The Role of China News Service in Overseas Chinese Affairs by Yuen Li BA

Home , China News Service, Chinese Land Reform, Diaspora politics, Guo Jian, Huaqiao University, Propaganda in China

Media Influence and News Production Centralization: The Role of China News Service in Overseas Chinese Affairs

by Yuen Li

B.A. in Business Administration, May 2009, Babson College

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Elliot School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Asian Studies

May 21, 2017

Thesis directed by

Bruce Dickson Professor of Political Science and International Affairs

Acknowledgments

I am immensely grateful to my thesis advisor Bruce Dickson who offered me invaluable advice that cleared the most challenging obstacles in the process of writing this thesis. I am also thankful to the editors and journalists who agreed to my interviews and enlightened my understanding of the overseas Chinese-language media.

iii

Abstract of Thesis

Media Influence and News Production Centralization: The Role of China News Service in Overseas Chinese Affairs

After the bloody Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, the legitimacy of the Communist

Party of China (CCP) suffered a devastating blow among the overseas Chinese (OC). The

CCP responded to the challenge by implementing transnational outreach policy in the OC community, which includes substantial efforts to increase the Party’s influence in the overseas Chinese-language media (OCLM). By conducting a qualitative analysis of the evolution of the CCP's OC policy, this thesis finds that the Party has made tremendous progress in achieving the policy’s strategic goals: modernization and transnational legitimacy. The CCP’s increased influence in the OCLM has made crucial contributions to the Party's success in restoring transnational legitimacy in the OC community. This thesis finds that the China News Service (CNS), China's second-largest news agency operating under the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, plays a major role in the

CCP's attempt to influence the OCLM and centralize the production of Chinese-language news.

iv Table of Contents

Acknowledgements iii

Abstract of Thesis iv

List of Tables vii

Glossary of Terms viii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: Literature Review 5

Chapter 3: Research Methods 13

Chapter 4: The Evolution of the CCP’s OC Policy 14

4.1 The Founding Era (1949 – 1966) 14

4.2 The Cultural Revolution Era (1966 – 1976) 23

4.3 The Reform Era (1976 – Present) 29

Chapter 5: The China News Service 41

5.1 The Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media 43

5.1.1 The Features of the Forum 45

5.1.2 The Essays Commissioned by the CNS 48

5.1.2.1 The Propaganda Essays 49

5.1.2.2 The Practical Essays 52

5.1.3 The Declaration of Consensus 56

5.1.4 The Contradictions between the Essays and the Declarations 60

5.2 The Advanced Seminar for the Overseas Chinese Language Media 64

5.2.1 The Lectures Given at the Seminar 67

5.2.2 The Responsiveness of the Seminar 70

5.3 The Centralization of News Production 75

5.3.1 The Bundled Service of the Overseas Center 76

5.3.2 The Reform of the CNS 78

Chapter 6: Conclusion 82

References 85

Appendix A 106

vi List of Tables

Table 1 45

Table 2 47

Table 3 57

Table 4 64

vii

Chapter 1: Introduction

Two hundred years after Chinese Malaysians published the “Chinese Monthly

Magazine” (Cha Shisu Meiyue Tongji Zhuan 察世俗每月统记传), the overseas Chinese- language media (haiwai huawen meiti 海外华文媒体, hereafter OCLM), serving 45 million Chinese diaspora, has grown to more than 5,000 organizations around the world.1

The Chinese diaspora – commonly known as the overseas Chinese (huaqiao 华侨, hereafter OC) – has a long history with the Communist Party of China (CCP). From the perspective of the CCP, the OC community offers tremendous resources for the modernization of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but it also harbors potential threats to the legitimacy of the regime. After all, the persisting efforts of the OC community, including those from the 120 OCLM established by the revolutionaries, has made crucial contributions to the downfall of the Qing dynasty.2

Excluding the Cultural Revolution era, the CCP has remained consistent with the strategic goals of its OC policy. In the early decades of the PRC, the CCP needed remittance and investment from the OC community to reconstruct China, but the Party struggled with building positive relations with the OC due to the emergence of radical ideological movements. During the Cultural Revolution, the ideological frenzy in the

PRC resulted in the demonization and persecution of the OC and their families living in

China. In the reform era, the CCP restored its OC policy and fully embraced the OC

1 Zhang, Xinxin. "Zhang Xinxin Shuli Huawen Meiti 200 Nian: Jingli Sici Dafazhan (章新新梳理华文媒体 200 年：经历四次大发展) [Zhang Xinxin Analyzes 200 Years of Chinese-language Media: Four Major Periods of Development]." China News Service, published Aug 22, 2015, accessed Aug 29, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2015/08-22/7483095.shtml; Zhuang, Guotu. 2010. "Huaqiao Huaren Fenbu Zhuangkuang He Fazhan Qushi (华侨华人分布状况和发展趋势) [Population Distribution and Development Trends of Overseas Chinese]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Study 4 (155), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/155/1830.shtml. 2 Zhang. "Zhang Xinxin Shuli Huawen Meiti 200 Nian."

community by utilizing their financial and human capital for the modernization of China.

By conducting a qualitative analysis of the evolution of the CCP's OC policy, this thesis finds that since the founding of the PRC, except for the decade of Cultural Revolution, the CCP's OC policy has made substantial progress towards two strategic goals: modernization and transnational legitimacy.

This thesis defines modernization as the process by which a country develops its economy while accumulating technological advancements that fulfill the country's strategic demands. In the case of China, the CCP's strategic goal of modernization is not limited to the economic benefits of development, but also includes the accumulation of crucial technologies that generate positive impacts for China's overall power. This thesis defines legitimacy by applying Bruce Gilley's definition in which the legitimacy of a state is the degree to which citizens treat the state as rightfully holding and exercising political power, while the institutions of the state are the infrastructure for generating the performance on which legitimacy is based.3 Since China has a large population of OC, the CCP not only has to preserve legitimacy within China's border but also needs to sustain transnational legitimacy in the OC community. Even though many of the 45 million OC are foreign citizens, they still share interests with China – some have investments in China, some maintain business connections with China, while others have close emotional links with China.4 Having shared interest means that the CCP needs to

3 Gilley, Bruce. 2008. "Legitimacy and Institutional Change: The Case of China." Comparative Political Studies 41 (3): 259-284; Gilley, Bruce. 2006. "The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries." European Journal of Political Research 45 (3): 499-525. 4 Thunø, Mette. 2007. Beyond Chinatown : New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.

care about the Party’s legitimacy in the OC community. This thesis, therefore, defines transnational legitimacy by extending the definition of legitimacy to the OC community.

From the perspective of the CCP, the greatest difference between its internal legitimacy and transnational legitimacy is that the Party has a limited set of tools to influence how the OC community perceived the Party. The CCP needed new instruments to maintain transnational legitimacy. During the early years of the reform era, the PRC was gradually integrating with the rest of the world. Having replaced the ROC in the

United Nations, the CCP was having a much easier time with the maintenance transnational legitimacy in the OC community during the 1980s. After the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, however, the Party realized that the OC community could harbor potential threats to the legitimacy of the regime. With its tight grip on domestic media and the security apparatus, the CCP's task to re-establish internal legitimacy is less challenging comparing to the situation abroad. The bloody Tiananmen crackdown sent a shockwave among the OC communities around the world, but at the time, the Party had little power to influence the perception of the OC. The CCP responded to the challenge by initiating a new phase of OC policy that focuses on reconstructing the Party's transnational legitimacy. Barabantseva, Liu, Nyíri, and To demonstrate how the CCP utilized its economic and political resources to exploit the business, social, cultural, and ancestral links with the OC, and ultimately, to disseminate transnational patriotism and

"Chineseness" in the OC community.5

5 Barabantseva, Elena. 2005. "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese Policies of the PRC's Central Government." Asien 96 (96): 7-28; Liu, Hong. 2005. "New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism." Journal of Contemporary China 14 (43): 291-316; Nyíri, Pál. 2005. "The New Migrant: State and Market Constructions of Modernity and Patriotism." In China Inside Out : Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism, edited by Joana Breidenbach and Pál Nyíri. Budapest: Central European University Press, 141-176; To, James. 2014. Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.

The CCP's external propaganda in the OC community is a crucial component of the process to reconstruct the Party's transnational legitimacy, but there is a limited amount of literature exploring the Party's influence in the OCLM industry until the recent years. Mei, Cook, and Sun provide a detailed account of the CCP's strategy to maximize the Party's influence among the OCLM through investment, advertisement, diplomatic pressure, and cyber attacks.6 This thesis contributes to the study of OC affairs by finding that the China News Service, China's second largest state-owned news agency operating under the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OCAO) (Guowuyuan

Qiaowu Bangongshi 国务院侨务办公室), plays a significant role in China's external propaganda by influencing the OCLM and centralizing Chinese-language news production.

This thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter two discusses the bodies of literature that are relevant to the CCP's external propaganda in the OC community. Chapter three discusses the research method of the thesis. Chapter four delineates the evolution of the

CCP's OC policy and argues that the policy's strategic goals are modernization and transnational legitimacy. Chapter five examines the China News Service's role in the

CCP's effort to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM and centralize Chinese- language news production. Chapter 6 concludes the findings in this thesis on the CCP's attempt to reconstruct transnational legitimacy.

6 Cook, Sarah. 2013. The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How the Communist Party’s Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets Around the World. Washington DC: National Endowment for Democracy. http://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CIMA- China_Sarah%20Cook.pdf; Mei, Duzhe. 2001. How China's Government is Attempting to Control Chinese Media in America. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation. http://jamestown.org/program/how- chinas-government-is-attempting-to-control-chinese-media-in-america/; Sun, Wanning. 2016. Chinese- Language Media in Australia: Developments, Challenges, and Opportunities. Sydney: Australia-China Relations Institute. http://www.australiachinarelations.org/content/chinese-language-media-australia- developments-challenges-and-opportunities-2.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The study of OC finds its origin in the study of diaspora. This thesis defines diaspora as a phenomenon in which a population, for various social, economic, or political reasons, has migrated from its country of origin and resettled in a foreign destination, but continues to maintain its community by preserving emotional and economic connections with the home country.7 For centuries, the phenomenon of diaspora has been a perennial issue that is ubiquitous to the societies around the world.8

In many cases, the existing connection between the diasporic population and its home country provides the opportunity for the government of the home country or the host country to mobilize or politicize the diasporic population to achieve political, economic, diplomatic or military goals.9

In recent years, the potential influence of diaspora amid the emergence of globalization has prompted a rise in the interdisciplinary discourse in which diaspora has become a variable of international relations. The study of diaspora within the literature of international relations can be divided into four categories. The first type of diaspora literature examines the social assimilation of the diasporic population in its host country or its re-integration after returning to its home country.10 The second type focuses on the

7 Sheffer, Gabriel. 1986. Modern Diasporas in International Politics. London: Croom Helm; Cohen, Robin. 2008. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. London: Routledge. 8 Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. New York: Cambridge University Press. 9 Bertelsen, Judy. 1977. Nonstate Nations in International Politics: Comparative System Analyses. New York: Praeger Publishers; Rothschild, Joseph. 1981. Ethnopolitics. New York: Columbia University Press; Shain, Yossi. 2007. Kinship and Diasporas in International Affairs. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Esman, Milton J. 2009. Diasporas in the Contemporary World. Cambridge, MA: Polity. Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. 1996. Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 10 Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Christina Szanton Blanc. 2005. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. New York: Routledge; Faist, Thomas. 2000. "Transnationalization in International Migration: Implications for the Study of Citizenship and Culture." Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2): 189-222.

construction of diasporic identity and culture, which encompasses a broad range of variables including state and non-state actors, migration processes, and domestic politics.11 The third type of literature investigates how the diasporic population generate and maintain political influence over the policies in its host country and in its home country.12 The fourth type of literature examines the strategy of transnational outreach with which the government of the home country attempts to politicize and mobilize its diasporic population for its national interests.

Focusing on the strategic goals of transnational outreach, Adamson, Demetriou, and Varadarajun argue that the home country, with the assistance of both state and nonstate actors, cultivates positive relations with its diasporic population through policies that reinforce the country’s diplomatic agenda and national identity for the advancement of international trade liberalization and export-oriented growth.13 In contrast, Francesco

Ragazzi proposes that there are three types of relationship between the home country and its diaspora population.14 First, by offering incentives and nurturing patriotism, the home country facilitates the return of its diasporic population for economic development.

11 Adler, Emanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." European Journal of International Relations 3 (3): 319-363; Doty, Roxanne Lynn. 1996. "Sovereignty and the Nation: Constructing the Boundaries of National Identity." Cambridge Studies in International Relations 46 (1): 121-147; Hopf, Ted. 1998. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory." International Security 23 (1): 171-200; Katzenstein, Peter. 1996. "Alternative Perspectives on National Security." In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by Peter Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 16-17. 12 Levitt, Peggy and Rafael De la Dehesa. 2003. "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations." Ethnic and Racial Studies 26 (4): 587-611; Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth. 2003. "Diasporas and International Relations Theory." International Organization 57 (03): 449-479; Esman, Milton. 1986. "Modern Diasporas in International Politics." In Modern Diasporas in International Politics, edited by Gabriel Sheffer. London: Croom Helm, 333-349; King, Charles and Neil J. Melvin. 1999. "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia." International Security 24 (3): 108-138. 13 Adamson, Fiona B. and Madeleine Demetriou. 2007. "Remapping the Boundaries of State and National Identity: Incorporating Diasporas into IR Theorizing." European Journal of International Relations 13 (4): 489-526; Smith, Robert C. 2003. "Diasporic Memberships in Historical Perspective: Comparative Insights from the Mexican, Italian and Polish Cases." International Migration Review 37 (3): 724-759. 14 Ragazzi, Francesco. 2009. "Governing Diasporas." International Political Sociology 3 (4): 378-397.

Second, the home country perceives its diasporic population as the regime's potential threats, for which the country must gather intelligence, establish surveillance, and in extreme situations, change the behavior of its diasporic population by force. Finally, the home country prevents the assimilation of its diasporic population in the host countries by constructing a transnational identity, through which the home country can advance its national interests by maintaining its diasporic population as an instrument of foreign policy. The construction and maintenance of transnational outreach requires careful management and consumes substantial resources for the home country. Yasemin Soysal proposes that to establish and manage transnational outreach, the home country needs to apply a statist-corporatist model in which the country builds a centralized top-down superstructure with various complementary institutions acting as intermediaries.15

The frameworks of transnational outreach are particularly relevant for China, since the country has been actively establishing connections with its 45 million diasporic population, especially after 1989. Amid the rise of China in the age of globalization, the study of China’s transnational outreach has received an increasing amount of attention.

The existing literature provides a comprehensive review on the historical shifts of

China’s transnational outreach. Frank Pieke proposes the four models of OC relations,

Wang Gungwu describes a four-stage relationship between China and the OC, while

Pingping Zhu Lincoln identifies the three regimes of OC patriotism.16 The works of these scholars reveal that the history of China’s transnational outreach can be divided into four

15 Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 16 Pieke, Frank N. 1987. "Four Models of China's Overseas Chinese Policies." China Information 2 (1): 8- 16; Gungwu, Wang. 1993. "Greater China and the Chinese Overseas." The China Quarterly 136 (136): 926-948; Zhu, Lincoln PingPing. 2005. "Towards a Theory on Sino-Southeast Asian Relations." NUCB Journal of Language Culture and Communication 7 (7): 55-67.

eras. First, the imperial court of the Qing dynasty saw the OC as a threat to the empire, which compelled the Qing government to neglect the protection of its citizens overseas while rejecting the development of positive relations with the OC community. Second, after the founding of the Republic of China (ROC), the Nationalist regime embraced the

OC community by promoting citizenship by blood and transnational patriotism. Third, in the early decades of the PRC, China initially struggled with developing positive relations with the OC and subsequently returned to perceiving the OC and their families as an external threat during the Cultural Revolution. Finally, in the reform era after 1978,

China recalibrated its OC strategy and initiated a new period of transnational outreach.

The CCP’s attempt to establish transnational outreach has received a considerable amount of attention. Fitzgerald lays the foundation for the study of the CCP’s transnational outreach by examining the variables that have led to the CCP’s challenges during its initial attempt in the early years of the PRC to develop positive relations with the OC community.17 Mozingo and Suryadinata argue that in those early years, despite the CCP's initial outreach attempt, the Party saw its relationship with the OC as a minor concern and often sacrificed the interests of OC in exchange for other priorities.18 As

China reconnects with the OC community after the Cultural Revolution, observers divert their attention to the CCP's recalibration of transnational outreach. Through the exploitation of economic, social, and ancestral links with the OC in the reform era, the

17 Fitzgerald, Stephen. 1972. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949- 1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 18 Mozingo, David. 1968. "China and Indonesia." In China in Crisis, edited by Tang Tsou and Bingdi He. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 333-356; Suryadinata, Leo. 2005. China and the ASEAN States: The Ethnic Chinese Dimension. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic.

CCP can disseminate its new ideology, promote dual identity and dual allegiance, and ultimately, unify the OC community by cultivating of transnational patriotism.19

To successfully construct and maintain its transnational outreach, the CCP has invested a tremendous amount of efforts in propaganda within the OC community. A significant amount of literature has focused on the developments of the CCP's propaganda strategy in the reform era. Daniel Lynch reviews the changes in the CCP's propaganda institutions and argues that since the beginning of the reform era, a number of variables, including administrative fragmentation, property rights reform, and advancements in media technology, has eroded the system of Maoist propaganda

"thought work" – the comprehensive control over the perceptions, attitudes, and values of the Chinese people – and contributed to the commercialization, globalization, and pluralization of the Chinese media.20 As the CCP continues to adjust its propaganda policy, Anne-Marie Brady and David Shambaugh update the development of the CCP’s propaganda by examining the shifts in propaganda policies that have consolidated the

Party’s authoritarian rule, as well as by exploring the institutions that are responsible for

19 Liu, Hong. 1998. "Old Linkages, New Networks: The Globalization of Overseas Chinese Voluntary Associations and its Implications." The China Quarterly 155 (155): 588-609; Liu, Hong. 2005. "New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism." Journal of Contemporary China 14 (43): 291- 316; Nyiri, Pal. 2006. "The Yellow Man's Burden: Chinese Migrants on a Civilizing Mission." The China Journal 56 (56): 83-106; Nyíri, Pál. 2005. "The ‘New Migrant’: State and Market Constructions of Modernity and Patriotism." In China Inside Out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism and Transnationalism, edited by Pál Nyíri and Joanna Breidenbach. Budapest: Central European University Press, 141-176; Thunø, Mette. 2001. "Reaching Out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans- Territorial Scope of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century." The China Quarterly 168 (168): 910-929; Barabantseva, Elena. 2005. "Trans-Nationalising Chineseness: Overseas Chinese Policies of the PRC's Central Government." Asien 96 (96): 7-28; Leung, Maggi W. H. 2007. "Rethinking 'Home' in Diaspora. A Family Transnationalized? A Place of Nostalgia? A Commodity for Sale?" In Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China, edited by Mette Thunø. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 210-233; Live, Yu-sion. 2007. "The Sinwa of Reunion: Searching for a Chinese Identity in a Multicultural World." In Beyond Chinatown: New Chinese Migration and the Global Expansion of China, edited by Mette Thunø. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 234-253. 20 Lynch, Daniel C. 1999. After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and 'Thought Work' in Reformed China. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

the design and implementation of propaganda policies.21 Besides the overviews of

Chinese propaganda, observers also limit their scope on the specific variables that have contributed to the evolution of Chinese propaganda. Brady, Volland, Wang, and Esarey argue that the internal adjustments within institutions, as well as the external factor of economic liberalization, have contributed to the effectiveness of propaganda amid the pressure from the pluralization of the Chinese society.22 Looking at the variables that have led to the shifts in the Party’s propaganda policy, Brady, He, and Niquet explore the

CCP’s underlying interests that have motivated the Party to select or abandon a specific propaganda narrative.23 Investigating the CCP’s propaganda methods, Schoenhals and Ji explain how the Party’s linguistic techniques that have improved the delivery of its propaganda narratives.24

21 Brady, Anne-Marie. 2008. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield; Brady, Anne-Marie. 2006. "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era." Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3 (1): 58-77; Brady, Anne-Marie. 2002. "Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernization of Propaganda in the PRC." International Journal 57 (4): 563-578; Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China’s Popular Authoritarianism." American Behavioral Scientist 53 (3): 434-457; Shambaugh, David. 2007. "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes, and Efficacy." The China Journal 57 (57): 25-58. 22 Brady, Anne-Marie and Juntao Wang. 2012. "Sword and Pen: The Propaganda System of the People's Liberation Army." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 122-145; Brady, Anne-Marie and Juntao Wang. 2009. "China's Strengthened New Order and the Role of Propaganda." Journal of Contemporary China 18 (62): 767-788; Volland, Nicolai. 2012. "From Control to Management: The CCP's 'Reforms of the Cultural Structure'." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 107-121; Esarey, Ashley. 2005. "Cornering the Market: State Strategies for Controlling China's Commercial Media." Asian Perspective 29 (4): 37-83. 23 Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. "The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction." The China Quarterly 197 (197): 1-24; Niquet, Valerie. 2012. "'Confu-Talk': The use of Confucian Concepts in Contemporary Chinese Foreign Policy." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 76-89; Brady, Anne-Marie. 2012. "State Confucianism, Chineseness, and Tradition in CCP Propaganda." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 57-75; Brady, Anne-Marie and Yong He. 2012. "Talking Up the Market: Economic Propaganda in Contemporary China." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 11-36. 24 Schoenhals, Michael. 1992. Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies. China Research Monograph. Vol. 41. Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California; Ji, Fengyuan. 2012. "Linguistic Engineering in Hu Jintao's China: The Case of the 'Maintain Advancedness' Campaign." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 90-103.

The rising significance of diaspora in the study of international relations, coupling with the increasing attention to the study of Chinese propaganda, have inspired scholars to examine the relationships among the CCP, the OC, and the OCLM. Some of the literature investigate how OCLM organizations have obtained and maintained influence in their respective OC communities, as well as what type of influence these organizations have generated in those communities.25 Others explore how the OCLM not only maintains the emotional connection between China and the OC, but also offers assistance to the assimilation of OC in their host countries.26 Despite the growing amount of literature focusing on the relationship between the CCP and the OC, there is a lack of attention to the CCP's influence over the OCLM. Anne-Marie Brady and James To review the CCP's influence over the OCLM and argue that the Party has changed its external propaganda policy in response to China's evolving national interests, but there is a lack of attention on how the Party's institutions interact with the OCLM and influence

25 Sen, Krishna. 2006. "'Chinese' Indonesians in National Cinema." In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 119-136; Ip, Manying. 2006. "Chinese Media in New Zealand: Transnational Outpost Or Unchecked Floodtide?" In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 178-199; Gao, Jia. 2006. "Radio-Activated Business and Power: A Case Study of 3CW Melbourne Chinese Radio." In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 150-178; Huat, Chua Beng. 2006. "Gossip about Stars: Newspapers and Pop Culture China." In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 75-90. 26 Zhao, Xiaojian. 2006. "Disconnecting Transnational Ties: The Chinese Pacific Weekly and the Transformation of Chinese American Community After the Second World War." In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 26-41; Zhou, Min, Wenhong Chen, and Guoxuan Cai. 2006. "Chinese-Language Media and Immigrant Life in the United States and Canada." In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 42-74; Gamson, William and David Meyer. 1996. "Framing Political Opportunity." In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 275-290; Lim, Khor Yoke and Ng Miew Luan. 2006. "Chinese Newspapers, Ethnic Identity and the State: The Case of Malaysia." In Media and the Chinese Diaspora: Community, Communication, and Commerce, edited by Wanning Sun. New York: Routledge, 137-149.

editorial decision.27 To fill the gap in the study of Chinese propaganda and transnational outreach, this thesis demonstrates how the China News Service plays a crucial role in the

CCP's attempt to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM and to centralize the process of Chinese-language news production.

27 Brady. Marketing Dictatorship, 151-174; To, James. 2014. Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 173-189; Brady, Anne-Marie. 2015. "Unifying the Ancestral Land: The CCP's 'Taiwan' Frames." The China Quarterly 223: 787-806; To, James. 2012. "Beijing’s Policies for Managing Han and Ethnic-Minority Chinese Communities Abroad." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 4 (4): 183-221; To, James. 2012. "'Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart': Thought Management and the Overseas Chinese." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 164-182.

Chapter 3: Research Methods

This thesis draws evidence from official publications written by government institutions and state-owned media, including unpublished internal documents. These primary sources include essays written by CCP officials, essays written by OCLM executives, official policy records, and comments of CCP leaders published by state- owned media. This thesis also incorporates a diverse pool of research papers written by

Chinese experts on OC affairs. I have also interviewed twelve OCLM executives and journalists, half of which work for organizations involved with the CNS, others work for organizations known to be pro-democracy.

With a diverse collection of primary and secondary sources, this thesis delineates the evolution of the CCP's OC policy and argues that the Party has made tremendous progress towards two strategic goals: modernization and transnational legitimacy. Based on the news agency's official publications, this thesis finds that the China News Service designed events to serve as platforms for the CCP to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM. Finally, by exploring the development of the Overseas Center of the China

News Service, this thesis finds that the CCP has made considerable progress in its effort to centralize Chinese-language news production.

Chapter 4: The Evolution of the CCP’s OC Policy

The evolution of the CCP's policy on OC affairs since the founding of the PRC can be divided into three eras: (1) the founding era between 1949 and 1966, (2) the

Cultural Revolution era between 1967 and 1977, and the reform era from 1978 till the present day. In the founding era, the CCP had the intention to establish positive relations with OC, but the Party struggled with the implementation of its OC policy. During the

Cultural Revolution, the CCP bureaucracy completely lost control of the government, while the Central Cultural Revolution Group hijacked the Party's policy on OC affairs.

After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to compensate for its mistakes and began to fully embrace the benefits of maintaining positive relations the OC community. By analyzing the evolution of the CCP's OC policy, this thesis argues that despite the brief period of the Cultural Revolution, the Party's policy on OC affairs seeks to achieve two strategic goals: modernization and transnational legitimacy.

4.1 The Founding Era (1949 – 1966)

After the founding of the PRC, the CCP established two institutions to manage

OC-related issues. In 1949, the Party founded the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission

(OCAC) (Huaqiao Shiwu Weiyuanhui 华侨事务委员会) as the principal institution responsible for both internal and external OC affairs. In addition to the research, development, and implementation of OC policies on various levels of the PRC government, the OCAC also managed the China News Service (Zhongguo Xinwenshe 中

国新闻社), which acted as the propaganda arm of the OCAC, the Huaqiao Travel Service

(Huaqiao Luxingshe 华侨旅行社), which was responsible for receiving OC visits in

China, and the OC education institutions, which included the Huaqiao University (华侨

大学) in Fujian, for education of visiting OC students and the assimilation of returned

OC.28 Besides the OCAC, the CCP also established a Party-led association to organize and mobilize the OC who had returned to the PRC. Following the guidance of the CCP leadership, officials on the provincial and municipal level formed more than 70 lower- level OC associations, which culminated in the launch of the All-China Federation of

Returned Overseas Chinese (AFROC) (Zhongguo Quanguo Guiguo Huaqiao Lianhehui

中华全国归国华侨联合会) at its first meeting in 1956.29

The development of the CCP's OC policy between the founding of the PRC and the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution sets the foundation for its contemporary policy, on which the CCP emphasizes two strategic goals – modernization and transnational legitimacy – to address the most pressing internal and external issues facing the PRC in the founding era. Internally, China's society and its economy were in desperate need of reconstruction and development after the devastations of the WWII and the Chinese Civil

War. To reconstruct the China, the CCP adopted three policy objectives on internal OC affairs: (1) to protect OC interests in China, (2) to attract OC remittance and investment, and (3) to maximize the economic impact of OC. The potential remittance and investment from OC communities demonstrated an opportunity for the CCP to accelerate the reconstruction of China and to accumulate the PRC's foreign currency reserve. The promotion and protection of OC remittance and investment, therefore, became one of the objectives of the CCP's policy on OC affairs.

28 Mai, Shangwen. 2007. "Zhongqiaowei Chuchuang Xinzhongguo Qiaowu (中侨委初创新中国侨务) [OCAC Innovates OC Affairs in New China]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Study 6 (139), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/qwhg/139/1030.shtml. 29 Dong, Xiao. "Zhongguo Qiaolian (中国侨联) [All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese]." Xinhua News, published Apr 3, 2006, accessed Mar 30, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tai_gang_ao/2006-04/03/content_4378351.htm.

The greatest impediment for the CCP to promote OC investment and protect their interests in China was the fact that the Party was also in the process of nationalizing all private properties in the PRC. The CCP's most important economic policy in the early years of the PRC was nationalization of the entire Chinese economy. A essential step in this process is to seize control of all privately-owned properties in the country through

"land reform" (tudi gaige 土地改革). The Party's most immediate issue regarding internal

OC affairs, therefore, was to implement land reform by seizing the private properties owned by OC and their families. The implementation of land reform was crucial, but the

Party also did not want to antagonize the OC communities because the PRC desperately needed to attract OC remittance and investments. To alleviate the negative consequences of seizing the private properties of OC, the Party decided to offer privileges for the OC and their families in the process of land reform. In 1950, the CCP leadership issued the

“Approach in Dealing with the Property of Overseas Chinese in the Land Reform”

(Tudigaige Zhong Dui Huaqiao Tudi Caican De Chuli Banfa 土地改革中对华侨土地财

产的处理办法), which specified how the local government should seize the properties owned by OC and their families while providing a slight privilege with which the OC and their families were allowed to keep a small portion of their private properties.30

To counter the land reform's negative influence towards OC investment, the CCP implemented several economic policies to encourage OC investment through the offer of special investment privileges. In 1955, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the

“Regulations on the Overseas Chinese Applying for the Use of Barren Hills and Land”

30 Zhao, Zengting. 1990. "Jianguo Chuqi Qiaoxiang De Tudi Gaige (建国初期侨乡的土地改革) (Land Reform in the Hometowns of Overseas Chinese during the Early Years of the PRC)." Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies 05: 66-72, 70-71.

(Huaqiao Shenqing Shiyong Guoyou De Huangshan Huangdi Tiaoli 华侨申请使用国有

的荒山荒地条例), which established the legal foundation for OC to invest in China’s agricultural, forestry, and livestock industry.31 In the same year, the NPC also passed the

“Regulations on Schools Donated by Overseas Chinese” (Huaqiao Juanzi Xingban

Xuexiao Banfa 华侨捐资兴办学校办法), which encouraged OC to support the construction of education infrastructure in the PRC.32 Two years later, the NPC passed the “Regulations on the Preferential Treatment of the Investments from Overseas Chinese in State-owned Enterprises” (Huaqiao Touziyu Guoying Huaqiao Touzi Gongsi De

Youdai Banfa 华侨投资于国营华侨投资公司的优待办法) to promise lucrative returns for OC investments.33

Despite the seizure of OC properties, the investment policies of the CCP has received positive responses from the OC community. For example, in 1952, the Fujian provincial government founded the Fujian Overseas Chinese Investment Company

(Fujian Huaqiao Touzi Gongsi 福建华侨投资公司) to attract OC investment. Four years later, the company’s total value had grown to 44 million RMB; between 1952 and 1966, more than 11,000 OC individuals invested in the company, bringing the value of total OC investments in the company to more than 80 million RMB, which allowed the Fuijian

31 "Huaqiao Shenqing Shiyong Guoyou De Huangshan Huangdi Tiaoli (华侨申请使用国有的荒山荒地条例) [Regulations on the Overseas Chinese Applying for the use of Barren Hills and Land]." National People's Congress, published Aug 6, 1955, accessed Mar 30, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/10/content_4288.htm. 32 "Huaqiao Juanzi Xingban Xuexiao Banfa (华侨捐资兴办学校办法) [Regulations on Schools Donated by Overseas Chinese]." National People's Congress, published Aug 2, 1957, accessed Mar 30, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/10/content_5009560.htm. 33 "Huaqiao Touziyu Guoying Huaqiao Touzi Gongsi De Youdai Banfa (华侨投资于国营华侨投资公司的优待办法) [Regulations on the Preferential Treatment of the Investments from Overseas Chinese in State-Owned Enterprises]." National People's Congress, published Aug 2, 1957, accessed Mar 30, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/10/content_5004313.htm.

provincial government to establish 47 factories and commercial subsidiaries in 27 cities and counties.34 Likewise, the Guangdong provincial government founded the Guangdong

Overseas Chinese Investment Company (Guangdong Huaqiao Touzi Gongsi 广东华侨投

资公司) to attract OC investments. In 1956, the company established 21 factories and commercial subsidiaries in Guangdong with a total value of 71 million RMB; between

1951 and 1966, the company had attracted a total investment of 78 million RMB from almost 20,000 OC individuals.35

Another objective of the CCP’s internal policy on OC affairs was to protect OC interests in China, which meant that the CCP needed to defend the legality of remittance income. In 1952, the OCAC released the “Nine Approaches Regarding the Treatment of

Land and Property under Land Reform” (Dui Tugai Zhong Huaqiao Tudi Caichan Chuli

De Jiudian Banfa 对土改中华侨土地财产处理的九点办法).36 One of the main purpose of the Nine Approaches was to tackle the widespread phenomenon in which local government officials were confiscating OC remittance as part of the land reform process.

The act of seizure would not only discourage future remittance from abroad but would also reduce the prospect of attracting the other investments from the OC community. To tackle this issue, the Nine Approaches legitimizes OC remittance by arguing that the income is not the profit of "feudal exploitation" (fengjian boxue 封建剥削), but a type of honorable income that the hard-working OC laborers had earned while being exploited by the foreign capitalists.

34 Ren, Guixiang. 2009. "Haiwai Huaqiao Huaren Yu Zujiguo Guanxi 60 Nian Shuping (海外华侨华人与祖籍国关系 60 年述评) [Analysis on the Relationship between Overseas Chinese and their Ancestral Country]." Contemporary China History Studies 16 (5): 191-201, 192. 35 Ibid. 36 Zhao, "Jianguo Chuqi Qiaoxiang De Tudi Gaige" 69.

The CCP also needed to maximize the economic impact of OC remittance. In

1955, the State Council issued the “Order Regarding the Implementation of OC

Remittance Protection Policy” (Guanyu Guanche Baohu Qiaohui Zhengce De Mingling

关于贯彻保护侨汇政策的命令).37 The Order reinforced the legality of the OC remittance and encouraged the remittance recipients to invest the income in their local communities, thereby enhancing the positive impact of the income towards China's reconstruction process. Two years later, the CCP exercised a new approach to integrate the remittance income into the newfound communist economy. Following a similar

Soviet model, the State Council released the "Instructions Regarding the Issue of Striving after the Remittance from Overseas Chinese” (Guanyu Zhengqu Qiaohui Wenti De

Zhishi 关于争取侨汇问题的指示), which integrated OC remittance into the Chinese economy through the OC Remittance Coupon (Qiaohuijuan 侨汇劵).38 Under the

Coupon system, the family members of OC would spend their foreign currency remittance in exchange for the OC Remittance Coupons, with which the family members could make purchases at dedicated stores that accept these Coupons. The introduction of the Coupon system allowed the CCP to maintain complete control of the foreign currency influx while providing an instrument for the Coupon holders to privately possess the purchasing power of the remittance without compromising the foundation of China's communist economy.

37 "Guowuyuan Guanyu Guanche Baohu Qiaohui Zhengce De Mingling (国务院关于贯彻保护侨汇政策的命令) [State Council Order Regarding the Implementation of OC Remittance Protection Policy]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, published Feb 23, 1955, accessed Apr 1, 2017, http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/node102/userobject7ai1564.html. 38 Mai. "Zhongqiaowei Chuchuang Xinzhongguo Qiaowu."

The CCP struggled to implement its official policies regarding OC remittance due to the rising suspicion towards OC and their families. Beginning in the late 1950s, the political movements in the PRC ignited the suspicion towards “overseas relations”

(haiwai guanxi 海外关系) for which local CCP officials continued to use as an excuse to harass OC and their family members.39 In 1962, in response to the rising harassment and discrimination against OC in China, the CCP leadership issued the “Report Regarding the

Issue of Overseas Relations” (Guanyu Haiwai Guanxi Wenti De Baogao 关于海外关系

问题的报告), in which the Party criticized the emerging discrimination, reiterated the

CCP’s position embracing OC remittance, and ordered the local government to cease any activity that conflicts with the Beijing’s official OC policy.40 Despite the efforts of the

CCP leadership, the harassment and discrimination of OC and their families continued to exacerbate, eventually evolving into the abuse and persecution at the outbreak of the

Cultural Revolution.

On the external front, the strategic goal of the CCP's policy on OC affairs in the founding era was to enhance the transnational legitimacy of the PRC. After the founding of the PRC, the Nationalist regime representing the ROC in Taiwan was still recognized as the sole legitimate government of China by most countries around the world and by the United Nations. One vital mission of the CCP's OC policy, therefore, was to compete for the legitimate representation of China against the Nationalist regime among OC

39 Godley, Michael R. 1989. "The Sojourners: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China." Pacific Affairs 62 (3): 330-352. 40 Zhao, Hongying. "Haiwai Guanxi Yu Gaige Kaifang (海外关系与改革开放) [Overseas Relations and the Reform and Opening]." People's Daily Online, published Feb 9, 2010, accessed Mar 5, 2017, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/10959859.html.

communities around the world.41 To achieve this strategic goal, the CCP had two policy objectives for external OC affairs: (1) to relieve the ethnic tension between OC and the local people in Southeast Asia and (2) to assimilate returned OC into the Chinese society.

To enhance the transnational legitimacy of the PRC, the CCP needed to improve the treatment of OC in their host countries by eliminating the distrust against OC by foreign governments. Due to the rise of communism in China and the emergence of the

Cold War, the fear of communist infiltration had led to the discrimination and persecution of OC in Southeast Asia, which forced many OC to escape from their host countries.42 In

1952, responding to the exodus of OC in Southeast Asia, the CCP issued the “Instructions

Regarding Overseas Chinese Work” (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Haiwai Qiaomin

Gongzuo De Zhishi 关于海外侨民工作的指示).43 The Instructions represented a shift in the CCP's external OC policy, after which the Party halted the operation of covert organization and the participation in covert activities that aimed to overthrow the host countries' capitalist regimes while urging other political parties in the PRC to avoid establishing branches overseas. The key objective of the Instructions was to project a positive image for the PRC among OC communities by alleviating the anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asia. However, scholar also argues that the CCP abandoned its initial strategy of using OC to export communist revolution in the region because the

41 For the ROC’s policy to enhance its transnational legitimacy, see To, James. 2014. Qiaowu: Extra- Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 91-107, 165-168, 235-239. 42 Liu, Xiong. 2011. "Shixi Zhanhou Dongnanya Shehui Bianqianzhong De Lengzhan Yinsu (试析战后东南亚华侨社会变迁中的冷战因素) [Analysis on the Cold War as a Variable Affecting the Post War Social Transformation of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia]." Seeking Truth 5 (5): 152-156. 43 Chen, Wenshou. 2007. "Mao ZeDong De Huaqiao Guan (毛泽东的华侨观) [Mao Zedong's View on Overseas Chinese]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Study 3 (135), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/qwhg/136/900.shtml

Party realized that such effort would never prevail due to the historical animosity between the OC and the local people.44

Despite the Party’s initial reluctance, the conclusion of the dual citizenship issue for OC in Southeast Asia was another policy for the CCP to alleviate the anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asia. In 1953, the CCP issued the “Instructions on Issues

Regarding the Citizenship of Overseas Chinese (Guanyu Chuli Huaqiao Guoji Wenti De

Zhishi 关于处理华侨国籍问题的指示), which still recognized the dual citizenship of the OC.45 Two years later, however, the PRC and Indonesia signed the “Agreement

Regarding the Issue of Dual Citizenship” (Guanyu Shuangchong Guoji Wenti De

Tiaoyue 关于双重国籍问题的条约), which stipulated that any Indonesian OC who had dual citizenship must choose one and give up the other.46 The Agreement subsequently became the standard model for the PRC to conclude the dual citizenship issue with the other countries in Southeast Asia. By abandoning the support of dual citizenship, the

CCP relieved the distrust against OC in Southeast Asia and offered an opportunity for the

OC to fully embrace the citizenship of their host countries.

Finally, the assimilation of returned OC into the Chinese economy was a key objective of the CCP's OC policy that addressed both the internal goal of modernization and the external goal of transnational legitimacy enhancement. In 1954, the CCP issued

44 Fitzgerald, Stephen. 1972. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949- 1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 97. 45 Cheng, Xi. 2004. " 'Shuangchong Guoji' De Fangqi: Zhongguo Yu Yinni Kaipi Mulin Waijiao De Tupokou ('双重国籍'的放弃: 中国与印尼开辟睦邻外交的突破口) [the Renouncement of the 'Dual Citizenship': A Breakthrough in the Development of the Diplomatic Relations of Good Neighborhood between China and Indonesia]." All-Round Southeast Asia (9): 61-66, 62. 46 "Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yu Yindunixiya Gongheguo Guanyu Shuangchong Guoji Wenti De Tiaoyue (中华人民共和国和印度尼西亚共和国关于双重国籍问题的条约) [Agreement Regarding the Issue of Dual Citizenship between the PRC and Indonesia]." National People's Congress, published Apr 22, 1955, accessed Apr 5, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/23/content_5000688.htm.

the "Instructions Regarding the Employment Issues of Overseas Chinese Returned to

China" (Guanyu Chuli Guiguo Huaqiao Jiuye De Wenti De Zhishi 关于处理归国华侨就

业问题的指示).47 For the older OC returned to China without a special skill, the

Instructions proposed that the local government need to pay them settlement benefits, as well as to encourage them to participate in agricultural production or to work at state- owned enterprises. For the younger OC, the local governments were instructed to train them at factories or, if they had special handicraft skills, lend them small loans to initiate their production process. The introduction of the Instructions helped the Party to integrate the returned OC into the Chinese economy; moreover, by aiding and settling the exodus of OC in China, the policy projected a positive image for the CCP in the OC community.

4.2 The Cultural Revolution Era (1966 – 1976)

Between 1966 and 1976, the ideological frenzy of Cultural Revolution reversed the CCP’s strategic goals on OC affairs and disintegrated the bureaucracy of the OCAC.

During the height of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1969, the political movement transformed both the internal and external strategic goals of the CCP’s policy on OC affairs. Internally, the promotion of OC remittance and investment for modernization was replaced by the demonization of “overseas relations” and the abuse and persecution of OC and their families. Externally, the enhancement of the PRC’s transnational legitimacy was replaced by the export of Cultural Revolution through the fomentation of OC in launching similar ideological movements against the governments of their host countries. After 1970, the initial frenzy of Cultural Revolution began to

47 Ren, Guixiang. "Mao Zedong Qiaowu Sixiang Yu Shijian Yanjiu (毛泽东侨务思想与实践研究) [Analysis on Mao Zedong's Thoughts and Implementations of Overseas Chinese Affairs]." China Cadres Learning Network, published Sep 24, 2014, accessed Apr 1, 2017, http://www.ccln.gov.cn/dangshidagjian/dangshi/dsyj/89120-2.shtml.

ameliorate. The CCP leadership gradually restored some of the external OC policies, but the abuse and persecution of OC and their families in China continued until the end of the

Cultural Revolution in 1976.

In 1966, the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CRG) (Zhongyang Wenge

Xiaozu 中央文革小组) began denouncing the OCAC and its policies. At an OC affairs meeting in Guangdong, Jiang Qing (江青) and Zhang Chunqiao (张春桥), the leaders of the CRG, denounced the OCAC’s existing policy on OC affairs as “anti-movement”

(fandong 反动), and suggested that the secret agents of the imperialists had already infiltrated into the country by using OC identities as covers.48 As the Cultural Revolution intensified in 1967, the CRG and its “Rebels” (Zaofanpai 造反派) – the most rebellious subgroup of the Red Guards (Hong Weibing 红卫兵) who executed the violent acts of the

Cultural Revolution – began to denounce Liao Chengzhi (廖承志), the CCP’s top leader on OC affairs and the director of the OCAC, by accusing him of implementing the

“bourgeoisie anti-revolutionary approach” (zhicanjieji fangeming luxian 资产阶级反革

命路线) and of “oppressing the Great Proletarian Revolution in foreign affairs” (zai duiwai shiwu zhong yazhi weidade Wuchanjieji Wenhuadagem 在对外事务中压制伟大

的无产阶级文化大革命); across the country, the Rebels persistently denounced OCAC officials, harassed the operation of the institution, and eventually, paralyzed the entire bureaucracy of the OCAC in the summer of 1967.49

48 Being “anti-movement” means that someone is trying to disrupt the communist movement which brings progress to the society. The accusation was commonly used as an excuse for political persecution before the reform era. For details the Guangdong meeting, see 49 Zheng, Puhong. 1996. "Wenge Shiqi Zhongguo De Haiwai Huaqiao Zhengce (文革时期中国的海外华侨政策) [China's Overseas Chinese Policy during the Cultural Revolution]." Southeast Asian Studies 2 (2): 51-59, 52.

While the bureaucrats were losing control of the government operations, the

CRG and its Rebels were transforming the CCP's policy on OC affairs. Under the influence of the CRG and its Rebels, the strategic goal of external OC policy during the height of the Cultural Revolution became the export of the similar movements through the OC around the world. The attempt to incite similar movements abroad was particularly detrimental to the relations between the PRC and its Southeast Asian neighbors. In 1966, the Rebels protested in front of the Embassy of Burma in Beijing and accused the Burmese government of "colluding with the imperialists" (yu diguozhuyi goujie 与帝国主义勾结); meanwhile, the CRG fomented the OC in Burma to study Mao

Zedong's thoughts and pledge allegiance to the motherland.50 The bilateral relations between the PRC and Burma was already in terrible shape due to several events of rising ethnic tension in the early 1960s – the Burmese government’s anti-Chinese policies, the broke down of the negotiations between the government and the Burmese Communist

Party, and the anti-Chinese riots in Yangon; the anti-Burma protest in Beijing was the last straw that pushed the two countries to withdraw their ambassadors.51 The PRC’s diplomatic relations with other Southeast Asian countries, including Cambodia,

Indonesia, and Singapore, as well as its relations with Hong Kong and Macau, were also severely damaged by the CRG’s attempt to export the Cultural Revolution.52 More importantly, the apparent shift in the PRC's external OC policy validated the fear of communist infiltration that had initially generated the ethnic tension between OC and the

50 Cariño, Theresa C. 1985. China and the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 40. 51 He, Shengda. 2010. "Zhongmian Guanxi 60 Nian: Fazhan Guocheng He Lishi Jingyan (中缅关系 60 年：发展过程和历史经验) [60 Years of Sino-Myanmar Relations: Progress of Development and Experience from History]." Around Southeast Asia 11 (11): 12-20, 14-15. 52 Zheng. "Wenge Shiqi Zhongguo De Haiwai Huaqiao Zhengce." 53.

locals since the founding of the PRC. The hijacking of external OC policy by the CRS has not only caused a devastating blow to the PRC's international image but also exacerbated the persecution and discrimination of OC in Southeast Asia.

Internally, the CCP's policy on OC affairs under the influence of the CRG generated ten years of abuse and persecution against OC and their families living in

China. The key objective of the CCP's internal OC policy during the Cultural Revolution was the demonization and persecution of anyone having "overseas relations." Across the country, the Rebels accused the OC and their family members of being secret agents working for foreign imperialist enemies. Similar to the persecutions against CCP cadres, ethnic minorities, intellectuals, and former property owners, it did not matter whether there was any evidence supporting any wrongdoing. The approach of the Rebels was that someone would instantly become guilty as long as that person was branded with a negative identity. In order to humiliate the victims, the Rebels would "denounce" (pidou

批斗) their targets by publicly berating them, confiscating all of their properties, and often physically torturing them.53 One account indicates that during the Cultural

Revolution, over 13,000 OC and their family members were abused and persecuted across 19 provinces.54 In addition to the humiliation on a personal level, the CRG has also banned OC from exercising six types of social and economic activities. For those who were living in China, the OC and their families were banned from (1) leaving China,

(2) inviting relatives to visit China, (2) communicating with the outside world, and (4)

53 For detailed descriptions of the violence of the Cultural Revolution, See Schoenhals, Michael. 1996. China's Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 122-135, 146- 147, 166-169, 170-172. 54 Zhao. "Haiwai Guanxi Yu Gaige Kaifang."

receiving remittances; for those who were living outside China, they were banned from

(5) visiting China and (6) permanently moving back to China.55

In 1970, Zhou Enlai (周恩来) began to recalibrate the PRC’s foreign policy, which partially restored the Party’s initial strategic goal on external OC affairs. The

CCP’s key focus at this critical junction was to ameliorate the fear of communist infiltration among Southeast Asian countries. Under the instruction of Zhou Enlai, the

CCP dissolved the OCAC in 1969 and moved its responsibilities to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs in 1970.56 The governments of Southeast Asian countries had always been suspicious of the true missions of the OCAC since the founding of the PRC. Since the CRG's attempt to export the Cultural Revolution has validated such fear, the best approach for the CCP to accommodate its neighbors was officially shutting down the

OCAC. In 1971, at a meeting with Ne Win, the Prime Minister of Burma, Zhou Enlai reassured that the OCAC had been dissolved; Zhou also explained that China initially needed the support of the OC to expel the imperialists, but since the imperialists had been defeated, it was no longer necessary for China to maintain such organization.57

The CCP also felt the need to influence the OC’s potentially misleading behaviors in their host countries. In 1973, Zhou emphasized the need to further address the fear of communist infiltration in Southeast Asia at a Politburo meeting regarding the release of the “Report Regarding Overseas Chinese Students Participating in the ‘Shangshan

Xiaxiang’ Movement” (Guangyu Huaqiao Xuesheng Shangshan Xiaxiang Wenti De

Qingshi Baogao 关于华侨学生上山下乡问题的请示报告).58 At the meeting, Zhou

55 Ibid. 56 Zheng. "Wenge Shiqi Zhongguo De Haiwai Huaqiao Zhengce." 56. 57 Cariño. China and the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, 46-47. 58 Zheng. "Wenge Shiqi Zhongguo De Haiwai Huaqiao Zhengce." 56.

argued that the Southeast Asian countries still feared the possibility of communist infiltration by OC students returning to their host counties, and that the CCP needed to address this fear by encouraging the students not to talk about their experiences in the

“Shangshan Xiaxiang” movement.59 To alleviate the ethnic tension between OC and the local people, Zhou also recommended that the CCP need to encourage the OC in

Southeast Asian countries to embrace the society of the host country by learning the local language and marrying the local people.60

Despite the gradual recalibration of external OC policy, the internal OC policy that had led to the abuse and persecution of OC and their families persisted until the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1970, Guangdong provincial government issued the “Six

Regulations On How to Deal with Officials with Overseas Relations” (Chuli You

Haiwaiguanxi Ganbu De Liutiao Guiding 处理有海外关系干部的六条规定), which prohibited CCP officials from maintaining relations with relatives abroad, prevented the

Party from hiring anyone who had “overseas relations,” and imposed scrutiny on the marriage of CCP officials; any official who refused to sever “overseas relations” would be punished, and in the worst case scenario, be expelled from the Party.61 The Six

Regulations essentially legalized the abuse and persecution of OC and their families in

Guangdong. A typical example was a returned OC named Wu Shichang (伍时畅), who

59 "Shangshan Xiaxiang" was a movement of the Cultural Revolution during which the CCP attempted to "re-educate" China's university students. During the movement, students had to move to the countryside and experience the proletarian lifestyle by participating in agricultural productions. For the details of the "Shangshan Xiaxiang" movement, see Guan, Haiting. 1995. "Wenhua Dageming Zhong Zhishi Qingnian Shangshan Xiaxiang Yundong Shulun (文化大革命中知识青年上山下乡运动述论) [Analysis on the Shangshan Xiaxiang Movement for Young Intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution]." Contemporary China History Studies 5 (5): 68-74. 60 Zheng. "Wenge Shiqi Zhongguo De Haiwai Huaqiao Zhengce." 57. 61 Zhao. "Haiwai Guanxi Yu Gaige Kaifang."

was the family member of a CCP official in Taishan (台山) county. Wu was an OC merchant and philanthropist who went back to his hometown of Taishan to support its modernization. After the release of the Six Regulations, the Rebels persecuted Wu as a

"class enemy" (jieji diren 阶级敌人) – his donations of money and machinery were branded as corruption, all of his properties were confiscated, and the tombs of his ancestors were destroyed.62

4.3 The Reform Era (1976 – Present)

After the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, the CCP began to rebuild China's government bureaucracy and recalibrate the country's internal and external policies. In

1978, the CCP reinstated the bureaucracy of OC affairs by establishing the Overseas

Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council (OACO) along with similar offices at various levels of government across the country.63 In the reform era, the CCP re-established its

OC policy by reintroducing the strategic goals of modernization and transnational legitimacy. Before the Party could introduce any new policies, however, the immediate task for the CCP was to initiate the vindication process for the OC and their family members who suffered from abuse and persecution during the Cultural Revolution, which meant that the CCP had to resolve the demonization of "overseas relations."

As the result of ten years of ideological frenzy, the negative perceptions associated with "overseas relations" were already deeply entrenched among the Chinese officials and citizens. For the CCP, the best way to refute the perception of "overseas

62 Ibid. 63 Peng, Jin. 2013. "Zhengben Qingyuan Boluan Fanzheng: Lun Liao Chengzhi Xinshiqi Qiaowu Lilun Yu Shijian (正本清源拨乱反正: 论廖承志新时期侨务理论与实践) [Clearing the Foundation and Correcting the Mistakes: The Theory and Practice of Liao Chengzhi on Overseas Chinese Affairs in the New Era]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Study 2 (171), http://qwgzyj.gqb.gov.cn/yjytt/171/2248.shtml.

relations" was to reshape public opinion by the authority of the Party's top leadership. In

1977, during a meeting with OC visitors from Hong Kong and Macau, Deng Xiaoping

(邓小平) announced that the CCP was determined to vindicate the demonization of

“overseas relations.”64 At the meeting, Deng made four crucial conclusions that define the Party’s renewed position towards “overseas relations:” (1) the distrust towards

“overseas relations” is “anti-movement,” (2) China needs more “overseas relations,” (3)

“overseas relations” may lead to other positive relations, and (4) China need to refute the negative identity associated with the OC and their families. Deng’s conclusions allowed

Liao Chengzhi, the first director of the OCAO, to publish an essay on the People’s Daily in which Liao refutes and denounces the demonization of the “overseas relations.”65 In the essay, Liao argues that most of the OC are patriotic and progressive and that the Party must not treat the entire OC population as "anti-movement" simply because of the bad behaviors of a few. Liao's essay also suggests that the Party needs to allow civil interactions and communications between China and the rest of the world, defend the legitimacy of OC remittance, and encourage Chinese citizens to maintain positive relations with the OC and other foreign friends. With the support of Deng and Liao, the

CCP was able to construct a renewed position on "overseas relations," which paved the way for the vindication for the abuse and persecution of OC and their families.

The CCP leadership’s efforts to vindicate the OC culminated at the “National

Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs” (Quanguo Qiaowu Huiyi 全国侨务会议),

64 Ren, Guixiang. 2006. "Xinshiqi Duiwai Kaifang De Xiansheng: Deng Xiaoping Qiaowu Sixiang Shuping (新时期对外开放的先声: 邓小平侨务思想述评) [the First Voice in the New Era of Opening and Reform: Analysis on Deng Xiaoping's Thoughts on Overseas Chinese Affairs]." Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC 10 (5): 91-97, 92. 65 Peng. "Zhengben Qingyuan Boluan Fanzheng."

which was held right after the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.66 The National Conference officially refuted the OC policy during the

Cultural Revolution and initiated the vindication process for the abuse and persecution of

OC and their families. The vindication process can be summarized into two major steps: apology and reparation. First, the CCP would clear all of the victims’ prior accusations associated with “overseas relations” and apologize to victims and their families. Second, the CCP would return or compensate the victims’ seized properties, restore their political rights, and ensure that they would receive the same treatment and opportunities as domestic Chinese. Based on the principles established at the 1978 National Conference, the CCP continued to refine its vindication policies throughout the next decade. At the end of the 1980s, the vindication process corrected more than 64,000 cases of wrongful persecution, returned more than 40 million square meters of seized property, and cleared more than 600,000 accusations against the OC and their families.67

Besides vindicating the OC, the CCP also established a new set of policy that restored the Party’s initial objectives for internal OC affairs. In January 1978, the CCP issued the “Report Regarding the Preparation Meetings for the National Conference on

Overseas Chinese Affairs” (Guanyu Quanguo Qiaowu Huiyi Yubei Huiyi De Qingkuang

Baogao 关于全国侨务会议预备会议的情况报告).68 The Report argues that the CCP needs to set modernization as the strategic goal regarding nine issues of OC affairs: (1)

66 Li, Liming and Zengye Shi. 2009. "Qiaowu Lingyu Boluan Fanzheng Shulue (侨务领域拨乱反正述略) [Analysis on the Correction of Mistakes in Overseas Chinese Affairs]." Contemporary China History Studies 2 (2): 76-84, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49157/49163/9250079.html. 67 Qiu, Jin and Wulong Yan. 2011. 2011 Nian Huaqiao Huaren Lanpishu: Zhengce Pian (2011 年华侨华人蓝皮书: 政策篇) [2011 Blue Book of Overseas Chinese: Report on Policy]. Xiamen: Huaqiao University, 45. 68 Peng. "Zhengben Qingyuan Boluan Fanzheng."

the perception of “overseas relations,” (2) OC remittance and donation, (3) the relocation of returned OC, (4) the property ownership of OC, (5) the traveling of OC, (6) the admission of OC students in Chinese universities, (7) the immigration status of OC living in China, (8) the receiving of OC family visits from abroad, and (9) OC citizenship. To summarize the CCP’s recalibrated position, the Report announces a new general guideline for OC affairs – “treat them equally without discrimination, look after them according to their needs” (yishi tongren bude qishi, genju tedian shidang zhaogu 一视同

仁不得歧视，根据特点适当照顾).

On the external front, the CCP re-adopted the strategic goal of transnational legitimacy. The Party announced the new objectives for external OC affairs at the First

Session of the Fifth NPC in 1978, during which Hua Guofeng (华国锋), the appointed successor of Mao Zedong who was ousted by Deng Xiaoping in 1980, presented a government report titled “Unite Together, Struggle for the Construction of a Powerful

Socialist Modern Country” (Tuanjie Qilai, Wei Jianshe Shehuizhuyi De Xiandaihua

Qiangguo Er Fendou 团结起来，为建设社会主义的现代化强国而奋斗).69 In the report, Hua outlines the new foundation of the CCP's external OC policy by introducing four key policy objectives: (1) China does not recognize dual citizenship, (2) China needs to protect the rights of Chinese citizens visiting other countries, (3) the OC need to respect the laws and traditions of their host countries, and (4) China needs to cultivate patriotism for China in the OC community. Compared to the founding era, the key

69 Hua, Guofeng. "Tuanjie Qilai, Wei Jianshe Shehuizhuyi De Xiandaihua Qiangguo Er Fendou (团结起来，为建设社会主义的现代化强国而奋斗) [Unite Together, Struggle for the Construction of a Powerful Socialist Modern Country]." People's Daily Online, published Feb 26, 1978, accessed Apr 4, 2017, http://www.people.com.cn/zgrdxw/zlk/rd/5jie/newfiles/a1140.html.

difference in policy objectives of the reform era is that in the latter, the CCP elevated the significance of the need to protect the rights of Chinese citizens abroad. The reason for the policy shift, however, was not driven by any changes in the CCP's strategic goals, but rather, because the PRC did not join the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations until 1979.70 In the reform era, the internal and external policy objectives for OC affairs represent the same strategic goals of which the Party had introduced in the founding era – modernization and transnational legitimacy. Throughout the rest of the reform era, the

CCP continues to refine its internal and external OC policies, but the strategic goals of the Party’s OC policy remain unchanged.

In the reform era, the liberalization of the Chinese economy and the PRC’s integration with the international system allow the CCP to fully embrace potential OC resources by attracting both investments and human talents from the OC community. In

January 1979, at a meeting with prominent Chinese merchants, Deng Xiaoping proposed that China needed to expand the capacity of modernization and that the OC needed to come back and invest.71 Without the constraints of the communist economy, the PRC can fully embrace the benefits of OC investments, but the Party still need to attract investors by offering financial incentives, as well as to build confidence by protecting investments.

During the 1980s and the 1990s, the CCP issued series of policies to achieve these goals, some of which are designed specifically for targeting OC investment, others are meant to cover all foreign investment. The following are four of the most significant OC policies

70 Huang, Deming and Chen, Jialing. "Weiyena Lingshi Guanxi Gongyue Jiqi Shijian (维也纳领事关系公约及其实践) [Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Its Applications]." National People's Congress, published Oct 20, 2005, accessed Apr 1, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/rdlt/fzjs/2005-12/20/content_343467.htm. 71 Deng, Xiaoping. 1994. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan: Di Er Juan (邓小平文选: 第二卷) [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: Volume Two]. 1st ed. Beijing: People's Press, 156.

in the first two decades of the reform era. In 1983, the State Council issued the

"Instructions Regarding the Enhancement in Utilizing Foreign Capital" (Guanyu Jiaqiang

Liyong Waizi Gongzuo De Zhishi 关于加强利用外资工作的指示), which gave the

OCAO the power to offer special privileges to OC investments.72 In 1985, the State

Council issued the “Temporary Regulations Regarding Investment Privileges for

Overseas Chinese” (Guanyu Huaqiao Touzi Youhui De Zanxing Guiding 国务院关于华

侨投资优惠的暂行规定). The Temporary Regulations allowed OC to invest in China in the form of sole proprietorship or private-public partnership while offering eleven special privileges that included a variety of tax, tariff, and land lease benefits.73 In 1990, the State

Council issued the “Regulations Regarding the Encouragement of Investments from

Overseas Chinese and Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macau” (Guanyu Guli Huaqiao

He Xianggang Aomen Tongbao Touzi De Guiding 关于鼓励华侨和香港澳门同胞投资

的规定), which replaced the 1985 Temporary Regulation with a similar but more sophisticated iteration of various tax benefits and legal protections to attract OC investments in China.74 In 1998, the State Council issued the “Opinions Regarding the

Further Expansion of Opening up and the Enhancement of Foreign Capital Utilization”

72 "Guanyu Jiaqiang Liyong Waizi Gongzuo De Zhishi (关于加强利用外资工作的指示) [Instructions regarding the Enhancement in Utilizing Foreign Capital]." State Council of the PRC, published Sep 3, 1983, accessed Apr 4, 2017, http://history.mofcom.gov.cn/?datum=1983 年 9 月《关于加强利用外资工作的指示》. 73 "Guanyu Huaqiao Touzi Youhui De Zanxing Guiding De Tongzhi (国务院关于华侨投资优惠的暂行规定的通知) [State Council Memo on the Temporary Regulations regarding Investment Privileges for Overseas Chinese]." State Council of the PRC, published Apr 2, 1985, accessed Apr 3, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2012-09/21/content_5383.htm. 74 "Guanyu Guli Huaqiao He Xianggang Aomen Tongbao Touzi De Guiding (关于鼓励华侨和香港澳门同胞投资的规定) [Regulations regarding the Encouragement of Investments from Overseas Chinese and Compatriots from Hong Kong and Macau]." State Council of the PRC, published Aug 19, 1990, accessed Apr 3, 2017, http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/node102/userobject7ai1540.html.

(Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Duiwai Kaifang, Tigao Liyong Waizi Shuiping De Ruogan

Yijian 关于进一步扩大对外开放，提高利用外资水平的若干意见), which elevated the political legitimacy of utilizing foreign capital – including but not limited to OC capital – by identifying it as a component of Deng Xiaoping Theory (Deng Xiaoping

Lilun 邓小平理论).75

The investment from OC has generated tremendous impact on China’s modernization in the reform era. One way to measure such impact is to look at the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) brought into China by OC investors. The official data indicates that as of 1987, the number of companies with OC investors accounted for 80% of the total companies registered with foreign investment, whereas the accumulated amount of OC FDI in mainland China accounted for 70% of total FDI.76

Two decades later, there were about 140,000 companies registered with OC investors in mainland China, which accounted for 50% of the companies with FDI; between 1978 and

2007, the accumulated amount of FDI by OC investors in mainland China (including

Hong Kong and Macau) was 400 billion USD, which accounted for about 60% of China's total FDI (665 billion USD).77 Without the constraint of the communist economy, China can fully embrace the economic benefits of having an OC community. The investment

75 "Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda Duiwaikaifang Tigao Liyong Waizi Shuiping De Ruogan Yijian (关于进一步扩大对外开放，提高利用外资水平的若干意见) [Opinions regarding the further Expansion of Opening Up and the Enhancement of Foreign Capital Utilization]." State Council of the PRC, published Apr 14, 1998, accessed Apr 3, 2017, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66688/4494444.html. 76 Wu, Hongqin. 2007. "Cong Qiaozi Qiye Kan FDI Zai Woguo Jingji Fazhan Zhong De Zuoyong (从侨资企业看 FDI 在我国经济发展中的作用) [Observe the Impact of FDI through Overseas Chinese Investments]." Foreign Investment in China 8 (8): 50-53, 51. 77 Long, Denggao, Liang Zhao, and Yan Ding. 2008. "Haiwai Huashang Touzi Zhongguo Dalu: Jieduanxing Tezheng Yu Fazhan Qushi (海外华商投资中国大陆：阶段性特征与发展趋势) [Investment of Overseas Chinese in Mainland China: Features and Trends]." Overseas Chinese History Studies 2 (2): 10-17, 11.

from OC is a crucial variable that has facilitated China's economic miracle in the first three decades of reform and opening.

After joining the World Trade Organization, China began to attract foreign investments from around the world. The new sources of FDI have reduced the significance of OC investments in China, but as China gradually upgrades its industries, the introduction of talents has become the CCP's top objective in OC policy. In 1983,

Deng Xiaoping argued that it was necessary for China to invite foreign talents for the country's modernization and that the introduction of talents is a "strategic issue" for the country.78 In the same year, the CCP leadership issued the “Decision Regarding the

Introduction of Foreign Talents for the Development of Four Modernization” (Guanyu

Yinjin Guowai Zhili Yili Sihua Jianshe De Jueding 关于引进国外智力以利四化建设的

决定).79 The 1983 Decision lays the foundation of the CCP's talent introduction policy by emphasizing that the Party needed to prioritize the introduction of foreign talents for the modernization of China. The CCP's policy intends to bring in foreign talents of all origins, but in practice, the Party emphasizes talents from the OC community due to the shared language and culture. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the CCP continued to refine its policies for the introduction of talents by offering attractive positions, benefits, and tax incentives while helping the returning OC and their family members to resettle in

78 Jiao, Jinhu. "Yinjin Guowai Zhili Sanshinian Huigu Yu Zhanwang: Guangna Tianxia Yingcai (引进国外智力三十年回顾与展望: 广纳天下英才) [Past and Future of 30 Years of Foreign Talents Introduction: Absorb All the Talents underneath the Sky]." The Thousand Talents Program, published Jun 5, 2013, accessed Mar 29, 2017, http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/34303. 79 "Jinian Dengxiaoping Tongzhi Danchen 100 Zhounian Yinzhi Tekan: Yinzhi Zhanlue 20 Nianhou Zaijiedu (纪念邓小平同志诞辰 100 周年引智特刊: 引智战略 20 年后再解读) [Special Feature Commemorating the 100th Birthday of Dengxiaoping: Analyzing the Strategy of Talent Introduction after 20 Years]." State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs, published Aug 17, 2004, accessed Aug 28, 2016, http://www.safea.gov.cn/content.shtml?id=12742478.

China.80 The best example is the Hundred Talents Plan (HTP) (Bairen Jihua 百人计划) announced in 1994, through which the CCP has successfully brought in more than 2000 scientific talents from prominent foreign universities and research institutions between

1994 and 2013.81

Entering the 21st century, the CCP began to step up its efforts for the introduction of foreign talents by establishing numerous new policies that fulfill China's need to promote innovation and research in high value-added industries. The following are two of the Party's most significant policy announcements regarding the introduction of foreign talents. In 2003, the State Council issued the “Decisions Regarding the Further

Strengthening of Talent Introduction” (Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Rencai Gongzuo De

Jueding 关于进一步加强人才工作的决定), in which the CCP announced that China will offer long-term or permanent residency to incoming foreign talents.82 The 2003

Decision marked the beginning of the CCP's initiative to advance its talent introduction strategy, which has generated a series of policies aimed to refine the process of acquiring residency in China. The proposal of a Chinese "green card" has led to the re-emergence of the dual citizenship issue, for which the CCP has issued several new policies to resolve, but the Party has yet able to find a permanent solution due to the fragmentation of responsibilities among government bureaucracies.83

80 Qiu, Jin and Wulong Yan. 2011 Nian Huaqiao Huaren Lanpishu: Zhengce Pian (2011 年华侨华人蓝皮书: 政策篇) [2011 Blue Book of Overseas Chinese: Report on Policy], 41. 81 http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2014/11/307664.shtm 82 "Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang Rencai Gognzuo De Jueding (中共中央国务院关于进一步加强人才工作的决定) [Decisions of Party Central and State Council Regarding the Further Strengthening of Talent Works]." Xinhua News, published Dec 26, 2003, accessed Aug 28, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-12/31/content_1256161.htm. 83 Yi, lili. "Rencai Yinjin Xu Kefu Zhengce 'Xushe' De Ganga (人才引进需克服政策'虚设'的尴尬) [Talent Introduction Needs to Overcome the Awkwardness of ‘Fake' Policies]." Central Party School of the

The CCP’s most prominent talent introduction policy in the new century is the

Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) (Qianren Jihua 千人计划), which was announced in 2008 through the “Opinions Regarding the Implementation of Introducing Foreign High-level

Talents” (Guanyu Shishi Haiwai Gaocengci Rencai Yinjin Jihua De Yijian 关于实施海

外高层次人才引进计划的意见).84 Unlike the HTP, which focused on scientific talents, the TTP offers lucrative benefits to attract two types of foreign talents: experienced scholars doing cutting-edge research on technologies compatible with the China's strategic demands or entrepreneurs planning to commercialize new technologies.85 The

CCP has seen remarkable results in recruiting high-level talents. Between 2008 and 2016, the TTP brought in more than 5,200 foreign talents; about 1,800 are under 40 years old, and more than 2,000 are working on long-term research projects.86

Although modernization has remained the top strategic goal of the Party’s OC policy since the beginning of the reform era, the CCP has not forgotten about its goal to maintain transnational legitimacy in the OC community. One may argue that in the

CPC, published Mar 14, 2016, accessed Aug 28, 2016, http://www.studytimes.cn/zydx/ZLGL/ZHANLCK/2016-03-14/5032.html. 84 Peng, Lijun. "Zhongyang Rencai Gongzuo Xietiao Xiaozu Guanyu Shishi Haiwai Gaocengci Rencai Yinjin Jihua De Yijian Da Jizhe Wen (中央人才工作协调小组关于实施海外高层次人才引进计划的意见答记者问) [Central Talent Work Coordination Group Answers Questions Regarding Foreign Talents Introduction Program]." Xinhua News, published Jan 7, 2009, accessed Aug 30, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-01/07/content_10620815.htm. 85 "The Recruitment Program for Innovative Talents." Thousand Talents Plan, accessed Aug 29, 2016, http://www.1000plan.org/en/. 86 The composition of foreign talents in 2016 is unknown. However, between 2008 and 2013, the TTP introduced more than 3,300 foreign talents, only about 100 of which are not of Chinese descent. See Luo, Xu. "Zhongguo Qianren Jihua Yi Yinjin 5208 Ming Haiwai Gaocengci Rencai (中国千人计划已引进 5208 名海外高层次人才) [China's Thousand Talents Plan Has Already Introduced 5208 Foreign High- level Talents]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, published Jan 7, 2016, accessed Aug 29, 2016, http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2016/0107/37723.shtml; Wang, Huiyao. "Wang Huiyao: Sida Chaju Zhuai Gaocengci Rencai Huiguo Xiaoli (王辉耀: 四大差距阻碍高层次人才回国效力) [Wang Huiyao: Four Reasons Preventing High-level Talents to Return to China]." Thousand Talents Plan, published Oct 17, 2013, accessed Aug 30, 2016, http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/42203.

reform era, the Party’s transnational legitimacy has encountered its most devastating challenge yet – the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy movement. The overwhelming support of the movement by the OC around the world generated a shocking alarm within the CCP and warned the Party about the potential threats to the regime within the OC community. From the CCP’s perspective, the Party’s transnational legitimacy is more challenging to preserve than its internal legitimacy. Internally, the Party maintains a tight grip on the media and the security apparatus, which means that the CCP has the necessary tools to overcome the internal legitimacy challenge. Outside China, however, the CCP had no power to influence the foreign media, which meant that the Party had no capacity to shape the international discourse regarding the Tiananmen movement. The Party’s transnational legitimacy in the OC community has received a devastating blow after the crackdown. Such development is particularly alarming for the CCP because it understands the potential danger of a subversive OC population. After all, many of the

CCP’s founders were members of the OC community trying to overthrow the Qing dynasty.

In order to reconstruct transnational legitimacy to counter the negative impact of the Tiananmen crackdown, the CCP's external propaganda began to pay more attention to the OC community.87 At this critical moment, the CCP’s external propaganda emphasized the need to work on Chinese students studying abroad because of the United

States’ Emergency Immigration Relief Act of 1989, which offered citizenship to Chinese university students. During a meeting with education and propaganda officials in 1990,

87 Brady, Anne-Marie. 2009. Testimony of Associate‐Professor Anne‐Marie Brady School of Political and Social Sciences University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. Washington DC: U.S.‐China Economic & Security Review Commission. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/4.30.09Brady.pdf, 3.

Zhu Muzhi (朱穆之), a high-level CCP official responsible for external propaganda, argued that in order counter the West's attempt to intercept China's returning talents, the

CCP to enhance its propaganda efforts towards Chinese students studying abroad.88 The

Party even offered amnesty to visiting Chinese students who participated in anti-CCP demonstrations abroad.89

In addition to influencing Chinese students, the CCP also initiated a series of new

OC policies to maintain the Party's transnational legitimacy in the OC community.

Reconstructing transnational legitimacy is crucial not only for the CCP to eliminate its potential competitors within the OC community, but also for the Party's strategy to attract

OC investment for China's modernization. By investigating the Forum on the Global

Chinese Language Media, the Advanced Seminars for Overseas Chinese Language

Media, and the Overseas Center of the China News Service, this thesis finds that the CCP not only attempts to influence the OCLM but also plans to centralize Chinese-language news production.

88 Zhu, Muzhi. 1995. Zhu Muzhi Lun Duiwai Xuanchuan (朱穆之论对外宣传) [Zhu Muzhi's Analysis on External Propaganda]. Beijing: China International Press, 292-293. 89 To, James. 2012. "'Hand-in-Hand, Heart-to-Heart': Thought Management and the Overseas Chinese." In China's Thought Management, edited by Anne-Marie Brady. New York: Routledge, 164-182, 167.

Chapter 5: The China News Service

The China News Service (CNS) (Zhongguo Xinwenshe 中国新闻社) is a Chinese state-owned news agency responsible for providing news content through all types of medium for the OCLM around the world. Directly managed under the OCAO, the CNS is the successor of the CCP’s International News Agency (Guoji Xinwenshe 国际新闻社) – a news agency founded in 1938 to broadcast news stories on the CCP’s efforts to liberate

China among the global overseas Chinese (OC) communities.90 After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the news agency is succeeded by the CNS in 1952 under the leadership of the OCAC’s Liao Chengzhi.91 When the CCP first established the

CNS, the original team only had 47 members, all of whom were experienced editors and journalists from the OCLM around the world.92 Constrained by the lack of resources, the

CNS initially did not produce its own news content; instead, it would make slight edits to news stories published by Xinhua News Agency or The People’s Daily, which were then broadcasted through the agency’s own China News Broadcasting Radio (Zhongguo

Xinwen Guangbo Diantai 中国新闻广播电台), so that the OCLM around the world could write down and publish these news stories.93

In the late 1950s, the CNS began to expand its operation by introducing the production of books, magazines, and movies, as well as to conduct research on the

OCLM industry. For example, beginning in 1958, the CNS produced and exported

90 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian (中国新闻社的辉煌六十年) [the Glorious Sixty Years of the China News Service]." China News Service 2012, accessed Oct 12, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/cns60/news/163.shtml. 91 Guo, Jian. 1995. "Zhongguo Dierda Tongxinshe: Zhongguo Xinwenshe (中国第二大通信社: 中国新闻社) [the Second Largest News Agency in China: China News Service]." International Communication 1995 (Z1): 58-59. 58. 92 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian." 93 Guo. "Zhongguo Dierda Tongxinshe: Zhongguo Xinwenshe." 58.

several movies to Hong Kong, the first of which was A Tour around Peking (1962)

(Beijing Manyou 北京漫游), a documentary about tourist attractions in Beijing.94 In

1963, the CNS began reporting international news by sending its first journalist abroad to

Indonesia for the Games of the New Emerging Forces - a sporting event participated by

48 countries.95 During the Cultural Revolution, the CNS was initially forced to suspend all of its operations except the China News Broadcasting Radio, but was able to maintain a temporary office under Xinhua News Agency; the CNS gradually recovered its operation beginning in 1970 and reinstituted in 1978.96

After Tiananmen, the operation of the CNS began to expand. In 1995, through fax and computer network, the CNS was releasing about 50 news articles every day to

OCLM in 20 different countries and regions; on a monthly basis, the CNS wrote about

300 exclusive features while releasing more than 200 news photos.97 To attract investment from the OC community, about 40% of all news content during the early

1990s was about China's economic development and potential investment opportunities.98

In 1995, the CNS established its first online presence by launching chinanews.com – its official online news portal; a year later, the agency launched the China News Week

(Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan 中国新闻周刊) – a popular weekly magazine published in five languages around the world.99After decades of development, the CNS now employs more than 2000 employees in 46 branches across the world.100

94 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian." 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Guo. "Zhongguo Dierda Tongxinshe: Zhongguo Xinwenshe." 59. 98 Ibid. 99 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian." 100 Ibid.

The CNS is a key institution for the CCP to initiate external propaganda over the

OCLM industry. By investigating two international media events organized by the CNS, the Forum on Global Chinese Language Media and the Advanced Seminar for the

Overseas Chinese Language Media, this thesis find that the CCP operates the two events as platforms to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM.

5.1 The Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media

Organized by the CNS on behalf of the OCAO, the biannual Forum on the Global

Chinese Language Media (Shijie Huawen Chuanmei Luntan 世界华文传媒论坛) is the most crucial international event that serves as a platform for the CCP to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM. During the news conference for the First Forum in 2001,

Guo Zhaojin (郭招金), the vice president and chief editor of the CNS, stated that the

Forum is an unofficial platform that serves as an opportunity for the CNS to consolidate the existing relations with the established OCLM organizations, create new relations with the emerging OCLM organizations, and ultimately, increase the market share of CNS among the OCLM industry.101

Even though one may read news articles directly on chinanews.com, the CNS does not compete with the OCLM. What Guo means by increasing market share is that the CNS wants to enhance its role as the OCLM's news content provider, which means that the agency is competing with other Chinese news content providers like Reuters or

Taiwan's Central News Agency. The news content provided by the CNS is indistinguishable from the ones that are available from Reuters, with the exception that

101 "Shoujie Huawen Chuanmei Luntan Ruqi Kaimu (首届华文传媒论坛将如期开幕) [the First Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media Opens as Scheduled]." China News Service, published Sep 14, 2001, accessed Oct 22, 2016, http://www.fcm.chinanews.com.cn/2001-09-14/2/91.html.

they promote a pro‐CCP perspective by following the Party’s latest propaganda guidelines.102 The statement by the chief editor also illustrates the key difference between the identity of the Chinese media – both state-owned and privately owned – and the

OCLM: the OCLM consists of privately-owned media organizations serving their local

OC community, whereas the state-owned or the heavily censored Chinese media institutions bears obvious political interests.

From the perspective of the OC community, hearing a certain rhetoric from the local newspaper generates an additional layer of credibility in contrast to hearing the same rhetoric from Chinese media. The added layer of credibility is crucial for the CCP to implement rhetoric control among the OCLM, especially when the rhetoric aims to generate a positive image for China. Since conventional wisdom expects that the mainland Chinese media organizations are the mouthpieces of the CCP, the ability to influence privately owned OCLM around the world becomes a crucial mission of the

Party's external propaganda strategy.103 By examining the Forum, this thesis demonstrates how the CCP operates the Forum as a platform to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM for the establishment of China's positive international image, and ultimately, to disseminate the CCP's external propaganda rhetoric.

102 Brady. Testimony of Associate‐Professor Anne‐Marie Brady, 4. 103 This phenomenon is similar to Stockmann’s finding in which Chinese readers are more likely to be persuaded when reading non-official newspapers in China. See Stockmann, Daniela. 2013. Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 203- 222.

5.1.1 The Features of the Forum

Table 1: Forum on the Global Chinese Language Media Session Date Location Number of Participants Essays Published 9/15/2001 to 140+ organizations 1 Nanjing 40+ 9/18/2001 from 30+ countries 9/21/2003 to 145 organizations from 2 Changsha 55 9/24/2003 30+ countries 9/10/2005 to 200+ organizations 3 Wuhan 70 9/12/2005 from 45 countries 9/1/2007 to 200+ organizations 4 Chengdu 70+ 9/4/2007 from 47 countries 9/18/2009 to 300+ organizations 5 Shanghai 70+ 9/20/2009 from 40+ countries 9/16/2011 to 400+ organizations 6 Chongqing 90 9/18/2011 from 50+ countries 9/6/2013 to 400+ organizations 7 Qingdao 80+ 9/9/2013 from 58 countries 8/22/2015 to 400+ organizations 8 Guiyang 80+ 8/23/2015 from 60+ countries Source: China News Service.104

Since 2001, the CNS has organized eight Forums in eight different Chinese cities, while each of the Forums usually lasted between two and four days. To maximize the impact of the Forum, the CNS invited top-level managers and editors of Chinese- language newspapers, magazines, radios, televisions, and online media organizations from OC communities around the world. At the Forum, the OCLM executives are joined by Politburo-level CCP officials and executives from the mainland Chinese media. The scale of the Forum has been gradually increasing – in 2001, about 140 OCLM organizations from 30 different countries and regions participated in the Forum, whereas in 2015, the number increased to about 400 OCLM organizations representing more than

60 different countries and regions.105

104 Forum details are drawn from the official forum websites. For reference, see Appendix A. 105 Table 1.

The Forum is a meticulously organized event with a mix of work and entertainment, but with an emphasis on the latter. Using the First Forum in Nanjing as an example, the first day of the Forum was for checking in and ended with a welcoming banquet hosted by both the CNS and the Nanjing municipal government. On the second day, the CLM executives went on a tour of Nanjing in the morning, participated in the opening ceremony of the Forum in the afternoon, and watched a show called “Nanjing at

Night” (Nanjing Zhiye 南京之夜) in the evening. The actual discussions did not begin until the third day, during which the executives went to a local exhibition for trade and economic development in the morning, participated in the discussion session in the afternoon, and went to a banquet hosted by the Xuzhou municipal government at night.

The last day was mostly discussions, both in the morning and the afternoon, which ended with a closing ceremony, a banquet hosted by the News Office of the Jiangsu Province, and a tour at Fuzimiao (夫子庙), one of the most famous tourist attractions in Nanjing.

After the 2001 Forum had ended, the CNS invited the OCLM executives to five extra days of sightseeing activities in the region.106 Due to the lack of publicly available information on the details of the tours, it is unknown how much the sightseeing activity is for entertainment or dedicated to the agendas of the Forums.107 Most of the subsequent

Forums organized in other Chinese cities followed a similar schedule, but the amount of entertainment decreased noticeably after Xi Jinping initiated his anti-corruption campaign in 2012. At the 2015 Forum, the CNS condensed all of the activities into two days,

106 "Shoujie Shijie Huawen Meiti Luntan." 107 During the interviews with the editors and journalists from the OCLM organizations that have participated in the Forum, all of my interlocutors have either declined to comment or claimed to have no knowledge of the event.

eliminated the extravagant banquets sponsored by local municipal governments, and organized only one day of sightseeing activities after the Forum had ended.

Table 2: The Agendas of Forums on the Global Chinese Language Media Year Agenda 2001 1. The role and the market positioning of OCLM. 2. OCLM needs to grasp the opportunity and accelerate development. 3. Cooperation between OCLM and mainland Chinese media. 4. How to handle the challenges in the Internet era? 2003 1. New trends in OCLM development. 2. How to initiate cooperation with mainland Chinese media. 3. Chinese economic development as an opportunity for OCLM to accelerate development? 4. How to produce inclusive, comprehensive, and unbiased news on China? 5. The relationship between OCLM organizations and the mainstream media in their host countries. 2005 1. How to take advantage of the global phenomenon of “China Rush"? 2. How can OCLM produce realistic, accurate, and unbiased news about China? 3. OCLM and Chinese-language education. 4. How to promote economic and cultural exchange between China and the OCLM's host countries? 5. The “Rise of Central China” development strategy. 2007 1. OCLM and “Harmonious China.” 2. How to assist the establishment of harmonious Overseas Chinese (OC) organizations? 3. How to assist the formation of harmonious relationships between OC organizations and their respective mainstream societies? 4. How to assist the establishment of a cooperative and harmonious environment? 5. How to inherit and disseminate a harmonious traditional Chinese culture? 6. The challenges faced by OCLM in the era of new media. 2009 1. The impact of global financial crisis towards OCLM. 2. How can OCLM survive the financial crisis? 3. How to establish the "discourse power" of OCLM? 4. The role of OCLM in the Shanghai World Expo. 2011 1. How can OCLM speak out in the mainstream societies of the West? 2. OCLM transformation amid the evolution towards “Omni-media.” 3. The opportunity of OCLM amid the rising Chinese power. 2013 1. OCLM and the “China Dream.” 2. OCLM and civic identity in a multi-cultural environment. 3. OCLM transformation amid the evolution of “Omni-media.” 4. Overseas Chinese and inter-cultural exchange. 5. OCLM and the promotion of Chinese enterprises. 2015 1. How to properly tell the “China Story"? 2. OCLM's inheritance of Chinese culture. 3. OCLM and China's “Internet+” strategy. 4. OCLM and the integration of new mediums. 5. OCLM and the Belt and Road Initiative. Source: China News Service.108

108 Liang, Xiaohui. "Dazao Huamei Bubian Jingshen Jiayuan (打造华媒不变精神家园) [Build a Home for the Spirit of Chinese-Language Media]." China News Service, published Aug 22, 2015, accessed Oct 12, 2016, http://epaper.chinanews.com/att/1/2015-08/22/08/2015082208_pdf.pdf.

5.1.2 The Essays Commissioned by the CNS

The most important event of the Forum is the discussion session during which the

OCLM executives would present their essays written for the Forum and exchange opinions on the arguments of the essays. When the CNS prepares for the Forum, the agency selects a small number of the main agendas for the discussion sessions; the CNS divides them into two categories: general-purpose agenda and event-inspired agenda.

General-purpose agendas are recurring topics that would always remain relevant for the

OCLM industry, like the promotion of cultural exchange between China and the OCLM's host countries in 2005, 2007, 2013, and 2015.109 In contrast, the CNs created the event- inspired agendas in response to a particular event. For example, the CNS selected three event-inspired agendas in 2009, two of which were to address the challenges facing the

OCLM industry amid the global financial crisis, whereas the remaining one was to emphasize the role of OCLM in promoting the upcoming Shanghai World Expo in

2010.110

After setting the agendas, the CNS invites the OCLM executives to write essays echoing the agendas and summon the best authors to present their essays on-stage at the discussion sessions of the Forum. At the end of the Forum, the CNS would publish the entire collection of commissioned essays, but the CNS has explained neither the selection process nor the standards of essay selection. It is also unclear whether the CNS had only selected pro-CCP media executives to write these essays, or the CNS had commissioned a wide-range of essays from a diverse group of OCLM executives but censored the ones

109 Table 2 110 Table 2

that were politically incorrect for the Forum.111 Nevertheless, the outcome of the process is that the CNS has always been able to collect and publish a decent amount of essays echoing the agendas of the Forum, while the number of published essays has increased from about 40 in 2001 to its peak at 90 in 2011.112 The essays written for the Forum can be divided into two categories: the first type of essays advocates the OCLM to follow the official rhetoric of the CCP, whereas the second explores the challenges and opportunities in the OCLM industry. In the next section, this thesis analyzes the essays written for the Forum to reveal how the CCP operates the Forum as a platform to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM.

5.1.2.1 The Propaganda Essays

The first type of essays written for the Forum serves as a direct approach for the

CCP to encourage the OCLM to follow the external propaganda policy of the Party.

These essays follow the Forum's agendas, which are instructions to guide the OCLM executives on how to deliver a rhetoric that adheres to the CCP's external propaganda priorities.113 One of the top priorities of the CCP’s external propaganda strategy, as

President Jiang Zemin (江泽民) has proposed at the 1999 National External Propaganda

Work Conference (Quanguo Duiwai Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyi 全国对外宣传工作会

议), is to defend the international image and the national interests of China by explaining the country’s political stability, economic development, social progress, and unity among

111 The best way to investigate the selection process is to conduct interviews with any OCLM personnel who has participated in the event. However, during the interviews with the OCLM editors and journalists, all of my interlocutors have either declined to comment or claimed to have no knowledge of on the Forum. 112 Table 1 113 Table 2

different ethnicities.114 Hereafter, the defense of China’s international image by emphasizing the political, economic, social, and cultural achievements of China has become the one of the core missions of the CCP’s external propaganda policy, as various expressions of such mission continues to emerge at the External Propaganda Work

Conference in 2004, 2007, 2009, and 2012.115

The first type of essays written for the Forum consists of propaganda essays that directly adhere to the CCP’s external propaganda policy by defending the national interests of China. In an essay written for the 2001 Forum in Nanjing by He Yiyun (何毅

云), the president of a Chinese-language newspaper in Japan named Dongfang Shibao

(东方时报), the author argues that the OCLM needs to shoulder the responsibility of promoting cross-strait unification.116 In particular, the author proposes that the OCLM needs to censor any rhetoric that supports Taiwan independence to act as a counterweight for the pro-independence rhetoric overseas. The timing of this essay is quite appropriate,

114 "Quanguo Duiwai Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyi (全国对外宣传工作会议) [National External Propaganda Work Meeting]." News of the Communist Party of China, published Feb 27, 1999, accessed Sep 4, 2016, http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/151935/176588/176597/10556595.html. 115 Shi, Jiangmin. "Waixuan Gongzuo Yao Tiejin Zhongguo Shiji He Guowai Shouzong (外宣工作要贴近中国实际和国外受众) [External Propaganda Work Needs to be Close to China's Reality and Audience Overseas]." People's Daily Online, published Apr 22, 2004, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22039/2462084.html; "Liu Yunshan Qiangdiao Jinjin Zhuazhu Youli Qiji Jiji Zhangkai Duiwai Xuanchuan (刘云山强调紧紧抓住有利契机积极开展对外宣传) [Liu Yunshan Emphasizes Positive Opportunity Encourage to Develop External Propaganda]." Xinhua Net, published Jan 21, 2007, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007- 01/21/content_5633178.htm; "Quanguo Duiwai Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyi Zhaokai (全国对外宣传工作会议召开) [National External Propaganda Work Meeting Convenes]." Xinhua Net, published Jan 6, 2009, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-01/06/content_10613452_1.htm; "Quanguo Duiwai Xuanchuan Gongzuo Huiyi Zaijing Zhaokai (全国对外宣传工作会议在京召开) [National External Propaganda Work Meeting Convenes in Beijing]." People's Daily Online, published Jan 5, 2012, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/16805091.html. 116He, Yiyun. "Haiwai Huayu Meiti Chujin Zhongguo Tongyi De Jiaose Yu Zuoyong (海外华语媒体促进中国统一的角色与作用) [the Role and Function of Overseas Chinese Language Media in Promoting the Unification of China]." China News Service, published Feb 5, 2002, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.fcm.chinanews.com.cn/2001-09-06/2/54.html.

since Chen Shui-bian (陈水扁), the presidential candidate of the pro-independence

Democratic Progressive Party, had just won the Taiwanese election in the previous year.

It is possible that the CNS did not instruct He to implement such rhetoric, and that the proposal of censorship by the author is genuinely his idea. The fact that the CNS selected this essay and allowed He to present it at the discussion sessions is an indirect approach for the CCP to promote censorship among the OCLM, demonstrating the Party's intention in operating the Forum as a platform to influence the OCLM.

Another example that reflects the CCP’s external propaganda priorities is an essay presented at the 2013 Forum in Qingdao by Huang Huanming (黄焕明), the president of a Chinese-language newspaper in Cambodia named Jian Hua Daily (柬华日报). In the essay, Huang suggests that the OCLM has the responsibility to promote the “Chinese

Dream” (zhongguo meng 中国梦).117 In particular, the author argues that the “Chinese

Dream” has accurately captured the yearning among the OC communities in which the

OC dreams of achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese race” (zhonghua minzu weida fuxing 中华民族伟大复兴) and “the peaceful rise of China” (zhongguo heping jueqi 中国和平崛起); the OCLM around the world, therefore, must disseminate the idea of the “Chinese Dream” in order to assist the revival of China’s wealth and power. The

“Chinese Dream” is a propaganda slogan proposed by Xi Jinping in late 2012 as the trademark philosophy of his new administration.118 The selection of Huang’s essay by the

117 Huang, Huanming. "Huamei Yao Chengwei Zhongguomeng De Jiji Chuanbo Zhe (华媒要成为中国梦的积极传播者) [Chinese-Language Media Needs to Become the Active Communicator of the Chinese Dream]." China News Service, published Feb 5, 2002, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/zgqj/2013/08-20/5184045.shtml. 118 Wong, Edward. 2012. "Signals of a More Open Economy in China." The New York Times, Dec 9. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/world/asia/chinese-leaders-visit-to-shenzhen-hints-at-reform.html.

CNS, therefore, is a perfect example in which the CCP directly conveys the Party’s external propaganda policy through the essays written by the OCLM executives. The propaganda essays, like the ones written by He and Huang, have revealed that the CCP operates the Forum as a platform to influence the OCLM, so that the OCLM may act as the mouthpiece by disseminating the Party’s external propaganda rhetoric.

5.1.2.2 The Practical Essays

The second type of essays written for the Forum provides practical analysis that explores the latest challenges and opportunities in the OCLM industry. As the previous section has revealed, the CCP's attempt to promote the Party's interests through propaganda essays is quite conspicuous, but if all of the essays were promoting the

Party's interest, the Forum would completely lose its legitimacy as an unofficial platform designed to benefit the OCLM industry. To maintain the legitimacy of the Forum by advancing the interests of the OCLM industry, some of the essays written for the Forum need to emphasize the actual needs of the OCLM by addressing the real issues facing the industry. Many of these practical essays focused on the challenge of emerging new media towards traditional print media – a common issue among the global newspaper and magazine industry. In an essay written for the 2001 Forum by Lin Renjun (林任君), the chief editor of a Chinese-language newspaper in Singapore named Lianhe Zaobao (联合

早报), the author shares the paper's recent experience in venturing towards the production of multimedia news contents.119 Lin argues that the company's recent expansion into TV production has successfully expanded the market while also highlighting several critical

119 Lin, Renjun. "Xinjiapo Huawenbao Zouxiang Duomeiti Ronghe (新加坡华文报走向多媒体融合) [Chinese Newspaper in Singapore Moves Towards Multimedia Integration]." China News Service, published Feb 5, 2002, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.fcm.chinanews.com.cn/2001-08-22/2/38.html.

challenges in training the company's existing employees for video production. Unlike the propaganda essays that clearly advocates a specific pro-CCP rhetoric, Lin's essay has no embedded CCP interest; instead, it offers valuable recommendations for the OCLM to explore new opportunities amid the rapid transformation in the global media industry at the turn of the century.

In addition to addressing operational challenges, the practical essays also explore the latest developments in the OCLM market. In an essay written for the 2011 Forum in

Chongqing by Zhang Hong (张宏), the chief editor of a Chinese-language newspaper in

Japan named Rizhong Shangbao (日中商报), the author investigates the evolution of

Chinese-language newspapers in Japan by exposing a recent trend of once-successful

Chinese-language newspapers going out of business. Zhang argues that the reasons behind such phenomenon are, for some, the difficulties in hiring new journalists, and for others, the lack of funding. The author also believes that these problems have led to the decline in the quality of Chinese-language journalism in Japan, which had ultimately resulted in the demise of these OCLM organizations.120 Zhang's description on the difficulty of hiring Chinese-language journalists offers valuable insights for other OCLM organizations in Japan; such insights may also resonate with other OCLM in countries with a smaller OC population. By commissioning practical essays serving the interests of the OCLM, the CNS can slightly dilute the negative impression of which the OCLM executives may perceive the Forum as an exercise of CCP external propaganda. By

120 Zhang, Hong. "Riben Huawen Baozhi De Jingying Zhuangkuang Ji Zhanwang;(日本华文报纸的经营现状及展望) [the Operational Status and Prospect of the Chinese-Language Japanese Newspapers in Japan]." China News Service, published Sep 16, 2011, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/kong/2011/09-16/3333846.shtml.

keeping a decent amount of practical essays in the discussion session, the CNS can maintain a façade for the Forum that disguises the Forum as an unofficial platform designed to benefit the OCLM industry.

Although many of the earlier practical essays are politically neutral, recent practical essays have revealed a more sophisticated approach to promoting the CCP's external propaganda priorities by embedding recommendations that align the interests of the OCLM with the CCP. Compared to the direct promotion of external propaganda rhetoric observed in the propaganda essays, the embedded recommendations in the practical essays is a superior approach in persuading the OCLM executives to comply with the Party's external propaganda policy. By promoting the alignment of interests between the Party and the OCLM, the CCP will substantially increase its power to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM. For example, In response to the global financial crisis, many of the essays presented at the 2009 Forum in Shanghai aimed at addressing the challenges in the OCLM industry. In one of these essays, Liu Changle (刘

长乐), the president and CEO of Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV Group (凤凰卫视集团), proposes that the cultural industry in mainland China is booming despite the global financial crisis, and that the OCLM needs to embrace it as an opportunity to reverse the recent decline of the OCLM industry. Liu also argues that Phoenix TV’s strategy of

“having a foothold in Hong Kong, relying on mainland China, and marching to the rest of the world” (lizu xianggang, yituo dalu, zouxiang shijie 立足香港，依托大陆，走向世

界) has made a crucial contribution to the company's recovery from the 1997 Asian

financial crisis.121 Unlike the authors of the propaganda essays, Liu does not directly instruct the OCLM to follow the CCP's external propaganda policy. Instead, the author argues that by maintaining a closer relationship with China, which implies having an increased amount of shared interests with the CCP, the OCLM will overcome the challenge of the global financial crisis.

At the same Forum, Wang Wei (王威), the assistant chief editor of a Chinese- language magazine in the U.S. named Coastide (彼岸), has also presented an essay that promotes the value of building closer ties with China for the recovery of the OCLM industry. In the essay, Wang argues that the financial crisis has elevated the weight of

China in the global economy, and that this new dynamic in the relationship between

China and the rest of the world, together with the emerging opportunities in the mainland

Chinese market, have provided “unprecedented” (qiansuo weiyou 前所未有) value for the OCLM industry.122 Similar to Liu's essay, Wang's essays implies that having an increased amount of shared interests with China will be beneficial to the recovery of the

OCLM industry. Moreover, Wang also proposes that to take advantage of the growing market in mainland China, the OCLM needs to boost its effort to overcome the political rift within the OC communities and strengthen the "discourse power" (huayuquan 话语

权) of the OCLM. Wang’s recommendation follows the core principles of boosting the discourse power of China – a new external propaganda policy introduced by the CCP in

121 Liu, Changle. "Huawen Meiti Zai Jinrong Weiji Zhong Yuhuo Chongsheng (华文媒体在金融危机中浴火重生) [Chinese-Language Media Rebirths Amid the Financial Crisis]." China News Service, published Sep 16, 2009, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/ga/news/2009/09-16/1870063.shtml. 122 Wang, Wei. "Weiji Yu Jiyu Mianqian De Huawen Chuanmei (危机与机遇面前的华文传媒) [Chinese- Language Media Facing Crisis and Opportunity]." China News Service, published Sep 7, 2009, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/cul/news/2009/09-07/1853471.shtml.

2008.123 Wang's essay does not specify how exactly can the OCLM executives accomplish such objectives, but the recommendation of uniting the political views of the

OC communities and strengthening the discourse power of OCLM certainly complements the CCP's external propaganda policy. The essays written by Liu and Wang have not only shown that the CCP operates the FGLCM as a platform to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM, but also revealed that by promoting shared interests with the OCLM, the

CCP's external propaganda policy has become more sophisticated in recent years.

5.1.3 The Declaration of Consensus

In addition to the essays written by OCLM executives, the declaration of consensus is another feature by which the CCP have shown the Party’s intention of operating the Forum as a platform to influence the OCLM. The CNS introduced the declaration of consensus in the Third Forum in Wuhan (武汉). Announced by Liu

Beixian (刘北宪), the executive vice president of Xinhua News Agency, the Wuhan

Declaration (Wuhan Xuanyan 武汉宣言) is not a legally binding document for which the

OCLM executives need to sign and comply; instead, the declaration concludes the findings of the essays written for the Forum and offers a list of guidance with which Liu urges the OCLM industry to respect, commit, and implement.124 Although Liu’s announcement claims that the participants have “passed” (tongguo 通过) the declaration, the published schedules of the Forums throughout the years have shown no sign of any

123 Zhang, Weiwei. "Pushi Jiazhi De Lailongqumai (普世价值的来龙去脉) [the Story Behind the Universal Value]." Xinhua Net, published Sep 18, 2008, accessed Oct 2, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/theory/2008-09/18/content_10071999.htm. 124 Jia, Jingfeng. "Huawen Chuanmei Luntan Bimu: Quanqiu Huawen Meiti Fabiao Wuhan Xuanyan (华文传媒论坛闭幕: 全球华文媒体发表武汉宣言) [the Forum on Chinese Language Media Closes: Global Chinese-Language Media Issues Wuhan Declarations]." China News Service, published Sep 12, 2005, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/news/2005/2005-09-12/8/624776.shtml.

voting process or consensus-seeking mechanism through which the participants may express whether they agree or disagree with the list of guidance on the declaration of consensus.125 It is unclear whether the CNS had previously negotiated with the OCLM executives and reached a consensus regarding the guidance on the declaration, or the

OCLM executives had not reached any consensus at all, but nevertheless went along with the CNS because they expected that the declaration of consensus was nothing more than an empty propaganda exercise.126

Table 3: List of Consensus Declarations Year Consensus of the Forum 2005 1. Inherit Chinese civilization and disseminate Chinese culture. 2. Provide impartial, unbiased, and comprehensive news content on Chinese reform. 3. Promote cooperation and exchange between China and the OCLM's host countries. 4. Defend the rights of OC while elevating the political, social, and economic status of OC in the host countries. 5. Elevate the overall quality of OCLM by integrating resources among OCLM organizations. 6. Promote cooperation and exchange that are mutually beneficial to OCLM organizations. 2007 1. Promote the "voice of harmony" for the establishment of a peaceful, cooperative, friendly and energetic OC society. 2. Promote the peaceful coexistence between Chinese and local culture. 3. Promote the culture of mutual assistance among OC communities. 4. Promote responsible and civilized business practices among OC communities. 5. Promote the role of OC as the vehicle of public exchanges between Chinese and the rest of the world. 6. Promote cooperation between OCLM organizations and the mainstream media of host countries. 7. Promote cooperation between OCLM and Chinese media. 8. Promote the 2008 Beijing Olympics. 9. Demonstrate an open, democratic, progressive, and civilized national image for China.

125 Since 2001, the FGCLM has always been following a similar set of daily schedules. The only noticeable difference in the post-2005 schedules is that the CNS has added the announcement of the declaration to the closing ceremony. For the 2005 GFOCLM schedule, see Jia, Jingfeng. "Disanjie Shijie Huawen Chuanmei Wuhan Luntan Richeng Anpai (第三届世界华文传媒武汉论坛日程安排) [the Daily Schedule of the Third Forum on Global Chinese Language Media in Wuhan]." China News Service, published Aug 31, 2005, accessed Aug 22, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/news/2005/2005-08-31/8/619060.shtml. 126 Similar to the responses from the essay evaluation process, during my interviews with the editors and journalists of the OCLM organizations, all of my interlocutors have either declined to comment or claimed to have no knowledge of how the participants have reached the consensus.

2009 1. Improve the business operation of OCLM. 2. Introduce new concepts and new technologies among OCLM. 3. Provide realistic, impartial, and unbiased news content to establish a harmonious public opinion in the host countries of OCLM. 4. Defend the rights of OC in other countries, as well as compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan while elevating their social status. 5. Maintain a high level of social responsibility by promoting the integration of OC and the local communities in the host countries. 6. Promote economic recovery and social progress in the host countries. 2011 1. Enhance the credibility and the strength of dissemination of OCLM for the establishment of an impartial, fair, and balanced global discourse system. 2. Promote innovation in media operation and develop multi-dimensional media platforms. 3. Maintain realistic, impartial, and unbiased journalistic discipline. 4. Promote social-economic development in the host countries and encourage cooperation and exchange between China and the rest of the world. 5. Explore the possibility of strategic transformation amid the rise of new media. 2013 1. Advance the progress of human development with the dissemination of positive energy and the establishment of credibility. 2. Establish connections among different regions, different races, and different cultures. 3. Promote "China Dream" among OC communities. 4. Introduce transformative innovations in media operation amid the challenge of new media. 5. Promote cooperation between OCLM and Chinese media for the dissemination of Chinese culture. 6. Disseminate the "story of China" by establishing an impartial, fair, and balanced global discourse system. 2015 1. Promote the establishment of harmonious OC communities. 2. Promote the exchange between the OC communities and the mainstream societies of the host countries. 3. Inherit traditional Chinese culture and become the vehicle to promote Chinese culture around the globe. 4. Depict a realistic image of China in front of the global audience. 5. Promote non-governmental exchanges and mutual understanding between China and the rest of the world while introducing development opportunities in China. Source: China News Service.127

Similar to the essays written for the Forum, the guidance on the declaration of consensus can be divided into two categories: the first type of guidance offers specific directions on how the OCLM should approach a particular issue or event, whereas the second type of guidance offers recommendations on how to improve the operational capabilities of the OCLM. In the Wuhan Declaration, for example, four out of six items belong to the first type of guidance: (1) inherit Chinese civilization and disseminate

Chinese culture, (2) provide impartial, objective, and comprehensive (gongping, keguan,

127 Liang. "Dazao Huamei Bubian Jingshen Jiayuan."

quanmian 公平, 客观, 全面) news content on Chinese reform, (3) promote cooperation and exchange between China and the host countries of the OCLM, and (4) defend the rights of OC while elevating the political, social, and economic status of OC in the their host countries. In contrast, the remaining two guidance emphasize the improvements on the operational capabilities of the OCLM: (1) promote cooperation and exchange that are mutually beneficial to OCLM organizations and (2) elevate the overall quality of OCLM by integrating resources among OCLM organizations.128 By analyzing the first type of guidance, this thesis demonstrates how the declaration of consensus reveals the CCP's intention in operating the Forum as a platform to influence the OCLM.

The best example on the list of guidance that reveals the CCP’s intention is the promotion of impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism, for which the CNS has iterated through various expressions on the declarations of consensus in 2005, 2009,

2011, 2013, and 2015.129 At first glance, the promotion of impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism seems to be a welcoming recommendation advocating the proper standard of journalism. During the interviews with OCLM editors and journalists in the U.S., however, my interlocutors argued that the CCP has no interest in urging the

OCLM to practice proper journalism. Instead, they suggested that the guidance actually means the exact opposite – the CCP perceives any negative rhetoric on China as partial, subjective, and incomprehensive; the Party, therefore, wants the OCLM to practice

“impartial, objective, and comprehensive” journalism by building a positive international image for China and defending China’s national interests.130 By illustrating the

128 Table 3 129 Table 3 130 The executives and journalists of my interviews, despite the fact that they have never participated in the Forum, suggested that the Forum is a platform for CCP external propaganda.

contradiction between the promotion of proper journalism and the arguments of Forum essays, this thesis argues that the CNS has no intention of promoting the proper standard of journalism, which reinforces the CCP's intention in operating the Forum as a platform to influence the OCLM.

5.1.4 The Contradictions between the Essays and the Declarations

One of the top priorities of the CCP's external propaganda policy is to defend the international image and the national interests of China by explaining the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural achievements.131 Such mission will require the

OCLM to maintain a pro-China rhetoric, which clearly contradicts with the promotion of impartial, unbiased, and comprehensive journalism. When an OCLM organization truly practices impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism, it will be necessary for its content to be sometimes critical of China, and to report an event or carry a certain rhetoric that may inflict damage to China's international image and national interests. A closer look at the essays written by the OCLM executives suggests that the CNS has no interest in promoting the superior standard of journalism championed by the declarations of consensus.

Many of the essays written for the Forum follow a rhetoric that contradicts the proposed journalistic standards. Instead of advocating the practice of impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism, the essays echo with the CCP’s external propaganda policy by defending the international image and national interests of China. As He

Yiyun’s essay in the previous section has revealed, the author intends to encourage the

OCLM to censor pro-independence rhetoric. The promotion of cross-strait unification has

131 Shi. "Waixuan Gongzuo Yao Tiejin Zhongguo Shiji He Guowai Shouzong (外宣工作要贴近中国实际和国外受众) [External Propaganda Work Needs to be Close to China's Reality and Audience Overseas]."

always been one of the CCP’s top priorities in external propaganda, as President Jiang has stated at the External Propaganda Work Conference in 1999. The encouragement of censorship in He’s essay clearly contradicts with the practice of impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism, but perfectly echoes with the CCP’s external propaganda priorities.

Another example is an essay written for the 2007 Forum in Chengdu by Zhang

Yan (张雁), the president of a Canadian Chinese-language newspaper named Global

Chinese Press (环球华报). In the essay, the author argues that there is a rising trend of

“China threat theory” (zhongguo weixie lun 中国威胁论) among the international community due to Western media’s lack of understanding about China. To counter the rise of “China threat theory” and defend the positive image of China, Zhang suggests that the OCLM needs to be the “bridgehead” (qiaotoubao 桥头堡) in promoting an honest image of China and the “harmonious” (hexie 和谐) nature of China’s rise.132 Zhang’s essay brilliantly combines the defense of Chinese national interest with the Party’s propaganda slogan of “harmonious society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会) proposed by

President Hu Jintao in 2005.133 Zhang's proposal to defend China's positive international image contradicts with the practice of impartial, objective, and comprehensive

132 Zhang, Yan. "Zhongguo Jueqi Yu Haiwai Huawen Chuanmei De Lishi Jiyu (中国崛起与海外华文传媒的历史机遇) [the Rise of China and the Historical Opportunity for Overseas Chinese Language Media]." China News Service, published Aug 21, 2007, accessed Aug 23, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/hr/kong/news/2007/08-21/1006817.shtml. 133 Li, Jing. "Hu Jintao Zongshuji Guanyu Goujian Shehuizhuyi Hexieshehui De Youguan Lunshu (胡锦涛总书记关于构建社会主义和谐社会的有关论述) [General Secretary Hu Jintao's Discussions on the Construction of Socialist Harmonious Society]." People's Daily Online, published Mar 23, 2005, accessed Sep 4, 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/42475/3263993.html.

journalism, showing that the CNS has no intention to promote the proper standard of journalism.

Similarly, in an essay presented at the 2009 Forum by Pang Yan (庞燕), the president of Canada Chinese Times (中华时报), the author argues that “the principle of putting national interests above all else” (guojia zhishang de yuanze 国家至上的原则) is the soul of the mainland Chinese media and the OCLM. The author also suggests that the

OCLM needs to defend the image of China by establishing "the awareness of prioritizing the interest of the motherland" (zuguo zhishang de yishi 祖国至上的意识) and following a principle that adopts “the Chinese position, the global vision,” and “the heart of humanity” (zhongguo lichang, shijie yanguang, renlei xionghuai 中国立场，世界眼

光，人类胸怀).134 Pang’s essay promotes the principle of putting Chinese national interests above all else, which clearly contradicts the practice of impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism, but perfectly echoes the CCP’s external propaganda priorities.

The essays written for the Forum also advance the Chinese national interests by promoting China's national strategy. In an essay written for the 2015 Forum by Wang

Weijun (王威钧), a senior editor of a Taiwanese newspaper named The Commons Daily

(民众日报), the author argues that the OCLM needs to champion the One Belt One Road

Initiative (OBOR) (Yidai Yilu 一带一路) by generating a positive public opinion for the

OBOR in the host countries of the OCLM. The OBOR is one of China’s most important national strategy proposed by Xi Jingping in 2013. The objective of the OBOR is to

134 Pang, Yan. "Ruhe Yingde Yingdui Tufashijian Baodao De Guoji Huayuquan (如何赢得应对突发事件报道的国际话语权) [how to Gain the International Discourse Power in Response to Emergency News Coverage]." China News Service, published Sep 8, 2009, accessed Aug 23, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/kong/news/2009/09-08/1856445.shtml.

provide both financial and technical support to infrastructure construction in countries along the ancient Chinese land and maritime trade routes. By promoting Chinese companies to construct infrastructure projects in those countries, China will be able to enhance its influence in South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, while the initiative will also alleviate the pressing issue of overcapacity in the Chinese economy.135

Wang’s seems to be very confident on the OBOR. The author suggests that a positive public opinion in the OBOR countries will lead to better the investment environment for Chinese businesses, which will subsequently generate Chinese immigration in that country and create a bigger market for the OCLM.136 Although Wang emphasizes the benefits of the OBOR, the author has failed to address the possibility that

Chinese interests may clash with the native communities. By merging the interest of the

OCLM with the national strategy of China, Wang's essay is essentially proposing that the

OCLM need to become the CCP's mouthpiece for the promotion of China's national strategy, proving that the Forum has no intention of promoting the practice of impartial, objective, and comprehensive journalism. The contradiction between the essays and the declaration of consensus verifies the claim of my interlocutors in which the CCP considers any negative rhetoric towards China as partial, subjective, and incomprehensive, while also confirms that the Forum is designed as a platform for CCP to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM.

135 "One Belt, One Road." Council on Foreign Relations, published Mar 28, 2015, accessed Sep 14, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/one-belt-one-road/p36818. 136 Wang, Weijun. "Yidai Yilu Wei Huawen Meiti Chuangzao Jiyu (一带一路为华文媒体创造机遇) [One Belt One Road Creates Opportunity for Chinese-Language Media]." China News Service, published Aug 14, 2015, accessed Aug 23, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/kong/2015/08-14/7468423.shtml.

5.2 The Advanced Seminar for the Overseas Chinese Language Media

Table 4: Advanced Seminars for the Overseas Chinese-Language Media Additional Field Session Date Location Participation Curriculum trips 1 1/9/2006 Beijing 23 OCLM 1. Traditional Chinese None to organizations culture 1/13/2006 from 19 2. Theories of journalism countries 3. Business operation for media organizations 2 11/21/2006 Beijing 18 OCLM 1. Theories of journalism None to organizations 2. Journalistic operations 11/25/2006 from 15 3. The Chinese economy countries 4. Traditional Chinese culture 3 11/26/2007 Beijing 22 OCLM 1. Traditional Chinese None to organizations culture 12/1/2007 from 15 2. The Beijing Olympics countries 3. The Chinese economy 4. Business operation for media organizations 5. The relationship between news and culture 4 9/19/2008 Beijing 14 OCLM 1. The history of ethnic Xinjiang to organizations minorities in China 9/21/2008 from 13 2. The culture of ethnic countries minorities in China 3. The migration patterns of ethnic minorities 4. Chinese policies towards ethnic minorities 5 12/1/2009 Guangzhou 23 OCLM 1. The evolution from Local media to organizations traditional media to organizations 12/3/2009 from 18 new media countries 2. The latest innovations in new media 6 8/29/2010 Beijing 40 OCLM 1. The history and culture Xinjiang to organizations of Xinjiang and Tibet 8/31/2010 from 23 countries 7 6/11/2012 Xiamen 39 OCLM 1. Traditional Chinese Jilin, Liaoning to organizations culture 6/13/2012 from 25 2. Cross-strait news countries dissemination 3. Newsgathering operations 4. The economic developments in Northeast China 8 6/14/2012 Shanghai, 40 OCLM 1. The news speakers Joining with to Chengdu organizations system domestic media 6/19/2012 from 20 2. Developments along organizations on a countries China's border grand tour across 3. The current situation in Tibet in September Tibet 2012 9 9/14/2012 Beijing 80 OCLM 1. Media development Shandong, to organizations 2. The Chinese economy Guangdong, Jiangsu, 9/16/2012 from 32 3. Chinese foreign policy Xinjiang, Ningxia countries and Gansu

10 5/27/2013 Xiamen 60 OCLM 1. The development of Fujian, Guangxi, and to organizations OCLM under the Shanxi 5/30/2013 from 24 China Dream countries 2. Cross-strait media exchange 3. New media development 4. Traditional Chinese culture 11 6/15/2014 Chengdu 68 OCLM 1. The economy and Ethnic Tibetan to organizations culture of the ethnic region of Sichuan 6/17/2014 from 32 Tibetan region in countries Sichuan 12 9/25/2014 Beijing 65 OCLM 1. Financial reform in Xinjiang, Tianjin, to organizations China Shandong, and 9/27/2014 from 34 2. Provincial economic Shanghai countries reform policies 3. The OBOR 4. The latest developments in new media 13 5/11/2015 Beijing 78 OCLM 1. Chinese foreign policy Yunnan, Anhui, to organizations 2. The OBOR Fujian, Liaoning, 5/14/2015 from 31 3. Chinese national and Heilongjiang countries security strategy 14 5/16/2016 Beijing 97 OCLM 1. Chinese economic and Zhejiang, Hebei, and to organizations social development Shandong 5/19/2016 from 35 2. The OBOR countries 3. China’s policy towards the OC 4. Cross-platform media development 15 9/23/2016 Beijing 80 OCLM 1. The OBOR Xinjiang, Sichuan, to organizations 2. The role of OCLM in Guangxi, and Hubei 9/27/2016 from 34 the OBOR countries Source: China News Service.137

In 2006, the CNS began to organize the Advanced Seminar for the Overseas

Chinese Language Media (Haiwai Huawen Meiti Gaoji Xunlianban 海外华文媒体高级

研修班). Serving as a complement to the established influence of the Forum, the Seminar is a more responsive and flexible platform to generate influence over the OCLM. Since

2006, the CNS has organized 15 sessions of the Seminar; unlike the biannual Forums, the agency usually plans the Seminar once a year, but with a few exceptions.138 The daily

137 Details of the Seminars are drawn from news articles published by the CNS. For reference, see Appendix A. 138 The exceptions will be discussed later in this section. For the more details on the 15 sessions of the Seminar, see Table 4.

schedule of the Seminar – usually lasting between two and five days – follows the same routine that can be divided into four stages: (1) opening ceremony, (2) lectures and discussions, (3) closing ceremony, and (4) field trips.139 Comparing to the Forum, the

Seminar focuses more on lecture sessions and less on discussion sessions, which explains why most of them are organized in cooperation with Chinese universities. The CNS does not publish the full list of participants for the Seminar, but the available information indicates that some of the OCLM executives attending the Seminar represent the traditional news organizations that have also developed new online platforms.140 The scale of the Seminar is much smaller than the Forum, but the number of participants at the Seminar has been steadily growing. At the First Seminar in 2006, the CNS only invited OCLM executives representing 23 organizations from 19 countries; in contrast, at the Fifteenth Seminar in 2016, the CNS invited OCLM executives representing 80 organizations from 34 countries.141

Similar to the agendas of the Forum, the CNS arranges three to five lecture topics for the “curriculum” (kecheng 课程) of the Seminar, all of which are prepared and delivered by a wide-range of lecturers, including university professors and government officials.142 The CNS discloses the topics of the Seminar curriculums, but the agency

139 The field trips became part of the Seminar schedule since the Fourth Seminar in 2008. 140 Kang, Xiaolan. "Diwuqi Haiwai Huawen Meiti Gaoji Yanxiuban Zai Jinan Daxue Kaiban (第五期海外华文媒体高级研修班在暨南大学开班) [the Fifth Advanced Seminar for Overseas Chinese Language Media Begins at Jinan University]." State Council Information Office, published Dec 2, 2009, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.scio.gov.cn/hzjl/hdjj/wz/Document/482472/482472.htm; Zhang, Dongdong. "Ye Xiaowen Wei Diliuqi Haiwai Huawen Meiti Gaoji Yanxiuban Shouke (叶小文为第六期海外华文媒体高级研修班授课) [Ye Xiaowen Lectures for the Sixth Advanced Seminar for the Overseas Chinese Language Media]." China News Serivce, published Aug 30, 2010, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/zgqj/2010/08-30/2500458.shtml. 141 Table 5. 142 Yang, Lingxiao. "Dishiqi Haiwai Huawen Meiti Gaoji Yanxiuban Zai Huaqiao Daxue Jieye;(第十期海外华文媒体高级研修班在华侨大学结业) [the Tenth Advanced Seminar for Overseas Chinese Language

refrains from publishing any transcript or presentation of the lecture sessions.143 By analyzing the available information on the Seminar, this thesis argues that the curriculums and lectures have revealed two attributes of the Seminar. First, similar to the

Forum, the Seminar serves as a platform for the CCP to influence the editorial decision.

Second, the Seminar is more flexible and responsive than the biannual Forum – if an emergency news event occurs and needs the CCP's attention, the CNS may assemble a group of OCLM executives at an event-inspired Seminar to disseminate the CCP's external propaganda rhetoric.

5.2.1 The Lectures Given at the Seminar

The purpose of the lectures given at the Seminar is similar to the essays written for the Forums – to express the CCP’s external propaganda rhetoric and influence the

OCLM. The various lecture topics in the curriculums of the Seminar can be divided into two categories: propaganda and practical. For example, at the 14th Seminar in 2016, the

CNS has prepared four different topics for its curriculum: (1) Chinese economic and social development, (2) the OBOR, (3) China's policy towards the OC, and (4) cross- platform media development. The first three lecture topics of the 2016 curriculum are propaganda topics that potentially involves the OCLM organizations adjusting their current editorial preferences on a particular issue, whereas the one remaining is a practical topic designed to benefit the business operation of the OCLM. Citing the lecture

Media Graduates at Huaqiao University]." Xinhua Net, published Jun 1, 2013, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2013-06/01/c_124797717.htm. 143 It is uncertain whether the CNS has pressured the OCLM not to publish the contents of the lectures, but only one OCLM organization has made the transcripts and presentations of the lectures available to the public.

details of the Seminar, this thesis argues that the Seminar also serves as a platform for the

CCP to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM,

At the 13th Seminar in 2015, He Yafei (何亚非), the assistant director of the

OCAO gave a lecture titled “The Great Powers Foreign Affairs Philosophy with Chinese

Characteristics and OC Affairs” (Zhongguo Tese Daguo Waijiao Sixiang Yu Qiaowu

Gongzuo 中国特色大国外交思想与侨务工作).144 He’s lecture argues that after decades of struggle and hard work, China has experienced drastic transformation, became a great power, and reached a historical turning point, at which President Xi Jinping is proposing the foreign affairs philosophy of “win-win cooperation” (hezuo gongying 合作共赢) by introducing the OBOR to establish shared interests with the rest of the world. The assistant director also argues that the OCLM may play a crucial role in assisting the

OBOR by disseminating positive and attractive news stories in the OC communities of the countries that are involved in the OBOR, which will consequently promote people exchange between China and those countries. By suggesting the OCLM maintain a positive image for the OBOR, the assistant director is not only convincing the OCLM to defend China's positive international image, but also requesting the OCLM to become a

CCP mouthpiece that promotes China's national strategy.

The key difference between the Forum essays and the Seminar lectures is that many of the lectures are given by prominent Chinese scholars. The purpose of inviting

144 Yang, Kaiqi. "78 Wei Haiwai Huawen Meiti Fuzeren Ju Beijing Yanxiu (78 位海外华文媒体负责人聚北京研修) [78 Executives of Overseas Chinese Language Media Gathers in Beijing for Seminar]." China News Sevice, published May 11, 2015, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/hr/2015/05- 11/7267777.shtml; You, Zi. "Dishanqi Haiwai Huawen Meiti Gaoji Yanxiuban Kaiban Huarenjie Yingyao Canjia (第十三期海外华文媒体高级研修班开班华人街应邀参加) [Huarenjie was Invited to the Thirteenth Advanced Seminar for Overseas Chinese Language Media]." Huarenjie, published May 11, 2015, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://yingguo.huarenjie.com/article-250284-1.html.

the scholars is to establish the theoretical foundation for the OCLM executives to understand why the CCP is pursuing a particular external propaganda rhetoric. At the

Ninth Seminar in 2012, Jin Canrong (金灿荣), a prominent scholar and the associate dean of Renmin University’s School of International Relations, gave a lecture titled “The

Current Condition of International Relations and Chinese Foreign Policy” (Dangqian

Guoji Xingshi He Zhongguo Waijiao 当前国际形势和中国外交).145 In the lecture, Jin explores China's national interests at geopolitical hotspots around the world, China's strategy in great power relations, and the potential trajectory of future Chinese foreign policy. Jin's lecture not only describes the latest developments in international relations from the perspective of China but also explains the theories and logic behind those developments by using vivid analogies, so that someone unfamiliar with international relations can still understand the arguments. The introduction of academic theories at the

Seminar lectures has elevated the learning experience and added legitimacy to the

Seminar. More importantly, Jin's in-depth analysis on the developments in international relations from the perspective of China has established a theoretical foundation for the

OCLM executives to understand the underlying logic of the CCP's external propaganda rhetoric. By introducing a sophisticated theoretical foundation to the CCP's external propaganda rhetoric, the CNS has increased the prospect of the OCLM submitting to the influence of the CCP.

145 Lin, Lin. "Jin Canrong Laoshi Tan Dangqian Guoji Xingshi He Zhongguo Waijiao (金灿荣老师谈当前国际形势和中国外交) [Professor Jin Canrong Discusses Current International Environment and Chinese Foreign Policy]." World Hall of Fame Network, published Sep 15, 2012, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.famehall.com/beijing/2012/20120915235514.shtml.

Similar to the practical essays written for the Forum, the practical lectures given at the Seminar have enhanced its legitimacy by addressing issues that are relevant to the interests of the OCLM. For example, at the Ninth Seminar, Peng Lan (彭兰), a professor at Renmin University's School of Journalism and Communication (Renmin Daxue

Xinwen Xueyuan 人民大学新闻学院), gave a lecture titled “The Development Trend in

New Media and its Influence” (Xin Meiti De Fazhan Qushi Ji Qi Yingxiang 新媒体的发

展趋势及其影响).146 In the lecture, Peng explains the three-phased evolution of the global online media industry, the advertising operation of online media in mainland

China, and the recent development of “self-media” (zi meiti 自媒体) – the rapidly emerging independent journalists on Chinese social media platforms. Peng’s lecture has accurately addressed some of the most pressing challenges brought by the evolution of technology, which is not limited to the OCLM, but relevant to the entire media industry.

By helping the OCLM executives to navigate through the latest challenges to the industry, the CNS has introduced an additional layer of legitimacy to the Seminar by fulfilling the interests of the OCLM industry.

5.2.2 The Responsiveness of the Seminar

Although the Forum and the Seminar are both designed as platforms to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM, the Seminar has an advantage of responsiveness over the Forum. When there is a news event that needs immediate attention from the CCP, the

CNS may arrange a session of Seminar to address the event, so that the OCLM may reinforce or adjust their current rhetoric to fulfill the CCP's external propaganda

146 Lin, Lin. "Penglan Laoshi Wei Xinmeiti Jiangdao (彭兰老师为新媒体讲道) [Professor Peng Lan Lectures on New Media]." World Hall of Fame Network, published Sept 15, 2012, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.famehall.com/houston/2012/20120915211923.shtml.

priorities. The CNS usually arranges a Seminar once a year with a few exceptions – there were three Seminars in 2012, two in 2006, 2014, and 2016, but no Seminar in 2011.147 By examining the timing of the ethnic issue Seminars, this thesis argues that in order to complement the biannual Forum and consolidate the agency's influence over the OCLM, the CNS has established the Seminar as a flexible and responsive platform to address news events that require the Party's intervention.

In early 2008, the ethnic tensions in Xinjiang and Tibet began to escalate. The rising ethnic tensions generated a substantial amount of negative image for China while

Beijing was at the final stage of preparing for the Olympics. In March 2008, a violent clash broke out between Tibetans and the local police – the most aggressive challenge by

Tibetans to the CCP’s rule in almost two decades.148 A few weeks later, Uyghurs held mass protests in Hotan, a Southern city of Xinjiang with a Uyghur majority.149 After the

Beijing Olympics, ethnic tensions continued to escalate while generating more negative rhetoric for China’s international image despite the country’s crackdown efforts in

Xinjiang and Tibet. On July 5, 2009, more than 1,000 rioters in Urumqi, the capital of

Xinjiang, clashed with the police due to rising tension between the Hans and the

Uyghurs; the event has led to almost 200 deaths and the lockdown of the city’s Uyghur district.150

147 Table 4. 148 For the details of the Tibet riot, see Yardley, Jim. 2008. "Violence in Tibet as Monks Clash with the Police." The New York Times, Mar 15,. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/world/asia/15tibet.html; and "Tibetan Riots Spread Outside Region" 2008. The New York Times, Mar 16, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/world/asia/16iht-tibet.4.11148124.html. 149 For the details of the Xinjiang riot, see French, Howard W. 2008. "China Confirms Protests Staged by Uighur Muslims." New York Times, Apr 3, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/03/world/asia/03china.html. 150 Wong, Edward. 2009a. "China Says its Forces Killed 12 in Xinjiang;" The New York Times, Jul 20, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/world/asia/21china.html; Wong, Edward. 2009b. "Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension." The New York Times, Jul 5,

Besides the riots and protests, China has also suffered from terrorist attacks that have become symbols of the country’s ethnic tensions. One year after the 2009 Xinjiang riot, an explosive terrorist attack on a bridge in Aksu, a small city in Northwest Xinjiang, has led to seven deaths and at least twelve wounded.151 In 2013, the East Turkestan

Islamic Movement, a Uyghur terrorist group aiming to fight for Xinjiang’s independence, is responsible for an explosive attack at the Tiananmen Square that has led to at least five deaths and 40 wounded.152 A year later, knife-wielding Uyghur assailants slashed civilians at railroad stations in Urumqi and Kunming, the capital of Yunnan; the terrorist attacks in the two Chinese cities have led to at least 32 deaths and more than 200 wounded.153

In response to the negative rhetoric surrounding the ethnic tensions and terrorist attacks in China, the CNS organized Seminars that dedicated the activities to addressing ethnic issues. First, the CNS organized the Fourth Seminar in September 2008 in response to the earlier riots in Xinjiang and Tibet. Unlike the usual set of mixed curriculum topics, the four lecture topics of the Fourth Seminar only emphasized China's ethnic issues: (1) the history of ethnic minorities in China, (2) the culture of ethnic minorities in China, (3) the migration patterns of ethnic minorities, and (4) Chinese

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html. 151 Barboza, David. 2010. "Blast Kills 7 in Western China." The New York Times, Aug 19, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/world/asia/20china.html. 152 Ramzy, Austin. 2013. "China Says Terror Group was Behind Tiananmen Attack." The New York Times, Nov 1, https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/china-says-terror-group-behind-tiananmen-attack/. 153 There was a third knife attack in Guangzhou, but Chinese officials claimed that it was a lone wolf attack unrelated to any terrorist organizations. For the Kunming attack, see Buckley, Charles. 2014. "Attackers with Knives Kill 29 at Chinese Rail Station." The New York Times, Mar 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/asia/china.html; for the Urumqi attack, see Forsythe, Michael. 2014. "Assailants Attack Train Station in Restive Western China." The New York Times, Apr 30, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/world/asia/blast-hits-railway-station-in-restive-western- china.html; for the Guangzhou attack, see Ramzy, Austin. 2014. "China Hesitates to Label Guangzhou Attack Terrorism." The New York Times, May 8, https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/china-hesitates-to-label-guangzhou-attack-terrorism/.

policies towards ethnic minorities.154 The timing of the ethnic-focused curriculum illustrates the CCP's intention to alleviate the negative impact of rising ethnic tensions on

China's international image by influencing the OCLM's rhetoric regarding ethnic issues in

China. As the ethnic tensions in China continue to linger after 2008, there was an apparent surge of Seminars that are dedicated to the ethnic issues in Xinjiang and Tibet between the Fourth Seminar in 2008 and the Eleventh Seminar in 2014.155 By having the

Seminar as a flexible and responsive platform, the CNS not only can consolidate the agency's influence over the OCLM but can also tailor the curriculums of the Seminar to suit the external propaganda priorities of the CCP.

A common approach for the Seminar to counter the negative rhetoric on ethnic tensions in China is to focus on the success of economic development in the region. At the Ninth Seminar in 2012, the CNS invited Xu Zhitao (徐志涛), the assistant director of the CCP Central Committee United Front Work Department’s Seventh Bureau

(Zhonggong Zhongyang Tongzhanbu Qiju Fujuzhang 中共中央统战部七局副局长) who participated in the Party's earlier negotiations with Dali Lama, to give a lecture on

China's economic policy in Tibet.156 In the lecture, Xu first highlights how the 2003 and

2008 reform in the Tibet Work Coordination Leading Small Group (Xizang Gongzuo

Xietiao Lingdao Xiaozu 西藏工作协调领导小组) – the CCP’s top-level decision-

154 "Qi Haiwai Huamei Keguan Gongzheng Baodao Goutong Zhouguo Yu Shijie (冀海外华媒客观公正报道沟通中国与世界) [Wishes the Impartial News Reporting by Overseas Chinese Media Will Communicate China with the Rest of the World]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, published Sep 22, 2008, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2008/0922/1/10534.shtml. 155 Table 4. 156 The Seventh Bureau of the CCP United Front Work Department is responsible for co-opting the private sector. For details on the responsibilities of the Seventh Bureau, see "Jigou Shezhi (机构设置) [Institution Structure]." The United Front Work Department, published Dec 10, 2010, accessed Oct 10, 2016, http://www.zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/jgsz/201012/690112.shtml.

making body for all issues related to Tibet – has improved the level of horizontal cooperation across different bureaucratic departments in Tibet. The assistant director also suggests that the upcoming Tibet Work Conference (Xizang Gongzuo Huiyi 西藏工作会

议) has three main agendas: (1) the “seven further emphasis” (qige gengjia zhuzhong 七

个更加注重) on the social, political, and economic developments of Tibet, (2) the future goals of economic development in Tibet, and (3) the strategic importance of environmental protection in the economic development of Tibet.157 To generate a positive image for CCP’s rule in the Tibet, Xu has avoided sensitive issues like the condition of human rights and religious freedom while diverting the OCLM executives’ attention to

Tibet’s recent economic accomplishments and the region’s prospects of economic improvements under the Party’s rule. Similar to the lecture given by Jin Canrong, the in- depth introduction of China’s policy in Tibet has established a theoretical foundation for the OCLM executives to understand the underlying logic of the CCP’s external propaganda rhetoric, thereby increases the prospect of the OCLM submitting to the influence of the CCP.

In addition to the lectures on ethnic-related topics, the CNS has also reinforced the attempt to construct a positive image for Chinese ethnic policies by arranging additional field trips for the OCLM executives visit the ethnic regions in China. After the

2008 Seminar, the executives went on a field trip to "observe the grassroots communities" (kaocha jicheng 考察基层) in Xinjiang.158 Since the introduction of field

157 Lin, Lin. "Xu Zhitao Zhujiang Xizang De Lishi Yu Wenhua (徐志涛主讲西藏的历史与文化) [Xu Zhitao Lectures on the History and Culture of Tibet]." World Hall of Fame Network, published Sep 16, 2012, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://www.famehall.com/beijing/2012/20120916221010.shtml. 158 "Qi Haiwai Huamei Keguan Gongzheng Baodao Goutong Zhouguo Yu Shijie."

trips in 2008, every Seminar with a focus on ethnic issues was reinforced by an extra field trip to observe the latest situation inside the ethnic regions in China.159 The aim of the field trips is the dissemination of China's perspective on the issues regarding the ethnic regions, through which the CNS can introduce a positive rhetoric on the rule of the

CCP in the ethnic regions, and to counter the negative impact on China's international image from the Uyghur protests and Tibetan riots. By tapping the synergy of connecting the lectures with the field trips, the Seminar has become a flexible and responsive platform that complements the Forum in the CCP's efforts to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM.

5.3 The Centralization of News Production

Influencing the editorial decision of the OCLM is only the first step in achieving the external propaganda priorities of the CCP. From the perspective of the Party, influencing the editorial decision of the OCLM involves two types of risk. First, despite the Party's influence, the editorial staff of the OCLM still holds the final ruling on whether a news article gets published eventually. If an editor in the final moment has decided to ignore the pressure from the CCP and pursue an anti-China rhetoric that violates the interests of the Party, the CCP may retaliate by withdrawing the Party's support to the organization, but it does not change the fact that the OCLM has already damaged China's interests.

Second, even if an OCLM organization follows the Party's official rhetoric, the

CCP may not be satisfied with the quality of the news content. As the essay written by

Zhang Hong for the 2011 Forum has pointed out, it can be quite difficult to hire Chinese-

159 Table 4.

language journalists in foreign countries even if that country has a larger number of OC communities. Without talented Chinese-language journalists, it will be challenging for an

OCLM organization with limited resources to properly deliver the CCP's rhetoric for its

OC community, especially in countries with a smaller OC population. To minimize these risks, the CNS has decided to elevate the level of control over the rhetoric of the OCLM by centralizing the process of news production.

5.3.1 The Bundled Service of the Overseas Center

In 1996, the CNS initiated the strategy to centralizing news production by establishing the CNS Overseas Center (Zhongguo Xinwenshe Haiwai Zhongxin 中国新

闻社海外中心). The mission of the Overseas Center is to centralize the news production process of overseas Chinese-language newspapers through an approach that combines two key elements of news production – layout design and news content delivery.160

Layout design is a vital daily process in newspaper production by which the articles and advertising materials are put together on a final layout before going into the printing press. Various decisions in layout design, including the inclusion or exclusion of a particular article, the arrangement of different articles, or even the size of the font of a news title, may influence the attention of the readers and the perception of the readers towards a news event.

News content delivery is the core operation of the CNS. Many newspapers do not have the resources to maintain correspondents abroad, but they still need to provide the latest international news stories for their readers. The solution to this problem is to purchase news content from a news agency like Reuters, Associated Press, or the CNS. A

160 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian."

Chinese-language newspaper may have a team of China news correspondents or another news agency for the delivery of China news; the ultimate goal of the CNS, therefore, is to replace the newspaper's China news correspondents or the competing news agencies as the dominant news content distributor of the OCLM industry. By establishing the

Overseas Center, the CNS aims to enhance the appeal of its service by bundling layout design with news content delivery.

The Overseas Center's bundled service offers operational benefits for the Chinese- language newspaper, but it is possible that the service may eventually generate a negative impact on the paper's reputation. The immediate benefit is that the reduced cost of operation will allow the management to allocate the additional resources to the rest of the organization. Without the need to maintain a team of China correspondents, the management may divert the additional resources to improve local news reporting or to establish an online platform. The bundled service clearly benefits the newspaper by allowing it to enhance its profitability and expand its operations immediately. One may argue, however, that in the long-term, the readers will notice the influx of pro-China news coverage. The potential damage to the newspaper's reputation will not only harm its operation and profitability but will also relegate its value as a vessel of external propaganda from the perspective of the CCP. It will be a difficult task for the newspaper to facilitate a gradual rhetoric transformation to avoid criticism from its readers and minimize the potential damage to its reputation.

In contrast, the bundled service offers tremendous benefits for the CNS with minimal negative consequences. First, the daily cooperation between the CNS staff at the

Overseas Center and the editors of the newspaper will enhance their personal connection,

thereby increasing the likelihood of the editors acceding to the CNS’s preference of layout design. Moreover, in a potential situation where the editor of the newspaper has decided to insert a news story that damages the national interests of China, the Overseas

Center has the option to stop the publication by refusing to produce the layout. Second, the enhanced personal connection offers the perfect opportunity for the CNS to expand its news content delivery service. Initially, the editors of the newspaper may have some reservations about the service of the CNS and may still subscribe to other Chinese- language news agency. As the CNS staff builds closer ties with the editors, better insight on the editors’ preference in news content will increase the chance for the CNS to promote its service and eliminate its competitors. By taking over the layout design and eliminating its news service competitors through the Overseas Center’s bundled service, the CNS aims to centralize the news production process and obtain complete control on

China-related rhetoric in the OCLM.

5.3.2 The Reform of the CNS

Initially, the Overseas Center struggled with finding newspaper clients for its bundled service – the Center has only acquired four clients between 1996 and 1999.161

The lack of popularity of the bundled service represented a broad weakness that was prevalent in the CCP's internal and external propaganda efforts – old-fashioned propaganda jargons plagued the Party's propaganda rhetoric and baffled the readers. In the early 2000s, the top leaders of the CCP noticed the Party's weakness in propaganda rhetoric and decided to fix the issue by introducing a new approach of "Three Close To"

161 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe Haiwai Zhongxin Xianjin Shiji (中国新闻社海外中心先进事迹) [Progressive Accomplishments of the China News Service Overseas Center]." Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 2004, accessed Aug 24, 2016, http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node21/node136/node137/userobject7ai2073.html.

(San Tiejin 三贴近). At a Politburo meeting on March 28, 2003, President Hu Jintao (胡

锦涛) proposed that news propaganda needs to be “close to reality” (tiejin xianshi 贴近

现实), “close to the people” (tiejin qunzong 贴近群众), and “close to everyday life”

(tiejin shenghuo 贴近生活).162 Two months later, Li Changchun (李长春), a standing committee member of the Politburo who was in charge of the Party’s propaganda and ideology, published an essay explaining how should the news institutions apply the

“Three Close To” approach to enhance the Party’s effectiveness in propaganda.163 In the essay, Li suggests that news propaganda must integrate the common concerns of the people within the propaganda rhetoric. In particular, Li proposes that the rhetoric needs to utilize common expressions and examples from everyday lives, to employ narratives that make the people feel pleasant, and to include contents that have actual news value.

Although the CCP officially announced the "Three Close To" approach in 2003, the real reform inside the CNS started a few months earlier. In late 2002, the CNS initiated the “Five Exclusive” (Wugezhuan 五个专) news service approach, which promotes the development of “exclusive news” (zhuandian 专电), “exclusive column”

(zhuanlan 专栏), “exclusive photo” (zhuantu 专图), “exclusive layout” (zhuanban 专版), and “exclusive feature” (zhuanji 专辑).164 The goal of the “Five Exclusive” approach is

162 "Hu Jintao Zongshuji Zhuchi Zhaokai Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Huiyi (胡锦涛总书记主持召开中共中央政治局会议) [General Secretary Hu Jintao Hosts CCP Politburo Meeting]." Xinhua Net, published Mar 28, 2003, accessed Sep 4, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2003- 03/28/content_804735.htm. 163 Li, Changchun. "Cong 'Santiejin' Rushou Gaijin Jiaqiang Xuanchuan Sixiang Gongzuo (从'三贴近'入手改进加强宣传思想工作) [Improve Propaganda Thought Work from 'Three Close to']." People's Daily Online, published May 16, 2003, accessed Sep 4, 2016, http://people.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22039/1851485.html. 164 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe Haiwai Zhongxin Xianjin Shiji (中国新闻社海外中心先进事迹) [Progressive Accomplishments of the China News Service Overseas Center]."

to emphasize qualitative improvements in the news service through the production exclusive news content that focuses on China-related news events from the perspective of the OC community.165 The CNS has described this transformation as a switch from

"writing articles for the leadership" (fagao shangtian 发稿上天) to “providing content for the grassroots” (neirong luodi 内容落地).166

To implement the new approach, the CNS began providing an exclusive daily opinion column that comments on the most relevant news events in China from the perspective of the OC community.167 In 2006, the initial success of the opinion column encouraged the CNS to start providing editorials for its clients.168 Meanwhile, the CNS has also started taking full advantage of its vast resources and political support by providing exclusive feature stories with a broad range of topics from Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. to the 40th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution.169 In addition to improvements in news content, the CNS has upgraded its support services to overseas clients. In 2005, the Overseas Center began offering 24-hours technical assistance; in the same year, it also started supplying hardware and software while providing customized build and upgrade service for their computer systems.170

After initiating its reform efforts in the early 2000s, the CNS has seen noticeable improvements in the number of clients subscribing to the bundled service at the Overseas

165 Zhang, Qiaosu. "Zhongguo Xinwenshe Haiwai Zhongxin (中国新闻社海外中心) [the China News Service Overseas Center]." Xinhua Net, published Nov 2, 2007, accessed Aug 26, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2007-11/02/content_6998084.htm. 166 Ibid. 167 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian." 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Zhang. "Zhongguo Xinwenshe Haiwai Zhongxin."

Center – the total number increased from 8 in 2004 to 60 in 2011.171 The qualitative improvements of the CNS's news service are one of the decisive factors for the expansion of the Overseas Center. The success of a news agency is ultimately dependent on the quality of its product – if the CNS had continued to practice its prior approach of "writing articles for the leadership," it is unlikely that the Overseas Center could produce the same level of development. Through the successful implementation of news service reform, the

CNS has generated a remarkable progress in the centralization of OCLM news production.

171 "Zhongguo Xinwenshe De Huihuang Liushi Nian."

Chapter 6: Conclusion

In the early decades of the PRC, the CCP needed financial support from the OC community to reconstruct China, but the Party struggled with the OC because of its emerging ideological movements. During the Cultural Revolution, the ideological frenzy in the PRC has led to the demonization and persecution of the OC and their families.

Entering the reform era, the CCP vindicated the identity of the OC and fully embraced the OC community by utilizing their financial and human capital for the modernization of

China. This thesis finds that after the founding of the PRC, despite the drawback during the Cultural Revolution, the CCP has made tremendous progress towards the two strategic goals of OC policy: modernization and transnational legitimacy.

After the bloody crackdown in Tiananmen, the Party's transnational legitimacy was in crisis. In response to the challenge, the CCP initiated a new phase of reconstruction for its transnational legitimacy. The CCP’s increased influence in the

OCLM has made crucial contributions to the Party’s success in restoring its transnational legitimacy in the OC community. The CNS has played a major role in the restoration process by operating various platforms for the Party to influence the editorial decision of the OCLM and by making significant progress in the task to centralize Chinese-language news production. The CNS is a key institution that has delivered substantial inputs to the

CCP’s reconstruction of transnational legitimacy.

Finally, this thesis proposes that further research is necessary for measuring the level of success in the CCP’s attempt to influence the OCLM. This thesis initially planned to conduct a quantitative content analysis of the news articles published by the

OCLM to examine whether the CNS has successfully influenced the editorial decision of

the OCLM. My attempt to measure the changes in OCLM rhetoric has failed for two reasons.

First, the sample size of OCLM organizations was too small to make a conclusion about the CCP’s influence over the OCLM industry. I found convincing evidence to conclude that some of the most prominent OCLM are being influenced by the CCP, but the actions of a few organizations do not represent the 5,000 OCLM around the world.

Moreover, many of the OCLM are smaller organizations serving a local community without online presences, which further complicates the sample gathering process.

Second, it is tough to judge whether the CCP has indeed influenced an OCLM to carry a particular rhetoric. Even if an organization makes an apparent switch towards a pro-

China rhetoric, it is still very hard to determine whether the CCP has influenced that organization, or the organization has genuinely changed its view on the Party.

The first issue of the sample size can be solved with an increased amount of resources for the fieldwork. The process of converting printed articles into an electronic database is arduous but remains plausible as long as there are enough time and resources.

The second issue, however, is much harder to resolve. The ideal evidence would be getting a direct confession from one of the editorial staff or finding the trace of financial transactions between the CCP and the OCLM, but both situations are highly unlikely to occur, especially when the research targets are experienced journalists.

Despite the failure to measure the success level of the CCP’s external propaganda, this thesis has made valuable contributions to the study of Chinese diaspora by illustrating the role of the CNS in the CCP’s attempt to influence the OCLM and centralize Chinese-language news production. With the help of the CNS, the CCP has

made tremendous progress in transnational outreach through the reconstruction of transnational legitimacy in the OC community.

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