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4.1 Million; Lebanon Also Hosts 356,000 Palestinian Refugees

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4.1 Million; Lebanon Also Hosts 356,000 Palestinian Refugees ; SGK3P 36130- Basic data:: Official name: Republic of Lebanon. Total area: 10.400 sq km. Population: 4.1 million; Lebanon also hosts 356,000 Palestinian refugees. Religions: Islam 70% (Sunni, Shia, Alawite, Ismailite, Druze), Christian 30% (11 Christian groups - 4 Orthodox, 6 Catholic, 1 Protestant). Languages: Arabic (official), French (official), English, Armenian. BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEBANON. FEBRUARY 19981 Basic data:: Official name: Republic of Lebanon. Total area: 10.400 sq km. Population: 4.1 million; Lebanon also hosts 356,000 Palestinian refugees. Religions: Islam 70% (Sunni, Shia, Alawite, Ismailite, Druze), Christian 30% (11 Christian groups - 4 Orthodox, 6 Catholic, 1 Protestant). Languages: Arabic (official), French (official), English, Armenian. Per capita GDP: $3.700 (1997 est). External debt: $3.7 billion. UN system assistance: $18 million (1996). Historical and political background: Lebanon gained independence in 1943. From that time until 1990, Lebanese politics were governed by an unwritten agreement, the so-called National Pact. It provided that seats in parliament and positions in the government bureaucracy should be distributed among the recognized religious groups (confessional communities) on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims and that the three top positions in the governmental systems should be distributed as follows: President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and Parliament's Speaker a Shia Muslim. Those religious groups most favoured by the 1943 formula sought to preserve it, while those who perceived themselves to be disadvantaged sought to revise it or to abolish it entirely. The struggle gave a strongly sectarian coloration to Lebanese politics and to the civil strife in the country. The civil war which began in 1975 ravaged the country. Although the main conflict broke out between Muslims and Maronite Christians, splits and fighting often occurred within communities because of political discord over domestic and regional issues and the rivalry between leaders. Neighbouring countries -- Syria and Israel — became actively involved in the crisis. A number of extraregional players also attempted to influence the conflict. A national reconciliation agreement reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989 paved the way for an end to the civil war. The Taif Agreement, in whose formulation Syria played a central role, was signed into law in 1990. It provided for alteration of the National Pact to create a 50-50 Christian-Muslim balance in parliament and to rearrange the powers of the different branches of government. The Agreement put into writing many of the provisions of the Pact, including the understanding on the three top positions. In 1992, the Lebanese-Saudi billionaire, Rafiq al-Hariri, was chosen Prime Minister to head a cabinet whose main objective would be to lead the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. (See details in a separate note on Lebanon's history). Government: Head of State: the President, currently Elias Hrawi, was elected in November 1989 for a six-year term by parliament. His term was extended in late 1995 by 1 On Lebanon-Israel negotiations see a separate note on the Middle East peace process. three years. Head of Government: Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Legislature: the unicameral National Assembly has 128 seats equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Speaker of the Parliament - Nabih Berri. Before 1990 executive power in Lebanon was largely in the hands of the President. He appointed a Prime Minister with whom he collaborated in forming a government. The Taif Agreement transformed the political system, transferring executive powers to the Prime Minister. Though the President has remained head of state, his power has been drastically reduced. He is no longer empowered to dissolve Parliament at will and is no longer commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Responsibility for choosing the Prime Minister rests with both the President and the Speaker. However, real political power in the Lebanese leadership is difficult to ascribe as it remains closely linked to communal relations rather than the prerogatives of governing institutions. In practical terms, political power now centres on a triumvirate of the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker, under the semi-official rubric of a leadership troika. Political forces: Traditionally, powerful political organizations centre on individuals or religious communities. The Shia Muslim community is the best mobilized and represented today. Popular authority is split, however, between the more secular and mainstream Amal movement, headed by the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, and the pro-Iranian Hizbullah (Party of God). Amal has been able to maintain a strong position within its community in the south, although it has lost ground to Hizbullah in the Bekaa and south Beirut. Hizbullah has several seats in Parliament. It is the only Lebanese militia, other than the South Lebanon Army (SLA), that was not disarmed after the war. Its war against Israel in the south is widely viewed in Lebanon as a struggle for national liberation. The official representative of the Shia is the president of the community's Higher Council, Sheikh Shamseddine. Among Sunnis., political power is loosely structured. During the war the Sunnis relied largely on Palestinian factions and thus developed no strong militias of their own. When the Palestinians were defeated, the Sunnis were left militarily at a disadvantage. Sunni authority now derives partly from the community's strong influence in the economy, partly from its strong position within the offices of state where Mr. Hariri is the Prime Minister, and partly from the natural sympathy it receives from other Sunni Arab governments in the Gulf and elsewhere. The once dominant Christian minority emerged weakened and divided from the civil war. The Christians resent the loss of their traditional privileges and what many of them see as a Syrian takeover of Lebanon. They form the core of the opposition to the present political regime. Many Christian leaders, such as the former head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, former army commander Michel Aoun (headed a military government between 1988 and 1990), and the National Bloc leader, Raymond Edde, are either in prison or exile. As a result, the political influence in the community has drifted towards the Maronite patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir, who has been an outspoken critic of the government and of Syrian influence over Lebanon. The National Liberal Party is headed by Dory Chamoun. One of the main challenges facing the government continues to be to reintegrate the Christians into political life. The 1996 parliament election saw greater Christian participation than before, although only a few critics of the government made it into the new chamber. The Druze Muslim community and the Christian Greek Orthodox community, have played influential roles in politics in Lebanon. However, their power is limited by their small size. The main Druze figure is Walid Junblat, who heads the Progressive Socialist Party, and is a political ally of Mr Hariri. Economy: Under the peaceful conditions which generally prevailed prior to 1975, Beirut was the principal commercial and financial centre of the Middle East. Real GDP growth was 6% per year from 1965 to 1975. The civil war and Israeli invasions devastated the country, dramatically affecting production and exports, causing infrastructure damage, and triggering massive outflows of capital and relocation of people. With the end of the civil war and advent of Prime Minister Hariri's government in October 1992, expectations were raised for an economic revival. Among priority goals were the economy, the environment and administration reform. One of Hariri's first steps was the introduction in March 1993 of an ambitious ten-year reconstruction plan, dubbed Horizon 2000, involving $10 billion in direct investment and another $2.9 billion in other charges. In early 1994, the Solidere company was established to reconstruct Beirut's city centre. In the initial stage of reconstruction in 1993-1995, the government achieved remarkable results in rebuilding infrastructure and Beirut's centre (spending on Horizon between 1993 and June 1997 totaled $3.6 billion) and initiated a number of development projects. However it failed to maintain steady progress. Economic growth decelerated from an average 6.5% during 1992-1995 to 4% in 1996 and an estimated 3.5% in 1997. The slowdown was due to persistent high budget deficits (public debt has risen to an unsustainable 23% of GDP), the impact of the April 1996 Israeli attacks and lower overall confidence, factors which reduced both domestic and foreign investment. Overall, Israeli occupation of the south and the deadlock in the peace process continue to affect the economy negatively. Socio-economic conditions improved during the first half of the 1990s, but the benefits of the recovery were not shared evenly. Slack growth over the past two years dampened the expectations of the population for a rapid improvement in their living conditions and resulted in a rise in social tensions. Attempting to respond to the mounting pressures, the government has recently showed a renewed interest in social reconstruction. The Lebanese Government has deployed determined efforts to sensitize donors and private investors to support the reconstruction and development of the country and to mobilize the required resources. The Friends of Lebanon Conference (December 1996, Washington D.C.), organized by the US in support of the reconstruction of Lebanon in accordance with the Understanding of 26 April 1996, pledged $1 billion in investment and an additional $2.2 billion for specific projects. This appears to represent the limit of what the country can expect to attract in the immediate future. Displaced persons: About 800,000 people were displaced by the civil war. The Israeli military campaigns in June 1993 and April 1996 created more internal refugees, though many of them returned home soon after. More than 20,000 families regained their villages of origin by the end of 1995.
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