Algeria's Deceptive Quiet

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Algeria's Deceptive Quiet >> POLICY BRIEF ISSN: 1989-2667 Nº 117 -MARCH 2012 Algeria’s deceptive quiet Barah Mikaïl Parliamentary elections in Algeria are due for 10 May. While >> these are not nearly as important as presidential elections from the population’s point of view, the question looms of whether they will open the way for political change. Doubts surround the ailing president HIGHLIGHTS Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s ability to finish his mandate. When the Arab spring arrived in early 2011, Algeria seemed ripe to follow • Understanding why the Tunisia’s path to transition. Despite the country’s oil-derived wealth, corruption and abject income inequality had impoverished citizens living Arab spring has so far under this military-backed regime. Frustration reigned. A lack of hope was passed Algeria by is of increasingly palpable among young Algerians. And yet Algeria has considerable geostrategic remained relatively calm. Popular demonstrations have not hit boiling import. point. The prospect of regime change has dissipated. • The government’s reform Algeria is a key piece in North Africa’s geopolitical puzzle. Its shared border proposals have highlighted with Libya, major reserves of oil and gas, regional counter-terrorism its limited room for strategy and steely refusal to fall in with the regional strategies of foreign manoeuvre. powers all afford it a unique status. Understanding why the Arab spring has so far passed Algeria by is of considerable geostrategic import. There are • A possible change in several reasons for the apparent ‘Algerian silence’: historical antecedents that leader, overtures to the West feed the opposition’s current organisational muddle; the government’s populism; and shortcomings in European strategies. and a harnessing of economic potential are all good auguries for a better ALGERIA’S PARADOX future. History looms large in Algeria’s current soul-searching. The 132 year French occupation (1830 -1962) and the people’s subsequent fight for ALGERIA’S DECEPTIVE QUIET 2 >>>>>> independence today evoke great national pride. failed to counteract the regime’s containment Yet periods of calm have been the exception to tactics. The fundamental lack of political the rule. Bad governance and inefficient organisation in the Algerian population is the distribution of oil-generated wealth became most pertinent factor. Asked why protests have entrenched. Political life operated beneath the failed, opposition figures in Algiers all refer to the banner of the single-party rule of the National absence of organisational structures, especially Liberation Front. With growing resentment among the youth. They also accuse national towards the regime, violent riots broke out in media and ostensibly opposition parties in October 1988. These marked a new chapter in parliament of helping the regime. As one Algerian politics. President Chadli Benjedid journalist put it: the regime is ‘playing on passed a new constitution based on a transition society’s divisions to strengthen its position; it towards a multi-party system. But in 1991, just distributes money to various socio-economic following the country’s first fair legislative categories of the population in order to buy elections, incipient reforms were reversed due to social peace.’ the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front. A decade of violence ensued. The Islamist threat Indeed, the chaotic political organisation of permitted the resurgence of the military, Algerian society stands as an astonishing para - supported by the West. While outbreaks of dox. Algerians are well known for having a crit - violence were commonplace through the 1990s, ical point of view on their institutions; this the army has reasserted its grip since. much is gleaned simply by being on the streets in Algiers. And trade unions have begun to The year 2011 could have brought substantial press harder for social demands. Nevertheless, changes. One of the most significant events while there are took place on 5 January. That day, riots took 90,000 registered place in Oran and Algiers that were brutally associations, only quashed by security forces. Once again, the 1000 of these are With government played deaf to demands for better really active. A seri - discredited socio-economic conditions and an ous disconnect has improvement in living standards. However in emerged between institutions the wake of the Tunisian revolt, the Algerian trade unions and state apparatus understood the perils of not the population. and a lack of reacting at all. A dose of pragmatism was vital Algeria is a young tangible social to mitigate the winds of change that threatened country; half of its to sweep away the region’s authoritarian population is under reform, few regimes. Hence the regime changed behaviour. the age of 25. But An insider to president Bouteflika explains: the youth’s limited are optimistic strategy was to present Algeria as an presence in trade about May’s incrementally ‘developing democracy’. On 15 unions dominated April 2011, President Bouteflika gave a by elder stalwarts election televised speech in which he announced that that cling to archaic important political reforms would be means of organisa - introduced in the near future. tion will have long- term ramifications. Collective action does have At the same time, a certain ambivalence coloured a role, and Algerians’ desire for radical change Algerian responses to the actions of citizens burns on. But fledgling coordination and elsewhere in the region. Demonstrations in regime divide-and-rule tactics too easily stifle Algeria never reached the intensity of those in its potential. This is all too easily compounded Tunisia, Egypt or Libya. Opposition leaders have by apologists hiding behind the president’s POLICY BRIEF - Nº 117 - MARCH 2012 3 political weakness as justification for the stunt - emergence of new political movements. But ed reform; a pretext strikingly present even critics state that this is far from sufficient. They among more reformist voices in the capital. insist that authority for the regulation of broadcast media should be totally independent, Amid weak opposition, the regime’s ability to which is not contemplated by the regime. The play on Algerian patriotism has gained it government also plans submitting religious support. The scars of its painful experience associations to a ‘special regime’. And measures with France are still on show – something that are afoot for forbidding any partnership cements its postcolonial national identity. between Algerian associations and foreign Contrary to its neighbouring countries, Algeria NGOs. These are clear signs of regression. has developed a foreign policy that promotes Interestingly, secular opposition figures are non-alignment in nationalist as well as pan- reluctant to support the lifting of restrictions Arabic decisions. In recent years, president on Islamist organisations’ political activity. Bou te flika has routinely demanded that France apologise for its former conduct. Policies are The regime’s proposals are far from sufficient; dominated by the development of military and even the limited steps that are under standings and alliances with non- contemplated will face opposition in the American partners such as Russia and China; parliament. The National Liberation Front and the regime’s ‘euro-scepticism’; its relations with the Democratic National Rally have insisted on the Polisario Front in Western Sahara; its amendments to protect their own positions. denunciation of Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians; and its push for pan-Arab unity The reforms to date are timid and inchoate. and assertiveness. Despite the country’s Algeria is wealthy but still needs to improve on numerous problems, Algerians feel their a plethora of issues, such as fighting honour has been recovered. This ‘Algerian- unemployment, encouraging foreign direct centred’ interpreta tion of trends must not be investment, promoting industrial policy, underestima ted. NATO’s role in ousting increasing revenues and combating corruption. Libya’s Moammar Qaddhafi led to a backlash The army’s strident interference in civilian against foreign interference in Algeria. The affairs is no secret but the government’s government thus has decided to react to the reluctance to address this ignores a vital Arab spring, but in its own way. opportunity to inspire confidence in the people. The gap that opposes conservatives to reformists is also reflected within the state LIMITED REFORMS apparatus. Therefore, instead of profiting from regional instability to strengthen its position, Having announced reforms in mid-April 2011 the government’s proposals for reforms have the government clarified some months later. Its simply highlighted its limited room for parliament in turn adopted reforms later in manoeuvre. December 2011.Taken as a whole, Algeria’s current reforms are notable but cover a limited Tellingly, few interlocutors in Algeria seriously number of areas. expect that the regime’s internal tensions and contradictions will bring top-down change. The government currently focuses on three The army remains a strong actor that operates main decisions: a reform of the media sector under civilian auspices. Bouteflika is still the that should put an end to the government’s army’s preferred leader; it was the army that monopoly on broadcast media; a reform of allowed him to benefit from a 2008 civic associations to revive their activity; and a constitutional amendment to open the way for law on political parties that should prompt the a third presidential
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