. These conflicts advances. The creation of NATO of Change” speech (Macmillan & included the Polish-Soviet war of was an unprecedented move that Hurd, 1966). Following unsuccess- 1920, the Greco-Turkish War of helped the United States become ful attempts after World War II to 1919-1922, and wars leading to the the Western security guarantor hold to parts of the Middle East as independence of the Baltic states and provider of last resort, around an informal hegemon, the British and Finland. In an attempt to resur- the same time when the Bretton elite had lost the willpower and rect the Russian Empire in commu- Woods institutions became the taste for the imperial enterprise, nist garb, Moscow fought to recap- ultimate global economic security allowing the United States to take

10 SEPTEMBER 2020 “China is a strikingly different challenger to the United States than the Americans were to their British cousins. It would be a grave mistake for the United States to surrender this hard-won position willingly. The citizens of Hong Kong can certainly vouch for this. ” the United Kingdom’s place. This is British exodus, caused by the rise London in exchange for Indian only half the story, however. of nationalism in the developing participation in the war. However, world, the Cold War, and imperial the manner in which the British The British sacrificed their empire overstretch, generated a geopolit- left India created an enormous to receive American help in order ical vacuum. As a result, a series power struggle between Hindus to survive the German challenge. of postcolonial conflicts occurred and Muslims. Communal tensions At the Atlantic Charter meeting in from the 1940s through the 1960s. between India’s two largest 1941, Winston Churchill convinced These included the partition of religious populations were at a Franklin D. Roosevelt to bring the India, during which around 1 million boiling point even before the British United States into World War II people died, as well as subsequent withdrawal. (Patrick, 2011). The underlying India-Pakistan Wars. strategic intention of the meeting Britain’s decision to leave all but is less talked about. Britain agreed The vehement Arab resistance to ensured a grisly conclusion. The to dismantle its empire in ex- the creation of Israel also foment- British withdrawal from India in change for U.S. support in winning ed a number of wars between 1947, after years of negotiations the war. In principle, this was the Israel and coalitions of Arab states. between India’s National Congress meeting that transferred the reins A Communist Chinese insurrec- and the All-India Muslim League, of global power and management tion in Malaysia, the failed Enosis generated a humanitarian and of the international system to the (unification with Greece) in Cy- geopolitical catastrophe much United States. prus, and a slew of bloody ethnic bigger than the Turkish-Greek war conflicts in Africa from Kenya of 1920. The partition led to one of Washington forced London’s hand to Nigeria followed suit. Millions the largest (if not the largest) mass toward reducing its posture in the perished, and several millions more migrations in history as well as a world so that the United States became refugees. communal conflict that resulted in could replace it at the helm. To- around 1 million deaths – the scars day, China is a strikingly different Partition and the of which remain with us today. challenger to the United States than the Americans were to their Indo-Pakistani Wars The massive vacuum of imperial British cousins. It would be a grave Britain’s grip over the crown jewel power and largely undefined bor- mistake for the United States to of its empire was already loosening ders caused genocidal violence to surrender this hard-won position as it went into World War II. The erupt throughout the subcontinent, willingly. The citizens of Hong Kong Indians, under the guidance of with trains full of dead migrants can certainly vouch for this. Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal arriving in both India and Pakistan Nehru, were able to negotiate a (Doshi & Mehdi, 2017). The relatively swift worldwide promise of independence from

11 SEPTEMBER 2020 The (British) Radcliffe Boundary invasion of East Pakistan and the Commission had failed to allocate creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Arab-Israeli Wars key areas to either country, espe- The British exit from the subcon- British and French imperial fin- cially in the case of Jammu and tinent not only sparked deadly in- gerprints can be found across Kashmir (Ilahi, 2003). India and surgencies but eventually brought the Middle East and Africa to this Pakistan still vie for control of the two armed nations to the brink of day. The region’s post-Great War whole of the former princely state. a nuclear war (Mian, 2016). As we partition – compounded by poorly can see, the consequences of a executed exits after World War II – The geostrategic vacuum in the superpower’s global retreat without remains one of the lasting sources subcontinent has led to three major designing and implementing the of instability across the region. wars fought in Kashmir – in 1948, post-withdrawal architecture can 1965, and 1999 – as well as the be far-reaching and devastating. The British dismantling of the Otto-

12 SEPTEMBER 2020 man Empire without consideration the two intifadas (1987 and 2000) When the Soviet Union collapsed of simmering intra-Arab rivalries all have at least some roots in the and Tajikistan became independent set in motion a series of conflicts, initial British withdrawal of their in September 1991, a power strug- while their inability to resolve con- once-hegemonic power. While it is gle began in the capital of Dushan- flicts around the national aspira- true that the modern Middle East is be. In the country’s first presidential tions of Jews and local Arabs set largely the result of imperialist rule election since independence, for- the stage for Arab-Israeli wars, of by Great Britain and France, both mer Communist party General Sec- which there have been five so far. of which were inevitably driven retary Rahmon Nabiyev emerged out, the Arab-Israeli wars greatly victorious. Nabiyev was backed Britain realized that it could not influenced the region, providing by a faction of ex-Communists in keep both the promises of the an excuse for the rulers to delay direct conflict with a coalition of 1917 Balfour declaration and also much-needed domestic reforms Democrats and Islamist factions. keep the local Arab population in order to maintain mobilization By June 1992, fighting had sprung and the newly independent Arab against the “Zionist entity.” up between pro-government forces countries satisfied (Schneer, 2010). and the United Tajik Opposition. The Crown could not cope with the The United States secured relative armed conflict between the Yishuv stability in the Middle East with The opposition forces captured (pre-independence Israel) and the the Camp David Accords (1979), Nabiyev and forced him to resign Arab populations, leading to the jeopardized from time to time by his presidency. His successor, closing of the gates of the Jewish radical Shiite, Iranian, and Sunni Emomali Rahmon, led a campaign National Home Mandate in the transnational militant organizations of militias based in Kulob, an dark days before and during the (al Qaeda, ISIS). Thus, a U.S. depar- agricultural region aligned with the Holocaust, thus trapping Jews who ture from the area could escalate capital Dushanbe and the key city might otherwise have been able to simmering conflicts and may be di- of Khojent, in mass ethnic cleans- escape Europe. sastrous for Washington, its allies, ing against the Ismaili Pamiris and and hundreds of millions of people Gharmis – groups that had backed In 1948, Britain hurriedly deferred in the region. the opposition and had ethnic to the U.N. General Assembly connections in Afghanistan. Civil Partition resolution and turned Post-Soviet Civil Wars strife continued, with a variety of in its original League of Nations liberal-Democratic and Islamist in Tajikistan, Chechnya, Mandate. Almost instantaneously, factions operating from South Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq and Nagorno-Karabakh Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The invaded the British Mandate terri- Of course, the British Empire was violence only ceased in the face of tories, part of which became the not the only great power that left massive Russian military support newly proclaimed Israel, while Gaza behind a void resulting in civil war of Nabiyev and Rahmon. and the West Bank were occupied or ethno-religious conflict. The by Egypt and Jordan, respectively. An armistice was signed in 1997, policies of perestroika and glas- but anywhere between 20,000 and nost – sweeping social and politi- This would not be the end; wars 100,000 people had been killed cal reforms under Soviet President in the Middle East broke out every over five war-torn years (Toshmu- Mikhail Gorbachev – decreased few years as the British left a pow- hammadov, 2004). Cross-border Moscow’s influence in the USSR’s er vacuum that the Soviets sought Tajik connections with Afghanistan periphery (Gidadhubli, 1987), bring- to fill. The Suez Crisis in 1956, contribute to the flow of arms, ing previously suppressed conflicts the Six Day War of 1967, the Yom drugs, and fighters in both direc- back to the forefront from the Kippur War (1973), the two Leb- tions to this day. Baltics to Armenia/Azerbaijan and anon Wars (1982 and 2006), and in Central Asia.

13 SEPTEMBER 2020 Even more people died in the mering, as it allows Moscow to Chechnya (1994-1997 and 1999- Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in play an intermediary role and sell 2003) demonstrated to the Russian Nagorno-Karabakh, as hundreds weapons to both sides. The realist government and to the world how of thousands became refugees. lens is especially important in this creating a power vacuum leads Moscow, the imperial metropolis, case because it shows how power to the emergence of terrorism-rid- favored Christian Armenia before struggles inevitably result when a den enclaves that export violence and after the collapse of the Soviet strategic vacuum is created. thousands of miles away (Cohen, Union, and today Russia benefits 2014). Over 100,000 killed and from keeping the conflict sim- Finally, the two brutal wars in hundreds of thousands of refugees

14 SEPTEMBER 2020 compounded the tragedy of the could not hold together. The decay de-Baathification, and the ham-fist- Chechen people, previously ethni- and collapse of the central power ed transition of power from cally cleansed from their ancestral in Moscow generated a vacuum in Hussein’s brutal dictatorship to a homeland and genocidally exiled by which regional wars flared up. U.S.-imposed quasi-democratic Josef Stalin to Siberia and Central system ensured Shiite dominance Asia in 1944. The 21st Century: and Iranian influence in post-war Iraq. This development in turn led The Soviet Union, a communist re- Iraq and Syria to an unprecedented deficit of iteration of the czarist empire, kept The United States bit off more than security, law and order, and gover- together by the ruling party, ideol- it could chew in Iraq. Washington’s nance. As the United States tried ogy, and artificial borders drawn inept political management of to disengage, radical militants filled by Stalin to weaken ethnic groups, the Sunni-Shiite divide, pursuit of the Sunni space, while Iran and its

15 SEPTEMBER 2020 “An American strategic retreat is also likely to trigger further regional conflicts. Iran and Russia are the primary candidates to challenge regional supremacy in the Middle East, as evidenced by Russian military expansion along the Syrian Mediterranean coast, Russian military police taking control of Manbij, and a triumphant visit by Putin to the Gulf. ” allied militias filled the Shiite space. el troops. Iran and Russia have a Iraq destabilized and parts of it strong relationship with the Assad Beware of Unintended became ungovernable, contributing regime and contributed to ISIS’s Consequences to the rise of al Qaeda in Iraq, and decline. Turkey is fighting ISIS but The United States must learn from later, to ISIS. is completely opposed to Kurdish history, including the case of the forces due to longstanding enmity. In the case of Syria, multiple power British Empire and the ensuing vacuums have arisen, as the chal- Israel and Saudi Arabia are chaos caused by its strategic lenge to Assad’s control during the strongly opposed to Iranian mili- fatigue and disengagement, as well local iteration of the Arab Spring in tary entrenchment in Syria. This as from the collapse of the four 2011 almost dissolved the Baath- confluence of often-opposing European empires in the early 20th led Syrian state. The Syrian civil national interests in Syria indi- century: Austro-Hungarian, Ger- war created an environment ripe cates great peril. Syria has already man, Ottoman, and Russian. Much for the Islamic State to thrive, op- turned one-third of its citizens into can be gleaned from the collapse erating in areas outside of govern- internally displaced persons, and of the Soviet Union. Earlier cases of ment control in both Syria and Iraq. 6.1 million became refugees in imperial collapse reinforce the con- In 2014, ISIS launched the Eastern Turkey, Jordan, and other Middle clusion that a great power disen- Syria Offensive, winning control of Eastern and European countries, gagement creates a vacuum that, Raqqah province (Wilson Center, contributing to great societal and if not filled by the hegemon’s allies 2019). The Palmyra offensive in political upheavals. or another great power, can easily 2015 allowed ISIS to further cap- deteriorate into chaos. Managing ture the military base in the region The Trump administration’s de- international security architecture and increase its control to roughly cision to withdraw entirely from remains an elusive and difficult half of Syria. The emergence of Syria, later partially reversed, could task. A statesman’s mistake can ISIS and the weakening of the As- create the space for ISIS to re- lead to conflict. For example, sad regime prompted a whole host group, and for Iran and Russia to when U.S. Secretary of State Dean of nations to pursue their own pow- solidify their foothold within Syria, Acheson omitted Korea from the er interests in Syria (Laub, 2017). jeopardizing U.S. ties with Iraq fur- all-important U.S. “defense perim- ther and dooming the Syrian Kurds eter” in 1950, Stalin, Mao Zedong, The United States had all but de- to disaster. This would greatly un- and the founder of the Kim dynasty feated ISIS in Syria after intensive dermine American credibility as the Kim Il-Sung attacked South Korea, bombardments, the use of Special security guarantor of last resort. and a bloody war raged until 1953 Forces and the help of Kurdish reb- in which 3 million people — in-

16 SEPTEMBER 2020 cluding 36,000 Americans — lost the United States from the Middle An American strategic retreat is their lives East, which Trump inherited from also likely to trigger further regional the Obama administration, and the conflicts. Iran and Russia are the Moreover, as was the case with weakening of U.S. commitments in primary candidates to challenge Great Britain, Germany, Ottoman Europe will shift the global balance regional supremacy in the Middle Turkey, and the USSR, a strategic of power in favor of Iran, Russia, East, as evidenced by Russian disengagement leads to loss of and China (Barnes & Cooper, military expansion along the Syrian markets, economic decline, indus- 2019). It will also lift the pressure Mediterranean coast, Russian mili- trial base deterioration, and cur- from radical Islamic groups, such tary police taking control of Manbij, rency devaluation. This was true in as al Qaeda and ISIS. Such sce- and a triumphant visit by Putin to all the cases listed above, and the narios may bring about nothing the Gulf (Hubbard et al., 2019). Chi- U.S. disengagement is unlikely to less than a U.S. strategic defeat, na recently offered Iran a strategic be different. i.e., the United States’ abandon- cooperation agreement. In addition ing its post-Cold War hegemonic to Beijing’s military base in Djibouti, These lessons need to be heed- superpower status. this would be an early and signifi- ed. The goal of the withdrawal of cant step for a permanent Middle

17 SEPTEMBER 2020 East strategic engagement. large-scale infrastructure projects, (Astakhova, 2019). Turkey’s merits will enhance its military, economic, as a NATO ally will become increas- In the wake of the Soleimani assas- cultural, and educational presence ingly questionable. sination, Iran is likely to continue its in Europe and the Middle East as game of geopolitical chess through well (Zeneli, 2019). The historic lesson is simple: A asymmetric low-intensity warfare, detailed, long-term cost-benefit bal- using Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria, Realist Wisdom ance based on the United States’ Jordan, Lebanon, and Yemen to national interests needs to be con- intimidate neighbors. It will also The U.S. retreat is not limited to ducted concerning the U.S. over- attack and threaten with drones the Middle East. On the African seas presence. Both inter-agency and cruise missiles, as well as in- continent, Russia and China are leaders and external experts termediate-range ballistic missiles, expanding their economic and should participate in such an effort. which the aborted Joint Compre- military presence, while cuts in the hensive Plan of Action failed to U.S. African Command are under No nation should maintain global limit. Tehran is weaponizing the consideration (Copp, 2019). China influence out of vanity, but losing Shiite populations in Saudi Arabia’s surpassed the United States as a one’s status may become costlier, Eastern province, in Kuwait and trade and investment partner with messier, and bloodier than read- Bahrain, and around the Gulf (Saul Africa as early as 2009 (Ighobor, justing that global presence to fit et al., 2017). A U.S. troop exit from 2013). Meanwhile, Russia is using 21st-century interests and threats. neighboring Iraq, which may occur its expertise in hybrid warfare, pro- The realist case for Washington’s soon, would be the greatest gift the paganda, weapons sales, nuclear participation in world affairs is not Trump administration could give reactors, and raw materials, to advocating world domination, but Ayatollah Khamenei. expand its hold from the Central rather preservation of the stabili- African Republic to Congo to Mad- ty of the global order Americans With the United States scaling agascar and South Africa (Smith, painstakingly put into place over down its presence in the region, 2019). As a trenchant Russia and a the past six decades. Iran will boost its naval power in rising China accumulate more pow- the Gulf of Aden and near Bab er and presence in the developing Otherwise, a protracted era of al-Mandeb, the entrance to the world, challenges to U.S. influence chaos, wars, conflicts, terrorism, strategic Red Sea and the southern will abound. and turbulence would exact its own gateway to the Suez Canal (Cord- price on U.S. security and business. esman, 2019). This will represent A weaker U.S. commitment to The commander-in-chief’s duty is a threat to the Horn of Africa, Europe would encourage Moscow to develop and implement strategy, and to shipping from the Gulf, to increase its military presence in to assemble the brightest minds especially of oil and natural gas NATO’s periphery further, including to formulate it, and to listen to (Barden, 2019). in Belarus and in the South Cauca- those who know and understand sus. Russian influence in Turkey, it — not to beat a hasty retreat for Further south, Iran and Russia will complete with arms sales and no reason or abandon allies while continue attempts to push the energy projects, will continue to the world watches and challeng- United States from the Gulf. Great grow. Moscow is actively bringing ers lie in wait. power security providers get first Ankara into its orbit, building upon dibs for weapons, infrastructure the giant $20 billion Akkuyu nucle- To address its global challenges, projects, finance deals, and other ar power project, completing the the United States should focus on big-ticket government contracts. massive TurkStream gas pipeline, encouraging NATO members to China, already the primary investor and increasing sales of advanced increase their military allocations, in ports, airports, and most other weapons systems like the S-400 developing their armed forces

18 SEPTEMBER 2020 for defense against the Russian important theater both in oppos- will need to be deployed with that threats and missions in the Middle ing militant extremism and in in mind. However, none of this can East and Northern Africa. Wash- balancing Chinese and Russian happen before COVID-19 is brought ington should work with moderate encroachment. Finally, the principal under control and political stability Arab states and Israel to shore up economic and security challenges is restored in the United States. stability in the Middle East, while of the 21st century to the United making an effort to repair rela- States and to the non-Chinese ac- The rise of other powers and the tions with Turkey. Furthermore, tors in the Indo-West Pacific region lessons of history make it impera- AFRICOM needs to be moved into will emanate from Beijing. Both tive that the United States does not the theater and not operated out traditional naval and air assets and abdicate its post as leader of the of Europe. Africa will remain an new cyber and space capabilities free world. □

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Dr. Ariel Cohen, left, is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Program, and Director of Energy, Growth, and Security program at the International Tax and Investment Center (EGS ITIC). James C. Grant, Manager of Programs at EGS ITIC and Muhammad Zuhair Murad Khan, a Research Intern at ITIC, contributed to this article.

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