Enhancing deterrence and defence on NATO’s northern flank Allied perspectives on strategic options for Norway James Black, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich, Ruth Harris, David Ochmanek, Marina Favaro, Katerina Galai, Emily Ryen Gloinson For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4381 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., and Cambridge, UK © Copyright 2020 RAND Corporation Cover images © Norwegian Armed Forces R® is a registered trademark. RAND Europe is a not-for-profit research organisation that helps to improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org www.randeurope.org III Preface This study examines strategic options and NATO in the High North. Finally, it outlines a for enhancing deterrence and defence on number of proposed Strategic Options (SOs) for the northern flank of the North Atlantic consideration as the Norwegian MOD continues Treaty Organisation (NATO). To inform to evolve its national defence strategy and ongoing strategy and policy development, configure its wider contributions to collective the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MOD) security within the Alliance. commissioned RAND to examine selected For more information about the study or Allied perspectives on strategic opportunities RAND’s wider research on defence, security and challenges in the North Atlantic region and and other policy areas for governments in High North. This involved a multidisciplinary Europe and the US, please contact: and multinational team, involving RAND Europe and its US-based parent organisation, the Ruth Harris RAND Corporation. RAND is a not-for-profit Research Group Director research institute whose mission is to help RAND Europe improve policy and decision making through Westbrook Centre, Milton Road objective research and analysis. Cambridge, CB4 1YG, UK t. +44 122 335 3329 This report presents findings from a targeted e. [email protected] document review, supported by expert workshops in Oslo and a series of field visits to Stephen J. Flanagan defence establishments in Denmark, France, Senior Political Scientist Germany, the UK and the US, along with NATO RAND Corporation institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. It 1200 South Hayes Street provides insight into areas of convergence Arlington, VA 22202-5050, USA and divergence between Norwegian and Allied t. +01 703 413 1100 perspectives on key strategic issues for Norway e. [email protected] Adobe Stock/ The Art of Pics V Summary Context and purpose of this study understanding of how other Allies perceive the on Allied perspectives for Norway key strategic issues for Norwegian and NATO defence on the northern flank. Specifically, The strategic environment in and around RAND was tasked to examine the perspectives Europe is characterised by increased of defence officials from Denmark, France, competition among major powers, evolving Germany, the UK, the US and NATO institutions. threats from weak or failing states and non- This involved a mixed-method approach state actors, and rapid change in the means combining desk-based research, expert of influence available to all of these actors. workshops and field visits. This presents the Norwegian government, Perceptions matter in defence. If they are including the Ministry of Defence (MOD), to be deterred from aggressive courses of with both challenges and opportunities as action, potential adversaries must perceive a it reviews its strategy and policies to ensure nation’s or alliance’s defence capabilities to Norway’s continuing security, prosperity and be credible. Partners and allies must similarly way of life. These efforts are not only important perceive each other as competent, reliable to the country’s own security interests, but and committed, in order to maintain bonds of also form part of Norway’s contribution to trust and avoid tensions over burden-sharing. collective efforts from the North Atlantic Treaty Those who seek to undermine NATO recognise Organisation (NATO) to enhance deterrence, that achieving cohesion and coherence crisis management and regional security in among 29 Allied nations – in the face of the North Atlantic region and High North. A practical barriers to interoperability and various fuller appreciation of NATO Allies’ perspectives, enduring differences over national priorities expectations and capabilities concerning the and strategic culture – is both the Alliance’s defence of Norway can help to ensure effective greatest challenge and its source of strength. delivery of all these tasks and the safeguarding of the Alliance’s common interests and values. These perceptions are subjective, fluid and contested: how a nation such as Norway sees To this end, the MOD commissioned the not- its own role on the world stage may differ for-profit research institute RAND – comprising significantly from how its friends or rivals both RAND Europe and the US-based RAND perceive it. To shine a spotlight on this issue, Corporation – to conduct an independent study this report presents a summary of findings from in support of Norwegian strategy development, consultations with both Norwegian and Allied planning and defence policy. The central officials. These insights enable a gap analysis focus of this study is on providing a fuller VI Enhancing deterrence and defence on NATO’s northern flank Figure 0.1. Map of Russian Bastion Defence in relation to Norway and the Bear and GIUK Gaps Bastion Svalbard Greenland (NORWAY) (DENMARK) Bear Gap Bastion Defence RUSSIA GIUK Gap ICELAND FINLAND NORWAY SWEDEN UK Source: adapted from Mikkola (2019). between areas of convergence or divergence on internal and regional drivers for potential key strategic issues affecting NATO deterrence conflict, though Allies’ primary focus and defence on the northern flank. remains on external threats. • The Norwegian and Allied officials Allied perspectives on NATO in consulted for this study share a common the High North threat assessment regarding Russian capabilities and intent in the High North. Norway and key NATO Allies share Improved Russian capabilities mean common perceptions of the Alliance’s that Norwegian and NATO strategy must role and missions in the High North, plan for possible future operations in a with nuances in the emphasis placed on highly contested environment, while also different threats recognising the enduring internal and • Allied threat assessments of the High structural challenges that Russia faces. North consider the most significant threat • Norwegian and Allied officials see the to be horizontal escalation of a crisis Bear Island–North Cape and GIUK gaps as or conflict triggered in another region. key to warning of Russian Northern Fleet Allied officials highlight the strategic operations and sea-denial efforts against importance of the High North to Russia’s NATO. Once deployed beyond the Bear Bastion Defence as the potential trigger for Gap, Russian Navy surface vessels and horizontal escalation. Environmental and submarines, armed with Kalibr and other geopolitical developments provide other VII modern cruise missiles, pose an increased benefits from Norway’s active contributions threat to Allied activities in the North to the Alliance. Leading Allies perceive Atlantic and Norwegian Sea. They also Norway as having an impressive mix of pose a direct challenge to transatlantic sea high-end capabilities for a nation of its size, lines of communication (SLOCs) that are and a mature Total Defence Concept. essential to Allied reinforcement of Europe • These capabilities and commitments, in the event of any major conflict. coupled with a well-respected approach • While recognising the need to consider to nuanced strategy-making, mean that the strategic implications of a rising China, Norway is seen by key NATO Allies as able Allied perceptions of the urgency and scale to ‘punch above its weight’ as a medium of this challenge differ. Norway and the power that has made a significant impact Allies consulted also recognise the evolving on strategic thinking within the Alliance. challenges posed by terrorism and non- Allies recognise Norwegian contributions state actors, with NATO seen as having a to collective security on the eastern and support role to primarily national responses. southern flanks as delivering important benefits to both Norway and NATO alike. • There remain some differences in the level of emphasis placed on certain issues in • Despite these perceived areas of strength, defence strategy and planning – most like other NATO Allies Norway continues notably, for example, between the degree to face a number of pressing challenges to which China is seen as a direct and across different levels – political, strategic imminent security threat by the US or by