SPECIAL REPORT America’s Global Retreat and the Ensuing Strategic Vacuum September 2020 America’s Global Retreat and the Ensuing Strategic Vacuum By Ariel Cohen Contents The Post-Cold War Hegemony and its hortly after President Donald Trump ordered Discontents Executive Summary 3 a U.S. retreat from Syria and Afghanistan in SOctober 2019, events in the region drew U.S. Foundations of U.S. Power 3 forces right back in. The administration’s decision to target Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the The Trump Doctrine 5 Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, triggered tit-for-tat retaliation between Washington Middle Eastern Challenge 8 and Tehran at the opening of 2020, bringing bilateral tensions to their highest levels since the 1979 When Great Powers Withdraw 8 hostage crisis. Despite these actions in the region, Washington is still seeking to retreat from its security The Costs of the Global System – and commitments in the Greater Middle East and Central of Retreat 9 Asia. While there are financial and political benefits to reducing America’s footprint abroad, a reduced The Lessons of the 20th Century: Imperial presence in this geopolitically critical part of the Collapse, Chaos, and Conflict 10 world could also create a strategic vacuum with dire diplomatic, economic, and security consequences. After the Empire Departs: Case Studies 10 The specters of a resurgent Russia and rising China Partition and the Indo-Pakistani Wars 11 raise the question of how a U.S. withdrawal from the world stage could harm Washington’s long-term Arab-Israeli War 13 strategic interests. The best approach to analyzing such a scenario is through the realpolitik perspective, Post-Soviet Civil Wars in Tajikistan, Chechnya, wherein countries strive to safeguard and expand and Nagorno-Karabakh 13 their own strategic interests. By definition, strategic interests are power-based, yet they don’t exclude The 21st Century: Iraq and Syria 15 policies to uphold doctrines of democratization, state building, or liberal values, especially if raison d’etat Beware of Unintended Consequences 16 dictates it. Realist Wisdom 18 In true realist fashion, the Trump administration is concerned primarily with American economic and COVER: U.S. troops from the Combined Joint Task Force talk security interests – and domestic politics. Yet the high with Iraqi soldiers during a handover ceremony at an Iraqi base in Mosul, northern Iraq. The base was turned over to Iraqi forces Continued on next page on March 30. (Photo by Zaid AL-OBEIDI / Getty Images) 2 SEPTEMBER 2020 Continued from previous page countries and beyond, sends a very different message from the costs of maintaining a U.S.-centric international system and American one the United States is projecting diplomatic and military presence abroad brings a tremendous return: a (Ma, 2020). guaranteed place atop the international security architecture designed by the United States and its allies after World War II. Foundations of The term “strategic vacuum” refers to a situation in the international U.S. Power system whereby a regional or global hegemon withdraws from an area, leading to an imbalance of power which eventually becomes filled. The United States’ dominance has Geopolitics – like nature – abhors a vacuum. History is replete with been predicated on, among other examples that demonstrate how the rapid depressurization of a power factors, the deployment, mainte- pulling out from a region too quickly or too soon can lead to instability nance, and actions of the military in the form of civil wars, military coups or genocide. This paper argues around the world. From the Navy’s that U.S. disengagement from the Middle East and beyond would create protection of international shipping a strategic vacuum portending systemic and regional instability while lanes to the U.S. Army’s presence undermining American liberal hegemony. Other opportunist contenders in Afghanistan and Iraq since the for great power status, such as Russia and China, or even intermediate early 2000s, U.S. military assets powers such as Turkey and Iran, may view such a retreat as a strategic have played a key role in maintain- opportunity to bolster their hard and soft power around their periphery ing relative global stability. U.S. at the cost of American influence and power projection. global power is also dependent on an array of alliances in Asia and Europe, which are fraying under numerous stresses, including the lack of an agreed-upon enemy (a COVID-19 pandemic have high- role the Soviet Union used to fill), The Post-Cold War lighted the United States’ internal U.S. nationalist economic policies, Hegemony and its crises. These events may indicate and Europe’s perceived inability to Discontents how untenable this hegemony pay up for NATO defenses. Only could be if the United States does nine countries were able to meet The United States maintained a not maintain a healthy and robust the 2% of GDP share goal that U.S. position of seemingly unmatched social compact, which predicates President Barack Obama and the economic and military strength an active foreign policy. NATO leaders agreed upon at the relative to its global peers from the Wales summit and which Trump Soviet collapse until the 2010s. Trump’s ill-considered decision to doubled down on in July 2018 Despite the so-called “rise of the halt funding for, and quit, the World (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, rest” – namely the emergence of Health Organization in the middle 2014; Haltiwanger, 2019). China as a near-peer competi- of a pandemic ceded ground to tor, the re-emergence of Russian Beijing and projected the image of The current U.S. administration be- international ambitions beyond its a disinterested superpower turn- lieves that energy resources should near abroad, and the appearance ing inward, while China has been be wielded as a foreign policy tool, of regional powers like Turkey and actively trying to escape criticism a strategy familiar to Russian Pres- India – the United States and its for being the source of the virus. ident Vladimir Putin (Guliyev, 2020). allies enjoyed a Pax Americana for China’s new “mask diplomacy,” Trump criticized the infamous Nord 30 years. However, racial protests which involves sending planeloads Stream 2 pipeline between Germa- across the country and Wash- of medical personnel and protec- ny and Russia as counter to NATO ington’s delayed response to the tive equipment to Belt and Road defense objectives, as the 55 billion 3 SEPTEMBER 2020 cubic meter pipeline encourages Energy diplomacy reinforces the ical objectives are achieved and greater European economic de- sound strategic notion of building regional allies are empowered. pendence on Moscow. The White stability through careful econom- The Congressional decision to halt House alternative is to sell the ic and military alliances, with the aid to South Vietnam in 1973, for United States’ plentiful liquefied deployment of troops on foreign example, led to the emboldening of natural gas to Europe, extending a soil reserved only as a last resort in the North Vietnamese and brought lifeline to Eastern European coun- achieving U.S. foreign policy aims. about the eventual fall of Saigon tries like Poland, Ukraine, and the According to the realist credo, (Kissinger, 2003). Iraqi security Baltic States, which are particu- endless wars should be avoided. forces were similarly abandoned in larly vulnerable to Russian energy In the extreme cases where a the aftermath of Operation Endur- coercion. Energy diplomacy with force deployment is necessary, ing Freedom, which allowed ISIS Europe should become a lynchpin history shows that these forces to rise from the ashes of al Qaeda, of U.S. foreign policy in the region. should not be removed until polit- despite stark warnings from State 4 SEPTEMBER 2020 Department and Defense Depart- Group, 2019). It is indeed time to lasting defeat of ISIS in Syria by ment officials in Iraq (Brands & stop endless wars, but not without “developing enduring coalitions” Feaver, 2017). leaving a stable situation in both (Mattis, 2018). The decision to Iraq and Syria. move out of Syria and essentially Trump’s order to withdraw some abandon the Kurdish forces goes troops from war-torn Syria in The Trump Doctrine against the 2018 National Defense October 2019 follows the pattern Strategy but, it could be argued, of “mission accomplished”: the Trump’s National Security Strate- is more in line with Trump’s 2017 premature U.S. withdrawals from gy, laid out in 2017, promoted an National Security Strategy. Iraq under President George W. “America First” approach based Bush (2008), and from Afghani- on “preserving peace through Trump has yet to articulate a stan (2014) and Iraq (2011) under strength” (Trump, 2017). The specific foreign policy doctrine Obama. At minimum, it highlight- document stressed that the Trump under his presidency, but excerpts ed the acceleration of an existing administration would keep a from his White House address on trend toward U.S. disengagement necessary military and economic Oct. 23, 2019, shed insight on his from the Middle East and possibly presence in the Middle East to position: from Europe. While the Trump pres- maintain regional stability and idency has neutralized ISIS leader emphasized the importance of bol- “I am committed to pursuing Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Iran’s stering vulnerable partners in the a different course, one that Soleimani, suggesting a proactive region against Iran and the scourge leads to victory for America.” stance in defense and counterter- of violent extremism. A peaceful rorism activities, these actions are resolution to the Syrian civil war is “As a candidate for president, still taking place in the context of a another primary U.S. foreign policy I made clear that we needed broader U.S. retreat from the vast objective – one that is far from be- a new approach to American areas to which the United States ing met.