Freas Although it must be conceded that global market forces and increased ad- ministrative centralization did indeed have a negative e#ect on the peas- ants’ circumstances, I challenge the prevailing idea that it was largely a matter of exacerbating a pre-existing situation.4 Rather, these factors ef- fected a transformation in what was hitherto a relatively more equitable relationship between the peasantry and local elites. I take my lead from OTTOMAN REFORM, ISLAM, Beshara Doumani’s pioneering study,5 in which he addresses socio-eco- AND PALESTINE’S PEASANTRY nomic factors related to the region’s integration into the global economy during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and how they impacted Erik Eliav Freas Nablus and its environs. In so doing, he paints a much more nuanced pic- ture of the situation of Palestine’s peasantry than that generally provided by historians dealing with nineteenth-century Syria and Palestine. Too o"en, the tendency has been to skim over the state of a#airs prior to the intensi!cation of European economic penetration and the advent of the Tanzimat reforms. Inasmuch as I take my lead from Doumani, I would acknowledge historical distinctions between the Nablusi region and other parts of Palestine. Nonetheless, given that what follows in this article is intended primarily as a !rst step in a reexamination of peasant-elite rela- When considering the situation of the Arab peasantry in nineteenth-centu- tions during the period in question, and that there did exist at the time a ry Ottoman Syria (inclusive of present-day Palestine),1 a “self-evident” truth sense of Palestine as constituting a distinct and coherent geographical en- seems to have developed that rural peasants were exploited and oppressed tity,6 I believe it is legitimate to speak of that region as a whole with respect by local elites—both urban notables and rural shaykhs. Yet was it really as to the aforementioned thesis. simple as that? In the period before incentives generated by global market As a corollary to this thesis, I argue that changes in the nature of the forces that were brought about by increased European economic activity relationship between the traditional elite and the peasantry altered the came to de!ne economic relations between the two—likewise, before the way in which most Muslim peasants understood their religious identity, in Ottoman Tanzimat reforms saw the establishment of formalized adminis- connection with a gradual formalization of Islamic practice. Prior to trative structures—a case could be made that the authority of urban nota- changes that took place over the course of the nineteenth century, the au- bles and rural shaykhs was, to a signi!cant degree, dependent on its tacit thority of notables largely manifested itself in their collective role as me- acceptance by the peasantry, such that the latter was not entirely without diators between formal Islamic institutions and the peasantry. leverage.2 One might even argue that this authority was something that had, Correspondingly, religious identity among the peasantry was generally in a sense, to be earned, that the peasantry expected urban notables and conceived of in a relatively informal manner. Most peasants had limited rural shaykhs to behave in a manner worthy of their authority. Particularly direct a$liation or interaction with formal Islamic institutions; corre- in the case of the latter, the fact that there o"en existed rival claimants for spondingly, their understanding of Islam largely conformed to what were the loyalty of constituents would seem to lend support to this thesis.3 more or less vaguely de!ned notions as to what constituted proper Islamic behavior—a set of values o"en re%ective of cultural norms or broadly con- Erik Freas is Assistant Professor of History in the Department of Social Sciences at City ceived ideas about social justice. For most peasants, authority !gures such University-Borough of Manhattan Community College. 196 197 Freas as rural shaykhs were in a very real sense the “face” of the Islamic author- !ned ideals for accepted behavior, notions of justice, and levels of account- ity represented by urban-based institutions, likewise in terms of what con- ability to the collective community.”11 stituted proper Islamic practice. Together with urban notables, these For urban notables, the case was somewhat di#erent, and more formal shaykhs mediated between the peasantry and the more formal Islamic in- Islamic credentials—one’s knowledge of the Qur’an, or how many times one stitutions of the urban milieu,7 and it was their ability to do this that to no had made pilgrimage—did in fact carry considerable weight. Nonetheless, small extent earned them their positions of authority. Related to this, said expectations similar to those applying to rural shaykhs applied to urbanites authority was very much dependent on its tacit acceptance by the peas- as well, both when dealing with non-elites in the towns (i.e., townsfolk), antry, something, it is argued, that was in turn dependent on whether and, perhaps more importantly for our purposes, with respect to town-vil- these local elites were seen as warranting the peasants’ respect. While the lage relations, where “[g]enerosity and cooperation from the notability cre- measure of elites’ worthiness in this sense might be understood in terms ated bonds of loyalty between urban and rural sectors.”12 In sum, then, both of whether they were “good” Muslims, the peasantry did not reckon such urban and rural notables were expected to represent the interests of the things in a formalistic way. Certainly relevant, especially with respect to larger community when dealing with the Ottoman authorities.13 In this re- urban notables, was whether one held a position within an Islamic institu- spect, it should also be noted that, at least until the middle of the nineteenth tion and/or carried a reputation as a learned and pious Muslim. More im- century, the distinction between elite and non-elite was arguably not as portant, however, was the degree to which one behaved in what would rigid as it would later become. To begin with, both elites and non-elites were have been considered by the peasantry as an appropriately “Islamic” man- understood as integral to the society as a whole—the social gap between the ner—that is, whether they were generous, hospitable, fair, and honest, leaders and the larger population was small, and as noted by ‘Adel Manna‘, among other traits. Formal practice and training would not have consti- “between the apex and the base of the social pyramid [there was] limited tuted the only estimation, indeed, probably not even the most important salience, particularly in rural society, which constituted the demographic one by which one’s worth as a Muslim was measured. majority.”14 Indeed, particularly in the countryside, the delineation between &is was particularly true of rural shaykhs, a category inclusive of elites and non-elites—that is, between shaykhs and peasants—was not al- both nahiya and village shaykhs. &e former were powerful local shaykhs, ways clear; nor, for that matter, was it clear among the peasant themselves, whose jurisdictions corresponded to administrative sub-districts known many of whom were semi-nomadic and occupied a social space between as nahiya.8 As of the beginning of the nineteenth century, in general, the the more purely nomadic Bedouin tribes and more land-rooted peasantry, nahiya shaykhs were responsible for collecting taxes, maintaining law and or fallahin. To put it another way, social categories, much like religious ones, order, and dispensing justice. In turn, each village in the nahiye had a vil- were relatively %uid and individuals could, up to a point, move between lage shaykh responsible for running local a#airs.9 Even where technically them. &is was soon to change. appointed by the Ottoman government, however, it was usually only with As the nineteenth century progressed, the interests of both urban no- the general consent of those under their authority that the shaykhs were tables and rural shaykhs became increasingly tied to external economic able to maintain their respective positions—as the American missionary forces. &eir political authority became embedded in formal administrative Elihu Grant put it, their positions were con!rmed “by acclamation or by structures, such that they became beholden !rst and foremost to the general consent.”10 Based on the aforementioned “Islamic” criteria, rural Ottoman center in Istanbul. Correspondingly, the amount of leverage peas- shaykhs were expected to be fair when meting out justice, resolute when ants had in their relationships to them greatly diminished. Perhaps more confronting adversity, pious in their own personal behavior, and generous importantly, social categories began to crystallize and the division between with peasants experiencing hard times. Put in more technical terms, their local elites and the peasantry widened. In connection with the new eco- actions “were circumscribed by social and cultural boundaries that de- nomic opportunities brought about by European economic penetration, the 198 199 Freas former increasingly used their collective position of authority to exploit a an important primary source for some of the secondary sources refer- peasantry with whom they felt fewer ties. Rural shaykhs, now in the guise of enced here, I do not directly utilize them here. In part, this choice re%ects absentee landlords, along with urban-based creditors, were increasingly the uneven and inconsistent use that the peasantry made of the shari‘a driven by commercial considerations. Correspondingly, the criterion deter- courts in Palestine. Doumani observes that in Nablus, up to 1830, there is mining elite status came to be one based almost entirely on wealth, particu- a virtual absence of court cases involving the peasantry.