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The Republic of China's Foreign Policy Towards Africa

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The Republic of China's Foreign Policy Towards Africa CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by Wits Institutional Repository on DSPACE The Republic of China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa: The Case of ROC-RSA Rela- tions ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By San-shiun Tseng A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Johannesburg, November 2008 Table of Contents Title Page Acknowledgements Abstract Map Abbreviations Chapter I: Introduction····························································································1 Chapter II: Modern Diplomacy of the World ······················································12 1: Personal Diplomacy··························································································13 2: Economic Diplomacy ·······················································································20 3: Foreign Aid·······································································································28 4: Conference Diplomacy ·····················································································38 5: Public Diplomacy ·····························································································49 Chapter III: The ROC’s Policy towards Africa (1949-2004)·····························70 1: Africa’s Position in the World···········································································70 2: The ROC and Africa ·························································································76 3: The PRC and Africa··························································································84 4: The ROC’s Policy towards Africa·····································································93 5: Evaluation·······································································································104 Chapter IV: Operation Vanguard (1960-1974) ················································117 1: Origin and Operation Safari············································································117 2: Action and Execution······················································································120 3: Achievements of Agricultural Cooperation·····················································127 4: Kou River Reclamation District······································································132 5: New Development··························································································137 Chapter V: Relations between the ROC and African States ·························143 1: North Africa····································································································143 2: East Africa······································································································145 3: West Africa ·····································································································149 4: Central Africa ·································································································162 5: Southern Africa·······························································································166 Chapter VI: South Africa’s links with the ROC (1905-1990)··························177 1: The Challenges to Both Countries ··································································177 2: Premier Sun’s Visit and Prime Minister P W Botha’s Visit ·····························188 3: Economic Cooperation and Investment ··························································198 4: Military and Nuclear Cooperation ··································································210 5: Cultural Exchange and Cooperation ·······························································216 Chapter VII: The ROC-RSA Relations after 1991（1991-2004）················231 1: Challenge from the PRC·················································································231 2: Contact and Co-operation with the ANC ························································239 3: Various Kinds of Cooperation·········································································247 4: The Cutting of Diplomatic Ties ······································································254 5: Substantive Relations after 1998 ····································································261 Chapter VIII: Conclusion ····················································································272 Appendix Bibliography Acknowledgements I was fortunate to have the opportunity to live and work in the Republic of South Africa from October 1993 to December 1996, and from July 2001 to January 2006, as a member of the Republic of China’s diplomatic service. It was a time of ongoing transition in South Africa and during those years I traveled to twenty-two African countries to further un- derstand the politics, economic situation, and social and daily realities of life in Africa. In order to conduct my research, I relied heavily on the services, the kindness, the patience, the expertise and the assistance of others, both in South Africa and in Taiwan. This thesis could not have been completed without the gracious intellectual guidance, supervision and advice of my supervisor, Professor Garth Shelton, in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand. I am most grateful for his kindness in assisting me in various aspects in preparing this thesis. Professor Shelton has accorded me not only with his precious time, but also his support and encouragement, for which I owe an enormous debt of gratitude. His suggestions, comments and corrections are particularly appreciated. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Liu Dar-shen for his valued role in encouraging me with my advanced studies. Finally, I wish to extend my special thanks to my wife Jen Tseng for her invaluable support, encouragement and for reminders from time to time that what is worth doing is usually also worth completing. Many thanks also to Jenny Tseng, for typing most of the work. I II ABSTRACT Modern diplomacy is very different in form and substance from the diplomacy of 30 years ago. The five main components of modern diplomacy are personal diplomacy, economic diplomacy, foreign aid, conference diplomacy and public diplomacy. Personal diplomacy and conference diplomacy have much in common and have played a promi- nent role in the late 20th and early 21st century. Since 1949, the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been two separate political entities competing for influence internationally. So when, in the 1960s, most African countries gained their independence and joined the UN, both the ROC and the PRC jostled to win their friendship in a zero-sum game that has lasted for the past 50 years. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the ROC used foreign aid in the form of “Operation Vanguard” as the main tool to help its African allies. It proved to be very helpful and successful and in 1969, 22 African countries had established diplomatic re- lations with the ROC. Yet when the ROC withdrew from the UN, its former African allies switched recognition to Beijing. By the 1980s, only South Africa, Malawi and Swaziland still maintained diplomatic ties with the ROC. In the 1990s, the ROC achieved some positive gains with ten African countries having Ambassadors in Taiwan by 1997. Also, official delegations from the ROC were established in Kinshasa, Antananarivo and Luanda. This was a setback for China, to some extent. The thesis will analyze the relations between the ROC and the five geographic areas of the African continent. Since their independence, Malawi and Swaziland have estab- lished and kept diplomatic ties with the ROC for 40 and 38 years respectively. Countries like Senegal, Lesotho, Chad and the Central African Republic have switched recognition as their needs have changed. The ROC and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) ex- changed consular offices beginning in 1905 until in 1976 when they upgraded to full diplomatic relations until their demise in December 1997. During the period from the first democratic elections in RSA in April, 1994, until December, 1997, frenzied diplomatic III efforts, bargaining and negotiations set a new record in world diplomatic history. Since January, 1998, the ROC and RSA have had substantive relations. Without doubt, the PRC has made much progress in its influence in the domains of international politics and its economy. Beijing released an official China-Africa policy white paper, a document remarkable for the broad range of issues it covers. As a member of the UN Security Council, China has provided large amounts of donations and foreign aid to Africa, has convened the “China-Africa Cooperation Forum” and offset foreign debt, all of which have served to squeeze the ROC’s diplomatic space in Africa. Since 2000, Liberia, Senegal and Chad have added their names to the long list of the PRC’s diplomatic allies. This thesis also examines the kinds of diplomacy that the ROC has employed in Africa to win friendships. Among them are three modern diplomatic tools which have proved the most useful and successful. These will be looked at in terms of their strength, weakness, opportunity and threat. Given that South Africa has been the most significant and influential country in Africa
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