Scepticism syllabus Fall 2019

1. Name of Course: Scepticism

2. Lecturer: Daniel Kodaj

3. No. of Credits and no. of ECTS credits: 2 (4 ECTS)

4. Semester: Fall 2019

5. Any other required elements of the departments: none

6. Course Level: MA (elective), PhDs may attend

7. Brief introduction to the course outlining its primary theme, objective and briefly the place of the course in the overall programme of study. The course offers an overview of contemporary responses to scepticism. We'll look at global scepticism as well as more localized challenges concerning our of other minds, modality, laws, and and a priori .

8. The goals of the course We tend to think that we possess a considerable amount of knowledge, both as individuals and as a species. Sceptical aim to undermine this conviction. Sceptical challenges can be global (calling into question all or most of our purported knowledge) or local (challenging an important subset of our ordinary views, such as beliefs about other minds or the reliability of induction). For some philosophers, scepticism is a methodological tool that helps us uncover the real roots of, or the true character of, human knowledge; for others (arguably a minority), it is a substantive philosophical thesis that ought to humble everyone who reflects on the premises leading to it. The course offers an introduction to the contemporary varieties of scepticism and to the antidotes that are on sale.

9. The learning outcomes of the course Students will master key in the debate. They will become familiar with arguments for and against the contemporary anti-sceptical strategies, and, hopefully, they will develop their own take on the sceptical problematic.

10. Week by week breakdown * = optional reading

The readings can be accessed at dkodaj.net/scepticism

1 INTRODUCTION In a nutshell, the sceptical challenge consists in the following (“O” stands for some ordinary truism, such as “I have hands” or “the Moon exists”): (1) If I know that O, then I know that I'm not living in a computer simulation. (2) I don't know that I'm not living in a computer simulation. (3) Therefore, I don't know that O. In week 1, we'll relate this argument to the topics that follow. We'll also discuss deadlines etc. no reading

2 DENYING CLOSURE Epistemic closure holds iff we know the logical consequences of the things we know. If this principle fails, then premise (1) of the sceptical argument is false. So denying closure offers a straightforward solution to the sceptical challenge. But is it plausible to deny that we know what follows from the things we know...? and John Hawthorne (2005): 'Is knowledge closed under known entailment?', in M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in . *Assaf Sharon and Levi Spectre (2017), 'Evidence and the openness of knowledge', Philosophical Studies.

3 Contextualists try to defang the sceptic by arguing that she sets the bar too high, employing a standard of knowledge that is inappropriate in most contexts. Ordinarily, we do know that we have hands, that the Moon exists etc., even though, in the context of sceptical debates, we do not know these things. Contextualusts deny that “know” means the same thing in (2) and (3). But is it plausible to say that the meaning of 'know' changes so radically when one visits a lecture on scepticism...? Keith DeRose (1994): 'Solving the sceptical puzzle', Philosophical Review. *Barry Stroud (1984): The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, ch.2.

4 EXTERNALISM According to externalists, whether a is justified depends on the environment that the believer is in. Externalism offers a convenient response to the sceptic: if we are NOT in a computer simulation and our senses are working reliably, then we know that we're not victims of a sceptical scenario, because our cognitive faculties are reliable. But is this a real reply to the challenge? Ernest Sosa (1994): 'Philosophical scepticism and epistemic circularity', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. *Barry Stroud (1994): 'Scepticism, “externalism”, and the goal of epistemology', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.

5 NEO-MOOREANISM G.E. Moore claimed that our naive belief in the reality of external objects is sufficient for refuting the sceptic. Neo-Mooreans develop this strategy by going beyond Moore's bare assertion that he knows he has hands. James Pryor (2000): 'The skeptic and the dogmatist', Noûs. *Roger White (2006): 'Problems for dogmatism', Philosophical Studies.

6 Phenomenalism is the view that the existence of external objects supervenes on our sense data. This hypothesis undercuts scepticism about the external world, since our ordinary beliefs are true as long as our sense data are arranged in the right way, which is true even if we live in the Matrix. Robert Smithson (2017): 'A new epistemic argument for idealism', in K. Pearce and T. Goldschmidt (eds), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. *Margaret Atherton (2018): 'Berkeley and ', in D.E. Machuka and B. Reed (eds), Skepticism from Antiquity to the Present.

7 STRUCTURALISM Structuralists think that the world is a sort of holistic structure in which nodes (individual objects) are defined by their relations to other nodes. Structuralists maintain that we do know a great deal about the world even in sceptical scenarios. David Chalmers (2019): 'Structuralism as a response to skepticism', Journal of Philosophy.

8 DREAMS A famous version of the sceptical challenge alleges that we might be dreaming. We will look at Ernest Sosa's argument that the phenomenology of dreams undermines dream scepticism. Ernest Sosa (2005): 'Dreams and philosophy', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. *Jonathan Ichikawa (2008): 'Scepticism and the imagination model of dreaming', The Philosophical Quarterly.

9 OTHER MINDS From week 9, we focus on forms of local scepticism. We begin with scepticism about the existence of other minds. Anil Gomes (2011): 'Is there a ?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. *Joel Smith (2010): 'Seeing other people', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

10 INDUCTION Do we know that the laws of physics will continue to hold tomorrow? Samir Okasha (2001): 'What did Hume really show about induction?', The Philosophical Quarterly. Colin Howson (2000): Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief, ch.3.

11 A PRIORI Do we have mathematical knowledge? Do we know that is valid? James R. Beebe (2011): 'A priori skepticism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. *Laurence BonJour / Michael Devitt (2005): 'Is there a priori knowledge?', in M. Steup and E. Sosa (eds), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology.

12 MODALITY Do we have knowledge about the possible and the impossible? Peter van Inwagen (1998): 'Modal epistemology', Philosophical Studies. * (2007): 'Knowledge of metaphysical modality', in The Philosophy of Philosophy.

11. Assessment: 30% in-class presentation of one of the readings 70% essay (cca. 2000 words)

12. Other details: Assessment deadlines: TBC Contact: [email protected]