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Scepticism and Its Limits: an Investigation of Contextualist Strategies

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Scepticism and Its Limits: an Investigation of Contextualist Strategies Scepticism and its Limits: An Investigation of Contextualist Strategies A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2018 Maeve M. MacPherson School of Social Sciences Table of Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 5 Scepticism and its Limits: An Investigation of Contextualist Strategies ................................. 5 Declaration.............................................................................................................................. 6 Copyright Statement .............................................................................................................. 6 Dedication ................................................................................................................................ 7 Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 9 1. The Argument from Ignorance ........................................................................................ 9 1.2 Possible Responses to The Argument from Ignorance ................................................ 12 2. Overview of Part 1 ......................................................................................................... 15 3. Overview of Part 2 ......................................................................................................... 16 4. Overview of Part 3 ......................................................................................................... 16 Part 1 ..................................................................................................................................... 18 Semantic Contextualism’s Problematic Defence of Everyday Anti-Scepticism ............. 18 0. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 18 0.1 Semantic Contextualism .............................................................................................. 19 1. DeRose’s Problematic Defence of Everyday Anti-Scepticism .................................. 22 1.1 Characterisation of DeRose’s Semantic Contextualism .............................................. 23 1.2 DeRose’s Semantic Contextualism and Scepticism ..................................................... 27 1.2.1 DeRose’s Subjunctive Conditionals Account of AI’s First Premise......................... 29 1.2.2 DeRose on Relative Strength of Epistemic Position ................................................. 30 1.2.3 The Rule of Sensitivity ............................................................................................. 34 1.3 DeRose’s Uncomfortable Concession to Scepticism ................................................... 38 1.3.1 DeRose’s Failure to Protect Truthful Knowledge Ascriptions concerning ~B ......... 39 1.3.1.1 DeRose’s Early Attempt to Protect Truthful Knowledge Ascriptions concerning ~B ....................................................................................................................................... 41 1.3.1.2 DeRose on Sensitivity ............................................................................................ 45 1.3.1.3 DeRose on Conversational Scores ......................................................................... 48 1.3.1.4 Sosa and Koethe on DeRose’s Inability to Protect Knowledge Ascriptions concerning ~B .................................................................................................................... 54 1.3.2 Instantiating Sceptical Contexts ................................................................................ 58 1.3.3 Scepticism as the Result of Ordinary Epistemic Practices ........................................ 60 1.3.4 The Legitimacy of the Sceptical Context .................................................................. 61 2 2. Cohen’s Problematic Defence of Everyday Anti-Scepticism .................................... 62 2.1 Characterisation of Cohen’s Contextualism................................................................. 63 2.2 Cohen’s Contextualist Response to The Sceptical Challenge ...................................... 66 2.2.1 Cohen on RSA .......................................................................................................... 67 2.2.2 Cohen on AI .............................................................................................................. 69 2.3 The Rule of Relevance ................................................................................................. 71 2.4 Cohen’s Uncomfortable Concession to Scepticism ..................................................... 73 2.4.1 Cohen’s Failure to Protect Truthful Knowledge Ascriptions concerning ~B ........... 74 2.4.2. Instantiating Sceptical Contexts ............................................................................... 79 2.4.3 Scepticism as the Result of Ordinary Epistemic Practices ........................................ 79 2.4.4 The Legitimacy of the Sceptical Context .................................................................. 80 3. Blome-Tillmann’s Problematic Defence of Everyday Anti-Scepticism ................... 81 3.1 David Lewis' Rule of Attention ................................................................................... 81 3.2 Blome-Tillmann's Alternative Rule: The Rule of Presupposition ............................... 84 3.3 Pragmatic Presuppositions ........................................................................................... 86 3.4 Does Blome-Tillmann Succeed in Protecting Truthful Knowledge Ascriptions concerning ~B? .................................................................................................................. 88 3.4.1 Blome-Tillmann’s Failure to Protect Truthful Knowledge Ascriptions concerning ~B ....................................................................................................................................... 91 3.4.2. Instantiating Sceptical Contexts ............................................................................... 96 3.4.3 Scepticism as the Result of Ordinary Epistemic Practices ........................................ 97 3.4.4 The Legitimacy of the Sceptical Context .................................................................. 98 4. Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................... 99 Part 2 ................................................................................................................................... 101 Diagnosing The Argument from Ignorance: Invariantist and Contextualist Presuppositions and Transmission of Warrant ............................................................... 101 0. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 101 1. Epistemic Closure and Transmission of Warrant ................................................... 101 1.1 Transmission Failure in Moore’s Proof ..................................................................... 110 1.2 Davies’ Limitation Principle ...................................................................................... 110 1.3 Why Transmission Fails in Moore’s Proof ................................................................ 112 2. Transmission of Warrant and the Argument from Ignorance .............................. 116 2.1 The Argument from Ignorance .................................................................................. 116 2.2 The Argument from Ignorance as Invariantist Scepticism ........................................ 118 2.3 Transmission Failure in the Invariantist Argument from Ignorance .......................... 122 3 3. Restricting the Argument from Ignorance .............................................................. 125 3.1 Context-Sensitive Scepticism .................................................................................... 125 3.2 Successful Transmission in the Restricted Argument from Ignorance ...................... 127 3.3 Upholding Epistemic Closure .................................................................................... 128 4. Concluding Remarks ................................................................................................. 131 Part 3 ................................................................................................................................... 133 Epistemic Contextualism’s Proper Defence of Everyday Anti-Scepticism ................... 133 0. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 133 1. A Theoretical Diagnosis of Invariantist Scepticism ................................................ 133 1.1 Discussion of the Components of Invariantist Scepticism ................................... 134 1.1.1 Epistemological Realism......................................................................................... 135 1.1.2 Epistemic Priority ................................................................................................... 141 1.1.3 Neutrality of Experience ........................................................................................
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