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Download PDF (46.3 Index abolition of agricultural taxes, the 147–52, 164, 170, 179, 180, 184, 6 185, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 200 acquaintance society 158 CDRF (China Development Research administrative reforms 143 Foundation) 4 anti-Japanese War 10 Cell, Charles 12 Apter, David 9 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection see CCDI Bai, Nansheng 4 central-local relations 17, 21, 27, 35–44, bargaining 5, 23, 31, 43, 70, 118, 132, 47, 48, 77, 87, 143, 188, 191, 194 141, 151, 188, 192, 194 central-local relations, restructuring Barnett, Arthur Doak 32 37–44 beijiu shi bingquan 35 chai na see forced demolition beilun 87 Chen, J. 136 Bernstein, Thomas 11 China Development Research biaoda kunjing 168 Foundation see CDRF binlin bengkui, or bengkui de bianyuan Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 33 see CASS blue-stamp hukou 4 Chinese Communist Party see CCP boluan fanzheng 34 city-governing-counties see boyi 5, 21, 25, 118, 128, 132, 168, 187, Shiguanxian 194 Collusion see hemou bumen benweizhuyi see combined-village-community model departmentalism 85 bureaucratic mobilization 16 Cultural Revolution, the 10, 12, 14, 16, 23, 34, 39, 65, 94, 139n2, 186, 188 cadre assessment system 49 Caixin 79 danwei 110n5 Cameron, David 9, 10 de-agriculturalisation 73 campaign-style governance 71, 118, decentralisation 17, 18, 24, 26, 35–7, 196 39, 41–3, 45, 57, 118, 187, 188, capitalism 2 191, 194–6 carrot-and-stick approach 153–60 decision-makers, policy initiatives CASS (Chinese Academy of Social 30–60 Sciences) 163, 165, 166 decision-making 6, 50, 89, 144 CCDI (Central Commission for Deng, Xiaoping 23, 34, 35, 39, 41, 43, Discipline Inspection) 102 54, 65, 90, 93, 94, 114, 115, 128, CCP (Chinese Communist Party) 193 10–12, 15–18, 25, 26, 31–9, 41, departmentalism 119 45–52, 55, 57, 59, 61, 73–6, 79, Deutsch, Karl 8 90–96, 98, 100–102, 111, 113–15, Dibao see minimum livelihood 124, 127, 129, 130, 138, 142–4, guarantee, the 239 Jia Gao and Yuanyuan Su - 9781786432599 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/01/2021 05:54:25PM via free access M4653-GAO_9781786432582_t.indd 239 05/12/2018 12:26 240 Social mobilisation in post-industrial China dingceng sheji see top-level design of household registration system, the see reform hukou dragon head enterprises 68, 135 Hu Jintao 6, 51, 52, 55, 99, 100, 124, 154, 161n5, 184, 189 ‘eating in separate kitchens’ 39, 42 hukou 3, 4, 7 economic reforms 17 Huntington, Samuel 9 economic structure 121, 126, 133–5, Hu–Wen xinzheng 52 137 Hu Yaobang 36 Eleventh Five-Year Plan 6, 51, 55, 59 emerging powers, invisible hand ideological legitimacy 49 89–110 imperialism 2 Etzioni, Amitai 9 in situ industrialisation 5 in situ urbanisation 5 false or pseudo innovation 127–8 integrated urban–rural development fazhan caishi ying daoli 41 126, 127, 130, 133, 138 Fei Xiaotong 3 interest groups 6, 31, 70, 114, 116, 117, fengjian canyu 34 119, 125, 128, 132, 137, 187, 188, Fengyu 147, 151 191, 194 fenquan 41 fenshuizhi 41 Jiangsu 67 fenzao chifan see ‘eating in separate Jiangxi Soviet period 10 kitchens’ Jiang Zemin 6, 44, 45, 51, 52, 87, 95, fiscal decentralisation 17, 39 110n4 fiscal reforms 47, 57 jianzhicun (administrative village) 85 floating population, the 3, 4 jigou gaige see governmental forced demolition 108, 162, 164, 165, institutional reforms 168, 169 jigou tiaozheng 39 ‘Four Cleanups’ (Siqing) 11 jinchang bu jincheng 2, 4 front-line roles 145–53 jiuming daocao 195 fushengji 68 Johnson, Chalmers 8, 22 game theory 117, 194 key performance indicators (KPIs) 49 ganbu gangwei zerenzhi 49 ‘Gang of Four,’ the 90 Laicheng 149 GDP 54, 55, 103, 189 Laiwu, city 27, 28, 77, 103, 112, 120–23 GDPism 128 Laiwu, economy 121, 123, 125 governmental institutional reforms Laiwu, history 121 39 land finance 2, 6, 7, 21, 27, 44, 48, 56, governmental reforms 143 57, 74, 77, 83, 86, 112, 122, 124, Great Leap Forward 3 129, 130, 166 green-card hukou 4 Lao-Tzu 62 gross output value 65, 67, 68 Leninist-Stalinist approach 200 Guangdong 67 liangge jijixing 42 guanxi 110n5, 158, 161n6 liangshang 37 guihua xianxing 82 liangshou zhua see ‘two-hands’ guoce-state policy 58 approach liangxia 37 heavy industry 67, 68 light industry 67, 68 hemou 128 litu bu lixiang 2, 4 holistic-dynamic approach 20–25 liudong renkou see floating population Jia Gao and Yuanyuan Su - 9781786432599 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/01/2021 05:54:25PM via free access M4653-GAO_9781786432582_t.indd 240 05/12/2018 12:26 Index 241 liyi jituan see interest groups peasant burden reduction 6 local urbanisation 5 People’s Daily 185 longtou qiye 135 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) (of Looney, Kristen 57 China) 161n3 policy support, mobilising 111–40 management deficit 132 political dynamics 79–87 Mao-style political campaign 18 financial resources, coordinated Mao Zedong 33, 60n6, 63, 65, 90, management 86 139n1, 139n2, 139n5 market forces, use of 86–7 Ma Pingchang 123, 133 pilot areas, identifying and selecting market forces 84–5 party-state systems 96–102 province-wide evaluations 83–4 social mobiliser 103–9 province-wide planning 82–3 market liberalisation 90–96 rural areas classifications 83–4 media liberalisation 20 political reality 31–6 Mencius 62 post-Mao China 1 middle bureaucracy 112–19 potential losses, protests 176–82 migrants 3 PRC (People’s Republic of China) 37, minimum livelihood guarantee, the 77 51, 63, 130, 200 minjin guotui 24 pre-1978 social mobilisation 8–14 minzhu jizhongzhi 37 prefectural-level city, Laiwu 120–23 minzhu juece 41 Procuratorial Daily 137 Mo-tzu 62 project-driven approach 27, 112, mubiao guanli zerenzhi see target 132–9, 156, 191 responsibility system province-governing-counties see multi-village-community model 84 Shengguanxian province-governing-county reform 143 National Social Science Fund of China provincial bureaucratic routines 71–8 see NSSFC communicating documents 72 NDRC (National Development and gathering feedback 78 Reform Commission) 119 holding work conferences 72–4 ‘No. 1 Central Document’ see ‘No. 1 leadership training 75–6 Document’ media promotion 74–5 ‘No. 1 Document’ 51, 55, 56 personnel allocations 76 nongcun 5 resources, arranging 77–8 nongmin 5 pseudo-or false innovation see false or nongye 5 pseudo innovation nongzhuanfei 4 NSSFC (National Social Science Fund rational correlations 169–76 of China) 187 ‘red-line’ of 1.8 billion mu, the 73 reform period 14–20 one village–one community model 85 Research Report on Mass Incidents 164 Organisation for Economic Co- Richman, Barry 12 operation and Development rural industrialisation 4, 5, 15–17, 81, (OECD) 30 94, 139n3 rural–urban income gap 53 pai gongzuozu 148 rural urbanisation 1–29, 31, 41, 51–9, participatory responses 162–83 61, 65, 84, 101, 102, 109, 124–6, party-state systems 96–102, 199 132, 135, 136, 138, 141–61, 185, passivity, Chinese 52, 78 189 Jia Gao and Yuanyuan Su - 9781786432599 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/01/2021 05:54:25PM via free access M4653-GAO_9781786432582_t.indd 241 05/12/2018 12:26 242 Social mobilisation in post-industrial China sange daibiao 47 TVEs (township and village sannong wenti 5, 51–9, 189 enterprises) 3, 4 sanzhongren 39, 59n6 Twelfth Five-Year Plan 51 Schenk-Sandbergen, Loes 12 ‘two-hands’ approach 128 Schurmann, Franz 10, 12 second Sino-Japanese War 8 UNICEF 8, 21 selective implementation 119 urban population growth 3 semi-acquaintance society 158 urban reform 17 Shandong, province 24–6, 35, 36, urban–rural inequality 5 62–71, 99, 120, 189 urban–rural integration see integrated Shandong Provincial Bureau of urban–rural development Statistics see SPBS urban–rural population distribution 48 shangao huangdiyuan 35 shanglou, nongmin 7, 81, 145 Wang Qishan 199 Shangzhuang 152 WeChat 79, 88n6 Shan Zengde 126, 128, 130, 133, 137, Wen Jiabao 6, 52 138 White, Lynn 13, 14 shengguanxian or sheng guan xian 116, White, Tyrene 13 143 shiguanxian or shi guan xian 116, 143 xiangmuzhi see project-driven shiquan 43, 48, 130 approach shuren shehui see acquaintance society Xi Jinping 55, 96, 113, 114, 127, 128, sihua, or sige xiandaihua 33 184, 185, 199, 200 small-town strategy, the 3, 4 Xinhua News Agency 74, 113, 131, socialism 2 154, 184 social mobilisation tasks 123–32 Soviet Union, the 11, 139n5 Yang Yixin 133 SPBS (Shandong Provincial Bureau of Yantai 35, 38, 65, 115 Statistics) 81 Ying Xing 167 state capacity 7 Strauss, Julia 11 zengjian guagou 7, 56–8, 71–3, 83, 105, 123, 131, 147, 188, 189 target-responsibility system 132 zhaijidi (housing allotment) 58, 85, 150 tax-sharing reform 57 zhaijidi zhihuan 58 ‘three represents’ theory see sange Zhang Hongliang 66 daibiao Zhao Ziyang 88n4 three rural problems or issues, the see zhenli biaozhun dabianlun 47 sannong wenti zhinong zijin 77 three types (categories) of people see zhizheng nengli 41 sanzhongren zhizheng nengli jianshe 46 tizhi gaige 115 zhonggengzu 16, 27, 35, 39, 48, 78, tongchou guanli 78, 82, 86, 157 112–15, 188, 191 tongshou tongzhi 41 Zhou Enlai 33, 128 top-level design of reform 119 Zhou Xueguang 162 totalitarianism 25, 30 zhuada fangxiao 95 Township and village enterprises see zhua zhongdian 128 TVEs zhufang huobihua gaige 44 township governments 141–61 Zhu Rongji 6, 52 tudi caizheng 6, 7, 44, 57 Zouping-based enterprise-style tuichu sanquan 137 community model 85 Jia Gao and Yuanyuan Su - 9781786432599 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 10/01/2021 05:54:25PM via free access M4653-GAO_9781786432582_t.indd 242 05/12/2018 12:26.
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