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Somalia Nutrition Cluster
SOMALIA NUTRITION CLUSTER GEDO Sub-National Nutrition Cluster Meeting Minutes (SRDA Dolow Office -17th January 2018 -10:00 – 11:00 am) Agenda Discussions Action points Welcome and As scheduled on 17th January 2018, the Gedo Nutrition Cluster was held at SRDA main Hall Closed Introduction –Dolow Office, the meeting officially opened by Gedo NCCo Mr. Aden Ismail with a word of prayer from Hussein From Trocaire. The meeting was poorly attended Review of the The chair reviewed the previous meeting minute which took place the same venue on 20th Closed previous December 2017 in discussion with the rest of the partners for their confirmation and meeting endorsement an agreed as a true record. minutes and action points Key nutrition The general situation of the region is discussed regarding the drought situation in the region services and which is almost rescaling up again as the rain performed poorly most of the District which situation didn’t left any impact for already devastating ago-pastoralist inhabiting along the Juba river, highlights this resulted internal movement between an area which had received less rain performance to a better place, hence leaving the fragile Women and Children behind to take look after the domestic livestock. Generally the Malnutrition rate across the region reported stable and decreased Mr. Burale from UNOCHA who usually attend the cluster emphasized the important of coordination’s at District level specially agencies implementing programs with the some district. Internal Coordination Between HIRDA, AMA and Trocaire at Bula Hawa District has been conducted in the presence of Aden Ismail NCco and Mr Abdirizak DMO beledhawa District, to address referral challenges. -
Into the Tunnels
REPORT ARAB POLITICS BEYOND THE UPRISINGS Into the Tunnels The Rise and Fall of Syria’s Rebel Enclave in the Eastern Ghouta DECEMBER 21, 2016 — ARON LUND PAGE 1 In the sixth year of its civil war, Syria is a shattered nation, broken into political, religious, and ethnic fragments. Most of the population remains under the control of President Bashar al-Assad, whose Russian- and Iranian-backed Baʻath Party government controls the major cities and the lion’s share of the country’s densely populated coastal and central-western areas. Since the Russian military intervention that began in September 2015, Assad’s Syrian Arab Army and its Shia Islamist allies have seized ground from Sunni Arab rebel factions, many of which receive support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, or the United States. The government now appears to be consolidating its hold on key areas. Media attention has focused on the siege of rebel-held Eastern Aleppo, which began in summer 2016, and its reconquest by government forces in December 2016.1 The rebel enclave began to crumble in November 2016. Losing its stronghold in Aleppo would be a major strategic and symbolic defeat for the insurgency, and some supporters of the uprising may conclude that they have been defeated, though violence is unlikely to subside. However, the Syrian government has also made major strides in another besieged enclave, closer to the capital. This area, known as the Eastern Ghouta, is larger than Eastern Aleppo both in terms of area and population—it may have around 450,000 inhabitants2—but it has gained very little media interest. -
Export Agreement Coding (PDF)
Peace Agreement Access Tool PA-X www.peaceagreements.org Country/entity Somalia Region Africa (excl MENA) Agreement name Declaration of National Commitment (Arta Declaration) Date 05/05/2000 Agreement status Multiparty signed/agreed Interim arrangement No Agreement/conflict level Intrastate/intrastate conflict ( Somali Civil War (1991 - ) ) Stage Framework/substantive - partial (Multiple issues) Conflict nature Government/territory Peace process 87: Somalia Peace Process Parties The Transnational Government of Somalia Third parties [Note: Several references to the international community] Description Agreement outlines the responsibilities of the Transitional National Assembly, the election of the Chief Justice, the roles of the President and Prime Minister, particularly, the limitations of power of the President. It includes 17-points of binding principles. The Annexes include a ceasefire; a plan of reconstrution and recovery; and the foundations for representation of the Somali population in the TNA and the national dialogue. Agreement document SO_000505_Declaration of national commitment.pdf [] Groups Children/youth No specific mention. Disabled persons No specific mention. Elderly/age No specific mention. Migrant workers No specific mention. Racial/ethnic/national Substantive group [Summary] Contains substantive consideration of inter-group representation in the Transitional National Assembly. Page 1, • Representation in the Conference and in the "Transitional National Assembly" shall be on the basis of local constituencies (regional /clan mix) Page 3, TOWARD THIS END WE ... 8. pledge to place national interest above clan self interest, personal greed and ambitions Page 6, ANNEX IV BASE OF REPRESENTATION IN THE ... WHAT TO GUARD AGAINST • It must be stressed that representation based on clan affiliations or the assumed strength or importance of certain clan, including the size of territories presumed or traditional belonging to certain clans, would only succeed in perpetuating or reinforcing the division of the nation. -
World Bank Final Report
The Common Social Accountability Platform Deploying the Common Social Accountability Platform to inform the 2020 World Bank Performance and Learning Review January 2020 Africa’s Voices Project Team: Africa’s Voices Project Team: Anna Tomson (Governance & Accountability Senior Programme Manager), Khadija Mohamed (Programme Officer), Nasri Ali (Programme Officer), Zakaria Sheikh (Research Assistant), Alexander Simpson (Software Engineer), Lucas Malla (Senior Quantitative Researcher), and Samuel Kimeu (Executive Director). © 2019 Africa’s Voices Foundation Ltd Africa’s Voices Foundation Africa’s Voices Foundation Kenya Riverside Suites, Riverside Lane, Nairobi UK Centre for Global Equality, 8C King’s Parade CB2 1SP Cambridge africasvoices.org @africas_voices This report was written by Anna Tomson, Senior Programme Manager, Governance & Accountability and Khadija Hussein at Africa’s Voices Foundation 2 Africa’s Voices Foundation List of acronyms 4 1. INTRODUCTION 5 1.1 Context 5 1.2 Project Objectives 5 1.3 The Common Social Accountability Platform 6 1.4 AVF’s Interactive Radio Method 6 2. Methodology 8 2.1 Building inclusive community engagement at scale 8 2.2 Gathering insight on public opinion 10 2.3 Limitations of the methodology 10 3. Engagement 11 3.1 Content of the radio dialogue 11 3.2 Who participated in the dialogue 11 4. Insights into citizen perspectives 14 4.1 Citizen priorities for development 14 4.2 Citizen access to decision making and grievance mechanisms 21 ANNEX 1: List of radio stations 26 ANNEX 2: Thick description 27 ANNEX -
On the Universal Children's
On the Universal Children’s Day: No fewer than 28,226 Children Have been Killed in Syria since March 2011 No Stability in Syria and the Region Without Stability for its Children Tuesday, November 20, 2018 1 snhr [email protected] www.sn4hr.org R181113 The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria. Contents I. Introduction and Methodology II. Toll of Violations against Children according to SNHR’s Database III. Patterns of Violations against Children by the Parties to the Conflict IV. Conclusions and Recommendations I.Introduction and Methodology One of the most significant, and unfortunate highlights of the eight-year long popular up- rising for democracy in Syria, which has subsequently transformed into an internal armed conflict, is the international community’s unprecedented abandonment of the Syrian people on all levels, which has vastly complicated the ramifications of this conflict and the form which the future of Syria will take. This can be seen in no starker way than in the case of the children of Syria. We have documented the most notable violations to which the children in Syria, as well as in some of the refuging countries, have been subjected to in our database, including dozens of reports that reflect our database and which contain statistical data, accounts, photos, and documents on the most dangerous incidents that the children of Syria have experi- enced. We stress, however, that these risks affect not only the children’s physical or mental health, and their education and medical care, but manifest themselves on a vastly more profound emotional and psychological level, leaving deep-rooted scars in their memories and shaping their identities in a distorted manner, which will surface ultimately in their fu- tures. -
Somalia Assessment
Somalia, Country Information Page 1 of 47 SOMALIA ASSESSMENT October 2002 Country Information and Policy Unit I SCOPE OF DOCUMENT II GEOGRAPHY III HISTORY IV STATE STRUCTURES VA HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES VB HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS ANNEX A: CHRONOLOGY ANNEX B: SOMALI CLAN STRUCTURE ANNEX C: POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS ANNEX D: PROMINENT PEOPLE REFERENCES TO SOURCE MATERIAL 1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT 1.1 This assessment has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. The document does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. 1.2 The assessment has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3 The assessment is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. 1.4 It is intended to revise the assessment on a six-monthly basis while the country remains within the top 35 asylum-seeker producing countries in the United Kingdom. http://194.203.40.90/ppage.asp?section=193&title=Somalia%2C%20Country%20Informati...o 11/25/2002 Somalia, Country Information Page 2 of 47 2. GEOGRAPHY 2.1 Somalia (known officially from 1969 until the collapse of central government in 1991 as the Somali Democratic Republic) has an area of 637,657 sq km and borders Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. -
SO 000505 Declaration of National Commitment.Pdf
PA-X, Peace Agreement Access Tool www.peaceagreements.org DECLARATION OF NATIONAL COMMITMENT (Arta Declaration), 5 May 2000 • The Somalia people are desirous oF reaFFirminG the sovereiGn state oF Somalia, and oF ForminG transitional mechanisms (transitional national assembly, transitional Government, an independent judiciary) which shall prepare the country For a peaceFul, permanent and democratic Future. • The Form oF Government shall be parliamentary democracy, with a bicameral national assembly ("Chamber of Elders" to provide leGitimacy, stability and assist in the reconciliation process; and a "Chamber of Representatives"). • The Transitional period shall last 24 months. • The Transitional mechanism shall be based on a "Decentralized" system oF Governance ""reGional autonomy " or Federal structure"), during the transitional period. • The decentralized system oF governance is one that brings diFFerent political communities under a common government For common purposes, and separates regional government For the particular needs of each region • Representation in the ConFerence and in the "Transitional National Assembly" shall be on the basis of local constituencies (regional /clan mix) The National Assembly THE TNA SHALL: • Symbolize power-sharing • be the sole authority with legislative Function during the period in question • elect an interim President (Head of State ) of the country • elect a "government" headed by a Prime Minister. TNA shall approve the Cabinet oF the Prime Minster. The Prime Minster shall be accountable to the TNA -
Iom Somalia Updateupdate ## 77 Humanitarian Response September 2017 Highlights January - September 2017
IOM SOMALIA UPDATEUPDATE ## 77 HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE SEPTEMBER 2017 HIGHLIGHTS JANUARY - SEPTEMBER 2017 ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER 212,719,940 litres of water provided to 568,749 people through water trucking in Banadir, Bay, Gedo, Lower Juba, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 378,031 58,234 health children under 5 consultations vaccinated EMERGENCY SHELTER & NFIs IDP households received emergency IOM’s Migration Health Division (MHD) distributing long-lasting insecticidal 5,800 shelter materials and non-food items (NFIs) nets (LLIN) in internally displaced people (IDP) sites in Mogadishu, Banadir in Banadir and Gedo regions Region © IOM 2017 D DROUGHT RESPONSE D D H FUNDING TO DATE D D D H D H D D H D D D D D P D H D D D D D D USD 18.79 Million D D H D H D D D D D H W H KEY INTERVENTIONS H PER DISTRICT D D W Sectors of intervention D D D Displacement Tracking Matrix F Food Security / Livelihoods D W D H Health D D S H W D D D D D S W S Shelter / NFI D W D F C W D W W Water / Sanitation / Hygiene H W D W D P Protection S D D W H Camp Management D C D F C S H W D D Stressed D P H Crisis Emergency D S H W D H IOM SOMALIA / HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE UPDATE # 7 SITUATION OVERVIEW As severe drought conditions continue, the overall nutrition situation has continued to deteriorate, especially in northern and central parts of the country. -
(PBF) Project Portfolio in Somalia Evaluation
Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Project Portfolio In Somalia Evaluation Report 27 December 2019 Evaluation Team: • Dr. Terrence Jantzi (Team Leader) • Anara Alymkulova (Peacebuilding Specialist) • Mohamed Adnan (National Context Specialist) KonTerra Support: • Erisa Yzeiraj Pereira (Research Analyst) TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................... iii 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Country Context ............................................................................................................ 1 1.2 PBF Overview and History in Somalia ........................................................................ 2 1.3 PBF Portfolio of Support Response in Somalia: 2015-2019 ........................................ 4 1.4 PBF Portfolio Operationalization and Stakeholders ................................................... 6 2 Evaluation Features .................................................................................... 11 2.1 Evaluation Scope and Key Questions ......................................................................... 11 2.2 Evaluation Methodology ............................................................................................. 14 2.3 Evaluation Limitations ............................................................................................... 15 3 Evaluation Findings ................................................................................... -
Report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
ADVANCED COPY – CONFIDENTIAL Letter dated 27 June 2012 from the members of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea We have the honour to transmit herewith the report focusing on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in accordance with paragraph 6 (m) of Security Council resolution 2002 (2011). (Signed) Matt Bryden Coordinator Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (Signed) Emmanuel Deisser Arms Expert (Signed) Aurélien Llorca Aviation Expert (Signed) Jörg Roofthooft Maritime Expert (Signed) Ghassan Schbley Finance Expert (Signed) Babatunde Taiwo Armed Groups Expert (Signed) Kristele Younes Humanitarian Expert ADVANCED COPY - CONFIDENTIAL 2 Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2002 (2011) Contents Page Abbreviations 5 Summary 6 I. Introduction 9 A. Mandate 9 B. Methodology 9 II. Acts that threaten the peace, security and stability of Somalia 11 A. Public sector financial mismanagement and corruption 11 B. Harakaat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahidiin 14 C. Al-Shabaab as a regional and international threat 15 D. Piracy and kidnap for ransom (KFR) 16 III. Violations of the general and complete arms embargo 19 A. Foreign military operations in Somalia 20 B. Private Security Companies (PSCs) 21 C. Private Maritime Security Companies/ Floating Armouries 24 D. Non-compliance 24 IV. Obstruction of Humanitarian Assistance 25 A. Denial of access 25 B. Diversion and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance 26 C. Best practices 27 V. Violations of International Humanitarian Law 27 A. Attacks on civilians 28 B. -
Respons Somalia: Rekruttering Til Al-Shabaab
Respons Somalia: Rekruttering til al-Shabaab • Hvem rekrutteres til al-Shabaab, og hvordan foregår rekrutteringen? Innledning Informasjonen om hvem som rekrutteres til al-Shabaab og hvordan rekrutteringen skjer har vært anekdotisk, og synes i likhet med mye annen informasjon om forhold i al-Shabaab-styrte områder å ha vært preget av kildenes egne subjektive vurderinger. Rapporten om radikalisering og rekruttering til al-Shabaab som utkom i september 2014 (Botha & Abdile), er derimot den første systematiske undersøkelsen blant en større gruppe tidligere medlemmer av bevegelsen. Denne studien underbygger langt på vei de synspunktene og vurderingene ulike observatører og Somalia-eksperter har tilkjennegitt overfor Landinfo, og som Landinfo deler. Denne responsen bygger både på Bothas & Abdiles studie, informasjon innhentet i forbindelse med reiser til Nairobi og Mogadishu, senest i februar 2015, samt artikler fra lokale og regionale medier og rapporter utarbeidet av blant annet FN og ulike Somalia-kjennere. Flere av de muntlige kildene er anonymisert av hensyn til eventuelle konsekvenser for arbeidssituasjonen og sikkerheten deres. Generell bakgrunn Mangeårig konflikt, skyhøy arbeidsledighet og dårlige framtidsutsikter, kombinert med manglende politisk lederskap, har gitt grobunn for framveksten av en rekke militser og voldelige ekstremistiske grupper, deriblant al-Shabaab. Det etiopiske nærværet i Somalia i 2007-2008 og overgrepene som ble begått av både somaliske og etiopiske regjeringssoldater, 1 medvirket også sterkt til den støtten opprørsgruppene fikk i befolkningen. 1 Hansen (2013, s.5) peker imidlertid på at store klaner som Rahanweyn og Darood-klanen, Majerteen, faktisk støttet den etiopiske innmarsjen, og at al-Shabaab ble dannet før invasjonen. Han legger større vekt på den omfattende korrupsjonen i landet og misbruket av donormidler, samt manglende eller uregelmessig avlønning av de somaliske politistyrkene som bakgrunn for støtten til al-Shabaab. -
(CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1
ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq1 S-IZ-100-17-CA021 December 2017 Monthly Report Michael D. Danti, Marina Gabriel, Susan Penacho, William Raynolds, Allison Cuneo, Kyra Kaercher, Darren Ashby, Gwendolyn Kristy, Jamie O’Connell, Nour Halabi Table of Contents: Other Key Points 2 Military and Political Context 3 Incident Reports: Syria 9 Incident Reports: Iraq 100 Incident Reports: Libya 131 Satellite Imagery and Geospatial Analysis 150 Heritage Timeline 155 1 This report is based on research conducted by the “Cultural Preservation Initiative: Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in Syria and Iraq.” Weekly reports reflect reporting from a variety of sources and may contain unverified material. As such, they should be treated as preliminary and subject to change. 1 Other Key Points Syria ● Aleppo Governorate ○ A reported SARG or Russian airstrike damages the Jub Abyad Mosque in Jub Abyad, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0225 ○ Reported Russian airstrikes damage Tal al-Daman Mosque in Tal al-Daman, Aleppo Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0227 ● Daraa Governorate ○ Future Horizons and Hello Trust clean up debris at Bosra al-Sham in Bosra al-Sham, Daraa Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0230 ● Deir ez-Zor ○ A reported SARG airstrike damages the Fatima al-Zahra Mosque in al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0222 ○ Reported SARG shelling damages al-Hashish Mosque in al-Sha’fa, Deir ez-Zor Governorate. ASOR CHI Incident Report SHI 17-0223 ○ DigitalGlobe satellite imagery reveals damage to exposed architecture at Mari, Tell Hariri, Deir ez-Zor Governorate.