; SGK3P 36130-

Basic data:: Official name: Republic of Lebanon. Total area: 10.400 sq km. Population: 4.1 million; Lebanon also hosts 356,000 Palestinian refugees. Religions: Islam 70% (Sunni, Shia, Alawite, Ismailite, Druze), Christian 30% (11 Christian groups - 4 Orthodox, 6 Catholic, 1 Protestant). Languages: Arabic (official), French (official), English, Armenian. BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEBANON. FEBRUARY 19981

Basic data:: Official name: Republic of Lebanon. Total area: 10.400 sq km. Population: 4.1 million; Lebanon also hosts 356,000 Palestinian refugees. Religions: Islam 70% (Sunni, Shia, Alawite, Ismailite, Druze), Christian 30% (11 Christian groups - 4 Orthodox, 6 Catholic, 1 Protestant). Languages: Arabic (official), French (official), English, Armenian. Per capita GDP: $3.700 (1997 est). External debt: $3.7 billion. UN system assistance: $18 million (1996).

Historical and political background: Lebanon gained independence in 1943. From that time until 1990, Lebanese politics were governed by an unwritten agreement, the so-called National Pact. It provided that seats in parliament and positions in the government bureaucracy should be distributed among the recognized religious groups (confessional communities) on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims and that the three top positions in the governmental systems should be distributed as follows: President must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and Parliament's Speaker a Shia Muslim. Those religious groups most favoured by the 1943 formula sought to preserve it, while those who perceived themselves to be disadvantaged sought to revise it or to abolish it entirely. The struggle gave a strongly sectarian coloration to Lebanese politics and to the civil strife in the country.

The civil war which began in 1975 ravaged the country. Although the main conflict broke out between Muslims and Maronite Christians, splits and fighting often occurred within communities because of political discord over domestic and regional issues and the rivalry between leaders. Neighbouring countries -- Syria and Israel — became actively involved in the crisis. A number of extraregional players also attempted to influence the conflict. A national reconciliation agreement reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989 paved the way for an end to the civil war. The Taif Agreement, in whose formulation Syria played a central role, was signed into law in 1990. It provided for alteration of the National Pact to create a 50-50 Christian-Muslim balance in parliament and to rearrange the powers of the different branches of government. The Agreement put into writing many of the provisions of the Pact, including the understanding on the three top positions. In 1992, the Lebanese-Saudi billionaire, Rafiq al-Hariri, was chosen Prime Minister to head a cabinet whose main objective would be to lead the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. (See details in a separate note on Lebanon's history).

Government: Head of State: the President, currently Elias Hrawi, was elected in November 1989 for a six-year term by parliament. His term was extended in late 1995 by

1 On Lebanon-Israel negotiations see a separate note on the Middle East peace process. three years. Head of Government: Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Legislature: the unicameral National Assembly has 128 seats equally divided between Christians and Muslims. Speaker of the Parliament - Nabih Berri. Before 1990 executive power in Lebanon was largely in the hands of the President. He appointed a Prime Minister with whom he collaborated in forming a government. The Taif Agreement transformed the political system, transferring executive powers to the Prime Minister. Though the President has remained head of state, his power has been drastically reduced. He is no longer empowered to dissolve Parliament at will and is no longer commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Responsibility for choosing the Prime Minister rests with both the President and the Speaker. However, real political power in the Lebanese leadership is difficult to ascribe as it remains closely linked to communal relations rather than the prerogatives of governing institutions. In practical terms, political power now centres on a triumvirate of the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker, under the semi-official rubric of a leadership troika.

Political forces: Traditionally, powerful political organizations centre on individuals or religious communities. The Shia Muslim community is the best mobilized and represented today. Popular authority is split, however, between the more secular and mainstream Amal movement, headed by the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, and the pro-Iranian Hizbullah (Party of God). Amal has been able to maintain a strong position within its community in the south, although it has lost ground to Hizbullah in the Bekaa and south Beirut. Hizbullah has several seats in Parliament. It is the only Lebanese militia, other than the South Lebanon Army (SLA), that was not disarmed after the war. Its war against Israel in the south is widely viewed in Lebanon as a struggle for national liberation. The official representative of the Shia is the president of the community's Higher Council, Sheikh Shamseddine.

Among Sunnis., political power is loosely structured. During the war the Sunnis relied largely on Palestinian factions and thus developed no strong militias of their own. When the Palestinians were defeated, the Sunnis were left militarily at a disadvantage. Sunni authority now derives partly from the community's strong influence in the economy, partly from its strong position within the offices of state where Mr. Hariri is the Prime Minister, and partly from the natural sympathy it receives from other Sunni Arab governments in the Gulf and elsewhere.

The once dominant Christian minority emerged weakened and divided from the civil war. The Christians resent the loss of their traditional privileges and what many of them see as a Syrian takeover of Lebanon. They form the core of the opposition to the present political regime. Many Christian leaders, such as the former head of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, former army commander Michel Aoun (headed a military government between 1988 and 1990), and the National Bloc leader, Raymond Edde, are either in prison or exile. As a result, the political influence in the community has drifted towards the Maronite patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir, who has been an outspoken critic of the government and of Syrian influence over Lebanon. The National Liberal Party is headed by Dory Chamoun. One of the main challenges facing the government continues to be to reintegrate the Christians into political life. The 1996 parliament election saw greater Christian participation than before, although only a few critics of the government made it into the new chamber.

The Druze Muslim community and the Christian Greek Orthodox community, have played influential roles in politics in Lebanon. However, their power is limited by their small size. The main Druze figure is Walid Junblat, who heads the Progressive Socialist Party, and is a political ally of Mr Hariri.

Economy: Under the peaceful conditions which generally prevailed prior to 1975, Beirut was the principal commercial and financial centre of the Middle East. Real GDP growth was 6% per year from 1965 to 1975. The civil war and Israeli invasions devastated the country, dramatically affecting production and exports, causing infrastructure damage, and triggering massive outflows of capital and relocation of people.

With the end of the civil war and advent of Prime Minister Hariri's government in October 1992, expectations were raised for an economic revival. Among priority goals were the economy, the environment and administration reform. One of Hariri's first steps was the introduction in March 1993 of an ambitious ten-year reconstruction plan, dubbed Horizon 2000, involving $10 billion in direct investment and another $2.9 billion in other charges. In early 1994, the Solidere company was established to reconstruct Beirut's city centre.

In the initial stage of reconstruction in 1993-1995, the government achieved remarkable results in rebuilding infrastructure and Beirut's centre (spending on Horizon between 1993 and June 1997 totaled $3.6 billion) and initiated a number of development projects. However it failed to maintain steady progress. Economic growth decelerated from an average 6.5% during 1992-1995 to 4% in 1996 and an estimated 3.5% in 1997. The slowdown was due to persistent high budget deficits (public debt has risen to an unsustainable 23% of GDP), the impact of the April 1996 Israeli attacks and lower overall confidence, factors which reduced both domestic and foreign investment. Overall, Israeli occupation of the south and the deadlock in the peace process continue to affect the economy negatively.

Socio-economic conditions improved during the first half of the 1990s, but the benefits of the recovery were not shared evenly. Slack growth over the past two years dampened the expectations of the population for a rapid improvement in their living conditions and resulted in a rise in social tensions. Attempting to respond to the mounting pressures, the government has recently showed a renewed interest in social reconstruction.

The Lebanese Government has deployed determined efforts to sensitize donors and private investors to support the reconstruction and development of the country and to mobilize the required resources. The Friends of Lebanon Conference (December 1996, Washington D.C.), organized by the US in support of the reconstruction of Lebanon in accordance with the Understanding of 26 April 1996, pledged $1 billion in investment and an additional $2.2 billion for specific projects. This appears to represent the limit of what the country can expect to attract in the immediate future.

Displaced persons: About 800,000 people were displaced by the civil war. The Israeli military campaigns in June 1993 and April 1996 created more internal refugees, though many of them returned home soon after. More than 20,000 families regained their villages of origin by the end of 1995. Although the problem appears to have lost its acuity, several thousand people are probably still displaced. Their return hinges on the evacuation of illegally occupied buildings, the availability of financial resources, etc.

Palestine refugees: Lebanon is home to 356,000 Palestinians who arrived in the country at various stages after the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973. Mostly Sunni Muslim, they live in 12 squalid camps. For fear of disturbing the delicate sectarian balance between Lebanon's religious groups and for financial reasons, the Lebanese Government vehemently opposes settling Palestinian refugees on its soil. The refugees face severe restrictions on employment, lack access to government health services and public education, and are largely confined to manual work ~ when it is available. Unemployment in the camps is estimated at over 40%. Since the 1991 Gulf War the situation has worsened. Families in the camps used to rely heavily on relatives working in the Gulf, particularly Kuwait, but after the PLO leadership sided with Baghdad in the war, around 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from the area. The bulk of the refugee population relies almost entirely on UNRWA.

South Lebanon: The situation there remains tense, sometimes reaching dangerous levels of escalation. Hizbullah and other guerrilla groups mount almost daily attacks on positions and patrols of the IDF and SLA forces in the "security zone", causing retaliatory artillery fire and air raids. From time to time, Katyusha rockets are fired into northern Israel, mainly in response to irregular actions (i. e. firing at civilians) by the IDF or SLA in "the security zone". Last year Israel suffered its heaviest casualties. In September 1997, in Israel's worst defeat in Lebanon since 1985, 12 Israeli commandos were killed in the village of Insariyeh near Sidon. Lebanon's stance is that guerrilla activities are the right of all people to resist the occupation. Beirut declines to consider disbanding Hizbullah until Israel pledges to withdraw. Thus, the possibility of a repeat of Israel's massive attacks in 1993 and 1995 on south Lebanon and other parts of the country is strong.

Relations with neighbours and external actors

Syria's role; Syria is the main power broker in Lebanon with some 35,000 troops in the centre, east and north of the country, as well as several thousand additional secret service agents. President Hrawi is close to Syria, and Syria secured his nomination and election in 1989. The Parliament is one which Syria can trust. Damascus seems to exercise direct or indirect control over all important political and administrative decisions made by the Lebanese government. Its supervision is especially strong in the fields of security, defence and foreign policy. Lebanon and Syria signed a Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination in May 1991, and a Pact of Defence and Security in September of that year. The treaty and the pact decreed very close relations between the two countries. A Syrian- Lebanese Higher Council was activated in August 1993 and it presents a formal framework in which Lebanese-Syrian relations are defined. The Taif Agreement stipulated that Syrian troops would redeploy to the Bekaa Valley by September 1992. However, this requirement was not met. It could now be presumed that Syrian redeployment will occur only as part of a wider Arab-Israeli settlement.

Israel in Lebanon: The Israeli military has been in Lebanon since 1978 when it first invaded the country. It invaded again in 1982, and currently occupies a band of territory in the south which it calls the "security zone" and where it arms, trains and finances the Christian-led South Lebanon Army (SLA). In April 1996 Israel launched another attack aiming to suppress Hizbullah guerrilla activities.

France: The former mandatory power, France, has always had important relations with Lebanon. Traditionally close to the Maronites, the French are now building strong ties with Lebanon's Muslim communities. Under President Chirac, France has considerably intensified its diplomacy with a view to playing a more central role in the peace process and in the region in general. Lebanon appears to have become a cornerstone of the French Middle Eastern policy.

United States: Historically, the US has had considerable influence in Lebanon, but this influence has declined since 1983. hi 1982 the US sent marines to Lebanon as part of an international peacekeeping force, but a truck bombing in 1983, which killed more than 240 marines, provoked its withdrawal from Lebanese affairs. It has since resumed diplomatic ties with Lebanon and its interest with regard to Lebanon has been steadily growing. In July 1997, the US Government lifted a more than 10-year ban on Americans traveling to Lebanon. Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia: Iraq used to be a traditional rival of Syria in Lebanon, though its presence, which had declined during the war with Iran, was seriously eroded by the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, and in 1993 the pro-Iraqi Baath Party was declared illegal. Most recently, Lebanon followed Syria in easing restrictions on relations with Iraq. Iran and Lebanon maintain good relations. Iran is the main supporter of Hizbullah (Iranian Revolutionary Guards stationed in southern Lebanon between 1985 and 1988) whose head, Sheikh Nasrallah, visited Tehran in October 1997. Saudi Arabia has traditionally supported the Sunni community in Lebanon and is currently a strong backer of Prime Minister Hariri.

Lebanon and the United Nations: (see separate note).

Victor Poliakov John K-enninger 30 January 1998 Uffic^-inr^harge Asia and'tiie/Pacific Division/DPA BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEBANON, ISRAEL AND SYRIA, MARCH 1998

Security Council Resolution 425 Executive summary 1. Expectations have recently been raised in Lebanon and in Israel that the Secretary- General, while on a forthcoming tour of the region, will address the implementation of SCR 425. These expectations have been prompted by Israel's conditional acceptance of the resolution which contains references to UNIFIL's responsibilities and the role it is mandated to play in southern Lebanon. The Secretary-General stay in the Middle East will coincide with the 20th anniversary (19 March 1978) of SCR 425. Since he does not have the " contemporary" backing of the Security Council to negotiate any proposal (although SCR 426 adopted the same day as SCR 425, constitutes an important starting point), he may be advised: (a) listen first to the leaders of the region with no obligation to advance anyone's cause (thus avoiding exploitation by the parties); (b) to reflect on those positions and messages upon his return to New York; (c) to explore the situation further in his contacts with the other capitals (P5 and possibly others); and (d) to decide on whether to seek the endorsement of the Security Council. The appointment of a Special Envoy could also be considered.

Developments 2. In early March, after the Iraqi crisis began to fade, Israel intensified its diplomatic campaign aimed at promoting its offer to withdraw troops from southern Lebanon. Last Sunday, PM Netanyahu outlined his intentions to the Cabinet and, according to Israeli media, his two aides were reported to have traveled to Paris to ask France to transmit the withdrawal proposal to the Lebanese Government. On 5 March, the Prime Minister and Defense Minister Mordechai began separate visits to Europe.

3. Israel has stated its readiness to implement the provisions of SCR 425. However, interpreting the resolution as not requiring an unconditional withdrawal, Israel is prepared to withdraw only within a framework that will ensure the implementation of all elements of the resolution. That includes UNIFIL's goals of "restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area". In its view, such effective authority would have to include arrangements for the protection of all residents of the area.

4. The above position was communicated to the Secretary-General by Ambassador Gold on 27 January (S/1998/75). It leads to three basic conclusions. Firstly, Israel sees SCR 425 in the context of the stated tasks of UNIFIL in order to arrive at its primary goal of securing its northern border. Secondly, the conditional, according to Israel, nature of the resolution implies negotiations on its implementation, specifically on the matter of security guarantees. Lastly, Israel envisages UNIFIL as carrying out its mandate in full. A member of the Israeli mission in New York stated that his Government would welcome the Secretary-General's ideas regarding the implementation of 425 and the role to be played by United Nations/UNIFIL. He mentioned that if the United Nations could guarantee safety and order in the area, Israel would be willing to withdraw. He remarked, however, that currently Israel does not consider UNIFIL's strength and operational organization to be adequate to that task but would be prepared to discuss the issue with the Secretary-General. In preparation for the Secretary-General's visit, Ambassador Peleg, speaking without instructions, said on 4 March that the issue was a very important one for Israel. He was told by Mr. Prendergast that the Secretary-General would be well prepared to discuss it and was also asked to indicate if Israel had anything particular in mind for the Secretary-General's consideration.

5. It should be noted that when DM Mordechai on 4 January declared Israel's readiness to implement of SCR 425 subject to security arrangements, he addressed his offer to Beirut in the first place. Mordechai stressed the Lebanese Government's obligation to maintain peace and order after an Israeli pullout and expressed confidence in the Lebanese army's ability to do so. The manner in which the Israeli views were presented to the Secretary-General on 27 January hardly constitutes a shift in the Israeli position towards a more integrated and profound role to be assumed by the United Nations. Most probably these are not a contradiction but the links of the one chain.

6. Israel's acceptance of SCR 425 is certainly not a gesture of goodwill. It appears that it has been forced to do so by a combination of factors which have been widely discussed in the press. It could have been prompted by rising casualties in southern Lebanon - a record 37 soldiers killed in 1997 - which gave rise to public calls and pressure on the part of peace movements (MP Beilin's for example) for a quick withdrawal. The desire to divert attention from the deadlocked peace negotiations with the Palestinians cannot be excluded either. Israeli diplomatic activity might also be intended to counter charges that Israel, like Iraq, is in violation of Security Council resolutions. An aim of hastening the restart of Israeli-Syrian negotiations could be also included in the list as well as an intention to weaken the Syrian negotiating position on the Golan. Nevertheless, the Israeli acceptance and the activity around it represent a certain step forward towards finding a solution to the situation in South Lebanon.

7. Contrary to Israel, which avoids emphasizing that the primary responsibility of UNIFIL is to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, Beirut bases its position on the resolution's call for Israel to "withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory." It rejects Israeli calls for security arrangements (including dismantling Hizbullah and protection of SLA personnel) as contradicting the unconditional nature of SCR 425. Lebanon and Damascus view Israel as setting conditions on a binding Security Council resolution and seeking negotiations on what is not negotiable.

8. On 2 March, in a interview published in the Arabic daily "Al-Hayat", Lebanese Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz detailed the Lebanese stance. He recalled that the arrangements for the implementation of SCR 425 were already outlined in the subsequent SCR 426 which endorsed the relevant report of the Secretary-General representing a necessary mechanism for implementing the former. Thus, according to para 8 of SCR 426, Lebanon is of the opinion that it is the United Nations task to work out arrangements with Israel and Lebanon as a preliminary measure for implementing SCR 425. Lebanon and Israel are not required to be in contact for that purpose, and it is the United Nations which should confirm the date of Israeli withdrawal and communicate it to Lebanon. Beirut will not agree to negotiate with regard to SCR 425 as this will result in forfeiting its rights embedded in the resolution and open doors for interpretation of SCR 425 and delaying its implementation.

9. Confirming expectations regarding the Secretary-General's visit, Boueiz said that Lebanon would welcome his proposals regarding the implementation of SCR 425 provided that they were in conformity with its substance. If the Secretary-General brings Israeli interpretations of the resolution, he would be referred to the text of resolutions, the letter and spirit of which he has to comply.

10. Syria's official reaction to the Israeli overture was in line with numerous Syrian media reports rebuffing the Israeli approaches as an attempt to separate the Syrian and Lebanese negotiating tracks. Foreign Minister Farouk Shara, while on a "coordinating" visit to Beirut on 4-5 March, remarked that "the Israeli proposals are aimed at putting an end to the Lebanese resistance without implementing the withdrawal and are just a repetition of the 17 May Agreement" (The latter was signed in 1983 under US pressure and amounted to a peace treaty in everything but name. All of Lebanon south of the Awali River was designated as a joint Lebanese-Israeli security zone with a token UNIFIL presence. Its implementation was dependent on the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces. It was abrogated by Lebanon in March 1984). Damascus and Beirut have always pledged to coordinate positions and not to sign a separate agreement with Israel. It is of course in the power of Syria to put the brakes on any progress with regard to SCR 425 under whatever pretext, and/or to link it to the advancement of Israel-Syria talks on the Golan.

11. France may become an important player as, reportedly, it has already been requested by Israel to act as an intermediary. According to Boueiz, France would be prepared, if asked by all the concerned parties, to play a role within an international system in southern Lebanon or separately from it. The United States has yet to pronounce itself with regard to the recent developments.

12. We have, at this stage, no way of knowing how the situation will develop: how sincere Israel is in its intentions to implement SCR 425 and withdraw; whether Lebanon will be cooperative on the matter; and whether Syria will allow any progress. However, it appears that current developments offer a window of opportunity towards restoring peace and security in southern Lebanon. / ] /7 rfr J ' Victor Poliakov /f^^^^-- John Rennifltfer/Officer-in-Charge 6March 1998 " £s AsiaandJ&ePacific Division/DPA At its 2073rd meeting, on 18 March 1978, the Resolution 426 (1978) Council decided to invite the representative of the of 19 March 1978 Sudan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question. The Security Counc 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolu- tion 425 (1978), contained in document S/12611 of 19 March 1978;23 At its 2074th meeting, on 19 March 1978, the 2. Decides that the United Nations Interim Force Council decided to invite the representatives of Iraq, in Lebanon shall be established in accordance with Mongolia, Pakistan and Qatar to participate, without the above-mentioned report for an initial period of six vote, in the discussion of the question. months, and that it shall continue in operation there- after, if required, provided the Security Council so decides. Adopted at the 2075th meet- ing by 12 votes to none, with 2 abstentions Czecho- Resolution 425 (1978) slovakia. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).'* of 19 March 1978 The Security Council, Taking nott Uf Ull! Utters from the Permanent Decision Representative of Lebanon10 and from the Permanent At its 2076th meeting, on 3 May 1978, the Council Representative of Israel,*0 proceeded with the discussion of the item entitled "The Having heard the statements of the Permanent situation in the Middle East: letter dated 1 May 1978 21 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, Security Council (S/12675)".25 Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situa- tion in the Middle East and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace, Convinced that the present situation impedes the Resolution 427 (1978) achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, of 3 Mar 1978 1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, The Security Council, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; Having considered the letter dated 1 May 1978 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its mili- Council,58 tary action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese ter- Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) ritory; of 19 March 1978, 1. Approves the increase in the strength of the 3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Gov- United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon requested ernment of Lebanon, to establish immediately under by the Secretary-General from 4,000 to approximately its authority a United Nations interim force for South- 6,000 troops; em Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the with- 2. Takes note of the withdrawal of Israeli forces drawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace that has taken place so far; and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the 3. Calls upon Israel to complete its withdrawal area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from all Lebanese territory without any further delay; from Member States; 4. Deplores the attacks on the United Nations Force that have occurred and demands full respect 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the for the United Nations Force from all parties in Council within twenty-four hours on the implementa- Lebanon. tion of the present resolution. Adopted at the 2076tlfmeet- ing by 12 votes to none, Adopted at the 2074th meet- with 2 abstentions (Czecho- ing by 12 votes to none, slovakia, Union of Soviet with 2 abstentions (Czecho- Socialist Republics).*'' slovakia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).** 23 See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978. 3* One member (China) did not participate in the voting. 19 Ibid., documents S/12600 and S/12606. » See Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third *> Ibid., document S/I2607. Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1978. =» Ibid., Thirty-third Year, 2071* meeting. z« Ibid., document S/12675. 23 One member (China) did not participate in the voting. zr One member (China) did not participate in the voting. quc circuiatea as a document 01 me ucncrai Assembly and of the Security Council. action by the international community. (Signed) B. J. FERNANDO The invasion complicates immeasurably and retards progress towards the solution of the Middle East problem as a whole Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka and will have severe repercussions on all efforts to achieve to the United Nations a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East question. The ANNEX Co-ordinating Bureau reaffirmed that a solution of the Middle East question was possible only by a recognition of the inalien- Communique issued on 17 March 1978 by the able rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to Co-ordinaling Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries self-determination and an independent sovereign State of their own in Palestine, the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab ter- The Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries met ritories occupied by it since June 1967 and the strict imple- k emergency session on 17 March 1978 to consider the Israeli mentation of relevant United Nations resolutions.. Invasion of Lebanon by land, sea and air, which commenced jt midnight on 14/15 March 1978. The Co-ordinating Bureau expressed its solidarity with the The Co-ordinating Bureau unanimously condemned this lat- Lebanese people and fully supported the complaint made by est act of blatant aggression by Israel against the sovereignty Lebanon to the St.aiity Council regarding the invasion of jad territorial integrity of Lebanon, as well as its expansionist its territory by Israel. The Bureau further expressed its full policy. The aggression has caused a considerable number of support for all efforts by Lebanon to secure the immediate deaths in Lebanese territorial and enormous damage to prop- and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli invader and to re-establish its sovereignty and conditions of peace and stability erty, as well as large-scale refugee migrations from the south- yn Lebanon region. in southern Lebanon and in the country as a whole. The Co-ordinating Bureau considers that the latest brutal The Co-ordinating Bureau reiterated its unequivocal support armed Israeli attack also aims at bringing into jeopardy the for and solidarity with the Palestinian people, under the very existence of the Palestinian people who live in the ter- leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, at this ritory of Lebanon and at eliminating the Palestinians and the critical period in their just struggle. Palestine Liberation Organization as one of the key factors in The Co-ordinating Bureau calls upon all non-aligned coun- the settlement of the question of Palestine and the conflict tries to condemn this new aggression of Israel and to demon- in the Middle East. strate their active solidarity with the Arab peoples confronting The position that has arisen further aggravates the explosive the aggression, in particular with the Lebanese people and situation in the region and constitutes an immediate and direct the Palestinian people.

DOCUMENT S/12611

Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978)

[Original: English] [19 March 1978]

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance (UNTSO), who will continue to function on the of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) of 19 Armistice Demarcation Line after the termination of March 1978 in which the Council, among other things, the mandate of UNIFIL. decided to set up a United Nations force in Lebanon General considerations under its authority and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it on the implementation of the 3. Three essential conditions must be met for the resolution. Force to be effective. First, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Terms of reference Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation 2. The terms of reference of the United Nations of all the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are: to function as an integrated and efficient military unit. (a) The Force will determine compliance with 4. Although the general context of UNIFIL is not Paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 425 (1978); comparable with that of the United Nations Emergency (by The Force will confirm the withdrawal of Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Disengage- Israeli forces, restore international peace and security ment Observer Force (UNDOF), the guidelines for and assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the those operations, having proved satisfactory, are renirn of its effective authority in the area; deemed suitable for practical application to the new c Force. These guidelines are, mutatis mutandis, as . ( ) The Force will establish and maintain itself follows: ^ an area of operation to be defined in the light of sut>Paragraph b above; (a) The Force will be under the command of j, W) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, e under the authority of the Security Council. The recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area J operation will not be utilized for hostile activities command in the field will be exercised by a Force of any kind; Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander . (e) In the fulfilment of this task, the Force will will be responsible to the Secretary-General. The the T*C co~°P^rat'on °f tne Military Observers of Secretary-General will keep the Security Council fully United Nations Truce Supervision Organization informed of developments relating to the functioning 61 of the Force. All matters which may affect the nature Israel and Lebanon as a preliminary measure for the or the continued effective functioning of the Force implementation of the Security Council resolution. It;s will be referred to the Council for its decision. assumed that both parties will give their full co-opera, (b) The Force must enjoy the freedom of move- tion to UNIFIL in this regard. ment and communication and other facilities that are Proposed plan of action necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force 9. If the Security Council is in agreement wiflj and its personnel should be granted all relevant privi- the principles and conditions outlined above, I intentij leges and immunities provided for by the Convention to take the following steps: on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. (a) I shall instruct Licutenant-Gencral Ensio Stf, (c) The Force will be composed of a number of lasvuo, Chief Co-ordinator of the United Nations contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, to contact the request • : .ne Secretary-General. The contingents immediately the Governments of Israel and Lebanon will be selected in consultation with the Security and initiate meetings with their representatives for the Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in purpose of reaching agreement on the modalities of mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the establishment representation. of a United Nations area of operation. This should not (d) The Force will be provided with weapons of delay in any way the establishment of the Force. a defensive character. It will not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to (b) Pending the appointment of a Force Com- attempts by forceful means to prevent it from dis- mander, I propose to appoint Major-General E. A charging its duties under the mandate of the Security Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Interim Com- Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption mander. Pending the arrival of the first contingents of that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary the Force, he will perform his tasks with the assistance steps for compliance with the decisions of the Council. of a selected number of UNTSO military observers. At the same time, urgent measures will be taken to Letter (e) In performing its functions, the Force will act secure and arrange for the early arrival in the area Inai: with complete impartiality. of contingents of the Force. (/) The supporting personnel of the Force will (c) In order that the Force may fulfil its respon- be provided as a rule by the Secretary-General from sibilities, it is considered, as a preliminary estimate, among existing United Nations staff. Those personnel that it must have at least five battalions each of about will, of course, follow the rules and regulations of 600 all ranks, in addition to the necessary logistics The trag the United Nations Secretariat. units. This means a total strength of the order of 4,000. lation of I 5. UNIFIL, like any other United Nations peace- cause of p: keeping operation, cannot and truist not take on respon- (d) Bearing in mind the principles set out in mittee on sibilities which fall under the Government of the paragraph 4 c above, I am making preliminary inquiries the Palest! country in which it is operating. These responsibilities as to the availability of contingents from suitable to preside. countries. must be exercised by the competent Lebanese author- Accord'.: ities. It is assumed that the Lebanese Government will (<•) In view of the difficulty in obtaining logistics the memK take the necessary measures to co-operate with UNIFIL contingents and of the necessity for economy, it would selves will- in this regard. It should be recalled that UNIFIL will be my intention to examine the possibility of building Israel shi'. have to operate in an area which is quite densely on the existing logistics arrangements. If this should against the inhabited. not prove possible, it will be necessary to seek other draw its 6. I envisage the responsibility of UNIFIL as a suitable arrangements. territory'. two-stage operation. In the first stage, the Force will (/) It is proposed also that an appropriate number • In the confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese of observers of UNTSO should be assigned to assist • invasion i- territory to the international border. Once this is UNIFIL in the fulfilment of its task in the same way ment of ' achieved, it will establish and' maintain an area of as for UNEF. to have a operation as defined. In this connexion, it will super- being ma. vise the cessation of hostilities, ensure the peaceful (g) It is suggested that the Force would initially of which character of the area of operation, control movement be stationed in the area for a period of six months. element. . and take all measures deemed necessary to assure the Estimated cost and method of financing more th:i effective restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. achie\ed 7. The Force is being established on the assump- 10. At the present time there are many unknown the inalic- tion that it represents an interim measure until the factors. The best possible preliminary estimate based the Pales- upon current experience and rates with respect to Government of Lebanon assumes its full responsibilities At til.' in Southern Lebanon. The termination of the mandate other peace-keeping forces of comparable size is ap- proximately S68 million for a Force of 4,000 all ranks in that I< of UNIFIL by the Security Council will not affect the themseh c- continued functioning of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed for a period of six months. This figure is made up of initial setting-up costs (excluding the cost of initial tinians. v. Armistice Commission, as set out in the appropriate driven fr Security Council decision {see S/10611 of 19 April airlift) of $29 million and ongoing costs for the six- month period of $39 million. vented ;': 1972}. which v. 8. With a view to facilitating the task of UNIFIL, 11. The costs of the Force shall be considered as live in p*. particularly as it concerns procedures for the expedi- expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Mem- As \C'-. tious withdrawal of Israeli forces and related matters, bers in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of of the I- it may be necessary to work out arrangements with the Charter. has drav. tions for 62 UNITED NATIONS

uJQi | r Security Council ' " Distr. GENERAL

S/1998/75 27 January 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JANUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I wish to refer to the letter dated 6 January 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General (S/1998/7), requesting the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months.

As on previous occasions, most recently in our letter to you dated 30 July 1997 (S/1997/603), I am obliged to respond to a number of incorrect or misleading points made in the Lebanese letter.

These misconceptions arise from the failure to recognize the simple fact that the fundamental cause of the volatile situation in South Lebanon is the heinous terrorist activity carried out by Hizbollah and other terrorist organizations, both Lebanese and Palestinian, acting under its umbrella. Not only is the Government of Lebanon unable or unwilling to prevent the use of Lebanese territory as a base for aggression against Israel, but, in clear violation of international law and the charter of the United Nations, it supports and encourages such activity, together with other States well known for their support of international terrorism.

In these circumstances, Israel has no choice whatsoever but to exercise its right of self-defence in order to protect the lives of the civilian population in its northern towns and villages. Israel has repeatedly explained that it has no territorial claims or ambitions in South Lebanon and that, were the Government of Lebanon to comply with its obligation to dismantle terrorist infrastructure and to prevent attacks on Israel, there would be no reason for ah Israeli presence in this area.

In this context, I would like to clarify Israel's position with regard to Security Council resolution 425 (1978). As clearly stated by Israel's Minister of Defence in a recent interview for the magazine Al-Watan Al-Arabi. Israel is ready to implement the provisions of the resolution. However, resolution 425 (1978) does not call for an unconditional withdrawal; Israel is prepared to implement the withdrawal envisaged in the resolution, but only within a S/1998/75 English Page 2

\ framework that will ensure the implementation of all elements of the resolution, including implementation of UNIFIL's expressly stated goals of the "restoring of international peace and security" and "assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area". Such effective authority would obviously have to include, inter alia, arrangements for the protection of all residents of the area.

Once again I avail myself of this opportunity to call upon the Government of Lebanon to return to the negotiating table and engage in dialogue to achieve a treaty of peace within the framework of the Middle East peace process, which would ensure peace and security for both sides. Were the Government of Lebanon to expend the energy that it currently devotes to distributing misinformation, instead of to combating the terrorist activities within its territory and engaging in face-to-face negotiations, the prospects for peace along our border would be greatly increased.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Dore GOLD Permanent Representative BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEBANON. FEBRUARY 1998

Historical background

Lebanon's history reaches back to the Phoenicians, whose maritime culture flourished between 2700-450 B.C., and to antiquity. During the Middle Ages, Lebanon's mountains were a refuge to minority communities creating an extremely heterogeneous society in terms of religion and culture. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the territory of present-day Lebanon was mandated to France by the League of Nations. The country gained independence in 1943, and the last French troops were withdrawn in 1946.

From 1943 to 1990, Lebanese politics were governed by an unwritten agreement, the so-called National Pact. The agreement, reached in 1943, was a formula for Christian-Muslim coexistence. It divided major posts in government between the different religious communities based on their share of the population as recorded in 1932. Representation in parliament and the civil service was shared among the groups in a general ratio of 6:5 in favour of the Christians, hi return, the Christians agreed to play down their special relationship with France and the West, and the Muslims formally dropped their demand for union with Syria.

hi the mid-1950s, Lebanon, under President Chamoun, positioned itself in the US camp against Egypt's president Abd al-Nasser and the Soviet bloc. It accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. This antagonized Mr. Chamoun's political opponents as well as a large proportion of the Muslim population, which was broadly sympathetic to Nasser and his Pan-Arab ideas. Li March 1958, tensions escalated and fighting broke out between pro- and anti-government factions, hi July that year, in response to an appeal by the Lebanese Government, US forces were sent to Lebanon. They were withdrawn in October, after the inauguration of President Shihab, who was supported by all sides of the conflict. Under President Shihab, Lebanon underwent a number of administrative and political reforms and Lebanon experienced stability and rapid economic growth throughout the 1960s.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon became increasingly radicalized and militarized. Frequent clashes involving Israeli forces and the fedayeen endangered civilians in south Lebanon and unsettled the country. After King Hussein defeated the armed Palestinian groups in Jordan in 1970, thousands of Palestinian fighters crossed through Syria into Lebanon. Lebanese government attempts to curb or control Palestinian military activities failed.

Coupled with the Palestinian problem, Muslim and Christian differences grew throughout the 1960s, with occasional clashes between sectarian militias. The Muslims were dissatisfied with what they considered an inequitable distribution of political power and social benefits. Lebanon's foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict also provoked domestic disagreement. Muslim opposition groups moved closer to militant Palestinian organizations, whose growing power made Christians fearful. In April 1975, shots were fired at a church and, later, a busload of Palestinians was ambushed by gunmen in the Christian sector of Beirut. These accidents sparked the devastating 15-years civil war. The Palestinian groups joined the predominantly leftist Muslim side as the fighting persisted, eventually spreading to most parts of the country and drawing Lebanese of all religious persuasions and factions into the intercommunal strife. Although the main contradiction broke out between Muslims and Maronite Christians, splits and fighting often occurred within communities because of the political discord over domestic and regional issues and the rivalry between leaders.

In 1975-76, the Muslim-Palestinian alliance gained the upper hand and advanced on Christian areas. This situation was halted when Syria intervened in June 1976 at the request of President Franjiah, officially to restore peace but unofficially to counter the leftist advance. Thousands of Syrian troops entered Lebanon and have stayed in the country ever since. However, relations between the Christians and Syria soon deteriorated and the Maronites began to pursue an alliance with Israel. In October 1976, Arab summits in Riyadh and Cairo set forth a plan to end the war. The resulting Arab Deterrent Force, composed largely of Syrian troops, moved in at the Lebanese government's invitation to separate the combatants.

After a series of Palestinian guerrilla attacks on Galilee, Israel staged its first major incursion into Lebanon in March 1978 when it occupied most of the area south of the Litani river. The UN Security Council passed resolution 425 calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and creating a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). When the Israelis withdrew, they turned over positions inside Lebanon along the border to then- Lebanese ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), and formed a "security zone" which exists to this day under the effective control of Israel and the SLA.

A string of accidents, including PLO shelling of northern Israel, culminated in the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 1982 with the aim of driving the PLO and Syria out of the country. Israeli forces moved quickly through Lebanon and encircled West Beirut by mid-June, beginning its three-month siege. Maronites did not take part in the fighting though they shared Israel's political aims. In August an agreement was reached through American mediation that provided for the evacuation of PLO fighters (to Tunis and Yemen) and Syrian troops from Beirut and the deployment of a three-nation Multinational Force (US, France, Italy and later Britain). When the evacuation ended by late August these units departed (they returned in late September). Israeli forces stayed, though. On 16 September, Phalangist militiamen, with Israeli knowledge, entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila and massacred their inhabitants. A sustained guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation forced a withdrawal, completed in June 1985. Again, however, the Israelis refused to relinquish the border zone, which was handed over to the SLA. While retreating, Israel engaged in fierce clashes with the Shia Resistance Movement. In fact, in Hezbollah it created an enemy across its northern border which was more firmly entrenched and, potentially, more dangerous than the PLO.

In a major blow to the Government, the Lebanese army virtually collapsed in February 1984 following the defection of many of its Muslim and Druze units to opposition militias. In May 1985 and twice in 1986 the savage "war of camps" flared up pitting the Palestinians living in refugee camps in Beirut, Tyre, and Sidon against the Shia Amal militia which was concerned with resurgent Palestinian strength in Lebanon. With the consent of the Prime Minister, Amal and Druze leaders, Syrian army units reentered Beirut in July 1986 (more troops were deployed in February 1987). In May 1987 the National Assembly voted to abrogate the agreement, signed by Lebanon and Yasser Arafat in Cairo in 1969, which defined and regulated the PLO's activities and legitimized its presence in Lebanon. In July 1987, Bourj al-Barajneh, Arafat's last stronghold in Beirut was captured by the forces of PLO dissident and Syria proxy Abu Musa. Arafat loyalist were evacuated to the Ain-Hilweh camp, outside Sidon.

When President Gemayel's term ended in 1988, parliament was unable to elect a successor. Mr. Gemayel named the army chief, General Michel Aoun, to head an interim government until presidential elections could be held. His appointment met with Syrian and Muslim opposition, however; at the same tune, therefore, the Acting Prime Minister under Gemayel's presidency continued to act as de facto prime minister also. Lebanon was plunged into constitutional crisis, with two governments claiming legitimacy. General Aoun led two military campaigns, first in 1989 to expel Syrian forces from Lebanon and then in 1990 against the rival Christian Lebanese Forces (LF). Both attempts were accompanied by renewed fierce fighting between Christian and Muslim forces, causing heavy casualties, hi October 1990, General Aoun was defeated by Syrian troops and took refuge in the French Embassy. He has been living in exile in France since August 1991.

Negotiations between warring groups and with Syria were pursued between 1983 and 1987 to reach agreement on internal political reform and Lebanese-Syrian relations, hi 1989 the League of Arab States became actively involved in attempts to reach a cease-fire and find a solution to the Lebanese crisis. The Tripartite Arab Committee drafted a charter of national reconciliation which was presented, modified and approved at a meeting of the Lebanese parliament in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in October 1989. This document (the Taif agreement), in whose formulation Syria played a central role, paved the way for an end to the civil war. A new president, Elias Hrawi, was elected in November 1989 and the reforms agreed at Taif were passed into law in September 1990. In 1991 and 1992 considerable advancement in efforts to reassert state control over Lebanese territory were made. Militias - with the important exception of Hizbullah- were dissolved in May 1991 and partially integrated into the armed forces. Government troops moved against armed Palestinian elements in Sidon in July 1991. In May 1992 the last of the western hostages taken during the mid-1980s by Islamic extremists was released.

In October 1992 the Lebanese-Saudi billionaire, Rafiq al-Hariri, was chosen Prime Minister to head a cabinet whose main objective would be to lead the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The Hariri cabinet is still in place and, despite repeated signs of division and difficulties, it is widely regarded as the most competent of the three governments since the end of the civil war.

In June 1993 Israel launched a massive air and land artillery barrage on south Lebanon following attacks by Hizbullah guerrillas on Israeli soldiers in the occupied southern zone of the country and on northern Israel. Nearly 200 Lebanese civilians were killed. After that, the two sides agree not to target each other's civilians. In April 1996 Israel launched another massive air and artillery attack on south Lebanon. It extended attacks north to Beirut and hit electricity transmission stations there. The onslaught resulted in 142 dead and 330 wounded. Of that number, 116 Lebanese civilians were killed when Israeli shells hit the headquarters of UNIFIL Fijian battalion at Qana.

Israel's 17-day offensive ended with a cease-fire understanding brokered by the US and France. The understanding, announced on 26 April 1996, stipulated that Hizbullah would not carry out rocket attacks into Israel, while the latter, along with those cooperating with it, would not fire at civilian targets in Lebanon. Both sides also agreed that civilian areas would not be used as launching grounds for attacks. They also agreed that without violating the understanding, nothing should preclude any party from exercising the right of self-defence. The understanding provided for the establishment of a Monitoring group consisting of the US, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel, to monitor its application. The Group meets to consider the sides' complaints of violations. A consultative group was also organized by the US to assist Lebanon in the reconstruction of the country. It held a meeting in December 1996.

Victor Poliakov 30 January 1998 Ofefrn-Charge Asia and the Pacific Division/DPA BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE VISIT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO LEBANON. FEBRUARY 1998

United Nations and Lebanon

Political: Lebanon is a founding member of the UN. The last visit of the Secretary-General to Lebanon was in June 1984. On 16 August 1989, the Secretary-General summoned an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss means of achieving a cease-fire in Lebanon. Such a meeting, convened in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter, had been invoked on only two occasions previously. UNIFIL has been stationed in southern Lebanon since 1978.

The Security Council adopted resolution 1052 (1996) with regard to the fighting in southern Lebanon in April 1996. President Hrawi thanked the Secretary-General for his "firm stand" demonstrated during the April 1996 crisis and praised his decision to publish Major General van Kappen's report as an official document of the Security Council.

UNIFIL: see separate note by DPKO included with Talking Points.

ESCWA: In July 1994, ECOSOC recommended the relocation of the permanent headquarters of ESCWA from Amman to Lebanon. The decision was endorsed by the General Assembly in December 1994, and ESCWA moved to Beirut in October 1997. The Lebanese Government has repaired and remodeled the building which, in addition to ESCWA, will host offices of UN agencies in the country. The main outstanding issue is for national offices of UN organizations in Lebanon to secure rent-free conditions similar to those granted to ESCWA by the Lebanese Government. Lebanon aspires to become a regional centre for UN activities and in that connection is encouraging the UNICEF and UNEP regional offices to repatriate.

Economic assistance: Until 1995, UN assistance to Lebanon had been directed through the programme for United Nations Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon (UNARDOL). The General Assembly instituted UNARDOL in 1978, though it was only in 1992 that it was possible to establish a physical presence in the country. In March 1995, UNARDOL, which essentially accorded preferential treatment to Lebanon during the civil war and the period immediately after it, was discontinued. Its functions have been assumed by the UN Resident Coordinator who is at the same time UNDP Resident Representative (Mr. Ross Mountain, New Zealand). He provides support for and general guidance to UN activities in the country.

Since 1992 UN agencies have been returning gradually to Beirut, thereby contributing to meeting the aspirations of Lebanon to regain its position as an important centre for regional and international activities. At present, there are 10 national offices of UN organizations (UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNIC/UNIS, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNRWA, FAO, UNIDO and WHO), and four regional offices (ESCWA, ILO, UNESCO/Education Bureau for Arab States - UNEDBAS, and IAEA). There are two military missions in South Lebanon with liaison offices in Beirut, namely UNIFIL and UNLOB/UNTSO. Total staff strength of the UN organizations is more than 8,000 (UNIFIL 5,000, UNRWA 2,500, ESCWA 300, UNDP 170). A dozen other UN organizations are active, without maintaining physical presence. At the end of 1996, WFP and UNDCP closed down their offices in Lebanon upon completion of their mission. UNDCP currently operates from a regional base in Cairo.

UN system assistance amounted to US$ 16 to 18 million annually in the 1994-1996 period, which represented 5-7% of external assistance. Key programme areas are social reconstruction, public administration reform, management of the environment, economic management and coordination support. The total amount of resources controlled by the UN system annually - including substantial cost-sharing from government, and third parties - is about US$25 million.

All UN assistance was on a grant basis in 1996 (with the exception of US$1 million loan from IF AD). 58% of assistance was for technical cooperation, 22% emergency relief, and 20% investment project assistance. In addition, the World Bank provides loans on commercial terms. UN support targets areas of strategic importance, in particular human development and stability. Disbursements of the past year originated from more than two dozen organizations. UNDP, World Bank (grants), UNICEF, WHO and WFP accounted for 75% of total UN system disbursements.

Emergency assistance: At the time of Israel's April 1996 military operation, the UN launched an Appeal for Displaced Persons. The response to it exceeded expectations. Whereas the Appeal sought to mobilize US$8.6 million to cover the humanitarian needs of 20,000 families, US$16 million was contributed in cash and in kind by nearly forty countries and two dozen international organizations. Throughout the crisis, the office of the UN Resident Coordinator provided management support, procured relief items and monitored their distribution, (particularly in the UNIFIL zone with the latter's assistance), and received and distributed relief supplies on behalf of government institutions.

General Assembly resolution 50/22 C: Following Israel's sustained attacks against Lebanon in April 1996, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which, inter alia: considered that Lebanon was entitled to compensation from Israel; asked the Secretary- General to dispatch a special technical mission to the area to prepare, in cooperation with UNIFIL, a report on human losses and damage; and requested the Secretary-General (without specifying a time frame) to prepare a progress report. The UN mission, led by ESCWA Executive Secretary Hazem El-Bablawi, visited Lebanon on 27 May-6 June 1996. The report was prepared but was not submitted to the General Assembly. Lebanese prisoners: About 200 Lebanese are detained, mostly without trial or charge and often for several years, in the Khiam prison in southern Lebanon. In 1994-95, the Lebanese requested the Secretary-General several times to intervene to obtain the prisoners' release. Following his instructions, DPA attempted to achieve progress on the issue. The Lebanese and Israeli Missions, the ICRC, and the Centre for Human Rights were contacted. The Israelis were approached by Mr. Goulding, three Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. All parties who requested Israel to facilitate the release of these prisoners have consistently received the same answer: that it is not Israel but the SLA which was in charge of the detention camp, and all inquiries should be addressed to it. Nevertheless, the efforts bore some fruit: in 1995 the prisoners in Khiam were granted family visits, the ICRC was allowed access to them and 75 people were freed in seven groups. Since the fall of 1995 the issue remained more or less dormant until 30 June 1997 when the Secretary-General received a letter from Foreign Minister Bouez with the same request. Mr. Sevan has been pursuing related questions on a highly confidential basis for some time.

Palestinian refugees and UNRWA: The Lebanese Government was disturbed by the critical financial situation of UNRWA, which had been forced to announce a series of emergency measures including a review of school charges and a freeze in hospital reimbursements. The announcement led to near-riots and a hunger strike outside UNRWA's office in Beirut. After obtaining over $19 million in new pledges from donor countries, UNRWA has revoked the mentioned cuts but still the situation facing it remains critical. In an attempt to raise funds, mostly for health facilities and services, UNRWA launched a $11 million emergency appeal in July 1997, towards which donors have already pledged $9.3 million.

Role of Lebanon in the United Nations: Lebanon held the Presidency of the General Assembly at its 13th regular session (1958; Mr. Charles Malik); its Vice-Presidency at its 23rd, 29th, 38th, 45th and 50th sessions (Ambassador Moubarak); served as the Chairman of the First Committee during the 13th session and of the Third Committee during the 28th session; and served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for 1953-1954. It is now serving on ECOSOC for the fourth time (1996-98). There are 17 Lebanese staff members in posts subject to geographical distribution in the UN Secretariat (desirable range 2-14). The highest-ranking UN staff member is Assistant Secretary-General Samir Sanbar, head of DPI,. Lebanonjmid its 1997 dues for the regular budget in full.

Victor Poliakov 30 January 1998 OfficTSf^eharge Asia and the Pacific Division/DPA MULTILATERAL TALKS The multilateral talks were set up in 1991 as a part of the peace process. They were intended to complement the bilateral Arab-Israel negotiations with a forum where the wider issues of regional importance could be addressed, to promote regional cooperation, and to involve in it Israel, the Arab countries and others with ties to the region.

The multilateral track consists of five working groups: arms control and regional security; water; the environment; economic development and refugees. It brings together the US and Russia, most Arab countries, the EU members, Canada, China, Japan and India. Lebanon and Syria have refused to take part in the multilaterals. The United Nations has been participating in them as a "full extra-regional participant" since 1992. UN Under-Secretary Gharekhan was appointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to the Multilateral Peace Talks in January 1993. A measure of progress was achieved in these negotiations between 1992 and 1996. Since the election of PM Netanyahu, the multilateral talks have been dormant. The Arab countries, led by Egypt, refuse to restart the negotiations as long as the peace process remains deadlocked.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA ECONOMIC CONFERENCES These conferences (MENA) also grew out of the peace process and are designed to advance the twin goals of peace and economic development and to create a framework for regional cooperation. The MENA Summit in Casablanca (October-November 1994) for the first time brought together Arab and Israeli political leaders and businessmen. (The Israeli delegation included the Prime Minister and eight cabinet ministers). Delegations from 50 countries attended, many headed by foreign or trade ministers. The Summit in Amman (October 1995) discussed 200 regional projects, including linking electricity networks, building roads and resorts. Sixty-three countries participated. The Summit announced the establishment of the Middle East Development Bank - championed by the US, Israel, and Jordan. In August 1996, the US and Russia deposited an agreement on the Bank with the UN Secretary-General.

With the election of Netanyahu, the prospects for success of MENA meetings diminished as the Arab countries insisted on the need for Israel to honour the signed agreements. Downgraded by Egypt from the 'summit' status, the C_a_irQ_Conference (November 1996) was characterized by the emphasis on inter-Arab integration. The Cairo gathering was an economic meeting rather than a political event like the previous forums. 76 trade and business delegations participated. Arab dismay over Israel's policies was manifest in connection with the fourth, Doha Conference (November 1997). Despite strong US pressure, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority led a boycott. Among Arab countries, only Comoros, Oman, Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Somalia, Tunisia and Yemen attended, with most represented at a low level. For the first time since the MENA's inception, the organizers failed to announce the venue for the next gathering. Palestinian National Charter: In April 1996, the PNC canceled the provisions of the Palestinian National Charter (drafted in 1968) "that are contrary to the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 10 September 1993" (mutual recognition), thus formally amending clauses calling for the destruction of Israel. The cancellation, accepted by PM Peres, was rejected by PM Netanyahu on the grounds that the PNC had not specified exactly which of the Covenant's 33 articles were annulled. Apparently seeking to meet PM Netanyahu's vocal criticism regarding the Charter, in Washington Chairman Arafat presented to President Clinton a document which specifically identified by number all the 12 articles annulled by the PNC and another 16 which were "partially annulled." In the letter he emphasized the PLO's recognition of Israel's right to live in peace and security. He undertook to convene a special session of the PLO's Executive Committee to make the cancellation official PLO policy. The US welcomed the clarification. However, PM Netanyahu again argued that the only Palestinian body empowered to amend the Charter is the PNC, which Arafat has said he will not call into session on the grounds that it annulled the articles in question in 1996.

Security Memorandum: In December 1997, after prolonged talks, Palestinian and Israeli security officials, together with the CIA, worked out a Memorandum of Understanding on security cooperation arrangements. PM Netanyahu refused to sign the document as it included references to an Israeli obligation to crack down on Jewish extremists. BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH H. E. ELIAS HRAWI, PRESIDENT OF LEBANON

Reconstruction: During an initial phase of reconstruction (1993-1995), the Government, mainly through the mobilization of internal resources, achieved visible progress in rebuilding the infrastructure and Beirut's centre. However, economic growth decelerated in recent years and social tension has been rising. The government has attempted to make improvement of living conditions and human development a priority. In January, DPA was approached by the Lebanese Mission which, citing instructions, requested the UN to take an active public position in highlighting Lebanon's recovery achievements as an example in peace- building. This, in their opinion, would favourably project Lebanon and help to attract investments.

ESCWA: ESCWA moved to Beirut in October 1997. The Lebanese Government has repaired and remodeled the building which, in addition to ESCWA, will host national offices of UN agencies in Lebanon. The main outstanding issue is for those offices to secure rent-free conditions similar to those which have been granted to ESCWA by the Lebanese Government. Lebanon aspires to become a regional centre for UN activities and, in that connection, encourages UN regional offices to repatriate.

UN Assistance: UN assistance ranged from US$16-18 million annually in 1994-1996, which represented 5-7% of external assistance. Key programmes are social reconstruction, public administration reform and environmental management. There are 10 national and 4 regional UN offices in Lebanon, as well as UNIFIL. Total staff strength, excluding UNIFIL, is more than 3,000. Because of the economy's slowdown, the Government has repeated requests that the UN system make available funds from its core or extra-budgetary resources and provide increased support to, or undertake new initiatives for resource mobilization by the national authorities.

UNRWA: There are 362,000 registered refugees who live in 12 camps. They are denied Lebanese citizenship and face extreme social and economic conditions. Lebanese public and media attention is frequently focused on UNRWA's perceived inability to meet the refugees' basic needs. In an attempt to raise additional funds, UNRWA launched a $11 million emergency appeal in July 1997, towards which donors have already pledged $9.3 million.

Victor Poliakov ^ John Renminger/Officer-in-Charge 30 Januaryl998 Asia land/the Pacific Division/DPA BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RAFIK HARIRI OF LEBANON 4 ESCWA: ESCWA moved to Beirut in October 1997. The Lebanese Government has repaired and remodeled the building which, in addition to ESCWA, will host national offices of UN agencies in Lebanon. The main outstanding issue is for those offices to secure rent-free conditions similar to those which have been granted to ESCWA by the Lebanese Government. Lebanon aspires to become a regional centre for UN activities and, in that connection, encourages UN regional offices to repatriate.

i Reconstruction: During an initial phase of reconstruction (1993-1995), the Government, mainly through the mobilization of internal resources, achieved visible progress in rebuilding the infrastructure and Beirut's centre. However, economic growth decelerated in recent years and social tension has been rising. The government has attempted to make improvement of living conditions and human development a priority. In January, DPA was approached by the Lebanese Mission which, citing instructions, requested the UN to take an active public position in highlighting Lebanon's recovery achievements as an example in peace- building. This, in their opinion, would favourably project Lebanon and help to attract investments. 4 UN Assistance: UN assistance ranged from US$16-18 million annually in 1994-1996, which represented 5-7% of external assistance. Key programmes are social reconstruction, public administration reform and environmental management. There are 10 national and 4 regional UN offices in Lebanon, as well asUNIFIL. Total staff strength, excluding UNIFIL, is more than 3,000. Because of the economy's slowdown, the Government has repeated requests that the UN system make available funds from its core or extra-budgetary resources and provide increased support to, or undertake new initiatives for resource mobilization by the national authorities.

^ International Conferences: In November 1997 Prime Minister Hariri decided (on the basis of a proposal by the Foreign Minister) to create an interministerial committee for monitoring the follow-up to global conferences as well as sustainable development The Committee will be presided over by the Secretary- General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is expected to become operational in the first quarter of 1998. The UN Resident Coordinator has offered UN system support for the Committee. 4 UNRWA: There are 362,000 registered refugees who live in 12 camps. They are denied Lebanese citizenship and face extreme social and economic conditions. Lebanese public and media attention is frequently focused on UNRWA's perceived inability to meet the refugees' basic needs. In an attempt to raise additional funds, UNRWA launched a $11 million emergency appeal in July 1997, towards which donors have already pledged $9.3 million. Victor Poliakov \.f) 1^1. John RerinirJger/0riIcer-in-Charge 30 Januaryl998 n'e^cfflty-^ AsiaanklthePacific Division/DPA BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH MR. FARIS BOUEIZ, FOREIGN MINISTER OF LEBANON

Peace process: Lebanon insists on the full and unconditional implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and is willing to discuss security arrangements only after Israel undertakes to withdraw. Lebanon closely coordinates its position with Syria. Both contend that neither will sign a peace agreement with Israel separately from the other.

International Conferences: In November 1997 Prime Minister Hariri decided (on the basis of a proposal by the Foreign Minister) to create an interministerial committee for monitoring the follow-up to global conferences as well as sustainable development The Committee will be presided over by the Secretary- General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It is expected to become operational in the first quarter of 1998. The UN Resident Coordinator has offered UN system support for the Committee.

Lebanese prisoners: About 200 Lebanese are detained, mostly without trial or charge and often for several years, in the Khiam prison in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese have on several occasions (most recently in July 1997) requested the Secretary-General to intervene to obtain the prisoners' release. DPA attempted to achieve progress on the issue in 1994-95. hi 1997, DPA was told that Mr. Sevan had been pursuing related questions on a highly confidential basis. Israel stopped ICRC access to the prisoners in September 1997.

Victor Poliakov John Reiming< x/Officer-in-Charge 30 Januaryl998 Asia and meJPacmc Division/DPA [/ BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH MR. NABIH BERRI, SPEAKER OF THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT

Southern Lebanon: While hostilities have continued, IDF and Hizbullah have generally respected the 26 April 1996 Understanding, which bans firing into populated areas or launching attacks from there. But there has been some slippage; civilian casualties rose (34 dead July-December 1997; 9 dead January-July 1997; no dead July-December 1996) and Hizbullah operated more often near villages and UNIFEL positions. The Monitoring Group (US, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel) now usually records the facts and the positions of each side. It is at present the only point of direct contact between Israel and Syria and attempts have been made to broaden its mandate; however, Syria has resisted.

Resolution 425: At the beginning of this year, in an interview of Defence Minister Mordechai with an Arabic magazine, Israel declared its readiness to implement resolution 425 (1979), subject to security arrangements that would preserve the rights and security of the people in the area including the SLA. Mordechai emphasized that the Lebanese Government's obligation to maintain peace and quiet after an Israeli withdrawal and expressed confidence in the Lebanese army's ability to do so (UNIFIL shares this view, provided the army has political backing.) Israel would thus be content with less than full peace and for the first time accept resolution 425 as the basis of discussion. Again, Syria and Lebanon opposed, dismissed Mordechai's suggestion as a ploy to divide them, and demanded Israel's unconditional withdrawal both from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights.

UNIFIL reductions: Lebanon attaches great importance to UNIFIL and may express concern about possible reductions. The US is studying this for budgetary reasons and has approached FALD. The US was told that, after several reductions since 1992, UNIFIL is now at the minimum strength required for its present functions.

Lebanese prisoners: About 200 Lebanese are detained, mostly without trial or charge and often for several years, in the Khiam prison in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese have on several occasions (most recently in July 1997) requested the Secretary-General to intervene to obtain the prisoners' release. DPA attempted to achieve progress on the issue in 1994-95. In 1997, DPA was told that Mr. Sevan had been pursuing related questions on a highly confidential basis. Israel stopped ICRC access to the prisoners in September 1997.

30 January 1998 BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH MR. MOHSEN DALLOUL, MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF LEBANON

Resolution 425: At the beginning of this year, in an interview of Defence Minister Mordechai with an Arabic magazine, Israel declared its readiness to implement resolution 425 (1979), subject to security arrangements that would preserve the rights and security of the people in the area including the SLA. Mordechai emphasized that the Lebanese Government's obligation to maintain peace and quiet after an Israeli withdrawal and expressed confidence in the Lebanese army's ability to do so (UNIFIL shares this view, provided the army has political backing.) Israel would thus be content with less than full peace and for the first time accept resolution 425 as the basis of discussion. Again, Syria and Lebanon opposed, dismissed Mordechai's suggestion as a ploy to divide them, and demanded Israel's unconditional withdrawal both from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights.

Southern Lebanon: While hostilities have continued, IDF and Hizbullah have generally respected the 26 April 1996 Understanding, which bans firing into populated areas or launching attacks from there. But there has been some slippage; civilian casualties rose (34 dead July-December 1997; 9 dead January-July 1997; no dead July-December 1996) and Hizbullah operated more often near villages and UNIFIL positions. The Monitoring Group (US, France, Syria, Lebanon and Israel) now usually records the facts and the positions of each side. It is at present the only point of direct contact between Israel and Syria and attempts have been made to broaden its mandate; however, Syria has resisted.

UNIFIL reductions: Lebanon attaches great importance to UNIFIL and may express concern about possible reductions. The US is studying this for budgetary reasons and has approached FALD. The US was told that, after several reductions since 1992, UNIFIL is now at the minimum strength required for its present functions.

30 January 1998