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Philosophy 2019 Catalogue 2019 CATALOGUE PHILOSOPHY CONTENTS 2 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 7 ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 10 EPISTEMOLOGY 11 ETHICS & MORAL PHILOSOPHY 16 HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 19 LOGIC 20 METAPHYSICS & ONTOLOGY 22 PHENOMENOLOGY & EXISTENTIALISM 25 SOCIAL & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 30 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 34 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 37 GENERAL 40 NON-WESTERN PHILOSOPHY Receive regular up-to-date information about our new titles by registering for e-alerts at: eurospan.co.uk/mailinglist If you are a teaching academic or course leader you may request up to three titles as FREE inspection copies consider as textbooks for students on your course. For further details please visit: Due to currency fluctuations and publisher price changes, eurospan.co.uk/inspection prices charged may vary from those listed. AVAILABLE FROM EUROSPAN FROM 1 MARCH 2019 During the last few decades the interest in scholastic philosophy has grown. In particular, analytic philosophers have been inspired by the strong argumentative method of scholastic philosophy. In 2011 Editiones Scholasticae was founded, dedicated to publishing in this burgeoning field in three areas: • New publications on scholastic philosophy in both English and German. • Reprints of excellent scholastics books first published in the 19th and 20th centuries in German and English. • Translations of classical French and English scholastic books. NEW ARISTOTLE’S REVENGE The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science Edward Feser Dec 2018 515pp 9783868382006 Paperback £25.50 / €28.00 Among the many topics covered in this important new book are the metaphysical presuppositions of scientific method; the status of scientific realism; the metaphysics of space and time; the metaphysics of quantum mechanics; reductionism in chemistry and biology; the metaphysics of evolution; and neuroscientific reductionism. It brings contemporary philosophy and science into dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition. BESTSELLER UNA VERITAS A MANUAL OF SCHOLASTIC METAPHYSICS The ‘Inclusive’ Definition NEO-SCHOLASTIC A Contemporary Introduction of Truth as a Proof for the PHILOSOPHY Edward Feser Existence of God Charles Reinhard 2014 320pp Edited by Claudio Pierantoni Baschab 9783868385441 Paperback Apr 2018 345pp Apr 2018 460pp £21.50 / €23.50 9783868382105 Hardback 9783868382112 Hardback £82.50 / €92.00 £82.50 / €92.00 Provides an overview of scholastic approaches to causation, substance, Proposes a new proof of the existence A complete and systematic exposition essence, modality, identity, of God, based on a development of scholastic philosophy based upon persistence, teleology, and other of elements found in patristic and the sound principles of Aristotle issues in fundamental metaphysics. scholastic philosophical tradition, in and St Thomas Aquinas, bringing The book interacts heavily with particular that of St Augustine, it into contact with the facts of the literature on these issues in St Anselm and St Thomas Aquinas. modern science. The considerations contemporary analytic metaphysics, which have guided the author are so as to facilitate the analytic reader’s two: he wished both to modernise understanding of scholastic ideas and popularise philosophia perennis. and the reader’s understanding of It covers the philosophy of contemporary analytic philosophy. nature, psychology, ontology and metaphysics, and natural theology. Information on all books published by EDITIONES SCHOLASTICAE will be available from 1 March at eurospanbookstore.com/editionesscholasticae 2 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY INSPIRED BY BAKHTIN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY Dialogic Methods in the Humanities Edited by Matthias Freise HIGHLIGHT Jun 2018 250pp, 9 figures, 2 tables 9781618117380 Hardback £107.00 / €120.00 FROM WONDER Studies in Comparative Literature and Intellectual History TO WISDOM Offers an examination of seven disciplines within the Introductory humanities field which underwent a fundamental Readings transformation. In order to apply ‘exact' scientific in Philosophy methods, these disciplines turned away from their very subjects and took a revisionist approach based on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, tracing the search for common and specific grounds of the humanities. MAIMONIDES' GRAND EPISTLE TO THE SCHOLARS OF LUNEL Ideology and Rhetoric Charles H. Sheer Apr 2019 100pp 9781618119612 Paperback £31.95 / €36.00 9781618119605 Hardback £88.95 / €99.00 When Maimonides' Mishneh Torah reached Lunel, France, scholars composed twenty-four objections to his positions. Maimonides' rejoinder opened with an unusual rhymed prose epistle with effusive praise for his correspondents and artistic and complex language. In this book, Charles Cognella Academic Publishing Sheer offers the first annotated translation of the entire epistle. Academic Studies Press THE MANY FACES OF MAIMONIDES Dov Schwartz May 2018 350pp THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN ARTS 9781618117809 Hardback £117.00 / €131.00 Aesthetics After Darwin. Competition, Emunot: Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah Cooperation, Self-Transformation: Alexander Offers a new reading of Maimonides'Guide of the Perplexed, G. Baumgarten, Alexander von Humboldt, exploring how Maimonides' commitment to integrity Immanuel Kant, and Lawrence Sterne led him to a critique of the Kalām, a complex concept of Winfried Menninghaus immortality, and insight into the human yearning for Jun 2019 200pp metaphysical knowledge. 9781644690000 Hardback £97.95 / €109.00 Evolution, Cognition and the Arts SHAPES OF APOCALYPSE Arts and Philosophy in Slavic Thought Edited by Andrea Oppo May 2018 288pp 9781618118240 Paperback £34.95 / €39.00 Myths and Taboos in Russian Culture Highlights the philosophical and literary idea of apocalypse within key examples in the Slavic world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. From Russian realism to avant-garde painting, the fiction of the nineteenth century to twentieth-century philosophy, the concepts of ‘end of history’ and ‘end of present time’ are specifically examined. WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 3 The Catholic University of America Press WRITING & FREEDOM From Nothing to Persons and Back William Myers AQUINAS ON EMOTION'S PARTICIPATION Nov 2018 277pp IN REASON 9780999513408 Hardback £64.95 / €72.00 Nicholas Kahm Defends (a strong version of) free will as necessarily Jan 2019 277pp interpersonal: my freedom is nothing but my acceptance 9780813231570 Hardback £79.95 / €89.00 of yours. This is how Milton, Rossetti, and Dickinson treat Presents Aquinas's answer to the perennial question: In their readers, and how scientists and philosophers ideally what way can the emotions be rational? For Aquinas, the treat each other. The book's open-ended essays model starting point of this inquiry is Aristotle's claim (EN.I.13) freedom so understood. that there are three parts to the soul: the rational part; the non-rational part which can participate in reason; and the non-rational part that does not participate in reason. Cognella Academic Publishing THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION OF NATURAL KINDS AND ITS DEMISE FROM WONDER TO WISDOM Stewart Umphrey Introductory Readings in Philosophy Jul 2018 277pp Edited by Fidel A. Arnecillo Jr. 9780813230412 Hardback £79.95 / €89.00 Nov 2018 222pp Examines the emergence of Aristotle's account of species, 9781516531745 Paperback £65.95 / €76.00 what Schoolmen such as Thomas Aquinas and William of For full details of this title, see page 2. Ockham did with this account, and the tacit if not explicit rejection of all such accounts in modern scientific theory. By tracing this history Stewart Umphrey shows that there Marquette University Press have been not one but two relevant “scientific revolutions” or “paradigm shifts” in the history of natural philosophy. OPPOSITION AND PHILOSOPHY BEFORE TRUTH Piotr Hoffman Lonergan, Aquinas, and the Problem Nov 2015 175pp of Wisdom 9781626006041 Paperback £21.95 / €24.00 Jeremy D. Wilkins Marquette Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 87 Nov 2018 277pp Asks how the concept of opposition can be instrumental in 9780813231471 Hardback £69.95 / €77.00 solving some of the notorious problems of philosophers, Wisdom, according to Thomas Aquinas, is the quality with special attention to Sartre and Heidegger. The three of right judgment. This book is about the problem of main issues are identified in the chapter titles: ‘Opposition becoming wise, the problem "before truth". It is about and Particularity’, ‘Opposition and Intersubjectivity’, and that problem particularly as it comes up for religious, ‘Opposition and Temporality’. philosophical, and theological truth claims. THE HUMAN PERSON A Beginner's Thomistic Psychology Steven J. Jensen Nov 2018 277pp 9780813231525 Paperback £37.95 / €42.00 Presents a brief introduction to the human mind, the soul, immortality, and free will. While delving into the thought of Thomas Aquinas, this book addresses contemporary topics, such as scepticism, mechanism, animal language research, and determinism. 4 WESTERN PHILOSOPHY University of Missouri Press TOLSTOY AND HIS PROBLEMS THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE STORYTELLER Views from the Twenty-First Century Eric Voegelin and Inessa Medzhibovskaya Twentieth-Century Literature Nov 2018 288pp, 2 images Charles R. Embry 9780810138803 Paperback Feb 2018 208pp £43.50 / €48.00 9780826221520 Paperback £26.95 / €30.00 9780810138810 Hardback The Eric Voegelin Institute Series in Political Philosophy £129.00 / €143.00 Throughout his philosophical career, Eric Voegelin had Studies in Russian Literature and much to say about literature in both his published work Theory and his private letters.
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