PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(as of 12 October, 2001)

Also available at http://www.idpproject.org

Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.

The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP Project or NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59 1209 Geneva - Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 788 80 85 Fax: + 41 22 788 80 86 E-mail : [email protected] CONTENTS

CONTENTS 1

PROFILE SUMMARY 7

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT 11

THE CONFLICTS IN CHECHNYA 11 BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT: CHECHNYA RECENT HISTORY (1922-1998) 11 THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN DAGESTAN AND CHECHNYA (SEPTEMBER 1999 - MARCH 2000) 13 VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW BY THE FEDERAL FORCES HAS LED DIRECTLY TO THE DISPLACEMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION (1999-2000) 16 CIVILIAN POPULATION IN CHECHNYA EXPOSED TO ABUSES BY THE CHECHEN REBELS (1999- 2000) 18 FEDERAL AUTHORITIES TAKE MEASURES TO STABILISE THE SITUATION IN CHECHNYA (2000- 2001) 18 THE ARMED CONFLICT CONTINUES IN THE FORM OF A GUERILLA WARFARE (2000-2001) 20 CIVILIAN POPULATION IN CHECHNYA ALSO EXPOSED TO THE VIOLENCE OF THE CHECHEN REBEL GROUPS (2000) 23 REVIEW OF POPULATION MOVEMENTS BETWEEN CHECHNYA AND INGUSHETIA (SEPTEMBER 1999-DECEMBER 2000) 24 OTHER CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT 26 ETHNIC RUSSIAN POPULATION LEAVE NORTH CAUCASIAN REPUBLICS IN A CONTEXT OF ETHNIC ANTAGONISMS 26 DISPLACEMENT RESULTING FROM THE INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICT IN THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT (1992-1998) 27 DEFINITIONS 28 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE CIS REGION: A WIDE RANGE OF CATEGORIES 28

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES 31

POPULATION FIGURES: DISPLACEMENT AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA (SINCE AUGUST 1999) 31 DISPLACED POPULATION IN INGUSHETIA: AT LEAST 150,000 PERSONS (SEPTEMBER 2001) 31 DISPLACED POPULATION IN CHECHNYA: AT LEAST 134,000 PERSONS (SEPTEMBER 2001) 32 INGUSHETIA HOSTS BETWEEN 120,000 AND 170,000 DISPLACED PERSONS FROM CHECHNYA (NOVEMBER 2000-MARCH 2001) 34 ESTIMATES FOR THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION IN CHECHNYA RANGE FROM 138,000 TO 235,000 PERSONS (FEBRUARY 2001) 36 NO PRECISE FIGURE FOR THE DISPLACED WHO LEFT CHECHNYA AND INGUSHETIA TO OTHER PARTS OF RUSSIA (2000) 38 POPULATION FIGURES: OTHER SITUATIONS OF DISPLACEMENT 38 CASELOAD FROM THE FIRST CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA 38 INGUSHETIA HOSTS BETWEEN 16,000 AND 35,000 DISPLACED FROM THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT (NORTH OSSETIA) (1999-2000) 39 STATISTICAL SOURCES 40 POPULATIONS FIGURES OF THE FEDERAL AND REGIONAL MIGRATION SERVICES FLAWED BY INCONSISTENT PRACTICES 40 THE DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL PUTS IN PLACE AN INFORMAL REGISTRATION SYSTEM IN INGUSHETIA (1999-2000) 41

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT 44

GENERAL 44 CONSTANT MOVEMENTS OF IDPS BETWEEN CHECHNYA AND INGUSHETIA (2000) 44 HIGH-RISK ROAD TO SAFETY: SELECTED REPORTS (NOVEMBER 1999) 44

PROTECTION CONCERNS 47

PHYSICAL SAFETY AND PERSONAL LIBERTY 47 DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA UNDER PRESSURE TO RETURN TO CHECHNYA (1999-2001) 47 CIVILIAN POPULATION IN CHECHNYA CONTINUOUSLY EXPOSED TO MAJOR THREATS FOR PHYSICAL AND PERSONAL SECURITY (2000-2001) 49 CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN CHECHNYA MAINLY CAUSED BY LANDMINES AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (2000) 53 CHECHENS ELSEWHERE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION EXPOSED TO DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT (2000) 53 LOCAL POPULATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN SOUTHERN INGUSHETIA EXPOSED TO MILITARY ACTIVITIES (AUGUST 2000) 54 TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DISPLACED POPULATION AND LOCALS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS IN INGUSHETIA (AUGUST 2000) 54 FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 54 RUSSIAN MILITARY IMPOSES STRICT LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENT INSIDE CHECHNYA (2000) 55 THE "PROPISKA" SYSTEM REMAINS DE FACTO IN PLACE IN SEVERAL REGIONS (2000) 55

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER) 57

FOOD 57 THE MAJORITY OF HOUSEHOLDS IN CHECHNYA NEEDS EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE (2001) 57 NUTRITION SITUATION IN INGUSHETIA REMAINS PRECARIOUS (2000) 57 SHELTER 59 INTERNALLY DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA FACE HIGH RISK OF EVICTION FROM THEIR TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION (2001) 59 ABOUT 77,000 DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA IN NEED OF URGENT SHELTER ASSISTANCE (2000) 60 VAST SHELTER NEEDS IN GROZNY AND OTHER TOWNS IN CHECHNYA (2000) 61 SEVERE CONDITIONS IN CAMPS IN CHECHNYA: THE EXAMPLES OF CAMPS IN SERNOVODSK, ARGUN AND GUDERMES (2000) 62

2 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE DISPLACED CHECHEN DISPLACED REPORTEDLY IMPEDES THEIR ACCESS TO ACCOMMODATION IN MOSCOW (1999) 63 HEALTH 63 HEALTH NEEDS OF THE POPULATION IN CHECHNYA LARGELY UNMET (2000-2001) 63 HEALTH SITUATION IN INGUSHETIA REQUIRES VIGILANCE AND CAREFUL MONITORING (2001) 65 OUTBREAK OF HEPATITIS A REPORTED IN IDP CAMPS (2000) 67 7,000 PERSONS IN NEED OF PROSTHETIC OR ORTHOPAEDIC HELP IN CHECHNYA (2000) 67 PSYCHOSOCIAL NEEDS OF THE DISPLACED CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES (DECEMBER 1999- MARCH 2000) 68 MENTAL HEALTH OF CHILDREN: CHECHEN ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHIATRISTS AND NEUROLOGISTS REVEALS SEVERE PROBLEMS IN CHECHNYA (2000) 70 WATER AND SANITATION 70 INFRASTRUCTURE AND EQUIPMENT IN INGUSHETIA MUST BE MAINTAINED AND UPGRADED IN ORDER TO MEET POST-EMERGENCY NEEDS (2000) 70 LACK OF CLEAR WATER AND POOR SANITATION CREATES MAJOR THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH IN CHECHNYA (2000) 71

ACCESS TO EDUCATION 72

INGUSHETIA 72 ACUTE LACK OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES FOR THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN INGUSHETIA (2000) 72 CHECHNYA 73 287 SCHOOLS OUT OF A TOTAL OF 400 ARE AT LEAST PARTLY OPERATIONAL IN CHECHNYA (2000) 73

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 74

SELF-RELIANCE 74 ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF HOST FAMILIES (2000) 74 AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES NEED EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO ENHANCE SELF-RELIANCE CAPACITY OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN INGUSHETIA AND CHECHNYA (2000) 74 COPING STRATEGIES OF THE DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA: HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON AID (JULY 2000) 76 INFLUX OF IDPS FROM CHECHNYA AGGRAVATES THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NORTH CAUCASUS (MARCH 2000) 77 PARTICIPATION 78 IDPS IN INGUSHETIA VOICE THEIR CONCERNS (2001) 78 PARTICIPATION OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (26 MARCH 2000) 79 DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA WERE ALLOWED TO VOTE FOR THE ELECTION OF THE CHECHNYA REPRESENTATIVE IN THE STATE DUMA (AUGUST 2000) 81

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP 82

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS 82 IMPROVING ACCESS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION TO IDENTITY DOCUMENTS (2000) 82

3 MOST DISPLACED FROM CHECHNYA ARE NOT GRANTED THE FORCED MIGRANT STATUS (NOVEMBER 1999-SEPTEMBER 2000) 82

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE 85

FAMILY UNITY 85 DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA GATHERED INTO "FAMILIES" AVERAGING 9 MEMBERS (1999-2000) 85 REPORTS OF CHECHEN MEN SEPARATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES AT THE CHECHEN-INGUSH BORDER AND CHECKPOINTS (JANUARY 2000) 85

PROPERTY ISSUES 87

GENERAL 87 THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS PROVIDING FOR COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTIES DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THE SECOND CONFLICT IN CHECHNYA (2000) 87 25 % OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION INTERVIEWED BY MSF DESCRIBED THEIR HOMES IN CHECHNYA AS INTACT OR LIGHTLY DESTROYED 87 REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD LOOTING BY RUSSIAN FORCES INSIDE CHECHNYA (NOVEMBER 1999) 88

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT 89

RETURN TO CHECHNYA 89 FEW DISPLACED HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCESS OFFICIAL AID FOR RETURN (2000) 89 CONDITIONS FOR RETURN TO CHECHNYA NOT FULFILLED (2000-2001) 89 MOVEMENTS OF DISPLACED PERSONS BETWEEN INGUSHETIA AND CHECHNYA REMAIN WITHOUT EFFECT ON THE TOTAL IDP CASELOAD (2000-2001) 91 FEDERAL AUTHORITIES PLAN RETURN OF DISPLACED POPULATION TO CHECHNYA (2000-2001) 92 RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT TAKES MEASURES FOR REHABILITATION AND LONG-TERM RECONSTRUCTION WORK IN CHECHNYA (2000-2001) 94 UNHCR AVOIDS STIMULATING FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY IN CHECHNYA (FEBRUARY 2001) 95 UNHCR PREPARES PROGRAMMES FOR ASSISTING DISPLACED RETURNING TO CHECHNYA (2000) 96 RETURN TO THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT (NORTH-OSSETIA) 97 MOST DISPLACED WILL RETURN BUT A SMALL PORTION IS LIKELY TO STAY DURABLY IN INGUSHETIA (2001) 97 RESETTLEMENT 99 ABOUT 35,000 ETHNIC INGUSH DISPLACED WILL BE PERMANENTLY RESETTLED IN INGUSHETIA (2000-2001) 99 SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF THE ETHNIC RUSSIANS DISPLACED FROM CHECHNYA IN THE STAVROPOL REGION (2000) 100

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 101

ACCESS TO NORTH CAUCASUS 101 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN WORK FACE DIFFICULT SECURITY CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN CAUCASUS (2001) 101

4 BUREAUCRATIC OBSTACLES HAMPER TIMELY DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN CHECHNYA (2000-2001) 103 TEMPORARY SUSPENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN CHECHNYA FOLLOWING SECURITY INCIDENTS (2001) 105 ACCESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS AND JOURNALISTS TO NORTHERN CAUCASUS STRICTLY LIMITED (2000) 106 THE RESPONSE TO LACK OF ACCESS BY INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES: FROM THE 'REMOTE CONTROL' CONCEPT TO A MORE ACTIVE PRESENCE (1999-2000) 107

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 109

LEGAL BACKGROUND 109 THE CIS CONFERENCE: A REGIONAL PROCESS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF DISPLACEMENT (MAY 1996) 109 AN OFFICIAL CATEGORY FOR IDPS AND INVOLUNTARY MIGRANTS FROM THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: THE STATUS OF "FORCED MIGRANT" 111 LOCAL AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES 112 FEDERAL AUTHORITIES PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL AID TO THE DISPLACED POPULATION (2000-2001) 112 DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD AID IN INGUSHETIA REGULARLY SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF DISRUPTED PAYMENTS FROM THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES (2000-2001) 114 NEIGHBOURING REPUBLICS RELUCTANT TO HOST MORE CHECHENS, EXCEPT INGUSHETIA (1999- 2001) 115 INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 116 UN HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR SUPERVISES UN HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN CAUCASUS (2000) 116 MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UN AND THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT (OCTOBER 1999-AUGUST 2000) 118 MEASURES TAKEN BY UN AGENCIES TO STRENGTHEN MONITORING OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN NORTH CAUCASUS (2000) 118 PROTECTION: PLANNED ACTIVITIES IN THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOR 2001 119 SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS: PLANNED ACTIVITIES IN THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOR 2001 122 FOOD: INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY OPERATION UNDER THE COORDINATION OF WFP (2001) 124 AGRICULTURE: PLANNED ACTIVITIES IN THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOR 2001 126 HEALTH: PLANNED ACTIVITIES IN THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOR 2001 128 WATER AND SANITATION: INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE COORDINATION OF UNHCR (2001) 131 EDUCATION: INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES UNDER THE COORDINATION OF UNICEF (2001) 133 MINE ACTION: INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN FRAMEWORK OF THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOR 2001 135 ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INFRASTRUCTURE: PLANNED ACTION IN THE UN CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FOR 2001 139 INTERNALLY DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA AND CHECHNYA NEED MORE FOOD ASSISTANCE (2000) 141 GOOD DONOR RESPONSE TO 2000 APPEAL HAVE ENABLED UN TO ADDRESS CRITICAL NEEDS IN INGUSHETIA AND, INCREASINGLY, IN CHECHNYA (2000) 142 INGUSHETIA RECEIVES MORE HUMANITARIAN AID THAN CHECHNYA (2000) 144 DONOR SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN AID IN PRIORITY (2000) 145

5 ACTIVITIES OF THE RED CROSS MOVEMENT IN 2001: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION 146 NGOS 148 ALMOST 30 LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS OPERATE IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS (JUNE 2001) 148 THE DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL HAS PLANS TO HELP THE INGUSH DISPLACED IN INGUSHETIA (APRIL 2000) 150 COMMITTEE 'CIVIC ASSISTANCE', A LOCAL NGO PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE DISPLACED IN MOSCOW 151 RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS 152 RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT DISCUSSED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CHECHNYA (SEPTEMBER 2000) 152 UN HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS ADDRESS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CHECHNYA (2000- 2001) 153 FOLLOW-UP TO ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND WAR CRIMES: INSUFFICIENT PROGRESS ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (2000-2001) 155 OSCE OBSERVER MISSION RETURNS TO CHECHNYA (JUNE 2001) 158 COUNCIL OF EUROPE SCRUTINIZES SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHECHNYA (2000-2001) 160 EU AND UNITED STATES UNWILLING TO USE POLITICAL OR ECONOMICAL LEVER TO CONVINCE RUSSIA TO CHANGE CONDUCT IN CHECHNYA (2000) 162 ICRC GIVEN ACCESS TO THE DETENTION CAMPS IN CHECHNYA (MARCH 2000) 163 INEFFECTIVE AMNESTY LAW (2000) 163 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 165

LIST OF SOURCES USED 167

6 PROFILE SUMMARY

Existing data suggest that at least 500,000 persons are currently displaced in the Russian Federation as a result of armed conflict and violence in North Caucasus. The exact scope of internal displacement can however not be determined with precision. The vast majority has been forced to leave their homes in Chechnya devastated by two conflicts in less that a decade. These people, mainly ethnic Chechens, have been temporarily registered for humanitarian purposes by federal and international agencies in Ingushetia and Chechnya but figures in the field however frequently diverge as a result of continuous population movements, insecurity and inconsistent registration practices. Displaced who have moved elsewhere in the Russian Federation have also been registered inconsistently as only some of them, mostly non-ethnic Chechens, have received the official status of "forced migrant" from federal authorities.

The first armed conflict between federal forces and secessionist armed groups in Chechnya (1994-1996) took the lives of 30,000 civilians and displaced as many as 600,000 persons. Most ethnic Russians and other non-Chechen groups left Chechnya and other North Caucasian republics during this period and resettled durably elsewhere in the Russian Federation. Federal authorities granted them the status of "forced migrant", which entitles beneficiaries to social assistance in support to their resettlement. As of June 2001, more than 100,000 of them are still holders of the status (UNHCR 6 March 2001, Federal Ministry for Federal Affairs June 2001). However, the majority of the displaced were ethnic Chechens and were not recognised as forced migrants as they allegedly returned to Chechnya following the agreements between the warring parties in August 1996 and May 1997. Many of them were still displaced in neighbouring republics as the second conflict in Chechnya broke out in September 1999 (USCR 2001).

The resumption of the armed hostilities between the federal military forces and the Chechen separatists plunged North Caucasus in a new humanitarian disaster. As during the first conflict, both sides have conducted the military operations in total disregard to humanitarian principles. Disproportionate use of force, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, arbitrary arrest, torture and inhuman treatment, which human rights organisations mainly attributed to the federal forces, compelled up to 600,000 persons from their homes as of end of 1999. The majority remained displaced within Chechnya but a significant number of them (up to 250,000 persons) fled to the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia during the winter 1999-2000, the only escape route left opened by the federal authorities (HRW February 2000, USCR 2001).

The main military campaign was declared over in April 2000, as federal sources reported that the Chechen fighters were forced to withdraw from the lowlands to the mountains. Some return movements have been possible although the conflict has persisted since then as a low-level warfare (FEWER December 2000). Civilians in the Chechen republic are still exposed to indiscriminate military actions, extortion, disappearances, and random violence by Russian soldiers and Chechen rebels. Armed clashes between federal forces

7 and Chechen rebels, usually followed by sweep operations carried out by federal forces in villages, continue to be reported by international observers and belie the return to normalcy in Chechnya portrayed by the authorities (HRW 24 September 2001).

Humanitarian agencies face difficulties in determining the current scope of the displaced population in Chechnya and Ingushetia. Problems of access to the population in Chechnya and the mobility of the displaced between the two republics explain the discrepancies in the figures available. Estimates in Chechnya range from 134,000 persons according to the registration system maintained by the Danish Refugee Council (figure used by UNHCR for its assistance programmes) to 225,000 according to the federal authorities (DRC 30 September 2001, UNHCR September 2001). Ingushetia, one of the poorest republics in the Russian Federation, continues to host between 146,000 displaced persons according to the Danish Refugee Council and 180,000 persons according to federal authorities (DRC 30 September 2001 & 31 July 2001).

In both republics, the majority of the displaced has found shelter with the local population, but significant groups (up to 20% of the displaced in Ingushetia) live in collective shelters. The self-reliance capacity of the local population is stretched to the limits, forcing UNHCR to negotiate with Ingush host families or find alternative accommodation for the growing number of vulnerable displaced facing eviction. Nearly all internally displaced in Ingushetia remain dependent on the food aid provided by the international community and the federal authorities (UN September 2001). Irregular food assistance and limited local nutritional resources in Chechnya leave large segments of the displaced and resident population underfed. Humanitarian organisations report serious health risks, linked to malnutrition, poor hygiene and permanent stress. Alarming rates for tuberculosis and hepatitis A, mental disorders and injuries caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance are among the most serious problems facing health workers on the ground (UN September 2001 & June 2001).

Chechen displaced who escaped Chechnya or Ingushetia hoping to find more favorable conditions elsewhere in the Russian Federation face numerous difficulties, starting with the impossibility to register as residents. Although the system of residence permits inherited from the Soviet period (so-called "propiska") has been legally abolished, de facto limitations to the free choice of residence remain in place in numerous regions, including major urban centres such as Moscow or Saint Petersburg. Furthermore, displaced from the current conflict in Chechnya have not been able to access the "forced migrant" status, which federal authorities grant only to persons who have no intention of return (UNHCR 6 March 2001). Without status, most Chechen displaced in urban centres have been unable to access essential services and social benefits. Their precarious situation has been also aggravated by the constant harassment from police forces (U.S. DOS February 2001).

Since the beginning of the second conflict in Chechnya, federal authorities have been keen to see the displaced in Ingushetia return to their homes as early as possible, raising concerns among the human rights community about any premature movements to unsafe areas. Although UNHCR has not reported any "formal attempts" to push back displaced

8 persons to Chechnya, the principle of voluntary return have been regularly at risk (UNHCR September 2001). The hasty creation of safe areas within Chechnya, the disruption of food aid or the denial of documentation and registration in Ingushetia have been denounced by human rights organisations as practices pressuring the displaced to return (Memorial 7 June 2001). Records of population movements between Ingushetia and Chechnya however show that return movements during the past twelve months remained insignificant. International agencies and national human rights organisations continue to consider that security conditions and rehabilitation efforts in Chechnya are still inadequate for large scale return (UN September 2001).

Return to the Prigorodny district (North Ossetia), from where between 30,000 and 6000 ethnic Ingush were displaced by communal violence in 1992, has only be possible for about 18,000 persons as of December 2000, according to authorities in North Ossetia. Another 20,000 persons are still waiting in Ingushetia for their return to North Ossetia while several thousands are likely to settle in Ingushetia permanently (UNHCR 7 March 2001). Violent incidents against returnees continue to be reported in the Prigorodny district (RFE/RL 25 May 2001, AP 5 September 2001).

Insecurity in northern Caucasus seriously hampers the delivery of assistance and protection to the displaced. International humanitarian workers are exposed to major threats, as a result of kidnapping, landmines and other security incidents. UN agencies limit their presence in Ingushetia to the strict minimum and enter Chechnya only for rapid assessment missions. Armed escort for international staff is the rule for all UN agencies and the vast majority of the international NGOs. However, insecurity can explain only partially the persisting reluctance of the authorities to allow international NGOs the access to Chechnya. Despite their asserted will to restore the conditions for the early return of the displaced, civilian and military authorities have obstructed consistently the work of international NGOs in Chechnya through numerous bureaucratic impediments which have been reinforced again in July 2001 (UN September 2001; Prague Watchdog 26 & 27 September 2001).

The assistance provided by the international community is essential to meet the basic needs of the displaced in North Caucasus, as the federal authorities have failed to provide humanitarian and reconstruction aid at a sufficient level. Within the framework of the UN inter-agency appeal for 2001, the international donor community has mainly supported programmes in the sectors of food, shelter and non-food items, health, water and sanitation, mine action and education (UN November 2000, UN September 2001). Protection is also an area where several organisations, such as UNHCR, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, have been actively involved, through the support given to the governmental and non-governmental human rights structures (UNHCR September 2001, COE 19 September 2001, OSCE 18 June 2001). However, UN special rapporteurs, including the Representative on IDPs, Dr. Francis Deng, have not been able so far to visit Chechnya, as recommended by the UN Commission of Human Rights in 2000 and 2001 (UN CHR 20 April 2001 & 25 April 2000).

9 (Updated October 2001)

10 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

The conflicts in Chechnya

Background to the conflict: Chechnya recent history (1922-1998)

· Russian expansion in the Caucasus meets fierce Chechen resistance throughout the nineteenth century · Forced collectivization and attempts at "Russification" by the Bolsheviks led to renewed unrest and rebellion in Chechnya, culminating with brutal repression during the Stalinist 1930s · Chechens and Ingush deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and other far reaches between 1944-1957 · In 1957, Khrushchev decreed their return · With Ingushetia opting to remain within Russia, Chechen leader Djohar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General, proclaimed Chechen sovereignty on November 2, 1991 · As a result of the declaration of independence, some 100,000 Russians left Chechnya · December 1994-August 1996: Russian troops undertake a military intervention in the republic; up to 400,000 people flee to other areas of Chechnya and the Russian Federation; Cease fire agreement and Chechnya's future political relationship with Russia regulated by the August 1996 Khasavyurt Accords · 1997-1999: Chechnya remains unstable; insecurity and hostage-taking oblige to a reduction of international humanitarian aid; Sharia law introduced by the President of the Chechen republic

"Chechnya experienced 21 months of warfare between December 1994, when some 40,000 Russian troops entered the rebellious republic, and August 1996 when a cease-fire took hold. An estimated 50,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. Indiscriminate bombing and artillery attacks destroyed large areas of the Chechen capital Grozny in the first two months of the war, forcing up to 400,000 people to flee to other areas of Chechnya and to the frontier regions of Ingushetia, Daghestan, North Ossetia, and southern Russia. As the war continued into the surrounding countryside and southern mountain areas, entire villages were destroyed, resulting in further displacement.

The war was the most recent manifestation of the historical inability of Chechnya and Russia to find a workable modus vivendi. Chechnya's history over the past 200 years has been defined largely by Russian and Soviet attempts to subdue the Caucasus. In Czarist times, an uncontrolled northern Caucasus was considered to be Russia's Achilles' heel against incursions from the Persian and Ottoman Empires. From the second decade of the nineteenth century, Russian armies began their push into the mountains meeting fierce, well-organized, and Islamicized Chechen resistance. During a 25 -year campaign of resistance led by the Imam Shamil between 1834-1859, Russian forces opted for a scorched earth strategy, destroying the lands and villages that gave the Chechen fighters sustenance and forcing the population to flee to the relative safety of the mountains. Russian armies won a titular military victory in 1859 with Shamil's capture, but resistance

11 continued for the remainder of the century and well into the next. In modern times Shamil, who was an ethnic Avar from Daghestan, remains a venerated folk hero in both Chechnya and Daghestan.

Upon the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, Bolsheviks promised independence, cultural autonomy, and religious freedom to Chechens and others in the northern Caucasus. However, the Soviet Red Army consolidated its power in the Caucasus soon afterward. Forced collectivization and attempts at Russification led to renewed unrest and rebellion in Chechnya, culminating during the Stalinist 1930s with brutal repression, forced famine, mass arrests, exiles, and killings. Chechnya was united with Ingushetia as an ASSR in 1934. The Ingush and Chechens, who together comprise the Vainakh people, are ethnically related, speak a similar language, and often share kinship ties.

With the advent of World, War II, as German forces advanced into the Caucasus, small numbers of anti-Soviet guerrillas mounted attacks against Soviet forces. This provided Stalin with a pretext to punish the 'unreliable' ethnic groups of the northern Caucasus. With great loss of life, Chechens and Ingush were deported en masse to Soviet Central Asia and other far reaches, and their lands were divided up among Russians, the Laks of Daghestan, and North Ossetians. The Chechens and Ingush remained in exile until 1957, when it was decreed by Khrushchev that they could return to their homes. The return was badly managed, however, and recurring clashes between the returnees and settlers continued for many years.

Perestroika in the late 1980s allowed for the resurgence and open expression of national identities in the Caucasus, leading in Chechnya as elsewhere to a declaration of independence from Russia. With Ingushetia opting to remain within Russia, Chechen leader Djohar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General, proclaimed Chechen sovereignty on November 2, 1991, shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations between the struggling democracy in Moscow and the Chechen capital Grozny were difficult from the outset. Moscow refused to recognize Chechnya's secessionist aspirations and mounted both covert and overt operations to weaken Dudayev's position and replace him with a more tractable regime.

In Chechnya, the pervasive socioeconomic ills brought about by the collapse of the Soviet system and Dudayev's own increasingly autocratic style of leadership sent the territory into a spiral of fragmentation and instability. These conditions were exacerbated by the emptying of jails, the proliferation of small arms, and burgeoning criminal activity. Like his successor Aslan Maskhadov, Dudayev's challenge was to impose a hierarchical state system atop a society more closely organized along lateral, clan-based relations. Amid a worsening breakdown of law and order, some 100,000 Russians, many of them holding highly skilled, essential jobs in Chechnya's infrastructure and industry, departed for more hospitable surroundings. Russian military leaders promised Yeltsin that Chechnya could be quickly subdued. Amid protests from Ingushetia and liberal circles in Moscow, a Russian invasion force was mustered in the northern Caucasus and entered Chechnya on December 11, 1994. […]

12 Although an OSCE mission with fewer than 10 diplomats and military observers was dispatched to Grozny in June of 1996, the mission's political marginalization by OSCE member states and its size meant that it could achieve little tangible result over the course of the war. Russia was given largely free reign by the international community in its prosecution of the war, in deference to Russian sovereignty and its key roles in other pressing international foreign policy issues. Fighting eventually ended in August 1996, following an all-out attack in Grozny on Russian forces, who were forced out in a humiliating defeat by a much smaller separatist force. Russian President Yeltsin's national security advisor at the time, former Soviet general Alexander Lebed, concluded a cease-fire agreement with the separatist leadership. The terms of the cease-fire stipulated the withdrawal of Russian forces and a five-year hiatus for discussions on Chechnya's future political relationship with Russia.

From the cease-fire to [June 1998], Chechnya has remained unstable. Despite presidential and parliamentary elections and repeated accommodations of radicals and militants by the elected leadership, the warlords and factions rather than politicians have continued to control events. Criminality has deepened in Chechnya following the cease-fire, partly a consequence of large numbers of unemployed former fighters and the destroyed economy. Specifically, humanitarian actors have been increasingly targeted for attack, the most tragic instance of which was the assassination, with possible political motives, of six expatriate ICRC employees and the serious wounding of a seventh in an ICRC hospital compound south of Grozny on December 17, 1996, just prior to elections. Although the aid community drastically scaled back its presence in response, a rash of hostage takings targeting expatriate aid agency staff continued in and around Chechnya to February 1998, when the kidnapping of the UNHCR head of office in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia, led to a further reduction of humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus. Since the scaling down of international aid operations, the Russian Federation has responded with emergency assistance to several ecological disasters in Chechnya. Insecurity has precluded any comprehensive assessment of post-war need." (Hansen 1998, pp. 20-22)

"In February 1999 [January 1997 elected President] Maskhadov introduced Islamic law into the republic by presidential decree. He also stripped the parliament of its legislative powers and abolished the post of vice-president. Maskhadov ordered the drafting of a new constitution based on the Koran and created a Shura (State Council), as an advisory body which the opposition was invited to join. The opposition wad crated an alternative Majlis Shura (Supreme State Council), to which they elected themselves and in which they allocated a seat to Maskhadov, but on condition that he resigned as president, claiming that presidency is incompatible with Sharia law. The parliament, once the base of support for Maskhadov, refused to recognize the presidential initiatives as legitimate and continued to function as before. This created a triarchy, although no one possesses ultimate political authority over the entire republic." (Matveeva 1999, pp. 94-95)

The military operations in Dagestan and Chechnya (September 1999 - March 2000)

13 · Russian military intervention in Chechnya follows bomb explosions in Moscow attributed to Chechen terrorists and a Chechen incursion into the neighbouring republic of Dagestan (August- September 1999) · After advancing quickly through northern Chechnya, Russian forces encountered fierce resistance as they approached the Chechen capital Grozny (November-December 1999) · Chechen rebel forces abandon Grozny; military operations continue in Southern Chechnya; Chechen leader calls for a guerrilla war against the Russian forces (February-March 2000)

"On September 5 [1999], Russian military forces began a month-long air assault on Russia's self-ruled, separatist republic of Chechnya, displacing more than 80,000 civilians by month's end. What began as a campaign to defeat Chechen-based armed Islamic 'Wahhabi' guerrillas who seized several villages in Chechnya's neighboring republic, Dagestan, in August and early September, quickly turned into an offensive resembling the 1994-1996 Russian-Chechen war […]. Throughout September, Russian forces widened the bombing campaign from sites along Chechnya's eastern border with Dagestan to targets throughout the republic. They reportedly targeted the Wahhabi guerrillas, who they claimed bombed several apartment buildings in Moscow, Dagestan, and other areas of the Russian Federation. On September 28, after several failed attempts to engage Russia and stop the escalating war, President Maskhadov condemned 'the Russian aggression' and enlisted Shamil Basayev--former Chechen commander and leader of the Wahhabi guerrillas--to lead Chechnya's new war against the Russian Federation. (Unlike the 1994-1996 war in which many ethnic Chechens fought for independence, most Chechens reportedly oppose the fundamentalist ideology of the Wahhabi guerrillas and their attempts to infiltrate Dagestan.)

By the end of September, villages surrounding Chechnya's capital, Grozny, lay in ruins, hundreds of civilians had been killed by wayward bombs, and more than 80,000 displaced Chechens sought shelter in neighboring Ingushetia, Dagestan, and North Ossetia." (USCR October 1999)

"After advancing quickly through northern Chechnya, taking several towns without a fight, including Chechnya's second largest city of Gudermes, Russian forces encountered fierce resistance as they approached the Chechen capital Grozny. In November, Russian troops fought hard to encircle the city and cut off supply lines from the south, with towns and villages to the south of Grozny the scene of very heavy fighting. By early December, Russian forces had more or less encircled Grozny.

Russian commanders initially ruled out a ground offensive into Grozny, in an apparent attempt to avoid repeating the mistakes of December 1994 and January 1995, when hundreds of Russian soldiers entering the city in columns of tanks proved to be easy targets for the Chechen rebels. Russian forces began a relentless bombing and shelling campaign on the city in late November 1999. On December 6, the Russian military announced an ultimatum to all civilians in Grozny to leave the city by December 11 or face 'elimination.' Leaflets dropped from Russian planes instructed civilians: 'Those who remain will be viewed as terrorists and bandits and will be destroyed.... Everyone who does not leave the city will be destroyed.' The ultimatum was eventually retracted, apparently under pressure from the international community.

14 Countless civilians fell victim to the continuing bombing and shelling campaign. On various occasions the Russian government and military announced safe exit routes for civilians wishing to flee from the city but continued to target those very routes. An estimated ten to fifty thousand civilians, often the elderly, poor, and infirm, remained trapped in Grozny's basements.

In mid-December, Russian forces started the ground offensive on Grozny. In Grozny, Russian soldiers met fierce resistance from Chechen rebel fighters intimately familiar with the city. During the offensive, the number of casualties among Russian soldiers rose very quickly. In one episode reminiscent of the 1994-1995 offensive on Grozny, Associated Press and Reuters correspondents reported that, on December 16, a column of tanks trying to enter the center of the city was surprised, and Russian troops were slaughtered by Chechen fighters. Maria Eismont of Reuters and Ruslan Musayev of the Associated Press said they had counted the bodies of more than one hundred Russian soldiers. The report was vehemently denied by the Russian government. In interviews with foreign and Russian journalists, however, numerous Russian soldiers who had fought in Grozny admitted that many soldiers from their units had died. Several soldiers described how each step on the streets of Grozny posed a threat as Chechen snipers were hiding all over the city and claimed the lives of many Russian soldiers. In mid-January, Chechen snipers killed General Malofeyev, one of the commanders of the invasion of Grozny, in a major setback for the Russian army. Russian troops were unable to recover his body until five days later.

The Russian government initially denied reports in the Russian and international media that claimed that the casualty rate among soldiers had soared. In mid-January, officials reported that 700 soldiers had died since the beginning of the fighting in Dagestan in August. On January 25, the Russian government said that in fact 1,173 soldiers had died. Many independent observers, however, believe even these numbers severely understate the real casualty figures, and some have estimated that as many as 3,000 Russian soldiers may have died in the Chechnya campaign so far.

In early February, Chechen rebel forces abandoned Grozny. One group apparently tried to bribe Russian officers for a safe passage but walked into a mine field which left many rebels dead and many more wounded. On February 7, Russian Acting President Vladimir Putin claimed that his troops had taken control of all of Grozny. In an interview with a Spanish daily, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov said that 'for the time being we have given up [Grozny].'" (HRW February 2000)

"Civilians continue to flee villages in southern Chechnya amid reports of widespread destruction of property and a continuing military push by Russian troops. Newcomers report that virtually all homes in the Komsomolskoe village in Southern Chechnya have been destroyed. The number of people fleeing Chechnya has remained steady at about 1,000 people a week." (UNHCR 28 March 2000)

15 "The Russian authorities at present claim to have control over the vast majority of the territory of Chechnya: however, military operations continue in the mountains in the south of the Republic. The media have put the number of Chechen combatants at approximately 3 000. The Russian forces have captured a leader of the Chechen fighters, Mr S. Raduyev, who has been taken to Moscow for trial.

This fighting still causes significant loss of life among civilians and military personnel alike. There is no evidence that the belligerents have changed their way of conducting the military operations. Mr Maskhadov has called for a guerrilla war against the Russian forces, and attacks on Russian military targets are increasing in the territories formally controlled by the Russians." (COE Parliamentary Assembly 4 April 2000, paras. 20-21)

For a detailed chronology of recent events in Chechnya, see Annex IV of the report on the conflict in Chechnya presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (25 January 2000) [Internet]

Violations of humanitarian law by the Federal Forces has led directly to the displacement of the civilian population (1999-2000)

· The indiscriminate use of force (air power and artillery) by the federal forces resulted in the displacement of up to 200,000 persons and widespread civilian casualties · Reports of summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture and rape by the federal forces · Early December 1999, ultimatum by the Federal forces requests civilian population to leave Grozny despite absence of safe corridors

"The indiscriminate use of force by government forces in the conflict with separatist elements in Chechnya resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of up to 200,000 persons, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in Ingushetiya.

Estimates vary of the total number of civilian casualties caused by bombs and artillery used by government forces. The number of civilian casualties cannot be verified, and figures vary widely from several hundred to several thousand. Government officials argue that they are employing 'high precision' tactics against separatist and terrorist targets in Chechnya. However, a wide range of reporting indicates that government forces are relying mainly on unguided rockets and other low precision weapons.

In September and early October, government forces launched air and artillery attacks against numerous Chechen villages along the republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the territory controlled by Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. Basayev led attacks in Dagestan in July and August and was believed to have retreated to this region in Chechnya. Villagers living in the region under attack claimed that they were not supporters of Basayev.

Attempts by government forces to gain control over Chechnya's capital, Groznyy, were characterized by indiscriminate use of air power and artillery, which destroyed numerous

16 residential and civilian buildings. Up to 140,000 Russian military and security personnel in the Northern Caucasus region were involved in the current conflict in Chechnya, far more than during the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. On September 24, government aircraft reportedly bombed a bus with refugees near Samashki, resulting in the deaths of eight persons. Human Rights Watch confirmed that on September 27, Russian aircraft allegedly bombed a school and residential areas in Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Groznyy, killing 7 civilians and wounding another 20, including schoolchildren. Human Rights Watch confirmed an attack by Russian airplanes on Urus-Martan, 15 miles south of Groznyy, on October 3, which resulted in the deaths of 27 civilians. On October 5, a government tank fired on a bus near Chervlyonnaya, reportedly killing some 28 civilians. According to NGO reports, on October 7, government troops attacked the village of Elistanzhi, killing some 48 civilians. On October 21, explosions killed scores of civilians in Groznyy's downtown market and a local hospital. Western press organizations reported at least 60 civilian deaths and 200 persons injured, although Chechen government officials claimed that at least 118 persons died and more than 400 were injured. Russian officials offered contradictory explanations for the explosions; some denied any government complicity and blamed Chechen separatists. However, Ministry of Defense officials claimed on October 22 that special forces units had attacked a weapons market, but without using artillery or air power. The ICRC reported that two-thirds of Groznyy's 150,000 residents fled the city as a result of the military campaign. On October 27, government forces subjected Groznyy to the heaviest attacks up to that point as government aircraft bombed the city and killed dozens of Chechens. Chechen defense officials claimed that 116 persons were killed in the attacks that day. Also on October 27, government forces shelled the village of Samashki, killing at least 5 persons and injuring dozens. On November 1, government troops that had taken positions in a psychiatric hospital near Samashki overnight opened fire on the doctors and other medical staff who reported to work that morning, resulting in injuries to three staff members. Troops prevented hospital staff from returning to care for their patients for several days, and the condition of the hospital's patients remains unknown. On November 16, government troops surrounded and shelled two large towns near Groznyy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Argun. The attacks prompted criticism from international human rights organizations for indiscriminate attacks against civilian settlements.

According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in other villages.

Early in December, government forces airdropped a series of leaflets over Groznyy that warned civilian residents and rebel fighters to leave the city. In one leaflet directed at Chechen fighters, the command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces in the Northern Caucasus warned that any persons remaining in Groznyy after December 12 would be destroyed by air and artillery strikes. Amid international criticism of the leaflets, government officials later qualified the leaflets' language and denied that they had imposed an ultimatum on the city's inhabitants." (U.S. DOS 25 February 2000, sec. 1g)

Other types of violations identified by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

17 "The most serious allegations about violations by the Russian forces fall into the following categories:

- disproportionate, indiscriminate bombing of the civilian population (the most striking example being the destruction of Grozny);

- excesses committed against the civilian population during military operations, including summary executions;

- arbitrary detention of Chechens and their maltreatment, including torture, in the temporary detention centres;

- daily violations of human rights, including murders (during the visit to the village of Argun, the inhabitants described how Russian soldiers, who were probably drunk, murdered a 15-year old boy who had not respected the curfew)." (COE Parliamentary Assembly 4 April 2000, para. 32)

Civilian population in Chechnya exposed to abuses by the Chechen rebels (1999-2000)

· Reports of arbitrary executions, human shielding and forced labor by the Chechen forces

"Chechen separatists also committed abuses. According to unconfirmed reports, separatists killed civilians who would not assist them, used civilians as human shields, forced civilians to dig fortifications, and prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In particular, Russian officials reported in December that they had unearthed evidence of mass killings by Chechen fighters in Naurskiy raion. Government officials and some local residents claimed that the fighters singled out Russian-speaking residents for execution in October, just after the resumption of government ground combat operations in Chechnya. In addition, human rights NGO's reported that Chechen fighters on November 28 fired upon unarmed civilians who were trying to maintain a neutral zone in Gekhi, southwest of Groznyy. According to local residents, at least five civilians were wounded in the attack." (U.S. DOS 25 February 2000, sec. 1g)

See also Human Rights Watch reports, "Chechen fighters endanger civilian lives (Shielding violates laws of war)" (13 January 2000) and "Chechen rebels shoot unarmed civilians in Gekhi (Civilians in town attacked by both Russian and rebel forces)" (30 November 1999) [Internet] See also Amnesty International report, "Chechnya: Civilian hostages at risk" (8 March 2000)[Internet]

Federal authorities take measures to stabilise the situation in Chechnya (2000-2001)

· Mr. Kadyrov appointed head of administration in Chechnya (June 2000)

18 · Permanent controversy between Kadyrov and his first deputy Gantamirov harms the administration authority · Russian President announced reduction in the number of Russian troops in Chechnya and the transfer of responsibility for military operations from the Defense Ministry to the Federal Security Service (FSB) (January 2001) · Illicit export of oil and scrap metal from Chechnya continues to fuel the conflict · A senior Russian official met a representative of the Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov (September 2001)

"After his election as President of the Russian Federation in March 2000, President Putin announced that Russia would withdraw some of its troops from Chechnya in compliance with limits imposed by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). On 8 June 2000, he imposed 'temporary' direct presidential rule on Chechnya. The head of administration in Chechnya was to be appointed by the Russian President and supervised by the plenipotentiary presidential representative in the North Caucasus (now Southern) federal district. On 12 June, Mr. Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov was nominated to the post. Mr. Kadyrov, a Muslim cleric, had supported Chechen independence in the 1994-1996 conflict, but supported the later military intervention in Chechnya in September 1999, because he disagreed with the pro-Muslim policies of Chechen President Maskhadov." (UNHCR November 2000, p. 10)

The Chechen Republic (CR) Administration, headed by Akhmed-Hadjy Kadyrov, has degenerated into a state of permanent controversy (between Kadyrov and his first deputy Gantamirov), lowering the administration’s authority with the general population. Coupled with poor federal financing of social and economic programmes, this state of affairs presents a serious obstacle to stabilisation. "(FEWER December 2000, p. 6)

"A turning point in the Chechen war? Over the past week, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken three key decisions that appear to be aimed at expediting an end to the fighting in Chechnya and strengthening the civilian administration there.

On 18 January, Putin signed a complex plan drafted by then-still-interim administration head Akhmed-hadji Kadyrov for stabilizing the economic, social and political situation in Chechnya. One key component of that plan was an unspecified reduction in the number of Russian troops to be stationed in Chechnya.

The following day, Putin signed a decree expanding the powers of Kadyrov's administration and formally removing from its designation the epithet "interim" contained in his June decree forming that administrative structure. The 19 January decree empowered Kadyrov to appoint a Chechen premier, who will simultaneously serve as one of his first deputies, and a fully-fledged Chechen government. The same day, Kadyrov named as premier former Stavropol Krai government head Stanislav Ilyasov, who was born and raised not far from the border between Chechnya and Daghestan.

Finally, on 22 January, Putin issued a further decree 'On Measures To Combat Terrorism on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation,' which formally

19 transferred responsibility for conducting military operations in Chechnya from the Russian Defense Ministry to the Federal Security Service (FSB), whose spokesman Aleksandr Zhdanovich said later that day that his agency's top priority will be to hunt down detachments of Chechen fighters and neutralize their leaders. (That transfer of responsibility has also put paid to the Russian Defense Ministry's plans, announced by Chief of General Staff Colonel General Anatolii Kvashnin in mid-December, to deploy small groups of Russian troops in 200 of Chechnya's 357 villages to maintain order and protect the local population against attack by Chechen militants. Several Russian commentators had criticized that proposal as militarily ineffective and counter- productive.)

Both Western journalists and Chechen observers have suggested in recent months that the Russian military's failure to take further action to wipe out the remaining Chechen fighters even though their whereabouts are well-known is at least partly due to senior officers' desire to continue enriching themselves through the illicit export of oil and scrap metal from Chechnya (see 'RFE/RL Caucasus Report,' Vol. 4, No. 1, 5 January 2001). On 21 January, the Russian Interior Ministry launched a coordinated operation to intercept all such consignments of crude oil and scrap metal destined for export from Chechnya, suggesting that Putin may finally have lost patience with the military's combined inactivity and rapacity." (RFE/RL 25 January 2001)

© 2000 RFE/RL, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

"A senior Russian official has met representatives of the Chechen leader, Aslan Mskhadov, as a deadline for the separatists to begin peace talks ran out.

The two sides held preliminary talks to discuss President Putin's demands that the rebels should disarm before any peace negotiations, but the Russian envoy, Viktor Kazantsev, said the Chechens were reluctant to do so.

'We have barely started,' Mr Kazantsev said on Russian TV. 'I'm not not saying they're ready, they have doubts.'

Reports from Chechnya say that so far only a few weapons have been handed in by civilians.

Russia gave the Chechens 72 hours to hand in their weapons and begin talks to end their two year fight for independence." (BBC 27 September 2001)

The armed conflict continues in the form of a guerilla warfare (2000-2001)

· On 15 April 2000, Russian military and political leaders officially declared the fighting stage of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya to be over · Since then, the conflict has developed into an unrelenting guerrilla war · Criminal behaviour of demoralised federal soldiers alienates local population and fuel support to the Chechen rebels

20 · Sweep operations conducted by the federal forces continue to cause more population displacement (2001)

"On 15 April 2000, Russian military and political leaders officially declared the fighting stage of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya to be over. The General Staff held that Ministry of Defence forces had defeated the key rebel formations armed with heavy weapons, and destroyed their control system and infrastructure. According to official figures up to 13,000 rebels, including 20 well-known field commanders, were killed. Another 20 field commanders were arrested and detained. The Russian troops have lost about 3,000 soldiers (these figures seem questionable to many NGOs and to the media). Human rights organisations estimate citizen losses at approximately 9,000. (V. Ibragimov, representative of Ichkeria, quotes different data: 14,000 killed by federal forces and 1500 by the Chechen resistance). In the course of the operation the federal forces seized strategically important settlements and took control of the Chechen part of the Russian-Georgian state border.

Low morale and order among federal troops After the battle stage of the operation was over the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Federal Security Service (FSB) were charged with the task of suppressing the smaller guerrilla groups. The defeat of major rebel units and seizure of the whole Chechen territory perimeter does not represent an outright victory for the federal forces. For the last six months the conflict has developed into an unrelenting guerrilla war. The Russian military estimates the number of rebels in Chechnya at between 2,000 and 2,500 (Maskahdov believes that there are 15,000). Russian troops are attacked daily, subjected to acts of terrorism, and bear monthly losses in the region of 50-70. Rebel numbers are not decreasing, and their main leaders, Maskhadov, Basaev, Khattab, Gelaev, and Baraev, move freely throughout Chechnya co-ordinating guerrilla activities. As a result, the principal goal of the counter-terrorist operation remains unattained.

Large army units, unable to engage effectively with the dispersed and mobile guerrilla groups, emphasise defence, thereby minimising their battle involvement. This shift marks the beginning of an entrenched struggle with the guerrillas. The federal troops are still suffering heavy losses due to ‘kamikaze’ actions in particular. Grozny city, war-torn, with ruined industry and houses and deep craters, provides an effective spring-board for subversive activity. The military say that there are at any one time at least one hundred rebels in the city, hiding during the daytime and attacking roadblocks and burning and mining other targets at night. Today there is growing evidence that a guerrilla war is being conducted within Chechnya, and it is commonly acknowledged that this type of war will continue until its root causes have been effectively addressed. Official claims by Russian forces that the situation is under control do not reflect reality. In fact, the federal forces are incapable of protecting either themselves or the civilian population. Together with the rivalry among Chechen leaders, this general state of affairs fuels the ongoing guerrilla war.

Experience demonstrates that armies that remain outside barracks in the field combating active guerrilla operations become demoralized very quickly, and begin to engage in

21 looting and vandalism. Today, the Russian command is confronted with the problem of how to prevent the degeneration of troops. Soldiers tried by the ordeals of war, have found themselves with time on their hands. The result is that the 100,000-strong army is getting out of control. The growth of alcohol-related crime and of anti-social behaviour is widespread. Weaponry, drugs and alcohol seem to pose a greater threat to the army and civilians than the rebels. Servicemen who have suffered during the war have difficulties re-integrating into civilian life. They cannot stop reaching for their guns to resolve problems; their victims are mainly civilian.

Alienation of the civilian population The Ministry of Defence, plunged into a protracted guerrilla war, has neither the means nor the forces necessary to go on, and has started to express its dissatisfaction with MVD and FSB activities. General V. Manilov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Headquarters, admitted publicly that the inefficiency of these agencies has enabled rebels to move freely through the republic, to set up bases and store weapons. The military has been led to believe that the elimination of mobile guerrilla groups and counter-terrorist actions is to be conducted by the special police forces. In fact, neither Ministry of Interior Affairs troops, nor OMON (the special police forces) or SOBR (Special Rapid Response Units) dispatched to Chechnya from other parts of Russia are capable of solving these problems. On the contrary, all sorts of 'special' or 'cleaning' operations lead to an escalation in the number of civilian casualties, intensify refugee flows and strengthen support for the guerrillas on the ground, even among groups initially antagonistic towards the guerrillas. Battle operations lead to victims among the civilian population rejecting the positive effects of social and economic assistance programmes and obstructing the process of stabilization. The violence and illegal activities of the Russian forces towards Chechen civilians aggravates the tendency to treat the combat activities of the federal forces as actions directed 'against the people', supporting the widely held perception of rebel resistance in terms of a national liberation movement. Chechen resistance may in the near future become dominated by a wave of new recruits brought up in an atmosphere conducive to extremities of belief, as there is a new brutality in battle. One should realise that the Russian military forces in Chechnya are nationally homogeneous, and that they are fighting in a territory with a mono-ethnic population. This creates pre-conditions for tension in relations between the two sides." (FEWER December 2000, pp. 6-8)

"Russian government troops are arbitrarily detaining hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chechen men in a new round of sweep operations, Human Rights Watch said today. Eyewitnesses from several villages alleged torture, ill-treatment, and extortion of the detainees.

In at least two villages, Sernovodsk and Alkhan-Kala, Russian forces went from house to house rounding up men without so much as conducting an initial passport check, villagers told Human Rights Watch. During Tuesday's sweep operation in Sernovodsk, prompted by a bomb explosion the previous day, hundreds of men were detained; the Alkhan-Kala sweep, which aimed to seize rebel leader Arbi Baraev, took place from June 19 to 25.

22 'The level of arbitrary detentions we are seeing now is unprecedented,' said Elizabeth Andersen, executive director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. 'This amounts to collective punishment and is absolutely unacceptable.'

Human Rights Watch researchers learned of other sweep operations in the last ten days in Assinovskaia, Kurchaloi, Mairtup, Starye Atagi, as well as two districts of Grozny. Many Chechens feared similar sweeps in other villages as well.

The new-style sweeps in Sernovodsk and Assinovskaia have already led to a new influx of fleeing civilians into Ingushetia. Human Rights Watch researchers in the region noticed an increase in the number of displaced Chechens in camps close to the Chechen- Ingush administrative border. Many civilians from Sernovodsk-including many who stayed in a camp for displaced people in the town-walked across the hills into Ingushetia Tuesday night, saying they feared a further sweep on Wednesday.

As of Thursday, it was unclear whether the new arrivals would stay in Ingushetia or return once the sweep in Sernovodsk ends. Human Rights Watch is concerned that those who wish to stay in Ingushetia may face problems registering with the Ingush authorities, as the Russian government ordered an end to registration of new displaced persons from Chechnya starting April 1, 2001." (HRW 6 July 2001)

"Monday, September 17 [2001] Chechen fighters carried out large coordinated attacks in towns of Gudermes, Argun and in Nozhay-Yurt district, south East Chechnya. Minor attacks were reported from other parts of Chechnya, including Grozny.

Chechen fighters shot down an Mi-8 military helicopter near Khankala, Russia's main military base in Chechnya. All 13 people on board, including general Anatoli Pozdnyakov, were killed. […] Wednesday, September 19 [2001]

More than 500 people have been detained over the last two days in Argun, Gudermes, and the Jalka village, following the coordinated attacks on these places on Monday. So called "mopping-up operations" were going on also in other parts of Chechnya and movement around the country was limited." (Prague Watchdog 23 September 2001)

For more information on violations on human rights by Federal forces, see " Civilian population in Chechnya continuously exposed to major threats for physical and personal security (2000-2001)" [Internal link]

Civilian population in Chechnya also exposed to the violence of the Chechen rebel groups (2000)

· Chechen rebel fighters fail to differentiate between civilians and combatants · Killings of civilian administrators who were associated with the Russian government

23 · Bomb attacks near Russian positions have led to loss of life and injury not only among Russian forces but also among civilians

"After their withdrawal from Chechnya's lowlands into the mountains, chechen rebel fighters reverted to guerilla warfare tactics, failing to differentiate between civilians and combatants. As a result, civilians have died or sustained injuries.

According to press reports, rebel groups have claimed responsibility for killing several civilian administrators who were associated with the Russian government. For example, Interfax, a Moscow-based agency, reported the murder of October 24 murder of Lecha Avturkoyev, head of the Kurchaloi district administration; the November 16 murder of Sharan Batagov, head of the administration of Mesker-Yurt village; and the January 4 murder of Saypudi Aksaktemirov, a city administration official in Argun. Itar-Tass agency reported the November 9 murder of Yusa Tsuyev, head of the Alkhan-Kala administration. As civilian administrators are noncombatants under the Geneva Conventions, direct attacks on them are violations of international humanitarian law.

In recent months, several bomb attacks near Russian military or police positions have led to loss of life and injury not only among Russian forces but also among civilians. These attacks affected both combatants and noncombatants and may have constituted violations of international humanitarian law.

Human Rights Watch asked officials in Moscow and Chechnya in writing for assistance in identifying and locating survivors of or witnesses to such incidents, in particular regarding civilian administrators who had been attacked or threatened because of their association with the Russian government. No assistance was forthcoming." (HRW 22 January 2001)

Review of population movements between Chechnya and Ingushetia (September 1999-December 2000)

· Most of the displaced arrived in Ingushetia n September 1999, mainly from Grozny and other major cities affected by the conflict · Significant return movements were reported following the fall of Grozny in February 2000 · The intensification of military operations from July 2000 triggered new flows of displaced into Ingushetia

"At the start of the last quarter of 1999, about 100,000 refugees were registered in Ingushetia. In two months that population almost doubled to reach 186,000 in December 1999, according to the HCR. That result, far below the level put forth by the Ingushetian migrations department, which put out a figure of 275,000 refugees, is probably closer to reality in view of the host country's desire to obtain an additional volume of aid. However, until February 2000 the fighting intensified constantly, and on that date it was estimated that almost 260,000 Chechens were refugees in Ingushetia.

24 During this period, the majority of the refugees came from Grozny and its surroundings, but also from a few other large cities (Ourous-Martan) which were still the only ones affected by war.

Generally speaking all of these refugees, exhausted, waited for hours at the border stations. On several occasions, the border was closed for several days. Even evacuation of the injured was then impossible, and the refugees remained in the rain and the mud, sleeping in trenches, without food.

- The return of the refugees to Chechnya following the fall of Grozny in February 2000

It was not until after the fall of Grozny (between 31 January 1999 and 2 February 2000) that the refugees began to return to Chechnya, leaving their precarious camps or housing, short of money for the tenants, in the hope of a normalisation of the situation.

That return movement was not on a large scale, little by little the number of refugees in Ingushetia declining to reach a population of less than 200,000 in May 2000 (175,000 according to the authorities).

Numerous refugees are multiplying their reconnaissance trips, and there are many of them (particularly the Grozny inhabitants) who found that they had no home left to which to return.

Others make business trips (mainly women coming to get supplies at the market in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia, to resell them on a retail basis in the stalls in Chechnya), and the majority travel because the families have become separated and it is first of all necessary to try to reconstruct.

- New flow of refugees into Ingushetia in June / July 2000

Since the beginning of July, the intensification of military operations, repression and Russian exactions related to the multiplication of military actions carried out by the Chechen fighters on their territory have brought a population shift back toward Ingushetia. Thus on 13 July 2000, the HCR recorded the passage of 400 families at the Kavkaz border station, as against fewer than 50 in the other direction. The next day the queue of refugees stretched out for more than two kilometres.

The majority of the new arrivals are still registered with the Ingushetian authorities, who have since received an order not to register anybody else.

Mid-July: according the manager of the Migrations department, 152,000 persons are officially registered compared with 210,000 in January. 35,000 of them are not Chechens (the majority being Ingushetians), and, benefiting from specific aid, they will not return to Chechnya. 67,000 Chechens are said to have left, by way of personal networks, for the other regions in the Russian Federation, and 100,000 others are "parked" in two provisional housing centres.

25 - A delicate situation since the summer of 2000 At present, the population movements seem to be stabilising, since about 150,000 officially registered persons are refugees in Ingushetia. 2,000 of them make very frequent round trips between Ingushetia and Chechnya to check on the possibility of re-settlement or to care for old people who are unable to travel. On the other hand, few definitive departures are registered. That is because of the present refusal on the part of the Migrations department to register the new arrivals or to re-register persons who have left Ingushetia a first time. The refugees' reluctance to leave that host republic is also explained by their fear of losing their place in a tent or in a carriage, this applying both to the official camps and to the informal ones.

To the 150,000 persons officially registered by the HCR, one should add an indefinite number of "clandestines". The fact is that the last few months the Russian military has laid siege to the mountains and to new villages, a fact that risks giving rise to a new flow of Chechens toward Ingushetia. The arrival of winter will probably increase the number of refugees.

A reign of terror is largely maintained by the Russian military which since summer has been multiplying bombardments of forests and fields, but also of homes using heavy artillery, exactions, sacks and installation of anti-personnel mines. In addition, a very large number of young men considered potential fighters have been arrested in the last few months. Last summer, some 'cleansing' operations also took place in the Ingushetian camps: Russian soldiers, supported by the Ingushetian militia, surrounded several camps and arrested all young men, particularly the ones who had spoken in the filtration camps.

The multiplication of such acts and their widespread distribution among the population of the camps maintain this climate of terror for the purpose of dissuading the Chechens from returning to their country. In addition there is the deterioration of the situation between the Chechens and the Ingushetians, the latter finding it ever more difficult to tolerate the presence of the refugees on their territory." (MDM December 2000)

Other causes of displacement

Ethnic Russian population leave North Caucasian republics in a context of ethnic antagonisms

"Immigration into the North Caucasus grew from 1989 (when there was anti Caucasian violence in Central Asia) and reached its peak in 1995 when a massive displacement occurred within the region as a result of fighting in Chechnya. From 1996 emigration overtook immigration and at present the migration balance is negative. Those who are leaving are the local intelligentsia and Russians, a rapidly shrinking minority.

26 In the nationalist conflicts among the indigenous groups, concessions to accommodate new demands were made at the expense of the local Russians. There is no official pressure on Russians to leave; in fact, measures are taken to encourage them to stay. In reality, however, all the important economic and socially prestigious positions, as well as viable political appointments, are being monopolized by indigenous groups. Only token Russians remain in formal positions, while the real power lies firmly with representatives of the titular groups. Moreover, many Russians used to work in the numerous defence enterprises in the region. They were left unemployed in changing economic circumstances when heavy industries collapsed and economic activities started to concentrate mainly around the trade and service sectors. Their ability to adapt to the new situation has also been hampered by the absence of extended family networks and lack of free capital. Moreover, Russians more readily consider emigration as few have roots in the North Caucasian republics and some have places to go back in the rest of Russia.

The Russian community in Chechnya is a special case. According to various estimates, between 30,000 to 50,000 still [June 1999] live in the republic, mostly in Naruski and Shelkovskii raions. They are subject to widespread abuse, pressure to give up their houses, robbery and murder, while the Chechen law enforcement structures are unable to offer effective protection. The Russian community has petitioned the federal authorities to organize an urgent evacuation of Chechnya for resettlement assistance, but their appeals have fallen on deaf ears. It is hypocritically assumed that Chechnya is a part of the Russian Federation and therefore Russians cannot face any specific problems." (Matveeva 1999, p. 58)

See also movements of Ethnic Russians leaving Chechnya prior to the first conflict in Chechnya in "Background to the conflict: Chechnya recent history (1922-1998)" [Internal link]

Displacement resulting from the inter-communal conflict in the Prigorodny district (1992-1998)

· Administrative and practical obstacles prevented the return of deported Ingush to the Prigorodny district in North-Ossetia after 1956 · Between 30,000 and 60,000 Ingush and 9,000 Ossetians forced to leave the Prigorodny district as a result of violent conflict in 1992 · Only the Ossetians have been able to return since

"The conflict area of Prigorodnyi Raion extends from the suburbs of Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia east to the present Ingush border, less than 20 minutes from Chechnya. Like the Chechens, the Ingush were forcibly deported under Stalin in 1944. When Khrushchev signed a decree rehabilitating the deported peoples in 1956, the lands presently comprising Prigorodnyi Raion, which had been ceded to North Ossetia, were not returned to the newly reconstituted Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) despite their 90 percent Ingush makeup prior to the deportations.

27 Administrative and practical obstacles, many of them engineered by Ossetian authorities, prevented many Ingush from again taking up residence on their former lands.

Tensions between the Ingush and Ossetians rose and fell through the 1970s and 1980s but exploded into the open with perestroika. Mass demonstrations and growing unrest led the Ossetian authorities to declare a state of emergency in Prigorodnyi in April 1991. Intercommunal violence rose steadily in the area of Prigorodnyi east of the Terek river, despite the introduction of 1,500 Soviet interior troops to the area. On April 26, 1991, in the last months of the Soviet Union, the Russian Supreme Soviet passed the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples that pledged a return to predeportation boundaries. Fearful of losing Moscow's support for a return of Prigorodnyi, Ingushetia opted to remain in Russia when Chechnya claimed independence. By this time, some 16,000 refugees from the conflict in South Ossetia, but who had primarily lived in other parts of Georgia, had fled north and took shelter in Prigorodnyi, significantly adding to the prevailing tensions. Ingush-Ossetian violence worsened and both sides began arming in earnest. According to human rights investigators, many of the worst incidents of intimidation and forced eviction of Ingush occurred at the hands of South Ossetian refugees. In some cases, North Ossetian locals protected Ingush from those refugees.

Open warfare broke out in October 1992. Approximately 500 people died in a week of concentrated violence during which many homes, primarily belonging to ethnic Ingush, were destroyed or taken over. Russian interior forces actively participated in the fighting and sometimes led Ossetian fighters into battle. Estimates of displacement from Prigorodnyi vary widely, but between 34,500-64,000 Ingush were forced to flee to Ingushetia and 9,000 Ossetians to North Ossetia. Most Ossetians had returned as of 1998, but only a handful of Ingush had done so. IDPs from Prigorodnyi who found refuge in Ingushetia would later compete for space and aid with massive influxes of Chechen IDPs.

The conflict in Prigorodnyi Raion remains frozen amid low-level, back-and-forth violence against police officers and civilians, widespread hostage taking, and deepening animosities. New hope for peace and resettlement was kindled in 1997 with Russian- brokered agreements that set out plans for return and resettlement. However, at the time of this writing, IDP returns have been stalled by continued violence and have been further undermined by the curtailment of UNHCR's presence due to untenable security conditions." (Hansen 1998, pp. 19-20)

For more details on the conflict, see also Human Rights Watch/Helsinki Report "The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodnyi Region" (May 1996) [Internet]

Definitions

Internal displacement in the CIS region: A wide range of categories

28 · Internally displaced persons have been officially recognised by governments of the CIS and international agencies as part of the scope of the June 1996 CIS Conference · The Russian Federation does not collect statistics based on the IDP definition but the category of "forced migrant", a status created to provide protection to ethnic Russians and others, coming from former Soviet republics (or "involuntary relocated persons", according to the terminology adopted by the CIS Conference), and internally displaced persons · It is possible to distinguish IDPs in statistics for forced migrants on the basis of the place of origin · Other categories defined in the context of the CIS Conference may also encompass internally displaced persons, such as the "formerly deported persons" or "ecological migrants"; those categories are not documented in this profile

Categories of population movements identified by the CIS Conference which can include internal displacement (CIS Conference 11 June 1996)

"Internally displaced persons (4) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

Note (4) Working definition used by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons (Document No. E/CN.4/1995/50 of 2 February 1995.)"

"Involuntarily relocating persons (7) are persons who are forced to relocate to the country of their citizenship as a result of circumstances endangering their lives, such as armed conflict, internal disorder, inter-ethnic conflict or systematic violations of human rights and who are in need of assistance to resettle in their countries of citizenship.

Note (7) In the Russian Federation, such persons are included in the category “forced migrants”, which may also include 'internally displaced persons'."

[Ed. Note: UNHCR continues to refer to IRPs in its programme documents for the Russian Federation. UNHCR planning figures for 2000 includes a total of 965,000 IRPs, which include some 170,000 persons who left Chechnya during the 1994-1996 conflict. The figure of 965,000 corresponds to the caseload of forced migrants, as defined in the Russian law (see below). (UNHCR December 1999, p. 193)]

"Formerly deported peoples are peoples who were deported from their historic homeland during the Soviet period. Some of the persons belonging to this category may be stateless. " [Ed.Note: The current country profile covers only internal displacement within the Russian Federation. Displacement from former Soviet Republics whose independence has been internationally recognized since then is not covered in the profile. This is the case of the Crimeans Tatars and the Meskhetians]

"Ecological migrants are persons who are obliged to leave their place of permanent residence and who move within their country, or across its borders, due to severe environmental degradation or ecological disasters."

29 [Ed. Note: Internal displacement as a result of human-made or natural disasters is not documented in this profile.]

Definition of a forced migrant, Law 20 December 1995 On The Introduction Of Amendments And Additions To The Law Of The Russian Federation "on Forced Migrants" "A forced migrant shall be a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave his/her place of permanent residence due to violence committed against him/her or members of his/her family or persecution in other forms, or due to a real danger of being subjected to persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, language or membership of some particular social group or political opinion following hostile campaigns with regard to individual persons or groups of persons, mass violations of public order."

[Ed. Note: This category has been applied by the authorities of the Russian Federation to provide protection to ethnic Russians, Tatars, and others, coming from former Soviet republics, and persons displaced within the Russian Federation, mainly as a result of the Osset-Ingush and the Chechen conflicts. Official statistics for forced migrants indicate the place of origin of the displaced, which makes possible to distinguish IDPs. (IOM 1998, pp.10-14]

For more information on the CIS Conference, see "The CIS Conference: A regional process to address the problems of displacement (May 1996)" [Internal link]

30 POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Population figures: displacement as a result of the second conflict in Chechnya (since August 1999)

Displaced population in Ingushetia: at least 150,000 persons (September 2001)

· Local authorities give the figure of 180,000 IDPs in Ingushetia, with only 150,000 of them being officially registered · Since April 2001, the Ministry of Nationality in Ingushetia has refused to register new arrivals · According to registration conducted by the Danish Refugee Council, 146,000 IDPs are currently living in Ingushetia · Small-scale return movements to Chechnya explain recent decrease of IDP population in Ingushetia · 70% of the displaced population have found accommodation with host families while the rest live in collective settlements

"According to the Ingush Branch of the Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and Ethnic Policies, at present there are 181,342 IDPs in Ingushetia, 150,087 of them being registered on the form No. 7 and consequently having the right for receiving the humanitarian assistance distributed by RF EMERCOM. The most part of IDPs is registered in Sunzhenskiy district, neighbouring to Chechnya (92,000). According to the Territorial Body of the Ministry of Federal Affairs in Ingushetia, the repeatedly arrived IDPs are not registered. Their number exceeds 9,000; they stay in tent-camps and at host families. The only source of survival for this category of IDPs is humanitarian assistance distributed by international relief agencies." (DRC 31 July 2001)

"DRC/ASF Registration

Ingushetia

According to the latest DRC/ASF survey data as of 28.09.2001, the number of the IDPs living in Ingushetia constitutes 146,922 persons. The majority of the IDPs live in Sunzhenskiy District of Ingushetia, neighbouring to Chechnya (52,549 persons). At present the survey data is processed at three DRC/ASF Information Centers (1 in Malgobek, 1 in Sleptsovsk and 2 in Nazran). The database is updated fornightly." (DRC 30 September 2001)

"At the time of the 1989 census, the number of population (97 nationalities) living in the Chechen-Ingush republic was about 1,270,500. By comparing the various sources with data from the 1989 census, and considering the number of people who have reportedly emigrated from the republic, as well as casualties, and morbidity and birth rates, the UN

31 considers that about 400,000 inhabitants currently live in Chechnya, whereas Ingushetia has about 320,000 inhabitants. The number of displaced people in Chechnya and Ingushetia is 160,000 and 160,000 respectively.

IDP Gender Females: 55 % Males: 45%

Where do the IDPs stay? Tent camps: 12 % Spontaneous settlements: 18% Host families: 70% Source UNHCR/Vesta" (UN June 2001, p. 14)

DRC/ASF registration of Chechnya IDPs in Ingushetia (as of 28/09/2001) (breakdown by age & sex)

Sex/Age 0-4 5-17 18-59 60+ Grand Total F 6 880 26 689 40 905 6 704 81 078 M 6 901 26 205 28 811 3 927 65 844 Total 13 781 52 794 69 716 10 631 146 922

(DRC 30 September 2001)

IDPs from Chechnya, total (1999-2000) 153 000 (UNHCR/DRC registration) Ethnicity: - ethnic Chechen 92 % - ethnic Ingush 7,1%

(UNHCR 1 March 2001)

"Since April 2001, the local branch of the Ministry of Nationality in Ingushetia has refused to register new arrivals (estimated at 12,700). This caused the unregistered IDPs to be deprived of humanitarian aid and/or shelter provided by the Government. Nevertheless, newcomers continue to be registered by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and are included in the aid provided by international organisations. According to DRC database, on which UNHCR assistance is based, the number of IDPs from Chechnya as of 30 June 2000, is 148,700 persons in Ingushetia and 132,323 in Chechnya." (UNHCR September 2001, p. 216)

Displaced population in Chechnya: At least 134,000 persons (September 2001)

· Danish Refugee Council registered 134,000 internally displaced persons in Chechnya for a total population of 790,000 persons

32 · According to UN estimates, Chechnya hosts about 160,000 internally displaced persons for a total population of 400,000 persons · 53% of the displaced population are women, according to DRC figures · Local authorities report 225,000 IDPs in Chechnya as of mid-2001

"As of 28.09.2001, the Chechnya population constitutes 789,251 persons, having as many as 134,439 inner IDPs in the area. The Chechnya database is served by 5 DRC/ASF Information Centers (in Urus Martan, Shali, Gudermes and two in Grozny). " (DRC 30 September 2001)

"At the time of the 1989 census, the number of population (97 nationalities) living in the Chechen-Ingush republic was about 1,270,500. By comparing the various sources with data from the 1989 census, and considering the number of people who have reportedly emigrated from the republic, as well as casualties, and morbidity and birth rates, the UN considers that about 400,000 inhabitants currently live in Chechnya, whereas Ingushetia has about 320,000 inhabitants. The number of displaced people in Chechnya and Ingushetia is 160,000 and 160,000 respectively." (UN June 2001, p. 14)

Table 3 Population of Chechnya and inner IDPs in Chechnya (as of 28/09/2001) (breakdown by district)

DistrictPresent Total IDP Achkhoy-Martanovskiy 68507 12561 Vedenskiy 25694 2240 Groznenskiy 82815 11549 Gudermesskiy 94373 12588 Itum-Kalinskiy 2894 203 Kurchaloyskiy 62903 4577 Nadterechny 45149 8087 Naurskiy 36240 6156 Nozhay-Yurtovskiy 37983 4356 Grozny City 91499 30350 Urus-Martanovskiy 88132 14863 Shalinskiy 107912 22654 Sharoyskiy 1363 4 Shatoyskiy 9257 1343 Shelkovskoy 34529 2908 · Total 789251 134 439

Table 4 DRC/ASF registration of inner IDPs in Chechnya (as of 28/09/2001) (breakdown by age & sex)

Sex / Age 0-4 5-17 18-59 60+ Grand Total F 5 846 21 240 37 925 6 436 71 447

33 M 5 809 22 044 30 934 4 205 62 992 Total 11 539 43 180 68 859 10 641 134 439

Table 5 DRC/ASF registration of population in Chechnya (as of 28/09/2001) (breakdown by age & sex)

Sex / Age 0-4 5-17 18-59 60+ Grand Total F 31 476 117 863 217 735 46 622 413 696 M 32 706 121 421 190 458 30 970 375 555 Total 64 182 239 284 408 193 77 592 789 251

(DRC 30 September 2001)

"In Chechnya, according to the Ministry of Nationality, an estimated 225,700 IDPs are without permanent shelter, out of whom 12,700 are currently residing in camps located in the northern part of the Republic." (UNHCR September 2001, p. 216)

Ingushetia hosts between 120,000 and 170,000 displaced persons from Chechnya (November 2000-March 2001)

· Estimates by local authorities give at least 170,000 internally displaced in Ingushetia but only about 150,000 displaced have been registered for humanitarian assistance · These figures may be inflated as a result of movements of displaced in Chechnya who travel to Ingushetia to collect food · 55% of the displaced are women and 45% are under 18 · About 70 % of the displaced are living with host families

UN planning figures for 2001 The UN has considered various sources of information on population figures for the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. These include government figures from EMERCOM and the Ministry of Federation; Danish Refugee Council registrations; and discussion with major humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC. While there is fairly widespread agreement that there are a total of 300-350,000 IDPs living in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the views differ on the proportion of IDPs in each of the two republics. The UN has compared the various sources with data from the last official census taken in 1989, and considered the number of people who have reportedly emigrated from the region, as well as known casualties, and morbidity and birth rates since 1989. As a consequence of this exercise the UN used the following figures as indicative for planning purposes.

Population Number Residents in Ingushetia 320,000

34 IDPs in Ingushetia 160,000

(UN November 2000, p. 8)

Field figures "According to the Ingush Branch of the Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and Ethnic Policies, presently there are 179,701 IDPs from Chechnya living in Ingushetia. Out of them, as many as 147,198 persons are officially registered by the local authorities and considered to be entitled to receive humanitarian assistance coming through EMERCOM and other state sources. […]

As of 19/02/2001, the total number of the displaced registered with DRC/ASF in Ingushetia constituted 153,683 persons." (DRC 26 February 2001)

UNHCR field figures as of 18 February 2001 122,500 IDPs in Ingushetia (of which 29,000 in camps) (IASC 28 February 2001)

Problems of registration According to an UNHCR/DRC update, 178 000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Chechnya are still staying in the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia [2] . Of this figure, 152 000 fled the recent conflict, the remainder has been displaced since the previous war. Minors make up 45% of this figure. According to the Ministry of Emergencies (EMERCOM) the IDPs in Ingushetia amount to 142 149. The discrepancy between the two figures is most likely due to the fact that UNHCR/DRC might have registered some IDPs residing on the Chechen side of the border and travelling to Ingushetia to collect food. However, to any of these figures one should add an additional few thousand IDPs who are not registered. It should be noted that the population of Ingushetia amounts to 300 000 people. (COE 23 January 2001, para. 4)

According to the Ingush authorities, currently there are 176,000 IDPs living in Ingushetia. 144,375 persons of them are officially registered. The official data also indicates that the highest number of IDPs are registered in Sunzha district. The number of displaced persons registered with DRC is 151,417. As indicated by the UNHCR monitors, the number of new arrivals from Chechnya is increasing, and during the reporting period as many as 1,700 persons arrived in Ingushetia while only 100 people left for Chechnya over the same period. The majority of new arrivals were from Argun, Grozny, and Achkhoy-Martan. The IDPs indicate the security situation and lack of inadequate living conditions as the main reasons for remaining in Ingushetia. (UN OCHA 15 February 2001)

IDPs from Chechnya, total (1999-2000) 153 000 (UNHCR/DRC registration) Ethnicity: - ethnic Chechen 92 % - ethnic Ingush 7,1% Female/Male 55 % / 45%

35 Children (under 18) 45 % Shelter : - in tent camps 10 % - in train wagons 2 % - in spontaneous settlements 18 % - with host families 70 % New arrivals of IDPs in Ing. 1-31 Feb. 2500 (UNHCR estimate) Return movement to Che. 1-31 Feb. 200 (UNHCR estimate)

(UNHCR 1 March 2001)

For more detailed statistics on the geographical distribution of the internally displaced population in Ingushetia and for breakdown figures by age group and genders, see also annex 1 to the report of the Danish Refugee Council No. 34, 26 February 2001 (pdf format) [Internet]

See also "Movements of displaced persons between Ingushetia and Chechnya remain without effect on the total IDP caseload (2000)" [Internal link]

Estimates for the internally displaced population in Chechnya range from 138,000 to 235,000 persons (February 2001)

· At least 70 % of the internally displaced population registered by the Danish Refugee Council are women and children · Central districts in Chechnya hosts about 50% of the displaced population

UN planning figures for 2001 "The UN has considered various sources of information on population figures for the republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia. These include government figures from EMERCOM and the Ministry of Federation; Danish Refugee Council registrations; and discussion with major humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC. While there is fairly widespread agreement that there are a total of 300-350,000 IDPs living in Chechnya and Ingushetia, the views differ on the proportion of IDPs in each of the two republics. The UN has compared the various sources with data from the last official census taken in 1989, and considered the number of people who have reportedly emigrated from the region, as well as known casualties, and morbidity and birth rates since 1989. As a consequence of this exercise the UN used the following figures as indicative for planning purposes."

Population Number Residents in Chechnya 370,000 IDPs in Chechnya 170,000

(UN November 2000, p. 8)

Field figures

36 Danish Refugee Council/ASF registration of Chechnya IDPs in Ingushetia (as of 19 February 2001) (Breakdown by location)

DistrictPresent Total IDP Achkhoy-Martanovskiy 75 131 17 474 Vedenskiy 21 257 1 827 Groznenskiy 86 174 13 361 Gudermesskiy 92 384 12 419 Zavodskoy 16 723 4 748 Itum-Kalinskiy 3 020 219 Kurchaloyskiy 62 646 4 656 Leninskiy 26 135 9 396 Nadterechny 45 033 7 992 Naurskiy 36 685 6 423 Nozhay-Yurtovskiy 33 785 4 092 Oktyabr'skiy 22 643 7 594 Staropromyslovskiy 27 092 6 554 Urus-Martanovskiy 91 114 14 083 Shalinskiy 108 581 23 835 Sharoyskiy 1 352 4 Shatoyskiy 8 732 1 137 Shelkovskoy 34 950 3 126 Total 793 437 138 940

DRC/ASF registration of inner IDPs in Chechnya (as of 19 February 2001) (breakdown by age & sex)

Sex / Age 0-4 5-17 18-59 60+ Grand Total W 5 444 21 934 39 736 6 784 73 898 M 5 571 22 634 32 401 4 436 65 042 Total 11 015 44 568 72 137 11 220 138 940

(DRC 26 February 2001)

See also survey conducted by the Danish Refugee Council about the population in Chechnya from March to July 2000 [Internet]

UNHCR reports 234,000 internally displaced persons in Chechnya (of which 12,000 in camps) as of 18 February 2001 (IASC 28 February 2001)

37 No precise figure for the displaced who left Chechnya and Ingushetia to other parts of Russia (2000)

· About 69,000 displaced in Ingushetia left to other parts of the Russian Federation, according to Federal authorities (November 2000) · UN figures give 20,000 internally displaced in Dagestan as of November 2000 · About 20,000 displaced left Chechnya to other North-Caucasian republics and Moscow as of June 2000, according to UNHCR

"According to the Ingush Territorial Representative Office of the RF Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and National Policy (former Migration Service for Ingushetia), since the beginning of the military conflict in Chechnya in 1999, a total of 302,390 IDPs from Chechnya came to Ingushetia. Out of them, 68, 792 persons left for other parts of Russia, and 91,181 - returned to Chechnya." (DRC 10 November 2000)

40,000 estimated IDPs from the current Chechnya conflict are located in other parts of the Russian Federation (than Ingushetia), mainly in the North-Caucasian republics and Moscow (10,000) (UNHCR 6 March 2001).

"Figure for Dagestan are scanty and even more difficult to verify. Aid agencies could use the following figures as indicative for planning purposes: 12,000 IDPs from Chechnya and 8,000 IDPs from within Dagestan itself." (UN November 2000, p. 8)

Population figures: other situations of displacement

Caseload from the first conflict in Chechnya

· 169,000 displaced from Chechnya were officially registered as forced migrants between 1992 and 1999; about 114,000 of them remain registered as of June 2000 · Up to 300,000 ethnic Russians may have fled Chechnya during that period since not all of them were registered at their new place of residence, according to the government · The Chechen diaspora throughout Russia may reach 500,000 persons, the government estimates

"Before October 1991 (the actual date of D. Dudaev's rise to power) Chechnya's population was over 1 million persons including 744,500 Chechens (57.8%); 229,500 Russians (23.1%); 21,000 Ukrainians; 15,000 Armenians; 10,000 Nogayans; 6,000 Tartars and other nationalities.

In 1992-1994, as a result of a determined policy of forcing out the representatives of the non-title nation and the flight of the Chechen intellectuals to other entities of the Russian Federation about 250,000 persons left Chechnya. Out of this number 83,400 inhabitants (in 1992 - 21,588; 1993 - 39,823; 1994 - 22,008) were officially registered as internally displaced persons.

38 In 1995-1996, 53,700 more persons were registered as internally displaced (in 1995 - 33,769; 1996 -19,922). In the consecutive years the outflow from Chechnya continued. 32,849 inhabitants were registered as internally displaced persons (in 1997 - 15,160; 1998 - 13,007; in the first half of 1999 - 4,682). The actual number of those who have fled Chechnya was much higher since not all of them were registered at their new place of residence.

The Chechen population of Chechnya as of September 1999 was about 650,000 persons but for social, economic and other reasons about 50% of the Chechen inhabitants were practically permanently residing beyond the Republic's territory i.e. under 350,000 Chechens were actually living in the Chechen Republic.

The Chechen 'diaspora' in other regions of Russia reaches today 500,000 persons, including up to 250,000 in Moscow.

According to some estimates, the Russian population in Chechnya accounts now for no more than 20,000 persons i.e. has reduced 10 times as compared to 1991. (Government of the Russian Federation 17 January 2000)

Other neighbouring regions, namely the Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya, the Republic of Dagestan and the Stavropol region accommodate in total approximately 10 000 people displaced after the recent conflict. However, certain areas have been accommodating large numbers of Chechen IDPs since 1992. According to the Russian official figures, as many as 300 000 ethnic Russians have left the Chechen Republic since 1992. For example, in the Stavropol region alone, the number amounts to 76 000 people. The delegation visited some settlements of Russian IDPs from Chechnya in the area of Budennovsk constructed with the assistance of local communities. The Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration. Undoubtedly, living conditions in these settlements are much better than those in IDP camps and the majority of IDPs have been successfully integrated into the local communities. Many of them have found employment. (COE 23 January 2001, para. 5)

Internally displaced persons registered as "forced migrants" 131,340 IDPs currently hold the forced migrant status, as of June 2001. 810 percent of them have been displaced from Chechnya, mostly as a result of the first 1994-96 Chechnya. Other have been displaced from other republics in northern Caucasus, mainly Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The IDPs ex-Chechnya are spread all over the Russian Federation, but most have settled in the North-Caucasus District; IDPs with forced migrant status from Prigorodny district of North-Ossetia are mainly in Ingushetia (14,158 persons as of June 2001). (Federal Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, June 2001)

Ingushetia hosts between 16,000 and 35,000 displaced from the Prigorodny District (north Ossetia) (1999-2000)

39 According to the Federal Ministry on Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, 14,650 internally displaced from the Prigorodny district (North Ossetia) in Ingushetia are holders of the forced migrant status as of January 2001. (Ministry of Federal Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy, January 2001)

"Another 35,000 ethnic Ingush from North Ossetia remained internally displaced in Ingushetia." (USCR 2000, p. 270)

"A total of 23,009 IDPs from the Prigorodny District (North Ossetia-Alania) and 5 IDPs from Dagestan were registered in Ingushetia during the process [of registration undertaken by the Danish Refugee Council in Ingushetia in February-March 2000]." (DRC 21 March 2000)

Statistical sources

Populations figures of the Federal and regional Migration Services flawed by inconsistent practices

· Statistics from the Federal Migration Service include only those IDPs who officially registered as 'forced migrants' · Some regions overstate the number of forced migrants; Cases of multiple registered migrants · Large number of forced migrants do not go through the registration process either because they do not see any benefit therefrom or as a result of restrictive admission policies in the regions

"According to official statistics, as of 1 January 1998, there were 1,191,939 'refugees' and 'forced migrants' in the Russian Federation. Such figures include only those who officially registered with the Federal Migration Service (FMS). Sue to a lack of clarity in the legislation and flawed registration practices, official statistics do not always correctly reflect the magnitude of forced migration flows. […] The FMS set up branch offices, which forward local statistical information on a monthly basis to the headquarters. Since 1993, the FMS has published annual statistical reports, which include data not only on the numbers but also on ethnic, social and demographic composition of the registered persons. The FMS has also established computer links with some of its regional branches. This made statistical information more regular and more reliable. The categories of published data, however, were not consistent over the years. For some years, for example, FMS bulletins contain data on the percentage of successful petitions for a given status, on rural-urban distribution of 'forced migrants', and on the regional distribution of different ethnic migrants groups, but for other years such data are not included. […] [T]he categories of 'refugees' and 'forced migrants' do not correspond with internationally accepted ones, including those adopted as working definitions at the CIS Conference. The Russian categories encompass not only CIS refugees, persons in refugee-like situations,

40 involuntary relocating persons, but also IDPs and some repatriants. While it is possible to distinguish IDPs on the basis of the place of origin, the relative share of the other categories among the total inflows of 'refugees' and 'forced migrants' is difficult to assess. […] [One factor] that affected statistical evaluation relates to flawed practices. It is widely believed that some regions overstate the number of registered migrants. The local administration receives funds in relation to the number of such migrants, and so multiple registration suits both the migrants and the administrators. For example, the North Ossetian authorities in 1993 claimed a figure of about 110,000 'refugees', but the real figure was thought to be considerably lower. On the other hand, more than forty subjects of the Russian Federation limit the migrant inflows to their territories. More than twenty subjects passed restrictive legislative acts in this respect, which contradicts the 1993 Federal law on freedom of travel and choice of residence.

Some migrants register more than once in order to get benefits several times. Many 'forced migrants', however, ignore registration altogether because they perceive the process as cumbersome and the benefits very limited. This is particularly true for those who settle with relatives. In December 1992 when the Government started to grant interest-free loans to migrants, the number of persons registering rose sharply. According to the FMS, 'this immediate increase of the number of 'forced migrants' in the Russian Federation exceeds by far those 'officially registered.'

The discrepancy between registered and real inflows of 'refugees' and 'forced migrants' varies from region to region and depends considerably on the admission policy pursued by the regions. For example, as of 1 January 1994, the number of 'forced migrants' in Krasnodar region was slightly over 14,000, according to the FMS, and 120,000, according to regional authorities. Major discrepancies between officially registered and actual numbers of inflow are common to the regions with restrictive admission and residence policies towards 'refugees' and 'forced migrants'. They are Krasnodar and Stavropol districts, Moscow and St. Petersburg, Rostov, Kaliningrad, Moscow and Leningrad regions, and more recently, Belgorod, Voronezh, Volgograd, Yaroslavl. Kursk, Penza, Ulyanovsk and some other regions, Tatarstan, Bashkotostan, Northern Ossetia and some other republics. This is widely acknowledged by FMS officials themselves. The more rigid the restrictive measures are towards 'refuges' and 'forced migrants', the bigger the share of them without proper status or even propiska. In this case, they are not covered by statistics of forced migration or total migration inflow to the region." (IOM 1998, pp. 12-14)

The Danish Refugee Council puts in place an informal registration system in Ingushetia (1999-2000)

· Database provides detailed statistics about the displaced population in Ingushetia but also helps to identify most vulnerable persons and contributes to family reunification · Registered displaced persons are deleted from the database if they do not appear to two food distributions consecutively · Registration for relief aid has become a pull factor for the displaced to come to Ingushetia

41 "On 18/02 DRC accomplished registration of displaced population in Ingushetia. The information that has already been included into a computerized database program that presents the actual picture of displacement in the republic. The registration was funded by UNHCR and performed in close cooperation with the Ingush Migration Service and the local authorities. A total of 80 field workers, including DRC FO Nazran staff temporarily hired personnel, took part in the registration. The database does not only show the breakdown of the IDP population by different categories, like age, sex number of people in a family, etc., but also serves as a profitable tool for identification of the most vulnerable persons, contributes to a family reunification program." (DRC 23 February 2000)

"The basic registration of the IDPs currently settled in Ingushetia was conducted by the Danish Refugee Council from 15 January to 22 February 2000. The registration was funded by UNHCR. An additional registration took place from 22 to 29 February that also allowed for corrections of minor mistakes that had occurred in the first preliminary version of the database. After the information collected during the additional registration has been processed, it appears that the total number of IDPs from Chechnya in Ingushetia has increased significantly and by late February has arrived at 213,821 instead of the originally registered 186,149 IDPs.

It is envisaged that the results of the DRC deregistration mechanisms soon will become apparent. The deregistration takes place at the food distribution points. When registrered IDPs have not appeared twice during the bi-weekly food distributions, they are assumed to have returned and are deleted from the IDP database. Hence, DRC expects that the number of registered IDPs shortly will decrease again.

Shortly after the end of the basic registration of the IDP population in Ingushetia, DRC opened an Information Center in Nazran. The Center provides IDPs with information for family reunification, assists the displaced in identification of their registration points, etc. It is located at DRC FO Nazran and consists of two DRC staff receiving visitors from 9:00 to 17:00 (incl. Saturdays and Sundays). Over 30,000 IDPs have registered themselves more than once during the IDP registration and double entries on the same IDPs have been deleted from the database. Consequently, many double registered IDPs are not aware of the distribution points where they are entitled to receive their food rations." (DRC 13 March 2000)

Registration as a pull factor to Ingushetia "As mentioned in earlier Situation Reports, DRC and UNHCR conducted a registration of the IDPs in Ingushetia from 15 January to 22 February. After that on-going registration points were established that allowed newly arrived IDPs to register as well. However, during the first week of the continued registration almost 30,000 additional IDPs registered, since apparently the registration for humanitarian relief aid had become a pull factor for IDPs to come to Ingushetia. By late February the number of registered IDPs had arrived at 213,821 instead of the originally registered 186,149 IDPs and DRC had to stop the registration. However, the latest upsurge of guerilla activities in Chechnya has

42 led to an additional significant inflow of people fleeing from the war zone. In view of the fact and following the request of UNHCR, DRC resumed registration of newly arrived Chechnya IDPs in Ingushetia on 29 March. For convenience reasons, it was decided to open a registration point in three locations of Ingushetia: Nazran, Malgobek and Sleptsovskaya. An additional registration point is soon to be set up in Karabulak.

The deregistration mechanism is beginning to show results as well. The deregistration takes place at the 56 UNHCR/WFP/DRC distribution points throughout Ingushetia. When IDPs have not twice appeared at the bi-weekly distributions they are assumed to have returned and are deleted from the distribution lists and from the database. By late March the number of registered IDPs had therefore decreased slightly to a little more than 210,000 persons.

From 26 March to 4 April, DRC has registered 2,943 IDPs at the three registration points in Ingushetia. It is expected that the number of registered IDPs will increase more significantly, once it has become widely known that DRC has resumed registration, and especially when DRC will begin distribution in Karabulak with its concentration of newly arrived IDPs." (DRC 4 April 2000)

43 PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Constant movements of IDPs between Chechnya and Ingushetia (2000)

· Registration of displaced for humanitarian distribution and larger food rations distributed in Ingushetia have been a pull factor for people in Chechnya to go to Ingushetia · The displaced population in Ingushetia decreased in December-January 2000 but approaching winter and continuous violence continue to push people out of Chechnya

"Some movements of the population may be continuously observed. Over the last week there has been a small increase in the number of IDPs arrivals in Ingushetia. It is estimated that approximately 1 000 arrived in Ingushetia in October. This movement seems to be largely due to the ongoing UNHCR/DRC re-registration exercise to update the list of those eligible to humanitarian aid distribution in Ingushetia. Also, some IDPs are arriving in Ingushetia due to continued fighting and military screening operations, as well as lack of winterised shelters in Chechnya. New arrivals come mostly from Grozny, where living conditions are increasingly difficult with winter approaching.

As of 15 January [2001], the number of registered Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia has dropped to about 147,000 people. This is approximately 12,000 people less than at the end of the last month. However the total number of IDP could quickly rise as a result of continued violence in Chechnya." (WFP 19 January 2001)

Influence of food aid on movements of the displaced "WFP monitors constantly receive complaints from IDPs over the fact that Ingushetia and Chechnya the food rations are not the same. WFP representative suggested to consider a possibility of similar food rations to be used in Ingushetia and Chechnya. DRC/ASF supported the idea, in general. The fact, in the initial stage of its program of food assistance in Chechnya DRC/ASF has already proposed to unify the rations. The present discrepancy between the rations in the republics creates a pull factor for the people to come to Ingushetia for the assistance and slows down the IDP return to Chechnya from the Ingush Republic." (DRC 24 October 2000)

See also "Movements of displaced persons between Ingushetia and Chechnya remain without effect on the total IDP caseload (2000)" [Internal link]

High-risk road to safety: selected reports (November 1999)

44 · Routes from besieged cities effectively closed due to artillery and air bombardment; no safe corridors · Displaced in flight exposed to extortion and arbitrary detention at check points

"Civilians fleeing the bombing have also suffered casualties. Routes to safety from besieged towns remain effectively closed due to artillery and air bombardment. Particularly dangerous is a stretch of the Baku-Rostov highway—the principal artery crossing east-west through Chechnya to the Ingush border—that passes southwest of Grozny. 'Ramazan' left Shatoi on November 16 at 3:00 a.m. in a van with 15 people. At approximately 7:00 a.m., on the Baku-Rostov highway outside the town of Kulary, five shots rang out towards their vehicle from a Russian position on the left side of the road. One hit the vehicle, and seriously wounded 4-year- old Eliza Khabaeva. According to her father Isa, 38, she is now in the intensive care ward of Sunzhenskaia district hospital in Sleptsovsk.

Kharon Askhabov, 35, said that he was unaware of any humanitarian corridor out of Urus Martan. He left on November 15 at 7:00 a.m. in a convoy of three cars with relatives. On the Baku-Rostov highway outside of Achkoi Martan, one of the cars was hit by a shell, and the seven passengers were killed: an old man, two women, and four children. 'Ruslan' from Urus Martan related that he saw two empty cars, one of them burning, the other with holes from shrapnel on the Baku-Rostov highway close to Zakan-Iurt on November 15. The passengers had presumably fled.

Human Rights Watch notes that thousands of displaced persons flee each day on the Rostov-Baku highway. Any firing on this road, which, according to witness testimony, is frequent, runs the risk of striking civilian vehicles, endangering the lives of displaced persons. Human Rights Watch calls on the United Federal Forces to take all feasible measures to protect noncombatants fleeing for safety, including declaring periodic cease- fires.

Human Rights Watch's letter to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees urged her to seek assurances from Prime Minister Putin that Russian forces would protect fleeing civilians from attacks; that corrupt border police would be disciplined; and that humanitarian organizations would have unfettered access to Chechnya, including areas under Russian control.

Reaching the border is not the last hurdle the displaced must face before safety. Kharon Askhabov left Urus Martan on November 15. At the second control point after Assinovskii, federal soldiers demanded money from him, detaining him for forty minutes. When he answered that he had no money, they swore at him and threatened, 'If you don't give us some [money], you'll be last in this line, or you won't get across at all.' He replied that in his car there were three women and seven children. They swore at him again. He had only 60 rubles for gasoline (approximately U.S.$2). The women in his car gathered 300 rubles so that the soldiers would let him through. Askhabov, who had left Ingushetia the day before to return to Chechnya to bring his family to safety, had already been forced to pay 400 rubles in order to enter Chechnya. Another displaced person

45 interviewed at the Chechen-Ingush border recounted that on November 15, soldiers at the border demanded 100 rubles, ostensibly a fine for riding his motorcycle without a helmet." (HRW 18 November 1999)

"[W]omen and men are subjected to 'filtration' when their identity documents are checked against computer data, which allegedly includes information on suspected members of armed Chechen groups and their relatives. They are usually kept for some time at a detention place at the checkpoint and then taken to 'filtration camps'. Hundreds of men and teenage boys have also been reportedly detained in the towns and villages of Naursky District, Grozny and other regions under the control of the Russian forces and taken to 'filtration camps'." (AI 17 February 2000)

46 PROTECTION CONCERNS

Physical safety and personal liberty

Displaced in Ingushetia under pressure to return to Chechnya (1999-2001)

· Ingushetia has been the only territory opened to the civilians fleeing the war in Chechnya · Since 1999, Federal authorities have attempted to return the displaced to Chechnya · Methods used include the transfer of settlements and aid from Ingushetia and the creation of "safe areas" in Chechnya · Since April 2001, Federal authorities have suspended the registration of newly displaced arriving in Ingushetia · According to recent survey, most displaced have no intention of returning to Chechnya during 2001 · UNHCR recommends cautious approach to return to Chechnya

"We are extremely concerned that the Russian authorities are again pressing the inhabitants of the Chechen Republic to return.

Since the renewal of military activities in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999 there have been numerous attempts first not to let the peaceful population leave the territory of Chechnya and then to make them return.

Inhabitants of Chechnya, wishing to leave the fighting zone, were forbidden from travelling beyond its borders. At the end of September 1999, a telegram was sent to this effect to the interior ministry authorities for the regions and republics of the Russian Federation. It was signed by the commander of the united "West" federal military group, General Major V Shamanov.

Practically the only Russian region receiving forcibly displaced persons from Chechnya was the republic of Ingushetia. At the beginning of November 1999, its borders were opened to people fleeing the war, on the personal instruction of President of the Republic of Ingushetia, R Aushev. The federal military command opposed this decision for a long time.

As early as 12 November 1999, Deputy Primeminister of the Russian Government and representative of the Russian Government in the Chechen Republic, Nicolai Koshman, stated at a press conference that by 25 December all Chechens who had been forcibly displaced would be relocated from Ingushetia to the territory of Chechnya. Soon thereafter, an attempt was made to send railway carriages with refugees from Ingushetia into Chechnya.

47 Later various populated areas in Chechnya were declared 'safe zones'. It was recommended to people who had lived in these areas that they could return to them. Both inside Chechnya, and beyond its borders, inhabitants from the "safe zones" were not allowed to register using Form No. 7, essential for receiving minimum welfare benefits. By Order No. 15 of the Federal Welfare Ministry of 25 February 2000, Form No. 7 was abolished completely. However, within three weeks this order was revoked because of the worsening situation in Chechnya and the sharp increase in the flows of refugees.

Appeals and even demands to return are being continually repeated. At the same time, provision of food in the refugee camps in Ingushetia has stopped. Ingushetia is owed between 300 and 500 million roubles by the federal authorities. Meanwhile the return of inhabitants to Chechnya has been accompanied neither by the creation of even basic living conditions nor any relenting in the arbitrary behaviour of the military. Since the start of 2001, in the few temporary living centres to which refugees have been sent from Chechnya since autumn 1999 food has been stopped on a number of occasions. […] Since 13 April 2001, registration of people leaving the Chechen Republic on Form No. 7 has been stopped by a decision of the territorial authority for the federal ministry for Ingushetia. The minister from the Ingushetia Republic Emergency Situations Ministry, V Kuks, has declared that registration will stop for about one month until a new form is available. However, no mention has been made of the new form in any federal documents.

At the end of May, the head of the administration for the Chechen Republic, Akhmad Kadyrov stated that he was reckoning on the return of all the forcibly displaced persons currently living in camps in Ingushetia, before the first winter frosts. After a working meeting to discuss problems of developing production in Chechnya, held at the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, A Kadyrov declared that according to information from the heads of the republic's regional administrations, it would be possible to place up to fifty thousand returning forcibly displaced persons in homes. In addition, there are about fifteen thousand places in makeshift general accomodation in buildings such as schools, halls of residence and kindergartens.

The head of the Chechnya administration then attacked the leadership of Ingushetia for allegedly holding the refugees back by force and frightening them.

The Federal Minister for Chechnya Matters, Vladimir Elagin was even more emphatic. The Minister on 24 May ran a conference on 'A plan for work by an interdepartmental group to create the conditions for the return of citizens who have temporarily left the Chechen Republic and on the question of rebuilding the social and economic infrastructure of the Chechen Republic'. A resolution was passed at the conference on creating seven temporary living centres on the territory of the republic and on returning refugees from Ingushetia to Chechnya in the course of June 2001. Compensation was promised, for those who returned to the republic in June, for lost homes.

48 At the request of the UNHCR, members of the non-governmental organisation "Vesta" carried out a poll of 624 families of Chechens (4,370 people), living in private homes, camps and other arbitrary accomodation which has sprung up in Ingushetia. Around 24 % of families asked, said that some or all members of their family planned to return to Chechnya this year. Around 75 % of families did not plan to return this year, if the situation remained unchanged, and 9 % of families had no intention of ever returning to Chechnya. On the basis of these results it is easy to conclude that the inhabitants of Chechnya are not ready to return.

People do not wish to return home, not just because of the advice of Ruslan Aushev. The reasons are well known: no guarantees of safety, shootings, people being killed on a daily basis, illegal actions being carried out by representatives of federal forces, especially during the continual 'clean-up' operations." (Memorial 7 June 2001)

See also Memorial, Violations of humanitarian law and human rights; situation of civilians who have fled the conflict zone 20 January 2001 [Internet] and Situation of Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of Ingushetia, Spring 2001 [Internet]

"The Russian authorities on many occasions assured the delegation that they do not intend to exert any pressure on IDPs to return and there are no reports of direct forced repatriation.

However, some IDPs complain that in order to collect their pensions they have to go to Chechnya even if they are registered in Ingushetia which they feel as a kind of indirect pressure." (COE 23 January 2001, paras. 45-46)

UNHCR response "UNHCR has addressed forced return to dangerous areas effectively to date; the capacity to intervene effectively must be expanded in areas where violence continues. The hospitable attitude of authorities in areas of relative safety requires encouragement and support. A careful balance must be maintained between activities undertaken in Chechnya and those implemented in Ingushetia, to avoid creating a false sense of security or the potential for attracting individuals back to dangerous areas." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.3.10)

See also "UNHCR avoids stimulating false sense of security in Chechnya (February 2001)" [Internal link]

Civilian population in Chechnya continuously exposed to major threats for physical and personal security (2000-2001)

· The civilian population are far less frequently the victims of indiscriminate bombing and shelling than in the early months of the war · Russian soldiers and police continue to arbitrarily detain men and women, particularly young Chechen men ranging in age from fifteen to forty-five, and loot homes

49 · Human Rights Watch also collected testimonies of torture and ill-treatment in detention centres, extortion by the Russian Forces, disappearances, and other forms of violence · The Chechen rebel fighters have also committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law

"With major military clashes between Russian and Chechen forces ending in spring 2000, civilian lives in Chechnya are blighted by Russian forces who detain, torture, extort, and harass them on a daily basis; and by Chechen rebels who target civilians who cooperate with the Russian administration, and who bomb Russian positions in densely populated areas. Even though civilians are far less frequently the victims of indiscriminate bombing and shelling than they were in the early months of the war, they still face the daily risk of torture, "disappearance," and summary execution.

Russian forces now control all districts of Chechnya, except for parts of the mountainous south, where it continues to bomb and launch artillery strikes on Chechen positions. Chechen rebels mount frequent ambushes on Russian government troops in Russian- controlled areas, kill soldiers at checkpoints, attack police stations and Russian military positions, and target for murder Chechens working with the Russian administration. […] On the basis of almost one hundred new interviews with victims and witnesses, Human Rights Watch found that violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have not lessened; they have become routine. Civilians continue to live in a stranglehold of fear.

Russian soldiers and police on sweep operations arbitrarily detain men and women, particularly young Chechen men ranging in age from fifteen to forty-five, and loot homes. Detainees are frequently taken to makeshift detention facilities such as earthen pits, where they are routinely tortured and denied all due process rights. Many detainees have "disappeared" without a trace. Groups of masked men, often speaking unaccented Russian, burst into homes of civilians at night and take away or kill their inhabitants. Chechen rebels have threatened and killed civilian administrators and are presumably responsible for the bombing of Russian positions that have killed and wounded numerous civilians.

All of the abuses described in this brief research summary took place from July to November 2000, a time the Russian government has characterized as a "period of normalization" of the situation in Chechnya. The pattern of abuses described confirms the work of other human rights and humanitarian organizations active in Chechnya, including the Memorial Human Rights Center, a prominent Russian nongovernmental organization.

Sweep Operations: Arbitrary Detention and Pillage Russian forces conduct sweeps of towns and villages ostensibly to seize illegal weapons and ferret out those suspected of rebel collaboration. In many Chechen villages, sweeps may occur anywhere from every week to every few days. During a sweep, soldiers typically surround a village, district, or street and conduct systematic house-to house searches. Russian forces on sweep operations have arbitrarily detained large numbers of

50 people, primarily young men, for indefinite periods, often holding them in pits or other makeshift facilities. They have also systematically stripped homes of valuables.

The most frequently cited grounds for detention of Chechens is the need to check the identity of the detainee or his or her lack of a residence permit for the town or village where the sweep operation is taking place. Periods of detention may last from a day or two to weeks or months. Russian forces have detained Chechens on other, wholly arbitrary grounds as well […];

In the vast majority of cases Human Rights Watch documented, officials at police stations or military command posts did not formally register the detentions. Detainees are often held in unofficial detention centers, have no access to lawyers, and are not formally charged; while they interrogate detainees, it is not clear whether police and other Russian forces carry out further further investigatory measures, such as summoning witnesses or gathering material evidence. […] Numerous Chechen civilians told Human Rights Watch that their houses had been stripped of their valuables by soldiers and police officers during sweep operations. In fact, these operations were so frequently the occasion of systematic pillage that many Chechens believe they are carried out not to seek out rebel fighters and their weapons or ammunition depots but for the personal enrichment of the troops. […]

Torture and Ill-treatment Twelve persons provided Human Rights Watch detailed testimony of torture they suffered, through November 2000, while being detained by Russian security forces. Several medical professionals told Human Rights Watch that they frequently treat persons who are victims of torture, suggesting that the practice is widespread and ongoing. A doctor from a mid-sized village in Chechnya, for example, told Human Rights Watch that for months he has examined new torture victims every week.

All former detainees, without exception, told Human Rights Watch that they had been beaten and kicked while being held by Russian security forces. Many said they were tied up, or suspended by their hands above the ground, and beaten and kicked on the arms, legs, head, and kidneys. Several former detainees said they had been beaten on the genitals. […] A number of former detainees also reported being tortured by electric shock. […]

Extortion Most former detainees told Human Rights Watch that Russian forces had extorted payment from their relatives in exchange for their release; sums ranged from several thousand roubles to thousands of dollars, and would include demands for weapons and ammunition. (18) According to relatives of former detainees, Russian forces set specific

51 sums and deadlines for paying. Extorted sums were paid either directly to soldiers or police officers holding the detainee, or through middlemen. […]

"Disappearances" Many Chechen men "disappear" after being taken into Russian custody. Witnesses claim to have seen Russian forces take the individuals into custody, after which all trace of them is lost. In almost all such cases, family members who actively seek information from Russian military, police, and procuracy officials are informed that the person was not on any list of detainees and had never been detained. […]

Unidentified Attackers Many interviewees told Human Rights Watch of the intense fear generated by a new pattern of nighttime raids on homes by armed men in masks believed to be Russian security personnel, although in plain clothes. The raiders did not appear to be motivated by financial gain. Human Rights Watch documented three such cases that took place between September and November 2000. […]

Random Shootouts and Indiscriminate Fire Chechen civilians fear wanton criminal violence by Russian forces as much as they fear the arrest and torture of their loved ones. Random violence and shootouts, often by drunken soldiers, have become part and parcel of life in Chechnya. " (HRW 22 January 2001)

See latest reports of violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Chechyna:

· Memorial, "Cleansing Operation in the Village of Alleroy", 24 August 2001 [Internet] · Memorial, "Cleansing Operation in the Village of Stariye Atagi", 13 August 2001 [Internet] · Memorial, "Cleansing Operation in the Village of Tsotsin-Yurt", 6 August 2001 [Internet] · Memorial "'Cleansing Operations' in the village of Chiri-Yurt: May – June 2001", 30 July 2001 [Internet] · HRW "New Round of Russian Sweep Operations Triggers Outflow of Civilians", 6 July 2001 [Internet]

See also Memorial 2 January 2001 "Human Rights Violations in Chechnya" [Internet]

For more information on violence by the Chechen rebel fighters, see "Civilian population in Chechnya also exposed to the violence of the Chechen rebel groups (2000)" [Internal link]

52 Civilian casualties in Chechnya mainly caused by landmines and unexploded ordnance (2000)

· Women and children suffer 4% of all injuries related to hostilities and 34 % of all mine and UXO injuries · Movements of the displaced between Chechnya and Ingushetia increases the risk of sustaining mine-related injuries

"An MSF Holland assessment of 56 health facilities in Chechnya undertaken from 16 March - 30 April 2000 revealed that 66 percent of the facilities had reported that gun shot wounds and mine injuries were among the three main causes of mortality for adults. In a more recent assessment of 23 facilities undertaken by MSF Holland in August 2000 (conducted in Grozny city and district as well as Argun city, Shali and Shatoy), 67% of all casualties related to hostilities are reportedly due to mine and UXO injuries. Women and children were reported as suffering 4% of all injuries related to hostilities and 34 % of all mine and UXO injuries. 170 casualties related to hostilities were identified for the month of August alone.

Although relatively few IDPs have returned permanently to Chechnya, many travel back and forth for a few days at a time. in addition, as the winter sets in, more people may be obliged to move in Chechnya seeking food and shelter, thereby increasing the risk of sustaining mine-related injuries." (UN November 2000, pp. 33-34)

Chechens elsewhere in the Russian Federation exposed to discriminatory treatment (2000)

· Moscow administration has taken measures against non-Muscovites · Chechen and other ethnic minorities face increased harassment by police in Moscow

"Chechens in Moscow faced very serious abuses in the aftermath of the bombings of two Moscow apartment buildings in September 1999. Federal and local authorities took a series of draconian administrative measures against non-Muscovites as a result of which many children could not go to school while adults had trouble finding work, getting married, or receiving passports. At the same time, Moscow police were given carte blanche to terrorize ethnic Chechens living in the city. Police dragged more than twenty thousand Chechens to police stations, photographing and fingerprinting many of them. According to the Russian human rights organizations Memorial and Civic Assistance, police prosecuted at least fifty Chechens after planting drugs and ammunition in their clothes or their apartments. Moscow courts found most of these Chechens guilty despite overwhelming evidence that the charges were trumped up. Members of other ethnic minorities also faced increased harassment by police.

When Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov spoke of a possible "Chechen connection" following another bombing in Moscow in August 2000, Chechens appeared to be in for a repeat performance. However, the dramatic sinking of a Russian submarine diverted attention

53 from the bombing and police apparently abandoned the crackdown, though not before detaining and seriously beating at least some Chechens." (HRW December 2000, p. 317)

Local population and displaced persons in southern Ingushetia exposed to military activities (August 2000)

"IDPs in the southern parts of Ingushetia complain of increased firing and shelling in proximity of villages populated by IDPs and locals. This activity causes great concern and anxiety among the population in the area, and instances of livestock being killed are reported. It is not known whether this activity is related to military training or clashes with rebel groups. Land mines are reportedly prevalent in the southern border areas." (UNHCR 25 August 2000)

Tensions between the displaced population and locals and law enforcement officials in Ingushetia (August 2000)

· Occasionally, fighting breaks out in relation to distribution of humanitarian aid · Reports of law enforcement officials harassing the displaced · UNHCR is discussing with its partners increased support for sports and educational activities for displaced between 15 and 20 years of age to improve the general atmosphere in the camp

"Incidents of fights continue to occur throughout Ingushetia, involving IDPs, locals, as well as law enforcement officials. In many cases these incidents are linked to youths under the influence of alcohol. Occasionally, fighting breaks out in relation to distribution of humanitarian aid. On 23 August, UNHCR met with the Deputy Minister of Interior of Ingushetia to address this issue. The Deputy Minister agreed that these tensions represent a problem, and informed that Ingush authorities have increased the number of police to control the situation in the republic. He confirmed that some unfortunate incidents had taken place where law enforcement officials were harassing IDPs, and assured UNHCR that appropriate measures had been taken and all involved officials had been relieved from their duties. The Ingush Ministry of Interior welcomes all cooperation with UNHCR with regard to ensuring safe conditions for IDPs and locals. It was agreed to invite Ministry of Interior officials to future UNHCR training sessions in Ingushetia.

UNHCR is discussing with its partners increased support for sports and educational activities for IDPs between 15 and 20 years of age. It is expected that project implementation for this group will have a positive effect on the general atmosphere in the camps." (UNHCR 25 August 2000)

Freedom of movement

54 Russian Military imposes strict limitations on movement inside Chechnya (2000)

· All movements from and to Grozny have been blocked · The limitations have no impact on movement through Kavakz 1 checkpoint to Ingushetia · Continuous reports of harassment and extorsion at checkpoints

"On November 26, the Russian Military authorities introduced very strict limitations on movement inside Chechnya. It concerns the areas along the main road starting from the village of Shaami-Yurt and up to the city of Gudermes. The military have also blocked all incoming/outgoing movements outside the Chechen capital Grozny (except for the transport of MVD and military units). At the same time the Russians have initiated check up of identities of the Grozny residents: all youngsters living in Grozny residents: all youngsters living in Grozny without the local registration are temporarily arrested for verification of their identities. However, as it has been stated by the Head of Achkoy- Martanovskiy District Administration, the limitations have not had impact on freedom of movement through Kavkaz-1 checkpoint (one of the major border checkpoints between Chechnya and the neighboring Ingushetia)." (DRC 30 November 2000)

"The IDPs report extensive harassment and extortion at checkpoints throughout the Chechen Republic." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 8)

The "propiska" system remains de facto in place in several regions (2000)

· Constitutional Court overturned regulations at the regional level restricting the free choice of residence · Moscow has maintained the system of residence permit (propiska) to deny access to registration to the internally displaced from the Caucasus

"In 1993, the 'Law of the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to freedom of movement and choice of their place of sojourn or residence within the RF' was adopted. The Law, however, listed a number of restrictions to choice of place of residence.

Since 1995, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation has been making rulings to overturn various regional propiska - like laws and regulations. Nevertheless, many regions of the Russian Federation continue adopting regulations aimed at restricting choice of residence and, in particular, in denying registration to migrants, including internally displaced persons. While the spotlight of the international human rights community has been on the city of Moscow, all the Russian regions neighbouring Chechnya have adopted laws hindering integration of Russian citizens who fled the conflict in Chechnya. A recent (June 1998) decision of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the inadmissibility of propiska - like practices of registering new arrivals every six months. it remains to be seen if this decision will lead to uniform implementation of Constitutional provisions of freedom of movement and choice of residence throughout the country." (OSCE October 1998)

55 "Moscow authorities used the August explosion to defend Moscow's longstanding propiska, or residency permit, system. Federal prosecutors had earlier ordered Moscow to get rid of the system to bring regional legislation in line with federal laws. At the time of writing, Moscow maintained its propiska system." (HRW December 2000, p. 317)

56 SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

Food

The majority of households in Chechnya needs external assistance (2001)

· Population in Grozny is generally underfed, with severe iron-deficiency · Households have been unable to build food reserves for the winter · More than 300,000 persons are in need of food assistance in Chechnya · Stress and undernutrition prevents mothers from breast-feeding their infants

"The recent UN Inter-Agency Needs Assessment mission established that the humanitarian situation in Chechnya remains alarming. Deliveries of food in Chechnya have been minimal due to problems of security and resources. In Chechnya, WFP has, as of October 2000, expanded its programme of assistance to reach 75,000 persons. Rations are provided only in Grozny and Achkoy-Martan, urban areas most affected by conflict, to infants (under 3), orphans (under 14), pregnant women and nursing mothers, elderly or handicapped persons and all members of single-parent families. This remains much below established needs. WFP, on the basis of registration data produced by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), estimates that more than 300,000 persons are in need of food assistance in Chechnya.

In September, WFP conducted a Household Food Economy Assessment in Ingushetia and in Grozny. The Assessment revealed that the population of Grozny is generally underfed, with an average energy intake below 2,100 kcal per day. Iron-deficiency is becoming a serious problem: its prevalence is three times greater than in the rest of the Russian Federation and it affects women in particular. WHO reports that predatory diseases, such as tuberculosis, are in the increase. DRC registration figures indicate that nearly 40% of infants are not breast-fed, a circumstance that is not all characteristic of Chechnya. As a result of stress and/or inadequate nutrition, 7,500 women literally lost their breast-milk.

In the summer [2000], households were unable to build needed reserves for the winter. They have exhausted their coping mechanisms." (WFP 2001, paras. 10-12)

Nutrition situation in Ingushetia remains precarious (2000)

· Mass hunger in Ingushetia has been avoided thanks to humanitarian aid · The displaced population remains in great need of food assistance · The composition of the existing humanitarian relief food baskets does not meet all the nutritional needs of IDPs

57 "In Ingushetia, which is one of the poorest republics in the Russian Federation, WFP is providing basic food commodities (wheat flour, oil, sugar, and iodised salt) to some 155,000 IDPs while the rest, living in Sputnik and Severny camps, are being assisted by Islamic Relief (IR). The ICRC provides a quarterly package of complementary foods and non-food items to essentially the same caseload. EMERCOM, as lead agency within the Government, provides bread and hot meals for IDPs living in camps, as and when funds are available. Several international NGOs also provide supplementary food items such as fresh fruit and vegetables, hot meals, and canned meat, on a scale. UNHCR extended food assistance to 10,000 members of vulnerable host families.

In 2000, WFP facilitated co-ordination between all these food aid providers, ensuring that the neediest IDPs are adequately covered and that duplication is limited. In Ingushetia, mass hunger has been avoided but IDPs remain in great need of humanitarian aid." (UN November 2000, p. 17)

"Based on information from MoH, WFP, ACF, IMC and ICRC, two WHO experts visiting Ingushetia in December 2000 carried out an analysis of the IDP population’s ability to purchase additional food.

IDPs obtain food from three major sources: humanitarian assistance, additional purchases/bartering and from relatives. According to data from the United Nation's World Food Programme's (WFP) survey entitled 'Household food economy assessment' in Ingushetia and Chechnya, all IDP households in the Republic of Ingushetia are divided into three groups: poor (25–35%), typical (60–70%) and better-off (1–10%). The diet of the better-off households does not depend significantly on humanitarian assistance, whereas poor households eat only what is available from humanitarian relief. Typical households obtain food from relief and other sources.

All food assistance to the IDP population in Ingushetia is divided in to two categories: basic and complementary. Basic food assistance in Ingushetia, which covers all IDP residents, is delivered by the Danish Refugee Council and Islamic Relief (IR). Both NGOs are implementing partners of the WFP and both distribute WFP food commodities. Complementary food assistance is provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and IR, who distribute their own food commodities to all IDPs in Ingushetia.

Complementary food baskets have varying contents, which of ten duplicate the contents of the basic food basket. Moreover, the composition of the existing humanitarian relief food baskets does no t meet all the nutritional needs of IDPs. Insufficient nutrient intake often results in an increased prevalence of infectious diseases, anaemia, stunting, complications during pregnancy and other nutrition related problems, all of which already exist in the region. Therefore, the development of a unified complementary food basket, which, together with the basic food assistance would comply with the recommended energy and nutrient requirements, is badly needed. Comparing WFP standard sets of food and those additionally provided by ICRC and Islamic Relief, WHO consultants analysed

58 the food composition and proposed an appropriate 'food basket' adjustment." (WHO January 2001)

Shelter

Internally displaced in Ingushetia face high risk of eviction from their temporary accommodation (2001)

· Owners of spontaneous settlements want to recuperate their property after more than two years of occupation · Evictions of individual families from private accommodation continues on almost a daily basis · UNHCR tries to help negotiate with host families or find alternative accommodation · UNHCR is continuing the winterization process to prepare for the third winter the displaced people will spend in Ingushetia

"Another large group of displaced persons from Chechnya has been evicted from their settlement in Ingushetia. Some 80 displaced persons, including women, children and elderly people, were left without shelter last week in Malgobek, Ingushetia, when the building they had been staying in was torn down. The group had been living at the site since 1999, but the building was bought by a new owner who wanted to set up a new structure on the site. UNHCR, in coordination with local authorities, provided 17 tents for the displaced people in a nearby settlement which had already been selected by UNHCR and the Ingushetia authorities for improvement work. Eighteen families have now moved into the new tents, and currently flooring and other facilities are being provided. UNHCR expects to provide tents to a few more families in this site in the coming days. Gas, electricity and sanitation facilities will be installed with support from UNHCR before winter.

This eviction comes just a week after a similar group of 100 persons was evicted from their settlement near Nazran. UNHCR is also aware of several other group settlements under immediate threat of eviction, including one building in the Nazran area which houses more than 120 people. UNHCR is concerned that these group evictions could be a new trend, as owners of the various spontaneous settlement sites realize that the displaced people will not be returning to Chechnya before the winter, and they will therefore remain in the sites for the third winter in a row. In an effort to avoid such evictions, UNHCR has provided a number of settlements with building materials to improve the facilities, which benefits both the displaced persons living there as well as the owner of the site.

Meanwhile, evictions of individual families from private accommodation also continue on an almost daily basis. Some evicted families are able to find other places to stay on their own. UNHCR also tries to help negotiate with host families or find alternative accommodation, particularly when vulnerable people are facing eviction. Alternative

59 accommodation can be somewhat easier to identify for individuals than for the larger groups evicted at once.

UNHCR is continuing the winterization process to prepare for the third winter the displaced people will spend in Ingushetia. Some 20 settlements have been selected by UNHCR and the Ingushetia authorities for upgrading. Depending on the needs of each settlement, UNHCR, local authorities and NGOs provide shelter materials to upgrade the structures, make them easier to heat, and improve the flooring or roofing of the housing. Since last year, UNHCR has upgraded and winterized more than 60 settlements in Ingushetia. In all, Ingushetia continues to host some 150,000 displaced people from Chechnya." (UNHCR 28 August 2001)

About 77,000 displaced in Ingushetia in need of urgent shelter assistance (2000)

· Current shelters need upgrading as most displaced from Chechnya have decided to stay in Ingushetia during the winter · IDPs accommodated in railway carriages and in so-called spontaneous settlements faced severe difficulties such as inadequate sanitary conditions overcrowding and difficulties with heating · UNHCR has started the construction of a new tent camp for 24,000 internally displaced

"With the onset of winter, the shelter needs for people displaced from their homes are more serious now than at any previous time. In Ingushetia, the greatest demand for shelter can be grouped into four main categories: · IDPs living in spontaneous settlements which were marginal or sub-standard during the 1999-2000 winter; · IDPs living in tents or spontaneous settlements where living conditions have deteriorated significantly during the year; · IDPs living in railway wagons; and · IDPs living in host accommodation at risk of eviction due to strained relations with their hosts.

60 Security in Chechnya is the overriding concern for IDPs in Ingushetia, and for a significant number of them, return also depend on the availability of shelter, and potable water, as well as governmental and humanitarian assistance inside Chechnya. For most IDPs these conditions are unlikely to be met in the near future.

The IDP situation in the northern Caucasus stabilised in the autumn of 2000. IDPs continued to move to and from between Ingushetia and Chechnya in small numbers. However, the net effect was negligible. It appears that most IDPs had decided where to stay for the winter. 160,000 IDPs made up of 151,000 IDPs of Chechen ethnicity and 9,000 IDPs of Ingush ethnicity are expected to remain in Ingushetia during the winter of 2000-01. Of these, host families accommodate 110,000. The remaining 50,000 IDPs are accommodated in a variety of situations including tent camps, animal sheds, and shipping containers. Many of these sites need upgrading to provide a dry, warm, safe, and decent living environement.

In 2000, 12,000 IDPs accommodated in railway carriages (wagons) in Ingushetia, and in the worst of the spontaneous settlements, faced particular difficulties such as inadequate sanitary conditions overcrowding and difficulties with heating. The first stage of construction of a new UNHCR winterised tent camp started in September 2000 and will accommodate 4,000 of the 12,000 IDPs. The second and third stages of this camp are likely to be completed before the end of 2000. When this camp is complete there will be 24,000 IDPs in tent camps in Ingushetia. Tent camps, while cheaper to provide than housing, incur considerable costs of maintenance and servicing." (UN November 2000, pp. 23-24)

Vast shelter needs in Grozny and other towns in Chechnya (2000)

· IPDs and residents need more shelter assistance while they carry out further repairs · Lack of thermal insulation creates serious health risks · High level of destruction particularly in central districts

"According to assessments carried out by UN agencies and NGOs in Chechnya, there are vast shelter needs in Grozny and towns in Chechnya. There are few organisations operating there, and these deliver assistance on a small scale. Much of this small amount concentrates of food and medicine, with shelter forming but a small component. One of the identified needs is to assist IDPs and residents to live in their houses, while they carry out further repairs. This assistance should comprise building materials and tools to enable essential repairs, tents to provide minimum accommodation while repairs are carried out, stoves, and fuel for heating and cooking.

The hostilities have damaged many houses, so they lack thermal insulation. Experience shows that heaters are rather poorly designed and maintained, with venting functioning poorly in most of the houses. This creates serious health risks, especially to children and

61 people with cardio-vascular, respiratory, and other health problems." (UN November 2000, p. 24)

"The present war in Chechnya has had a devastating effect on the living conditions of many citizens. The accommodation of a significant part of the population has been partly of fully destroyed. Thus, 22.8% of the registered families of Chechnya have had their houses' and/or apartments' windows broken, 13,4% - doors; 16.5% of the registered population have had their roofs destroyed, while the accommodations of 13,0% of the population have been fully destroyed during the present and previous war. Approximately 87% of the destruction tool place in the following regions: Grozny City (37.3%), Groznenskiy District (15.1%), Urus-Martanovkiy District (10.9%) and Shalinskiy District (9.4%)." (DRC 10 October 2000)

Severe conditions in camps in Chechnya: the examples of camps in Sernovodsk, Argun and Gudermes (2000)

· Minimal hygiene conditions in the Sernovodsk camp near the Ingush border (2,400 persons) · Heavily damaged buildings in Argun and Gudermes host between 1,500 and 2,000 IDPs each

"- The Sernovodsk camp This camp, made of carriages, is located near the border between Ingushetia and Chechnya. On the morning of 17 December 1999, the Ingushetian authorities organised the departure of the first 36 carriages from the Severny camp (Ingushetia) to Chechnya. The first carriages arrived in Sernovodsk (Chechnya) and parked alongside a small ruined station, 2 km from the village centre. At the time of that departure, only the occupants of the first 17 carriages had been informed of the departure, and they received food reserves for 3 days. But the following 19 carriages left without provisions, with only time enough to collect the children. At the start of January, 10 other carriages came from Severny. In February 2000, in Sernovodsk, 2,400 persons, including 800 children, were crowded into 47 carriages.

The hygiene conditions are also minimal: no laundry, nor bleach, and soap received last August. The MTchS (the Russian ministry for disasters and emergency situations) is studying the possibility of providing soap. There are water points, but the water is not drinkable and there are frequent cuts. They last an average of 2 to 3 days. A tank truck supplies the carriages (for 3 days), but irregularly. That makes it possible to heat the carriages and to make tea. It is the wagon manager who sees to collecting coal, transported by the Sleptsovsk MTchS. However, not everybody benefits equally from the incoming items: the strongest serve themselves first. As a little joke, one woman says: 'If we stay, Sernovodsk will become a real desert. We have cut down almost all the trees'. There is no shower, but a 'washing facility' tent is under study. The women do their laundry in a warm-water spring.

62 The food supply is uncertain. About every ten days, the refugees recieve 200g of canned meat, 30g of tea, 250g of sugar, 130g of pasta, 400g of buckwheat, 350g of cabbage and 400g of bread. Only the children received 2 tangerines and an apple for the Year 2000 New Year.

- The Argun and Gudermes camps Argun is 10 km east of Grozny, and Gudermes 25 km. In each of those towns there are two camps, installed in two big sets of square buildings. They were already occupied during the 1st war (1994-1996). Holes have been made in these buildings by shells: damaged stairways, broken glass, walls destroyed... no water (one external water point, in the middle of the square), no electricity. Gas, which was re-established in mid-February, makes it possible to heat the buildings in the Argun 2 camp. Since the bombardment last July 3, one end of the building in which Médecins du Monde works as well as the houses around it, made of brick, have been totally destroyed. The families are packed into in the flats when it is possible to reach them. Children drag themselves around in the stairway, made of rubbish and holes, on the steps that still exist. They wait. The roads, under mud and destroyed by bombardments, are hard to use. In February 2000 there were 1,500 Chechen displaced persons in the Argun camps and 2,000 in the Gudermes camps. But many come from the surrounding areas for care and food." (MDM December 2000, section IV)

Discrimination against the displaced Chechen displaced reportedly impedes their access to accommodation in Moscow (1999)

"Chechen internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Civic Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face great difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment. The St. Petersburg Times in April [1999] reported that a similar pattern of discrimination exists against person from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg, although the housing law forbids discrimination, according to human rights lawyer Yuriy Shmidt, the chances of a would- be tenant winning a laswsuit are low because there is no legal precedent." (U.S. DOS 25 February 2000)

Health

Health needs of the population in Chechnya largely unmet (2000-2001)

· Public health problems such as tuberculosis, anaemia in women and children, and mental disorders are particularly alarming · Tuberculosis has reached epidemic proportions (June 2001) · Acute shortages of drugs, medical supplies and equipment; threatening lack of health workers · Increase of still-births among the IDP population due to severe anaemia

63 "Medical staff in Grozny, including the chief epidemiologist who regularly attend health coordination meetings in Nazran, stress that Hepatitis A morbidity shows a 12.5-fold increase during the first five months of 2001, compared to the same five months in 2001. Likewise, a four-fold rise in mumps and a three-fold increase in whooping cough, mostly in children, indicate that extended programmes of immunisation is not attaining the necessary coverage. However, among many other health problems, linked to poor hygiene, nutrition, and permanent stress, tuberculosis is the major concern in both Chechnya and Ingushetia. TB has now reached epidemic proportions with an estimated morbidity rate of 278 per 100,000 IDPs in Ingushetia and 224 per 100,000 residents in Chechnya, compared to 89 per 100,000 residents in the rest of Russia." (UN June 2001, p. 5)

"Turning to mental health, more than 80% of the Chechen population is affected by some degree of mental disorders. the existing psychosocial facilities consist mostly of children rehabilitation centres, some of which also include women and young men. WHO in cooperation with relevant NGOs, provides psychosocial and psychiatric training to medical staff from Chechnya and Ingushetia. Moreover, WHO is financing a children's rehabilitation centre in Grozny, where about 300 children have received services. The relatives of these children are getting training as well in how to cope with the mental disorders." (UN September 2001, p. 7)

Tuberculosis It is estimated by MoH Ch that at present there are about 5 000 patients with active TB in Chechnya. Two thousand (2 000) of them are BK positive. TB incidence and mortality rates among permanent residents in Chechnya are as follows: Incidence: 224/100 000 Mortality: 26/100 000 The TB incidence rate is thought to be underestimated, as only visits to health institutions are counted while screenings are not held. The TB incidence among IDPs in camps in Chechnya and across the republic may be as high as 600/100 000. Most patients are in the 20-39 age group. The overall TB incidence among men is triple that of women. However, extrapulmonary TB is slightly more common among the latter, which evidently primarily affects their reproductive system.

Evidence of the unfavourable TB epidemic control situation is substantiated by the growing TB-related morbidity among children. In 2000, localized TB was diagnosed in 82 children, incidence rates of infiltrative TB with decay, disseminated TB, fibrous- cavernous TB and miliary TB is high. Resistance to TB drugs is estimated to be found in 70% of chronic cases and 35% of new TB cases (MoHCh). (WHO August 2001, p. 9)

"The health needs of the population in Chechnya, according to information collected from various sources, are largely unmet. Public health problems such as tuberculosis, anaemia in women and children, and mental disorders are particularly alarming. The emergency situation of this year has caused a total depletion of resources amongst the health facilities that still exits. There are acute shortages of drugs, medical supplies, and equipment. Health workers need social support and professional training. The threat of

64 further departures of health workers further compounds these problems. The epidemiological surveillance system barely works.

There is a growing concern, in particular in light of the WFP household food security survey, about the nutritional status of the population of Chechnya and IDPs in Ingushetia, especially among vulnerable groups: pregnant women, children, and elderly people. Reports by MSF and other medical NGOs suggest an increase of still-births among the IDP population due to severe anaemia." (UN November 2000, p. 26)

"The overall health situation is very poor, and there is a dramatic shortage of medicines. In IDP camps, the delegation met sick people, in particular, children who have not undergone any treatment. Reportedly, IDPs are systematically asked to pay to receive specialised medical services which in principle should be free of charge. However, compared to the earlier disastrous situation, certain progress can be observed. The majority of IDPs have access to basic medical care which was not the case a few months ago. The skills of IDPs having medical education are widely used in camps. Moreover, according to the information provided by the Russian authorities, 52 hospitals, including 8 in Grozny, have been re-opened in Chechnya." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 12)

For the latest WHO bulletins on North Caucasus, consult WHO website [Internet]

See also Médecins du Monde Report "Chechnya - Ingushetia: the Chechen civilians' despair" December 2000 [Internet]

Health situation in Ingushetia requires vigilance and careful monitoring (2001)

· Most common diseases among the displaced are respiratory tract, cardiovascular and gastrointestinal diseases · Close cooperation of the Ingush administration, UN agencies, and NGOs has made it possible to combat major outbreaks of hepatitis A in camps · Health problems, linked to poor hygiene, nutrition, and permanent stress, tuberculosis are major concerns in Ingushetia · Displaced without financial resources can only access primary health care structures · Despite international assistance, Ingush health structures are saturated by the heavy caseload of internally displaced persons

"Health Status

June-July morbidity statistics from selected NGOs show that the most common diseases encountered with the NGO-served population are still respiratory tract, cardiovascular and gastrointestinal diseases.

Information provided by ARD and collected from 24 Chechen IDP compact settlements shows the following disease incidence among IDPs in January-June 2001: diseases of the

65 respiratory tract rank first, diseases of the alimentary tract second and diseases of the cardiovascular system third.

Morbidity data provided by Hammer Forum for the same period confirms that the majority of the diseases registered were cardiovascular, gastrointestinal and respiratory tract diseases in January-March 2001. In April-June, however, gastrointestinal diseases showed a seasonal rise and ranked first, as compared to cardiovascular and respiratory diseases.

The latest statistics available from Islamic Relief (June/July 2001) show that the most common diseases encountered with the IR-served population during these months were acute respiratory infections and alimentary tract, cardiovascular, gynaecological and neurological diseases.

The MSF-Belgium (MSF-B) morbidity breakdown for June was: diseases of the respiratory tract - 37%; diseases of the alimentary tract - 19%; and cardiovascular diseases - 11%.

Sporadic cases of Acute Flaccid Paresis (AFP) were reported by several NGOs (MSF-B, BIF) in IDP children in Ingushetia. An investigation was carried out by the republican SES and no cases of the suspected diagnosis of poliomyelitis were confirmed. One case of suspected vaccine-associated poliomyelitis was recently identified with an eight- month-old child in Vladikavkaz." (WHO August 2001, p. 4)

"Outbreaks of hepatitis A in camps and spontaneous settlements in September-October 2000 highlighted the concerns of epidemics in highly populated areas and the need to provide clean drinking water and dispose of sanitary waste. The close cooperation of the Ingush administration, UN agencies, in particular the WHO, and the NGO community has made it possible to combat such outbreaks although individual cases registered in different districts require further vigilance and careful monitoring. […] However, among many other health problems, linked to poor hygiene, nutrition, and permanent stress, tuberculosis is the major concern in both Chechnya and Ingushetia. TB has now reached epidemic proportions with an estimated morbidity rate of 278 per 100,000 IDPs in Ingushetia and 224 per 100,000 residents in Chechnya, compared to 89 per 100,000 residents in the rest of Russia." (UN June 2001, p. 5)

"The overall health situation is very poor, and there is a dramatic shortage of medicines. In IDP camps, the delegation met sick people, in particular, children who have not undergone any treatment. Reportedly, IDPs are systematically asked to pay to receive specialised medical services which in principle should be free of charge. However, compared to the earlier disastrous situation, certain progress can be observed. The majority of IDPs have access to basic medical care which was not the case a few months ago. The skills of IDPs having medical education are widely used in camps. Moreover, according to the information provided by the Russian authorities, 52 hospitals, including 8 in Grozny, have been re-opened in Chechnya." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 12)

66 "About 600 tuberculosis and 500 hepatitis patients, many of them children, have been recently hospitalised in Ingushetia. With the winter, local hospitals have been crammed with IDPs suffering from various inflammatory illnesses. The doctors are finding it difficult to cope with the situation because of the poor medical equipment and availability of medicines." (WFP 12 January 2001)

For the latest WHO bulletins on North Caucasus, consult WHO website [Internet]

Outbreak of Hepatitis A reported in IDP camps (2000)

· The situation has stabilised in Ingushetia but numerous cases of the disease have been registered in Chechnya

"Hepatitis A is a recurrent problem in the North Caucasus as well as in some other parts of the former Soviet Union. The North Caucasus region is classified as a region of intermediate prevalence. This endemicity explains the periodic outbreaks: when hygienic conditions deteriorate, infection becomes apparent in older children and young adults. Internally displaced person (IDP) camps are a perfect setting for hepatitis A transmission. It is the opposite of high prevalence regions where young children usually contract the disease and develop immunity for life.

The first cases were reported in the middle of August 2000 in the IDP camp Sputnik in Ingushetia. The outbreak increased by mid -September with a peak reached in mid- October, with 30-35 cases/week registered by the Sanitary Epidemiological Surveillance Service (SES). Most cases are usually reported in the autumn, though by the end of November the situation became relatively stable with the total number of cases at 358, compared with 1,044 in 1994, the year with the highest prevalence for the entire decade. IDPs made up at least 60% of the patients, among whom two-thirds were children. All of the hepatitis A cases are only clinically diagnosed as viral laboratory tests are for all intensive purposes unavailable. The exact source of infection remains unknown as the war environment prevents its identification.

No fatalities have been reported. The Sleptsovskaya district, along the Chechen border, was the most affected however, it should be added that the highest morbidity rates among the local population were registered in the Malgobeksky district. At the same time, numerous cases of the disease were also registered in Chechnya, Urus Martan being the most affected district." (WHO December 2000)

7,000 persons in need of prosthetic or orthopaedic help in Chechnya (2000)

· 400 amputees are among the internally displaced population (IDP) in Ingushetia ·

67 "As a result of hostilities in the Republic of Chechnya during the last decade, approximately 7,000 citizens of the republic have lost or damaged a limb and are currently in need of prosthetic and/or orthopaedic aid. In addition, approximately 400 amputees are among the internally displaced population (IDP) in Ingushetia." (WHO January 2001, p. 3)

"Unfortunately, in the near future it is unlikely that the political situation in Chechnya will improve significantly. Ambushes, acts of terror and mines/UXOs will also further contribute to an increase in the number of people in need of prosthetic and/or orthopaedic assistance." (WHO January 2001, p. 4)

Psychosocial needs of the displaced children and their families (December 1999- March 2000)

· Many children have witnessed the killing of relatives, have left family members behind, or have been separated from their parents · No mechanism is in place to help the affected population cope with the stress and meet their psychosocial needs, except NGO programmes in the camps (Médecins du Monde, Centre for Peace Making and Community Development) · Other areas of serious concern is gender-based violence and drug abuse

"In a late February report, Medecins du Monde (MDM), in commenting on the state of mental health among IDPs in Ingushetia, noted that virtually the entire population had fallen victim in some form or another to psychological trauma and that 25 percent were seriously affected. This analysis confirms in substance earlier data collected by UNHCR in their household survey of IDP settlements in Ingushetia. MDM emphasised that the trauma was linked to the direct effects of extreme violence affecting the civilian population, the living conditions of displaced persons outside Chechnya, as well as the revisiting of recent psychological injuries, especially for children, linked to the deadly war in 1994-1996.

In a statement still applicable to the present situation, MDM noted: 'For many, on top of the heavy difficulties of everyday life are piled the still uncertain prospects for the future and a fear of returning to Chechnya'. Regarding survivors of the bombing in Grozny who were exposed to devastating human and material destruction, or who were victims of violence, the report concludes that, 'The psychological trauma is deep and will probably lead to irreversible psychological consequences'." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.3.7)

See WHO report "Health in North Caucasus: June-July 2000" [Internet]

See also MDM report "Chechnya - Ingushetia: Testimonies and sanitary data", 23 February 2000 [Internet]

"Fighting always leaves behind trauma victims of all types. Many children have witnessed the killing of relatives, have left family members behind, or have been separated from their parents. The displaced children, as well as those who are being

68 directly exposed to acts of violence, live in fear, anxious for their own life and security. They have gone through a psychologically traumatic experience that will negatively impact their development.

There are no qualitative and quantitative data on the magnitude of the psychosocial impact of the fighting on children and their families. However, discussions with NGOs providing assistance, interviews with health personnel and teachers, as well as direct contact with the affected population, have revealed that the situation is very serious. Yet, with the exception of some programmes by NGOs, no mechanism is in place to help the affected population cope with the stress and meet their psychosocial needs.

Another area of serious concern is gender-based violence, which is being increasingly documented. An assessment of this area needs to be undertaken and support provided, as necessary." (UN March 2000, p. 16)

"Children and adults from Chechnya are prone to develop deep and serious psychological traumas due the conflict, as the traumatic events have been occurring over such a long period of time. (It is only three years since the end of the last conflict.) Although no assessment has been conducted, there can be no doubt that recent events will have a long lasting impact, not at least on the children, - some of whom have just relived their second war experience and had wounds reopened.

From the UNHCR household survey of non-camp settlements [11-13 December 1999], it is worth noticing, - although no questions pertaining to mental health were asked, that:

7 % of the IDPs had relatives who were killed or injured in Chechnya 16 % of the IDP family members remained in Chechnya, - the majority of the IDPs has no contact with their relatives inside Chechnya, 13 % of the IDPs indicated that they had witnessed harassment of women 8 % of the IDP children are separated from their parents and under the care of friends and relatives.

CPCD provides psychosocial assistance to children in four IDP camps (1 in Sleptsovskaya, three in Karabulak). MDM has psychological rehabilitation center for children in two IDP camps. The clinical impression after interviewing a number of health personnel and teachers is that there is lots of untreated serious mental health problems in the IDP population. Psychotropic medication has not been widely available prior to the conflict, and also in Ingushetia it is not easily accessible. In Ingushetia as a whole there are registered 2,200 psychiatric patients, who practically get no assistance due to financial constraints. Drug abuse has creased in Ingushetia lately, and is said to be linked to the much wider abuse inside Chechnya. According to MoH/I data for 1999, there are 26.4 registered cases of drug abuse per 100,000 population." (WHO/UNICEF/IOM 5 February 2000)

69 Mental health of children: Chechen Association of Psychiatrists and Neurologists reveals severe problems in Chechnya (2000)

"Since January 2000, the Chechen Association of Psychiatrists and Neurologists has been carrying out research and rehabilitation activities in IDP camps in Chechnya and Ingushetia. They have examined 500 children and teenagers and found out that the number of stress disorders with children and teenager IDPs inside Chechnya is three times higher than with children from Ingushetia (87 percent in Chechnya compared to 26 percent in Ingushetia). The number of children suffering from post-traumatic stress disorders is 58 percent and 15 percent respectively. The Association works in IDP camps and spontaneous settlements in Pravoberezhnoe and Tolstoy-Yurt in Chechnya, and in Troitskaya, Ingushetia. 103 young patients are presently undergoing rehabilitation. 124 children with mild symptoms of stress disorders receive assistance from the teachers working at the Association. Most commonly used methods of treatment are: art therapy and acupuncture, combined with child festivals and establishing contacts with children from other countries through exchange of correspondence." (UN OCHA 30 June 2000)

Water and sanitation

Infrastructure and equipment in Ingushetia must be maintained and upgraded in order to meet post-emergency needs (2000)

· Further increase in groundwater extraction, provision of pipelines, water treatment in areas of poor water quality, and extending the water trucking programme are currently needed · Latrines in several IDP camps and settlements do not comply with minimum standards and are suitable only for short-term use · The emergency garbage disposal system provided in 2000 was inadequate to maintain minimum sanitation standards and must be upgraded

"The water supply system which existed in Ingushetia prior to the current emergency was unable to cope with the influx of IDPs. A majority of the beneficiary population is connected to a government-operated water supply network. Some towns operate their own supplies, whilst more remote areas rely on individual supplies. All supplies depend on the extraction of groundwater. Maintenance of a basic level of supply to the beneficiary population required the establishment of emergency water bladders and bathing facilities at IDP camps, constant trucking of water to points not served by the network, and a major increase in the extraction rate of groundwater.

Despite the emergency effort, it was not possible to maintain sufficient water supply during the summer of 2000.

70 Identified needs include a further increase in groundwater extraction, provision of pipelines, water treatment in areas of poor water quality, and extending the water trucking programme.

Reticulated sewerage systems are available only in the central parts of the few major towns. A majority of the beneficiary population relies on various forms of latrines for human waste disposal. Although emergency pit latrines were installed at IDP camps and settlements, some of these do not comply with minimum standards and are suitable only for short-term use. Significant health hazards were experienced during 2000 due to the inadequacy of the human waste disposal system. […]

Identified needs include the upgrading, provision and maintenance of latrines to meet and maintain minimum humanitarian guidelines, the provision of hand washing facilities at latrines, an extension of the latrine pump-out trucking programme, and public education in hygiene practices.

Solid waste disposal and pest-vector control are essential sanitation requirements. The Government and private sector agencies, which carried out these activities prior to the emergency, had no spare capacity of the IDP population. The emergency garbage disposal system provided in 2000 was inadequate to maintain minimum sanitation standards.

Identified needs include an extension of the collection, transfer and disposal system, and a continuation of the pest/vector control programme." (UN November 2000, pp. 29-30)

Lack of clear water and poor sanitation creates major threat to public health in Chechnya (2000)

· In Grozny, all water treatment and distribution stations have been damaged

"The need for safe water and sanitation facilities is a high priority for residents, returnees and IDPs in Chechnya. According to a spot assessment conducted by UNHCR in October 2000, and information supplied by NGOs operating in Chechnya, public health is threatened by a lack of clean water and poor sanitation. In Grozny, all water treatment and distribution stations have been damaged, and the quality of trucked water is extremely poor. In large measure this is due to the environmental effects of massive oil spills. Many hospitals and health facilities rely on trucked water and suffer from poor sanitation facilities. While the Government of the Russian Federation is expected to undertake a major reconstruction of water and sanitation facilities in Chechnya, there is a need for the international community to assist with emergency requirements." (UN November 2000, p. 30)

71 ACCESS TO EDUCATION

Ingushetia

Acute lack of educational facilities for the displaced population in Ingushetia (2000)

· Less than half of the displaced children aged 7-12 years attend school · Alarming low enrolment rates among the secondary-school-age displaced children and availability of educational facilities for pre-school-aged children · Much remains to be done to create additional structured, positive recreational activities in camps as well as spontaneous settlements, especially for teenage IDPs

"According to the most recent DRC-run registration exercise, there are currently some 32,000 IDP children aged 7-12 years of age who should be attending school. Less than 12,000 currently do so. Of this total 3,623 children in forms 1-4 are enrolled in 93 government-run schools. 2,000 children also attend government-supported tent schools in 6 locations. In addition, UNICEF and its partners have established schooling capacities for 6,000 children in NGO-operated tent-schools in 32 locations. Despite these achievements, approximately 20,000 children will not attend primary school unless a major programme is initiated to resolve the serious problems of under-capacity within the Ingush school system.

Enrolment rates among the approximately 18,000 secondary-school-age IDP children in the age group between 12 and 16 are generally even lower. The situation with regard to enrolment rates and availability of educational facilities for pre-school aged children remains equally alarming. Of a total of 20 kindergarten facilities, 14 are fully or partially occupied by IDPs seeking temporary shelter.

Teaching staff for IDP children in tent-operated schools originate almost exclusively from the IDP community itself. Almost all schools operate in 2 or more shifts. The lack of teachers and available physical infrastructure are the two main constraints to be overcome in envisaging any expansion of educational opportunities for IDP children.

UNICEF, UNHCR, and partner NGOs achieved much in the course of the last year to assist in establishing summer camps, playrooms and children's activities in camps. Related programmes included psychosocial support elements. However, much remains to be done to create additional structured, positive recreational activities in camps as well as spontaneous settlements. Of major concern are teenage IDPs who, in the absence of training and employment opportunities, are susceptible to being drawn in various forms of marginal activity.

72 With the clear vision of a 12-month programme, a sound strategic approach and the winterisation of IDP settlements becoming inevitable, problems are now expected to become more manageable." (UN November 2000, pp. 31-32)

See also Action by Churches Together (ACT), "Uprooted Chechens: Many kids missed out schools", 28 September 2001 [Internet]

Chechnya

287 schools out of a total of 400 are at least partly operational in Chechnya (2000)

· Half the existing schools could close down during the winter months · UNESCO to undertake comprehensive assessment of the educational situation in early 2001

"Presently, there are an estimated 120,000 children between the age of 6 and 16 living in Chechnya. Many schools were destroyed during the fighting, and very few efforts have been made to rehabilitate buildings mainly due to the lack of security. In many places teaching takes place in private locations. In areas relatively spared from the worst physical effects of the hostilities, efforts of the Government to restore normal or even improved capacities can be witnessed. Overall, 287 schools out of a total of 400 are at least partly operational. Nonetheless, without massive external assistance, it is estimated that as many as half the existing schools could close down during the winter months.

UNESCO is to use core agency funds and will complete in early 2001 an assessment of the whole educational situation, from pre-school to higher education. The assessment, which comes at the specific request of the Russian Government, is to provide more detailed statistical and analytical data, including on such topics as the profile of children and their education grade, the needs for training teachers and education managers, and the material needs of educational institutions. The assessment report will propose several projects and could serve as a reference tool for Russian and international actors aiming for sustainable improvements in the sector." (UN November 2000, p. 32)

73 ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Essential contribution of host families (2000)

· Resources and hospitality of host families in Ingushetia are being stretched · Compensation grant provided to host families by Swiss Cooperation Agency · Host families in Chechnya provide essential help to the displaced population and need assistance

"Families in Chechnya and Ingushetia host thousands of displaced civilians. So far, the generosity of these families has prevented the further deterioration of IDPs' subsistence and allowed the humanitarian community at large to focus most resources on more vulnerable civilians in need. This local 'coping mechanism' should be increasingly supported in order to prevent the involuntary relocation of IDPs. In addition, the capacity of the local authorities to cope with emergencies should be enhanced.

While host families are accommodating 70% of IDPs in Ingushetia the resources and hospitality of the latter are being stretched, thus putting pressure on IDPs to vacate the premises and find alternative accommodation." (UN November 2000, p. 15)

"The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation has started giving retroactive financial compensations to the Ingush host families for accommodating the IDPs from Chechnya. The ruble equivalent per family is around US$100. The payments are being made to all host families. Regardless of their financial status - 18,000 HFs. However some of the Chechnya IDPs express confusion over the fact that even those [host families] who least their accommodations to the IDPs receive 'compensation' and at the same time get paid by the displaced." (DRC 10 November 2000)

"There are 13,259 members of host families in Chechnya according to the registration, the majority of which are hosting IDPs gratuitously. Only 974 persons (0,74%) of the registered number of the IDPs declared that they pay (in-kind or in cash) for their accommodation with host families. This testifies to the fact that the main burden of providing food for the IDPs is carried by the host families. The lack of assistance to host families in Chechnya may eventually lead to the expulsion of IDPs from host families before fall or winter 2000 as the host families themselves are facing great difficulties in making their living." (DRC 10 October 2000, pp. 17-18)

Agricultural activities need external support to enhance self-reliance capacity of the displaced population in Ingushetia and Chechnya (2000)

74 · Limited job opportunities in the agricultural sector for the resident and displaced population in Ingushetia · Livestock brought by the displaced to Ingushetia need vaccination · Agricultural activities can be profitably developed for the displaced population in the Achkhoy- Martan district (Chechnya)

"Agriculture and IDPs in Ingushetia

The total cultivated area is 57,700 hectares, of which 8,000 hectares are owned by about 40,000 small holders who grow potato, maize and vegetables on 0.2 hectares. The output of these crops and the meagre animal production are their sole source of food. Job opportunities in the agricultural sector are limited for both the resident and displaced population. The national herd comprises some 42,600 head of cattle and 50,100 small ruminants. The IDPs from Chechnya arrived in Ingushetia with 50,000 cattle and 20,000 sheep. These animals have not been vaccinated since the beginning of the hostilities.

Poor rural families host about 10,000 families displaced from Chechnya. They are concentrated in the hilly area located within a 25 km radius around Nazran (Nazran, Karabulak, Ekazhevo, Nazyr-Kort, Kantyzhevo and Surkhakhi villages), and the area surrounding the town of Malgobek (Sagopsh, Voznesenskaya and Psedakh).

Agriculture and IDPs in Chechnya

About 45,000 IDPs are hosted in camps within Achkhoy-Martan district, and one third is concentrated in the vicinity of the town of Sernovodsk near the Ingush border. Favourable agro-climatic conditions combined with good marketing opportunities would facilitate the production of vegetables and potatoes. It is estimated that, with appropriate assistance, 50% of the IDPs residing in the region would be interested in labour-intensive economically profitable agricultural production.

Analysis of need

The majority of IDPs lack financial resources to meet their basic needs (food, health and primary education). This problem is aggravated by the scarcity of job opportunities and by the lack of agricultural land for food crop production.

The scarce supply and high cost of agricultural inputs, particularly quality seeds, is a major constraint for the marginal farming host families in Ingushetia.

Without appropriate support to food crop production, the IDPs hosted in the camps in Chechnya will need protracted food aid from the Government and humanitarian organisations. Most of the Ingush farming families hosting IDPs are suffering from the additional pressure on their limited resources, already exhausted by the prolonged assistance they have provided to their friends and relatives displaced from Chechnya.

75 The animals that the IDPs brought into Ingushetia may cause outbreaks of infectious diseases. Often these animals are the sole assets they possess. There is also the risk that they may infect the cattle owned by the resident population. The Ministry of Agriculture lacks the financial resources for a vaccination campaign." (UN November 2000, p. 21)

Coping strategies of the displaced in Ingushetia: heavy dependence on aid (July 2000)

· Government of Ingushetia has barred the displaced population from seeking employment · Opportunities for alternative income-generating activities are very limited · The vast majority of the displaced population remains heavily dependent on international assistance · Other temporary solutions include selling one's property and borrowing money, trade of scrap metal, day labour and petty trading · Tensions between the displaced and the local population for limited labor opportunities

"The difficult economic situation in neighboring regions does not allow for the provision of sufficient assistance to the victims of the conflict by local authorities. The Government of Ingushetia has not allowed IDPs to seek employment and the opportunities for alternative income-generating activities are very limited. Thus the vast majority of the displaced population remains heavily dependent on international assistance." (WFP 2000, p. 1)

Coping strategies:

100% primary coping 90% strategy 80% secondary coping 70% strategies

60%

50%

40%

30% 20%

10%

0% international borrowing selling Emercom help from other NGOs money property relatives and friends

"Asked how their families were coping with the cur-rent situation, the displaced almost unanimously responded that humanitarian assistance from international NGOs was their main channel of support.

76 The International Commit-tee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and MSF were often cited.

Those who gave additional answers mentioned two temporary solutions with equal frequency: selling their property and borrowing money. Assistance from Emercom and from friends and family were also mentioned." [MSF teams conducted a survey in June 2000 among displaced Chechens in the district of Malgobeck, located in northwestern Ingushetia. This district harbors about one fourth of the total population of IDPs (internally displaced persons), which is currently estimated at more than 150,000.] (MSF 15 August 2000)

"In the summer [2000], households [in Chechnya] were unable to build needed reserves for the winter. They have exhausted their coping mechanisms. To earn money, many take part in activities such as the extraction and sale of scrap metal from abandoned factories. The poorest survive on day labour or pettry trading and rely heavily on gifts." (UN November 2000, p. 17)

Pensions

"Most the population has no legal sources of income. There are some cases when, for example, IDPs living in the tent camp in Znamenskoye Village (Nadterechniy Region) have to go to Grozny to get their pension. As a result, most of it is spent on passing numerous checkpoint along the way." (DRC 10 October 2000, p. 9)

"In the last week, WFP officials met with the Deputy Prime Minister and other high officials of the Ingush Government. The Government of Ingushetia reiterated its appreciation for the support of the international community, but expressed their continued concern about the economic impact of the crisis. Competition between IDPs (internally displaced persons) and the local population for limited casual labor opportunities is apparently causing tensions." (WFP 23 February 2001)

Influx of IDPs from Chechnya aggravates the socio-economic situation in North Caucasus (March 2000)

· Unemployment rate in Ingushetia increased dramatically in recent months, reaching 56 percent of the economically active population · Need for support to the federal and regional programmes of employment generation, emphasising public works and small income generation schemes for IDPs, host families, and local communities

"The influx of IDPs from Chechnya to the neighbouring republics, particularly Ingushetia, and the prospect of their longer-term settlement in these republics have seriously aggravated the socio-economic situation in the northern Caucasus. It has also put tremendous pressure on the authorities and the local population, particularly host families and the most vulnerable groups of the population, including women and youth.

77 It is estimated that some 30,000 IDPs will remain in Ingushetia after the hostilities have ceased and these IDPs and their host families are the intended beneficiaries of UNDP’s programme. Among the serious problems are the high rate of unemployment and the need to start rehabilitation of physical and social infrastructure of the region. In Ingushetia alone the unemployment rate increased dramatically in recent months, reaching 56 percent of the economically active population. The region depends fully on subsidies from the federal budget, and the existing capacities and very poorly developed social infrastructure, including those dealing with employment services, are inadequate to respond effectively to the challenges resulting from the situation. These problems have to be addressed urgently in order to avoid eruption of civil strife, further socio-economic degradation, an increase of criminal activities, and overall political instability.

Within this environment, international assistance can play a critical role in supporting the Government and local population in stabilising the increasing social tension, which is likely to continue even after many IDPs return home. As a first step, early rehabilitation measures could complement and strengthen the positive impact of ongoing emergency relief operations. Support to the federal and regional programme of employment generation, emphasising public works and small income generation schemes for IDPs, host families, and local communities, is needed. In addition, an analysis of longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected regions needs to be undertaken." (UN March 2000, p. 21)

Participation

IDPs in Ingushetia voice their concerns (2001)

· Chechen IDPs created a congress of displaced persons (March 2001) · Small group of displaced went on hunger strike, demanding peace negotiations be initiated (June 2001) · Displaced persons from camp in Ingushetia organised protest march (August 2001)

"In Ingushetia, IDPs from Chechnya have set up a congress of displaced persons. The committee intends to examine issues related to the situation for Chechens in Ingushetia, as well as the situation on the territory of Chechnya. The congress will convene in Ingushetia 4-5 March." (UNHCR 1 March 2001)

"On 15 June 2001, a group of 12 internally displaced persons, six men, four women and two girls went on a hunger strike in Ingushetia, demanding that federal authorities put an end to the war in Chechnya and initiate negotiations with the Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) set up a tent between the IDP camps "Sputnik" and "Satsita" in the Sunzhensky district of Ingushetia and vowed to fast to their death for peace. In late June, the number of strikers increased to 66.

78 The situation was continuously monitored by the World Health Organization and information was released daily. WHO also arranged for coordinated round-the-clock medical assistance as the strikers' health gradually deteriorated, mainly due to dehydration. Islamic Relief, Hammer Forum, MDM, MSF-France and others took an active part in care provision. Upon receiving information from WHO, MoH I entrusted the Sunzha district hospital with helping to maintain the strikers' health, including their hospitalisation if deemed necessary.

Ultimately, quite a number of strikers had to stop protesting due to health problems. A total of 15 IDPs were hospitalised. By 30 July, 17 strikers remained and they planned, together with other IDPs, to start a peace march to Moscow on 1 August 2001. However, authorities refused to grant them permission to march on the republic's territory and on 30-31 July the Ingush police removed the strikers and dismantled their tents.

At present, no strikers are hospitalised and all IDPs have returned to their tents." (WHO August 2001, p. 1)

"Ingushetian police on 2 August halted a group of Chechen displaced persons who had begun a protest march from a displaced persons camp in Ingushetia to demand that the Russian leadership begin peace talks with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, AP reported. Two of the organizers of the protest were detained. Ingushetian President Ruslan Aushev has previously defended the interests of the displaced persons and repeatedly called on the Russian leadership to begin talks with Maskhadov. LF" (RFE/RL 3 August 2001)

Participation of the internally displaced population to the presidential elections (26 March 2000)

· No arrangements were made to establish special polling stations at the camps in Ingushetia where displaced were housed · Many of those who had registered as internally displaced persons had already been added to the voter lists of the polling stations in the regions where they had relocated · Voter registers in Chechnya are outdated, but citizens could register on the day of election · Polling officials would be flexible on documentation requirements · Standard conditions for elections and pre-electoral activities did not exist in Chechnya due to the ongoing military campaign

"One of the major challenges related to compilation of voter lists. According to data on the last lists prepared for the Chechen Republic under President Maskhadov there were 380,000 voters. According to the Central Election Commission, however, the voter lists for the presidential election included closer to 460,000 voters. This number included federal forces in the military units serving in the region. A major concern expressed by critics of the move to hold elections in the Chechen Republic was that the data on the

79 resident population was seriously outdated. In addition, much of the population had been displaced by the conflict. In practical terms, it would probably have been impossible to accurately remove those who had left the area given the stressed and time constricted situation. In addition, the CEC [Central Election Commission] decided that refugees should remain on the lists because many were 'returning every day.' Their refuge in neighboring areas was considered temporary and most voters, it was believed, had full intentions to return. Plans called for internally displaced persons to be added back on the lists as they returned.

Another concern was that many citizens of the Republic had lost their passports and other forms of identification. A joint OSCE/ODIHR and CEC assessment mission to the Chechen Republic on 20 March established that special efforts were made by the Ministry of Interior to provide passports or special certificates that indicated that persons had officially applied for replacements. The mission also established that these certificates would be acceptable as ID on election day. Polling officials would be flexible on documentation requirements, and voters would be permitted to cast ballots on the basis of almost any form of identity, including even pension books so long as the document reflected residence in the Republic.

In spite of thousands of refugees displaced in neighboring regions, no arrangements were made to establish special polling stations at the camps where they were housed. Rather, residents of the camps were given status as residents which was noted by a stamp in their passports (propiska) or their residency certificates. Displaced voters cast ballots at regular polling stations. Many of those who had registered as internally displaced persons had already been added to the voter lists of the polling stations in the regions where they had relocated. Anyone else with a stamp in their passport or certificate indicating their being domiciled in a camp located in the area served by the polling station but whose name did not appear on the voter list was added to the "additional" voters register on election day." (OSCE 19 May 2000, Chapter V)

"The CEC decided to conduct the presidential elections in 12 of Chechnya's 15 districts for the estimated 460,000 voters there. On 20 March, the [International Election Observation Mission (IEOM)] observed the challenging circumstances under which the CEC was preparing all technical requirements for elections in Chechnya. Voter registers in Chechnya are outdated, but citizens could register on the day of election. Also, special measures were in place for displaced persons to take part in the voting within Chechnya and in the neighboring regions. However, standard conditions for elections and pre- electoral activities do not exist in the territory as a whole due to the ongoing military campaign in some areas and security conditions in others. In particular, election campaign activities in the territory did not take place, although the acting President visited there. Moreover, the population in Chechnya had very limited access to electronic and print media, had limited freedom of movement, and the potential for intimidation and fear could not be ruled out.

80 On election day, the IEOM did not deploy observers to Chechnya or the neighboring regions, though the CEC invited observers." (OSCE 19 May 2000, "Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions")

Displaced in Ingushetia were allowed to vote for the election of the Chechnya representative in the State Duma (August 2000)

· Few displaced persons made use of this opportunity

"On 20 August elections for the State Duma were held in Chechnya. Mr. Aslanbek Aslakhanov won the position with a clear margin, however, doubts have been raised with regard to the level of participation among the Chechen population. IDPs in Ingushetia were allowed to vote on the Chechen side of the Kavkaz-1 border checkpoint, however few persons made use of this opportunity. Although it appears that Mr. Aslakhanov (generally considered pro-Russian) enjoys some support among the Chechen population, the result of the vote is not expected to have any significant immediate effect on the general situation in the republic." (UNHCR 25 August 2000)

See also the section on the political participation of internally displaced persons in the Russian Federation in: "Internally Displaced Persons and Political Participation: the OSCE Region" published by the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement in September 2000 [Internet]

81 DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

Documentation needs

Improving access of the displaced population to identity documents (2000)

· Migration authorities are still reluctant to register application for the forced migrant status · Authorities started issuance of identity documents to undocumented displaced in Ingushetia in June 2000 · Numerous displaced households cannot register in Ingushetia and do not not enjoy access to humanitarian aid

"The situation of IDPs in Ingushetia remains precarious. The competent migration authorities are still reluctant to register or process applications for the granting of IDP status under the law of forced migrants. This is preventing IDPs who have made the choice not to return to Chechnya from legalizing their status and accessing the various compensation schemes, social allowances and installation grants which are provided for under the law. Finally, upon joint advocacy efforts from UNHCR and other relevant agencies, the Ministry of Interior initiated, in June 2000, the issuance of identity documents to undocumented IDPs in Ingushetia. As of the beginning of October several thousand IDPs had been issued such documents." (UN November 2000, p. 15)

"At present, Russian identity cards are being issued. According to the Russian authorities only 18,000-20,000 IDPs in Ingushetia have asked for them. It cannot be excluded that some people are afraid of applying because they do not wish to be registered at the Ministry of Interior." (COE 23 January 2001, paras. 43-44)

"Finally, the system installed for registering refugees is inappropriate, in consideration of the increasing number of refugees living illegally in the camps. The migration authorities refuse to register new refugees, with the exception of the ones that come from the Itum- Kale and Chatoï regions, or to re-register families returning to Ingushetia. Hence persons who are not registered do not enjoy access to humanitarian aid, but slip into the queues at the time of distributions. These days the NGO's that are present are unable to offer sufficient handling of all new arrivals." (MDM December 2000)

See also "The "propiska" system remains de facto in place in several regions (2000)" [Internal link]

Most displaced from Chechnya are not granted the forced migrant status (November 1999-September 2000)

82 · Only few hundreds ethnic Russian displaced from Chechnya were granted the "forced migrant" status in the regions of Stavropole and Krasnodar (as of September 2000) · It has become impossible in practive for newly arrived Chechen displaced to register in Moscow · The Federal Migration Service, through its territorial branches, have registered IDPs only the for the purpose of humanitarian assistance provision · Ethnic Chechen displaced are not granted the legal status of 'forced migrants' by the Federal Migration Service which reportedly reserve this status for displaced who 'did not intend to return to Chechnya' · Only document provided to the Chechen displaced is the Form 7 document for persons temporarily displaced, which gives access to food assistance, transfer to a temporary accommodation if available and free return journey within the Russian Federation

"The Russian authorities have not yet started to process individual claims for IDP status (with the exception of Stavropol and Krasnodar Krai, where few hundred ethnic Russian IDPs from Chechnya were granted IDP status under the 1995 Law on Forced Migrants). At this point in time, and although the FMS – through its territorial branches – have registered IDPs for the purpose of humanitarian assistance provision, IDPs from Chechnya do not have a proper legal status in their place of current displacement.

Chechen IDPs residing in some parts of the Russian Federation, in particular those staying in Moscow, St Petersburg and in the northern Caucasus regions (e.g. Stavropol, Kabardino-Balkaria and Krasnodar Krai) have encountered serious problems regarding their legal status and sometimes faced repeated security checks, fines, administrative detention, threat of eviction from their apartments and harassment by other groups of the local population. For example, in September 1999, a Moscow regulation, expressly referring to recent “terrorist acts that caused numerous victims among the civil population” instituted a re-registration procedure for all non-Muscovites staying in the capital city. As a result of this regulation, thousands of persons previously registered in Moscow could not re-register with the authorities. In practice, moreover, it became almost impossible for new arrivals, especially IDPs from Chechnya, to register in Moscow." (UNHCR September 2000, "Internally Displaced Persons")

"In contrast to Putin's assertion that Chechens would be considered Russian 'citizens', Russia's Federal Migration Service (FMS) did not register displaced ethnic Chechens in Ingushetia and elsewhere in the Russian Federation as 'forced migrants' (as they are entitled under Russian law), but reportedly reserved that status for displaced persons who did 'not intend to return to Chechnya.' (In the 1994-1996 war, the FMS allowed primarily ethnic Russians who could not return to Chechnya to register as forced migrants.) Consequently, unless they agreed not to return to their homes, newly displaced Chechens remained trapped in temporary accommodations (mostly in Ingushetia), unable to travel to regions where many had relatives who could assist them. Without forced migrant status, they would face bureaucratic obstacles to securing permanent residence permits, employment, health care, and pensions in other republics." (USCR November 1999)

83 "Persons forcibly displaced from the Chechen Republic during the hostilities in 1999- 2000 are not being given corresponding status by the Federal Migration Service, in contravention of the Forcibly Displaced Persons Act. This is because the special status imposes certain obligations on the Government. Officials cite the fact that there is no specific Government decision applying to this category of Russian citizens. The only registration of persons who have been forced to flee their homes in Chechnya is by means of a special document, namely, form 7 [or Registration of a family arriving under the emergency situations]. This document does not grant the holder any special status, but without it a person may not request accommodation in a camp for forcibly displaced persons or obtain certain foods free of charge on a regular basis, although neither of these entitlements is guaranteed. Holders of form 7 are further entitled to a free return journey to any region of the Russian Federation, and they may also request a transfer to a temporary accommodation centre for refugees or forcibly displaced persons in another area of the country (despite the fact that available places in such facilities are virtually non-existent). Eventual acquisition of forcibly displaced person status, and perhaps even compensation for destruction of property, depend solely on possession of form 7." (Memorial 20 January 2000)

84 ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Family unity

Displaced in Ingushetia gathered into "families" averaging 9 members (1999-2000)

· It took several months for these "families" to form, as members trickled into Ingushetia throughout the winter

"The influx of displaced persons into Ingushetia peaked between mid-September and mid-October [1999]. Since then smaller peaks have been recorded, following increases in fighting, threats, and rumors.

One in Ingushetia, the displaced gathered into "families" (defined here as a group of IDPs living together regardless of kinship) averaging 9 members. Half of the families count 5 to 9 members, while about a fourth have less than 5 members. It took several months for these "families" to form, as members trickled into Ingushetia throughout the winter."

[MSF teams conducted a survey in June 2000 among displaced Chechens in the district of Malgobeck, located in northwestern Ingushetia. This district harbors about one fourth of the total population of IDPs (internally displaced persons), which is currently estimated at more than 150,000.] (MSF 15 August 2000)

Reports of Chechen men separated from their families at the Chechen-Ingush border and checkpoints (January 2000)

· Males between ten and sixty rigourously checked in detention centres in Chechnya or not allowed access back to Chechnya

"Human Rights Watch strongly condemned today a new Russian order forbidding male Chechen refugees the ages of ten and sixty from entering or leaving Chechnya. Today border police began enforcing the order at checkpoints and border crossings.

The new order gives rise to fears that the Russians may undertake mass detention in 'filtration camps,' where many Chechens were systematically tortured during the 1994-96 Chechen war.

'Chechen males are now effectively trapped in a dangerous war zone,' said Holly Cartner, Executive Director of the Europe and Central Asia division of Human Rights Watch. 'It is fundamentally unacceptable to deny civilian males, including children as young as ten, the right to flee from heavy fighting. And it's against international standards.'

85 Following a Chechen counteroffensive and significant Russian military setbacks in early January, General Viktor Kazantsev, Commander for the North Caucasus Group of Forces, reportedly blamed the Russian 'mistakes' on 'our soft-heartedness.' On January 11 he ordered that only children under ten, men over sixty, and girls and women would henceforth be considered refugees. Gen. Kazantsev also ordered males between ten and sixty to be rigorously checked in detention centers for guerilla affiliation.

In the first Chechen war, Russian forces operated three official detention centers in Grozny, Mozdok, and Pyatigorsk, although many smaller camps existed unofficially throughout the region. These centers were known as 'filtration camps' because fighters were supposed to be 'filtered' out from civilians; they became notorious as centers for systemic torture, beatings and ill-treatment of thousands of Chechen males.

Soldiers at the main Chechen-Ingush border crossing confirmed to Human Rights Watch that they had received orders to turn back all men between the ages of ten and sixty who tried to enter or leave Chechnya, and Chechen civilians told Human Rights Watch that their male family members were stranded as a result. Datu Isigova, a refugee from Grozny, told Human Rights Watch that she was forced to leave her eleven-year-old son, Arbi, and her husband, Suleman, inside Chechnya today due to the new restrictions. Zura Mumayedova, a mother of three from Shatoi who arrived by bus at the Chechen-Ingush border on January 11, told Human Rights Watch researchers that four men she had been traveling with were ordered off the bus by Russian border guards, citing the new restrictions on Chechen males. Held at the border overnight, Mumayedova said that 'the Russian soldiers said that no men aged between ten and sixty would be allowed through.' She stated that the border guards prevented a fifty-nine-year-old man from crossing the border. She said that two boys, aged twelve and thirteen, made it past the border guards into Ingushetia only by concealing themselves on the bus. Other refugees reported that many other men had been turned back from the border, and that mothers with young children had often decided not to cross the border because they did not want to leave their young children behind.

Chechen men on the Ingushetia side of the border have been separated from their families, unable to cross back into Chechnya. Thirty-six-year-old Vayit Zagayev told Human Rights Watch that he arrived in Ingushetia in late December to get medicine for his bed-ridden mother and to obtain supplies for his family, currently living in Katyr-Iurt. Russian border guards today refused to allow him into Chechnya. Mauli Murtadaliyev, also thirty-six, said that the border guards would not let him escort the body of a deceased female relative back to Chechnya for burial." (HRW 12 January 2000)

86 PROPERTY ISSUES

General

There is no legal basis providing for compensation for properties destroyed as a result of the second conflict in Chechnya (2000)

· Archives of property documents in Grozny burnt downs (December 2000)

"There is no legal basis providing for compensation for destroyed property.

The Russian authorities informed the [Council of Europe] delegation that 2.5 million rubles (100,000 dollars) will be allocated from the budget in 2001 for the compensation for the lost or damaged property." (COE 23 January 2001, paras. 50-51)

"Bureau of Technical Inventory in Grozny burnt down At night between 1st and 2nd of December 2000, a building of the Bureau of the Technical Inventory of Grozny was burnt down. The building was located at the Prospect Pobeda, just a hundred meters away from a stationary checkpoint of Russian troops, in the area of intense night patrol. According to the available information, the whole BTI archive was destroyed in the fire. Tens and hundreds of thousands of cases on purchase and sale of houses, apartments ownership documents as well as documents defining the form of ownership will have to be remade now. The locals are confident that the archive was burnt intentionally (on purpose) by those people who had interest in doing so." (Memorial 2 January 2001)

25 % of the displaced population interviewed by MSF described their homes in Chechnya as intact or lightly destroyed

· Displaced in Ingushetia remain informed about the condition of their homes in Chechnya through direct assessment or by relatives and friends

· "Surprisingly 94% of the family heads interviewed said they had some knowledge about the condition of their homes in Chechnya. · 80% of them said they had gotten this information from close family members or even by themselves. 14% said their sources were relatives or friends who had returned to the camp or collective centers after a visit to Chechnya. Compared with earlier in the year, it seems the information was based less on rumors and on the circumstances of their flight, and more on direct assessments. · Only about ¼ of the displaced described their homes as intact or lightly destroyed."

87 lightly more than half intact destroyed destroyed 2% 24% 31%

totally burnt destroyed 12% 31%

[MSF team conducted a survey in June 2000 among displaced Chechens in the district of Malgobeck, located in northwestern Ingushetia. This district harbors about one fourth of the total population of IDPs (internally displaced persons), which is currently estimated at more than 150,000.] (MSF 15 August 2000)

Reports of widespread looting by Russian forces inside Chechnya (November 1999)

"Russian forces have looted homes in several of the districts under their control, Human Rights Watch said today. Internally displaced persons interviewed at the Chechen-Ingush border told of widespread looting in Sernovodsk (near the border), Ermolovskii (southwest of Grozny), and in the Naurskii district (north of the Terek river).

Dozens of people interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that their homes had been stripped of all foodstuffs and valuables -- sometimes including the floorboards -- by groups of armed soldiers, who sometimes came ready with military vehicles to carry away their loot.

'Looting was a terrible problem in the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya,' said Holly Cartner, executive director of Human Rights Watch's Europe and Central Asia division. 'It is a violation of international humanitarian law, and it must be stopped.'

Soldiers have not only looted basic food supplies stored for winter, but also taken anything of value from homes, often after their inhabitants have fled. As displaced persons have begun to filter back into Russian-controlled areas, they have found their homes emptied. Some of those people have then returned to Ingushetia in search of food and shelter." (HRW 14 November 1999)

88 PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Return to Chechnya

Few displaced have been able to access official aid for return (2000)

· Multiplication of requests is now said to be leading to a waiting time of at least one month

"These days, a person who is registered as a refugee in Ingushetia and who wants to return to Chechnya has to cancel his registration. To do that, he or she must fill out a form regarding a voluntary request for return supplied by the HCR and send it to the Ingushetian Migrations department, which in turn issues a return application certificate. Then the refugee must confirm his desire to return with the Russian Ministry of National Disasters and Emergencies. Once these administrative formulas have been carried out, that Ministry must officially see to the transport of the refugee and of his family between the camp and the place he is going to live, i.e., most often Grozny or the suburbs or Ourous-Martan. Once on the spot, the Ministry is responsible for checking on the family's possibility of re-settlement (absence of mines, state of the house...) and supplying one food and hygiene kit per person for two months. According to the HCR, in August 2000 1,574 people benefited from that aid-to-return system, but the multiplication of requests is now said to be leading to a waiting time of at least one month. In practise, it seems that few people have been able to benefit from this official process: the refugees probably leave Ingushetia seldom, because of the widespread destruction in Chechnya." (MDM December 2000, section IV)

Conditions for return to Chechnya not fulfilled (2000-2001)

· Security and human rights situation in Chechnya remains very precarious · Another major obstacle for return is the destroyed infrastructure and lack of housing · Reconstruction plans are hampered by insecurity

"The security situation in the Chechen Republic still remains very precarious. According to reports, small-scale fighting and attacks as well as the 'mine war' continue throughout Chechnya. Almost every day there are reports of victims, both among Russian servicemen and the civilian population, as a result of explosions of mines or bombs planted on the roads, in the vehicles etc. and elsewhere. UNHCR and UNICEF along with their implementing partners have initiated mine awareness programme both in Chechnya and in Ingushetia.

89 The human rights situation in Chechnya remains a matter of concern. Cases of human rights abuses continue to be reported, which obviously hampers the prospects for massive returns.

Strictly related to the security question is the need for investigations of and accountability for reported abuses. This is one of the preconditions for IDPs to feel safe to return to their homes. The delegation met Mr Vladimir Kalamanov, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Chechen Republic and two of the three Council of Europe experts working in his Office. The Rapporteur considers that Mr Kalamanov's Office substantially contributes to the re- establishment of the judiciary and the respect of human rights. In particular, the work of the Office is instrumental in collecting documentation on human rights violations. The Office has received over 4 000 written complaints. On 27 November 2000 Mr Kalamanov announced the outcome of investigations concerning 455 missing people. However, the delegation noted that as yet very little follow-up action to the complaints registered has been initiated by the Russian authorities.

Another major obstacle for return is the destroyed infrastructure and lack of housing. According to Mr M.Syltygov, the Chief Federal inspector of the Southern District for Ingushetia, 21 493 houses in Chechnya were totally, and approximately 23000 partially, destroyed. In some areas (e.g. in Grozny) nearly all buildings have been destroyed. There is an urgent need for construction materials.

According to Minister Blokhin, the Russian Federal Government has allocated 7.5 billion rubles (288 million dollars) to rebuild the houses destroyed in Chechnya. However, according to the independent estimates the reconstruction of Grozny alone would require a few billion dollars.

The Governmental Commission, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Khristenko, has drawn up a programme, over a period of 2-4 years, designed to help the economic recovery of Chechnya and its integration into Russia's economy. Its implementation would require some 50 billion rubles (2 billion dollars). It is foreseeable that 4.5 billion rubles (173 million dollars) could be earmarked for that programme in the 2001 federal budget. One of the programme's priorities is restoring the road system in Chechnya.

On 1 January 2001 the process of withdrawal of the Russian Federal troops is announced to start. There are plans to move the administration centre from Gudermes to Grozny. Some reconstruction in the city is being underway but it is hampered by security concerns." (COE 23 January 2001, paras. 27-33)

"On 15 January, the Special Representative of the RF President in charge of the human rights' observation in Chechnya, Vladimir Kalamanov, announced that around 60% of inner IDPs at present living in camp settlements in Chechnya are not able to return to the places of their permanent residence because their houses are no longer habitable, around 30% of the people are reluctant to go back due to absence of work places and living

90 infrastructure and only 10% cannot return because of difficult security situations." (DRC 7 February 2001)

"According to the Federal Ministry for Migration Policy and Federal Affairs, no IDPs currently in Ingushetia would be forced to return to Chechnya. However, the majority of IDPs consider that the main conditions for returning (security, accommodation and employment) are not yet in place." (WFP 10 August 2001)

Movements of displaced persons between Ingushetia and Chechnya remain without effect on the total IDP caseload (2000-2001)

· Return movements from Ingushetia to Chechnya have virtually ceased in December 2000-January 2001 · Two-way traffic continues across the Ingush-Chechen border for the collection of humanitarian aid or pensions · Return movements from Ingushetia and within Chechnya have remained very limited during the first nine months of 2001 · Most returnees are reluctant to settle permanently to Chechya due to the insecurity

"As indicated by the UNHCR monitors, the number of new arrivals from Chechnya is increasing, and during the reporting period as many as 1,700 persons arrived in Ingushetia while only 100 people left for Chechnya over the same period. The majority of new arrivals were from Argun, Grozny, and Achkhoy-Martan. The IDPs indicate the security situation and lack of inadequate living conditions as the main reasons for remaining in Ingushetia." (UN OCHA 15 February 2001)

"Continued instability in Chechnya has brought spontaneous returns to the republic to a virtual halt. A mere 40 to 50 people went back to Chechnya in December, while 1,500 fled from Chechnya to Ingushetia during the same period. Potential returnees are deterred by heavy Russian security presence, continued clashes and Chechnya’s devastated infrastructure. A total of 158,000 internally displaced Chechens are currently in Ingushetia. Most (about 70 percent) are still living with host families. About one-tenth are in tented camps, while about one-fifth still live in various 'spontaneous' settlements such as railway cars or decrepit buildings." (UNHCR 23 January 2001)

"A small number of people continue to arrive in Ingushetia from Chechnya at rate of about 200 persons per week. They say they flee continued military activity in Chechnya, as well as screening operations by federal Russian forces in several areas of southern Chechnya: Tangui-chu, Martan-Chu and Urus Martan. Land mines are prevalent in most areas in Chechnya, representing a severe threat to civilians returning to the republic. There are numerous reports of mine strikes. Some people are also fleeing the difficult living conditions in Chechnya, citing lack of winter-proof shelter, irregular gas and electricity supply and the absence of adequate humanitarian assistance. UNHCR border monitors say a number of people arrive in Ingushetia at the time of aid distribution in order to collect humanitarian assistance and go back to Chechnya. Return movement to

91 Chechnya remains very limited, even though two-way traffic continues across the Ingush- Chechen border. Some people go back to Chechnya briefly to collect their retirement pension checks or personal belongings but most return to Ingushetia." (UNHCR 1 December 2000)

"The IDP situation in the northern Caucasus has stabilised in the autumn of 2000. IDPs continued to move to and from between Ingushetia and Chechnya in small numbers. However, the net effect was negligible. It appears that most IDPs had decided where to stay for the winter." (UN November 2000, p. 23)

2500 Movement from Chechnya to Ingushetia

2000 Movement from Ingushetia to Chechnya

1500

People 1000

500

0 Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug 2000 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001

"Throughout the first nine months of 2001 there has been little or no return from Ingushetia to Chechnya (and of IDPs in Chechnya to their place of origin). This is the result of the continuing instability of the security environment inside Chechnya and the subsequent decision of IDPs to remain in Ingushetia until conditions improve to such an extent that they feel it is safe to return home." (UN September 2001, p. 3)

"UNHCR is working closely with authorities to safeguard the principle of voluntary return. So far, UNHCR has not registered any formal attempt to force IDPs to return to Chechnya. during the reporting period about 1,760 IDPs returned voluntarily to Chechnya, mostly from host families and mainly bound for Urus-Martan, Achkhoi- Martan and Shali regions. However, many of these people remain reluctant to return permanently to Chechnya due to reports of continued hostilities." (UNHCR September 2001, pp. 216-217)

New arrivals in Ingushetia during June 2001: 700 (estimate) Returnees to Chechnya during June 2001: 375 (estimate) (UN June 2001, p. 14)

Federal authorities plan return of displaced population to Chechnya (2000-2001)

92 · Plans for the closure of camps in Ingushetia by end of 2001 have been announced by Federal authorities · There will be no use of force for the resettlement of the displaced, according to authorities · Temporary accommodation camps have been built in Chechnya for receiving returning displaced from Chechnya (August 2001)

"In a statement made in November 10, the Minister for Federal Affairs, Migration and Nationality Issues, Mr. Blokhin, voiced a plan of the Federal authorities to close the IDP camps in Ingushetia by the beginning of next winter (2001-2002). However, according to him, there will not be used any forced means for the resettlement of the IDPs. The Minister stressed that despite numerous difficulties. IDP camps have been prepared for the coming winter period. But, together with that, out of 570 tents that need to be replaced, only 150 have been exchanged with new ones. The Federal Government plans to allocate 500 mln. rubles for maintenance of the IDP compact settlements in Ingushetia and Chechnya." (DRC 10 November 2000)

"A meeting between top Ingush officials was held in the Ingush capital of Magas, on November 17, to discuss measures to move Chechen IDPs from Ingushetia back to Chechnya. The resettlement is planned in two stages. The first stage envisages that the IDPs will be directed to the temporary settlement centers in Sernovodskaya and Argun villages starting from the beginning of the year 2001. In the second stage the IDPs will go to temporary shelters opened in Grozny, which may be implemented not earlier than in April 2001. Full implementation of the plan will require a huge amount of money. Creation of a temporary shelter in Argun, for example, will require 2.5 million rubles." (DRC 30 November 2000)

"The pro-Moscow head of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, opened the first session of his newly created government by announcing plans for the return of all refugees to Chechnya by the year's end.

Speaking to the republic's top officials Saturday, Kadyrov said his priority was the return of all persons who had fled the 16-month fighting between Russian federal troops and separatist rebels.

'The Chechen government has been set this task,' he said at the meeting in the eastern town of Gudermes, which currently acts as the administrative capital of the republic, news agencies reported.

'This year's spring and summer will be the turning-point in Chechen life that will allow people to return to their homes,' RIA Novosti quoted Kadyrov as saying.

'We will rebuild socio-economic conditions and reconstruct homes, which will create jobs for people, enticing them back to a peaceful existence,' he said.

93 'The lack of jobs in the republic has forced Chechens to serve the rebels for the hope of promised pay,' he explained." (AFP 4 February 2001)

"On 20 August the Chechnya republic committee for IDPs informed that six camps of temporary accommodation have been created in Chechnya for receiving displaced persons. More than 300 Chechens returned from Ingushetia's tent camps to Chechnya in the end of the previous week, including 50 people who came to a temporary accommodation camp in the town of Argun. According to the committee's information, over 400 displaced persons will return to the Argun camp of temporary accommodation by the end of August. Another four temporary accommodation camps are being built in Grozny and other Districts centers. Up to 50,000 refugees will be settled in the private sector. In the opinion of the committee's specialists, the number of Chechens wishing to return will sharply increase after the redistribution of the main humanitarian aid flow from Ingushetia tent camps to Chechen territory." (DRC 31 August 2001)

Russian Government takes measures for rehabilitation and long-term reconstruction work in Chechnya (2000-2001)

· Decree on measure for social and political stabilisation in Chechnya adopted in August 2000 · Approximately US$ 500 million to be allocated for the implementation of rehabilitation programme in Chechnya (January 2001) · Reconstruction aid has not materialised in Grozny · A Federal programme for the economic and social rehabilitation of Chechnya has also been adopted in August 2001

"The Government of the Russian Federation has passed a decree 'On the complex of top- priority measures to ensure normal functioning of the economic and social sphere of the Republic of Chechnya in 2000.' [Resolution No. 639, 29 August 2000] The decree was worked out in pursuance of the December 1999 resolution of the Russian Government aimed at stabilizing the social and political situation in the Republic of Chechnya. The measures envisage, in particular restoration of power, gas, water supply and sewage systems, rehabilitation of public infrastructure, and provision of housing and food to IDPs inside the republic. The Administration of the Republic of Chechnya is to coordinate the implementation of the decree." (UN OCHA 30 September 2000)

See text of the decree in Annex II to the UN Consolidated Appeal for 2001 [Internet]

"On 25 January, the Russian Government approved a programme for the rehabilitation of social and economic life in Chechnya in 2001, 14 billion rubles (approximately US$ 500 million) are to be allocated for the implementation of the programme. Among the priority tasks are the reconstruction of residential houses so that IDPs are able to return to Chechnya, payment of pensions, provision of education, as well as job opportunities." (UN OCHA 31 January 2001)

94 Despite [ongoing] efforts, reconstruction has been painfully slow. According to the State Committee for Refugees and Displaced Persons, 129,728 households were destroyed by the war. Despite efforts spearheaded by UNHCR to create 'one warm, dry room' in houses that were not severely damaged, and could be partially winterized, there simply was not discernible evidence of any reconstruction in Grozny in our drive-by assessment of the city. The sole exception was one remarkably lavish building that appeared newly constructed in the midst of chaos, the headquarters of the Energy Ministry.

The Moscow-appointed official head of the pro-Russian Chechen administration, Akhmad Kadyrov, himself complains about the lack of Russian reconstruction aid. 'Leaders need moral and financial support to achieve something,' he told Agence France Presse on December 18, 2000, ' but we have not received on ruble for reconstruction of compensation for the war and people are disillusioned." (USCR February 2001)

"On August 23 [2001], the Russian government approved the Federal program of economic and social rehabilitation in Chechnya for 2002 and subsequent years. About 4,5 billion rubles are planned to be appropriated from the federal budget next year, Vladimir Yelagin said. It is supposed that over 14 billion rubles of extra-budget money will also be spent on the restoration of Chechnya's economy and its social sphere. Besides, it has been planned to double the funding of housing construction - about 3,5 billion rubles is to be spent on that. The federal center is to spend 600 million rubles on farming and 500 million on law-enforcement in Chechnya." (DRC 31 August 2001)

See also Government of the Russian Federation, "Russian Government approves Chechen socio-economic recovery programme", 23 August 2001 [Internet]

For more information on the progress of the Rehabilitation Work in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, see report of the Federal Government in Annex C of the UNOCHA Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit for Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation), March 2001 [Internet]

UNHCR avoids stimulating false sense of security in Chechnya (February 2001)

· UNHCR activity in the region remains the preservation of a safe haven in Ingushetia for Chechen IDPs until conditions are created for safe return to Chechnya

"(a) Given the current situation in the North Caucasus, especially the slow progress in finding a political solution to the Chechen conflict, the overriding focus of all UNHCR activity in the region remains the preservation of a safe haven in Ingushetia for Chechen IDPs until such time that a conducive atmosphere is created for safe return to conflict affected areas. UNHCR maintains a cautious approach to humanitarian assistance within Chechnya, to avoid stimulating a false sense of security among the IDPs in an area where UNHCR is unable to provide even limited protection monitoring and cannot pretend to meet the massive basic assistance needs.

95 (b) In view of the fact that the changing security situation in the region poses difficulties for long-term planning, UNHCR maintains the position that its staff members, both national and international, should remain in Ingushetia. It continued providing basic life saving winterization support materials (windows and roofing materials) for some 750 families, as well as relief aid for Chechen IDPs inside Chechnya itself. However, no further substantive material assistance towards reconstruction of shelter is contemplated by UNHCR as this is considered to be the responsibility of the federal authorities.

(c) UNHCR is supporting government efforts to re-establish a civilian administration and the rule of law inside Chechnya through training initiatives for judges, prosecutors, lawyers and law enforcement officials. Such initiatives are taking place outside of Chechnya, so as not to suggest that the Republic is safe for return at this stage." (UN CHR 1 February 2001)

UNHCR prepares programmes for assisting displaced returning to Chechnya (2000)

· Packages for returnees and other persons of concern to UNHCR consisting of food and non-food items will be prepared and distributed to all IDPs who opt for return · There will be no UN and IOM facilitated returns until these agencies are satisfied that conditions are right for the safe, dignified, and voluntary return of IDPs to Chechnya · An information depository, for the tracking of sites, locations and movements of affected populations, will be established within UNHCR in Geneva

"Much of UNHCR’s focus will now shift to assist IDPs returning to Chechnya. Returnee packages will be prepared and distributed consisting of food and non-food items such as kitchen sets, blankets, mattresses, plastic sheets, jerry cans, personal hygiene items, clothes, and shoes. Agricultural kits including items such as shovels, hoes, and seeds, will also be part of the package and will be given to families from rural areas to strengthen their capacity to regain self-sufficiency. In addition, construction kits, which will include corrugated sheets, window glass, wood, tools, and plastic sheeting, will be provided to 700 most needy IDP families to rehabilitate their homes.

Additional shelter needs of the most vulnerable groups (pregnant women, children, elderly, medical cases) will be addressed, in close collaboration with EMERCOM, by accommodating them in tents or prefabricated units while their houses are repaired. (UN March 2000, p. 13)

In close coordination with all agencies involved, and coupled with an ongoing assessment of needs, UNHCR was able to review its programme strategy. Attention will now focus on some 100,000 IDPs, almost all of whom hope to return to Chechnya.

96 Reintegration activities will focus on shelter, water, sanitation, household and domestic support, transport and logistics and operational support to both UNHCR and its implementing partners.

Packages for returnees and other persons of concern to UNHCR consisting of food and non-food items will be prepared and distributed to all IDPs who opt for return. Non-food items will include kitchen sets, blankets, mattresses, jerry cans, personal hygiene items, clothes and shoes. Agricultural kits consisting of shovels, hoes, seeds, and so forth also will be part of the package and will be given to families from rural areas. […] UNHCR will, in cooperation with IOM and DRC, conduct an assessment, starting in late March 2000, of possible returns to Chechnya for a majority of the IDP population in Ingushetia. This assessment will draw upon registration data collected by the DRC and result in a contingency plan for organized returns. Donor support will be needed immediately to carry out the assessment and to draw up contingency plans. Once the plans are in place, additional and substantial funding will be required immediately to organize the returns should they take place within the time frame of the Appeal. The provision of medical services by IOM will be a necessary part of any organized return. There will be no such returns by the UN and IOM until the UN is satisfied that conditions are right for the safe, dignified, and voluntary return of IDPs to Chechnya.

An information depository, for the tracking of sites, locations and movements of affected populations, will be established within UNHCR in Geneva. This should facilitate information management and analysis, and will be accessible for UN Agencies and their operational partners in the region. Tools and techniques of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) will be used." (UN March 2000, pp. 27-28)

Return to the Prigorodny district (North-Ossetia)

Most displaced will return but a small portion is likely to stay durably in Ingushetia (2001)

· Programme of Action signed by authorities in North Ossetia and Ingushetia in October 1997 to facilitate return of the displaced · Number of villages in North Ossetia where Ingush displaced can return has increase progressively · Some 18 234 Ingush have returned permanently to Prigorodny, as of December 2000 · More than 20 000 IDPs have applied for assistance to return to the area · Several thousand displaced are likely to settle in Ingushetia permanently · Return movements continue to be hampered by violence in North Ossetia (2001)

"On 15 October 1997, a Programme of Action by the State Bodies of the Russian Federation, the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia and the Republic of Ingushetia was signed to facilitate refugee return and improve local morale. The legal relationship is determined by a Treaty Regulating Relations and Cooperation

97 between the Republic of North-Ossetia-Alania and the Republic of Ingushetia, signed in September 1997. The Ossetian side has abolished one law and three pieces of legislature which obstructed repatriation. The constitution of Ingushetia still contains Article 11, which insists on the 'return of the territory which Ingushetia was illegally deprived of'. This article contradicts federal legislation and the Ossetian side could appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court to abolish it. But the existence of such a provision equally serves the interests of those Ossete nationalists who want to paint an image of the Ingush as aggressors." (Matveeva 1999, p. 28)

"Return of ethnic Ingush IDPs from Ingushetia to North Ossetia has been fraught with problems since it started. Since 1994 when 'official' return involving federal authorities started, wagon settlements guarded by federal army soldiers were created by federal authorities in villages where safety of returnees could not be guaranteed otherwise, which resulted in numerous security incidents. In 1996, following the agreement to increase the number of villages for Ingush return to eight, two more new wagon settlements were created. One in Prigorodny district itself, in Tarskoye where the village population is openly hostile to the returning Ingush and another 'transit' settlement in Mayskoye, unilaterally established by the local Ingush authorities and where IDPs were moved on the assumption that they would eventually return to their villages of origin. While the Mayskoye transit camp became a bone of contention between Ingush and Ossets over return, the Tarskoye settlement was eventually burnt down by Ossets in July 1997.

The Federal Governmental regulation No. 274 of 6 March 1998, on opening bank accounts for those displaced as a result of Osset-Ingush conflict to rebuild their destroyed houses or to purchase new housing especially enabled Ingush IDPs to return and rehabilitate their former houses. As of 31 December 2000, 2,993 bank accounts were opened for 14,270 persons. The first instalments had been paid to 2637 persons, second instalment 1 162 persons, and the third instalment to 665 persons.

During 2000 the return process and the relationship between Ingush and North Ossetian authorities saw signs of improvement. The number of villages Ingush returned to expanded, in accordance with the Plan of Action of 15 October 1997. In 2000, IDPs continued to return to Kartsa, Chermen, Dachnoye, Dongaron, Kurtat, Balta, Redant, Chmi, Vladikavkaz and Sputnik.

During 2000 a total of 2 392 persons (424 families) returned in an organised manner to Prigorodny. As of 31 December 2000, (since 1994) some 18 234 Ingush have returned permanently to Prigorodny, according to the office of the Federal Presidential Representative to Prigorodny. In addition, more than 20 000 IDPs have applied for assistance to return to the area. Also, several thousand IDPs are likely to settle in Ingushetia permanently." (UNCR 7 March 2001)

Reports of violence againts returnees (2001) "Ossetians thwart Ingush repatriation Some 400 Ossetians blocked a border crossing with neighboring Ingushetia on 23 May [2001] to prevent the return to the village of Ir in North Ossetia's disputed Prigorodnys

98 Raion of some 87 Ingush families who fled the district during the fighting on late 1992, Russian agencies reported. at a subsequent meeting, North Ossetian Prime Minister Kazbek Kardinov and his Ingushetian counterpart Akhmet Malsagov agreed that 10 Ingush families will return to Ir every week, Interfax reported. The North Ossetians have systematically sought to prevent the return of any Ingush to Prigorodnyi Raion. LF" (RFE/RL 25 May 2001)

"Explosion hits passenger bus A blast tore through a passenger bus on the border between two rival southern Russian republics Tuesday, injuring three women, police said.

The explosion hit in the evening in a neutral area between border checkpoints in the republics of Ingushetia and North Ossetia, near the Ossetian village of Chermen, said Magomed Ozdoyevm duty officer of the Ingush regional police department.

The cause of the blast was not immediately clear. Ozdoyev said it may have been a bomb placed in a nearby tree.

The bus had been travelling from the Ingush city of Nazran in Kurtat in Ossetia, and was heading into the disputed Prigorodny region when it exploded." (The Russia Journal 5 September 2001)

Resettlement

About 35,000 ethnic Ingush displaced will be permanently resettled in Ingushetia (2000-2001)

· Ingush authorities will receive support from various international agencies for the resettlement of this population

"The Government of Ingushetia has indicated that it will allow some 9,000 ethnic Ingush IDPs from the current emergency to resettle permanently in Ingushetia along with a further 28,000 IDPs of Ingush origin from previous hostilities. Once the necessary legal grounds have been prepared for the IDPs’ integration into Ingushetia, UNHCR in co- operation with UNDP and FAO will assist with various multi-sectoral activities." (UN November 2000, pp. 24, 43)

"In the beginning of December 2000, following a meeting with group of people living in the Yuzhniy settlement, Sunzhensky District of Ingushetia, DRC/ASF carried out an assessment of the situation in the settlement. The Yuzhniy settlement is located at the border with Chechnya and has no particular infrastructure. Presently 65 families are residing in the village of Yuzhny in very poor conditions. This village has been established at the initiative of the Ingush administration with the intention that eventually

99 2000 IDP families of Ingush IDPs from Chechnya will be resettled. Though the land plots are in the process of being allocated, however, at present the facilities of the village are extremely limited with no running water or gas and only limited electricity supply. There is also no school, which is of great concern to the families. Hence, it is the intention of DRC/ASF to build a school and community centre in the village as a means of stimulating activity in the village and to ensure that the children have access to education. On December 30, 2000, DRC/ASF accomplished construction of the school. At the Opening Ceremony, both republican and regional officials greatly appreciated attention given by DRC/ASF to the settlement. The school is the first institutional facility built in the Yuzhniy settlement since its establishment." (DRC 12 January 2001)

Successful integration of the ethnic Russians displaced from Chechnya in the Stavropol region (2000)

· Local communities and the Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration

"Other neighbouring regions, namely the Republic of North Ossetia-Alanya, the Republic of Dagestan and the Stavropol region accommodate in total approximately 10 000 people displaced after the recent conflict. However, certain areas have been accommodating large numbers of Chechen IDPs since 1992. According to the Russian official figures, as many as 300 000 ethnic Russians have left the Chechen Republic since 1992. For example, in the Stavropol region alone, the number amounts to 76 000 people. The delegation visited some settlements of Russian IDPs from Chechnya in the area of Budennovsk constructed with the assistance of local communities. The Orthodox Church has largely contributed to this integration. Undoubtedly, living conditions in these settlements are much better than those in IDP camps and the majority of IDPs have been successfully integrated into the local communities. Many of them have found employment." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 5)

100 HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Access to North Caucasus

International humanitarian work face difficult security conditions in northern Caucasus (2001)

· UN Security Coordinator oversees UN staff security and security on a daily basis · Security situation in Chechnya remains tense and unpredictable with high risk of kidnapping of humanitarian staff · Persistant risk of kidnapping in North Ossetia and Ingushetia · Stringent preventive security measures for the UN and associated staff operating in the northern Caucasus · All organisations working in this operation have used armed protection for their international staff except four NGOs (February 2001)

"The UN Designated Official for security is responsible for UN staff safety and security, with UNSECOORD managing the process on a day-to-day basis. UNSECOORD has an office in Moscow, and sub-offices in Nazran and Vladikavkaz. Its presence in the field as ‘UNSECOORD’, as opposed to having staff cost-shared by all UN agencies, is unprecedented.

UNSECOORD has carried out a series of security assessments in Chechnya and concluded that the security situation remains tense and unpredictable. Kidnapping for financial gain continues to be the main threat to humanitarian workers. The impending winter may see an escalation of security incidents, and the risk of aid agency staff getting caught in an incident cannot be excluded. The presence of mines and unexploded ordnance in Chechnya and Chechen-Ingush border areas pose yet another serious threat to humanitarian workers.

In addition to its work in Chechnya, UNSECOORD strives to cover the security situation in Ingushetia and North Ossetia. The office’s assessment is that the situation in both republics is unclear, particularly with the impending presidential elections in North Ossetia (January 2002) and Ingushetia (March 2002) and the long-standing issue of IDP returns to Prigorodny region. However, the most worrisome threat continues to be that of kidnapping for financial gain. Other threats include explosions such as those that took place during the summer of 2001. Such incidents indicate that the republics are high risk and, as has been shown in the past, aid workers could be caught in violence or become direct targets of it.

To ensure a relatively safe work environment, UNSECOORD has introduced and continues to operate stringent preventive security measures for the UN and associated staff operating in the North Caucasus. These include: an international staff ceiling of

101 twelve (twelve UN agency staff plus two field security officers); staff rotations to ensure an element of unpredictability; close protection at all times; round-the-clock static security at the offices and houses, with fully equipped security equipment and alarm systems. UNHCR has contributed significantly to the provision of security for UN staff by providing technical support to RUBOP/UBOP (the regional department to combat organised crime), which provides armed mobile escorts to the UN and associated humanitarian operations in the North Caucasus.

The role of UNSECOORD goes well beyond that of managing the security of UN and associated staff in that the office has become a centre of information sharing and advice for the humanitarian community at large. Security advisories, threat assessments, and professional expertise are at hand for all aid agencies working in the North Caucasus. In order to continue this and ensure security arrangements for the UN and associated humanitarian operations, UNSECOORD requires the support of the international donor community.

Current Security Status Mission Area (Caucasus) UN Security Phase Since

Stavropol Kray and the city of Stavropol II 13.10.1999

The Republic of North Ossetia–Alania, III 30.01.1998 including Vladikavkaz and Prigorodny Region

Republic of Ingushetia including the town of IV 05.03.1999 NAZRAN and the Republic of Dagestan

Republic of Chechnya V 05.03.1999

(UN September 2001, pp. 30-31)

"All organisations working in this operation have used armed protection for their international staff although four NGOs feel that doing so in Chechnya itself compromises their neutrality. While respecting the views of these four NGOs, UN agencies, the ICRC, and the vast majority of NGOs believe that using armed protection for their international staff, whether in Chechnya or elsewhere, is necessary and reduces the threat of kidnapping. On 29 January, the UN stated that its implementing partners must use armed protection for any expatriate staff present in Chechnya, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. (A protocol on this issue is currently being developed in consultations between the UN and its implementing partners.) In order to improve the security cover for UN and associated staff, the Designated Official, with UNSECOORD's support, has submitted proposals to the government to train and equip a dedicated, expanded, Russian regional, anti-crime security group. This 'regional' unit would be based on an existing Ingush anti-crime unit

102 protection the UN so that the armed protection that the UN has enjoyed could be extended to the international staff on the UN's partners." (IASC-WG 9 February 2001)

"Médecins sans Frontières-France and Médecins du Monde are the only organisations that have not used armed protection at all. Action contre la Faim and MSF Holland have done so in Ingushetia." (IASC-WG 9 February 2001)

Bureaucratic obstacles hamper timely delivery of humanitarian aid in Chechnya (2000- 2001)

· NGOs subject to unclear procedures for obtaining a pass granting access to Chechnya · Use of radio communications in the field restricted · Problems such as customs clearances and value added tax exemptions persist but are less serious than they were one year · Chechen administration adopted provisions to limit NGO presence (July 2001)

"Access to Chechnya for the United Nations' humanitarian and development agencies has been consistently good in that it has been granted on each occasion that the UN agencies have requested it. Access and freedom of movement for the UN's partners has been more complicated, in particular because of the number of checkpoints in the republic and a certain unfamiliarity with the ways and means of non-governmental organisations. For example, passes granting access to Chechnya are issued to NGOs but the process of obtaining a pass is less than clear and often involves several ministries. The UN is currently working with the Russian authorities and NGOs to improve the situation." (IASC-WG 9 February 2001)

"It seems that bureaucratic obstacles constitute, along with the inadequate security, the main reason for the almost total absence of international humanitarian assistance in the Chechen Republic. It is true that poor security situation requires strict security rules. This should not, however, be used by the Russian authorities as an excuse to create unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, as often seems to be the case. This question was raised by the delegation during the meeting with Mr Kazantsev, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District.

Unfortunately, new regulations issued at the end of September have made the transport of relief aid to Chechnya more complicated. Transit permits are issued by the Chechnya central administration and the Russian army. Radio communications in the field, vital for the security of humanitarian organisations' staff are still subject to severe restrictions and to obtaining a licence which requires a complicated procedure. The length of bureaucratic procedures have delayed and, in some cases, cancelled the transport of food, medicine and other materials to the Chechen population.

103 During the meeting with the delegation, Mr Kalamanov accused some humanitarian organisations of refusing to co-operate with the local Chechen administration and pointed out that humanitarian assistance should be controlled by the administration.

According to the information received from some humanitarian agencies, the recent restructuring of the federal administration and transfer of competence regarding IDP camps from EMERCOM to the Ministry for the Federation and Minorities as from 1 October 2000 seem to have contributed to this unsatisfactory situation. The Russian authorities admit that the restructuring might have caused some momentary bureaucratic confusion but they have confidence in the advantages of the new structure in a long run. (COE 23 January 2001, paras. 34-38)

Late deliveries and customs clearance problems significantly affected distributions throughout the summer. WFP food pipeline has now become more regular, which is in good part attributed to a flexible donor response in providing cash to WFP for local purchases in the Russian Federation, this has proven to be more cost effective and faster." (WFP 3 November 2000)

"Problems such as customs clearances and value added tax exemptions persist but are less serious than they were one year ago. Most agencies are now avoiding problems with customs. UNDP and UNFPA, benefiting from country agreements with the Russian Federation that have been ratified by the lower house of the government (known as the Duma), and WFP, which has developed a mechanism with the Ministry of Emergencies, avoid paying value added tax. Further legislation on VAT exemption was issued at the end of December 2000 and it is understood that humanitarian aid bought in the Russian Federation will now be VAT-free." (IASC-WG 9 February 2001)

"The non-governmental community has been experiencing more and more difficulties when working in Chechnya. Security incidents involving NGO staff, the prolonged blocking of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) food convoy bound for Dagestan, and impediments with respect to the Centre for Peacemaking and Development (CPCD) food assistance in Chechnya adversely affect humanitarian action in the republic. New regulations issued by Resolution 22 of the Chechen government entitled 'On measures to streamline the stay of international non-governmental organisations and their representatives on the territory of the Chechen Republic' might further threaten unhindered access to civilians in need and the impartiality of the assistance. The UN has been holding discussions with the NGOs for their views on the matter so that a coherent position can be presented to the government." (UN 31 July 2001)

See also:

Prague Watchdog, Obstacles to Humanitarian Aid in the Northern Caucasus, by Oscar Braun, 26&27 September 2001 [Internet]

AFP "Pro-Moscow Chechen chief warns international agencies", 14 February 2001 [Internet]

104 Temporary suspensions of humanitarian operations in Chechnya following security incidents (2001)

· Humanitarian community suspended programmes in Chechnya following abduction of MSF staff member (January-February 2001) · Incident at a checkpoint in Chechnya resulted in the suspension of ICRC activities and travel in Chechnya (May 2001)

"During January [2001] the United Nations and almost all NGOs suspended programmes in Chechnya for the time being in order to evaluate the situation following the abduction of a staff member of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) - Holland in Chechnya on 9 January 2001, as well as to express solidarity with the NGO. However the UN and other organisations continued programmes in all other areas of the northern Caucasus. The humanitarian community held constant talks to discuss operational modalities in Chechnya and the resumption of programmes there taking into consideration the fact that without the external assistance the humanitarian situation in Chechnya would further deteriorate." (UN OCHA 31 January 2001)

"Following the release of a staff member of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) - Holland on 4 February 2001, the humanitarian community at large is intending to resume activities in Chechnya. The resumption of the UN's and its NGO partners's activities would be on a small scale and with local staff distributing aid to beneficiaries." (UN OCHA 15 February 2000)

See also AFP " Red Cross to stay in Chechnya despite kidnapping of US aid worker", 9 February 2001 [Internet]

PINF, "People In Need Foundation resumes aid activities in Chechnya", 18 February 2001 [Internet]

"On Tuesday 29 May [2001], around 4.30 p.m., a local employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was wounded at a checkpoint manned by federal forces at Staropromislovsky, on the outskirts of Grozny, after an ICRC vehicle clearly marked with a red cross emblem was stopped for a routine inspection. In circumstances that remain to be elucidated, shots were fired and the ICRC employee, Arbi Israilov, was wounded in the stomach. Mr Israllov was later admitted to Hospital No. 9 in Grozny and successfully operated on that evening. On 30 May in the morning his condition was stable. The ICRC mission in Nalchik, in the northern Caucasus, and the ICRC delegation in Moscow immediately contacted the Russian authorities and asked them to open an enquiry.

For the time being, the ICRC, deeply concerned about the difficulties encountered in carrying out its humanitarian work in Chechnya, is seeking to elucidate the circumstances

105 of this incident with the Russian authorities. It has also decided to suspend all activities and travel in Chechnya until clearer information has been obtained regarding security conditions. The ICRC extends its best wishes to Mr Israllov for a full and speedy recovery.

The ICRC has been working in the northern Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya, since 1993. Since the killing of six ICRC delegates in Novye Atagi on 17 December 1996 and the abduction of an ICRC delegate in 1999, most of the ICRC's work inside Chechnya has been carried out by local employees backed up by expatriates who conduct ad hoc missions on the spot. As part of its humanitarian activities for victims of the conflict in Chechnya, the ICRC visits detainees and, with its partner the Russian Red Cross Society, provides medical assistance and carries out water distribution programmes for over 50,000 beneficiaries and food programmes for around 30,000 vulnerable people. The two organizations also assist approximately 170,000 displaced persons throughout the northern Caucasus. The ICRC currently has 12 expatriate delegates and 440 local employees based in the region." (ICRC 31 May 2001)

Access of human rights organisations and journalists to northern Caucasus strictly limited (2000)

· Human rights forces face difficulties working inside Chechnya · Journalists need special accreditation to enter northern Caucasus · They are also exposed to kidnapping and arbitrary detention

"Human rights organizations working on Chechnya faced problems of access to Chechnya and to official information, and petty harassment. Despite oral assurances that Human Rights Watch would be granted access to Chechnya, this was not the case. Memorial, a leading Russian rights group, also continued to face difficulties working inside Chechnya. Human rights workers faced occasional harassment from police and the Federal Security Service (FSB), Numerous appeals by Human Rights Watch for information from the Russian authorities went unanswered." (HRW December 2000, p. 318)

"The country's Northern Caucasus continued to be a dangerous region for Russian journalists. Kidnapings and assaults remained serious threats. In addition, federal authorities--both military and civilian--limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated reports and equipment. Special accreditation besides the usual Foreign Ministry accreditation was required for entry to the region. In some cases, foreign journalists publicly complained that military officials in the northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to obtain local press accreditation." (US DOS February 2001, sect. 2.a)

"Novaya Gazeta’s star war correspondent, Anna Politkovskaya, was detained earlier this week in southern Chechnya after she approached an army checkpoint to interview soldiers. Her detention, first reported Wednesday by her colleagues, was confirmed later

106 in the day by the Kremlin and military officials. They said Politkovskaya was detained Tuesday for not following the rules for reporters working in Chechnya, but would soon be released. The Kremlin spokesman on Chechnya, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, said she was being held at the army unit in Khatuni, a village near Vedeno, and would be transported by helicopter to the army base in Mozdok just outside Chechnya "as soon as the weather allows," Interfax reported. He said she was being treated well and had been fed. Yastrzhembsky’s deputy said Politkovskaya had broken the rules by traveling in Chechnya without registering her whereabouts with the military. "She does have the proper accreditation for Chechnya, but she still failed to register with the military commanders in Mozdok and Khankala," Konstantin Makeyev said in a telephone interview." (The Moscow Times 22 February 2001)

The response to lack of access by international agencies: from the 'remote control' concept to a more active presence (1999-2000)

· Because of the insecure environment prevailing in North Caucasus, UN programmes were initially managed by local staff in situ ('remote control’), which, however, impeded adequate monitoring and reporting · In December 1999, following negotiations and high-level UN visits, the federal authorities made security arrangements that permitted international staff to undertake regular visits to Ingushetia

"Monitoring and reporting on the implementation of activities is of fundamental importance to the UN as it helps to ensure the appropriate use of resources and enables the UN to remain accountable to beneficiaries and donor governments. At the initial stages of the current operation, the UN based its programmes on the ‘remote control’ concept, i.e. programmes were to be managed by local staff in situ, primarily because of the insecure environment that prevented visits by international staff. ‘Remote control’, however, impeded adequate monitoring and reporting: on the one hand, local staff was inexperienced to handle a sizeable operation and on the other, the demands on the staff were excessive.

In December 1999, following negotiations and high-level UN visits, the federal authorities made security arrangements that permitted international staff to undertake regular visits to Ingushetia. As such, the UN strengthened its ability to discuss its operations with the authorities and to monitor and report in a more regular and reliable manner. This has a considerable impact on overall performance and effectiveness.

The implementing arrangement between UNHCR and DRC strengthened the capacity to monitor and report considerably. The two organisations now have over sixty local monitors in Ingushetia, enabling them to oversee distributions of assistance and provide daily information to the UN offices in Moscow. WFP has contracted World Vision International (WVI) to monitor the receipt, storage, and dispatch of commodities to and from the extended delivery point at Vladikavkaz, and to spot check distributions.

During January, UNICEF and WHO hired local staff in situ and supported them with regular visits by expatriate staff. This field presence further strengthened the UN’s

107 overall capacity to monitor programmes and evolving needs in a wider range of sectors than had previously been the case. Similarly, more NGOs have opened offices in the northern Caucasus, thereby further enhancing implementation modalities, monitoring and reporting of activities.

In sum, the operation has shifted from a ‘remote control’ mode to one of a more active presence. However, it still falls short of normal standards for monitoring. Therefore, monitoring still needs to be improved for example by: standardising distribution reports by sector; by making the quality, number, frequency of reports more consistent; making reports available to the government, donors, aid agencies, and beneficiary groups; and including host family members and displaced persons in the monitoring process.

The operational monitoring described above is complemented by strategic monitoring of the overall context and programme, mostly undertaken at the Moscow level, via the Resident Coordinator and agency representatives. Together these efforts ensure a better understanding of the effects on IDPs and host families of the evolving situation, as well as of the coverage and effectiveness of the humanitarian response." (UN March 2000, p. 8)

"UN humanitarian action has increased substantially since November 1999, despite insecurity, which has limited the number of UN international staff stationed in the areas to eight. National staff of UN Agencies now number over 200, including those currently employed under the UNHCR-WFP-DRC logistics operation and under WHO's health surveillance initiative. The overwhelming majority of staff is based in Nazran (Ingushetia) and Valdikavkaz (North Ossetia). The ICRC have five international staff in the region, and, combined with its partner the Russian Red Cross, has over 400 volunteers throughout the northern Caucasus. In addition to the presence of UN Agencies and ICRC, over 20 international NGOs now work in Ingushetia. Some one dozen of these carry out programmes in Chechnya. Organisations have few international staff, relying mostly on national staff to implement programmes. While the operation has shifted away from "remote control" to a more active international presence at the field level, this could change very quickly if the security situation worsens. As such, one of this UN programme's overall goals is to boost the capacity of local staff to become emergency relief 'managers'." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.2.1)

A practice shared by international NGOs: the example of Médecins du Monde "Humanitarian action rests on a few principles, one of which is free access to victims and unimpeded evaluation of their needs. In war-torn Chechnya, this is difficult, sometimes imposssible (risk of abduction, bombing…). Without the presence of permanent expatriates, Médecins du Monde has relied, since 1998, on local personnel and has introduced 'remote control': linked with the organization, since the beginning of its intervention in Chechnya (1995), the coordinator or the administrators, doctors, psychologists, logistic staff and nurses, all Chechen, share the values and practices of Médecins du Monde. […] All the same, expatriates go regularly to support their action with evaluation mission." (MDM 23 February 2000)

108 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

Legal background

The CIS Conference: A regional process to address the problems of displacement (May 1996)

· Conference attended by delegates from 87 States (including all 12 CIS countries) under the joint auspices of UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) · The Programme of Action calls for equal rights for internally displaced persons, the right to a nationality, the right to citizenship for anyone who was a member of a predecessor state, and the right to return for formerly displaced persons · Governments and NGOs expressed broad consensus in June 1999 that there should be some form of continuation of the consultative and networking mechanism beyond 2000

"In line with General Assembly resolution 50/151 of 21 December 1995, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees convened on 30 and 31 May 1996 in Geneva a Regional Conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighbouring States (hereafter referred to as the CIS Conference). The Conference was the culmination of an ongoing process that had begun in 1994. It was held under the joint auspices of UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)(through its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)). The Conference was attended by delegates from 87 States (including all 12 CIS countries), 27 international organizations (in addition to UNHCR, IOM and OSCE), 2 other governmental organizations and 77 non-governmental organizations. The Conference adopted a Programme of Action, which had been endorsed by a Preparatory Conference held in Minsk (Belarus) on 8 May 1996.

The three main objectives of the Conference, cited below, are considered to have been met.

(i) Providing a reliable forum for the countries of the region to discuss problems of population displacement in a humanitarian and non-political manner: This was achieved through a series of sub-regional meetings and expert meetings to discuss such problems and identify solutions, and the establishment of a Drafting Committee tasked with the formulation of a wide plan for action to address those problems, based on a declaration of principles.

(ii) Reviewing population movements in the region, and clarifying categories of concern: The discussions held among CIS countries and between them and other countries, as well

109 as with international and non-governmental organizations, were based on an analysis of the different movements of population, and led eventually to the identification of the various categories of populations displaced in the CIS countries. Definitions were developed, and were included in the Programme of Action adopted by the Conference.

(iii) Devising an integrated strategy which would enable the CIS countries to cope better with and prevent population displacement, as well as manage and regulate other types of migratory movements in the region: The Programme of Action, which was adopted by consensus by the Conference, is a framework for action by the CIS countries, in addressing displacement problems, on the basis of internationally recognized principles, in a spirit of international cooperation, solidarity and burden-sharing." (UNHCR EXCOM 8 August 1996, paras. 1-2)

"The non-binding Program of Action affirms the right to leave and return to one's country, to move freely within a country, to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries, and commit its signatories to uphold the principle of nonrefoulement. The program also calls for equal rights for internally displaced persons, the right to a nationality, the right to citizenship for anyone who was a member of a predecessor state, and the right to return for formerly [deported] persons (the term given to people forcibly moved during the Soviet era)." (USCR 1999, p. 227)

"The Programme of Action also provides a basis for UNHCR's work in the CIS countries for the next few years. During the preparatory process, UNHCR and IOM developed a joint operational strategy that envisages both organizations collaborating closely in all their activities in the region, either by working together, or through sharing information and complementing each other. The joint approach should allow for a more effective distribution of tasks in the countries of the region and a more efficient use of limited resources." (UNHCR EXCOM 8 August 1996, para. 2)

See the full text of the Programme of Action [Internet].

"A Steering Group, composed of representatives of participating states and international organizations, was established to reconvene after the Conference to monitor the follow- up process. It met once a year from 1996 to 2000, to review progress reports submitted by the Follow-up Unit. Non-governmental organizations were invited to participate as observers and to submit independent reports. On 13-14 July 2000, the Steering Group met at its fifth and last session to review the achievements of the CIS Conference process in the implementation of the Programme of Action, areas necessitating further attention, and to take a decision on the future activities. A set of recommendations was adopted for future action, moving the process to a more advanced level of cooperation in the search for concrete solutions." (UNHCR November 2000, p. 6)

See the latest documents of the CIS Conference (UNHCR website)

Joint UNHCR/IOM Document: Assessment Report of the Conference Process (1996- 2000) (pdf format) [Internet: http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/cis/assessrep.pdf]

110 Report and Recommendations for the CIS Conference Steering Group Meeting (Geneva, 13-14 July 2000) (pdf format) [Internet: http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/cis/cis00_sg5_3.pdf] Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Steering Group in the CIS Conference follow-up (Geneva, 13-14 July 2000) (pdf format) [Internet: http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/cis/cis00_sg5_4.pdf]

An official category for IDPs and involuntary migrants from the former Soviet Union: the status of "forced migrant"

· Internally displaced persons (except as a result of natural or human-made disasters) globally fall under the category of 'Forced Migrant' as defined in the Law of 20 December 1995 · Forced migrant status is also open to involuntary migrants from former Soviet Republics with Russian citizenship or who could obtain it by virtue of being former Soviet citizens

Law on the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation on "Forced Migrants", 20 December 1995

Article 1. Notion of "forced migrant"

"1. A forced migrant shall be a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave his/her place of permanent residence due to violence committed against him/her or members of his/her family or persecution in other forms, or due to a real danger of being subjected to persecution for reasons of race, nationality, religion, language or membership of some particular social group or political opinion following hostile campaigns with regard to individual persons or groups of persons, mass violations of public order.

Taking into account the facts stipulated in point 1 of the present article, the following persons shall be recognised as a forced migrant:

1) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a foreign state and came to the Russian Federation;

2) a citizen of the Russian Federation who was forced to leave the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of a subject of the Russian Federation and came to the territory of another subject of the Russian Federation.

3. Recognition of a forced migrant shall be also extended to a foreign citizen or a stateless person, permanently staying on legal grounds on the territory of the Russian Federation, who left the place of his/her permanent residence on the territory of the Russian Federation for reasons set forth in Point 1 of the present Article;

4. Recognition of a forced migrant shall be also extended to a citizen of the former USSR, who used to reside on the territory of a former constituent republic of the USSR,

111 who received refugee status in the Russian Federation and lost it, as he had acquired the Russian citizenship, upon availability of factors which prevented him/her from settling down on the territory of the Russian Federation during the time when his/her refugee status was in force." (Unofficial translation of the Law on Forced Migrants, as amended in 1995) [Internal link]

"At the end of 1998, 978,254 individuals were registered as forced migrants, including 117,717 who registered during the year. Nearly 37 percent of the total number of persons granted forced migrant status were from Chechnya (147,232) and other republics in the northern Caucasus (212,118). Most of the rest - over 60 percent - came from the former Soviet countries of Kazakhstan (300,260), Uzbekistan (139,454), Tajikistan (114,260) and Kyrgyzstan (60,726)." (USCR 1999, p. 222)

For the Russian version of the Law on Forced Migrants, as amended in 1995, see website of the 'Civic Assistance' NGO [Internet]

For the validity of statistics based on the forced migrant status, see "Populations figures of the Federal and regional Migration Services flawed by inconsistent practices" [Internal link]

Local and national authorities

Federal authorities provide substantial aid to the displaced population (2000-2001)

· The Ministry for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy is responsible at the federal level for the policy regarding IDPs · The Ministry has planned to enhance coordination mechanisms for the provision of humanitarian assistance (October 2000) · The Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) coordinates and channel international aid in the Northern Caucasus · The general policy of the government is to encourage Chechen IDPs to return to their place of origin by concentrating assistance in Chechnya

"As part of ongoing government reforms, the Federal Migration Service was dissolved in July 2000. The Ministry for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy of the Russian Federation has been designated to take over the responsibility for all migration and refugee matters. This may result in changes in state migration and asylum policy as well as personnel changes. UNHCR is concerned that this may affect FMS eligibility officers from various regions of the country who have been trained by UNHCR on refugee status procedures and on many aspects of refugee protection." (UNHCR November 2000, p. 45)

112 "According to the information received from some humanitarian agencies, the recent restructuring of the federal administration and transfer of competence regarding IDP camps from EMERCOM to the Ministry for the Federation and Minorities as from 1 October 2000 seem to have contributed to this unsatisfactory situation. The Russian authorities admit that the restructuring might have caused some momentary bureaucratic confusion but they have confidence in the advantages of the new structure in a long run." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 37)

"In late 1999 and early 2000, in the first stage of the crisis, the Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Natural Disasters (EMERCOM) promptly provided relief assistance to the affected population. This assistance included the building and organisation of camps for displaced persons, and the provision of basic relief supplies, including food. EMERCOM has distributed a total of 21,000 tons of food commodities in the Northern Caucasus - 12,000 tons in Ingushetia, and the remaining quantity in Chechnya and Dagestan. In comparison, WFP has distributed, between February and October 2000, about 16,000 MT of commodities (most of it in Ingushetia). The Russian Government appointed EMERCOM to co-ordinate and channel all international humanitarian relief assistance in the Northern Caucasus.

Under its winterization programme, EMERCOM, in collaboration with UNHCR, is presently establishing a new tent camp in Ingushetia in order to accommodate about 12,000 IDPs shifting from two train camps and other settlements. EMERCOM has also made plans to establish new camps inside Chechnya in order to accommodate IDPs returning from Ingushetia and Dagestan.

The general policy of the Government of the Russian Federation is to encourage Chechen IDPs to return to their place of origin. In line with this policy, and as a result of resource constraints, EMERCOM has tended to reduce the level of assistance it provides in Ingushetia and to concentrate resources in Chechnya. WFP and the UN, based on an assessment of the security situation in Chechnya, have refrained from any actions that would effectively “push” IDPs back.

To begin the reconstruction of Chechnya, the Government approved Resolution 639 titled “On the Complex of Top Priority Measures to Ensure Normal Functioning of the Economic and Social Sphere of the Republic of Chechnya in 2000”. The resolution envisages expenditures worth US$ 290 million for various reconstruction programmes in Chechnya. However, implementation is significantly behind schedule for want of funds.

On 12 October 2000, the Ministry of Federation Affairs, Nationalities and Migration Policy (MFANMP) convened a co-ordination meeting at which it was decided to establish a federal level Inter-Department Humanitarian Commission, headed by a Deputy Prime Minister. This Commission will be responsible for policy-making on internal displacement issues, as well as for maintaining links with donors, UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs. A similar co-ordination mechanism will be established in Chechnya as one already exists in Ingushetia. It is expected that the MFANMP will take on a role of

113 increasing importance in the provision of relief to the displaced persons and, in particular, the search for permanent solutions. […] In 2000, WFP initiated discussions with the Government of the Russian Federation to solicit a significant in-kind contribution of Russia for the UN’s food aid programme in the Northern Caucasus. This would be in addition to the Government’s own response. The Government responded positively but support has not been formally confirmed. Discussions will continue and it is hoped that Russian support through WFP will materialise." (WFP 2001, paras. 15-23)

See also "Factsheet: The Situation in the Chechen Republic" prepared by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, 8 August 2001 [Internet]

Distribution of food aid in Ingushetia regularly suspended because of disrupted payments from the Federal authorities (2000-2001)

· Delay in the payment of the food suppliers by the Federal authorities obliges Ingush administration to suspend the distribution of hot meals and bread · This situation provokes unrest among the displaced population in camps and spontaneous settlements

"Termination of complementary food distributions for IDPs in Ingushetia, by the Government, provoked public unrest among IDPs in the camps and spontaneous settlements of Karabulak municipal district. Some 20,000 people have reportedly been left without hot meals and bread and this could create a worrying humanitarian situation with the coming winter." (WFP 12 January 2001)

"On November 9 The Head of the Ingush Territorial Representative Office of the RF Ministry for Federal Affairs, Migration and Nationality Issues, Mr. Gireev, reported that from 13 November state deliveries of hot meals and bread for the Chechnya IDPs in Ingushetia would be resumed. By that time, it is expected that the Federal Authorities will transfer 43 mln. rubles to pay existing debts to the suppliers of food in the republic. However, this sum is not enough to cover all the debts, which presently constitute over 40 mln. rubles." (DRC 10 November 2000)

"The Ingush Migration Service, on October 12, suspended provision of hot meals and bread to the IDPs in Ingushetia because of the Russian government's debt of over 400 million rubles. However, on October 17, the Minister for Federal Affairs, National and Migration Policy, Aleksandr Blokhin, dismissed the information of the Ingush officials concerning the 400 million rubles debt saying that 'we don't have such information, and this figure (400 mln. RR) lies on the conscience of those who voice it'. According to the Minister, the official number of IDPs in Chechnya is 181,000 persons, whereas in the neighboring Ingushetia the figure constitutes 122,450 individuals. Out of them, around 40,000 IDPs will be living in tent camps in the territory of Ingushetia. The information obtained at the Ingush Ms indicates that on October 18, provision bread to the IDPs in

114 Ingushetia was resumed. But, unless the MS receives money by October 23, the distribution of bread will be suspended again." (DRC 24 October 2000, p. 2)

Neighbouring republics reluctant to host more Chechens, except Ingushetia (1999- 2001)

· Stavropol Region, Dagestan, and North Ossetia tightened border controls and set rules of transit, stipulating the 'temporary' nature of their hospitality · Despite its limited resources, Ingushetia hosts the bulk of the Chechen displaced population

"In early October [1999], with prospects waning for preventing a protracted, bloody war, neighboring Stavropol Region, Dagestan, and North Ossetia tightened border controls and set rules of transit, stipulating the 'temporary' nature of their hospitality.

'Until recently, Russians mostly fled from Chechnya. Now, Chechens are leaving too,' FMS director in Stavropol, Viktor Dulin, told Itar Tass on September 28. In response, he said, Stavropol authorities set up 'temporary' accommodations in Mineralnyye Vody and Kurskiy districts on the Chechen border 'as resting points before they transit out of Stavropol.' According to Dulin, Stavropol cannot host more Chechens because some 300,000 unregistered migrants and 74,000 registered 'refugees' from previous conflicts strain Stavropol's acute shortage of schools, medical facilities, jobs, and housing. Dulin emphasized that Stavropol serves as 'a transit point' for fleeing Chechens, on their way to official reception centers in Astrakhan, Saratov, Orenburg and other regions farther north.

North Ossetia also envisioned a temporary, transit-based role for itself. On September 29, Deputy of the North Ossetian parliament, Viktor Ishchenko, told Itar Tass that the entire border between North Ossetia and Chechnya was patrolled. Fleeing Chechens, he said, 'are received by the [local FMS], registered, and dispatched to the Mineralnyye Vody railway station to be sent to various Russian regions.'

Dagestan--which hosts thousands of displaced ethnic Chechens from the previous war-- closed its borders. On September 29, Dagestani authorities reported housing about 2,000 Chechens in 'temporary' camps set up in the Kizlyar and Nogaisky districts bordering Chechnya. On September 30, Itar Tass reported, 'The administrative [Dagestani] boundary with Chechnya has been closed.' Less than one week later, the New York Times talked to displaced civilians trapped in Dargo and Benoy, just inside Chechnya's eastern border with Dagestan. 'No one from our village went to fight [with the Wahhabis] in Dagestan. We don't believe in fighting our neighbors. If we go to Dagestan, they shoot at us now.'" (USCR October 1999)

"The difficult economic situation in Ingushetia does not allow for the provision of sufficient assistance to the victims of the conflict. Ingushetia is one of the poorest republics of the Russian Federation (it was rated third poorest in 1992). With a local population of 320,000, the Republic is not in position to provide for 160,000 displaced

115 persons. The utilities (water, electricity, gas) are over-stretched, public services (schools, hospitals) are strained and the labour market is saturated. Despite limited resources, the Government and the people of Ingushetia are committed to providing all possible support and assistance to Chechen displaced persons.

More than 80% of the displaced persons are staying in private accommodation. This means anything from a little bit of space in a crowded cow shed to a heated room in the host's residence. For better accommodation, rent is usually paid. The poorest IDPs tend to stay with the poorest hosts and not pay rent. A large number of poor host families have now exhausted their reserves. There have already been cases of eviction because IDPs were not able to pay rent and utility charges." (WFP 2001, paras. 5-6)

International response

UN Humanitarian Coordinator supervises UN humanitarian activities in Northern Caucasus (2000)

· The UN Humanitarian Coordinator is assisted by OCHA serving as the coordination secretariat · It maintains the dialogue with the Russian Government, ensures the coordination of UN agencies and the liaison with other humanitarian organisations · UN agencies with specific mandates have been designated as the focal points to coordinate programme issues in their respective sectors

"Coordination has been enhanced during the past six months, thanks to closer and more regular working relations in Moscow and at the field level. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the coordination of UN humanitarian activities, with OCHA serving as the coordination secretariat. Primary activities include:

- maintaining a dialogue with the Russian Government to ensure an effective framework of cooperation, in particular concerning operational modalities, governmental humanitarian assistance and plans, and staff safety; - ensuring that the UN agencies coordinate contingency planning, needs assessment, programme implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. This takes place, inter alia, by holding UN agency representative policy meetings each fortnight; and - promoting information exchange, and programme complementarity between the UN agencies, the ICRC, and the non-governmental sector; and organising monthly meetings between the donor community, UN agencies, and the ICRC to harmonise the international community's humanitarian response to the crisis.

UN agencies with specific mandates have been designated as the focal points to coordinate programme issues in their respective sectors. (See table below.) The Humanitarian Coordinator has strengthened this process by establishing an OCHA sub- office in Nazran to support Government-UN-ICRC-NGO consultation and organise weekly sector meetings." (UN November 2000, pp. 12-13)

116 Sector Coordination Focal Point Protection UNHCR Food WFP Agriculture FAO Shelter and Non-food Items UNHCR Health WHO Water and Sanitation UNHCR Education UNICEF Mine Action UNICEF Economic Recovery and Infrastructure UNDP Security UNSECOORD

Financial requirements for UN OCHA in 2001

Appealing Agency: OCHA Project Title: Enhancing Coordination amongst Humanitarian Organisations Project Code: RUS-01-1/N20 Sector: Coordination and Support Services Themes: Coordination Objective: Support the UN Humanitarian Coordinator to co-ordinate the collective efforts of the international community, in particular UN agencies, responding to human suffering Targeted Beneficiaries: Governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organizations providing assistance, and the people receiving it. Partners: Not applicable Project Duration: January – December 2001 Funds Requested: US$ 1,184,252

(UN November 2000, p. 57)

See also UNOCHA Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit for Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) June 2001 [Internet]

See also the website of UNOCHA office in Moscow: http://www.ocha.ru [Internet]

117 Memoranda of Understanding between the UN and the Russian government (October 1999-August 2000)

· A Memorandum on Consultations was signed between the Government and the UN (20 October 1999) · It was followed by a Memorandum of Understanding signed on 16 August 2000 on humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus

"Various memoranda of understanding between different ministries of the Russian Government and the UN exist but the central one for this operation is the Memorandum on Consultations signed between the Russian Government and the UN on 20 October 1999. Emercom and the Federal Migration Service are the primary Government counterparts of the UN system for this programme. Line ministries, such as the Ministry of Health, are also working to support the needs of civilians and the UN Agencies are in close contact with them." (UN November 1999, pp. 3-4)

"On 16 August, the United Nations and the Government of the Russian Federation signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus to establish a firm basis for the UN to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in need in the Republic of Chechnya, Republic of Dagestan, and the Republic of Ingushetia. The memorandum affirms that the UN and the Government of the Russian Federation will continue to cooperate on and coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance in the northern Caucasus. The MoU also confirms that the Government of the Russian Federation will work to ensure the security of UN and associated personnel engaged in humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus, as well as continuing to help the UN, its agencies, and their partners with visas for personnel, customs clearance of humanitarian cargo, and communications systems for humanitarian operations." (UN OCHA 16 August 2000)

See also UN OCHA "United Nations and the Government of the Russian Federation Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Humanitarian Action in the Northern Caucasus", 16 August 2000 [Internet]

The text of the 16 August 2000 Memorandum can be found on the website of UNOCHA Moscow [Internet]

Measures taken by UN agencies to strengthen monitoring of humanitarian action in North Caucasus (2000)

· UN follows a three-step approach for its humanitarian action inside Chechnya: security assessment - needs assessment - delivery of aid via local authorities and NGOs · The UN increased the number of its international and local staff in situ in the region and created several partnerships with experienced local and international NGOs, shifting from a ‘remote control’ mode to one of a more active presence

118 · Other measures include: creation of a special monitoring group, monitoring coordination by sector, creation of a database to manage output and beneficiary based information, adoption of a common approach to use selected indicators

"The UN wishes to highlight that humanitarian action inside Chechnya called for programmes being based on assessed needs and all parties respecting the independence, impartiality, and neutrality of humantarian programmes. While the UN will continue its three-step approach, i.e. security assessment - needs assessment - delivery of aid via local authorities and NGOs, this will now be increasingly supplemented by two initiatives. First, the establishment of partnerships with experienced international NGOs, whereby the UN and NGOs work together on assessment, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Second, paying increased attention to capacity building of local staff to that the provision of assistance can continue if international assistance has to step back from the region." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.1.3)

"Monitoring and reporting on the implementation of activities is of fundamental importance to the UN as it helps to ensure the appropriate use of resources. It also ensures UN accountability to beneficiaries and donor governments. Much has been achieved during the first seven months of this operation to improve monitoring. The UN increased the number of its international and local staff in situ and created several partnerships with experienced local and international NGOs. The operation has continued to shift from a ‘remote control’ mode to one of a more active presence. Strategic monitoring of the overall context and programme, mostly undertaken at the Moscow level via the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and agency country representatives, has become a regular feature. Together these efforts ensure a better understanding of the evolving situation’s effects on vulnerable populations, including IDPs and host families, as well as of the coverage and effectiveness of the humanitarian response. The quality, number, and frequency of reports became more consistent.

The UN is now taking additional measures to strengthen monitoring. First, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, supported by OCHA, will chair a special monitoring group which will meet once per month to review this programme's overall goals. Second, the agencies, which are focal points for sectors, have assumed responsibility for monitoring the goals and objectives that are relevant to their sectors. Third, the UN will create a comprehensive database to manage output and beneficiary based information and OCHA will issue monthly ‘UN Monitoring’ reports. Fourth, UN Agencies will aim to agree on a common approach to use selected indicators by which to measure the effectiveness of its programmes." (UN July 2000, sect. 3.2.4)

Protection: planned activities in the UN consolidated appeal for 2001

· UNHCR will implement protection activities directly or through implementing partners, except in Chechnya where it will operate only through governmental and non-governmental partners · Activities includes protection monitoring, legal assistance to the displaced population, legal capacity building in Chechnya, and psychosocial support · Vesta legal counselling centre in Nazran has been established with the support of UNHCR

119 Beneficiary Population Number IDPs in Ingushetia 160,000 Resident population in Ingushetia 320,000 Residents in Chechnya 370,000 IDPs in Chechnya 170,000 Total 1,020,000

"Objectives

· Ensure that IDPs in need have access to secure locations and humanitarian assistance, including freedom of movement and the right to remain in safe areas; · promote the creation of conditions that allow voluntary return to Chechnya in safety and dignity; · ensure that IDPs have access to necessary legal documentation and are treated according to human rights standards; · empower regional and federal authorities and NGOs to implement effective protection monitoring and intervention; and · as a complementary measure to other psychosocial support activities, focus psychosocial assistance on the civilians who have fundamental protection related mental health needs, including victims of sexual violence.

Proposed action

The activities described below will be conducted through UNHCR’s direct implementation or through governmental and non-governmental partners. Within Chechnya, activities will be implemented through governmental and non-governmental partners already working in the republic.

Protection monitoring and intervention · UNHCR will facilitate a co-ordinated approach to protection issues; and · through the monitors of its implementing partner, UNHCR will keep an overview of the living conditions and protection situation of all IDPs in Ingushetia and will undertake timely protection interventions when required.

Access to documentation and other civil and social entitlements · UNHCR, through implementing arrangements with local NGOs, will provide legal counselling to IDPs and returnees regarding access to legal documentation, status determination, as well as social rights and allowances. · In parallel, support will be provided to enhance national mechanisms for issuance of legal documentation to IDPs, as well as for the implementation of applicable legislation defining the status of IDPs and related rights and allowances. · For IDPs residing elsewhere in the Russian Federation, including major metropolitan areas, UNHCR will continue to advocate on their behalf, seeking

120 legalisation of their residence status and to avoid forced return to unsafe areas. A local NGO will carry out community-based activities in Moscow, to facilitate access to essential services such as medical care and education.

Capacity building and promotion of the rule of law · UNHCR, as a complementary measure to the work of the Council of Europe, will support efforts made towards the re-establishment of the rule of law in Chechnya by: organising workshops for judges and lawyers active in Chechnya concerning the role of the judiciary in the protection of IDPs; providing material support to equip selected courts in Chechnya as well as field offices of the Russian President’s Special Representative for the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of the Individual and of the Citizen in the Republic of Chechnya.

Psychosocial support and protection-related health intervention: · Through their local partners in Ingushetia, UNHCR and UNICEF will continue to provide psychosocial support to the most vulnerable individuals among the IDPs. Such activities will include offering sojourn to IDP children in summer camps, and rehabilitation treatment for IDP elderly in sanatoriums. In Chechnya, NGOs such as Memorial will provide psychosocial counselling to IDPs and returnees, with a focus on trauma rehabilitation, and will organise recreational activities for children and teenagers in camps. · In co-ordination with WHO, UNHCR will facilitate the transport and medical treatment of selected vulnerable IDP cases who cannot be treated in their current place of displacement. When necessary, evacuation will be arranged to hospitals located in other northern Caucasus republics or southern Russian regions." (UN November 2000, pp. 14- 16)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

Sector UNHCR Sector total Protection 430,000 430,000

UNHCR support to local legal counselling centre Ingushetia "Vesta legal counselling centre, which has been established in Nazran with the support of UNHCR, assists IDPs trace and renew documents, clarify registration issues, mediate cases of tensions between IDPs and the local population or administration. In addition, the centre is counselling those IDPs who are in need of medical treatment. To deal with this growing number of people, the centre intends to expand its operation and recruit a doctor who could provide basic medical assistance to IDPs and advise where they could apply for further treatment. The centre also plans to organise mobile teams to provide counselling and legal services to those IDPs who have difficulties to travel to Nazran." (UN OCHA 30 September 2000)

121 See also UNOCHA Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit for Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) June 2001 [Internet] and September 2001 [Internet]

Shelter and non-food items: planned activities in the UN consolidated appeal for 2001

· UNHCR plans to upgrade existing living facilities of IDPs in Ingushetia · Relief items and aid packages will be distributed to vulnerable people in Ingushetia and Chechnya · UNHCR will provide shelter assistance to a selected number of IDP families returning to Chechnya · Emergency repairs to selected public infrastructure in Chechnya will be undertaken · New tent camps have been constructed for the displaced staying in railway cars and some spontaneous settlements have been expanded · Alternative accommodation has been found for IDPs evicted by their host families · Swiss Development Agency provides compensation grants for host families

"Objectives

Ingushetia · To assist IDPs living in Ingushetia in tented camps and spontaneous settlements to have sufficient covered space to provide protection from adverse effects of the climate. IDPs will have sufficient warmth, security and privacy to ensure their dignity, health and well-being; · to provide emergency repair to communal structures, particularly schools and medical points in areas hosting IDPs in Ingushetia; · to ensure that IDPs in Ingushetia have access to non-food items such as household utensils, soap for personal hygiene and tools; and · to ensure that IDPs in Ingushetia have sufficient blankets, clothing and footwear to provide protection from the climate.

Chechnya

122 · Subject to security, to assist IDPs and returnees within Chechnya to reside in or near their house while it is being repaired; and · to address the non-food needs of vulnerable IDPs and returnees within Chechnya by providing relief supplies, and aid packages (household and hygienic items).

Proposed action

· UNHCR will upgrade the existing living facilities of IDPs in Ingushetia by undertaking maintenance or replacement of the existing tents and rehabilitation of spontaneous settlements designed to make them habitable; · UNHCR’s governmental and NGO partners will distribute to vulnerable people relief items and aid packages (household and hygienic items) in Ingushetia and Chechnya; · UNHCR will assist a selected number of IDP families returning to Chechnya. This assistance will take the form of: provision of building materials, provision of a tent for interim accommodation should the family’s house be completely uninhabitable, and provision of pre-fabricated housing for particularly vulnerable IDPs; and · UNHCR also will carry out emergency repairs to selected public infrastructure such as schools or hospitals in Chechnya." (UN November 2000, pp. 23-25)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

Sect U S or N e H c C t R o r

t o t a l She 5 5 lter , , and 1 1 Non 9 9 - 1 1 foo , , d 9 9 Ite 8 8 ms 8 8

Implemented activities in 2001

123 "The ICRC is providing a monthly distribution of hygienic kits plus ad hoc deliveries of articles such as kitchen sets, plastic sheeting, heaters, in favour of IDPs and vulnerable groups in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, as well as in the south of Russia." (UN June 2001, p. 4)

"The coordination focal point for Shelter and NON-FOOD ITEMS is UNHCR. UNHCR continually monitors the accessibility to shelter facilities in Ingushetia. All of the 10,400 IDPs previously staying in railway cars are now accommodated in the two camps established by the agency. Some fifty spontaneous settlements in the republic have been upgraded. Winterization activities in camps and spontaneous settlements as well as provision of non-food items continue in Ingushetia. UNHCR is to winterize 400 shelter rooms in Chechnya, i.e. provide IDPs in spontaneous settlements with a warm and dry living space, and replace 673 tents in Ingushetia by the end of 2001. There has been an increase in the number of IDPs leaving host families in Ingushetia mainly because they are no longer able to cover rent for accommodation. UNHCR tries to help negotiate with host families or find alternative accommodation for IDPs. Jointly with the Ingush authorities, UNHCR has been able to find alternative accommodation for more than 200 evicted IDPs over the last few months. In Chechnya, UNHCR’s NGO partners distribute non-food and shelter items to the displaced people. The agency has also provided 59 one- room prefabricated houses to the Chechen administration to accommodate the most vulnerable IDPs, and 18 ‘prefabs’ to support a WHO TB programme by extending the premises of the republican TB hospital in Ingushetia. UNHCR's NGO partners distribute non-food and shelter items to the displaced people in Chechnya with some 3,000 households to be assisted by the conclusion of the year via a common UNHCR/PINF programme."

Bilateral Humanitarian Assistance

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and Swiss Disaster Relief (SDC/SDR), part of the Swiss Government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has spent some US$ 2 million rendering compensation to host families who provided shelter to Chechen IDPs over last winter. The compensation payments of an equivalent of US$ 100 were provided via the Ingush postal system. 15,500 families benefited from the programme by the end of the first quarter of 2001. In addition, fifteen percent of the overall programme budget was directed towards small projects in the social, educational, and medical sectors in Ingushetia and three projects in Chechnya. Forty projects have been nominated for support so far in cooperation with UNHCR. In North Ossetia SDC/SDR is supporting medical facilities with equipment and staff training.

(UN September 2001, pp, 5-6)

Food: International emergency operation under the coordination of WFP (2001)

124 · In Ingushetia, the main providers of food aid in 2001 is be WFP and ICRC · Food aid in Chechnya reaches 75,000 internally displaced and vulnerable groups · ICRC and DRC are currently the only agencies providing food assistance in Dagestan

"The UN coordination focal point for FOOD is WFP. In February 2000, WFP replaced UNHCR as the primary supplier of basic foods to IDPs while UNHCR focused mostly on the host families. The food needs of the IDP population in Ingushetia are essentially being met with the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Islamic Relief (IR) distributing WFP commodities to over 155,000 people in Ingushetia. The ICRC is providing a quarterly package of complementary foods and non-foods to essentially the same caseload. Ministry of Federation, National and Migration Policy, as lead agency within the government, provides some bread and hot meals for IDPs living in camps. Several international NGOs also provide supplementary food items such as fresh fruit and vegetables, hot meals and canned meat on a smaller scale.

In Chechnya, WFP expanded its assistance to reach 110,000 persons during the winter. While this stopped in January and February due to insecurity, food aid is now reaching 75,000 people in Chechnya. Regular basic rations are provided to all districts in Grozny City, Grozny rural district, Urus-Martan, and Achkhoy-Martan. In addition to IDPs, food is targeted to infants, orphans, pregnant women and nursing mothers, elderly or handicapped persons and all members of single-parent families.

The ICRC, in co-operation with the Russian Red Cross (RRC), is also carrying out food programmes in Chechnya. In Dagestan, the ICRC and the RRC have commenced regular provision of loaves of bread, covering approximately 3,800 IDPs, bulk food, and hot meals to IDPs and Dagestanis displaced as a result of the situation in Chechnya. ICRC and DRC are currently the only agencies providing food assistance in Dagestan." (UN June 2001, p. 4)

"[WFP] plans to start a school-feeding programme in October [2001] for 20,000 children between 7 and 11 in Grozny and Achkoy-Martan" (UN September 2001, p. 5)

The total number of WFP food aid beneficiaries in the Northern Caucasus for 2001 will be as per the following table.

(WFP 2001, p. 8)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

125 Sector WFP Sector total Food 23,949,762 23,949,762

(UN November 2000)

For information on past and current WFP projects in northern Caucasus, consult section "Operations" in WFP website [Internet]

Agriculture: planned activities in the UN consolidated appeal for 2001

· FAO will assist Ministry of Agriculture in Ingushetia in the prevention of outbreaks of animal infectious diseases among livestock owned by IDPs · Emergency agricultural assistance for IDPs and host families in Ingushetia and Chechnya is also planned · Home gardening for 1,000 IDPs has been initiated in Chechnya with the support of the FAO (2001)

Beneficiary Population Number Vaccination of IDP owned livestock in Ingushetia 75,000 Host farming families and IDPs in Ingushetia 25,000 Rural IDPs in Chechnya 20,000 Total 120,000

"Objectives

The objectives of the emergency assistance are two-fold: · to support the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Ingushetia in the prevention of outbreaks of animal infectious diseases; and · to reduce the dependence of IDPs in Chechnya and in Ingushetia on food and other humanitarian assistance through the provision of agricultural inputs.

Proposed action

Vaccination of livestock owned by IDPs in Ingushetia The proposed assistance aims at providing the Ministry of Agriculture vaccines and anti- sera for brucellosis, tuberculosis, leptospirosis, foot-and-mouth disease and anthrax, and some small veterinary equipment for a country-wide vaccination campaign scheduled for spring 2001. FAO will be responsible for the purchase of the veterinary products and equipment as well as monitoring and evaluation, while the Ministry of Agriculture will be responsible for the execution of the project. This assistance will protect 20,000 head of cattle and 10,000 sheep from the afore-mentioned diseases.

Emergency agricultural assistance for farming host families in Ingushetia

126 This assistance aims at supporting 5,000 farming host families. The Ministry of Agriculture will be responsible for the execution of the project, while NGOs will be in charge of input distribution and direct follow-up of activities.

Emergency assistance for IDPs in Ingushetia The proposed assistance aims at providing 6,000 of the neediest IDP families with potato and vegetable seeds for the forthcoming spring planting season, hand tools, some fertilisers and appropriate technical advice. FAO will be responsible for the local procurement of inputs and technical assistance, while UNHCR in collaboration with local administrations will be responsible for the execution of the project and will be in charge of the distribution of inputs and follow-up of activities.

Emergency agricultural assistance for IDPs in Chechnya This assistance aims to support 4,000 displaced farming families. The project will be implemented on the land belonging to the regional administration, in the area around Sernovodsk. The administration will be responsible for the execution of the project and will be in charge of the follow-up of activities.

For emergency agricultural assistance to farming host families and IDPs, the provision of potato and vegetable seeds for the cultivation of a plot of 500 m² during the forthcoming planting season, from February to September 2001 should support their potato and vegetable consumption needs over a period of four to five months. FAO will be responsible for the purchase of inputs, which will be procured locally, and provision of technical assistance. Varieties will be selected among those adapted to the growing conditions of the targeted areas and all seed stocks will be tested to assure their quality before distribution. An international consultant will assist in the start-up of the projects and in the final evaluation.

The national and international consultants of these projects will work in close collaboration with the local staff to strengthen their project management capacity in emergency situations." (UN November 2000, pp. 21-22)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

Sector FAO Sector total Agriculture 719,000 719,000

"The Chechen Administration has agree to allocate plots of state-owned agricultural land to 1,000 IDP families living in Achkoy-Martan, for the cultivation of potato and other vegetables. Each family will be given 450sq. meter of land for home gardening for which FAO will provide seeds and hand tools. WFP, wherever needed, will support Government initiatives to promote self-reliance by providing food commodities through food-for-work until the beneficiaries have their first harvest." (WFP 2001, para. 21)

127 See also UNOCHA Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit for Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) March 2001 [Internet]

Health: planned activities in the UN consolidated appeal for 2001

· WHO will advocate for a stronger commitment of local and federal health authorities in health- related relief activities · Health monitoring in Ingushetia and Chechnya will also be continued, in particular regarding tuberculosis · UNFPA and WHO will undertake capacity building in maternal health and reproductive health services · UNICEF strengthens the mother and child health component in IDP health care facilities and strengthen capacities to treat victims of mines and unexploded ordnance · ICRC and the Russian Red Cross have developed medical programmes for IDPs and vulnerable groups

Beneficiary Population Number IDPs in Ingushetia 160,000 Members of host families in Ingushetia 200,000 Civilians in need in Chechnya 120,000 Total 480,000

"Objectives

· To enhance access to health care for the affected population, particularly IDP women and children and host families in Ingushetia and people in Chechnya; · to improve the quality of health care by providing support and professional training to health workers in Ingushetia and Chechnya and by providing the most critically needed medical supplies and equipment to local health care facilities; and · to ensure sustainability of relief assistance by involving national and local health structures, NGOs, and local communities.

Proposed action

WHO will advocate for a stronger commitment of local and federal health authorities for active partnership in international health-related relief activities. This commitment should support the provision of necessary health information, provision of premises and logistic assistance for training activities, and bringing in other resources to make health care more accessible and equitable.

WHO will strengthen the work on continuous health monitoring in the affected areas of the northern Caucasus, primarily Ingushetia and Chechnya, identifying priority health needs and the main problems to be addressed by relief efforts. WHO will continue

128 providing technical and coordination support to federal and local health structures, UN agencies, ICRC, and NGOs to ensure cohesive action by all partners.

WHO will further assist local health care systems to strengthen epidemiological surveillance, especially regarding tuberculosis. The roster of TB patients in Ingushetia and Chechnya will be developed to enhance continuity of treatment in accordance with WHO recommendations.

In collaboration with local health structures, UN agencies, ICRC, and NGOs, WHO will continue the work on upgrading the professional skills of primary health care workers in Chechnya and Ingushetia, including health workers among IDPs.

WHO will provide technical support and training for technical and administrative staff in Ingushetia and Chechnya to enhance management by local health care structures, including environmental health services. […]

UNICEF will strengthen the mother and child health (MCH) component in camp and settlement primary health care facilities and tackle the problem of maternal anaemia by distributing nutrition supplements. The issue of micronutrient deficiency will be addressed in collaboration with WHO through data collection on the nutritional status of IDP women and children. UNICEF will also provide basic MCH equipment and supplies for selected facilities at the primary and secondary health care levels inside Chechnya.

UNICEF will strengthen ongoing monitoring of the Expanded Programme of Immunization in Ingushetia conducted by the MoH and NGOs; cover remaining cold chain equipment and other non-renewable material requirements; maintain current levels of support for renewable immunization supplies; and expand EPI [Expanded Programme of Immunisation] manager training activities initiated in late 2000 for EPI staff and managers to all health facilities not yet covered. In selected health facilities inside Chechnya, UNICEF will continue to improve the EPI infrastructure in cooperation with NGOs already working in this field, replace poor cold-chain equipment, and re-establish training for EPI staff and managers.

UNFPA and WHO will concentrate on aspects of complementary training and capacity building in maternal health and will improve accessibility and quality of reproductive health services with special attention to 'safe motherhood', family planning, prevention, identification, and treatment of sexually transmitted infections (STI). This will be achieved by means of mobile obstetric teams, strengthening laboratory services, and upgrading skills and knowledge amongst health workers. UNFPA will provide basic reproductive health equipment and supplies.

WHO will continue supporting local health facilities to: cope with the most important emerging needs in primary health care; provide basic medical supplies and medicines and training in essential drug use; conduct mental health and physical rehabilitation of victims. UNICEF, in collaboration with WHO, will strengthen capacities of traumatological centres to treat victims of mine, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other

129 related injuries by supplying surgical equipment and consumables and providing technical support and training." (UN November 2000, pp. 28-29)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

S U U W S e N N H e c F I O c t P C t o A E o r F r

t o t a l H 2 1 3 4 e 2 , , , a 5 0 0 3 l , 4 8 5 t 0 0 6 1 h 0 , , , 0 0 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0

Implemented activities in 2001 UNICEF collaborated with WHO and the local authorities for the rehabilitation of the cold-chain system and the vaccination campaigns, both in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Furthermore UNICEF supported the mother and child health care through the distribution of kits and materials in maternity and health centres, as well as the surgical departments of several hospitals dealing with victims of mine incidents.

The ICRC and RRC have developed medical programmes for IDPs and vulnerable groups that include regular support to major hospitals (10 in Chechnya, 5 in Ingushetia), and primary health care (fixed and mobile medical points in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and the South of Russia). (UN June 2001, p. 5)

For updated information on WHO and other health-related activities in northern Caucasus, see WHO web page on Emergency and Humanitarian Action in North Caucasus [Internet]

130 Water and sanitation: International activities under the coordination of UNHCR (2001)

· Water storage and distribution capacities in IDP settlements not serviced by the regular water supply network will be maintained and augmented in Ingushetia · Water points and bladders in Ingushetia have been winterised · The provision of additional latrines and the disposal of solid waste have been provided · UNHCR assists to strengthen the water pipeline in Ingushetia · In Chechnya, emergency water supply and sanitation have been developed by UNICEF and ICRC will on key facilities

Beneficiary Population Number IDPs in Ingushetia 160,000 Resident population in Ingushetia 320,000 Targeted residents and returnees in Chechnya 200,000 Targeted IDPs in Chechnya 90,000 Total 770,000

"Objectives

· Water at the point of collection is to be palatable, and of sufficient quality to be drunk and used for personal and domestic hygiene without causing significant risk to health due to water-borne diseases, or to chemical or radiological contamination from short-term use; · beneficiaries are to have access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking and personal and domestic hygiene. Public water points are to be sufficiently close to shelters to allow use of the minimum water requirement; · to ensure that people have access to toilets, which are designed, constructed and maintained in such a way as to be hygienic and safe; · solid waste including garbage and medical waste is collected, transferred, and disposed of in a manner, which maintains effective sanitation for the beneficiaries and reduces environmental pollution to an acceptable level; · pest and vector control measures that make use of pesticides are to be carried out in accordance with agreed international norms to ensure that staff, the people affected and the local environment are adequately protected, and to avoid creating resistance to pesticides; and · all sections of the affected population are to be more aware of priority hygiene practices that create the greatest risk to health and be able to change them. People are to have adequate information and resources for the use of water and sanitation facilities to protect their health and dignity.

Proposed Action

Ingushetia

131 UNHCR will continue to concentrate its efforts on Ingushetia, in collaboration with the Government, UNICEF, WHO, and IRC and Islamic Relief, to maintain and augment water storage and distribution capacities in IDP camps and spontaneous settlements not serviced by the regular water supply network. In these same areas, UNICEF will support environmental sanitation activities by providing pesticides for vector control and materials for latrine construction. Populations in these areas will also benefit as they did throughout 2000 from regular allocations of basic hygienic supplies. Groundwater extraction will be further upgraded; pipelines will be installed to provide reliable, clean water to the large IDPs population in or near rural towns. Emergency water treatment plants will be provided and operated. The trucking of water to emergency water points not served by the piped system will be maintained and additional tankers will be supplied. Laboratory equipment for water quality analysis will be provided by WHO, together with training on safe collection, transport and storage of hazardous waste of medical facilities.

Additional latrines will be provided and maintained, including hand washing facilities and additional tankers for latrine pump-out. Solid waste collection, transfer and disposal will continue.

Chechnya In Chechnya, access to many areas is currently problematic given extreme insecurity. Strengthening data collection and monitoring activities is therefore a priority. UNHCR, UNICEF, ICRC, and NGOs will focus on major urban areas by providing temporary water storage and distribution materials as well as basic environmental sanitation equipment (latrines construction kits, pesticides) to key facilities (health centres, schools) already prioritised within the health and educational components of its programme. Local water technicians will be assisted in the installation and use of large-capacity water purification units in areas where the urban water distribution and supply network has yet to be re-established. For those areas with such a capacity, basic water treatment supplies and equipment will be provided. UNICEF will also work with local and international NGOs to ensure that basic hygienic supplies are made available at the household level.

WHO will provide training and conduct public education campaigns on drinking water quality control, protection and management of drinking water resources. Drinking water testing kits will be procured for both Ingushetia and Chechnya." (UN November 2000, pp. 30-31)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

Sector U U W S N N H e H I O c C C t R E o F r

t

132 o t a l Water 1 6 1 2 and , 6 0 , Sanitati 7 0 0 5 on 6 , , 2 3 0 0 3 , 0 0 , 8 0 0 8 0 0 0 0

Implemented activities in 2001 The UN coordination focal point for WATER AND SANITATION is UNHCR. The UNHCR water and sanitation programme, in conjunction with NGOs, has winterised water points and bladders to provide consistent, clean water to the IDP community in Ingushetia. The UN and NGOs are also providing waste disposal and sanitation facilities for IDPs at camps and spontaneous settlements around Ingushetia. Given the increased demand on the Ingushetian water infrastructure, the UNHCR WatSan team is also assisting to strengthen the water pipeline in the republic. UNICEF, through an implementing partner, has been producing and distributing potable water in Grozny since October 2000, covering the needs of several schools, hospitals and general distribution points. The ICRC has developed water and sanitation projects in Chechnya (rehabilitation and management of the pumping station #1 in Grozny in coordination with Vodokanal, and setting up of water trucking programme), as well as in Ingushetia (water trucking, building-winterisation, and management of showers in the IDP camps). (UN June 2001, p. 5)

Education: International activities under the coordination of UNICEF (2001)

· UNICEF, in cooperation with UNHCR have created the capacity for enrolment of most IDP children in Ingushetia above the age of six · Safe recreational facilities to IDP children in Ingushetia and accessible areas of Chechnya have been made available · Vocational training programmes for adolescent IDPs has been supported · International agencies also encourage programmes to raise mine awareness among children · UNICEF is also enhancing the training of teachers and health workers dealing with traumatised children

133 Beneficiary population Number IDP children in Ingushetia (ages 3 – 16) 65,000 IDP and resident children in Chechnya (ages 3 - 16) 140,000 Total 205,000

"Objectives

The Convention of the Rights of the Child guarantees access to basic education to all children. Following this, UNICEF and its partners will: · create the capacity for enrolment of all IDP children in Ingushetia above the age of two into educational programmes; · decrease vulnerability of teenaged IDPs by improving vocational and life skills; · ensure the availability of safe recreational facilities to IDP children in Ingushetia and accessible areas of Chechnya; · provide psychosocial support to IDP women and children, inter alia, by reinforcing day-care and kindergarten capacities for children; and · utilize the school system to raise mine awareness among children.

Proposed action

UNICEF's strategic approach focuses on providing maximum support to the Ministries of Education, as well as NGOs, in both Ingushetia and Chechnya in order to increase and sustain basic educational activities. Specific activities will:

· support existing educational structures and, in co-operation with UNHCR, increase the number of functioning facilities by putting up pre-fabricated or temporary school buildings and equipping them; · supply IDP school children with educational items such as textbooks, consumables and recreational items; · support initiatives in schools and amongst the IDP community that aim at reducing stress and psychological trauma, develop programmes that aim at the special recreational needs of teenagers, and continue to support summer camps for IDP children; · together with UNHCR, local and international NGOs, develop and restore kindergarten facilities and safe spaces for other young children in tents, prefabricated buildings and regular structures; · integrate the core curriculum for mine awareness education into regular and NGO-run schools […]; and · support, in cooperation with UNHCR, vocational training programmes for adolescent IDPs.

Through the work of its Nazran field office, UNICEF has developed databases on primary school and pre-school facilities. UNICEF will also continue to chair regular UN- ICRC-NGO education sector coordination meetings in Moscow and Nazran. As in the past, these meetings also address issues related to psychosocial support and mine action activities." (UN November 2000, pp. 31-33)

134 Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

Sector UNHCR UNICEF Sector total Education 500,000 2,175,000 2,675,000

Activities implemented in 2001 "The UN coordination focal point for EDUCATION is UNICEF. The hostilities in Chechnya have severely disrupted the education of some 65,000 displaced children between the ages of three and sixteen currently living in Ingushetia. UNICEF and NGOs managed to create the capacity to enrol most of the IDP children in Ingushetia above the age of six into educational programmes; decrease vulnerability of teenage IDPs by improving vocational and life skills; ensure the availability of safe sporting and recreational facilities to IDP children in Ingushetia and Chechnya; and utilize the school system to raise mine awareness among children. An assessment on the status of the school infrastructures in Chechnya is being finalised and will lead to the development of a programme for the basic rehabilitation of the education system in the republic." (UN June 2001, p. 5)

"Under the umbrella of education, UNICEF and UNHCR are also carrying out with an implementing partner a comprehensive training of trainers aiming at the improvement of the skills of teachers and health workers to deal with psychosocially traumatised children. In order to offer stress-relief to children affected by the conflict, UNICEF has provided funds for over 6,000 IDP children to attend summer-camps during the school holidays." (UN September 2001, p. 8)

Mine action: International activities in framework of the UN consolidated appeal for 2001

· UNICEF coordinates its mine action programmes with UNHCR, and WHO, in close cooperation with the ICRC and other partners · UNICEF has implemented a widespread mine awareness campaign in Ingushetia and increasingly, Chechnya · Mine action activities include mine awareness education, information gathering and analysis, victim assistance and vocational training

Beneficiary Population Numb er IDPs in Ingushetia 160,0 00 At risk groups among the resident population in 180,0 Ingushetia 00 Residents and IDPs in Chechnya 540,0

135 00 Total 880,0 00

"Objectives

· To reduce the number of deaths and injuries due to mines and UXO; · to raise the level of mine awareness among people in IDP camps, schools and among host families in Ingushetia, as well as affected populations in Chechnya; · to maintain a database on mine incidents that will be used to monitor the effectiveness of, and to prioritise, programme activity; and · to assist in the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of mine victims and their socio-economic reintegration within society.

Proposed action

Moving into its second phase of activity in 2001, UNICEF, UNHCR, and WHO, in close cooperation with the ICRC and together with other partners, will pursue an integrated approach to mine action. UNICEF will lead the effort to coordinate mine action activities that will include mine awareness education, information gathering and analysis, victim assistance and vocational training.

Mine awareness education In continuation of its mine action programme, UNICEF, together with UNHCR, VoM [Voice of the Mountains] and DDG [Danish Demining Group], will organise a 'Training of Trainers' session for 100 teachers and psychologists from mine-affected areas in Chechnya. UNICEF, in collaboration with the Chechen administration, will also assist with the development of a core curriculum on mine awareness education that will be incorporated throughout the school structure. Mine awareness materials will be developed for instructional purposes.

Together with partners, and with training provided by UNICEF, more interactive strategies such as 'child-to-child' and 'child-to-adult' programmes will be initiated. In collaboration with EMERCOM, the Ministry of Education, and the Chechen and Ingush authorities, a wider sensitisation campaign will be supported through the media. Large billboards with mine awareness messages will be posted at administrative border crossings in Ingushetia, informing all returnees of the danger of mines.

Information gathering and data analysis UNICEF and UNHCR will ensure that personnel from VoM receive advanced computer training at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in order to utilise the UN International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Following the training, VoM will act as the focal point for gathering mine incident data from a number of sources including WHO, ICRC, and MSF Holland, as well as with Vesta monitors operating within IDP camps. Additional information on the types and

136 locations of mines and UXO will also be collected from EMERCOM. This information will serve as a primary source to guide the mine awareness campaign and target specific communities and age groups. The data collected on mine incidents will help reveal the location of mined areas, the types of activities pursued during the time of the incident, the levels of knowledge about risk-taking behaviour, the types of injuries sustained and the provision of services in response to the accident. The database will also serve to assist with the development of a referral service which will be linked to the WHO prosthetic workshop in Vladikavkaz.

Victim assistance UNICEF and UNHCR have established a coordination mechanism for victim assistance through the weekly inter-agency forum on mine action. Both agencies will work in close collaboration with WHO and the ICRC to provide a comprehensive approach to dealing with victim assistance by facilitating the provision of services for both the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of victims. They will support the functioning WHO prosthetic workshop in Vladikavkaz, which is the main facility in the northern Caucasus providing prostheses and orthoses for injuries related to hostilities. The workshop produces between 20-30 new prostheses each month and treats approximately 35 patients each week. UNICEF will provide special services for the transportation and overnight stay for women and children on special days to the workshop. UNICEF will assist with the creation of a psychosocial counselling centre at the workshop and, with the assistance of partners, will provide follow-up psychosocial counselling services.

Vocational training Building on UNHCR's past experience with vocational training in the Russian Federation UNICEF, in close cooperation with UNDP, UNHCR, and the relevant regional ministries (such as Labour and Social Development), will expand upon these activities with a small- scale vocational training workshop for victims in Ingushetia. A special focus will be given to women without any income generation ability and youth that have suffered from limb-loss. The project will aim to increase access for women to additional job skills and resources given the substantial economic responsibility they assume for the maintenance and upkeep of their households. Local specialists will train approximately 150 persons." (UN November 2000, pp. 33-35)

Sec U U W S tor N N H e H I O c C C t R E o F r

t o t a

137 l Mi 1 1 5 1 ne 7 , 3 , Act 0 1 6 8 ion , 7 , 8 0 9 4 5 0 , 0 , 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0

Implemented activities in 2001

"The UN coordination focal point for Mine ACTION is UNICEF. Given the high threat of mines and unexploded ordinance (UXOs) in Chechnya, UNICEF, in close cooperation with UNHCR and the NGO community, has been implementing a mine awareness campaign to educate and increase the knowledge of the dangers of mines and UXOs to the IDP community in Ingushetia and Chechnya. The agency, in collaboration with the ICRC and several partner NGOs, has started preparing a series of mine awareness lessons to be included into the curriculum of Chechen schools. Mine awareness puppet theatre performances have been organised in Vladikavkaz for children from the IDP camps in Ingushetia. In collaboration with WHO, UNICEF has been transporting mine and UXO victims from Chechnya and Ingushetia to be treated at the Vladikavkaz prosthetic and orthopaedic workshop in North Ossetia. UNICEF is also providing meals, prosthetic and orthotic devices, physical therapy as well as psychosocial counselling for the mine and UXO victims. In addition, it has provided 4 pieces of essential equipment to the Prosthetic Workshop in order to double its capacity for prosthetic production. The UN agency undertook a 10-day needs assessment to assess the specific needs for psychological support for mine-disabled persons. This was followed by an advanced training course in psychosocial trauma counselling for its implementing partners (including primary health care workers, teachers, family members, and social service staff dealing with traumatised children), and a specifically designed crash course on how to deal with mine injured victims. Following the completion of a survey on the levels of mine awareness information, UNICEF undertook a six day data gathering workshop for its UN and NGO partners. In July, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided specialised training to UNICEF's implementing partner Voice of the Mountains (VoM) on the use of the IMSMA database. Special attention was also focused on the data gathering and data entry processes, which provide vital links between the UNICEF-supported mine awareness and victim assistance programmes. The UN agency is also assisting towards the reintegration of war victims through vocational training courses aimed at youth suffering from limb-loss and women without any means of earning money. Sixty persons have received vocational training in computers and accountancy courses at the Sleptsovskaya technical college in Nazran." (UN September 2001, p. 8)

138 Economic recovery and infrastructure: planned action in the UN consolidated appeal for 2001

· UNDP, in co-operation with ILO will support the capacity of relevant Ministries to support employment and income-generation programmes · Surveys for rehabilitation, reconstruction and human development activities will also be continued

Beneficiary Population Number IDPs and vulnerable groups in Ingushetia 50,000 IDPs and vulnerable groups in Chechnya 55,000 IDPs and vulnerable groups in Dagestan 10,000 Total 115,000

"Objectives

· Support employment and income generation programmes; and · carry out surveys for rehabilitation, reconstruction and human development projects.

Proposed action

UNDP, in co-operation with ILO, focuses on supporting the Ministries of Federation, Economic Development and Trade, and Labour and Social Development in the respective republics, using NGO and local capacities to implement the following activities:

Assistance in supporting employment and income generation programmes:

· organisation of economic opportunities and skills-assessment surveys; · organisation of small-scale public works in IDPs camps and spontaneous settlements in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan; · assistance to IDPs staying permanently in Ingushetia, Dagestan, and if security permits in some areas of Chechnya, to create small-scale enterprises in areas identified through economic surveys (for example food processing, construction works and building materials production); · managerial and financial assistance for the implementation of federal and regional governmental employment and social programmes in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan in the form of commissioning feasibility studies for the rehabilitation of community assets, schools and medical points; · organisation of home-based small enterprises in fields identified by economic surveys (for example sewing, crafts, and clothing for women, and partially disabled and elderly IDPs in Ingushetia and Chechnya); and · development of training programmes for IDPs, particularly for youth and affected women in fields identified as promising through economic and skills assessment surveys (for example secretarial skills, computer works, carpentry, management skills for

139 established small-enterprises) and creation of two training centres (one in Chechnya and one in Ingushetia). The two centres will allow a participation of 100 IDPs and be made of prefabricated block-containers.

Surveys for rehabilitation, reconstruction and human development activities by continuing the activities of the UNDP project office in Rostov-on-Don in the following fields:

· regular training seminars for local authorities; · comprehensive surveys focused on collection of data on major economic indicators related to the employment and production situation, standard of living and investment promotion policy in the region; · publication of a quarterly information letter with analyses of the collected information and with proposals for preventive development strategies, investments, and the role of civil society; and · preparation of the northern Caucasus component of the Human Development Report for the Russian Federation in 2001." (UN November 2000, pp. 35-37)

Financial requirements by agency (in US$)

Sector U S N e D c P t o r

t o t a l

Employ 7 7 ment 4 4 Recover 5 5 y and , , Infrastru 0 0 cture 0 0 0 0

See also UNOCHA Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit for Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) March 2001 [Internet]

140 Internally displaced in Ingushetia and Chechnya need more food assistance (2000)

· In Ingushetia, WFP provides basic food commodities to 155,000 IDPs while the rest living in Sputnik and Severny camps are assisted by Islamic Relief · The Federal Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergencies provides bread and hot meals to IDPs living in camps · Vulnerable host families in Ingushetia are assisted by UNHCR · In Ingushetia, mass hunger has been avoided but IDPs remain in great need of humanitarian aid · The current level of assistance in Chechnya remains much below established needs

"Food insecurity in the northern Caucasus continues to be a critical concern. The hostilities in Chechnya caused a massive displacement of the population within the republic and from it to Ingushetia, severely disrupting the people's livelihoods and means of access to food.

In Ingushetia, which is one of the poorest republics in the Russian Federation, WFP is providing basic food commodities (wheat flour, oil, sugar, and iodised salt) to some 155,000 IDPs while the rest, living in Sputnik and Severny camps, are being assisted by Islamic Relief (IR). The ICRC provides a quarterly package of complementary foods and non-food items to essentially the same caseload. EMERCOM, as lead agency within the Government, provides bread and hot meals for IDPs living in camps, as and when funds are available. Several international NGOs also provide supplementary food items such as fresh fruit and vegetables, hot meals, and canned meat, on a smaller scale. UNHCR extended food assistance to 10,000 members of vulnerable host families.

In 2000, WFP facilitated co-ordination between all these food aid providers, ensuring that the neediest IDPs are adequately covered and that duplication is limited. In Ingushetia, mass hunger has been avoided but IDPs remain in great need of humanitarian aid.

In Chechnya, WFP expanded its assistance to reach 75,000 persons during the summer and autumn. Regular basic rations are provided in Grozny, Urus-Martan, and Achkhoy- Martan. In addition to IDPs, food is targeted to infants, orphans, pregnant women and nursing mothers,elderly or handicapped persons and all members of single-parent families. In addition, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Action Contre la Faim (ACF) have provided food assistance to vulnerable persons and IDPs in other areas. Still, the current level of assistance remains much below established needs. 130,000 persons belong to vulnerable groups in Chechnya, in addition to the 170,000 IDPs who are also in need of support." (UN November 2000, p. 17)

Disorganised food aid

"Food stocks exist in Ingushetia, but the major problem lies in their distribution. The fact is that the food brought in by the Russian Federal departments or the NGO's transit by way of the hospitals, the Russian army and the Ingushetians, who appropriate a substantial amount of it.

141 In addition, as of March 2000 the Federal Migrations department interrupted distribution of warm meals and of bread in the camps, on the grounds of insufficient resources. Actually, as of that date Russia ceased to finance this programme.

The refugees' food needs are therefore covered by the humanitarian agencies and the NGO's. For several months the refugees have received canned food products as well as bread, but no fresh food. In the camps where Médecins du Monde operates, the refugees get only some bread every other day. Supplying the informal camps with food is even more difficult and is carried, at best, once a month. The poor nutritional quality of the food that is distributed worsens the refugees' health: anaemia and diarrhoea are multiplying, while their immune defences are weakening." (MDM December 2000)

Good donor response to 2000 appeal have enabled UN to address critical needs in Ingushetia and, increasingly, in Chechnya (2000)

· 78% of the financial requirements for the UN 2000 consolidated appeal have been covered by the donor community · Inter-agency assessment mission in October 2000 found that the primary needs of the displaced population in Ingushetia have been met · UN humanitarian action in Chechnya has gained some momentum during the summer and autumn of 2000 · Aid agencies have the capacity to expand their activities into Chechnya, provided that the necessary security arrangements are in place

"Financial Overview The United Nations Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus: 1 December 1999 – 31 December 2000 sought US$ 52.3 million from the donor community to enable UN agencies to complement the humanitarian relief provided by the Russian Government, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations in the following sectors: food aid, shelter and relief, health and nutrition, psychosocial rehabilitation, water and sanitation, education, income generation and preparatory rehabilitation activities, and protection. As of 1 November 2000, the donor community had pledged almost US$ 40.4 million or 78% of the requirements. While the response has been generous, further support is still needed under the current appeal to provide adequate assistance, especially during the winter.

Changes in the Humanitarian Situation and Progress Made During the past year, United Nations agencies have addressed the critical needs of civilians in Ingushetia and, increasingly, in Chechnya. From October 1999 to October 2000, the UN sent over 100 convoys of food and relief items to Ingushetia and Chechnya, and to other parts of the region. Relations with governmental and non-governmental organisations in Ingushetia have been regular, and, in Chechnya, contacts with authorities and NGOs have been continuously strengthened.

In complementing the Russian authorities' humanitarian response the UN helped to cover the most urgent needs of people displaced to Ingushetia. This contributed to stabilising

142 the situation in that displaced persons did not have to move further away from their homes in order to seek assistance.

In the case of Chechnya, the UN has carried out rapid needs assessments in Grozny, Alkhan-Yurt, Achkhoy-Martan, Urus-Martan, Znamenskoye, Naursky, Sernovodsk, Assinovskaya (areas which account for some two-thirds of the total population) and, working in close co-operation with authorities, ICRC, NGOs, and local communities, has gained a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian situation in other parts of Chechnya as well. UN humanitarian action has gained some momentum in the republic during the summer and autumn of 2000 and this is expected to continue so that the UN can address the pressing needs of people there, whether resident or displaced.

On 16 August 2000, the Russian Government and the UN signed a memorandum of understanding on humanitarian action in the northern Caucasus, which established a firm basis for the UN to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in need.

As a follow-up to the previous inter-agency missions that had taken place to prepare the flash appeal, its conversion into a full-fledged appeal, and its extension, the UN organised an inter-agency mission during the first week of October 2000 in order to review ongoing humanitarian programmes, and re-assess needs in Chechnya and Ingushetia. The mission comprised members from UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, OCHA, UNSECOORD and, for the first time, FAO. Staff from EMERCOM and the Ministry of Federation joined the mission. For the first time, the ICRC joined, as an observer, a UN mission preparing a consolidated appeal in Russia.

The mission held extensive consultations with stakeholders in humanitarian action. Team members met in Nazran with the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia. While consultations with the Chechen administration have been ongoing on this occasion they took place inside Chechnya, where UN humanitarian action has gained some momentum over the past months. In addition, the mission met non-governmental organisations working in Ingushetia and Chechnya, as well as representatives of groups of internally displaced persons. Discussions were also held with local communities during many of the site visits to camps, host families, hospitals, water facilities, distribution points, schools, and so forth.

The principal findings of the assessment mission were:

The primary needs in food, shelter, health, and water and sanitation, of the displaced population in Ingushetia have been met. The assistance provided in these sectors had an impact on public health by preventing an outbreak of epidemics. This effort is integral to the wider concept of protection and should be continued to the benefit of the local population in Chechnya and the displaced persons in Ingushetia. Before the end of the winter there is little prospect of return for displaced persons who, first and foremost, fear for their safety but also lack the material resources to re-establish their livelihoods given the extent of the destruction in their places of origin.

143 The UN contributed to reduce the pressure put on Ingush infrastructures by the influx of displaced civilians, for example by working with Ingush authorities to rehabilitate the public water supply system and providing assistance to host families and by providing supplies and equipment to schools, hospitals, and clinics.

The humanitarian situation remains extremely difficult for the affected population. Aid agencies already working in Ingushetia now have the capacity to continue and consolidate their work in Ingushetia and to expand it into Chechnya, provided of course that the necessary arrangements for the security of staff and their cargo are in place, and provided that their efforts complement those of the Government as it discharges its responsibility to alleviate suffering.

The security conditions prevailing in the region continue to be considered among the world's most dangerous. Given the situation, the establishment of an independent UNSECOORD office providing professional advice to the humanitarian community at large and managing safety and security of UN and associated staff has been critical for the continuation of operations. It has helped the UN agencies extend their work throughout Ingushetia and, during the past six months, into Chechnya.

Collaboration among humanitarian actors and the Russian authorities has contributed greatly to improve the delivery of assistance to civilians in need. In order to continue effective humanitarian action, the Government intends to support aid agencies with key issues such as gaining access to civilians in need; providing them communications frequencies; and exempting them from value-added tax." (UN November 2000, p. 4)

Ingushetia receives more humanitarian aid than Chechnya (2000)

· There has been however a continuous shift from Ingushetia to Chechnya during second half of 2000

"Clearly Ingushetia is a more privileged target for the distribution of humanitarian assistance than the Chechen Republic. There is a general feeling that too much assistance including the supply of relief aid and shelter materials pours into Ingushetia compared with Chechnya. According to Minister Blokhin only approximately 20% of the amount of international aid is sent to Chechnya (60% to Ingushetia and 19% to Dagestan)." (COE 23 January 2001, para. 20)

"There has been a steady shift in the UN's programme from Ingushetia to Chechnya during the last six months. Whereas during the summer of 2000, only 5-10% of the UN's aid was targeting civilians in Chechnya, about 30% of UN programmes did so in December. Most significantly, WFP had provided food for 110,000 people in Chechnya in December and planned to do likewise in January 2001." (UN Informal Humanitarian Coordination Group Meeting, 15 January 2001)

144 Donor support humanitarian aid in priority (2000)

· The long-term resolution of the conflict through reconstruction, law and order enforcement and support of a political settlement remains neglected by donors

"It seems clear from the data provided by the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the Northern Caucasus and ECHO, that funding in the Northern Caucasus is predominantly focussed on projects which work to meet the basic needs of civilians, refugees and IDPs through the provision of humanitarian aid. Projects such as these, which address Response Direction 5, Meet Basic Needs and Protect Chechen IDPs and Refugees, are supported with over 95% of the funding listed in the data analysed. Very few of these humanitarian projects address issues of social or economic reconstruction, Response Direction 1, and on average this area receives less than 3% of total funding. Of the 156 projects in all the data analysed only two (one of which had yet to be implemented) addressed issues of security and law and order and Response Direction 6, Strengthen Law Enforcement and the Protection of Rights in Chechnya; receiving on average less than 1% of total funding.

Response Directions 2 (Initiate a Political Settlement Process), 3 (Media and Transparency of Reconstruction and Settlement Efforts), and 4 (Ensure the Autonomy of Chechnya) were not addressed by any of the projects analysed. While the urgent priority of ensuring that people's basic needs are met cannot be denied, the predominant focus of donors and implementing agencies on immediate humanitarian needs is allowing little attention to the long-term resolution of the conflict through reconstruction, law and order enforcement and support of a political settlement. It is clear that there are problems associated with initiatives in more 'political' areas, and this is an issue that needs to be addressed in itself. However, the funding of economic reconstruction, and activities such as capacity-building, post-war trauma healing and other social reconstruction projects needs to increase, if a lasting settlement of the Chechen conflict is to be properly supported.

145 The above analysis is very basic, and there is a need for further, more detailed analysis of a wider range of sources, particularly local NGO projects and funding from bilateral donors. Such analysis would prove useful to those designing and implementing future projects in this region, alerting donors and NGOs to areas that require more attention, areas where there may have been duplication or areas which could benefit from follow- up activities." (FEWER 2 January 2001, pp. 15-16)

See also AFP, "EU pledges 5.6 million euro for Chechen refugees" [Internet]

Activities of the Red Cross movement in 2001: humanitarian assistance and protection

· Food and non-food assistance is provided with the support of the Russian Red Cross, to displaced and other groups, mostly in Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan · Water and sanitation facilities have been improved in IDPs camps in Ingushetia · Support have been given to the water supply system in Chechnya and other assistance provided to key institutions · Surgical assistance and support to prosthetic facilities have been provided · ICRC has gained access to persons detained in the connection with the security operation in Chechnya · ICRC runs a message service for persons who lost contacts with their relatives · Mine awareness education and dissemination of humanitarian law have also been implemented

"Food and non-food assistance Most of the ICRC food assistance in the Northern Caucasus is still distributed in Ingushetia. The ICRC supports almost all IDPs with food (1 food parcel/person/2 months) and hygienic parcels covering the individual hygienic needs of the IDP population in Ingushetia. 137,000 persons received this assistance during the last round of distribution. In addition, the ICRC supports two programmes of the RRC local branch, which distributes 3 loaves of bread to about 20,000 beneficiaries in IDP camps, and 5 hot meals to some 2,000 particularly vulnerable beneficiaries each week.

In Chechnya, the ICRC, in cooperation with the Chechen branch of the RRC, provides a monthly ration of vegetable oil, sugar, tea and soap to every person benefiting from the bread programme. This programme covers around 27,000 beneficiaries in Achkhoy- Martan, Argun, Grozny, Gudermes, Kurchaloy, and Urus-Martan. In addition, 1,300 IDPs in Argun and Gudermes, workers of the water-board company, 1,700 teachers as well as people in institutions have received food and non-food assistance adapted to their specific needs. The Chechen branch of the RRC runs a programme assisting 720 old and bedridden people who are visited at home by nurses providing them food, and hygienic and medical assistance. Chechen children who are resting in convalescent homes in neighbouring republics are assisted with school kits and shoes, and made aware of the dangers of mines and UXOs. So far in 2001, 11,300 school kits and more than 5,000 pairs of shoes have been distributed. In Dagestan, some 25,000 persons receive food and-non

146 food assistance from the ICRC. They are both Chechen and Dagestani IDPs as well as Dagestani returnees to their place of origin. As in Ingushetia, the RRC local branch runs a bakery, covering the needs of about 8,000 IDPs, and two soup kitchens, regularly providing about 2,700 vulnerable IDPs hot meals.

Monthly in Russia’s south, the RRC, supported by the ICRC and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), gives food and non-food items to 20,000 IDPs from Chechnya.

Water, sanitation, and shelter Since early 2000, the ICRC made it a priority to improve the water and sanitation situation in camps in Ingushetia. It has built fifteen shower installations (138 cabins). All have been insulated for the winter and have hot water. 18 water trucks deliver 1,800 m3 of pre-chlorinated to 40,000 in 30 settlements, each week.

In Chechnya, the ICRC rehabilitated the pumping station No 1 in Grozny, which gives an output of about 1,000 m3 a day of chlorinated water, which is distributed to the population. Furthermore, 2,125 blankets, 2,325 kitchen sets, and 111,200 m2 of plastic sheeting were distributed to hospitals, schools, and institutions. 917 stoves were installed and connected to the gas network in hospitals and schools.

Health The ICRC has been providing surgical assistance to 12 hospitals in Chechnya, 5 in Ingushetia, 3 in Dagestan, and 3 in North-Ossetia enabling them to treat thousands of surgical cases. The surgical assistance will further increase in the coming months but the medical facilities assisted will be rationalised. In Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan, the ICRC finances a RRC run mobile medical programme. It also supports a visiting nurses programme with covers more than 2,300 vulnerable people in 10 North Caucasus republics.

The ICRC, while no longer pursuing the idea of running a prosthetic workshop in Ingushetia, will train badly-needed prosthetic technicians and support existing prosthetic facilities.

Protection activities Following an agreement in March 2000, the ICRC was granted access to all people deprived of their freedom in connection with the security operation in Chechnya. ICRC delegates regularly visit persons detained in Chechnya as well as in other areas of the northern Caucasus and south Russia. The main aim of ICRC visits to detainees is to assess their conditions of detention and their treatment. In that regard, ICRC has developed an active dialogue with detaining authorities. Delegates regularly transmit and discuss their observations and recommendations with the competent authorities.

ICRC runs a ‘Red Cross Message’ service, which provides persons who lost contact with their relatives, as well as visited detainees, the chance to get in touch with their next of kin.

147 Promotional activities ICRC, in coordination with the UN and NGOs in Ingushetia, as well as in the other republics of the northern Caucasus and south Russia, carries out mine awareness education. Children are the primary target audience. ICRC has worked with a well known Chechen folk hero, developed a puppet show, as well as a comic book, and is working with teachers to develop activities for use in the classroom to further reinforce the information. Parents have also been targeted so that they are aware of effective means of sharing information with their children.

ICRC disseminates IHL to armed forces, in particular the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, and Border Guards. It aims at integrating essential basic notions of IHL into the training programme of officers and soldiers, particularly those actively involved in the armed operations in Chechnya.

In order to present the Red Cross Movement and the basis of IHL to civil society, and to enhance the image of the local society of the Russian Red Cross, the ICRC put up a travelling exhibition, which is shown across the region. Tuapse, Armavir and Anapa (Krasnodar), Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria), Vladikavkaz (North-Ossetia) and Maikop (Adyghea) have hosted the exhibition for a three week period during the last 12 months." (UN September 2001, pp. 9-10)

For more details on ICRC programmes in North Caucasus, consult ICRC web page [Internet]

See also UNOCHA Humanitarian Action Briefing Kit for Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) June 2001 [Internet]

NGOs

Almost 30 local and international NGOs operate in the northern Caucasus (June 2001)

· The major portion of NGOs' humanitarian assistance is being delivered to displaced persons living in collective settlements in Ingushetia · NGOs are willing to increase their presence in Chechnya but face security problems and lack of access · Close cooperation and coordination is maintained with other organisations carrying out humanitarian programmes

"Almost thirty local and international NGOs are working to address the consequences of the situation in Chechnya, providing assistance to the affected populations in the sectors of food aid, shelter and relief, health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education, mine awareness, and protection, thereby complementing emergency relief being provided by the authorities, bi-lateral donors such as SDC/SDR [Swiss Disaster Relief/Swiss Agency

148 for Development and Cooperation], UN agencies, and the international organisations such as ICRC, and SARC.

The major portion of NGOs’ humanitarian assistance is being delivered to displaced persons living in camps and spontaneous settlements throughout Ingushetia. Several NGOs are providing assistance to civilians inside Chechnya as well. The emergency programmes carried out by the NGO community in these republics include distribution of food and non-food items, winterisation and improvement of living conditions in the IDP camps and spontaneous settlements, provision of medicines and medical materials, running mobile medical clinics, provision of water tanking services, operation of wooden or tented schools, repair of school and health facilities, psychosocial rehabilitation for both children and adults, as well as mine awareness campaigns. In Ingushetia, a few NGOs have started implementing income-generation, as well as small agricultural projects. In addition, various surveys and assessments, such as a household survey, school assessment, nutrition survey, are being conducted in Chechnya. Two NGOs, MSF- Switzerland and DRC, are providing some assistance to displaced persons living in Dagestan. Several NGOs have created partnerships with the UN agencies to deliver, distribute, and monitor the UN assistance.

Given the vast humanitarian needs inside Chechnya, the NGOs are willing to increase their operations in the republic. However, the continuing problems of access to and freedom of movement within Chechnya are hindering the humanitarian operations there. Another issue of concern for the NGO community is related to the security and radio communications.

NGO humanitarian action in the region is based on assessment of needs, independent access to the affected population, and staff safety and security, and guided by the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality. To ensure efficient operations, NGOs continue to enhance monitoring by increasing their direct involvement in aid distributions, communicating with target communities and local authorities, and strengthening collaboration with other agencies. Frequent discussions among the NGO community, and between NGOs and the UN agencies, about policy and programmes promote complementarity, and help the humanitarian community at large to develop a coherent and strategic approach to alleviate the suffering of the affected population." (UN June 2001, pp. 9-10)

149 (UN June 2001, p. 16)

UNOCHA in Moscow maintains a database for projects implemented in Northern Caucasus. This database can be search on line [Internet]. An overview of national and international NGOs working in the North Caucasus can also be found in the UN Briefing Kit, September 2001 [Internet].

The Danish Refugee Council has plans to help the Ingush displaced in Ingushetia (April 2000)

· Rehabilitation projects for the ethnic Ingush displaced from Chechnya (15,000) and from Prigorodny district (23,000)

"In the not too distant future DRC is planning to implement a rehabilitation project for some of the around 15,000 ethnic Ingush IDPs from Chechnya that have been displaced in Ingushetia and who plan to remain in this republic. Another group of great concern is the over 23,000 Ingush IDPs from the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia that were displaced during the 1992 Ossetian-Ingush conflict. DRC is now planning activities on job creation and a shelter projects in order to improve the living conditions for these groups of IDPs and create grounds for them to increase self-sufficiency. According to Mr. Malsagov [Prime Minister of Ingushetia], it has been long since his Government tried to raise the issue of assistance to the displaced people willing to reside in Ingushetia, especially the ethnic Ingushes from both Chechnya and Prigorodny Region, but they were afraid of addressing that problem to the Russian Government. The Ingush government

150 representatives expressed great interest in the DRC plan to start the rehabilitation project in Ingushetia." (DRC 4 April 2000)

Committee 'Civic Assistance', a local NGO providing assistance to the displaced in Moscow

· Committee 'Civic Assistance' (CCA) provides legal counseling for refugees and forced migrants and plays the intermediary role for the relations between the refugees and governmental official structures · During 2,5 years, CCA helped 15 thousands of refugees at its receptions in Moscow and in Centers for Temporary Reception of the Federal Migration Service

"The Committee 'Civic Assistance' (CCA) was formed in 1990 in connection with the appearance in Moscow of the first refugees - the Armenian victims of the pogroms in Azerbaijan when it became clear that the powers were not ready and could not protect and help refugees.

From the very beginning CCA took on the tasks of legal consulting for refugees and forced migrants and played the intermediary role for the relations between the refugees and governmental official structures, provided defense in the courts, and defended the rights of refugees for housing and work. In conjunction with these tasks, the members of the committee had constant contact with all structures dealing with refugee problems: the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the regional migration services, and the Commission on Refugees at the State Duma. At the moment one co-chair of the committee, Lydia Graphova, represents the interest of refugees in the President's Social Chamber, the other co-chair, Svetlana Gannushkina, invited as an expert consultant in the Duma's Commission on Refugees, takes part in the development of legislation in the field of refugees’ and forced migrants’ rights and the third co-chair of the committee Deputy of the State Duma, the member of 'Yabloko' (an apple) section Vyacheslav Igrunov defends refugees’ rights at the meetings of the State Duma. CCA is accredited at the UNHCR and is in a constant contact with it and other international bodies.

This collaboration allowed the Committee to achieve some fruitfull results: From the beginning of 1998 the Committee got an exclusive right to use blanks signed by S. Gannushkina, for sending refugees, who have no status, to hospitals . It is a great achievement showing the fruitful collaboration of the CCA and governmental medicine institution. It is a pity that we cannot say the same about our collaboration with the official education structures.

On the base of legal expertise made by the members of the Independent Legal and Expert Council, CCA attained the abolition of a few governmental decrees pinching the refugee’s rights.

In 1990, CCA began to hold twice a weekly reception of refugees. At the reception, because of the extreme need, CCA distributed some financial help, including some clothing and kitchen utensils. Besides, two professional lawyers, psychologist and

151 therapist have taken part in the committee’s weekly receptions. At the CCA works a small adjusting and educational center for refugees’ children.

Since the beginning of the Chechen events, the influx of refugees to CCA has greatly increased, this made the activity of the committee even more important. During 2,5 year period it managed to help 15 thousands of refugees at its receptions in Moscow office and in Centers of Temporal Placing belonging to the Federal Migration Service. Human Rights Center of Memorial, led by Svetlana Gannushkina, visited Chechen refugees in the Centers of Temporary Placement. This work was conducted under the Memorials' program called 'Survey of the Situation of Forced Migrants from Chechnya.' The data base of CCA developed by volunteers was based on the search of the relatives of the inhabitants of Chechnya, with whose help about 200 people were found.

Financing of all mentioned above programs are based on UNCHR donations ($1000 a month), individual donations (contributions of the CCA members constitute about one third of the entire sum of money distributed among refugees) and funds given by international bodies such as Sorec Foundation, the Tides Foundation, which allowed the Committee to survive during the first two years of the Chechen war, Mission in Moscow of the Union of Friends, a group of English Quakers, Basel canton, German 'Greens-90'.

Over 150 articles and reports have been published about the rights of refugees in the main human rights newspapers by Lydia Graphova, Svetlana Gannushkina, Elena Burtina, Elena Zaks. As much material was also publicizes on the TV and on the radio programs 'Freedom,' 'Radio Rossia,' and 'Echo Moskvy.' CCA also prepared in due times materials for reports for the President's Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) which were used by the chair of the commission Sergei Kovalyov. Committee played an active role in the preparation of the UN Conference on problems of involuntary migration in SIC and its follow up.

In 1997 members of the Committee created the first electron historical archive titled 'Man-in-the-street: what was in Store for Them in Armed Conflicts in the Former USSR. Chechen war 1994-1997'. This work was funded by the Open Society Institute." (Ganushkina March 2000)

See the website of the Committee 'Civic Assistance' for more information [Internet]

Response to human rights concerns

Russian Parliament discussed human rights abuses in Chechnya (September 2000)

· Most of the participants in the Duma hearings agreed that the situation regarding the protection of the civilian population from both rebels and federal forces has become critical

152 "The problem of the human rights abuses was brought before Parliament for the first time on 21 September 2000. The hearings were devoted to 'cleaning' operations without motive, particularly searches for drugs or ammunition. All the reporters, including the Russian federal presidential representative to the Commission of Human Rights Observation, V. Kalamanov, confirmed that human rights abuses are still being committed on a massive scale ('Nezavisimaya Gazeta' (NG), 22.09.2000). The CR deputy, A. Aslakhanov, accused the army and public order protection bodies of cruelty, dishonesty and immorality in regard to the Chechen people, maintaining that the war will continue until the army begins to respect the rights of Chechen civilians, as they will fight and die to defend their honour, for 'it is impossible to suffer arbitrariness and lawlessness any longer' ('NG', 22.09.2000).

Most of the participants in the Duma hearings, state officials, analysts and experts, agreed that the situation regarding the protection of the peaceful Chechen population from both rebels and federal forces has become critical. (FEWER December 2000, p. 9)

See documents relating to the Duma hearings on the situation in Chechnya, 21 September 2000 on the website of Memorial (in Russian) [Internet]

A summary in English of the reports presented to the Duma during the hearing can be found in Annex 1 to the report of the Danish Refugee Council Report for North Caucasus, No. 28, 10 October 2000 [Internet]

UN human rights mechanisms address human rights violations in Chechnya (2000- 2001)

· UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Chechnya in March 2000 · UN Human Rights Commission condemned violations of humanitarian law and human rights in Chechnya by federal forces (2000 and 2001) · The Russian failure to implement the resolution was raised at a one-day commission session in September 2000

"In December 1999, Human Rights Watch called on the Security Council to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate violations of the laws of war in Chechnya. The Security Council, however, never formally discussed Chechnya.

In late March [2000], U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson travelled to the area after an earlier refusal of her request for a visit sparked an international outcry. Robinson became the first senior international official to acknowledge receiving evidence of summary executions, torture, and rape. Although Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at the end of the trip told Robinson she was welcome to visit Chechnya again in a few months, a formal invitation had not yet been extended at the time of writing.

153 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution criticizing Russia for violations of human rights in Chechnya-the first time a resolution was adopted regarding a permanent member of the Security Council. The resolution, among other things, called on the Russian government to establish 'according to recognized international standards' a national commission of inquiry and mandated five special mechanisms of the Human Rights Commission to visit Chechnya and report to the commission and the General Assembly. At the time of the General Assembly session in the fall, none of the special mechanisms had been able to visit. The Russian failure to implement the resolution was raised at a one-day commission session in September but no public record of the discussion was issued." (HRW December 2000, pp. 318-319)

"Human Rights Watch welcomed a resolution adopted today by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights expressing grave concern about human rights violations in Chechnya. The 22 to 12 vote, with 19 abstentions, followed fresh reports detailing Russia's failure to investigate atrocities. […]

Introduced by the European Union and cosponsored by 16 countries, the resolution strongly condemns the use of disproportionate force and serious human rights violations by Russia's forces and calls on Russia to ensure that both civilian and military prosecutors undertake credible and exhaustive criminal investigations of all violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. It also raises concern about the pattern of forced disappearances, torture and summary executions perpetrated by Russia's forces in Chechnya.

But the resolution stops short of calling for an international commission of inquiry, a body for which Human Rights Watch and other groups had advocated." (HRW 20 April 2001)

See also:

Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/24, "Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Republic", E/CN.4/RES/2001/24, 20 April 2001 [Internet]

Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, E/CN.4/2001/36, 1 February 2001 [Internet]

Statement by the High Commissioner for Human Rights "Situation of Human Rights in Chechnya in the Russian Federation", 5 April 2000 [Internet]

Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/58, "Situation in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation", E/CN.4/RES/2000/58, 25 April 2000 [Internet]

"Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons call on the Russian Authorities to observe the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement", UN Press Release, 20 December 1999 [Internet]

154 Follow-up to allegations of human rights violations and war crimes: insufficient progress according to international organisations (2000-2001)

· National institutions have recently been created with the mandate to ensure the follow up to allegations of human rights violations and war crimes in Chechnya · Authorities show unwillingness to investigate the crimes committed by federal troops during the military campaign since the beginning of August 1999 · The Military Prosecutor’s Office (for servicemen) the civilian prosecutor’s offices for civilians dismiss any report and witness testimony evidence prepared by human rights organisations · Chechens and Russians are reluctant to complain about concrete cases of human rights violations to national bodies, fearing repercussions or simply afraid that they will not be believed, or their case will not be properly reviewed · UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed her serious concerns about reported human rights violations in Chechnya and the authorities' response (February 2001) · None of the mechanisms created by the authorities possesses all the attributes of an independent inquiry · There is a major gap between the large number of complaints submitted to various government agencies and bodies and the relatively small number of court proceedings · The High Commissioner urges Chechen fighters to cease such attacks against federal and local authorities and against civilians, including kidnapping and hostage taking

"On the national level, a variety of institutions and individuals, some newly created for this specific purpose, are charged with the follow-up to the allegations of human rights violations and war crimes committed in the Chechen Republic. Unfortunately, no tangible, substantial results have been reported so far from any of them. In addition, most of these institutions/individuals seem to put the emphasis on human rights violations perpetrated by the Dudayev and Maskhadov regimes. This emphasis goes hand in hand with an apparent unwillingness to investigate the crimes committed by federal troops during the military campaign since the beginning of August 1999, even in the face of overwhelming evidence. These facts cast a doubt on the true independence and effectiveness of the institutions and individuals concerned, which does not bode well for their future work. […] The following are the national institutions/individuals I am aware of:

· the State Duma Commission on the Normalisation of the Political, Social and Economic Situation and Protection of Human Rights in the Chechen Republic under the Chairmanship of Duma Deputy Mr. A. Tkatchov;

· the Independent Russian Commission of Inquiry into the situation in the Chechen Republic under the Chairmanship of Duma Deputy Mr P. Krashennikov;

· the Military Prosecutor’s Office and the civilian Prosecutor’s office in the Chechen Republic;

155 · Mr V. Kalamanov and his office (Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Securing Human and Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic);

· Mr O. Mironov and his office (Ombudsman of the Russian Federation);

· Mr V.A. Kartashkin and his office (Chair of the Presidential Commission on Human Rights of the Russian Federation).

The State Duma Commission sees its main task, according to its Chairman, in the co- ordination of reconstruction efforts in Chechnya; its working group on “ensuring human rights and on problems of displaced persons” is concentrating on human rights violations committed by the Chechen side. […]

The Independent Commission under Mr Krashennikov, organised as a non-governmental organisation, which reports that it has received over 200 citizens’ complaints so far, has no official mandate except the benediction of President Putin. It has neither the power nor the staff to conduct its own investigations or control the activities of state bodies. However, the Commission has conveyed a number of complaints to the Prosecutor General’s Office, in particular regarding cases of looting by members of the Federal forces. Council of Europe support for this Commission – which is apparently envisaged - might be able to alleviate its financial and material problems, but will not be able to make up for the Commission’s lack of concrete investigatorial and prosecutorial powers.

Mr Mironov and Mr Kartashkin make periodical statements on the violation of human rights in the Chechen Republic, but again concentrate on those perpetrated by the Chechen side.

Mr Kalamanov’s Office is assisted by three staff members of the Council of Europe, who arrived at the Znamenskoye Office on 21 June 2000. (Mr Kalamanov himself seems to have travelled to Chechnya only twice so far). The Special Representative and his staff have received nearly 4000 citizens as of mid-June 2000, and have registered more than 700 complaints so far (more than half of which concern missing persons). The information thus obtained is transmitted to law enforcement agencies and the Prosecutor General’s Office for the purpose of its verification and the adoption of appropriate measures. As of 20 June 2000, Mr Kalamanov’s Office had received 154 replies to his enquiries. However, Mr Kalamanov’s Office suffers from the same lack of investigatorial and prosecutorial powers as Mr Krashennikov’s Commission .

The only body invested with powers of investigation and prosecution in Russia is the Military Prosecutor’s Office (for servicemen), and civilian prosecutor’s offices for civilians. The Military Prosecutor’s Office in particular seems to be hostile to undertaking systematic, credible and exhaustive criminal prosecutions of those members of the federal forces implicated in war crimes and other human rights violations. NGOs report that their reports, and witness testimony gathered by them, is dismissed out of hand, and in one case, was even described as “a waste of time”. As of 21 June 2000, only 467 criminal

156 cases had been opened, only 12(!) of which concerned crimes committed against the Chechen population. This can hardly be described as the “systematic, credible and exhaustive criminal prosecutions of those members of the federal forces implicated in war crimes and other human rights violations” the Assembly demanded of the Military Prosecutor’s Office in Recommendation 1456." (COE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 28 June 2000, paras. 16-23)

"No international investigators have been allowed to investigate the numerous allegations of human rights violations and war crimes committed by both sides, but especially by Russian troops. This can only be regretted, as, apparently, both Chechens and Russians are reluctant to complain about concrete cases of human rights violations to national bodies, fearing repercussions or simply afraid that they will not be believed, or their case will not be properly reviewed." (COE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 28 June 2000, para. 15)

Follow up in 2001

"The detailed information provided by the Government of the Russian Federation is welcome, as is the expression of the Government’s readiness to continue dialogue and cooperation with OHCHR. However, reports of continuing human rights violations in Chechnya, and criticisms of the authorities’ response, give rise to serious concern. It is noteworthy that these reports come from a variety of sources, including intergovernmental organizations, Russian and international NGOs, and members of the State Duma. They indicate that further determined efforts are essential before it can be said that adequate conditions for the respect of human rights exist in Chechnya. Determined efforts need to be made to prevent unexplained disappearances and killings, and to combat corruption, abuses and harassment at checkpoints. Any steps taken to re- establish an effective judicial system should lead to full respect for the right of everybody to defend his/her rights before independent and impartial bodies, within procedures governed by due process of law.

In her approach to the issue of human rights in Chechnya, the High Commissioner has stressed the importance of a credible response from the Russian authorities commensurate with the scale of the allegations of serious human rights abuses. She has recommended an independent, wide-ranging inquiry as the most appropriate way to address concerns. It is noted that, while a number of constructive mechanisms have been put in place, none possesses all the attributes which would normally be associated with such an independent inquiry.

The High Commissioner notes as a matter of serious concern that there is a major gap between the large number of complaints submitted to various government agencies and bodies and the relatively small number of court proceedings. If the information available fully reflects the situation, further determined steps should be taken in order to ensure justice to victims of abuses. All allegations of human rights violations should be investigated in accordance with international human rights standards and appropriate

157 action taken. Serious human rights violations should not be allowed to go unpunished and/or uncompensated.

Reports of serious human rights violations carried out by Chechen fighters against federal and local authorities and against civilians continue. The High Commissioner urges those responsible to cease such attacks, including kidnapping and hostage taking, and to observe international human rights and humanitarian law." (UN CHR 1 February 2001, paras. 43-46)

"Thorough investigations and exhaustive prosecutions have not been a priority for the Russian authorities. In May, Russia provided to the Council of Europe the first apparently comprehensive list of 358 Chechnya-related investigations to date. Human Rights Watch's analysis of the list reveals that more than half, or 190, cases have been suspended, and that only 18 percent are currently considered active cases. Only 41 of the 358 cases opened are for murder (18 of which have been suspended), yet more than 130 civilians alone were extrajudicially executed in three massacres of 1999 and 2000. Torture of detainees is routine in Chechnya, yet not a single investigation has ensued. The most frequently reported violations are disappearances, which account for 110 (or 31 percent) of the cases on the list; an overwhelming majority (79 percent) has been suspended.

Very few cases have progressed to the courts. On September 20, Rossiskaia gazeta published a list of 11 convictions of servicemen to date: five resulted in active prison sentences, of which two were for murder. In most cases, neither the convictions nor the investigations by the military procuracy appear to relate to torture, summary execution, arbitrary detention, or forced disappearance." (HRW 24 September 2001)

See also:

Council of Europe report "Conflict in the Chechen Republic - recent development", 20 January 2001 [Internet]

Eleventh and Twelfth interim report by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on the presence of the Council of Europe experts in the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, 19 September 2001 [Internet]

HRW "Memorandum on Domestic Prosecutions for Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Chechnya", 13 February 2001 [Internet]

OSCE observer mission returns to Chechnya (June 2001)

· OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya has been allowed to return to Chechnya after withdrawal in December 1998

158 · Mandate of the Assistance Group includes assistance for the speedy return of refugees and displaced persons · OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights provided technical and training assistance to the office of the President's Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya during 2000

"OSCE involvement in Chechnya

The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya was first established in April 1995, and helped in brokering ceasefire agreements to end hostilities in the area. Due to the deteriorating security situation, the international staff of the Group were withdrawn to Moscow in December 1998, where they continued to operate from temporary facilities. The OSCE office in Grozny remained open until armed fighting broke out again in 1999.

From Moscow, the Group co-ordinated the delivery of humanitarian aid and the implementation of projects aimed at providing assistance to those affected by the ongoing conflict.

Presence in Znamenskoye

The planning and preparation for the return of the Assistance Group to Chechnya began in 2000. The town of Znamenskoye, located in the northern part Chechnya, was selected as the base for deployment.

Following the official inauguration by the Chairman-in-Office on 15 June 2001, OSCE international staff will now be permanently deployed in Znamenskoye, working to implement the Assistance Group's mandate: promoting respect for human rights and freedoms; facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian aid; providing assistance for the speedy return of refugees and displaced persons; and promoting a peaceful resolution of the crisis and stabilization in the Republic." (OSCE 18 June 2001)

"At the November 1999 Istanbul summit, OSCE member states, including Russia, confirmed the mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya. The Russian government, however, subsequently refused to allow the Assistance Group to function in Ingushetia and created administrative obstacles to its return to Chechnya. As a result, the Assistance Group was unable to fulfill its functions in a meaningful way.

In other OSCE developments, its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) provided ad hoc technical and training assistance to the staff of Kalamanov's office. The office did not respond to evidence of widespread fraud during the March presidential elections, other than to characterize the elections as 'a benchmark in the ongoing evolution of the Russian Federation's emergence as a representative democracy.'" (HRW December 2000, p. 319)

For more information on the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya, see OSCE website [Internet]

159 See AFP, "Russia 'encouraging' on OSCE mission to Chechnya", 6 February 2001 [Internet]

Council of Europe scrutinizes situation of human rights in Chechnya (2000-2001)

· Several delegations of the Council of Europe visited the North Caucasus, including the European Commissioner for Human Rights · The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued several recommendations to Russia and suspended the voting rights of the Russian delegation · The Committee of Ministers refused to take action against the Russian Federation · The Council of Europe sent three experts to the office of the Representative of the Russian President on human rights violations in Chechnya · 90 complaints relating to human rights violations in Chechnya have been filed with the European Court of Human Rights

"A number of Council of Europe delegations visited the North Caucasus to assess the situation, including the European commissioner for human rights, members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.

Chechnya figured prominently on the agenda of all Parliamentary Assembly sessions in 2000. After its January recommendations went unheeded, a majority of parliamentarians voted in April to strip Russia's parliamentary delegation of its voting rights. The assembly also recommended that member states file an interstate complaint against Russia with the European Court of Human Rights and that the Committee of Ministers start proceedings to exclude Russia from the Council of Europe.

The Committee of Ministers brushed aside all of the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly without serious discussion and said that Russia's response to international pressure was satisfactory.

The secretary general of the Council of Europe invoked a seldom used mechanism to require Russia to explain the application of the European Convention on Human Rights with regard to the conflict. When Russia's response was unsatisfactory, the secretary general deferred further action to the Committee of Ministers, which remained silent.

The Council of Europe sent three experts to the office of Vladimir Kalamanov starting in June. Although the presence of these experts no doubt contributed to the efficiency of the office, the experts were not in a position to make a meaningful contribution to the accountability process." (HRW December 2000, p. 319)

See also:

Recommendation 1498 (2001) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Conflict in the Chechen Republic – recent developments, 25 January 2001 [Internet]

160 Recommendation 1499 (2001) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Humanitarian situation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chechnya, 25 January 2001 [Internet]

Resolution 1240 (2001) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, "Conflict in the Chechen Republic – recent developments", 25 January 2001 [Internet]

Eleventh and Twelfth Interim Report by the presence of the Council of Europe experts in the Office of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for ensuring Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, 19 September 2001 [Internet]

European Court of Human Rights "The European Court of Human Rights has received approximately 90 individual cases relating to human rights violations in Chechnya. Last summer the Court transmitted six cases to the Russian authorities. The rest are being processed." (UNCHR 1 February 2001, para. 34)

"Citizens can file appeals to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations that occurred after Russia's May 5, 1998, accession to the Council of Europe. Complainants need no longer exhaust all appeals in Russian courts before they can turn to the European Court. According to the press, the ECHR received 914 complaints from Russia, 60 of which are based on human rights violations in Chechnya. However, because the Government refused so far to respond to the initial complaints accepted by the ECHR (a procedural requirement), no cases have yet been heard." (US DOS February 2001, sect. 4)

Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)

"The Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) undertook two visits to the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation (26 February - 4 March 2000; 20-27 April 2000). The delegation focused its attention on the treatment of persons who have been deprived of their liberty because they were suspected of having committed offences in Chechnya. The delegation visited police holding cells and pre-trial detention facilities in Chechnya, and the also the Khankala military base near Grozny and detention and medical facilities in neighbouring republics of the Russian Federation. On 3 April 2000, the preliminary observations made by the CPT delegation after the visit were published, at the request of the Russian authorities. The observations following the second visit have not been made public." (UN CHR 1 February 2001, para. 34)

The Council of Europe High Commissioner for Human Rights "On the request of the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights travelled to Moscow and then on to the Republic of Chechnya from the 25th February to

161 the 4th March 2001. The purpose of the visit was to gain an accurate view of the situation in general and, in particular, of the respect for human rights and the follow up to the Commissioner’s earlier recommendations resulting from his two previous visits in December 1999 and February 2000 to the Russian Federation, as well as the seminar in Vladikavkaz on the 30th May 2000." (COE 14 March 2001, para. 1)

EU and United States unwilling to use political or economical lever to convince Russia to change conduct in Chechnya (2000)

· EU introduced the resolution on Chechnya at the UN Commission on Human Rights (April 2000) · European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Chechnya (February 2001) · Both the European Union and the United States refuse to take further action against the Russian Federation

"The early months of the war, the European Union (E.U.) under the Finnish presidency took a fairly tough stance on Russia, consistently criticizing its military operation and abuses and freezing some technical assistance funds. After Boris Yeltsin resigned as president and it became apparent that Vladimir Putin would become Russia's next president, the E.U. toned down its criticism and backed away from any tougher action.

To its credit, the E.U. introduced the resolution on Chechnya at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. However, the E.U. itself undermined the importance of this step. As Russia openly defied all international criticism and refused to recognize or implement the resolution, the E.U. and its member states started a series of bilateral and multilateral summit talks to establish good relations with Russia's new president.

E.U. member states refused to take Russia to the European Court of Human Rights over abuses in Chechnya. In response to an appeal from more than thirty leading human rights and humanitarian NGOs, the E.U. claimed that such a step was unnecessary as Russia was making progress toward accountability. The E.U. also refused to use political and economic levers, such as suspending the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement or support for international lending, to convince Russia to change its conduct in Chechnya.

In sharp contrast to its conduct in Kosovo in 1999, the E.U. failed to gather information independently on abuses in Chechnya. No E.U. diplomats visited Chechnya or even Ingushetia independently to interview victims of human rights abuses, although a December 1999 declaration of the E.U. foreign ministers requested that they do so." (HRW December 2000, pp. 319-320)

"The United States limited itself to a rhetorical response to the violations in Chechnya. It criticised Russia consistently over its actions in Chechnya but was unwilling to use any stronger political or economic levers. The United States was unwilling to suspend its support for international lending to Russia or to use bilateral economic assistance to convince Russia to change its conduct." (HRW December 2000, p. 320)

162 See also AFP 15 February 2000 "European Parliament calls for ceasefire on Chechnya" [Internet]

ICRC given access to the detention camps in Chechnya (March 2000)

· President Putin gave his personal authorization for the ICRC to have access to people detained in connection with the conflict, wherever they are held, in accordance with the organization's customary working procedures

"The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mr Jakob Kellenberger, was today (30 March) received by the newly elected President of the Russian Federation, Mr Vladimir Putin.

During the meeting President Putin expressed his wish to see ICRC activities extend into Chechnya, in cooperation with the Russian Red Cross, in order to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs currently prevailing there. He also made a commitment to providing Red Cross staff with the necessary security guarantees.

In regard to visits to detainees, President Putin gave his personal authorization for the ICRC to have access to people detained in connection with the conflict, wherever they are held, in accordance with the organization's customary working procedures. These essentially comprise the possibility of having repeated access to detainees and of holding private interviews with them. The ICRC President also expressed his determination to gain access to persons detained by Chechen fighters." (ICRC 30 March 2000)

Ineffective Amnesty law (2000)

· The amnesty for Chechen militants who laid down their arms expired on 15 May 2000. According to the Russian authorities, about 150 suspected militants have been freed under the act · This low figure in comparison to the reported number of persons arrested and detained in Chechnya, demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the amnesty law, according to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly

"The amnesty for Chechen militants who laid down their arms expired on 15 May 2000. According to the Russian authorities, about 150 suspected militants have been freed under the act. From the date of 15 May 2000, anybody carrying a weapon in Chechnya must automatically be treated as a criminal under Russian law. NGOs allege that, in fact, many Chechen men are arrested and detained as suspected militants because they have marks on their shoulders or fingers which might indicate that they carried or used an automatic gun. Unfortunately, many other activities leave similar marks (such as carrying and using farm utensils like shovels and sickles); in one case, even a surgeon was detained because of calloused hands (in which he had held his sutureneedles).

In fact, the figure of 150 released suspected militants is extremely small, in comparison to the statement by the provisional press centre of the Russian Interior Ministry in the North

163 Caucasus that over 10.000 people have been detained in Chechnya on suspicion of various crimes since the start of this year alone. Of them, according to the same source, 1.126 have been charged with active complicity in rebel activities. In my opinion, this demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the amnesty law." (COE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 28 June 2000, paras. 11-12)

164 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACF Action contre la Faim ACT Action by Churches Together AFP Agence France Presse ASSR Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic CCA Committee "Civic Assistance" CIS Commonwealth of Independent States COE Council of Europe CPCD Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development DP Displaced Person DRC Danish Refugee Council ECPT European Convention for the Prevention of Torture EDP Extended Delivery Point ERMECOM Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters FDP Final Distribution Point FMS Federal Migration Service FO Field Office HF Host family HIA Hungarian Interchurch Aid HIV Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus HRW Human Rights Watch ICCPR International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ID Identity Document IDP Internally displaced person IOM International Organization for Migration IR Islamic Relief IRP Involuntary Relocated Person MDM Médecins du Monde MoE Ministry of Education MoH/I Ministry of Health Ingushetia MOU Memorandum of Understanding MS Migration Service MSF Médecins Sans Frontières MT Metric tonne MTchS Russian Ministry for Disasters and Emergencies NGO Non-governmental organization OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ODHIR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSCE Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe PHC Primary Health Care

165 PINF People in Need Foundation POW Prisoner of War RF Russian Federation RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty SES Sanitary and Epidemiological Station STI Sexually Transmitted Infections TB Tuberculosis UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund UNSECOORD United Nations Security Coordinator USCR U.S. Committee for Refugees USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UXO Unexploded Ordnance VAT Value Added Taxes WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization WVI World Vision International

166 LIST OF SOURCES USED (alphabetical order)

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