Why Did Mikhail Gorbachev Start Reforming the Soviet Union?
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Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty William D
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by ScholarWorks at WMU Masthead Logo The Hilltop Review Volume 5 Article 5 Issue 1 Fall December 2011 Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty William D. Watson Western Michigan University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, Military History Commons, and the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Watson, William D. (2011) "Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the INF Treaty," The Hilltop Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/hilltopreview/vol5/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Footer Logo College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Hilltop Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 22 TRUST, BUT VERIFY: REAGAN, GORBACHEV, AND THE INF TREATY By William D. Watson Department of History [email protected] “Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slen derest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by miscalculation, or accident, or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.1” John F. Kennedy On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF), which aimed to eliminate short and medium range nuclear weapons from their respective national arsenals. -
Essential Questions and Answers… Cold War Crises and the End of the Cold War, 1958-1991
Essential Questions and Answers… Cold War Crises and the end of the Cold War, 1958-1991 QUESTION ANSWER 1. What was the Berlin Khrushchev’s demands to the Western allies (USA, France, GB) to leave West Berlin. Ultimatum of 1958? 2. What did the Berlin That the Western allies had 6 months to leave West Berlin and that it should be a Ultimatum say? free city (with its own independent government). 3. What was discussed at How Berlin should be run. No agreement was reached. the Geneva summit meeting in May 1959? 4. Who met at Camp Khrushchev and Eisenhower. They could not agree on a way forward for Berlin but David (in the USA) in the USSR did withdraw the Berlin Ultimatum. September 1959? 5. What was a U2? An American spy plane. It could fly at 70,000 feet and take photographs of Soviet bomber plane bases and missile sites. 6. When was Gary 1 May 1960. It was shot down by a SAM (surface to air missile). Power’s spy plane shot down by the USSR? 7. Who was the leader of Nikita Khrushchev. the USSR at this time? 8. What did Khrushchev He said the USSR had shot down a plane (but did not say it was a spy plane). do about the U2? 9. How did the American He said it was a weather plane. president, Eisenhower, respond? 10. What did Khrushchev He showed the photos Gary Powers had taken, proving it was a spy plane and that do next? Eisenhower was lying. 11. How did the U2 crisis Khrushchev walked out of the Paris Peace Summit meeting because Eisenhower make the Cold War refused to apologise for spying on the USSR. -
The End of the Cold War Housekeeping
The End of the Cold War Housekeeping Paper due tonight. Can turn it in later to me via email Final: QUESTIONS: THE END OF THE COLD WAR REVIEW: 1979-1985: The End of Détente The Invasion into Afghanistan Solidarity Reagan elected, calls USSR an “evil empire” and pushes buildup with changed strategy Gas prices go down Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) Computer weapons technology at all levels The new social contract in Soviet bloc wears thin Soviet leaders start dying off Gorbachev Comes To Power Committed Communist “Child of the 1960s”/ Knows something has to change DOMESTIC POLITICs “Acceleration”= Discipline, anti-alcohol “Perestroika”= Reform “Glasnost”—Ability to criticize Very uneven: Moscow and Leningrad in 1987 “Demokratizatsiia” Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy “The New Thinking” Abandons the position of strength argument Calls for mutual interdependence, peace: Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok Wants to ”deprive the United States of its image of the USSR as an enemy” Unilateral concessions for arms control talks Reykjavik Summit, 1986 The Zero-Zero Option in Europe in 1987 The unilateral arms concession in 1988 Eastern Europe: Rejects Brezhnev Doctrine in March 1988 in Yugoslavia In October, 1989: The ”Sinatra Doctrine” • https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ielyVJUgXK8 Reagan’s Role Defense spending and getting Saudi Arabia to lower oil prices– a little Strategic Defense Spending—no Gorbachev was most important Reagan recognized an opportunity Eastern Europe Roundtables in Poland, Hungary Poland: Stalemate between regime and society -
Domestic and Foreign Problems of the Brezhnev Era CHAPTER 5 Domestic and Foreign Problems of the Brezhnev Era
Chapter 5: Domestic and foreign problems of the Brezhnev era CHAPTER 5 Domestic and foreign problems of the Brezhnev era This chapter analyses Leonid Brezhnev’s rule of the USSR until his death in 1982. The extent to which this was an era of political, economic and social stagnation is fully explored. Soviet foreign policy in the 1970s is also discussed, in particular the reasons for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and its consequences. You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter: + What were the key features of the USSR’s politics, society and economy under Brezhnev? + Was Brezhnev’s leadership to blame for Soviet stagnation from 1964 to 1982? + What challenges did Soviet foreign policy face in the Brezhnev era? + To what extent were the USSR’s aims achieved in Afghanistan? + Why did the USSR invade Afghanistan? + How serious were the socio-economic and political problems confronting the USSR by the time of Brezhnev’s death? 1 Politics, economy and society under Brezhnev Key question: What were the key features of the USSR’s politics, society and economy under Brezhnev? By 1964, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of KEY TERM the Soviet Union (CPSU), was viewed by senior party members as increasingly unable to exercise the necessary leadership and stability Presidium Dominant, required for the USSR to uphold its world position. policy-making body within the CPSU formed by the Khrushchev was removed from party leadership following a plot by Council of Ministers, members of the Presidium, in which Leonid Brezhnev played a leading part. -
Anatoly Chernyaev, Georgi Arbatov, and the Foundations of the Soviet Collapse, 1970-1979
THE RUSTY CURTAIN: ANATOLY CHERNYAEV, GEORGI ARBATOV, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOVIET COLLAPSE, 1970-1979 Michael Ginnetti A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May 2015 Committee: Douglas Forsyth, Advisor Beth Griech-Polelle © 2015 Michael Ginnetti All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Douglas Forsyth, Advisor “It seems the Western interpreters of Marxism are right when they say it is an outdated gospel.” Such a harsh condemnation of communist ideology might be expected from some persecuted Soviet dissident or perhaps a war-drumming functionary in Washington. However, this quote is from none other than Anatoly Chernyaev, a high-level apparatchik working for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union who found himself disillusioned with the state of Soviet society in the 1970s. In much the same way, Georgi Arbatov, the director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, declared that, “one had a particularly sickening feeling inside because of the intolerable propaganda.” From these perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1970s, Chernyaev and Arbatov would rise to become personal foreign policy advisors to Mikhail Gorbachev and active reformers in the 1980s. The current restrictions on research in Russia have turned the personal writings of Chernyaev and Arbatov into resources of nearly exclusive importance on the history of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Not only were Chernyaev and Arbatov highly placed individuals within the Soviet government, they were remarkably intelligent, creative, and observant men who recorded their thoughts, impressions, and memories of the Soviet Union as it was before the implosion of the communist system. -
2018 Sartorius Christopher Ma
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS Norman, OK 2018 WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY ___________________________ Dr. Ronald K. Gaddie, Chair ___________________________ Dr. Colin M. Barry ___________________________ Dr. Deven E. Carlson ___________________________ Dr. Jorge L. Mendoza ___________________________ Dr. Shad B. Satterthwaite © Copyright by CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 2018 All Rights Reserved. This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all intelligence professionals, military and civilian, past and present, who have dedicated their lives to protecting our great nation and our allies. Acknowledgements Working on this doctoral dissertation has been both a joy and a challenge. This work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of countless individuals. At the most personal level, I would like to thank my wife, Fulvia, for her support over the past three years of this doctoral program and for her care and love over the past 25 years. I wish to thank my son, Konrad, for providing inspiration, much needed breaks in my work routine, and for sharing lunch together at the OU cafeteria followed by our fun table tennis matches. I also would like to thank my parents, Tim and Wanda Sartorius, for instilling in me the value of a great education. I would also like to thank Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, always friendly, open, and upbeat for enthusiastically encouraging me to pursue a doctoral degree at OU and Dr. -
1 the Great Communicator and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War1 by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman President Ronald Reagan Is
The Great Communicator and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War1 By Ambassador Eric S. Edelman President Ronald Reagan is known as the “Great Communicator,” a soubriquet that was awarded to him by New York Times columnist Russell Baker, and which stuck despite Reagan’s disclaimer in his farewell address that he “wasn’t a great communicator” but that he had “communicated great things.” The ideas which animated Reagan’s vision were given voice in a series of extraordinary speeches, many of them justly renowned. Among them are his “Time for Choosing” speech in 1964, his “Shining City on a Hill” speech to CPAC in 1974, his spontaneous remarks at the conclusion of the Republican National Convention in 1976 and, of course, his memorable speeches as President of the United States. These include his “Evil Empire” speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, his remarks at Westminster in 1982, his elegiac comments commemorating the 40th anniversary of the D-Day invasion and mourning the Challenger disaster, and his Berlin speech exhorting Mikhail Gorbachev to “Tear Down this Wall” in 1987, which Time Magazine suggested was one of the 10 greatest speeches of all time.2 Curiously, Reagan’s address to the students of Moscow State University during the 1988 Summit with Mikhail Gorbachev draws considerably less attention today despite the fact that even normally harsh Reagan critics hailed the speech at the time and have continued to cite it subsequently. The New York Times, for instance, described the speech as “Reagan’s finest oratorical hour” and Princeton’s liberal historian Sean Wilentz has called it “the symbolic high point of Reagan’s visit…. -
Chronology End of the Cold War in Europe
Chronology End of the Cold War in Europe (This chronology was compiled by the National Security Archive staff in April 1998 for the conference “The End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989: ‘New Thinking’ and New Evidence) 1987 January 12 - Jaruzelski meets with Pope John Paul II in Italy, Jaruzelski's first official visit to the West since the imposition of martial law in Poland. (Dawisha, p. 283, Foreign, p. 300) January 20 - The USSR stops jamming the BBC. (Garthoff, 304) January 21 - The CPSU Politburo discusses withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze advocates only a partial withdrawal and massive support of the Najib regime. Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov categorically demands a complete withdrawal. Gorbachev proposes "to pull it off within two years." (The Archive of Gorbachev Foundation) January 22 - The CPSU Politburo discusses "acceleration" in upgrading the machine- building industries. (The Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation) January 27 - At a meeting of the Central Committee Gorbachev surprises members with his description of the country as being one of "developing socialism," rather than the stock phrase, "developed socialism," and with approvals of "real elections" and secret ballots. This provides an opening wedge for the introduction of democratic procedure. (Matlock, 64; Garthoff, 303) January 29 - The CPSU Politburo holds discussions on the results of the Warsaw conference of CC secretaries of Comecon countries. The participants point at the growing pro-Western orientation of Eastern Europe. Anatoly Dobrynin argues against "over dramatizing the nuances in the behavior of Honecker." Gorbachev agrees that "they should remain friends." (The Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation) February 10 - The USSR announces that it has pardoned 140 prisoners convicted of subversive activities. -
Paper 2 Superpower Relations and the Cold War C1941-‐91
Year 11 Revision Period Study – Paper 2 Superpower Relations and the Cold War c1941-91 Revision Programme – Paper 2 Superpower Rivalry 1941-91 Paper 2 is one hour and forty five minutes long. It has two distinct sections ; Section A – Period Study - Superpower Rivalry 1941-91 ( 50 minutes) Section B – British Depth Study – Elizabethan England 1588-1601 (55 minutes) Section A – Three Questions. All assess AO1 and AO2. All rely on factual knowledge and understanding. Question 1- Explain two consequences of …. ( 8 marks) Allow 10 minutes for this answer. Write about two consequences – you only need to write half a page so be brief. Focus should only be on the effect of an event – good discourse markers to use would be as a result of; as a consequence; the effect was; so Question 2 Write a narrative account analysing… ( 8 marks) Allow 15 minutes. This answer expects a narrative explaining how events lead to an outcome. You are given two information prompts but are expected to add to this to gain the best marks. The key is to write an organised answer, putting events into the right order and most importantly showing how each event links to the next. There should be a clear beginning, middle and end to this response Question 3 Explain two of the following… the importance of xxx for …. ( 16 marks) Allow 25 minutes. You need to choose TWO from the three listed. You must explain the impact of an event – thinking what did this event lead to? What difference did this event make ? KEY TIP : Throughout revision focus on what events are; the effect they have on each other and the overall Cold War tensions. -
Security Without War a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy
SECURITY WITHOUT WAR A POST-COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY Michael H. Shuman and Hal Harvey With a Foreward by Senator Paul Simon Westview Press Boulder • San Francisco • Oxford You will say at once that although the abolition of war has been the dream of man for centuries, every proposition to that end has been promptly discarded as impossible and fantastic. Every cynic, every pessimist, every adventurer, every swashbuckler in the world has always disclaimed its feasibility....But now the tremendous and present evolution of nuclear and other potentials of destruction has suddenly taken the problem away from its primary consideration as a moral and spiritual question and brought it abreast of scientific realism. It is no longer an ethical equation to be pondered solely by learned philosophers and ecclesiastics but a hard core one for the decision of the masses whose survival is the issue. – General Douglas MacArthur, 1955 CONTENTS Foreward, Senator Paul Simon Acknowledgments Introduction (n/a) Cold War Policies in a Post-Cold-War World Toward a New View of Security Organization of the Book Part I. Redefining Security 1. New Security Threats Military Threats Political Threats Economic Threats Environmental Threats A Comprehensive Policy 2. Limits to Force The Folly of U.S. Intervention The Recent Record for Other Users of Force Force as a Last Resort 3. Dangers of Arms Racing The Controlled Arms Race The War Risks of the Controlled Arms Race Political Insecurity Economic Security Environmental Security Security Without Arms Races Part II. Preventing and Resolving Conflicts 4. Political Roots of Conflict Strong Democracy and Interstate Peace Strong Democracy and Intrastate Peace Promoting Strong Democracy Abroad Promoting Strong Democracy at Home Perpetual Peace 5. -
Summary of NATO's Able Archer 83 Exercise
Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP) 6 November 2003 Stasi Intelligence on NATO www.isn.ethz.ch/php Edited by Edited by Bernd Schaefer and Christian Nuenlist ________________________________________________________________________________________________ ABLE ARCHER 83 By Ben F. Fischer The Soviets were familiar with the annual NATO command post exercise codenamed ABLE ARCHER 83 from previous years, but the 1983 version included two important changes: • In the original scenario (which was later modified), the 1983 exercise was to involve high-level offi- cials, including the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in major roles, with cameo appearances by the President and the Vice President. Such high-level participation would have meant greater publicity and visibility than was the case during past runnings of this ex- ercise. ABLE ARCHER 83 included a practice drill that took NATO forces through a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons. According to high-level Soviet KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky, on the night of November 8 or 9-he was not sure which-the KGB Center sent a flash cable to West European residencies advising them, incorrectly, that US forces in Europe had gone on alert and that troops at some bases were being mobilized. The cable specu- lated that the (nonexistent) alert might have been ordered in response to the then-recent bomb attack on the US Marine barracks in Lebanon, or was related to impending US Army maneuvers, or was the beginning of a countdown to a surprise nuclear attack. Recipients were asked to confirm the US alert and evaluate these hypotheses. -
The German Question
Part II The German Question Gorbachev and the GDR 145 Chapter 7 Gorbachev and the GDR Daniel S. Hamilton The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the illegitimate off- spring of the Cold War, in the words of one writer, the “state that can- not be.”1 Even after forty years of separate existence, the GDR never became a nation; it was never seen as a 1egitimate state by its own people, by West Germans or even by its own superpower patron, the Soviet Union.2 The illegitimate nature of the East German regime proved to be an incurable birth defect. It was also a characteristic that distinguished East Germany from its socialist neighbors. Unlike Polish, Hungarian or Czechoslovak rulers, the GDR regime could not fall back on distinct national traditions or a sense of historical continuity binding its citi- zens to its leaders. The Finnish diplomat Max Jacobson captured the essence of the GDR’s precarious position: The GDR is fundamentally different from all other Warsaw Pact members. It is not a nation, but a state built on an ideological con- cept. Poland will remain Poland, and Hungary will always be Hun- gary, whatever their social system. But for East Germany, main- taining its socialist system is the reason for its existence.3 As J.F. Brown put it, “history has been full of nations seeking state- hood, but the GDR was a state searching for nationhood.”4 This lack of legitimacy afflicted the regime during the entire 40-year existence of the East German state. Without legitimacy, the regime could never consolidate its internal authority or its external stability.