DOCSLIB.ORG

Conservatism, Liberalism and Ideology Chandran KUKATHAS Singapore Management University, [email protected] DOI

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conservatism, Liberalism and Ideology Chandran KUKATHAS Singapore Management University, Kukathas@Smu.Edu.Sg DOI Singapore Management University Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences 1-1987 Conservatism, liberalism and ideology Chandran KUKATHAS Singapore Management University, [email protected] DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/08913818708459493 Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the Models and Methods Commons Citation KUKATHAS, Chandran.(1987). Conservatism, liberalism and ideology. Critical Review, 1(3), 30-44. Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2950 This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email [email protected]. Published in Critical Review, Volume 1, Issue 3, Pages 30-44 https://doi.org/10.1080/08913818708459493 Chandran Kukathas CONSERVATISM, LIBERALISM AND IDEOLOGY* CONSERVATISM: DREAM AND REALITY by Robert Nisbet Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 118pp., $9.95 (paper) LIBERALISM by John Gray Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 106pp., $9.95 (paper) IDEOLOGY by David McLellan Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 99pp., $9-95 (paper) All societies are more or less complex systems of rules, of symbols and signs directing and constraining individual behavior. The task of the social theorist is to analyze and uncover what order may underlie such structures. In this regard he faces at least two major problems. First, he has to determine how far the rules or norms which govern human ac- tion define the distribution of power, responsibility and resources, and so determine the relative value placed upon such goods as education, * This essay was written while resident at the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University as the R. C. Hoiles Postdoctoral Fellow. I wish to thank Jeremy Shearmur, Sheldon Richman, Tom Palmer, and David Beito for their comments on an earlier draft. Chandran Kukathas teaches political science at Australian National University, Canberra. 30 Kukathas • Conservatism, Liberalism and Ideology 31 art and scientific inquiry, and how far the existing structure of distri- bution of power and resources is itself responsible for the prevalence of particular rules. Second, he has to determine'how far the analytical methods he brings to the study of his subject are genuinely tools which facilitate social inquiry, and how far they embody presupposi- tions which do not so much aid investigation as pre-determine its re- sults. In both cases the theorist confronts questions about ideology. In the first case, the theorist deals with ideology insofar as he is forced to examine the problem of the relationship in any social struc- ture between ideas and interests. For any worthwhile explanation of social action must offer some account of how material circumstances affect, or are affected by, the moral, religious, scientific and political beliefs, customs and conventions which obtain in a society. What the theorist cannot or should not do is uncritically to presume that the as- sumptions implicit in those beliefs or customs or conventions can themselves explain the operations of society. To do this would be simply to offer a report of a society's self-image, of its ideology, rather than to explain society's workings. For example, it would be an inadequate explanation which de- scribed the agencies of the state (the legislature, the police, the various bureaucracies, and the judiciary) as disinterested servants whose ac- tions are governed purely by their terms of reference and not at all by any more parochial interests. For this picture assumes that the distri- bution of power and resources is more or less the result of the state's functioning within the formal constraints that guide it. Thus legis- latures, with the aid of a disinterested bureaucracy, make laws, which are upheld by the judiciary and enforced by the police, to serve the common good. Generally, this picture is not questioned by society: by its citizens or its non-state institutions such as the press. Yet while each individual is at liberty to accept his society's public self-conception, the social theorist is not. His concern is explanation. And explanation demands that he look behind the self-image, behind what we might call the ideology, to see what kinds of social relations do in fact prevail. Many, if not most, social theorists recognize this. Thus theorists of the Public Choice school, for example, seek to show how the actual distribution of government expenditure is better ex- plained by the nature and power of interest groups and the structure of incentives in society than by the public philosophy of the welfare state, while some Marxist theorists seek to show that the structure of social relations embodied in the legal and political order is merely a facade concealing the character of the more fundamental economic arrange- 32 Critical Review • Summer 1987 ments that persist, arrangements in which the interests of one social class predominate. (To be a student, or critic, of ideology, however, it is not enough simply to look behind the facade or self-image. It is also necessary to explain how and why ideology is generated, and what part, if any, ideology plays in the workings of society.) The social theorist also confronts a problem of ideology in a differ- ent sense. For if he thinks that the beliefs and conventions of society must be understood as largely governed by the prevailing structure of interests, he must also concede that his own methods of social inquiry, conforming as they might to what he thinks are acceptable scientific standards, may well be governed by something other than a disin- terested concern for truth. In short, his arguments and inquiries may be less "scientific" than "ideological." They may be governed by pre- suppositions which reflect the interests of his society, or of his imme- diate social grouping (such as the scientific community), rather than by assumptions which are defensible by some more "objective" stan- dard. Much of the argument in the philosophy of the social sciences has been about what kinds of social explanation can properly be re- garded as scientific, and so as valid, and what kinds of explanation are "merely" ideological. But what, precisely, is meant by ideology? This is a question which has itself aroused controversy. David McLellan's short book, Ideology, intended as "the briefest of introductions to an extremely slippery sub- ject," is an attempt to get a handle on this problem. And the attempt is made by tracing the efforts of various thinkers, the first notable one being Marx, to "find a firm Archimedean point outside the sphere of ideological discourse, an immovable spot from which to observe the levers of ideology at work." Tracing the career of the concept over two centuries, McLellan also examines the different Marxist conceptions of ideology to be found in the writings of Lenin, Lukacs, Gramsci, and Althusser, before turning to the non-Marxist traditions, and particu- larly to the work of Mannheim. From here he goes on to look briefly at a positivist claim which he thinks survives largely in America: that social science can be non-ideological. This opens the way for a discus- sion of the criticisms of this view emanating mainly from the Frank- furt school. In an all too brief concluding chapter, McLellan identifies two strands of theorizing about ideology. In the first strand the domi- nant contrast made is one between science and ideology. This science/ ideology dichotomy is to be found both in the Marxist traditions and in the empiricist English-speaking tradition, which differ essentially Kukathas • Conservatism, Liberalism and Ideology 33 over conceptions of science/ideology. The other strand of thinking, however, emphasizes the problems of studying society, suggesting that the social theorist cannot completely escape the interest-dominated perspective in which he finds himself. Can Ideology Be Overcome? The conclusion McLellan moves toward in his attempt to elucidate the concept of ideology is that any successful account of ideology must recognize, on the one hand, the inadequacy of the science/ideology di- chotomy, and on the other hand the inadequacy of any view suggest- ing the omnipresence of ideology. Ideology, he wishes to maintain, "is best viewed not as a separate system of signs and symbols that could be contrasted with—and eventually replaced by—another, e.g., science of some sort. Ideology is rather an aspect of every system of signs and symbols in so far as they are implicated in an asymmetrical distribution of power and resources." In effect, this means that the two problems of ideology confronting the social theorist are not, as my earlier distinc- tion suggests, separate problems but, rather, aspects of the same prob- lem. The social theorist is confronted by a world in which ideas play an important part, but also one in which those ideas are not wholly autonomous but are in some way related to material circumstances and interests. The ideas or methods he might use to investigate this world are themselves implicated in its operation; they cannot be viewed as, or refined into, neutral instruments with which we might dissect and analyze the rest of the world of ideas. We cannot use non-ideological tools to evaluate ideological phenomena. Thus it is unlikely that there can ever be an "end to ideology" as, he suggests, both the Marxist and the "Enlightenment, rationalist, empiricist" traditions have hoped. It is difficult to evaluate McLellan's position, largely because it is offered in a series of critical observations about the arguments of the various theorists of ideology whose views are discussed in his book.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Neoconservatives Among Us? Astudy of Former Dissidents' Discourse
    43 L 62 Neoconservatives Among Us? A Study of Former Dissidents’ Discourse* JENI SCHALLER Abstract: Neoconservative political thought has been characterized as “distinctly American”, but could there be fertile ground for its basic tenets in post-communist Europe? This paper takes an initial look at the acceptance of the ideas of American neo- conservative foreign policy among Czech elites who were dissidents under the communist regime. Open-ended, semi-structured interviews with eight former dissidents were con- ducted and then analyzed against a background of some fundamental features of neocon- servative foreign policy. Discourse analysis is the primary method of examination of the texts. Although a coherent discourse among Czech former dissidents cannot be said to ex- ist, certain aspects reminiscent of American neoconservative thought were found. Key words: neoconservatism, Czech dissidents, foreign policy, discourse analysis I. INTRODUCTION Neoconservatism, as a strain of political thought in the United States, has been represented as “distinctly American” and Irving Kristol, often considered the “godfather” of neoconservatism, emphatically states “[t]here is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe” (Kristol 2003: 33). Analyst Jeffrey Gedmin writes that the “environment for neoconservatism as such is an inhospitable one” in Europe, especially Germany (Gedmin 2004: 291). The states of Cen- tral Europe, in contrast to many of the established continental EU members, represent a rather more pro-American stance. With groups of former dissi- dents whose political leanings are in part informed by the American anti- communist, pro-democracy policies of the 1970s and 1980s, could there be a more hospitable environment for neoconservative ideas in a Central Euro- pean state such as the Czech Republic? The Czech dissident community was not as extensive or well-organised as that in Poland or even Hungary, largely due to the post-1968 “normalisation” in Czechoslovakia.
    [Show full text]
  • Centennial Bibliography on the History of American Sociology
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Sociology Department, Faculty Publications Sociology, Department of 2005 Centennial Bibliography On The iH story Of American Sociology Michael R. Hill [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologyfacpub Part of the Family, Life Course, and Society Commons, and the Social Psychology and Interaction Commons Hill, Michael R., "Centennial Bibliography On The iH story Of American Sociology" (2005). Sociology Department, Faculty Publications. 348. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologyfacpub/348 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Department, Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Hill, Michael R., (Compiler). 2005. Centennial Bibliography of the History of American Sociology. Washington, DC: American Sociological Association. CENTENNIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY Compiled by MICHAEL R. HILL Editor, Sociological Origins In consultation with the Centennial Bibliography Committee of the American Sociological Association Section on the History of Sociology: Brian P. Conway, Michael R. Hill (co-chair), Susan Hoecker-Drysdale (ex-officio), Jack Nusan Porter (co-chair), Pamela A. Roby, Kathleen Slobin, and Roberta Spalter-Roth. © 2005 American Sociological Association Washington, DC TABLE OF CONTENTS Note: Each part is separately paginated, with the number of pages in each part as indicated below in square brackets. The total page count for the entire file is 224 pages. To navigate within the document, please use navigation arrows and the Bookmark feature provided by Adobe Acrobat Reader.® Users may search this document by utilizing the “Find” command (typically located under the “Edit” tab on the Adobe Acrobat toolbar).
    [Show full text]
  • Conservatism and the Quest for Community
    Conservatism and the Quest for Community William Schambra he age of obama has been an age of revival for the Progressive Tideal of a “national community.” It is a vision rooted in two core beliefs: that direct, local associations and channels of action are too often overwhelmed by the differences among communities and the fractious character of American public life; and that rather than strengthening the sources of these differences, modern government should seek to overcome them in the service of a coherent national ambition. By dis- tributing the same benefits, protections, and services to all Americans, fellow feeling and neighborliness can be fostered among the public; combined with the power of the national government and professional expertise, this communal sentiment can then become a valuable weapon for attacking America’s most pressing social problems. A century ago, this ideal was a central tenet of the Progressive agenda — which sought, as Progressive icon Herbert Croly put it in 1909, the “subordination of the individual to the demand of a dominant and constructive national purpose.” It was an important goal of the New Deal, which President Franklin Roosevelt described in 1933 as “extending to our national life the old principle of the local community.” It was the essence of the liberal agenda of the 1960s, which President Lyndon Johnson called an effort to “turn unity of interest into unity of purpose, and unity of goals into unity in the Great Society.” And it was at the core of Barack Obama’s campaign for the presidency in 2008, which promised to over- come petty differences and, as Obama put it in one campaign speech, to Wil l i a m Sch a m br a is the director of the Hudson Institute’s Bradley Center for Philanthropy and Civic Renewal.
    [Show full text]
  • Robert A. Nisbet
    A public intellectual ROBERT A. NISBET Note: This presentation is based on the theories of Robert Nisbet as presented in his works. A more complete summary of his theories (as well as the theories of other macro-theorists) can be found in Macrosociology: The Study of Sociocultural Systems, by Frank W. Elwell. If you would like to receive a .pdf file of the chapter on Nisbet please write me at [email protected] and put Nisbet.pdf in the subject line. A Short Biography Robert Alexander Nisbet was born on September 30, 1913 in Los Angeles, the oldest of three boys born to Henry and Cynthia Nisbet. He began at the University of California at Berkeley in 1932. A Short Biography His association with Berkeley proved both long and fruitful. He completed his Bachelor’s degree in 1936, his M.A, in 1937, and his Ph.D. in 1939. A Short Biography Upon obtaining his Ph.D. he accepted an instructor’s position at Berkeley, subsequently rising through the ranks to full professor there in 1953. A Short Biography Nisbet served in World War II, enlisting in the Army in 1943 and serving in the Pacific eventually achieving the rank of staff sergeant. A Short Biography In 1953 he left Berkeley to become the founding dean of the College of Letters and Science at the new Riverside campus of the University of California, later becoming vice chancellor there in 1960. A Short Biography In 1963 he left academic administration, believing that “administrative work, sufficiently prolonged, has a sterilizing effect upon the creative or the scholarly mind.” A Short Biography After 30 years, Nisbet retired from the University of California in 1972, first accepting a position at the University of Arizona, and then moving on to the Albert Schweitzer Chair at Columbia University in 1974 working with Robert K.
    [Show full text]
  • Domestic Politics and International Cooperation by Andrew Moravcsik Department of Government Harvard University
    Center for European Studies Working Paper Series #52 Why the European Union Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation by Andrew Moravcsik Department of Government Harvard University Center for European Studies, Harvard University 27 Kirkland Street, Cambridge MA 02138 Tel.: 617-495-4303, x205 / Fax: 617-495-8509 e-mail: [email protected] Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, NY (1-4 September 1994) Most contemporary theories of international cooperation treat states as unitary actors and, therefore, focus primarily on the functional benefits of cooperation or the collective action problems states confront in realizing it.1 Less attention is paid to the impact of international negotiations and institutions on domestic politics, or to the consequences for international cooperation. This essay offers a theory of when and how international cooperation redistributes domestic power resources between state and society. Redistribution, it is argued, generally empowers national executives, permitting them to loosen domestic constraints imposed by legislatures, interest groups, and other societal actors. These shifts in domestic 'influence have important consequences for the nature of international cooperation. More specifically, I advance three arguments, each of which challenges existing understandings of international cooperation. First, international negotiations and institutions reallocate political resources by changing the domestic institutional.
    [Show full text]
  • Relationships Between Family and Government
    Wardle: Relationships Between Family and Government CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOLUME 31 FALL 2000 NUMBER 1 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FAMILY AND GOVERNMENT LYNN D. WARDLE* I. INTRODUCTION The relationship between family and government has become obscure. The concept that government should not attempt to define or restrict rela- tionships that merit legal treatment as "marriages" and "families" has be- come very popular among academics in the United States and many other nations. As Bruce Hafen, former Brigham Young University Law School Dean and family law professor writes, "the trend in most countries today is toward letting people decide for themselves how and when to form and dis- solve marriages and child-parent ties."' Other family law scholars have noted the "privatization" of family law2 and the diminution of moral discourse in family law in the past three decades.' The prevailing viewpoint among scholars seems to be that government should accept as "marriage" or "fam- ily" any relationship that the parties wish to call a "marriage" or a "family." " Professor of J. Law, Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA. E-mail: [email protected]. An earlier version of this article was pre- sented at the regional conference of the International Society of Family Law in Prague, Czech Republic, June 27-29, 1998. 1. Bruce C. Hafen, Bridle Your Passions: How Modern Law Can Protect the Family, VITAL SPEECHES, Aug. 1, 1997, at 633, available in 1997 WL 10024439, at *1 [hereinafter Bridle Your Passions]. 2. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis.
    [Show full text]
  • Classical Insights Big Ideas #4 October 18, 2013
    Classical Insights A dra Global Investment Analysis Based on the Classical Economic Model Classical Insights Big Ideas #4 October 18, 2013 This is the fourth in an occasional series in which I explore a variety of ideas that don’t quite fit into the “bullet points” format – yet which seem important for understanding changes now underway in the world. Paul Gottfried has written a great intellectual autobiography detailing the battles on the political right over the past 50 years. I got a glimpse of these while working for Jude Wanniski in the ‘90s and early ‘00s (when he railed almost daily against the neocons). Gottfried was fighting many of the same battles, but from world of academia. His book is called, Encounters: My life with Nixon, Marcuse and other friends and teachers. Points: 1) Western society has moved so far left that even European leftists of the mid-20th Century Frankfurt School would be considered hopelessly reactionary today. Gottfried fondly remembers Herbert Marcuse – arch villain of the modern traditionalist right -- as a “charming old-world academic with a touch of dottiniess.” Like other members of the Frankfurt School [such as Theodore Adorno] Marcuse was in some ways a bourgeois anachronism. This was evident from the way he dressed to the gallant manner in which he spoke to female students. With his extensive humanistic and linguistic erudition, he oozed traditional German Bildung.” P 47 Marcuse was also fair as a teacher – a quality Gottfried contrasts with his current PC colleagues or even his Cold War-era liberal professors from 50 years ago.
    [Show full text]
  • Neo-Conservatism and the State
    NEO-CONSERVATISM AND THE STATE Reg Whitaker 'This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortal1 God, to which wee owe under the Immortal1 God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutual ayd against their enemies abroad.' -Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan II:17 [I6511 If there is one characteristic of the neo-conservative political hegemony in America and Britain in the 1980s upon which both enthusiasts and most critics seemingly agree, it is that Reaganism and Thatcherism are pre- eminently laissez faire attacks on the state. From 'deregulation' in America to 'privatisation' in Britain, the message has seemed clear: the social democratic/Keynesian welfare state is under assault from those who wish to substitute markets for politics. Ancient arguments from the history of the capitalist state have risen from the graveyard to fasten, vampire-like, on the international crisis of capitalism itself. Once again the strident Babbitry of 'free enterprise versus the state' rings in the corridors of power, in editorial offices, in the halls of academe. Marshall McLuhan once offered the gnomic observation that we are fated to drive into the future while steering by the rear-view mirror. Or, as Marx wrote in regard to the French Revolution, revolutionaries '. anxiously conjure up the spirits
    [Show full text]
  • Conservative, Pluralist, Sociologist: Robert Nisbet's Burke
    STUDIES IN BURKE AND HIS TIME AND HIS STUDIES IN BURKE I N THE N EXT I SS UE ... S TEVEN P. M ILLIE S STUDIES IN The Inner Light of Edmund Burke A N D REA R A D A S ANU Edmund Burke’s Anti-Rational Conservatism R O B ERT H . B ELL The Sentimental Romances of Lawrence Sterne AND HIS TIME J.D. C . C LARK A Rejoinder to Reviews of Clark’s Edition of Burke’s Reflections R EVIEW S O F MJohnICHAEL Faulkner B ROWN Burke’sThe Meal Speech at the on Saracen’s the Test Head:and Corporation Edmund Burke Acts F . P. L OCK Edmund Burke Volume II: 1784 – 1797 , and the Scottish Literati S EAN P ATRICK D ONLAN , Edmund Burke’s Irish Identities Luke Sheahan M ICHAEL F UNK D ECKAR D Conservative, Pluralist, Sociologist: Robert Nisbet’s Burke N EIL M C A RTHUR , David Hume’s Political Theory Wonder and Beauty in Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry E LIZA B ETH L A MB ERT , Edmund Burke of Beaconsfield R O B ERT H . B ELL Fool“Burke, for Love: Kirk, The and Sentimental Revolution Romances in the of ModernLaurence SterneMind” the Fourth International Conference of the Edmund SBurkeTEVEN Society, P. M ILLIE NovemberS 17, 2018 The Inner Light of Edmund Burke: A Biographical Approach to Burke’s Religious Faith and Epistemology STUDIES IN Vigen Guroian Burke and Kirk on Radical Ideology in Modern Times VOLUME 22 2011 Wilfred McClay A “GenerousREVIEW S Loyalty”: O F The Vindication of a Forgotten Virtue AND HIS TIME F.P.LOCK, Edmund Burke: Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Change: Mechanisms and Metaphors
    Social Change: Mechanisms and Metaphors Kieran Healy∗ August 1998 ∗Department of Sociology, 2–N–2 Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton N.J. 08544. Email at [email protected]. Please do not cite or distribute without permis- sion. Thanks to Miguel Centeno, Sara Curran, Paul DiMaggio, Patricia Fernandez–Kelly, Frank Karel, Lynn Robinson, Brian Steensland, Steve Tepper, Bruce Western and Bob Wuthnow for suggestions, discussion and comments. Research for this paper was funded by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 1 2 Kieran Healy Contents Introduction 3 The Varying Fortunes of Social Change 4 The Legacy of the Nineteenth Century . 4 Social Change as Modernization . 5 The Analysis of Change 8 Prediction . 8 Metaphors of change . 11 Organic development . 11 Ecological competition and selection . 11 Diffusion and contagion . 12 Path dependence and hysteresis . 13 Complexity and self–organization . 14 Mechanisms and causes . 15 Sources of Social Change 16 Demography . 16 Technology . 17 Economic change . 20 Planned change . 21 Organizations . 23 Institutions . 25 Culture . 28 Conclusion 31 Appendix: An Annotated Bibliography 34 Demography and social change . 34 Technology and change . 38 Economic and political change . 41 Planned change and community change . 49 Organizational change . 54 Gender and social change . 62 Institutions and change . 66 Culture and social change . 69 Complexity theory . 76 Social theory and social change . 80 Social Change: mechanisms and metaphors 3 Introduction Good social science should be able to explain how and why things change. Questions about change can be posed directly, as when we wonder whether religious observance is declining in America, or try to explain why large corporations first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century.
    [Show full text]
  • A Survey of Higher Education September 10Th 2005
    The brains business A survey of higher education September 10th 2005 Republication, copying or redistribution by any means is expressly prohibited without the prior written permission of The Economist The Economist September 10th 2005 A survey of higher education 1 The brains business Also in this section Secrets of success America’s system of higher education is the best in the world. That is because there is no system. Page 6 Head in the clouds Europe hopes to become the world’s pre- eminent knowledge-based economy. Not likely. Page 9 A world of opportunity Developing countries see the point of universities. Page 14 Wandering scholars For students, higher education is becoming a borderless world. Page 16 Mass higher education is forcing universities to become more diverse, Higher Ed Inc more global and much more competitive, says Adrian Wooldridge Universities have become much more businesslike, but they are still doing the same OR those of a certain age and educa- The second reason is the rise of the old things. Page 19 Ftional background, it is hard to think of knowledge economy. The world is in the higher education without thinking of an- grips of a soft revolution in which cient institutions. Some universities are of knowledge is replacing physical resources The best is yet to come a venerable agethe University of Bolo- as the main driver of economic growth. A more market-oriented system of higher gna was founded in 1088, the University of The OECD calculates that between 1985 education can do much better than the state- Oxford in 1096and many of them have a and 1997 the contribution of knowledge- dominated model.
    [Show full text]
  • Reflections from the Old Right
    WINTER 2009-2010 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT Reflections from the Old Right REVIEWED BY CARL F. HOROWITZ With this work, at least, he doesn’t have to. Gottfried wanted to write a political memoir, not onservative political philosophy an end-of-the-world jeremiad. He may or may not — the real kind — has never been qualify as a public figure — his friendship with that big on optimism, inasmuch as it Richard Nixon would give him some benefit of the views human nature as predisposed doubt — but he is one of the few conservatives still toward rapaciousness. People can be alive willing to take on big ideas in ways that go Creal predators, whether for the purpose of territori- well beyond standard Red State Über Alles culture- al acquisition, abstract principle, or revenge. It’s the war talking points. job of civil society, backed by statecraft, to rein in Paul Gottfried belongs to the Old Right, a con- the worst among them. Even successful nations like tentious fraternity prone to crossing swords some- ours are far more unstable than they look, especially times as much among themselves as with others. But when those who govern lack the requisite wisdom unlike another Old Right paladin, Chronicles maga- to recognize peril domestically or from abroad. zine’s Thomas Fleming, a man seemingly terminal- Paul Gottfried, a professor of humanities at ly incapable of uttering or writing a sentence with- Elizabethtown College in Pennsylvania, recognizes out inflicting moral punishment, Gottfried comes this, perhaps a bit too much. And as one of our coun- off as pleasant, more so anyway than much of his try’s leading conservative political philosophers, recent work would suggest.
    [Show full text]