David Childs, Richard Popplewell. The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service. New York: New York University Press, 1996. XIV + 253 pp. $45.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-8147-1551-2.
Reviewed by Konrad H. Jarausch
Published on H-German (January, 1998)
One of the most fascinating aspects of the de‐ of this interesting topic in the English language. funct German Democratic Republic was its secret The contemporary historian David Childs (Not‐ service, the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit tingham) and the security analyst David Pop‐ (MfS), known by its popular abbreviation as the plewell (Salford) have collaborated in a volume Stasi. East Germans still shudder at the recollec‐ that probes both the domestic and the interna‐ tion of this ubiquitous and immoral police organi‐ tional dimensions of the East German secret ser‐ zation whose octopus-like tentacles reached even vice. Their British background provides an inter‐ into remote aspects of people's private lives. West esting, albeit sometimes a bit insular, perspective Germans tend to recall with embarrassment the on the GDR which difers from the internal Ger‐ unending chain of scandals that exposed the suc‐ man debates about individual complicity and the cessful penetration of their own state by commu‐ external American assessments of intelligence nist agents from the other side of the wall. Even breakdowns. The publications of the research many Anglo-Americans remember it as a sinister branch of the Federal Deputy for the Documents force from Cold War movies or spy stories such as of the State Security (Gauck-Behoerde), countless John Le Carre's or Len Deighton's fctional ac‐ stories in the press (such as Der Spiegel), revela‐ counts. Sensationalist disclosures of the collabora‐ tions in memoirs (like Markus Wolf's autobiogra‐ tion of prominent politicians, writers, and sports phy), and some personal interviews provide a heroes, or of such techniques as the preservation mass of fresh information on which such a pre‐ of personal smells in glass jars in the city of liminary overview can be based. Drawing on this Leipzig, have done little to undermine the Stasi's evidence, the authors set out to debunk the Stasi reputation for evil omnipotence after the collapse legend by analyzing the nature and extent of its of the GDR. domestic power as well as by probing the meth‐ Since secrecy breeds exaggeration, it is help‐ ods and achievements of its external spying ef‐ ful to have a comprehensive scholarly treatment forts: "The reality of the Stasi's success and the na‐ H-Net Reviews ture of the beast itself are, of course, central to this material several years ago, I found using this book" (p. xiii). these largely person-based records exasperating, In some important respects, this efort at sep‐ but encountered more than enough policy-orient‐ arating fact from fction in the debate about the ed documents from the center of Mielke's empire Stasi's secrets has been successful. For the general to provide a level of insight which is simply not reader, the volume provides a useful overview of available by reading secondary accounts. Espe‐ the development of the GDR's security apparatus, cially in a feld that is full of media sensations and going all the way back to the founding of the Ger‐ wild allegations it is imperative to check at least man communist party in 1919 and culminating in some central elements of the story against the the unexpected collapse of the second German sources in order to get a sense of which accounts state in 1989-90. Drawing on their contextual in‐ are reliable and which are not. Even if the relia‐ formation about the development of the SED as bility of their information about their targets may well as their intelligence expertise on Soviet espi‐ be open to question, Stasi records tend to ofer a onage organization, the authors present a broad- fairly accurate picture of the development of the ranging discussion that combines the domestic secret service itself; and in case of doubt they can with the international aspects of their subject. Es‐ also be cross-checked against collateral external pecially helpful is the organizational discussion of documentation. No doubt this is a gargantuan the various branches, activities and personnel of task, but its immense size is not enough of a rea‐ the Stasi in chapter III, while personal anecdotes son for failing even to attempt it in selected areas. and some graphic examples, like the practices of A second rather serious shortcoming is the postal surveillance, convey a sense of the frightful style of the volume, which is an example of the omnipresence of control in chapter IV. The discus‐ current genre of "lite book" preferred by universi‐ sion of espionage abroad centers on West Ger‐ ty presses because of its brevity and presumed many, the primary target of Wolf's infamous HVA, general appeal. But the result of authors knuck‐ and ofers pithy summaries of celebrated cases ling under to sales considerations tends to be a ranging from Otto John to Werner Stiller or Hans- chatty and superfcial treatment that serves well Joachim Tiedge in chapters V and VI. In contrast as a general introduction for the uninitiated, but to some journalistic fights of fancy, this is a sober leaves serious scholars wanting more depth. Typi‐ efort at analysis, judicious in its judgment, and cally, there is no systematic review of the litera‐ careful to confront infated claims with the avail‐ ture, leaving the reader at sea with a plethora of able evidence. titles of rather difering reliability and credibility. In other signifcant ways, the book is rather In many instances, the text provides a useful disappointing, even on its own terms. Its most im‐ background summary, only to stop just when the portant shortcoming is the lack of archival re‐ questions get more complicated and really inter‐ search which is simply inexcusable, since miles esting. For instance, the allusion to Christa Wolf's upon miles of Stasi fles are now accessible in the brief and early collaboration as informer does not ofce of the Bundesbeauftragter fuer die Unterla‐ mention the over twenty volumes of "victim fles" gen der Staatssicherheit. Like the defeat of the that show her as a later target of close surveil‐ Nazis, the collapse of communist rule has made lance in spite of her critical loyalty to the regime. the fles of the SED and of the GDR government as Also the recital of famous spy scandals leads to well as of important individuals like Egon Krenz the somewhat surprising conclusion that these available to researchers much earlier than the "successes" neither undermined the political cred‐ usual interval of thirty years. When I worked on ibility of the Federal Republic nor staved of the ultimate collapse of the GDR. In the Perestroika
2 H-Net Reviews discussion, the diferent internal tendencies with‐ live up to its own pacifst, feminist, and environ‐ in the Stasi, some of whom favored reform (Gross‐ mentalist claims. mann) while others opposed it (Mielke), are not Compared to recent works by Norman mentioned though they might explain the ambi‐ Naimark, Mary Fulbrook or Charles Maier on re‐ guity of some of the reports on the infuence of lated questions, the mixed performance of Gorbachev. The result of such an approach is a Childs's and Popplewell's Stasi book deserves only compressed but rather conventional account that one-and-one half cheers. As an introduction for focuses on organization, persons, and incidents the general reader and for undergraduate stu‐ without exploring the more complex contradic‐ dents it will perform a valuable service in pre‐ tions of the Stasi world. senting basic information in a largely reliable A fnal problem of this book is its lack of en‐ fashion. It makes much new German material gagement with perhaps the most interesting as‐ available in the English language for the frst pect of Stasi power, namely its mythical character. time, narrates of the outlines of the Stasi story, The authors only briefy discuss the psychological and discusses the variety of Stasi activities while impact of the terror system and do not address examining some of the most famous spy-cases in the probing questions raised by such literary competent and useful fashion. But this book will works as Wolfgang Hilbig's Ich or Guenter Grass's disappoint readers expecting more inside infor‐ Ein weites Feld, just to mention a few. In spite of mation, since it contains hardly any new details citing some egregious examples like the case of on the domestic or foreign activities of the East the dissident Vera Wollenweber, whose husband German secret service that might go beyond the turned out to be an informer, the presentation of existing literature. More importantly, the authors' the efect of the secret police on individual lives over-all interpretation that "intelligence played an remains curiously fat, unable to communicate important role in the downfall of the DDR by its the anguish of persons tarnished and broken by failure to perceive the deep-rootedness of discon‐ collaboration or to convey the pervasive tent with the socialist state" and its euphemistic schizophrenia between public speech and private reporting (p. 192) is not entirely convincing, since thought. It would be interesting to analyze unpublished documentation from the MfS sug‐ whether the Stasi was aware of the population's gests that the failure lay rather in the incapacity Angst and how far it consciously managed it in of the SED leadership to draw the correct conclu‐ order to increase its control. Although the switch sions from the increasingly alarming reports from initial brutality to more subtle methods in which it received in the summer and fall of 1989. later decades is mentioned, the counterproduc‐ This volume therefore presents a helpful starting tiveness of the expansion of the secret service bu‐ point, but its pages also demonstrate that much of reaucracy with Ostpolitik is not discussed enough, the actual primary research and the more com‐ leaving unanswered the question why ordinary plex work of interpretation remain yet to be done. people were at last able to break through their Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights re‐ fears in the mass exodus or demonstrations, and served. This work may be copied for non-proft with it the reason for the ultimate failure of intim‐ educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ idation. While the Stasi was very efective in com‐ thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ bating traditional anti-Communist and pro-West‐ tact [email protected]. ern enemies of the 1950s, it proved incapable of dealing with a diferent brand of internal critics of the 1980s, who just wanted to get socialism to
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Citation: Konrad H. Jarausch. Review of Childs, David; Popplewell, Richard. The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service. H-German, H-Net Reviews. January, 1998.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=1628
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