CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW Fourth Series/Quatri`eme s´erie Recueil de jurisprudence canadienne en droit du travail VOLUME 32 (Cited 32 C.C.E.L. (4th))
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[Indexed as: Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.] Joseph Wilson (Appellant) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Respondent) and Canadian Labour Congress, Canadian Association for Non-Organized Employees, Federally Regulated Employers - Transportation and Communications and Canadian Association of Counsel to Employers (Interveners) Supreme Court of Canada Docket: 36354 2016 CSC 29, 2016 SCC 29 McLachlin C.J.C., Abella, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. Heard: January 19, 2016 Judgment: July 14, 2016 Labour and employment law –––– Labour law — Discipline and termina- tion — Kinds of discipline — Discharge — Just cause –––– Employee was dismissed without cause after 4.5 years employment, and given six months’ pay — Employee brought successful unjust dismissal complaint under s. 240 of Canada Labour Code — Adjudicator found that, as matter of statutory interpre- tation, Code only permitted dismissals for just cause — Employer brought suc- cessful application for judicial review — Employee’s appeal to Federal Court of Appeal was dismissed — Employee appealed — Appeal allowed — Standard of review was reasonableness, and issue was whether adjudicator’s interpretation of ss. 240 to 246 of Code was reasonable — Purpose of statutory scheme was to ensure that non-unionized federal employees would be entitled to protection from being dismissed without cause under Pt. III of Code — Provisions offered statutory alternative to common law of dismissals, and to align protection from unjust dismissal for non-unionized federal employees with those available to un- ionized employees — If employer could dismiss without cause under Code by 2 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
providing severance pay, no role would exist for plurality of remedies available to adjudicator. Administrative law –––– Standard of review — Miscellaneous –––– Revised standard of review - reasonableness — Employee was dismissed without cause after 4.5 years employment, and given six months’ pay — Employee brought successful unjust dismissal complaint under s. 240 of Canada Labour Code — Adjudicator found that, as matter of statutory interpretation, Code only permit- ted dismissals for just cause — Employer brought successful application for ju- dicial review — Employee’s appeal to Federal Court of Appeal was dis- missed — Employee appealed — Appeal allowed — Standard of review was reasonableness, and issue was whether adjudicator’s interpretation of ss. 240 to 246 of Code was reasonable — Purpose of statutory scheme was to ensure that non-unionized federal employees would be entitled to protection from being dis- missed without cause under Pt. III of Code — Provisions offered statutory alter- native to common law of dismissals, and to align protection from unjust dismis- sal for non-unionized federal employees with those available to unionized employees — If employer could dismiss without cause under Code by providing severance pay, no role would exist for plurality of remedies available to adjudicator. Droit du travail et de l’emploi –––– Droit du travail — Mesures dis- ciplinaires et licenciement — Types de mesures disciplinaires — Cong´edie- ment — Motiv´e –––– Employ´e a et´´ e cong´edi´e sans motif apr`es avoir occup´e son emploi pendant quatre ans et demi et a re¸cu une indemnit´e de d´epart cor- respondant a` six mois de salaire — Employ´e a d´epos´e, avec succ`es, une plainte pour cong´ediement injuste en vertu de l’art. 240 du Code canadien du travail — Arbitre a conclu, en proc´edant a` une interpr´etation de la l´egislation, que le Code ne permettait que des cong´ediements avec motif — Employeur a d´epos´e, avec succ`es, une requˆete visant a` obtenir le contrˆole judiciaire de la d´ecision de l’arbitre — Appel interjet´e par l’employ´e devant la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale a et´´ e rejet´e — Employ´e a form´e un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Norme de con- trˆole etait´ celle de la d´ecision raisonnable et la question etait´ de savoir si la mani`ere dont l’arbitre a interpr´et´e les art. 240 a` 246 du Code etait´ raisonnable — Objet du r´egime l´egal pr´evu a` la partie III du Code consistait a` assurer aux em- ploy´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es une protection contre le cong´ediement sans mo- tif — Dispositions visaient a` pr´esenter une alternative l´egislative aux r`egles de common law r´egissant le cong´ediement et a` harmoniser les mesures de protec- tion contre le cong´ediement injuste offertes aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndi- qu´es avec celles offertes aux syndiqu´es — Si l’employeur etait´ autoris´e par le Code a` cong´edier un employ´e sans motif a` la seule condition qu’il verse a` ce dernier une indemnit´e de d´epart, la pluralit´e des r´eparations mises a` la disposi- tion de l’arbitre ne servirait pratiquement a` rien. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 3
Droit administratif –––– Norme de contrˆole — Divers –––– Norme de contrˆole r´evis´ee - d´ecision raisonnable — Employ´e a et´´ e cong´edi´e sans motif apr`es avoir occup´e son emploi pendant quatre ans et demi et a re¸cu une indemnit´e de d´epart correspondant a` six mois de salaire — Employ´e a d´epos´e, avec succ`es, une plainte pour cong´ediement injuste en vertu de l’art. 240 du Code canadien du travail — Arbitre a conclu, en proc´edant a` une interpr´etation de la l´egislation, que le Code ne permettait que des cong´ediements avec motif — Employeur a d´epos´e, avec succ`es, une requˆete visant a` obtenir le contrˆole judiciaire de la d´e- cision de l’arbitre — Appel interjet´e par l’employ´e devant la Cour d’appel f´ed´er- ale a et´´ e rejet´e — Employ´e a form´e un pourvoi — Pourvoi accueilli — Norme de contrˆole etait´ celle de la d´ecision raisonnable et la question etait´ de savoir si la mani`ere dont l’arbitre a interpr´et´e les art. 240 a` 246 du Code etait´ raison- nable — Objet du r´egime l´egal pr´evu a` la partie III du Code consistait a` assurer aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es une protection contre le cong´ediement sans motif — Dispositions visaient a` pr´esenter une alternative l´egislative aux r`egles de common law r´egissant le cong´ediement et a` harmoniser les mesures de protection contre le cong´ediement injuste offertes aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es avec celles offertes aux syndiqu´es — Si l’employeur etait´ autoris´e par le Code a` cong´edier un employ´e sans motif a` la seule condition qu’il verse a` ce dernier une indemnit´e de d´epart, la pluralit´e des r´eparations mises a` la disposi- tion de l’arbitre ne servirait pratiquement a` rien. The employee was dismissed without cause after 4.5 years of employment, with a clean disciplinary record. The employee was provided with severance pay of six months’ salary. The employee claimed that his dismissal was due to having made a complaint about the employer’s improper procurement practices, and filed an unjust dismissal complaint under s. 240 of the Canada Labour Code. The adjudicator allowed the employee’s complaint because the employer did not rely on any cause to terminate his employment. The employer brought a suc- cessful application for judicial review of the adjudicator’s decision. The applica- tion judge held that the decision of the adjudicator was unreasonable because nothing in Pt. III of the Code precluded employers from dismissing non-union- ized employees without cause. The Federal Court of Appeal agreed, but re- viewed the issue on a standard of correctness. The employee appealed. Held: The appeal was allowed. Per Abella J.: The appropriate standard of review was reasonableness. The entire purpose of the statutory scheme in Pt. III of the Canada Labour Code was to ensure that non-unionized federal employees would be entitled to protection from being dismissed without cause. The approach of severance pay in lieu of cause fell outside the range of “possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensi- ble in respect of the facts and law” since it undermines this purpose by permit- ting employers to deprive employees of the full remedial package that Parlia- ment created. The rights of employees were to be based on what Parliament 4 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
intended, not on the opinion of individual employers or adjudicators. The foun- dational premise of the common law scheme that employers have a right to dis- miss on reasonable notice without cause or reasons was completely replaced by the Code requiring reasons for dismissal. In addition, the various discretionary remedies available are inconsistent with the right to dismiss without cause. Per McLachlin C.J.C., Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon JJ. (concurring): The standard of review was reasonableness, and the adjudicator’s decision was rea- sonable and was to be restored. Clarifying or simplifying the standard of review jurisprudence to better promote certainty and predictability was unnecessary to resolve this case, and no particular proposal to do so was endorsed. Per Cromwell J. (concurring): The adjudicator’s decision was reasonable, and the appeal should be allowed. The standard of review does not require overhaul, and the existing caselaw set out the appropriate framework for addressing the standard of judicial review. Developing new and unlimited numbers of grada- tions of reasonableness review was not an appropriate development of the stan- dard of review jurisprudence. Per Cˆot´e and Brown JJ. (dissenting) (Moldaver J. concurring): Labour adjudica- tors disagreed on whether a federally-regulated employer could ever dismiss a non-unionized employee without cause. A dismissal without cause is not per se unjust, so long as adequate notice was given, and such dismissal did not allow employer to escape the scrutiny of an adjudicator or the courts if the employee challenges the lawfulness of the dismissal. The appropriate standard of review should be correctness, based on the narrow and distilled legal issue in the case at bar. Applying the standard of reasonableness meant that labour adjudicators could come to different conclusions and interpretations of the unjust dismissal provisions of the Code, which leads to compromising the core principles of the rule of law, being certainty and predictability. Where there is a lingering disa- greement on a matter of statutory interpretation, and where the legislature clearly could only have intended the statute to bear one meaning, correctness review was appropriate. Applying the standard of correctness, a federally-regu- lated employer can dismiss an employee without cause, so long as the appropri- ate notice and severance pay are provided. Section 168 of the Code expressly preserves the continued application of the common law to federally-regulated employers and employees, creating an over- lap between the legislation and the common law. Therefore the Code must be interpreted consistently with the common law, specifically that the contractual basis of individual employment applies, and that federal employers are not pro- hibited from dismissing non-unionized employees without cause. Parliament simply created another procedural mechanism by which employees could chal- lenge the lawfulness of their dismissal. L’employ´e a et´´ e cong´edi´e sans motif apr`es avoir occup´e son emploi pendant quatre ans et demi alors que son dossier disciplinaire etait´ vierge. L’employ´e a Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 5
re¸cu une indemnit´e de d´epart correspondant a` six mois de salaire. L’employ´e a fait valoir qu’il a et´´ e cong´edi´e en repr´esailles d’une plainte qu’il avait d´epos´ee a` propos de pratiques irr´eguli`eres d’approvisionnement par son employeur et a d´e- pos´e une plainte pour cong´ediement injuste en vertu de l’art. 240 du Code canadien du travail. L’arbitre a accueilli la plainte de l’employ´e parce que l’employeur n’avait donn´e aucun motif de cong´ediement. L’employeur a d´e- pos´e, avec succ`es, une requˆete visant a` obtenir le contrˆole judiciaire de la d´eci- sion de l’arbitre. Le juge des requˆetes a estim´e que la d´ecision de l’arbitre etait´ d´eraisonnable puisque rien a` la partie III du Code n’empˆechait les employeurs de mettre fin sans motif a` l’emploi d’employ´es non syndiqu´es. La Cour d’appel f´ed´erale a confirm´e cette d´ecision, mais a appliqu´e la norme de la d´ecision cor- recte. L’employ´e a form´e un pourvoi. Arrˆet: Le pourvoi a et´´ e accueilli. Abella, J. : La norme de contrˆole applicable etait´ celle de la d´ecision raison- nable. L’objet global du r´egime l´egal pr´evu a` la partie III du Code consistait a` assurer aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es une protection contre le cong´edie- ment sans motif. L’interpr´etation suivant laquelle le versement d’une indemnit´e de d´epart suffit n’appartenait pas aux « issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit », car elle mine compl`etement l’objet du r´egime en permettant aux employeurs de priver les employ´es de l’ensemble int´e- gral des mesures de r´eparation cr´e´ees par le Parlement a` leur intention. Les droits des employ´es devaient etreˆ fond´es sur l’intention du Parlement, non sur l’avis personnel d’un employeur ou d’un arbitre. La pr´emisse fondamentale du r´egime de common law, a` savoir qu’il existe un droit de cong´edier un employ´e sans motif moyennant un pr´eavis raisonnable, a et´´ e remplac´ee compl`etement par un r´egime pr´evu dans le Code exigeant que le cong´ediement soit motiv´e. En outre, la constellation des r´eparations a` la disposition de l’arbitre est incompati- ble avec le droit de cong´edier sans motif. McLachlin, J.C.C., Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, JJ. (souscrivant a` l’opinion majoritaire) : La norme de contrˆole etait´ celle de la d´ecision raisonnable. La d´ecision de l’arbitre etait´ raisonnable et devrait etreˆ r´etablie. Il n’´etait pas n´eces- saire, pour r´esoudre le pr´esent litige, de clarifier ou de simplifier notre jurispru- dence sur la norme de contrˆole dans le but de favoriser la certitude et la pr´evisibilit´e et aucune proposition en ce sens n’a et´´ e avanc´ee. Cromwell, J. (souscrivant a` l’opinion des juges majoritaires) : La d´ecision de l’arbitre etait´ raisonnable et le pourvoi devrait etreˆ accueilli. Il n’´etait pas n´eces- saire de proc´eder a` une r´eforme fondamentale, la jurisprudence actuelle etablis-´ sait un cadre d’analyse appropri´e sur la question de la norme de contrˆole. Ouvrir la porte au contrˆole judiciaire selon une norme de la d´ecision raisonnable repen- s´ee et caract´eris´ee par des degr´es de contrˆole apparemment illimit´es ne consti- tuait pas une evolution´ souhaitable de la jurisprudence en mati`ere de norme de contrˆole. 6 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. (dissidents) (Moldaver, J., souscrivant a` leur opinion) : Les arbitres ne s’entendaient pas sur la question de savoir si un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale pouvait cong´edier sans motif un employ´e non syndiqu´e. Un cong´ediement non motiv´e n’est pas en soi injuste, d`es lors qu’un pr´eavis suf- fisant a et´´ e donn´e, mais ce type de cong´ediement ne permettait pas a` l’employeur de se soustraire a` un contrˆole arbitral ou judiciaire, si l’employ´e d´ecide de contester la l´egalit´e de son cong´ediement. La norme de contrˆole appli- cable devrait etreˆ celle de la d´ecision correcte, consid´erant la question pr´ecise de droit pur que soulevait le pourvoi. Appliquer la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable reviendrait a` dire que les arbitres en droit du travail pourraient en arriver a` des conclusions et des interpr´etations diff´erentes au sujet des dispositions du Code concernant le cong´ediement injuste, ce qui risquerait de miner les principes de droit fondamentaux que sont la certitude et la pr´evisibilit´e. En pr´esence de diver- gences persistantes entre des d´ecideurs administratifs concernant l’interpr´etation d’une loi a` laquelle le l´egislateur voulait manifestement ne donner qu’un seul sens, c’est la norme de la d´ecision correcte qui devait etreˆ appliqu´ee. En appli- quant la norme de la d´ecision correcte, un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale peut cong´edier un employ´e sans motif, pourvu qu’un pr´eavis et une indemnit´e de d´epart ad´equats ont et´´ e donn´es. L’article 168 du Code pr´evoyait express´ement l’application continue de la com- mon law aux employeurs et employ´es r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale, cr´eant ainsi un chevauchement de la l´egislation et de la common law. Par cons´equent, le Code doit etreˆ interpr´et´e de mani`ere compatible avec la common law, c’est-`a- dire que le fondement contractuel du lien d’emploi individuel continue de s’appliquer et il n’est pas cat´egoriquement interdit aux employeurs f´ed´eraux de cong´edier sans motif les employ´es non syndiqu´es. Le l´egislateur a simplement cr´e´e un autre m´ecanisme proc´edural permettant aux employ´es de contester la l´egalit´e de leur cong´ediement. Cases considered by Abella J.: Agraira v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) (2013), 2013 SCC 36, 2013 CarswellNat 1983, 2013 CarswellNat 1984, 52 Admin. L.R. (5th) 183, 360 D.L.R. (4th) 411, 16 Imm. L.R. (4th) 173, [2013] S.C.J. No. 36, 446 N.R. 65, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered Alberta (Minister of Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (2012), 2012 SCC 37, 2012 CarswellNat 2419, 2012 CarswellNat 2420, 102 C.P.R. (4th) 255, 347 D.L.R. (4th) 287, 38 Admin. L.R. (5th) 214, 432 N.R. 134, (sub nom. Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright)) [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345, [2012] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.) — referred to Alliance Pipeline Ltd. v. Smith (2011), 2011 SCC 7, 2011 CarswellNat 202, 2011 CarswellNat 203, 328 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 56 C.E.L.R. (3d) 161, [2011] Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 7
S.C.J. No. 7, [2011] A.C.S. No. 7, 102 L.C.R. 1, 16 Admin. L.R. (5th) 157, 412 N.R. 66, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160 (S.C.C.) — considered British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal) (2011), 2011 SCC 52, 2011 CarswellBC 2702, 2011 Car- swellBC 2703, 25 Admin. L.R. (5th) 173, 337 D.L.R. (4th) 413, [2011] 12 W.W.R. 1, 23 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 421 N.R. 338, 95 C.C.E.L. (3d) 169, (sub nom. B.C. (W.C.B.) v. Figiola) 2012 C.L.L.C. 230-001, (sub nom. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422, 311 B.C.A.C. 1, 529 W.A.C. 1, [2011] S.C.J. No. 52, [2011] A.C.S. No. 52, (sub nom. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola) 73 C.H.R.R. D/1 (S.C.C.) — referred to Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat (2011), 2011 SCC 53, 2011 CarswellNat 4190, 2011 CarswellNat 4191, 93 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 337 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 26 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, D.T.E. 2011T-708, 422 N.R. 248, [2011] S.C.J. No. 53, [2011] A.C.S. No. 53, (sub nom. C.H.R.C. v. Canada (A.G.)) 2011 C.L.L.C. 230-043, (sub nom. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General)) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471, (sub nom. Canada (Human Rights Comm.) v. Canada (Attorney General)) 73 C.H.R.R. D/30 (S.C.C.) — referred to Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa (2009), 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) — referred to Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District) (2012), 2012 SCC 2, 2012 CarswellBC 17, 2012 CarswellBC 18, 11 R.P.R. (5th) 1, [2012] 2 W.W.R. 415, 26 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 340 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 93 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, [2012] S.C.J. No. 2, 425 N.R. 22, 316 B.C.A.C. 1, 537 W.A.C. 1, 34 Admin. L.R. (5th) 175, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5, [2012] A.C.S. No. 2 (S.C.C.) — considered G & R Contracting Ltd. and Sandhu, Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 7465 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (Public Works & Government Ser- vices) (2012), 2012 SCC 29, 2012 CarswellNat 1826, 2012 CarswellNat 1827, 97 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, 345 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 17 R.P.R. (5th) 1, 36 Ad- min. L.R. (5th) 1, 431 N.R. 10, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 108, [2012] S.C.J. No. 29 (S.C.C.) — referred to Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. CEP, Local 30 (2013), 2013 SCC 34, 2013 Car- swellNB 275, 2013 CarswellNB 276, [2013] S.C.J. No. 34, [2013] A.C.S. No. 34, 52 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 394, (sub nom. CEPU, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper) 2013 C.L.L.C. 220-037, D.T.E. 2013T- 418, (sub nom. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30) 445 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of 8 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Canada, Local 30) 1048 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30) 404 N.B.R. (2d) 1, 231 L.A.C. (4th) 209, (sub nom. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd.) 285 C.R.R. (2d) 150, (sub nom. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd.) [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458, (sub nom. C.E.P.U., Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd) 77 C.H.R.R. D/304 (S.C.C.) — considered Kanthasamy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2015), 2015 SCC 61, 2015 CSC 61, 2015 CarswellNat 6500, 2015 CarswellNat 6501, 93 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 36 Imm. L.R. (4th) 1, 391 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 479 N.R. 103, [2015] S.C.J. No. 61, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 909, 347 C.R.R. (2d) 163 (S.C.C.) — referred to Knopp v. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd. (1994), [1994] C.L.A.D. No. 172, 1994 CarswellNat 4176 (Can. Arb.) — considered M. (M.) v. United States of America (2015), 2015 SCC 62, 2015 CSC 62, 2015 CarswellQue 11505, 2015 CarswellQue 11506, [2015] S.C.J. No. 62, [2015] A.C.S. No. 62, 331 C.C.C. (3d) 421, 394 D.L.R. (4th) 7, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 973, 480 N.R. 1, 345 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to M.A.H.C.P. v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. (2011), 2011 SCC 59, 2011 CarswellMan 606, 2011 CarswellMan 607, D.T.E. 2011T-803, (sub nom. Manitoba Assn. of Health Care Professionals v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc.) 340 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 29 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc.) 423 N.R. 95, [2012] 2 W.W.R. 619, 96 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v. M.A.H.C.P.) 2012 C.L.L.C. 220-004, (sub nom. Manitoba Assn. of Health Care Professionals v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc.) 212 L.A.C. (4th) 93, [2011] S.C.J. No. 59, [2011] A.C.S. No. 59, (sub nom. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616, (sub nom. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc.) 275 Man. R. (2d) 16, (sub nom. Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc.) 538 W.A.C. 16 (S.C.C.) — followed Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd. (1992), 40 C.C.E.L. 1, (sub nom. Lefebvre v. HOJ Industries Ltd.; Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd.) 53 O.A.C. 200, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 491, 7 O.R. (3d) 480n, (sub nom. Lefebvre v. HOJ Industries Ltd.; Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd.) 136 N.R. 40, 92 C.L.L.C. 14,022, 1992 CarswellOnt 989, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986, 1992 CarswellOnt 892, [1992] S.C.J. No. 41, 7 O.R. (3d) 480, 7 O.R. (3d) 480 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to Madill and Spruce Hollow Heavy Haul Ltd., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellNat 3467, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 9
New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 2008 SCC 9, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, D.T.E. 2008T-223, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 372 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, 2008 CSC 9 (S.C.C.) — followed Newman and Northern Thunderbird Air Inc., Re (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 3703, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 248 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to O’Brien and Mushuau Innu First Nation, Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 60, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 14 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation Inc. (2015), 2015 SCC 44, 2015 CSC 44, 2015 CarswellOnt 14395, 2015 CarswellOnt 14396, 388 D.L.R. (4th) 540, (sub nom. Power Workers’ Union v. Ontario Energy Board) 475 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Power Workers’ Union v. Ontario Energy Board) 338 O.A.C. 1, 95 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 147 (S.C.C.) — referred to Pare and Corus Entertainment Inc. (Unjust Dismissal), Re (2015), 2015 Car- swellNat 1265, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 103 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — re- ferred to Payne and Bank of Montreal, Re (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 349, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 32, 16 C.C.E.L. (4th) 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — re- ferred to Qu´ebec (Procureur g´en´eral) c. Flynn (2010), 2010 SCC 28, 2010 CarswellQue 7456, 2010 CarswellQue 7457, EYB 2010-177238, D.T.E. 2010T-503, (sub nom. Syndicat de la fonction publique du Qu´ebec v. Quebec (A.G.)) 2010 C.L.L.C. 220-044, 84 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, (sub nom. Qu´ebec (Procureur g´en´eral) v. Syndicat de la fonction publique du Qu´ebec) 321 D.L.R. (4th) 193, (sub nom. Syndicat de la fonction publique du Qu´ebec v. Qu´ebec (Procureur g´en´eral)) 404 N.R. 41, 10 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, (sub nom. Syndicat de la fonction publique du Qu´ebec c. Qu´ebec (Procureur g´en´eral)) [2010] 2 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) — considered Redlon Agencies Ltd. v. Norgren (2005), 2005 FC 804, 2005 CarswellNat 1588, 2005 CF 804, 2005 CarswellNat 5483, [2005] F.C.J. No. 992, [2005] A.C.F. No. 992 (F.C.) — considered Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1, 1998 CarswellOnt 2, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 36 O.R. (3d) 418 (headnote only), (sub nom. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re) 221 N.R. 241, (sub nom. Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour) 98 C.L.L.C. 210-006, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, (sub nom. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re) 106 O.A.C. 1, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173 (S.C.C.) — referred to 10 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Roberts v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1979), 1 L.A.C. (3d) 259, [1979] C.L.A.D. No. 11, 1979 CarswellNat 1006 (Can. Arb.) — considered Sharma and Beacon Transit Lines Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellNat 4148 (Can. Arb.) — referred to Sharma and Maple Star Transport Ltd. (Unjust Dismissal), Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 2967 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to Swanson and Qualicum First Nation, Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 4108, 26 C.C.E.L. (4th) 139 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to Taypotat and Muscowpetung First Nation, Re (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 739, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 53 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to Tervita Corp. v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition) (2015), 2015 SCC 3, 2015 CSC 3, 2015 CarswellNat 32, 2015 CarswellNat 33, 380 D.L.R. (4th) 381, 79 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 467 N.R. 97, [2015] S.C.J. No. 3, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79 (2003), 2003 SCC 63, 2003 CarswellOnt 4328, 2003 CarswellOnt 4329, 2003 C.L.L.C. 220-071, 232 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2003] S.C.J. No. 64, 311 N.R. 201, 120 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 179 O.A.C. 291, 17 C.R. (6th) 276, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, 9 Admin. L.R. (4th) 161, 31 C.C.E.L. (3d) 216, REJB 2003-49439 (S.C.C.) — considered Young c. Wolf Lake Band (1997), 130 F.T.R. 115, 1997 CarswellNat 778, [1997] F.C.J. No. 514, 1997 CarswellNat 4316 (Fed. T.D.) — considered Yue v. Bank of Montreal (2016), 2016 FCA 107, 2016 CarswellNat 950, 30 C.C.E.L. (4th) 220 (F.C.A.) — considered
Cases considered by Cromwell J.: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa (2009), 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) — considered Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District) (2012), 2012 SCC 2, 2012 CarswellBC 17, 2012 CarswellBC 18, 11 R.P.R. (5th) 1, [2012] 2 W.W.R. 415, 26 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 340 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 93 M.P.L.R. (4th) 1, [2012] S.C.J. No. 2, 425 N.R. 22, 316 B.C.A.C. 1, 537 W.A.C. 1, 34 Admin. L.R. (5th) 175, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5, [2012] A.C.S. No. 2 (S.C.C.) — considered Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. CEP, Local 30 (2013), 2013 SCC 34, 2013 Car- swellNB 275, 2013 CarswellNB 276, [2013] S.C.J. No. 34, [2013] A.C.S. No. 34, 52 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 359 D.L.R. (4th) 394, (sub nom. CEPU, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper) 2013 C.L.L.C. 220-037, D.T.E. 2013T- 418, (sub nom. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30) 445 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30) 1048 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 11
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30) 404 N.B.R. (2d) 1, 231 L.A.C. (4th) 209, (sub nom. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd.) 285 C.R.R. (2d) 150, (sub nom. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd.) [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458, (sub nom. C.E.P.U., Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd) 77 C.H.R.R. D/304 (S.C.C.) — considered New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 2008 SCC 9, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, D.T.E. 2008T-223, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 372 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, 2008 CSC 9 (S.C.C.) — followed
Cases considered by Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. (dissenting): Altus Group Ltd. v. Calgary (City) (2015), 2015 ABCA 86, 2015 CarswellAlta 303, 33 M.P.L.R. (5th) 183, 382 D.L.R. (4th) 455, 80 Admin. L.R. (5th) 221, [2015] 6 W.W.R. 109, 599 A.R. 223, 643 W.A.C. 223, 12 Alta. L.R. (6th) 217 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Armsworthy v. L.H. & Co. (2005), [2005] C.L.A.D. No. 161, 2005 CarswellNat 7326 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Beatty v. Best Theratronics Ltd. (2014), 2014 ONSC 3376, 2014 CarswellOnt 8539, 18 C.C.E.L. (4th) 64, [2014] O.J. No. 2991 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, [2002] S.C.J. No. 43, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, REJB 2002-30904, 2002 CSC 42 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissent- ing opinion Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp. (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275, 8 C.P.C. 100, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 481, 23 N.R. 298, 1978 CarswellOnt 462, 1978 Cars- wellOnt 596, [1978] S.C.J. No. 86 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG (1975), [1975] A.C. 591, [1975] 1 All E.R. 810, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 513 (U.K. H.L.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion British Columbia Telephone Co. v. Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.) Ltd. (1995), 31 Admin. L.R. (2d) 169, 125 D.L.R. (4th) 443, 183 N.R. 184, 1995 Car- swellNat 705, 1995 CarswellNat 968, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 739, [1995] S.C.J. No. 12 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
54, EYB 1995-80079 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa (2009), 2009 SCC 12, 2009 CarswellNat 434, 2009 CarswellNat 435, 82 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, 77 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 385 N.R. 206, 304 D.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Canada (Citizenship & Immigration) v. Khosa) [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Canadian National Railway v. Benson (2004), 2004 MBQB 210, 2004 Car- swellMan 377, 35 C.C.E.L. (3d) 56, 188 Man. R. (2d) 218, [2004] M.J. No. 338 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1999), 1999 Car- swellBC 776, 29 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 1, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 426, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 733, 23 C.R. (5th) 259, 122 B.C.A.C. 1, 200 W.A.C. 1, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, 1999 CarswellBC 777 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2011), 2011 SCC 1, 2011 Car- swellNat 34, 2011 CarswellNat 35, 89 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 14 Admin. L.R. (5th) 1, 327 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 410 N.R. 127, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3, [2011] S.C.J. No. 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Chadee v. Norway House First Nation (1996), [1996] 10 W.W.R. 335, 23 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 589, 113 Man. R. (2d) 110, 131 W.A.C. 110, 43 Admin. L.R. (2d) 92, [1997] 2 C.N.L.R. 48, 1996 CarswellMan 462, (sub nom. Chadee v. Ross) [1996] M.J. No. 487 (Man. C.A.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Chalifoux v. Driftpile First Nation (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 4394, [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 368 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Champagne v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (2012), 2012 CarswellNat 708, [2012] C.L.A.D. No. 57 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — considered in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion Chandran v. National Bank of Canada (2011), 2011 ONSC 777, 2011 Carswell- Ont 2795, 89 C.C.E.L. (3d) 256, [2011] O.J. No. 1895, 2011 C.L.L.C. 210- 049 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General) (2007), 2007 SCC 21, 2007 CarswellBC 1117, 2007 CarswellBC 1118, (sub nom. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie) 2007 D.T.C. 5525 (Eng.), (sub nom. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie) 2007 D.T.C. 5229 (Fr.), 361 N.R. 322, (sub nom. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie) 2007 G.T.C. 1488 (Eng.), (sub nom. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie) 2007 G.T.C. 1493 (Fr.), 66 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, [2007] 8 W.W.R. 64, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 528, 240 B.C.A.C. 1, 398 W.A.C. 1, (sub nom. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie) 155 C.R.R. (2d) 366, (sub nom. British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie) [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873, Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 13
[2007] S.C.J. No. 21 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Cornelson v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd. (2014), 2014 ABQB 436, 2014 CarswellAlta 1212 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion D. McCool Transport Ltd. and Bosma, Re (1998), [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 315, 1998 CarswellNat 4022 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion Daniels v. Whitecap Dakota First Nation (2008), [2008] C.L.A.D. No. 135, 2008 CarswellNat 6276 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion Dominic v. Tl’azt’en Nation (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 3085 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Exalta Transport Services Ltd. and Cooper, Re (2002), 2002 CarswellNat 6708, [2002] C.L.A.D. No. 612 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissent- ing opinion G & R Contracting Ltd. and Sandhu, Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 7465 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Gendron v. Supply & Services Union of the P.S.A.C., Local 50057 (1990), [1990] 4 W.W.R. 385, 66 Man. R. (2d) 81, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298, 44 Admin. L.R. 149, 90 C.L.L.C. 14,020, 1990 CarswellMan 205, 109 N.R. 321, 1990 CarswellMan 379, EYB 1990-67185, [1990] S.C.J. No. 55 (S.C.C.) — con- sidered in a minority or dissenting opinion Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. T. Eaton Co. (1956), [1956] S.C.R. 610, 56 D.T.C. 1060, 4 D.L.R. (2d) 1, 16 Fox Pat. C. 91, 28 C.P.R. 25, 1956 CarswellNat 247, [1956] S.C.J. No. 37 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Gouchey v. Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 3430 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Halkowich v. Fairford First Nation (August 13, 1998), Deeley Adjud., [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 486 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Indian Resource Council of Canada and Whitecap, Re (2003), [2003] C.L.A.D. No. 545, 2003 CarswellNat 7342 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada v. Taub (2009), 2009 ONCA 628, 2009 CarswellOnt 5033, [2009] O.J. No. 3552, (sub nom. Taub v. Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada) 98 O.R. (3d) 169, 255 O.A.C. 126, (sub nom. Taub v. Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada) 311 D.L.R. (4th) 389 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Jackson v. Gitxsan Treaty Society (2005), 2005 BCSC 1112, 2005 CarswellBC 1836, 43 C.C.E.L. (3d) 179, [2005] B.C.J. No. 1703 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion 14 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Jalbert v. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd. (July 18, 1996), Ross Member, [1996] C.L.A.D. No. 631 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Kelso v. Canada (1981), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 199, 120 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 35 N.R. 19, 1981 CarswellNat 576, 1981 CarswellNat 576F (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Klein v. Royal Canadian Mint (2012), 2012 CarswellNat 4704, 2013 C.L.L.C. 210-013, [2012] C.L.A.D. No. 358 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Knopp v. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd. (1994), [1994] C.L.A.D. No. 172, 1994 CarswellNat 4176 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Lazarus v. Information Communication Services (ICS) Inc. (October 13, 2015), Doc. SC-14-00034348-0000, [2015] O.J. No. 5304 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Logan v. Progressive Air Service Ltd. (January 15, 1997), Doc. Kamloops 27740, [1997] B.C.J. No. 129 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Lum v. Shaw Communications Inc. (2004), 2004 NBCA 35, 2004 CarswellNB 206, 2004 CarswellNB 207, 270 N.B.R. (2d) 141, 710 A.P.R. 141, (sub nom. Shaw Communications Inc. v. Lum) 2005 C.L.L.C. 210-005, [2004] N.B.J. No. 172, [2004] A.N.B. No. 172 (N.B. C.A.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd. (1992), 40 C.C.E.L. 1, (sub nom. Lefebvre v. HOJ Industries Ltd.; Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd.) 53 O.A.C. 200, 91 D.L.R. (4th) 491, 7 O.R. (3d) 480n, (sub nom. Lefebvre v. HOJ Industries Ltd.; Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd.) 136 N.R. 40, 92 C.L.L.C. 14,022, 1992 CarswellOnt 989, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986, 1992 CarswellOnt 892, [1992] S.C.J. No. 41, 7 O.R. (3d) 480, 7 O.R. (3d) 480 (note) (S.C.C.) — consid- ered in a minority or dissenting opinion Madill and Spruce Hollow Heavy Haul Ltd., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellNat 3467, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion McCloud v. Samson Cree Nation (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 2184, [2011] C.L.A.D. No. 119 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services) (2004), 2004 SCC 54, 2004 CarswellOnt 3172, 2004 CarswellOnt 3173, 41 C.C.P.B. 106, 2004 C.E.B. & P.G.R. 8112 (headnote only), 45 B.L.R. (3d) 161, 242 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 324 N.R. 259, [2004] S.C.J. No. 51, 189 O.A.C. 201, 17 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152, 75 O.R. (3d) 479 (note), REJB 2004-68722, 2004 CSC 54, 75 O.R. (3d) 479 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 15
Morrisseau v. Tootinaowaziibeeng First Nation (2004), 2004 CarswellNat 4772, 39 C.C.E.L. (3d) 134, [2004] C.L.A.D. No. 357 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Nardocchio v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1979), 41 N.S.R. (2d) 26, 76 A.P.R. 26, 1979 CarswellNS 327 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Nelson v. Champion Feed Services Inc. (2010), 2010 ABQB 409, 2010 CarswellAlta 1198, 30 Alta. L.R. (5th) 162, [2010] A.J. No. 753, 5 Alta. L.R. (5th) 162 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir (2008), 2008 SCC 9, 2008 CarswellNB 124, 2008 CarswellNB 125, D.T.E. 2008T-223, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 2008 C.L.L.C. 220-020, 64 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 69 Imm. L.R. (3d) 1, 69 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 372 N.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 170 L.A.C. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 291 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2008] A.C.S. No. 9, 329 N.B.R. (2d) 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 844 A.P.R. 1, (sub nom. Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick) 95 L.C.R. 65, 2008 CSC 9 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Newman and Northern Thunderbird Air Inc., Re (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 3703, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 248 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Ng v. Bank of Montreal (2010), 2010 ONSC 5692, 2010 CarswellOnt 9822, 87 C.C.E.L. (3d) 86 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Novaquest Finishing Inc. v. Abdoulrab (2009), 2009 ONCA 491, 2009 Cars- wellOnt 3474, (sub nom. Abdoulrab v. OLRB) 2009 C.L.L.C. 210-033, (sub nom. Abdoulrab v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)) 95 O.R. (3d) 641, (sub nom. Abdoulrab v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)) 251 O.A.C. 28, [2009] O.J. No. 2524, 95 Admin. L.R. (4th) 121, [2009] O.L.R.B. Rep. 480 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion O’Brien and Mushuau Innu First Nation, Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 60, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 14 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion Palmer v. Dempsey Laird Trucking Ltd. (2012), 2012 CarswellNat 1620 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Paquette v. TeraGo Networks Inc. (2015), 2015 ONSC 4189, 2015 CarswellOnt 9801, 2015 C.L.L.C. 210-056, [2015] O.J. No. 3435 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Pare and Corus Entertainment Inc. (Unjust Dismissal), Re (2015), 2015 Car- swellNat 1265, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 103 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — re- ferred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Parrish & Heinbecker, Ltd. and Knight, Re (2006), 2006 CarswellNat 6950 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion 16 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Parry Sound (District) Welfare Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324 (2003), 2003 SCC 42, 2003 CarswellOnt 3500, 2003 CarswellOnt 3501, 2003 C.L.L.C. 220-062, [2003] S.C.J. No. 42, (sub nom. Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324) 230 D.L.R. (4th) 257, (sub nom. Social Services Administration Board (Parry Sound) v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 324) 308 N.R. 271, (sub nom. Social Services Administration Board (Parry Sound District) v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 324) 177 O.A.C. 235, 7 Admin. L.R. (4th) 177, (sub nom. Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157, 31 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 47 C.H.R.R. D/182, REJB 2003-47356, 67 O.R. (3d) 256 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Paul v. National Centre For First Nations Governance (2012), 2012 Car- swellNat 690, [2012] C.L.A.D. No. 44 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — re- ferred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Payne and Bank of Montreal, Re (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 349, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 32, 16 C.C.E.L. (4th) 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — re- ferred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Pereira v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 4571, 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 267, [2007] O.J. No. 2796 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Perley v. Maliseet First Nation at Tobique (2010), 2010 CarswellNat 4618 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Pierre v. Roseau River Tribal Council (1993), 64 F.T.R. 255, [1993] 3 F.C. 756, 1993 CarswellNat 231, 1993 CarswellNat 231F, [1993] F.C.J. No. 588 (Fed. T.D.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Poulter v. Gull Bay First Nation (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 3466 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Prosper v. PADC Management Co. (2010), 2010 CarswellNat 5908, [2010] C.L.A.D. No. 430 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion R. c. G. (B.) (1999), 1999 CarswellQue 1204, 1999 CarswellQue 1205, (sub nom. R. v. G. (B.)) 240 N.R. 260, 24 C.R. (5th) 266, (sub nom. R. v. G. (B.)) 135 C.C.C. (3d) 303, (sub nom. R. v. G. (B.)) 174 D.L.R. (4th) 301, (sub nom. R. v. G. (B.)) 63 C.R.R. (2d) 272, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475, [1999] S.C.J. No. 29, 7 B.H.R.C. 97 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Reference re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 & s. 133 of Constitution Act, 1867 (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, [1985] 4 W.W.R. 385, 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 59 N.R. 321, 35 Man. R. (2d) 83, 1985 CarswellMan 183, 1985 CarswellMan 450, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 17
Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), 1998 CarswellNat 1299, 161 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 228 N.R. 203, 55 C.R.R. (2d) 1, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 1998 Car- swellNat 1300, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, 51 C.R.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Ridley v. Gitxaala Nation (2009), 2009 CarswellNat 3498, [2009] C.L.A.D. No. 267 (Can. Arb.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1, 1998 CarswellOnt 2, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 36 O.R. (3d) 418 (headnote only), (sub nom. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re) 221 N.R. 241, (sub nom. Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour) 98 C.L.L.C. 210-006, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, (sub nom. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re) 106 O.A.C. 1, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minor- ity or dissenting opinion Rodgers v. Sun Radio Ltd. (1991), 38 C.C.E.L. 298, 109 N.S.R. (2d) 415, 297 A.P.R. 415, 1991 CarswellNS 403 (N.S. T.D.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Ryder v. Carry the Kettle First Nation (2002), 2002 SKQB 32, 2002 Carswell- Sask 46, 215 Sask. R. 239, 2002 C.L.L.C. 210-018, [2002] S.J. No. 47 (Sask. Q.B.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Schimanski v. B & D Walter Trucking Ltd. (2014), 2014 ABPC 288, 2014 CarswellAlta 2617 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Sharma and Beacon Transit Lines Inc., Re (2013), 2013 CarswellNat 4148 (Can. Arb.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Sharma and Maple Star Transport Ltd. (Unjust Dismissal), Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 2967 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson (1989), 26 C.C.E.L. 85, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416, (sub nom. Davidson v. Slaight Communications Inc.) 93 N.R. 183, 89 C.L.L.C. 14,031, 40 C.R.R. 100, 1989 CarswellNat 695, 1989 CarswellNat 193, EYB 1989-67228, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45 (S.C.C.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Spilberg v. Total Transportation Solutions Inc. (June 17, 2014), Doc. SC-12- 000014807-0000, [2014] O.J. No. 2903 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion St-Gervais (Commission scolaire) v. Belanger (1970), [1970] S.C.R. 948, 1970 CarswellQue 45, 1970 CarswellQue 45F, 16 D.L.R. (3d) 602 (S.C.C.) — re- ferred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Stark v. Tl’azt’en Nation (2011), 2011 CarswellNat 3074 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Swanson and Qualicum First Nation, Re (2015), 2015 CarswellNat 4108, 26 C.C.E.L. (4th) 139 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion 18 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Taypotat and Muscowpetung First Nation, Re (2014), 2014 CarswellNat 739, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 53 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) — referred to in a mi- nority or dissenting opinion Toronto Dominion Bank v. Wallace (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 161, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 431, 83 C.L.L.C. 14,031, 1983 CarswellOnt 835 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Vist v. Best Theratronics Ltd. (2014), 2014 ONSC 2867, 2014 CarswellOnt 7189, 2014 C.L.L.C. 210-038 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1989), 25 C.C.E.L. 81, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, [1989] 4 W.W.R. 218, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 94 N.R. 321, 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, 42 B.L.R. 111, 90 C.L.L.C. 14,035, 1989 CarswellBC 76, 1989 CarswellBC 704, [1989] S.C.J. No. 46, EYB 1989-66980 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd. (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 219 N.R. 161, 1997 CarswellMan 455, 1997 CarswellMan 456, [1997] S.C.J. No. 94, 123 Man. R. (2d) 1, 159 W.A.C. 1, 97 C.L.L.C. 210-029, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 36 C.C.E.L. (2d) 1, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 1, [1999] 4 W.W.R. 86, [1997] L.V.I. 2889-1, [1997] A.C.S. No. 94 (S.C.C.) — considered in a minority or dissenting opinion Wilson v. Sliammon First Nation (2002), 2002 BCSC 190, 2002 CarswellBC 363, [2002] B.C.J. No. 381 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to in a minority or dis- senting opinion Wyllie v. Larche Communications Inc. (2015), 2015 ONSC 4747, 2015 Cars- wellOnt 11291 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to in a minority or dissenting opinion Statutes considered by Abella J.: Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 Generally — referred to Pt. III — referred to s. 230(1) — considered s. 235(1) — considered s. 240 — considered s. 240(1) — considered ss. 240-245 — referred to ss. 240-246 — considered s. 241(1) — considered s. 241(2) — considered s. 241(3) — considered s. 242(1) — considered s. 242(3) — considered s. 242(3.1)(a) [en. R.S.C. 1985, c. 9 (1st Supp.), s. 16] — considered s. 242(4) — considered Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 19
s. 242(4)(b) — considered s. 242(4)(c) — considered s. 246 — considered Canada Labour Code, Act to amend the, S.C. 1977-78, c. 27 Generally — referred to Normes du travail, Loi sur les, L.Q. 1979, c. 45 en g´en´eral — referred to art. 124 — referred to
Statutes considered by McLachlin C.J.C., Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon JJ.: Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 Generally — referred to
Statutes considered by Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. (dissenting): Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2 Generally — referred to Pt. III — referred to s. 167(3) — considered s. 168 — referred to s. 168(1) — considered s. 230 — considered s. 235 — considered s. 235(1) — considered s. 235(2)(a) — considered s. 240(1) — considered s. 240(1)(a) — considered s. 240(2) — considered ss. 240-242 — referred to ss. 240-245 — referred to ss. 240-246 — referred to s. 241 — considered s. 241(2) — considered s. 241(3) — considered s. 242 — considered s. 242(1) — considered s. 242(3) — considered s. 242(4) — considered s. 242(4)(b) — considered s. 246 — considered s. 246(1) — considered Code civil du Qu´ebec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64 art. 2925 — referred to 20 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 113 s. 79 — referred to ss. 74-86.2 — referred to Employment Standards Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. E110 s. 96.1 [en. 2003, c. 7, s. 6] — referred to Employment Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2 ss. 61-76 — referred to s. 65 — referred to Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 s. 104 — referred to Employment Standards Act, S.P.E.I. 1992, c. 18 s. 30 — referred to Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-9 s. 82 — referred to s. 89(1) — referred to Labour Standards Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. L-2 s. 62 — referred to ss. 68-73 — referred to s. 78 — referred to Labour Standards Code, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 246 Generally — referred to s. 6 — referred to s. 21 — referred to s. 23 — referred to s. 71 — considered s. 71(1) — considered s. 71(2) — considered s. 71(3) — considered s. 72 — considered s. 78 — referred to Limitation Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 13 s. 6(1) — referred to Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. L150 s. 2(1) — referred to Limitation of Actions Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. L-8.5 s. 5(1) — referred to Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-8 s. 2(1) — referred to Limitation of Actions Act, nun-R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-8 s. 2(1) — referred to Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 139 s. 2(1) — referred to Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 21
Limitations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12 s. 3(1) — referred to Limitations Act, S.N. 1995, c. L-16.1 s. 9 — referred to Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B s. 4 — referred to Limitations Act, S.S. 2004, c. L-16.1 s. 5 — referred to Normes du travail, Loi sur les, RLRQ, c. N-1.1 en g´en´eral — referred to art. 82 — referred to art. 82 al. 4 — referred to art. 82.1 al. 3 [ad. 1990, c. 73, art. 36] — referred to art. 124 — referred to art. 126 — considered Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25 s. 97(2.1) [en. 1994, c. 52, s. 5] — referred to s. 100.1 [en. 1990, c. 30, s. 40] — referred to Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258 s. 2(1) — referred to Saskatchewan Employment Act, S.S. 2013, c. S-15.1 ss. 2-97(1) — referred to ss. 3-36(1) — referred to Statute of Limitations, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-7 s. 2(1) — referred to Words and phrases considered: unjust dismissal [Per Abella J.:] . . . that employees covered by collective agreements are pro- tected from [u]njust [d]ismissals and can only be dismissed for “just cause”. This includes an onus on employers to give reasons showing why the dismissal is justified, and carries with it a wide remedial package including reinstatement and progressive discipline. Termes et locutions cit´es: cong´ediement injuste [Abella, J.:] [L]es employ´es vis´es par une convention collective sont prot´eg´es contre le cong´ediement injuste; ils ne peuvent etreˆ cong´edi´es que pour une juste cause. Il incombe a` l’employeur de fournir les motifs d´emontrant en quoi le cong´ediement est justifi´e, et l’employ´e jouit d’importantes mesures de r´epara- 22 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
tion, dont la r´eint´egration dans l’emploi et des mesures disciplinaires progressives.
APPEAL by employee from judgment reported at Wilson and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Re (2015), 2015 FCA 17, 2015 CarswellNat 64, [2015] F.C.J. No. 44, 467 N.R. 201, 22 C.C.E.L. (4th) 234, 2015 C.L.L.C. 210-023, D.T.E. 2015T-442, 2015 CAF 17, 2015 CarswellNat 4803, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 467 (F.C.A.), affirming decision that adjudicator wrongly concluded that federal em- ployer could not dismiss employee without cause.
POURVOI form´e par un employ´e a` l’encontre d’un jugement publi´e a` Wilson and Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., Re (2015), 2015 FCA 17, 2015 CarswellNat 64, [2015] F.C.J. No. 44, 467 N.R. 201, 22 C.C.E.L. (4th) 234, 2015 C.L.L.C. 210-023, D.T.E. 2015T-442, 2015 CAF 17, 2015 CarswellNat 4803, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 467 (F.C.A.), ayant confirm´e la d´ecision voulant que l’abitre ait conclu a` tort que l’employeur f´ed´eral ne pouvait pas cong´edier un employ´e sans motif.
James A. LeNoury, Avi Sirlin, Reagan Ruslim, for Appellant Ronald M. Snyder, Eugene F. Der´enyi, for Respondent Steven Barrett, Louis Century, for Intervener, Canadian Labour Congress Stacey Reginald Ball, Anne Marie Frauts, for Intervener, Canadian Association, for Non-Organized Employees Christopher D. Pigott, Christina E. Hall, for Interveners, Federally Regulated Employers - Transportation and Communications and the Canadian Associa- tion of Counsel to Employers
Abella J.:
1 At common law, a non-unionized employee could be dismissed with- out reasons if he or she is given reasonable notice or pay in lieu. The issue in this appeal is whether Parliament’s intention behind amendments to the Canada Labour Code1 in 1978 was to offer an alternative statutory scheme consisting of expansive protections much like those available to employees covered by a collective agreement. In my respectful view, like almost all of the hundreds of adjudicators who have interpreted the scheme, I believe that is exactly what Parliament’s intention was.
1 R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 23
Background 2 In 1971, Parliament passed amendments to the Canada Labour Code2 setting out the notice requirements for firing non-unionized employees who had worked for three or more consecutive months.3 The amend- ments also stipulated a minimal rate of severance pay for those who had worked for 12 months.4 Employees dismissed for just cause are not enti- tled to either notice or severance pay. 3 More fundamental reforms were enacted in 1978, when the Code was again amended by adding a series of provisions to Part III under the heading “Unjust Dismissal”.5 They are found at ss. 240 to 246.6 This Unjust Dismissal scheme applies to non-unionized employees who have completed 12 consecutive months of continuous employment. Any such employee who has been dismissed has 90 days to make a complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee considers the dismissal to be un- just (s. 240). 4 A dismissed employee or an inspector can ask the employer for a written statement setting out the reasons for the dismissal. The employer must then provide the statement within 15 days (s. 241(1)). 5 An inspector is required to try to immediately settle the complaint (s. 241(2)). If the complaint cannot be settled within a reasonable time, the inspector can, at the request of the dismissed employee, refer the matter to the Minister (s. 241(3)), who may appoint an adjudicator to hear the complaint (s. 242(1)). The report of an inspector acts as a screening mechanism to prevent complaints which are frivolous, vexatious or clearly unmeritorious from proceeding to adjudication: Harry W. Arthurs, Fairness at Work: Federal Labour Standards for the 21st Cen- tury (2006), at pp. 179-80 (Arthurs Report). 6 The mandate of the adjudicator is to determine whether the dismissal was unjust (s. 242(3)). If it was, the adjudicator has broad authority to
2 An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. 17 (2nd Supp.), s. 16. 3 Currently Part III, Division X — Individual Terminations of Employment. 4 Currently Part III, Division XI — Severance Pay. 5 An Act to amend the Canada Labour Code, S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 21. 6 Currently Part III, Division XIV — Unjust Dismissal. 24 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
grant an appropriate remedy (s. 242(4)), including requiring the em- ployer to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the em- ployer to do in order to remedy or counteract any conse- quence of the dismissal. 7 No complaint can be considered by an adjudicator if the employee was laid off because of lack of work or the discontinuance of a function (s. 242(3.1)(a)).
Prior Proceedings 8 Joseph Wilson was hired by Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL)7 as a Senior Buyer/Order Administrator in 2005 and was later promoted to Procurement Supervisor. He worked for four and a half years until his dismissal in November 2009. He had a clean disciplinary record. 9 Mr. Wilson filed an “Unjust Dismissal” complaint in December 2009, claiming that he was unjustly dismissed contrary to s. 240(1) of the Code. In response to a request from an inspector for the reasons for Mr. Wilson’s dismissal, AECL sent a letter in March 2010 saying that he was “terminated on a non-cause basis and was provided a generous dismissal package that well exceeded the statutory requirements. We trust you will find the above satisfactory.” 10 Mr. Wilson claimed that his dismissal was in reprisal for having filed a complaint of improper AECL procurement practices. 11 A labour Adjudicator, Prof. Stanley Schiff, was appointed to hear the complaint. AECL sought a preliminary ruling on whether a dismissal without cause together with a sizeable severance package meant that the dismissal was a just one. 12 The parties agreed that regardless of the Adjudicator’s ruling on this preliminary issue, he retained jurisdiction to hear Mr. Wilson’s allega- tions of reprisal.
7 AECL is a federally regulated Crown corporation. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 25
13 The Adjudicator concluded that he was bound by Redlon Agencies Ltd. v. Norgren, 2005 FC 804 (F.C.), which had held that an employer could not resort to severance payments, however generous, to avoid a determination under the Code about whether the dismissal was unjust. Because AECL did not rely on any cause to fire him, Mr. Wilson’s com- plaint was allowed. 14 The Application Judge found this decision was unreasonable because, in his view, nothing in Part III of the Code precluded employers from dismissing non-unionized employees on a without-cause basis. The Fed- eral Court of Appeal agreed, but reviewed the issue on a standard of correctness.
Analysis 15 The parties before this Court, as they had in all the prior judicial pro- ceedings, accepted that the standard of review was reasonableness. I agree. The decisions of labour adjudicators or arbitrators interpreting statutes or agreements within their expertise attract a reasonableness standard: New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), at para. 68; M.A.H.C.P. v. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc., [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.), at para. 42. 16 The Federal Court of Appeal itself, including two of the judges who decided the case before us, recently held in Yue v. Bank of Montreal, 2016 FCA 107 (F.C.A.), that the decisions of adjudicators applying the Unjust Dismissal provisions of the Code attract a reasonableness stan- dard: It is well-settled that the reasonableness standard applies to review of adjudicators’ decisions under Division XIV of Part III of the Code, generally, and to their interpretations of what sorts of employer con- duct constitute an unjust dismissal: Payne v. Bank of Montreal, 2013 FCA 33 at paragraphs 32-33, 443 N.R. 253; MacFarlane v. Day & Ross Inc., 2014 FCA 199 at paragraph 3, 466 N.R. 53; Donaldson v. Western Grain By-Products Storage Ltd., 2015 FCA 62 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 33, 469 N.R. 189 [para. 5 (CanLII)] 17 Applying that standard, the Adjudicator’s decision was reasonable and consistent with the approach overwhelmingly applied to these provi- sions since they were enacted. It is true that a handful of adjudicators have taken a different approach to the interpretation of the Code, but as this Court has repeatedly said, this does not justify deviating from a rea- sonableness standard: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77 (S.C.C.), at para. 71; Dunsmuir, at paras. 55-56; Alliance 26 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Pipeline Ltd. v. Smith, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160 (S.C.C.), at para. 38; Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. CEP, Local 30, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458 (S.C.C.), at paras. 7-8. 18 Nor do I accept the position taken in this case by the Federal Court of Appeal that even if a reasonableness review applied, the Adjudicator should be afforded “only a narrow margin of appreciation” because the statutory interpretation in this case “involves relatively little specialized labour insight”. As this Court has said, the reasonableness standard must be applied in the specific context under review. But to attempt to cali- brate reasonableness by applying a potentially indeterminate number of varying degrees of deference within it, unduly complicates an area of law in need of greater simplicity. 19 But while it is true that the standard of review in this case falls easily into our jurisprudence, it seems to me that some general comments about standard of review are worth airing, albeit in obiter. There are undoubt- edly many models that would help simplify the standard of review laby- rinth we currently find ourselves in. I offer the following proposal as an option only, for purposes of starting the conversation about the way for- ward. Because it is only the beginning of the conversation, which will benefit over time from submissions from counsel, this proposal is not intended in any way to be comprehensive, definitive, or binding. 20 A substantial portion of the parties’ factums and the decisions of the lower courts in this case were occupied with what the applicable standard of review should be. This, in my respectful view, is insupportable, and directs us institutionally to think about whether this obstacle course is necessary or whether there is a principled way to simplify the path to reviewing the merits. 21 For a start, it would be useful to go back to the basic principles set out in Dunsmuir, under which two approaches were enunciated for reviewing administrative decisions. The first is deferential, and applies when there is a range of reasonable outcomes defensible on the facts and law. This is by far the largest group of cases. Deference is succinctly explained in Dunsmuir as follows: It does not mean that courts are subservient to the determinations of decision makers, or that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations, or that they may be content to pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness review while in fact imposing their own view. Rather, deference imports respect for the decision-making pro- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 27
cess of adjudicative bodies with regard to both the facts and the law. [para. 48] 22 The reason for the wide range is, as Justice John M. Evans explained, because “[d]eference ... assumes that there is no uniquely correct answer to the question”: “Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter?” (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 101, at p. 108. The range will nec- essarily vary. As Chief Justice McLachlin noted, reasonableness “must be assessed in the context of the particular type of decision making in- volved and all relevant factors” and “takes its colour from the context”: Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.), at paras. 18 and 23, citing with approval Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.), at para. 59. 23 The other approach, called correctness, was applied when only a sin- gle defensible answer is available. As set out in Dunsmuir, this applied to constitutional questions regarding the division of powers (para. 58), “true questions of jurisdiction or vires” (para. 59), questions of general law that are “both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise” (para. 60), and “questions regarding the jurisdictional lines between two or more com- peting specialized tribunals” (para. 61). 24 Most of the confusion in our jurisprudence has been over what to call the category of review in a particular case. Perhaps it is worth thinking about whether it is really necessary to engage in rhetorical debates about what to call our conclusions at the end of the review. Are we not saying essentially the same thing when we conclude that there is only a single “reasonable” answer available and when we say it is “correct”? And this leads to whether we need two different names for our approaches to judi- cial review, or whether both approaches can live comfortably under a more broadly conceived understanding of reasonableness. 25 It may be helpful to review briefly how we got here. In Dunsmuir, this Court sought to provide “a principled framework that is more coher- ent and workable” for the judicial review of administrative decisions (para. 32). As a result, the three existing standards of review were re- placed by two. The aim was to simplify judicial review. But collapsing three into two has not proven to be the runway to simplicity the Court had hoped it would be. In fact, the terminological battles over which of the three standards of review should apply have been replaced by those 28 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
over the application of the remaining two. And so we still find the merits waiting in the wings for their chance to be seen and reviewed. 26 However, where once the confusion was over the difference between patent unreasonableness and reasonableness simpliciter, we now find ourselves struggling over the difference between reasonableness and cor- rectness. In my respectful view, this complicated entry into judicial re- view is hard to justify. Ironically, the explanation in Dunsmuir for chang- ing the framework then remains a valid explanation for why it should be changed now, as the following excerpts show: The recent history of judicial review in Canada has been marked by ebbs and flows of deference, confounding tests and new words for old problems, but no solutions that provide real guidance for liti- gants, counsel, administrative decision makers or judicial review judges. The time has arrived for a reassessment of the question...... Despite the clear, stable constitutional foundations of the system of judicial review, the operation of judicial review in Canada has been in a constant state of evolution over the years, as courts have at- tempted to devise approaches to judicial review that are both theoret- ically sound and effective in practice. Despite efforts to refine and clarify it, the present system has proven to be difficult to implement. The time has arrived to re-examine the Canadian approach to judicial review of administrative decisions and develop a principled frame- work that is more coherent and workable. ... it has become apparent that the present system must be simplified. [paras. 1 and 32-33] 27 Dunsmuir had pointed out that courts were struggling with the “con- ceptual distinction” between two of the standards — patent unreasona- bleness and reasonableness simpliciter — and were finding that “any ac- tual difference between them in terms of their operation appears to be illusory” (paras. 39-41). An argument can be made, as Prof. David Mul- lan has, that this Court too has blurred the conceptual distinctions in a number of cases, this time between correctness and reasonableness stan- dards of review, and has sometimes engaged in “disguised correctness” review while ostensibly conducting a reasonableness review.8 Others too
8 David Mullan, “Unresolved Issues on Standard of Review in Canadian Judicial Review of Administrative Action — The Top Fifteen!” (2013), 42 Adv. Q. 1, at pp. 76-81. As examples of where this occurred, Prof. Mullan cites British Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 29
have expressed concerns about inconsistency and confusion in how the standards have been applied.9 The question then is whether there is a way to move forward that respects the underlying principles of judicial review which were so elegantly and definitively explained in Dunsmuir, while redesigning their implementation in a way that makes them easier to apply. 28 The most obvious and frequently proposed reform of the current sys- tem is a single reviewing standard of reasonableness. Before accepting it, it is important to remember the rule of law imperatives of judicial re- view. Dunsmuir discussed the relationship between judicial review and the rule of law in the opening paragraphs of its analysis: As a matter of constitutional law, judicial review is intimately con- nected with the preservation of the rule of law. It is essentially that constitutional foundation which explains the purpose of judicial re- view and guides its function and operation. Judicial review seeks to address an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foun- dational democratic principle, which finds an expression in the initia- tives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers. Courts, while exercising their constitutional functions of judicial review, must be sensitive not only to the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity of
Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. British Columbia (Human Rights Tribunal), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 422 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Mowat, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471 (S.C.C.) (Mowat); Alberta (Minister of Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345 (S.C.C.); and Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Canada (Public Works & Government Ser- vices), [2012] 2 S.C.R. 108 (S.C.C.). See also Lauren J. Wihak, “Whither the correctness standard of review? Dunsmuir, six years later” (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 173, at pp. 174-75 and 183. 9 See Lorne Sossin, “The Complexity of Coherence: Justice LeBel’s Adminis- trative Law” (2015), 70 S.C.L.R. (2d) 145; the Hon. John M. Evans, “Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter?” (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 101; David Phillip Jones Q.C., “The Year in Review: Recent Devel- opments in Administrative Law” (paper prepared for the Canadian Bar Associa- tion’s 2015 National Administrative Law, Labour and Employment Law Confer- ence); Wihak; Matthew Lewans, “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012), 38 Queen’s L.J. 59; Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012), 58 McGill L.J. 483; the Hon. Justice David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doc- trinal Coherence and Consistency”, February 17, 2016 (online). 30 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
avoiding undue interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures. By virtue of the rule of law principle, all exercises of public authority must find their source in law. All decision-making powers have legal limits, derived from the enabling statute itself, the common or civil law or the Constitution. Judicial review is the means by which the courts supervise those who exercise statutory powers, to ensure that they do not overstep their legal authority. The function of judicial review is therefore to ensure the legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the administrative process and its outcomes. [paras. 27- 28] 29 What this means is that “[t]he legislative branch of government can- not remove the judiciary’s power to review actions and decisions of ad- ministrative bodies for compliance with the constitutional capacities of the government. ... In short, judicial review is constitutionally guaranteed in Canada, particularly with regard to the definition and enforcement of jurisdictional limits” (Dunsmuir, at para. 31). 30 Notably, judicial review also “performs an important constitutional function in maintaining legislative supremacy”, which results in “the court-centric conception of the rule of law [being] reined in by acknowl- edging that the courts do not have a monopoly on deciding all questions of law”: Dunsmuir, at para. 30, citing Justice Thomas Cromwell, “Appel- late Review: Policy and Pragmatism”, in 2006 Isaac Pitblado Lectures, at p. V-12. 31 Nothing Dunsmuir says about the rule of law suggests that constitu- tional compliance dictates how many standards of review are required. The only requirement, in fact, is that there be judicial review in order to ensure, in particular, that decision-makers do not exercise authority they do not have. I see nothing in its elaboration of rule of law principles that precludes the adoption of a single standard of review, so long as it ac- commodates the ability to continue to protect both deference and the possibility of a single answer where the rule of law demands it, as in the four categories singled out for correctness review in Dunsmuir. 32 A single standard of reasonableness still invites the approach outlined in Dunsmuir, namely: ... reasonableness is concerned ... with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. [para. 47] Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 31
33 Approaching the analysis from the perspective of whether the out- come falls within a range of defensible outcomes has the advantage of being able to embrace comfortably the animating principles of both for- mer categories of judicial review. Courts can apply a wider range for those kinds of issues and decision-makers traditionally given a measure of deference, and a narrow one of only one “defensible” outcome for those which formerly attracted a correctness review. Most decisions will continue to attract deference, as they did in Dunsmuir, which means, as Justice Evans noted [that] a court may be more likely to conclude that a range of reasona- ble interpretative choices exists, and that deference is meaningful, when the tribunal’s authority is conferred in broad terms. If, for ex- ample, a tribunal is authorized to make a decision on the basis of the public interest, a reviewing court may well decide that the tribunal has a range of choices in selecting the factors it will consider in mak- ing its decision. At this point, questions of law shade imperceptibly into questions of discretion. Reasonableness review permits the court to determine whether the factors considered by the tribunal are ra- tionally related to the generally multiple statutory objectives. It is not the court’s role to identify the factors to be considered by the tribu- nal, let alone to reweigh them. [Footnote omitted; p. 110.] 34 Even in statutory interpretation, the interpretive exercise will usually attract a wide range of reasonable outcomes. This Court in Agraira v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.), for example, found that the Minister had considerable latitude in interpreting a statutory provision that required decisions be made in the “national interest”. 35 But there may be rare occasions where only one “defensible” out- come exists. In Mowat, for example, this Court found that the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation made it clear that the administrative body under review did not have the authority to award costs in a specific con- text. In the particular circumstances of that case, no other result fell within the range of reasonable outcomes. Similarly, this Court has set aside decisions when they fundamentally contradicted the purpose or policy underlying the statutory scheme: Halifax. 36 The four categories, however, which were identified as attracting cor- rectness under Dunsmuir based on rule of law principles, always yield only one reasonable outcome. 37 I acknowledge that no attempt to simplify the review process will necessarily guarantee consistent outcomes. Even under the current Dun- 32 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
smuir model, there have been cases in this Court where judges applied the same standard, yet came to different conclusions about the decisional effect of applying the standard.10 But the goal is not to address all possi- ble variables, it is to build on the theories developed in Dunsmuir and to apply them in a way that eliminates the need to sort cases into artificial categories. 38 Even if, however, there proves to be little appetite for collapsing the two remaining standards of review, it would, I think, still be beneficial if the template so compellingly developed in Dunsmuir, were adhered to, including by applying the residual “correctness” standard only in those four circumstances Dunsmuir articulated. 39 But as previously noted, in this case we need not do more than apply our usual approach to reasonableness. The issue here is whether the Ad- judicator’s interpretation of ss. 240 to 246 of the Code was reasonable. The text, the context, the statements of the Minister when the legislation was introduced, and the views of the overwhelming majority of arbitra- tors and labour law scholars, confirm that the entire purpose of the statu- tory scheme was to ensure that non-unionized federal employees would be entitled to protection from being dismissed without cause under Part III of the Code. The alternative approach of severance pay in lieu falls outside the range of “possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” because it completely undermines this purpose by permitting employers, at their option, to deprive employees of the full remedial package Parliament created for them. The rights of employees should be based on what Parliament intended, not on the idio- syncratic view of the individual employer or adjudicator. 40 Adjudicator Schiff’s decision was, therefore, reasonable. 41 As previously noted, Parliament passed amendments to the Code in 1971 which included provisions setting out the minimum remuneration owed to an employee whose employment had been terminated if that em- ployee worked for a threshold number of consecutive months and was not dismissed for just cause. These provisions are now found in ss. 230(1) and 235(1) of the Code, both in Part III. The enactment of these
10 See M. (M.) v. United States of America, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 973 (S.C.C.); Kanthasamy v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] 3 S.C.R. 909 (S.C.C.); Tervita Corp. v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.); Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation Inc., [2015] 3 S.C.R. 147 (S.C.C.); Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 33
provisions neither codified nor extinguished the common law; instead, it offered an alternative to going to court by setting out minimum entitle- ments for dismissed employees who wanted to avoid the expense and uncertainty of civil litigation: Arthurs Report, at pp. 172-74. 42 In 1978, Parliament further amended the Code and established the Unjust Dismissal scheme, currently found in ss. 240 to 246 in Part III of the Code. The central question in this case is what effect the 1978 amendments had on the rights of non-unionized employees whose em- ployment had been terminated. When the provisions were introduced, the then Minister of Labour, the Hon. John Munro, said: It is our hope that [the amendments] will give at least to the unorgan- ized workers some of the minimum standards which have been won by the organized workers and which are now embodied in their col- lective agreements. We are not alleging for one moment that they match the standards set out in collective agreements, but we provide here a minimum standard. [Emphasis added.] (House of Commons Debates, vol. II, 3rd Sess., 30th Parl., December 13, 1977, at p. 1831) 43 He explained the purpose of the new “Unjust Dismissal” provisions to the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration in March 1978 as follows: The intent of this provision is to provide employees not represented by a union, including managers and professionals, with the right to appeal against arbitrary dismissal — protection the government be- lieves to be a fundamental right of workers and already a part of all collective agreements. (House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration, Re- specting Bill C-8, An Act to Amend the Canada Labour Code, No. 11, 3rd Sess., 30th Parl., March 16, 1978, at p. 46) 44 The references in this statement to the right of employees to “funda- mental” protection from arbitrary dismissal and to the fact that such pro- tection was “already a part of all collective agreements”, make it diffi- cult, with respect, to draw any inference other than that Parliament intended to expand the dismissal rights of non-unionized federal employ- ees in a way that, if not identically, then certainly analogously matched those held by unionized employees. 34 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
45 Parliament’s intentions were also on display when, the previous Au- gust, the Minister acknowledged that while the terminology of “just” and “unjust” was, on its face, ambiguous, the extensive arbitral jurisprudence from organized labour would illuminate the way forward for non-union- ized federal employees who were dismissed: I realize that the terms “just” or “unjust” are sometimes difficult to define. However we have a vast body of arbitral jurisprudence on dismissals in the organized sector. They contain precedents that will enable arbitrators to determine whether a firing is warranted or not. Each case has to be decided according to its circumstances, but the application of the principles of fairness and common sense have es- tablished pretty clearly what constitutes just or unjust dismissal. (Hon. John Munro, “A better deal for Canada’s unorganized work- ers” (1977), 77 The Labour Gazette 347, at 349) 46 And this, in fact, is how the new provisions have been interpreted by labour law scholars and almost all the adjudicators appointed to apply them, namely, that the purpose of the 1978 provisions in ss. 240 to 246 was to offer a statutory alternative to the common law of dismissals and to conceptually align the protections from unjust dismissals for non-un- ionized federal employees with those available to unionized employees: Geoffrey England, “Unjust Dismissal in the Federal Jurisdiction: The First Three Years” (1982), 12 Man. L.J. 9, at p. 10; Innis Christie, Em- ployment Law in Canada (2nd ed. 1993), at p. 669; Arthurs Report, at p. 172. 47 The effect of the 1978 amendments was to limit the applicability of the notice requirements in s. 230(1) and the minimum severance provi- sions in s. 235(1) to circumstances that fell outside the Unjust Dismissal provisions. The notice and severance pay requirements under ss. 230(1) and 235(1), for example, apply to managers, those who are laid off due to lack of work or discontinuance of a function, and, in the case of s. 230(1), employees who have worked for the employer for more than three consecutive months but less than 12 months. In other words, ss. 230(1) and 235(1) are not an alternative to the Unjust Dismissal provi- sions in ss. 240 to 246, they apply only to those who do not or cannot avail themselves of those provisions: Redlon Agencies, at paras. 38-39; Young c. Wolf Lake Band (1997), 130 F.T.R. 115 (Fed. T.D.), at para. 50. 48 The soundness of the consensus among adjudicators interpreting the Unjust Dismissal provisions was confirmed in Prof. Arthurs’ 2006 report on Part III of the Code, commissioned by the then Minister of Labour. In preparing his report, Prof. Arthurs established a 16 person Commission Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 35
Secretariat, consulted two advisory panels (one consisting of impartial experts and the other of labour and management representatives), held two academic round tables engaging 38 participants from almost 20 uni- versities as well as industry groups, and consulted 23 independent re- search studies conducted by leading Canadian and foreign experts. Nine additional studies were provided by Commission staff on topics such as comparisons between Part III and labour standards legislation across Canada and in other countries. The Commission heard from 171 groups and individuals at public hearings and received over 154 briefs and other submissions. The Commission also met with labour, management and community-based organizations, and labour standards administrators and practitioners. 49 After this extensive review of Part III of the Code and its application, Prof. Arthurs confirmed that the goal of the new “Unjust Dismissal” pro- visions was meant to give “unorganized workers protection against un- just dismissal somewhat comparable to that enjoyed by unionized work- ers under collective agreements” (p. 172 (emphasis added)): ... over the years the adjudication system has not only remedied many of the procedural shortcomings of civil litigation, it has significantly modified the old civil and common law doctrines governing wrong- ful dismissal. ... Adjudicators, borrowing extensively from the juris- prudence developed over the years by arbitrators in unionized work- places, have built up their own distinctive doctrines that confer on unorganized federal workers quite extensive substantive and proce- dural protections. ... [T]his has coincided with, and arguably has- tened, the adoption of progressive attitudes and practices in the field of workplace discipline, many of which were also advocated by human resource and industrial relations professionals as a matter of best practice. [p. 178] (See also Gilles Trudeau, “Is Reinstatement a Remedy Suitable to At-Will Employees?” (1991), 30 Indus. Rel. 302, at pp. 312-13.) 50 The new Code regime was also a cost-effective alternative to the civil court system for dismissed employees to obtain meaningful remedies which are far more expansive than those available at common law. As Prof. Arthurs observed: At common ... law, employers who wish to reconfigure or reduce their workforce for business reasons are obliged to give “reasonable” notice to employees they intend to dismiss, unless the contract of em- ployment provides otherwise. Of course, as with other protections supposedly enjoyed by workers under the general law, this one has 36 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
always been difficult to enforce. Nonetheless, it remains the law to- day, and Part III does nothing to change it. What Part III does do is establish a different, more accessible procedure under which workers confronting discharge for business or economic reasons can claim notice and compensation without having to sue...... In effect, then, one great merit ... is that it overcomes the main defi- ciencies of civil litigation. It provides effective remedies and it removes cost barriers to access to justice. It thereby translates a uni- versally accepted principle — that no one should be dismissed with- out just cause — into a practical reality. Part III can therefore be un- derstood as an exercise in the reform of civil justice. [pp. 172-73 and 177] 51 The most significant arbitral tutor for the new provisions came from the way the jurisprudence defined “Unjust Dismissal”. It is true, as the Federal Court of Appeal noted, that the word “unjust” is a familiar one in the legal profession’s tool kit and has a generic, even iconic role. In the collective bargaining context, however, it has a specific and well under- stood — and no less iconic — meaning: that employees covered by col- lective agreements are protected from Unjust Dismissals and can only be dismissed for “just cause”. This includes an onus on employers to give reasons showing why the dismissal is justified, and carries with it a wide remedial package including reinstatement and progressive discipline. As in the 1978 provisions, there is no Unjust Dismissal protection in the case of layoffs or discontinuance of a job. 52 Notably, adjudicators did not interpret their mandate as requiring the automatic application of the arbitral jurisprudence or any remedies. In- stead, while they “have drawn heavily” from it, they also “modified it in order to reflect the differences at play in the non-unionized environ- ment”: Christie, at p. 688. 53 The decision which continues to be the accepted theoretical template, was the 1979 decision of Prof. George W. Adams in Roberts v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1979), 1 L.A.C. (3d) 259 (Can. Arb.). It helps illuminate what is generally understood by the terms “just cause” and “Unjust Dis- missal”: I am of the view that when Parliament used the notion of “unjust- ness” in framing [ss. 240 to 246], it had in mind the right that most organized employees have under collective agreements — the right to be dismissed only for “just cause”. I am of this view because the common law standard is simply “cause” for dismissal whereas “un- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 37
just” denotes a much more qualitative approach to dismissal cases. Indeed, in the context of modern labour relations, the term has a well understood content — a common law of the shop if you will: see Cox, “Reflections Upon Labour Arbitration”, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1958) at p. 1492. But having said that, I do not deny that the statute is silent on a whole host of important considerations that will, in any particular case, affect the precise meaning to be given to “justness”. [pp. 264-65] 54 He concluded that Parliament must also have had the concept of pro- gressive discipline in mind (pp. 265-66). This concept generally requires employers seeking to justify the dismissal to demonstrate that they have made the employee aware of performance problems, worked with the employee to rectify them, and imposed “a graduated repertoire of sanc- tions before resorting to the ultimate sanction of dismissal”: Arthurs Re- port, at p. 96; Christie, at pp. 690-91. 55 Prof. Adams explained why he thought progressive discipline was in- corporated into the scheme: Under a collective agreement, arbitrators have adopted the concept of progressive discipline, subject to specific provisions under the collec- tive agreement to the contrary...... Parliament must have had this basic concept in mind when it en- acted the instant provision because it is the very essence of “justness” in any labour relations sense. ... [M]ore fundamentally, it would be my view that on the enactment of [ss. 240 to 246] all employers sub- ject to this new provision were accorded the powers to meet the re- quirements of progressive discipline. With the greatest of respect, [a] more technical and contrary interpretation ... would simply frustrate and squander the purpose of this legislation. [Citations omitted.] (Roberts, at pp. 265-66) 56 But he also noted that adjudicators should be mindful of the varying employment contexts under the Code, so that the arbitral jurisprudence is not rigidly applied: However, this does not mean that Adjudicators should import the law of the collective agreement in discipline cases unthinkingly and with- out modification. They should be extremely sensitive to the varying employment contexts subject to this new provision of the Code, many of which may not fit comfortably within the “industrial” disci- pline model. In such cases appropriate modifications can be made as required. Thus, I must ask whether the use of suspensions in the banking industry ought not to be required. 38 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
(Roberts, at p. 266) 57 Ultimately Prof. Adams concluded that while the dismissal in the case before him was unjust, he did not consider reinstatement to be an appro- priate remedy in the circumstances. Instead, he awarded Ms. Roberts the equivalent of five months’ wages. 58 What turned out to be the consensus interpretation of the new provi- sions as reflected in the Roberts decision, was also the interpretation ac- cepted by Prof. Gordon Simmons in a report commissioned by Labour Canada to explain the provisions: For some guidance as to what constitutes just or unjust dismissal we can turn to nearly three decades of dismissal decisions pursuant to collective agreements. There are no hard and fast rules as each situa- tion must be determined according to the particular circumstances of each case. However, the arbitral jurisprudence which has been devel- oped can act as a guide to what have traditionally been regarded as sufficient or insufficient grounds for just dismissal. (C. Gordon Simmons, Meaning of Dismissal: The Meaning of Dis- missals Under Division V.7 of Part III of the Canada Labour Code (1979), at p. 1) 59 Until 1994, when Adjudicator T. W. Wakeling broke away in Knopp v. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd., [1994] C.L.A.D. No. 172 (Can. Arb.), the adjudicative path was clear that an employee could only be dismissed for just cause as that term was understood in the collective bargaining context. Adjudicator Wakeling’s revisionism led him to conclude that the common law approach applied, and that if the employer has satisfied the requirements in ss. 230(1) and 235(1) of the Code or according to the common law, whichever amount is higher, the dismissal would not be unjust. His is the interpretation accepted by the Federal Court of Appeal in this case. 60 Out of the over 1,740 adjudications and decisions since the Unjust Dismissal scheme was enacted, my colleagues have identified only 28 decisions that are said to have followed the Wakeling approach: Reagan Ruslim, “Unjust Dismissal under the Canada Labour Code: New Law, Old Statute” (2014), 5:2 U.W.O. J. Leg. Stud. 3 (online), at p. 28. Of these 28 decisions, 10 were rendered after this case was decided at the Federal Court and are therefore not relevant to determining the degree of “discord” amongst adjudicators before this case was heard: Sharma and Maple Star Transport Ltd. (Unjust Dismissal), Re [2015 CarswellNat 2967 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III))], 2015 CanLII 43356; G & R Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 39
Contracting Ltd. and Sandhu, Re, 2015 CarswellNat 7465 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Pare and Corus Entertainment Inc. (Unjust Dismissal), Re, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 103 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Madill and Spruce Hollow Heavy Haul Ltd., Re (2013), [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Swanson and Qualicum First Nation, Re (2015), 26 C.C.E.L. (4th) 139 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); O’Brien and Mushuau Innu First Nation, Re [2015 CarswellNat 60 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III))], 2015 CanLII 20942; Newman and Northern Thunderbird Air Inc., Re, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 248 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Taypotat and Muscowpetung First Nation, Re, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 53 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Payne and Bank of Montreal, Re (2014), 16 C.C.E.L. (4th) 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) and Sharma and Beacon Transit Lines Inc., Re, 2013 CarswellNat 4148 (Can. Arb.). 61 That leaves 18 cases that have applied the Wakeling approach. Three of them were decided by Adjudicator Wakeling himself. In other words, the “disagreement [that] has persisted for at least two decades” referred to by my colleagues consists of, at most, 18 cases out of over 1,700. What we have here is a drop in the bucket which is being elevated to a jurisprudential parting of the waters. 62 Even AECL concedes in its factum that “[t]he majority of adjudica- tors have held that employees may only be dismissed for just cause.” This consensus is hardly surprising given the unchallenged goals of the Unjust Dismissal scheme and their incompatibility with what is available under the common law. 63 In fact, the foundational premise of the common law scheme — that there is a right to dismiss on reasonable notice without cause or rea- sons — has been completely replaced under the Code by a regime re- quiring reasons for dismissal. In addition, the galaxy of discretionary remedies, including, most notably, reinstatement, as well as the open- ended equitable relief available under s. 242(4)(c), are also utterly incon- sistent with the right to dismiss without cause. If an employer can con- tinue to dismiss without cause under the Code simply by providing ade- quate severance pay, there is virtually no role for the plurality of remedies available to the adjudicator under ss. 240 to 245. 64 It is true that under s. 246, dismissed employees may choose to pur- sue their common law remedy of reasonable notice or pay in lieu in the civil courts instead of availing themselves of the dismissal provisions and remedies in the Code. But if they choose to pursue their rights under the 40 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Unjust Dismissal provisions of the Code, only those provisions apply. As Prof. Arthurs observed in his Report: ... the two types of proceedings differ most importantly in other respects. The first relates to remedies. If successful in a civil action, an em- ployee is entitled to damages equivalent to whatever compensation he or she would have received if the employment contract had been allowed to run its natural course — that is, for whatever period of notice would have been “reasonable.” If an employer has been unfair or high-handed in carrying out the discharge, the employee may be awarded additional damages. By contrast, if successful before an Ad- judicator under Part III, an employee is entitled both to reinstate- ment and to compensation, not only for the duration of the notice period, but for all losses attributable to the discharge. These are po- tentially more extensive and expensive remedies than those a court might award. [Emphasis added; p. 177.] 65 It is worth noting that the Code’s scheme, which was enacted in 1978, was preceded by similar Unjust Dismissal protection in Nova Scotia in 1975, and followed by a similar scheme in Quebec in 1979.11 Unlike other provinces, the Nova Scotia and Quebec schemes display significant structural similarities to the federal statute. They apply only after an em- ployee has completed a certain period of service and do not apply in cases of termination for economic reasons or layoffs. Like the federal scheme, the two provincial ones have been consistently applied as prohibiting dismissals without cause, and grant a wide range of remedies such as reinstatement and compensation. 66 It seems to me to be significant that in Qu´ebec (Procureur g´en´eral) c. Flynn, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.), interpreting the Unjust Dismissal provision in the Quebec Act, this Court concluded that “[a]lthough pro- cedural in form”, the provision creates “a substantive labour standard” (para. 10). It would be untenable not to apply the same approach to the Unjust Dismissal provision in the federal Code, and instead to character- ize the provision as a mere procedural mechanism.
11 An Act to Amend Chapter 10 of the Acts of 1972, the Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1975, c. 50, s. 4; An Act respecting labour standards, S.Q. 1979, c. 45, s. 124. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella J. 41
67 The remedies newly available in 1978 to non-unionized employees reflect those generally available in the collective bargaining context. And this, as Minister Munro stated, is what Parliament intended. To infer in- stead that Parliament intended to maintain the common law under the Code regime, creates an anomalous legal environment in which the pro- tections given to employees by statute — reasons, reinstatement, equita- ble relief — can be superseded by the common law right of employers to dismiss whomever they want for whatever reason they want so long as they give reasonable notice or pay in lieu. This somersaults our under- standing of the relationship between the common law and statutes, espe- cially in dealing with employment protections, by assuming the con- tinuity of a more restrictive common law regime notwithstanding the legislative enactment of benefit-granting provisions to the contrary: Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986 (S.C.C.), at p. 1003; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.), at para. 36. 68 AECL’s argument that employment can be terminated without cause so long as minimum notice or compensation is given, on the other hand, would have the effect of rendering many of the Unjust Dismissal reme- dies meaningless or redundant. The requirement to provide reasons for dismissal under s. 241(1), for example, would be redundant. And, if an employee were ordered to be reinstated under s. 242(4)(b), it could well turn out to be a meaningless remedy if the employer could simply dis- miss that employee again by giving notice and severance pay. These con- sequences result in statutory incoherence. Only by interpreting ss. 240 to 246 as representing a displacement of the employer’s ability at common law to fire an employee without reasons if reasonable notice is given, does the scheme and its remedial package make sense. 69 That is how the 1978 provisions have been almost universally ap- plied, including — reasonably — by the Adjudicator hearing Mr. Wil- son’s complaint. It is an outcome that is anchored in parliamentary inten- tion, statutory language, arbitral jurisprudence, and labour relations practice. To decide otherwise would fundamentally undermine Parlia- ment’s remedial purpose. I would allow the appeal with costs throughout and restore the decision of the Adjudicator. 42 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
McLachlin C.J.C., Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon JJ.:
70 We agree with Justice Abella that, under the current framework, the standard of review is reasonableness. We also agree with her disposition of the appeal on the merits and with her analysis of the two conflicting interpretations of the Unjust Dismissal provisions of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, proposed to the Court. Adjudicator Schiff’s decision was reasonable, and it should be restored. We appreciate Justice Abella’s efforts to stimulate a discussion on how to clarify or simplify our standard of review jurisprudence to better promote certainty and pre- dictability. However, as it is unnecessary to do so in order to resolve this case, we are not prepared to endorse any particular proposal to redraw our current standard of review framework at this time.
Cromwell J.:
71 I agree with Justice Abella, for the reasons she gives at paras. 15-18 and 38-40, that the standard of review is reasonableness. I also agree, for the reasons she gives at paras. 41-69, that the adjudicator’s decision was reasonable. I therefore agree that the appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and that the decision of the adjudicator should be restored. I write separately only to indicate two things. 72 The first is that, in my respectful view, our standard of review juris- prudence does not need yet another overhaul and that, as a result, I re- spectfully disagree with the approach that Justice Abella develops in obiter. In my view, New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dun- smuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), sets out the appropri- ate framework for addressing the standard of judicial review. No doubt, that framework can and will be refined so that the applicable standard of review may be identified more easily and more consistently. But the ba- sic Dunsmuir framework is sound and does not require fundamental re- thinking. 73 The second and related point is to underline my agreement with para. 18 of Justice Abella’s reasons in which she rejects the Federal Court of Appeal’s approach of attempting “to calibrate reasonableness by apply- ing a potentially indeterminate number of varying degrees of deference”. Of course, reasonableness, while “a single standard” nonetheless “takes its colour from the context”: see, e.g., Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.), Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 43
at para. 59; Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.), at para. 18; Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd. v. CEP, Local 30, 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458 (S.C.C.), at para. 74. Reasonableness must, therefore, “be assessed in the context of the particular type of decision making involved and all relevant factors”: Catalyst Paper Corp., at para. 18. However, in my opinion, developing new and apparently unlimited numbers of gradations of reasonableness review — the margins of appreciation approach created by the Federal Court of Appeal — is not an appropriate development of the standard of review jurisprudence.
Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. (dissenting) (Moldaver J. concurring):
74 Labour adjudicators have disagreed on the issue of whether it is ever lawful for a federally regulated employer to dismiss a non-unionized em- ployee without cause. This disagreement has persisted for at least two decades. Federally regulated employers and employees are left in a state of uncertainty about the fundamentals of their employment relationship. The adjudicator in this case found that only dismissals for cause are per- mitted under the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. On judicial review, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal disagreed: 2013 FC 733, 435 F.T.R. 300 (Eng.) (F.C.); 2015 FCA 17, [2015] 4 F.C.R. 467 (F.C.A.). Both courts held that dismissals without cause are permit- ted under the Code. The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter was remitted to the adjudicator to determine an appropriate remedy. 75 We agree with the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal. A dismissal without cause is not per se unjust, so long as adequate notice is provided. However, such a dismissal does not allow the employer to es- cape the scrutiny of an adjudicator or the courts if the employee chooses to challenge the lawfulness of the dismissal. The adjudicator in this case adopted the opposite interpretation, holding that dismissal without cause is automatically an unjust dismissal. Because the adjudicator’s interpreta- tion of ss. 240 to 246 of the Code is inconsistent with the text, context and purpose of these provisions, it ought to be set aside.
I. Standard of Review 76 For the reasons we set out below, we would apply a correctness re- view to the narrow and distilled legal issue in this case. 44 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
77 The parties before this Court agreed that the standard of review is reasonableness. However, the determination of the standard of review that applies in any case is a question of law, and “agreement between the parties cannot be determinative of the matter”: Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), 2004 SCC 54, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152 (S.C.C.), at para. 6. Our colleague Abella J. stated this point succinctly in Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), at para. 33, when she observed that “the par- ties should not be able, by agreement, to contract out of the appropriate standard of review” (emphasis in original). 78 We note Abella J.’s proposed revisions to the standard of review, ex- pressly made in obiter dicta. While we appreciate the constructive spirit in which they are proposed, and while we harbour concerns about their merits, we prefer to confine any statement regarding what is already the subject of a peripatetic body of jurisprudence to a judicial pronouncement.
A. Rule of Law Concerns Justify Correctness Review in This Case 79 In our view, this case exposes a serious concern for the rule of law posed by presumptively deferential review of a decision-maker’s inter- pretation of its home statute. In the specific context of this case, correct- ness review is justified. To conclude otherwise would abandon rule of law values in favour of indiscriminate deference to the administrative state. 80 This Court has recognized that, where deference is owed, a decision- maker’s interpretation of the law will be reasonable if it falls within a range of intelligible, defensible outcomes: New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), at para. 47. As a general proposition, we agree. 81 However, deferring in this way on matters of statutory interpretation opens up the possibility that different decision-makers may each reach opposing interpretations of the same provision, thereby creating “need- less uncertainty in the law [in the sense that] individuals’ rights [are] de- pendent on the identity of the decision-maker, not the law”: J. M. Evans, “Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter?” (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 101, at p. 105. This concern was raised forcefully by Stratas J.A. at the Federal Court of Appeal in the present case, and has been expressed elsewhere: see, e.g., Altus Group Ltd. v. Calgary (City), 2015 ABCA 86, 599 A.R. 223 (Alta. C.A.), at paras. 31-33; Novaquest Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 45
Finishing Inc. v. Abdoulrab, 2009 ONCA 491, 95 O.R. (3d) 641 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 48; Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada v. Taub, 2009 ONCA 628, 98 O.R. (3d) 169 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 65-67. 82 In theory, these disagreements can last forever. Administrative deci- sion-makers are not bound by the principle of stare decisis, and many decision-makers — like the labour adjudicators in the present case — lack an institutional umbrella under which issues can be debated openly and a consensus position can emerge. 83 This is precisely what has occurred in the present case. For decades, labour adjudicators across the country have come to conflicting interpre- tations of the unjust dismissal provisions of Part III of the Code. These conflicting interpretations go to the heart of the federal employment law regime: is an employer ever permitted to dismiss a non-unionized em- ployee without cause? Some adjudicators say yes. Some say no. Lower courts have found both interpretations to be reasonable: see, e.g., Federal Court reasons and Pierre v. Roseau River Tribal Council, [1993] 3 F.C. 756 (Fed. T.D.). 84 The rule of law and the promise of orderly governance suffer as a result. When reasonableness review insulates conflicting interpretations from judicial resolution, the identity of the decision-maker determines the outcome of individual complaints, not the law itself. And when this is the case, we allow the caprice of the administrative state to take prece- dence over the “general principle of normative order”: Christie v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2007 SCC 21, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 873 (S.C.C.), at para. 20; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.), at para. 71; Reference re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 & s. 133 of Constitution Act, 1867, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.), at pp. 747-52. 85 More troubling still, such a situation calls into question our legal sys- tem’s foundational premise that there is “one law for all” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, at para. 71), since, realistically, what the law means depends on whether one’s case is decided by one decision-maker or an- other. It goes without saying that the rule of law, upon which our Consti- tution is expressly founded, requires something closer to universal application. 86 The cardinal values of certainty and predictability — which are them- selves core principles of the rule of law (T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010), at p. 37) — are also compromised. In the context of the present case, leaving unresolved a divided body of arbitral decisions clouds an 46 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
essential feature of the federal regime governing employment relation- ships. Federally regulated employers cannot predictably determine when and how they can dismiss their employees, while employees are left in a state of uncertainty about the extent of their job security. 87 The conflicting adjudicative jurisprudence has done more than just create general uncertainty. It creates the risk that the very same federally regulated employer might be subjected to conflicting legal interpreta- tions, such that it may be told in one case that it can dismiss an employee without cause, while being told in another case that it cannot. As Roth- stein J. stated in his concurring opinion in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (S.C.C.), at para. 90, “[d]ivergent applications of legal rules under- mine the integrity of the rule of law”. This is not mere conjecture; it has already happened to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, the respondent in the matter before us: see Federal Court reasons and Champagne v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. [2012 CarswellNat 708 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III))], 2012 CanLII 97650. We would echo the statement of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in her concurring opinion in British Columbia Telephone Co. v. Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.) Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 739 (S.C.C.), that judicial intervention may be required to resolve conflicting administrative decisions: We must not forget that the parties involved in problems of this sort are often providing services of considerable importance to the public. It is the task of the legal system to provide them with clear guidance as to their legal obligations so that they can provide the services that they are required to provide in an efficacious and legal manner. When two different boards have given conflicting definitions of a body’s legal obligations, it is important that the body be afforded means of determining which obligation prevails and which it must obey. The boards themselves cannot determine this. The only body which can do it is the court. [para. 79] 88 Finally, the existence of lingering disagreements amongst decision- makers undermines the very basis for deference. It makes little sense to defer to the interpretation of one decision-maker when it is clear that other similarly situated decision-makers — whose decisions are equally entitled to deference — have reached a different result. To accord defer- ence in these circumstances privileges the expertise of the decision- maker whose decision is currently subject to judicial review over the ex- pertise of other similarly situated decision-makers without any compel- ling reason for doing so. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 47
89 We believe, therefore, that where there is lingering disagreement on a matter of statutory interpretation between administrative decision-mak- ers, and where it is clear that the legislature could only have intended the statute to bear one meaning, correctness review is appropriate. This lin- gering disagreement presupposes that both interpretations are reasonable, since, of course, a contradictory but unreasonable decision will be quashed on judicial review and no lingering disagreement can result. But we wish to make one point clear: it does not matter whether one or one hundred decisions have been rendered that conflict with the “consensus” interpretation identified by the majority. As long as there is one conflict- ing but reasonable decision, its very existence undermines the rule of law: L. J. Wihak, “Whither the correctness standard of review? Dun- smuir, six years later” (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 173, at p. 197. 90 Such a lingering disagreement exists in this case. While the majority says that “almost all” of the adjudicators have adopted the interpretation of the legislative scheme that was accepted by the adjudicator in this case (at para. 46), there is a significant line of cases adopting the opposite interpretation: see, e.g., Sharma and Maple Star Transport Ltd. (Unjust Dismissal), Re [2015 CarswellNat 2967 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III))], 2015 CanLII 43356; G & R Contracting Ltd. and Sandhu, Re, 2015 Car- swellNat 7465 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Pare and Corus Entertainment Inc. (Unjust Dismissal), Re, [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 103 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Madill and Spruce Hollow Heavy Haul Ltd., Re (2013), [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Swanson and Qualicum First Nation, Re (2015), 26 C.C.E.L. (4th) 139 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); O’Brien and Mushuau Innu First Nation, Re [2015 CarswellNat 60 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III))], 2015 CanLII 20942; Newman and Northern Thunderbird Air Inc., Re, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 248 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Taypotat and Muscowpetung First Nation, Re, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 53 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Payne and Bank of Montreal, Re (2014), 16 C.C.E.L. (4th) 114 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Sharma and Beacon Transit Lines Inc., Re, 2013 CarswellNat 4148 (Can. Arb.); Klein v. Royal Canadian Mint (2012), 2013 C.L.L.C. 210-013 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Paul v. National Centre For First Nations Governance [2012 CarswellNat 690 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III))], 2012 CanLII 85154; Palmer v. Dempsey Laird Trucking Ltd., 2012 CarswellNat 1620 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Gouchey v. Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3430 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Stark v. Tl’azt’en Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3074 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Dominic v. Tl’azt’en Nation, 2011 48 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
CarswellNat 3085 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); McCloud v. Samson Cree Nation, [2011] C.L.A.D. No. 119 (Can. Arb.); Prosper v. PADC Management Co., [2010] C.L.A.D. No. 430 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Perley v. Maliseet First Nation at Tobique, 2010 CarswellNat 4618 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Daniels v. Whitecap Dakota First Nation, [2008] C.L.A.D. No. 135 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Armsworthy v. L.H. & Co., [2005] C.L.A.D. No. 161 (Can. Arb.); Indian Resource Council of Canada and Whitecap, Re, 2003 CarswellNat 7342 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); Exalta Transport Services Ltd. and Cooper, Re, [2002] C.L.A.D. No. 612 (Can. Arb.); Chalifoux v. Driftpile First Nation, [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 368 (Can. Arb.); Halkowich v. Fairford First Nation, [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 486 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)); D. McCool Transport Ltd. and Bosma, Re, [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 315 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)), at paras. 12 et seq.; Jalbert v. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd., [1996] C.L.A.D. No. 631 (Can. Arb.); Knopp v. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd., [1994] C.L.A.D. No. 172 (Can. Arb.). 91 This is not an exhaustive list, but serves merely to illustrate that dis- cord exists in the adjudicative jurisprudence on the issue of whether the Code permits an employer to dismiss an employee without cause. It is the existence of this discord that undermines the rule of law and justifies correctness review in this case. Further, this is a matter of general impor- tance, defining the basis of the employment relationship for thousands of Canadians. We would also add that questions regarding the dismissal of federal employees do not fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of labour adjudicators. As we will explain below, civil courts also possess jurisdic- tion over some of these matters. The narrow and distilled question of law raised by this case goes to the very heart of the federal employment rela- tionship. Consistency in defining the nature of this relationship is there- fore required. 92 We turn now to the merits, applying a correctness review for the rea- sons set out above.
II. Statutory Provisions 93 This case concerns the interrelationship between the provisions of Part III of the Canada Labour Code which govern non-unionized federal employees. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 49
94 Section 230 of the Code codifies the common law rules on notice periods and wages in lieu of notice when terminating the employment of an employee without cause: 230(1) Except where subsection (2) applies, an employer who termi- nates the employment of an employee who has completed three con- secutive months of continuous employment by the employer shall, except where the termination is by way of dismissal for just cause, give the employee either (a) notice in writing, at least two weeks before a date specified in the notice, of the employer’s intention to terminate his employment on that date, or (b) two weeks wages at his regular rate of wages for his regular hours of work, in lieu of the notice. (2) Where an employer is bound by a collective agreement that con- tains a provision authorizing an employee who is bound by the col- lective agreement and whose position becomes redundant to displace another employee on the basis of seniority, and the position of an employee who is so authorized becomes redundant, the employer shall (a) give at least two weeks notice in writing to the trade union that is a party to the collective agreement and to the employee that the position of the employee has be- come redundant and post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place within the industrial establishment in which the employee is employed; or (b) pay to any employee whose employment is terminated as a result of the redundancy of the position two weeks wages at his regular rate of wages. (3) Except where otherwise prescribed by regulation, an employer shall, for the purposes of this Division, be deemed to have terminated the employment of an employee when the employer lays off that employee. 95 Section 235 of the Code establishes a minimum amount of severance pay that must be paid to certain employees whose employment is termi- nated without cause: 235(1) An employer who terminates the employment of an employee who has completed twelve consecutive months of continuous em- 50 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
ployment by the employer shall, except where the termination is by way of dismissal for just cause, pay to the employee the greater of (a) two days wages at the employee’s regular rate of wages for his regular hours of work in respect of each completed year of employment that is within the term of the employee’s continuous employment by the em- ployer, and (b) five days wages at the employee’s regular rate of wages for his regular hours of work. (2) For the purposes of this Division, (a) except where otherwise provided by regulation, an employer shall be deemed to have terminated the em- ployment of an employee when the employer lays off that employee. 96 Sections 240 to 245 of the Code set out a procedure whereby an em- ployee who believes that his dismissal was unjust can complain to an inspector, leading to the appointment of an adjudicator who will deter- mine whether the dismissal was unjust and order a remedy that the adju- dicator deems appropriate in the circumstances. Of relevance to this ap- peal are ss. 240 to 242: 240(1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), any person (a) who has completed twelve consecutive months of continuous employment by an employer, and (b) who is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement, may make a complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust. (2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the person mak- ing the complaint was dismissed. (3) The Minister may extend the period of time referred to in subsec- tion (2) where the Minister is satisfied that a complaint was made in that period to a government official who had no authority to deal with the complaint but that the person making the complaint believed the official had that authority. 241(1) Where an employer dismisses a person described in subsec- tion 240(1), the person who was dismissed or any inspector may make a request in writing to the employer to provide a written state- ment giving the reasons for the dismissal, and any employer who re- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 51
ceives such a request shall provide the person who made the request with such a statement within fifteen days after the request is made. (2) On receipt of a complaint made under subsection 240(1), an in- spector shall endeavour to assist the parties to the complaint to settle the complaint or cause another inspector to do so. (3) Where a complaint is not settled under subsection (2) within such period as the inspector endeavouring to assist the parties pursuant to that subsection considers to be reasonable in the circumstances, the inspector shall, on the written request of the person who made the complaint that the complaint be referred to an adjudicator under sub- section 242(1), (a) report to the Minister that the endeavour to assist the parties to settle the complaint has not succeeded; and (b) deliver to the Minister the complaint made under sub- section 240(1), any written statement giving the rea- sons for the dismissal provided pursuant to subsection (1) and any other statements or documents the inspec- tor has that relate to the complaint. 242(1) The Minister may, on receipt of a report pursuant to subsec- tion 241(3), appoint any person that the Minister considers appropri- ate as an adjudicator to hear and adjudicate on the complaint in re- spect of which the report was made, and refer the complaint to the adjudicator along with any statement provided pursuant to subsection 241(1). (2) An adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under sub- section (1) (a) shall consider the complaint within such time as the Governor in Council may by regulation prescribe; (b) shall determine the procedure to be followed, but shall give full opportunity to the parties to the complaint to present evidence and make submissions to the adjudi- cator and shall consider the information relating to that complaint; and (c) has, in relation to any complaint before the adjudica- tor, the powers conferred on the Canada Industrial Re- lations Board, in relation to any proceeding before the Board, under paragraphs 16(a), (b) and (c). 52 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
(3) Subject to subsection (3.1), an adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under subsection (1) shall (a) consider whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust and render a decision thereon; and (b) send a copy of the decision with the reasons therefor to each party to the complaint and to the Minister. (3.1) No complaint shall be considered by an adjudicator under sub- section (3) in respect of a person where (a) that person has been laid off because of lack of work or because of the discontinuance of a function; or (b) a procedure for redress has been provided elsewhere in or under this or any other Act of Parliament. (4) Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the adjudicator may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remunera- tion that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any consequence of the dismissal. 97 The unjust dismissal procedure set out in ss. 240 to 245 is not the only mechanism available to federally regulated employees to challenge the lawfulness of a dismissal. Section 246 of the Code expressly pre- serves their right to seek a civil remedy in the courts: 246 No civil remedy of an employee against his employer is sus- pended or affected by sections 240 to 245. 98 One other provision is worth mentioning. Section 168(1) of the Code preserves the application of the common law and contracts of employ- ment where those laws confer greater rights or benefits on employees than Part III of the Code does: 168(1) This Part and all regulations made under this Part apply not- withstanding any other law or any custom, contract or arrangement, but nothing in this Part shall be construed as affecting any rights or benefits of an employee under any law, custom, contract or arrange- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 53
ment that are more favourable to the employee than his rights or be- nefits under this Part.
III. Analysis 99 Applying correctness review, we are of the opinion that a federally regulated employer can dismiss an employee without cause, so long as appropriate notice and severance pay are provided. However, such a dis- missal does not preclude the employee from availing himself or herself of the unjust dismissal procedure in ss. 240 to 245 of the Code. There is “nothing in section 240 or the surrounding sections of the Canada La- bour Code which guarantees lifelong job tenure to employees of feder- ally regulated businesses, provided such employees do not give their em- ployers just cause for dismissal”: D. Harris, Wrongful Dismissal (loose- leaf), at p. 6-14. An employer therefore has the right to “justly terminate an employee by giving notice or compensation under ss. 230(1) and 235(1)”: H. A. Levitt, The Law of Dismissal in Canada (3rd ed. (loose- leaf)), at p. 2-126.1. 100 As a preliminary note, ss. 230 and 235 use the term “termination” of employment, while ss. 240 to 245 refer to “dismissal”. Sections 230 and 235 apply to all situations where the employment of an employee is ter- minated — including managers and those who are laid off due to lack of work or discontinuance of a function — while ss. 240 to 245 only apply to employees who are “dismissed”. Since the interpretive issue in this case centres on the meaning of the term “unjust dismissal”, we will use the term “dismissal” throughout this analysis unless otherwise required. 101 The adjudicator was asked to determine whether a dismissal without cause but with pay in lieu of notice was nevertheless an unjust dismissal. The narrow question we are addressing is this: Is a dismissal without cause automatically an unjust dismissal that always entitles an employee to a remedy under s. 242(4)? Or, as the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal both found in this case, is a dismissal without cause potentially an unjust dismissal (depending on the circumstances) that could entitle an employee to a remedy under s. 242(4)? 102 This is a distilled question requiring statutory interpretation and, ac- cordingly, we must begin with the modern principle of statutory interpre- tation articulated in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 54 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
(S.C.C.), at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87: Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the ob- ject of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. The modern principle requires that statutes “be read to give the words their most obvious ordinary meaning which accords with the context and purpose of the enactment in which they occur”: CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743 (S.C.C.), at para. 14; Rizzo Shoes, at para. 41. When a court interprets a statute, it is “seek- ing not what Parliament meant but the true meaning of what they said”: Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof- Aschaffenburg AG, [1975] A.C. 591 (U.K. H.L.), at p. 613 (per Lord Reid). In our view, the true meaning of what Parliament said is clear: federally regulated employers can dismiss their employees without cause. 103 The term “unjust dismissal” is not defined anywhere in the Code. An employee has the right to complain about any dismissal that the em- ployee “considers” to be unjust: s. 240(1). This right exists only for 90 days following the dismissal, after which the employee has no right to access the procedure in ss. 240 to 245 to challenge the lawfulness of a dismissal: s. 240(2). An employer must give written reasons for the dis- missal if requested to do so: s. 241. If an adjudicator finds that a dismis- sal is unjust, the adjudicator is empowered to award a remedy, including the remedy of reinstatement: s. 242(4). In our view, ss. 240 to 245 create an additional procedural mechanism for complaining about a dismissal (and provide an additional remedy for such complaints). But they do not define what dismissals qualify as unjust. 104 When one looks at the unjust dismissal provisions of the Code in iso- lation, one might infer that Parliament did intend to prohibit all dismis- sals without cause. As the majority notes, there are two elements of the unjust dismissal provisions that do not exist at common law and that could be interpreted as creating a just cause regime: the requirement that the employer provide reasons for the dismissal where requested (s. 241), and the power of the adjudicator to order reinstatement where appropri- ate (s. 242(4)(b)). Since neither of these powers or remedies exist at com- mon law, the majority says that Parliament created a “statutory alterna- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 55
tive” to the common law, creating a regime where federal employers can only dismiss their employees for just cause.
A. Problems With the Majority’s Reasoning 105 It is well established that a statute must “be read in a way that avoids absurdity and assigns a meaning to all of the words Parliament has used”: R. c. G. (B.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475 (S.C.C.), at para. 69. In our respectful view, interpreting ss. 240 to 245 as prohibiting an employer from dis- missing an employee without just cause produces an absurdity, since it leads to two identical classes of persons being treated differently based on an arbitrary or irrational distinction: Berardinelli v. Ontario Housing Corp. (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 275 (S.C.C.), at p. 280. 106 Sections 240 to 245 do not apply where an employee chooses to chal- lenge the lawfulness of his or her dismissal in the civil courts, where the 90-day limitation period expires (s. 240(2)), or where the Minister de- clines to appoint an adjudicator pursuant to s. 242(1). These provisions also do not apply to employees who are managers (s. 167(3)), or to em- ployees employed for less than 12 consecutive months (s. 240(1)(a)). The common law continues to apply “where the statute is silent or by its terms cannot apply”: Gendron v. Supply & Services Union of the P.S.A.C., Local 50057, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1298 (S.C.C.), at p. 1319. The common law must therefore continue to apply to these employees. 107 At common law, an employer may dismiss an employee without cause because “[a]n employer’s right to terminate the employment rela- tionship with due notice is simply the counterpart to the employee’s right to quit with due notice”: Dunsmuir, at para. 105. Courts have consist- ently applied the common law to the claims of dismissed federal employ- ees who are subject to Part III of the Code: see, e.g., Lum v. Shaw Communications Inc., 2004 NBCA 35, 270 N.B.R. (2d) 141 (N.B. C.A.); Cornelson v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2014 ABQB 436 (Alta. Q.B.); Nelson v. Champion Feed Services Inc., 2010 ABQB 409, 30 Alta. L.R. (5th) 162 (Alta. Q.B.); Chandran v. National Bank of Canada, 2011 ONSC 777, 89 C.C.E.L. (3d) 256 (Ont. S.C.J.); Paquette v. TeraGo Networks Inc., 2015 ONSC 4189, 2015 C.L.L.C. 210-056 (Ont. S.C.J.); Vist v. Best Theratronics Ltd., 2014 ONSC 2867, 2014 C.L.L.C. 210-038 (Ont. S.C.J.); Toronto Dominion Bank v. Wallace (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 161 (Ont. C.A.); Ryder v. Carry the Kettle First Nation, 2002 SKQB 32, 215 Sask. R. 239 (Sask. Q.B.); Nardocchio v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1979), 41 N.S.R. (2d) 26 (N.S. T.D.); Wilson v. Sliammon 56 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
First Nation, 2002 BCSC 190 (B.C. S.C.); Chadee v. Norway House First Nation (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 110 (Man. C.A.); Spilberg v. Total Transportation Solutions Inc., [2014] O.J. No. 2903 (Ont. S.C.J.); Lazarus v. Information Communication Services (ICS) Inc., [2015] O.J. No. 5304 (Ont. S.C.J.); Jackson v. Gitxsan Treaty Society, 2005 BCSC 1112, 43 C.C.E.L. (3d) 179 (B.C. S.C.); Beatty v. Best Theratronics Ltd., 2014 ONSC 3376, 18 C.C.E.L. (4th) 64 (Ont. S.C.J.); Schimanski v. B & D Walter Trucking Ltd., 2014 ABPC 288 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); Logan v. Progressive Air Service Ltd., [1997] B.C.J. No. 129 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); Rodgers v. Sun Radio Ltd. (1991), 109 N.S.R. (2d) 415 (N.S. T.D.). 108 Were ss. 240 to 245 to be taken as prohibiting a federal employee from being dismissed without cause, while s. 246 were to be taken as preserving the right of an employee to sue for wrongful dismissal in civil courts, the result would be that (1) a federally regulated employer can dismiss an employee without cause (even with appropriate notice) as long as the employee chooses to challenge the lawfulness of the dismis- sal in the civil courts, but (2) a federally regulated employer cannot dis- miss an identically placed employee without cause (but with appropriate notice) where that employee objects under the unjust dismissal provi- sions of the Code. The legal basis of the employment relationship would then depend on the ex post facto choice of mechanism by which the em- ployee challenges the lawfulness of his or her dismissal. Indeed, it would mean that an employer would not know its legal obligations in advance, since those legal obligations would depend upon either the discretion of the Minister or an employee’s ex post facto choice of mechanism to chal- lenge the dismissal. This is absurd. Since we must presume that Parlia- ment did not intend to produce absurd results (Rizzo Shoes, at para. 27), we cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation. 109 In addition, we note that s. 242(3) requires an adjudicator to “con- sider” whether or not a dismissal was unjust. Were the majority’s inter- pretation the only reasonable one (i.e., were it the correct interpretation), it would mean that, where an employer chooses to dismiss an employee without cause but with appropriate notice and severance pay, there would be nothing for the adjudicator to consider. The adjudicator would be obliged, not to consider, but to automatically conclude that the dismissal was unjust, a result which clearly deviates from the ordinary meaning of the word Parliament chose. 110 The majority says that there is a “consensus interpretation” of the un- just dismissal provisions that supports her interpretation (para. 58). It Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 57
finds support for such a consensus in “over 1,740 adjudications and deci- sions [rendered] since the Unjust Dismissal scheme was enacted” (para. 60). In contrast, it identifies a mere “28 decisions that are said to have followed the Wakeling approach” (para. 60). However, this comparison is simply not accurate. The 1,740 decisions to which the majority refers include every decision rendered under ss. 240 to 245 of the Code.12 The vast majority of these decisions have nothing to do with the “consensus interpretation” that the majority identifies, as they deal with issues as di- verse as whether the employer is subject to the Code; the extent of the adjudicator’s jurisdiction; whether a dismissal occurred; whether a limi- tation period had expired; whether just cause was alleged; procedural is- sues; the meaning of “lack of work or discontinuance of a function”; and, in a small minority of cases, whether an employer may dismiss an em- ployee without cause, but with payment of the appropriate notice and severance pay.13 111 In any event, we fail to see why the mere quantity of adjudicator deci- sions supporting one position or the other is of any relevance whatsoever to the merits of the statutory interpretation issue in this appeal. As this Court has previously held, it is “improper for one to engage in a prelimi- nary tallying of the number of decisions supporting competing interpreta- tions and then apply that which receives the ‘higher score’”: Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.), at para. 30.
B. The Proper Interpretation 112 The fundamental flaw with the majority’s interpretation of the subject provisions is that it reads them in isolation. The unjust dismissal provi- sions of the Code must be read in their broader context in order to deter- mine their meaning as part of a complete and coherent legal regime:
12 The source the majority relies on for this number states that “[g]iven that ss. 240 to 246 of the Code have been in existence for over 35 years, and have been subject to over 1,740 adjudications and decisions before Wilson, it is hard to believe that such new and novel law can be created from an old statute (footnote omitted).” See R. Ruslim, “Unjust Dismissal under the Canada Labour Code: New Law, Old Statute” (2014), 5:2 U.W.O. J. Leg. Stud. 3 (online), at p. 28. 13 For a summary of the wide array of issues that are dealt with in the decisions rendered by adjudicators under ss. 240 to 245 of the Code, see Levitt, at pp. 2-1 to 2-172. 58 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Rizzo Shoes, at para. 21. There are two elements of the broader context that are relevant: the continuing concurrent jurisdiction of the civil courts, and Part III of the Code as a whole.
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Civil Courts 113 Sections 240 to 245 of the Code create a mechanism for employees to challenge the lawfulness of their dismissal. This mechanism exists along- side the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts to award a civil remedy for wrongful dismissal, though subject to the doctrine of issue estoppel: s. 246(1); Pereira v. Bank of Nova Scotia (2007), 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 267 (Ont. S.C.J.); Levitt, at p. 2-1. An employee is therefore always entitled to challenge the lawfulness of a dismissal in the civil courts, irrespective of whether the employee first chooses to resort to the unjust dismissal procedure in the Code: s. 246(1); Wyllie v. Larche Communications Inc., 2015 ONSC 4747 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 76. 114 We note that, while the Code imposes a 90-day limitation period for complaints about unjust dismissal to be filed (s. 240(2)), the right of an employee to sue for wrongful dismissal in the civil courts is subject to the ordinary limitation period that exists in each province (usually be- tween two to six years): Ng v. Bank of Montreal, 2010 ONSC 5692, 87 C.C.E.L. (3d) 86 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 17-18; Canadian National Railway v. Benson, 2004 MBQB 210, 188 Man. R. (2d) 218 (Man. Q.B.), at para. 51; Limitation Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 13, s. 6(1); Limitations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12, s. 3(1); The Limitations Act, S.S. 2004, c. L-16.1, s. 5; The Limitation of Actions Act, C.C.S.M., c. L150, s. 2(1); Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B, s. 4; Civil Code of Qu´ebec, art. 2925; Limitation of Acts Act, S.N.B. 2009, c. L-8.5, s. 5(1); Limitation of Ac- tions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, s. 2(1); Statute of Limitations, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-7, s. 2(1); Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1, s. 9; Limita- tion of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. L-8, s. 2(1); Limitation of Ac- tions Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 139, s. 2(1); Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.W.T. (Nu.) 1988, c. L-8, s. 2(1). 115 To be clear, however, it is only adjudicators — appointed at the dis- cretion of the Minister — that can apply ss. 240 to 245 of the Code, be- cause a complaint about an unjust dismissal can be made only to an in- spector and decided by an adjudicator: ss. 240(1) and 242(1). But a complaint about an unjust dismissal is a complaint about the lawfulness of a dismissal. And courts possess equal jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of a dismissal of a federal employee. Adjudicators cannot Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 59
claim sole authority over this question. An employee therefore has two options to challenge the lawfulness of a dismissal: by utilizing the unjust dismissal procedure in the Code, or by bringing an action for wrongful dismissal in the civil courts. 116 Courts and adjudicators possess concurrent jurisdiction over the basic question of the lawfulness of a dismissal. The lawfulness of a dismissal is defined by reference to the legal basis of the employment relationship: in a “just cause” regime, all dismissals without just cause are unlawful dismissals. In a “without cause” regime, dismissals without just cause are unlawful dismissals unless they are accompanied by appropriate notice and severance pay. It is impossible to determine the lawfulness of a dis- missal without first knowing the legal basis of the employment relation- ship. Since adjudicators and courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to de- termine the lawfulness of a dismissal, it follows that both must do so with reference to the same legal basis for the employment relationship. 117 We therefore disagree with the majority that the addition of the unjust dismissal procedure to the Code altered the legal basis of the federally regulated employment relationship. Parliament has expressly preserved the continuing jurisdiction of the civil courts to decide the lawfulness of the dismissal, while denying these courts the ability to interpret and ap- ply the unjust dismissal provisions of the Code. The legal basis of the employment relationship must be the same for adjudicators and for courts tasked with determining the same question at first instance. Parlia- ment therefore could not have intended to alter the legal basis of the em- ployment relationship simply by adding the unjust dismissal procedure to the Code.
D. Sections 230 and 235 118 Our interpretation is supported by the wording of ss. 230 and 235 of the Code. Because ss. 230 and 235 of the Code do not apply to dismissals for just cause (ss. 230(1) and 235(1)), they must necessarily apply to dis- missals without cause. Otherwise they would be substantially redundant. By prescribing minimum notice periods and severance pay that are owed to employees who are terminated (including dismissed) without cause, Parliament clearly intended to permit federally regulated employers to dismiss non-unionized employees without cause. 119 The majority disagrees, saying that ss. 230 and 235 of the Code “ap- ply to managers, those who are laid off due to lack of work or discontin- uance of a function, and, in the case of s. 230(1), employees who have 60 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
worked for the employer for more than three consecutive months but less than twelve months” (para. 47). But this cannot be true, as it would mean that all other non-unionized federal employees who are dismissed but who choose not to challenge the lawfulness of their dismissal are entitled to nothing from their employer as a matter of law. Further, if these provi- sions did not apply to federal employees who choose to challenge the lawfulness of their dismissal in the civil courts, then such employees would not be entitled to any notice or severance pay unless such notice or severance pay is owed under the common law: Code, s. 168. 120 In our view, ss. 230 and 235 provide minimum notice and severance pay requirements to all employees covered by Part III of the Code irre- spective of whether, when, or how they decide to challenge the lawful- ness of a dismissal. To conclude otherwise would severely weaken the statutory protections that Parliament intended to provide to all non-un- ionized workers. 121 Therefore, as a baseline, Part III of the Code permits federally regu- lated employers to dismiss their employees without cause. To conclude otherwise would ignore the text of ss. 230 and 235 of the Code. The question, then, is whether the addition of the unjust dismissal provisions in ss. 240 to 245 fundamentally altered the nature of the employment relationship established by the Code.
Legislative History 122 When Parliament enacted ss. 240 to 245 in 1978 (S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, s. 21), it was supplementing the pre-existing provisions of Part III of the Code. Sections 230 and 235 — enacted in 1971 (R.S.C. 1970, c. 17 (2nd Supp.), s. 16) — used the language of dismissal for “just cause”, stating that they do not apply “where the termination is by way of dismissal for just cause”. Parliament therefore “thought fit to use this test on some occasions”: Knopp, at para. 68. Its conscious decision, however, not to use the language of “just cause” when enacting ss. 240 to 245 in 1978 lends support to the conclusion that Parliament did not intend to use these amendments to enact a “just cause” regime for non-unionized fed- eral employees: ibid. 123 The majority nevertheless relies on a statement made by the Minister of Labour to the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immi- gration in 1978 to establish that Parliament’s amendments to the Code intended to “expand the dismissal rights of non-unionized federal em- ployees in a way that, if not identically, then certainly analogously Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 61
matched those held by unionized employees” (at para. 44). However, as the majority notes, the Minister also stated: It is our hope that Parts III and IV will give at least to the unorgan- ized workers some of the minimum standards which have been won by the organized workers and which are now embodied in their col- lective agreements. We are not alleging for one moment that they match the standards set out in collective agreements, but we provide here a minimum standard. (House of Commons Debates, vol. II, 3rd Sess., 30th Parl., December 13, 1977, at p. 1831) 124 This portion of the Hansard record weakens the majority’s conclusion that Parliament intended to expand the rights of non-unionized employ- ees in a manner that identically matched those held by unionized em- ployees, since the Minister expressly disclaimed any intent to do so in his statements to the House of Commons. Further, in a promotional article disseminated to federal employees at the time of the amendments, the Minister affirmed that the unjust dismissal provisions “will give the un- organized worker a procedure for appealing against a dismissal he be- lieves to be unjust”. He also stated that they intended to confine this right of appeal to “dismissals imposed as a disciplinary measure” in order to “discourage employers from firing people unfairly and arbitrarily”: Hon. J. Munro, “A better deal for Canada’s unorganized workers” (1977), 77 The Labour Gazette 347, at p. 349 (emphasis added). This is therefore a frail basis for concluding that Parliament intended to alter the common law employment relationship by prohibiting all dismissals without cause.
E. Discretion of the Minister 125 There is another reason to doubt our colleague’s view that Parliament intended to confer new, substantive rights on federally regulated employ- ees that are equivalent to the rights conferred on unionized employees by a collective agreement. Pursuant to s. 242(1), the Minister, on receipt of a report of an inspector, “may” appoint an adjudicator to hear a complaint of unjust dismissal. The Minister is not bound to do so. Indeed, as Geof- frey England has documented, in the first two years after these provisions were enacted, “Ministerial consent to adjudication was denied in 19% of all cases in which it was requested”: England, at p. 11. We know of no similar substantive rights under collective agreements that rely on such ministerial discretion. 126 If ss. 240 to 245 do indeed confer on employees a right to be free from dismissal without cause by shifting the federal regime to a “just 62 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
cause” regime, this substantive right to job security would depend on the discretion of the Minister. If the Minister chooses not to appoint an adju- dicator, the employee will have no recourse to enforce his or her right not to be dismissed without just cause — the only option would be a com- mon law action for wrongful dismissal in the civil courts. It would, in effect, be up to the Minister to decide in any case whether the employer was entitled to dismiss an employee without cause. The legal basis of the federally regulated employment relationship cannot depend on ministe- rial discretion. We therefore do not agree that the addition of ss. 240 to 245 to the Code created a “just cause” regime.
F. The Common Law Continues to Apply 127 As discussed above, the common law employment relationship is an individual contractual relationship. No “wrong in law is done by the ter- mination [of the contract] itself”: Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (S.C.C.), at p. 1096, per McIntyre J. Rather, the common law implies a term in every contract of employment that both the employer and employee have the right to terminate it upon reasonable notice, absent just cause for termination without notice: Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986 (S.C.C.), at p. 998. This implied term is constrained by employment standards legisla- tion across Canada, as most provinces have enacted minimum amounts of notice or pay in lieu of notice that must be provided when terminating an employment contract. 128 It is a well-established rule of statutory interpretation that “[w]hen there is overlap between legislation and the common law, both are pre- sumed to apply”: R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6th ed. 2014), at § 17.24. Statutes must therefore be construed as being consistent with the common law unless the legislature clearly and unam- biguously expresses otherwise: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. T. Eaton Co., [1956] S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.), at p. 614; Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.), at p. 1077; Parry Sound (District) Welfare Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.). 129 Section 168 of the Code expressly preserves the continued application of the common law to the federally regulated employment relationship. There is therefore an overlap between the legislation and the common law here. Absent clearly and unambiguously expressed legislative intent to change the common law by adding the unjust dismissal provisions in Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 63
ss. 240 to 245, we must interpret the Code consistently with the common law, particularly since Parliament expressly preserved the common law by enacting s. 168. The majority has pointed to no such clear and unam- biguous statutory language. We must therefore interpret the Code con- sistently with the common law, meaning that the contractual basis of in- dividual employment continues to apply, and that federal employers are not categorically prohibited from dismissing non-unionized federal em- ployees without cause. More particularly, we must understand Parlia- ment, in adding ss. 240 to 245 as well as s. 246, as having preserved the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts over the question of the lawfulness of the dismissal, and not as having fundamentally altered the nature of the employment relationship. Parliament simply created another procedu- ral mechanism through which employees could challenge the lawfulness of their dismissal, in which the additional remedy of reinstatement is available. 130 We also note that s. 168 states that Part III of the Code shall not “be construed as affecting any rights or benefits of an employee under any law, custom, contract or arrangement” that are more beneficial to the em- ployee than the rights granted to the employee by Part III of the Code. This part of the provision would be meaningless had Parliament not in- tended to preserve the continued application of the common law. 131 We also respectfully observe that the majority’s understanding of the continuing role of the common law in the federal employment relation- ship is internally inconsistent. Implicit in the majority’s reasons is a be- lief that Parliament did not intend to oust the common law of wrongful dismissal when it enacted ss. 240 to 245: it states that Parliament’s inten- tion was “to offer an alternative statutory scheme consisting of expansive protections much like those available to employees covered by a collec- tive agreement” (para. 1), while claiming that this scheme has “com- pletely replaced” the “foundational premise of the common law scheme [...] [being] a right to dismiss on reasonable notice without cause or rea- sons” (para. 63). It also maintains that s. 246 entitles an employee to “pursue their common law remedy of reasonable notice or pay in lieu” (para. 64). In other words, the continuing operation of the common law to define the basis of the federal employment relationship where a rem- edy is pursued under s. 242 of the Code is denied; yet, its operation, for the purpose of defining the basis of the federal employment relationship where civil remedies for dismissal are pursued, is accepted. The majority says, for the former purpose, that the common law has been entirely re- 64 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
placed by the statutory regime (para. 63), yet, for the latter purpose, it characterizes this statutory regime as a mere “alternative” (para. 41). 132 With respect, the majority cannot, coherently, have it both ways. It cannot affirm the existence of a statutory “just cause” regime, which dis- places the common law, while acknowledging the continued application of the common law rules regarding the termination of a contract of em- ployment. The two legal propositions simply cannot coexist. 133 As we have said, therefore, it is incumbent on the majority to point to a clear and unambiguously expressed legislative intention to oust the common law. In our respectful view, the majority cannot do so. Indeed, the majority states that it is our interpretation which “somersaults our understanding of the relationship between the common law and statutes” since we assume “the continuity of a more restrictive common law re- gime notwithstanding the legislative enactment of benefit-granting provi- sions to the contrary”: para. 67. But this reasoning is, with respect, circu- lar. It assumes the question to be decided, being whether Parliament intended to oust the common law by enacting more “generous” provi- sions through statute. The simple fact that the statute confers benefits tells us nothing about whether the common law continues to apply. A legislature can create an alternate procedure for challenging the lawful- ness of a dismissal without thereby implicitly ousting the common law basis for all employment relationships. Indeed, this Court recognized in Dunsmuir that an adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable precisely be- cause it would have resulted in a “just cause” regime for non-unionized employees where the legislature had created a grievance mechanism for challenging dismissals but had not expressly indicated any intention to oust the common law: see para. 75.
Comparison With Other Regimes 134 Our conclusion is further reinforced by contrasting the federal regime with provincial schemes that have created a regime where only dismis- sals for just cause are permitted. Where they have done so, they have done so expressly. In Nova Scotia, s. 71(1) of the Labour Standards Code, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 246 (“LSC”), expressly prohibits employers from dismissing certain employees without just cause. It states: 71(1) Where the period of employment of an employee with an em- ployer is ten years or more, the employer shall not discharge or sus- pend that employee without just cause unless that employee is a per- son within the meaning of person as used in clause (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) or (i) of subsection (3) of Section 72. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 65
(2) An employee who is discharged or suspended without just cause may make a complaint to the Director in accordance with Section 21. (3) An employee who has made a complaint under subsection (2) and who is not satisfied with the result may make a complaint to the Board in accordance with Section 23 and such complaint shall be and shall be deemed to be a complaint within the meaning of subsection (1) of Section 23. Section 72 of the Nova Scotia LSC permits employers to dismiss all other employees without cause upon provision of the appropriate notice or payment of the appropriate pay in lieu of notice. The Nova Scotia LSC does not preserve concurrent jurisdiction of the courts over the lawful- ness of the dismissal of employees covered by s. 71 and 72. Instead, the Director and Board have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawful- ness of the dismissal and order a remedy: ss. 21, 23 and 78. Further, an employee always has the right to complain about the lawfulness of a dis- missal to the Director and the Board. Therefore unlike the Canada La- bour Code, the employee’s right to have his or her claim investigated and adjudicated in Nova Scotia does not depend on the discretionary ap- proval of the Minister: s. 71(2) and s. 71(3). 135 Similarly, in Quebec, employees who are employed for two years or more may only be dismissed for “good and sufficient cause”: An Act re- specting labour standards, CQLR, c. N-1.1, s. 124 (“ALS”). As in Nova Scotia, once a complaint is made about a dismissal and it is not settled, “the Commission des normes, de l’´equit´e, de la sant´e et de la s´ecurit´e du travail shall, without delay, refer the complaint to the Administrative La- bour Tribunal”: s. 126. An employee always has the right to have his or her claim settled or referred for adjudication in Quebec. This right does not depend on the discretion of the Minister. 136 Both the Quebec and Nova Scotia legislatures clearly intended to es- tablish “just cause” regimes in their respective provinces for certain em- ployees by expressly prohibiting dismissals without cause. Despite the similarity in other provisions such as those regarding minimum notice (ss. 82 and 82.1(3) ALS; s. 72(1) LSC), and those preserving civil reme- dies (s. 82, para. 4 ALS; s. 6 LSC), the fact remains the ALS only allows dismissals for “good and sufficient cause” (s. 124), while the LSC pro- vides that employers shall not discharge or suspend an employee “with- out just cause” (s. 71). Despite the majority’s statement to the contrary (para. 65), the contrast between these two provincial schemes and the provisions of the Code are such that they cannot be claimed to be “simi- lar”. Had Parliament intended to prohibit without cause dismissals, it 66 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
would have done so by using such clear and unambiguous language. This is all the more apparent since the LSC preceded the enactment of ss. 240 to 245 of the Code, and yet Parliament refrained from adopting such irre- sistibly clear language. The Nova Scotia and Quebec regimes therefore do not present a sufficient basis for concluding that all without cause dismissals are automatically unjust under the Code. The reason those two provincial schemes have, as our colleague correctly observes, “been con- sistently applied as prohibiting dismissals without cause” (at para. 65) is that, unlike the Code, they clearly do prohibit dismissals without cause. 137 Indeed, we note that other provinces have created alternative, non- judicial mechanisms for challenging the lawfulness of a dismissal while maintaining the common law “without cause” regime. See, e.g., Public Service Labour Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-25, ss. 97(2.1) and 100.1; Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 113, ss. 74 to 86.2; Employment Standards Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. E-7.2, ss. 61 to 76; Employ- ment Standards Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-6.2, s. 30; Labour Standards Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-2, ss. 62 and 68 to 73. 138 Further, almost all “without cause” jurisdictions make the remedy of reinstatement available where an employee is unlawfully dismissed, for example, where an employee is dismissed for unlawful or discriminatory reasons: Employment Standards Act (B.C.), s. 79; Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-9, ss. 82 and 89(1); The Saskatchewan Employ- ment Act, S.S. 2013, c. S-15.1, ss. 2-97(1) and 3-36(1); The Employment Standards Code, C.C.S.M., c. E110, s. 96.1; Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, s. 104; Employment Standards Act (N.B.), s. 65; Labour Standards Act (N.L.), s. 78. 139 There is no question that without cause dismissals continue to be per- mitted in all of these jurisdictions, even where a grievance or non-judi- cial mechanism for complaining about the lawfulness of a dismissal is available: see, e.g., Dunsmuir, at para. 75. The mere availability of a non-judicial procedural mechanism to challenge the lawfulness of a dis- missal, coupled with the availability of reinstatement in certain circum- stances, does not ipso facto transform a “without cause” regime into a “just cause” regime. In our view, the federal Code is more akin to these “without cause” jurisdictions than it is to the regimes in Nova Scotia and Quebec. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 67
G. Role of Remedies 140 The majority also says that an interpretation which permits federally regulated employers to dismiss their employees without cause would “have the effect of rendering many of the Unjust Dismissal remedies meaningless or redundant”: para. 68. But for two reasons, this is not so. First, the requirement to provide reasons where requested is simply an evidentiary tool for inspectors and adjudicators, not a wholesale change to the nature of the employment relationship. Second, the remedy of rein- statement is consistent with a “without cause” regime. 141 Section 241 of the Code allows a dismissed employee or an inspector to request that the employer “provide a written statement giving the rea- sons for dismissal”. Section 241 also prescribes the conditions by which an inspector may endeavour to settle the complaint: see ss. 241(2) and 241(3). In our view, the purpose of s. 241 is to enable the employee and the inspector to know the nature of the case alleged by the employer: if the employer is asserting that the employee was dismissed for cause, the employer must make that factual assertion in the written statement pro- viding reasons for dismissal. If the employer has dismissed the employee for lack of work or discontinuance of a function, this will be reflected in the written reasons for dismissal. And if the employer has simply dis- missed the employee without cause, it must state this in the reasons for dismissal so that the inspector and, if necessary, the adjudicator can de- termine the adequacy of the notice and severance pay. The “reasons” re- quirement also serves the function of identifying dismissals that may be discriminatory or retaliatory, irrespective of whether the dismissal was for just cause or was without cause. It functions similarly to the discov- ery process in a civil claim. We do not see how interpreting ss. 240 to 245 of the Code as a “without cause” regime would affect the operation of this evidentiary provision. 142 Further, affirming that the Code permits employers to dismiss em- ployees without cause does not render meaningless the remedy of rein- statement. As we have noted, the remedy of reinstatement is available in almost every provincial employment law regime irrespective of whether that regime permits an employer to dismiss an employee without cause. For example, reinstatement is routinely ordered where “there has been breach of the statutory requirements or protections governing the em- ployee’s employment, or where the termination is in breach of an appli- cable human rights code”: J. T. Casey, ed., Remedies in Labour, Employ- ment and Human Rights Law (loose-leaf), at p. 4-4 (footnotes omitted); 68 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
see also St-Gervais (Commission scolaire) v. Belanger, [1970] S.C.R. 948 (S.C.C.), at p. 952; Kelso v. Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.), at p. 210. Under the Code, adjudicators currently order reinstatement based on their expert assessment of whether the employer and employee will be able to continue working together in a healthy and productive employment relationship in the future. If the adjudicator has reason to believe that the employer will simply dismiss the employee again, he or she will not order reinstatement. In Ridley v. Gitxaala Nation, [2009] C.L.A.D. No. 267 (Can. Arb.), at para. 3, for instance, it was held that reinstatement is not appropriate where “it is highly likely to result in a second dismissal within a short period of time”. There is no reason to suppose that this practice would change were this Court to affirm the continuing right of federally regulated employers to dismiss their em- ployees without cause, as long as the appropriate notice and severance pay is provided. 143 The adjudicator retains significant remedial powers where a federally regulated employer dismisses an employee without cause. This is be- cause the employer must still provide appropriate notice and severance pay. If the employee chooses to complain about that dismissal before an adjudicator, and the adjudicator has jurisdiction to consider the com- plaint, the adjudicator has the power to determine whether the amount of notice and severance pay reflects “the wages that the employer ought to have paid the employee either over the course of the period of reasonable notice or as pay in lieu of notice”: Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701 (S.C.C.) at para. 66. The adjudicator may do so by comparing the amount the employee would be entitled to under com- mon law against the statutory minimum prescribed in ss. 230 and 235, and awarding the greater sum to the employee. The adjudicator’s power to do so is found in s. 168, which preserves the application of the com- mon law where it provides benefits in excess of what is prescribed in the Code. 144 Further, if the adjudicator finds something unjust in the manner of dismissal, the adjudicator has the power to award whatever remedy that he or she deems appropriate, whether this is compensatory damages, pu- nitive damages, or in appropriate cases, reinstatement. Adjudicators rou- tinely award damages for mental distress or punitive damages where the employer’s conduct in dismissing an employee is egregious or in bad faith: see, e.g., Poulter v. Gull Bay First Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3466 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) ($10,000 for bullying, demeaning, and harassing conduct that led to a constructive dismissal); Morrisseau v. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown JJ. 69
Tootinaowaziibeeng First Nation (2004), 39 C.C.E.L. (3d) 134 (Can.Adjud.(CLC Part III)) (three extra months of salary and benefits payable due to the employer’s callous behaviour in dismissing the em- ployee); Parrish & Heinbecker, Ltd. and Knight, Re, 2006 CarswellNat 6950 (Can. Arb.) (four months’ salary ordered as punitive damages for the employer’s conduct in dismissing the employee without cause or no- tice). These remedies are available in the civil courts and they are rou- tinely awarded as remedies for wrongful dismissals. They are equally available to employees who challenge the lawfulness of their dismissal through the adjudicative provisions of the Code. 145 An employer may also dismiss an employee for just cause. Where just cause is made out, an employer is not obliged to provide notice or severance pay to an employee. When an employer dismisses an em- ployee and alleges just cause, an adjudicator has the power to determine whether just cause was made out. If it was not, then the adjudicator may award any remedy that he or she deems appropriate, including reinstate- ment. Reinstatement is only awarded where it is requested by the em- ployee and where there is no significant deterioration in the employment relationship between the employer and the employee: Levitt, at pp. 2-119 to 2-120.
H. Summary of the Proper Interpretation 146 The purpose of ss. 240 to 245 is to provide a low cost, efficient, and effective procedural mechanism for employees to challenge the lawful- ness of their dismissal. Employees who are covered by a collective agreement have a similar procedural option to grieve the lawfulness of their dismissals, as the Minister noted in his statements to the Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower and Immigration and to the House of Commons in 1978. 147 This procedure is more efficient and perhaps more effective than a civil action, since it involves less stringent evidentiary rules, an expert adjudicator who is well versed in the factual nuances of employment re- lationships, and a stricter timeline than a court action. It is a “time- and cost-effective method of resolving employment disputes ... [that] pro- vides an alternative to judicial determination”: Dunsmuir, at para. 69. Additional remedies are available to employees who choose to use the unjust dismissal provisions. In this way, the unjust dismissal provisions of the Code increase access to justice for federal employees who are dis- missed from their employment. 70 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
148 But a procedural mechanism that increases access to justice does not, in and of itself, fundamentally alter the nature of the employment rela- tionship. This procedural mechanism — access to which is dependent on the discretion of the Minister — is not, therefore, the exclusive means by which a federal employee must challenge the lawfulness of the dismissal. The employee may choose to challenge the dismissal through the courts as well. The unjust dismissal provisions are simply a procedural option for federal employees. The common law continues to apply, and feder- ally regulated employers are entitled to dismiss employees without cause, but with payment of the appropriate notice and severance pay as pre- scribed by ss. 230 and 235 of the Code, the contract of employment, or the common law (whichever is greater). Adjudicators and courts possess concurrent jurisdiction to determine the adequacy of the notice and sev- erance pay and to order any other remedies that may be warranted in the circumstances. The mere provision of a notice and a severance payment does not allow an employer to escape the scrutiny of an adjudicator any more than it would allow the employer to escape the scrutiny of a court.
IV. Conclusion 149 We agree with the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal that the Canada Labour Code does not prohibit all federally regulated em- ployers from dismissing employees without cause. It follows that the ad- judicator’s decision should be set aside. We would therefore dismiss the appeal.
Abella, J.:
1 La common law permettait le cong´ediement non motiv´e d’un em- ploy´e qui n’est pas syndiqu´e moyennant un pr´eavis raisonnable ou une indemnit´e en guise et lieu de pr´eavis. La question en l’esp`ece est de savoir si le Parlement, en modifiant le Code canadien du travail1 en 1978, avait l’intention d’´etablir un r´egime l´egal alternatif offrant des pro- tections g´en´ereuses tr`es semblables a` celles dont jouissent les employ´es prot´eg´es par une convention collective. Soit dit en tout respect, a` mon avis et selon des centaines d’arbitres ayant interpr´et´e ce r´egime — presque tous en fait — , c’´etait l`a exactement l’intention du Parlement.
1 L.R.C. 1985, c. L-2. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 71
Contexte 2 En 1971, le Parlement a modifi´e le Code canadien du travail2. Il pr´evoyait, dans le cas d’un cong´ediement, une obligation de pr´eavis en- vers l’employ´e non syndiqu´e ayant travaill´e depuis au moins trois mois sans interruption.3 Les modifications pr´ecisaient egalement´ le taux mini- mal d’indemnit´e a` verser a` l’employ´e ayant travaill´e depuis 12 mois.4 Dans le cas d’un cong´ediement pour une juste cause (depuis 1985, un cong´ediement justifi´e), l’employ´e ne pouvait b´en´eficier ni du pr´eavis ni de l’indemnit´e. 3 Des modifications plus fondamentales ont et´´ e apport´ees au Code en 1978. Une s´erie de dispositions ont et´´ e greff´ees a` la partie III sous le titre « Cong´ediement injuste »5. Elles se trouvent aux articles 240 a` 246.6 Ce r´egime applicable en cas de cong´ediement injuste vise les employ´es non syndiqu´es ayant travaill´e sans interruption pendant 12 mois. Tout em- ploy´e dans cette situation qui estime avoir et´´ e injustement cong´edi´e dis- pose de 90 jours pour d´eposer une plainte ecrite´ aupr`es d’un inspecteur (art. 240). 4 L’employ´e cong´edi´e ou un inspecteur peut demander a` l’employeur de lui faire connaˆıtre les motifs du cong´ediement par ecrit.´ L’employeur dispose de 15 jours pour ce faire (par. 241(1)). 5 L’inspecteur doit imm´ediatement tenter de r´egler la plainte (par. 241(2)). S’il n’est pas possible de r´egler la plainte dans un d´elai raison- nable, l’inspecteur peut, a` la demande de l’employ´e cong´edi´e, la renvoyer au ministre (par. 241(3)), qui peut demander a` un arbitre de l’entendre (par. 242(1)). Le rapport de l’inspecteur constitue le crible qui empˆeche que les plaintes frivoles, vexatoires ou manifestement mal fond´ees m`enent a` une d´ecision (H.W. Arthurs, Equit´´ e au travail: Des normes du travail f´ed´erales pour le XXIe si`ecle (2006), p. 185-186 (le rapport Arthurs)).
2 Loi modifiant le Code canadien du travail, S.R.C. 1970, c. 17 (2e Supp.), art. 16. 3 Dans la version actuelle, partie III, section X — Licenciements individuels 4 Dans la version actuelle, partie III, section XI — Indemnit´e de d´epart 5 Loi modifiant le Code canadien du travail, S.C. 1977-1978, c. 27, art. 21. 6 Dans la version actuelle, partie III, section XIV — Cong´ediement injuste 72 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
6 L’arbitre a pour mandat de d´ecider si le cong´ediement etait´ injuste (par. 242(3)). Dans l’affirmative, l’arbitre est investi de larges pouvoirs lui permettant d’accorder la r´eparation convenable (par. 242(4)). En vertu de ce pouvoir, il peut notamment enjoindre a` l’employeur: a) de payer au plaignant une indemnit´e equivalant,´ au maxi- mum, au salaire qu’il aurait normalement gagn´e s’il n’avait pas et´´ e cong´edi´e; b) de r´eint´egrer le plaignant dans son emploi; c) de prendre toute autre mesure qu’il juge equitable´ de lui im- poser et de nature a` contrebalancer les effets du cong´ediement ou a` y rem´edier. 7 L’arbitre ne peut instruire la plainte si l’employ´e a et´´ e licenci´e en raison du manque de travail ou de la suppression d’un poste (al. 242(3.1)a)).
Historique judiciaire 8 En 2005, Energie´ atomique du Canada Limit´ee (EACL)7 a engag´e Joseph Wilson comme acheteur principal et administrateur de com- mandes et l’a promu par la suite au poste de superviseur de l’approvisionnement en mat´eriel. Il a travaill´e pendant quatre ans et demi avant d’ˆetre cong´edi´e, en novembre 2009. Son dossier disciplinaire etait´ vierge. 9 En d´ecembre 2009, M. Wilson a d´epos´e une plainte pour cong´edie- ment injuste en vertu du par. 240(1) du Code. En r´eponse a` la demande de l’inspecteur voulant obtenir les motifs du cong´ediement, EACL a pr´e- cis´e dans une lettre envoy´ee en mars 2010 que M. Wilson avait et´´ e [TRADUCTION] « licenci´e sans motif et avait re¸cu une g´en´ereuse in- demnit´e de d´epart qui exc´edait de beaucoup l’indemnit´e minimale pr´evue par la loi. Nous esp´erons que vous jugerez le tout satisfaisant ». 10 Selon M. Wilson, il aurait et´´ e cong´edi´e en repr´esailles d’une plainte qu’il avait d´epos´ee a` propos de pratiques irr´eguli`eres d’approvisionnement par EACL. 11 Le professeur Stanley Schiff a et´´ e nomm´e pour entendre la plainte en qualit´e d’arbitre. AECL lui a demand´e de trancher d’abord la question de savoir si un cong´ediement non motiv´e assorti d’une indemnit´e de d´epart g´en´ereuse equivalait´ a` un cong´ediement juste.
7 EACL est une soci´et´e d’Etat´ r´egie par la l´egislation f´ed´erale. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 73
12 Les parties ont convenu que, peu importe la r´eponse de l’arbitre a` la question pr´eliminaire, il aurait comp´etence pour entendre les affirmations de M. Wilson quant aux repr´esailles. 13 L’arbitre s’est dit li´e par l’affaire Redlon Agencies Ltd. c. Norgren, 2005 FC 804, suivant laquelle l’employeur ne peut, sous pr´etexte d’avoir vers´e une indemnit´e de d´epart — et ce quel qu’en soit le montant — , empˆecher que la question du cong´ediement injuste soit tranch´ee en appli- cation du Code. Vu qu’EACL n’avait donn´e aucun motif de cong´edie- ment, la plainte de M. Wilson a et´´ e accueillie. 14 Le juge saisi de la demande a conclu au caract`ere d´eraisonnable de la sentence; a` son avis, rien dans la partie III du Code n’empˆeche les em- ployeurs de cong´edier leurs employ´es non syndiqu´es sans motif. La Cour d’appel f´ed´erale etait´ d’accord, mais a proc´ed´e au contrˆole selon la norme de la d´ecision correcte.
Analyse 15 Devant la Cour comme devant les juridictions inf´erieures, les parties ont accept´e que la norme de contrˆole applicable etait´ celle de la d´ecision raisonnable. Je suis d’accord. Les sentences des arbitres en droit du trav- ail charg´es d’interpr´eter des lois ou des ententes qui rel`event de leur ex- pertise appellent la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable (Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Brunswick, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 190, par. 68; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. c. Manitoba Association of Health Care Profes- sionals, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 616, par. 42). 16 La Cour d’appel f´ed´erale elle-mˆeme — sous la plume de deux des juges ayant statu´e dans l’affaire dont nous sommes saisis — a conclu r´ecemment dans l’arrˆet Yue c. Bank of Montreal, 2016 FCA 107, que c’est la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable qui s’applique aux sentences des arbitres charg´es d’appliquer les dispositions sur le cong´ediement in- juste du Code: [TRADUCTION] Il est bien etabli´ que la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable s’applique au contrˆole des sentences arbitrales rendues a` l’´egard de la section XIV de la partie III du Code, g´en´eralement, et a` l’interpr´etation par les arbitres de ce qui constitue un cong´ediement injuste par l’employeur (Payne c. Banque de Montr´eal, 2013 CAF 33, par. 32- 33; MacFarlane c. Day & Ross Inc., 2014 CAF 199, par. 3; Donaldson c. Western Grain By-Products Storage Ltd., 2015 CAF 62, par. 33) [par. 5] 74 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
17 A` la lumi`ere de cette norme, j’estime que la d´ecision de l’arbitre etait´ raisonnable et conforme a` la d´emarche que la tr`es grande majorit´e appli- que a` ces dispositions depuis leur adoption. Certes, une poign´ee d’arbitres a adopt´e une autre d´emarche d’interpr´etation du Code, mais comme la Cour l’a dit a` maintes reprises, cela ne justifie pas que l’on s’´ecarte de la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable (Toronto (Ville) c. S.C.F.P., section locale 79, [2003] 3 R.C.S. 77, par. 71; Dunsmuir, par. 55-56; Smith c. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., [2011] 1 R.C.S. 160, par. 38; Syndicat canadien des communications, de l’´energie et du papier, section locale 30 c. Pˆates & Papier Irving, Lt´ee, [2013] 2 R.C.S. 458, par. 7-8). 18 Je ne saurais accepter non plus le point de vue adopt´e par la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale selon lequel, mˆeme si la norme de contrˆole applicable etait´ celle de la d´ecision raisonnable, il faudrait « consid´er[er] que la capacit´e de l’arbitre d’opter pour l’une ou l’autre des diff´erentes solu- tions est limit´ee » parce qu’en l’esp`ece l’interpr´etation l´egislative « sup- pose relativement peu de connaissances sp´ecialis´ees dans le domaine du travail ». Comme l’a affirm´e la Cour, le caract`ere raisonnable est fonc- tion du contexte particulier consid´er´e. Or, en tentant d’´etalonner la norme en appliquant des degr´es potentiellement ind´etermin´es de d´ef´erence, on compliquerait indˆument un domaine du droit qui a besoin d’ˆetre simplifi´e. 19 Certes, mˆeme si la question de la norme applicable en l’esp`ece s’inscrit bien dans notre jurisprudence, il me semble profitable d’exprimer des commentaires g´en´eraux sur la norme de contrˆole, en obiter. Il existe indubitablement de nombreuses approches susceptibles d’aider a` simplifier le labyrinthe actuel de la norme de contrˆole applica- ble. Je propose la d´emarche suivante comme une simple option, afin d’engager la conversation. Comme il ne s’agit que d’une amorce, la dis- cussion b´en´eficiera au fil du temps des observations que pr´esenteront les avocats, cette proposition ne se veut d’aucune fa¸con une proposition a` caract`ere exhaustif, d´efinitif ou obligatoire. 20 Une portion importante des m´emoires des parties et des d´ecisions des juridictions inf´erieures etait´ consacr´ee a` la norme applicable. A` mon avis, cette situation est insoutenable et nous appelle a` nous interroger, en tant qu’institution, sur la n´ecessit´e d’un tel parcours d’obstacles et sur l’existence d’un moyen de principe de simplifier la d´emarche menant a` l’examen au fond. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 75
21 Tout d’abord, il serait utile de rappeler les principes de base enonc´´ es dans l’arrˆet Dunsmuir, qui a d´efini deux d´emarches a` l’´egard du contrˆole de d´ecisions administratives. La premi`ere, empreinte de d´ef´erence, s’applique s’il existe plusieurs issues possibles raisonnables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit. C’est de loin le groupe d’affaires le plus nombreux. La Cour dans l’arrˆet Dunsmuir explique la d´ef´erence en ces termes: Il ne s’ensuit pas que les cours de justice doivent s’incliner devant les conclusions des d´ecideurs ni qu’elles doivent respecter aveugl´ement leurs interpr´etations. Elles ne peuvent pas non plus invoquer la no- tion de raisonnabilit´e pour imposer dans les faits leurs propres vues. La d´ef´erence suppose plutˆot le respect du processus d´ecisionnel au regard des faits et du droit. [par. 48] 22 Il peut y avoir plusieurs issues, selon le juge John M. Evans, car [TRADUCTION] « [f]aire preuve de d´ef´erence [...] c’est reconnaˆıtre qu’il n’y a pas une seule r´eponse correcte a` la question » (« Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter » (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 101, p. 108). Le nombre des issues varie forc´ement. Comme la juge en chef McLachlin le fait remarquer, le caract`ere raisonnable « s’appr´ecie dans le contexte du type particulier de processus d´ecisionnel en cause et de l’ensemble des facteurs pertinents » et « varie selon le contexte » (Catalyst Paper Corp. c. North Cowichan (District), [2012] 1 R.C.S. 5, par. 18 et 23, citant avec approbation Canada (Citoyennet´e et Immigration) c. Khosa, [2009] 1 R.C.S. 339, par. 59). 23 La deuxi`eme d´emarche, celle de la d´ecision correcte, s’appliquait seulement lorsqu’une seule r´eponse pouvait se justifier. Comme le dit la Cour dans Dunsmuir, il s’agissait d’une question constitutionnelle con- cernant le partage des comp´etences (par. 58), d’une « question touchant v´eritablement a` la comp´etence » (par. 59), d’une question de droit g´en´er- ale « a` la fois, d’une importance capitale pour le syst`eme juridique dans son ensemble et etrang`´ ere au domaine d’expertise de l’arbitre » (par. 60) et de « la d´elimitation des comp´etences respectives de tribunaux sp´ecial- is´es » (par. 61). 24 La principale source de confusion dans notre jurisprudence tient a` l’appellation a` donner a` la cat´egorie de contrˆole applicable dans un cas en particulier. Il vaut peut-ˆetre la peine de s’interroger sur la n´ecessit´e de d´ebats th´eoriques a` propos des mots qui servent a` d´esigner nos conclu- sions a` l’issue du contrˆole judiciaire. Conclure qu’il n’y a qu’une r´eponse « raisonnable » et dire que la r´eponse est « correcte », cela ne revient-il pas essentiellement au mˆeme? Ce qui nous am`ene a` nous demander s’il 76 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
est n´ecessaire d’avoir deux d´esignations diff´erentes pour les d´emarches en mati`ere de contrˆole judiciaire ou si ces deux d´emarches peuvent toutes deux s’inscrire confortablement dans une conception elargie´ de la raisonnabilit´e. 25 Il pourrait se r´ev´eler utile d’expliquer bri`evement comment nous en sommes arriv´es l`a. Dans Dunsmuir, la Cour cherchait a` etablir´ un « cadre d’analyse rationnel qui soit plus coh´erent et fonctionnel » (par. 32) pour le contrˆole judiciaire des d´ecisions administratives. Ainsi, pour simpli- fier, on a remplac´e les trois normes qui existaient a` l’´epoque par deux. Cependant, le fait de passer de trois a` deux normes ne s’est pas r´ev´el´e etreˆ la piste de simplicit´e qu’attendait la Cour. Dans les faits, les luttes terminologiques a` propos de celle des trois normes qui devait s’appliquer ont et´´ e remplac´ees par des luttes sur l’application des deux normes restantes. Pendant ce temps, l’analyse au fond attend en coulisses. 26 Si auparavant la distinction entre la norme de la d´ecision manifeste- ment d´eraisonnable et celle de la d´ecision raisonnable simpliciter portait a` confusion, de nos jours, nous avons du mal a` distinguer la norme de la d´ecision d´eraisonnable de celle de la d´ecision correcte. A` mon avis, il est difficile de justifier cette entr´ee compliqu´ee dans le contrˆole judiciaire. Il est ironique de constater que l’explication fournie dans Dunsmuir pour justifier le changement de cadre demeure valable aujourd’hui, comme le d´emontrent les extraits suivants: Au Canada, l’´evolution r´ecente du contrˆole judiciaire a et´´ e marqu´ee par une d´ef´erence variable, l’application de crit`eres d´eroutants et la qualification nouvelle de vieux probl`emes, sans qu’une solution n’offre de v´eritables rep`eres aux parties, a` leurs avocats, aux d´ecideurs administratifs ou aux cours de justice saisies de demandes de contrˆole judiciaire. Le temps est venu de r´e´evaluer la question...... Ses assises constitutionnelles claires et stables n’ont pas empˆech´e le contrˆole judiciaire de connaˆıtre une evolution´ constante au Canada, les cours de justice s’effor¸cant au fil des ans de concevoir une d´e- marche tout autant valable sur le plan th´eorique qu’efficace en pra- tique. Malgr´e les efforts pour l’am´eliorer et le clarifier, le m´ecanisme actuel s’est r´ev´el´e difficile a` appliquer. Le temps est venu de revoir le contrˆole judiciaire des d´ecisions administratives au Canada et d’´etablir un cadre d’analyse rationnel qui soit plus coh´erent et fonctionnel. ... il est devenu apparent que le m´ecanisme actuel devait etreˆ sim- plifi´e. [par. 1 et 32-33] Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 77
27 La Cour dans Dunsmuir avait indiqu´e que la « distinction concep- tuelle » entre les deux normes — celle de la d´ecision manifestement d´er- aisonnable et celle de la d´ecision raisonnable simpliciter — donnait du fil a` retordre aux tribunaux judiciaires, qui estimaient que « toute diff´erence r´eelle sur le plan de l’application se r´ev`ele illusoire » (par. 39-41). On peut faire valoir, a` l’instar du professeur David Mullan, que la Cour a elle-mˆeme dans certains arrˆets estomp´e les distinctions conceptuelles en- tre les normes de la d´ecision correcte et de la d´ecision raisonnable et a parfois proc´ed´e a` un contrˆole selon la norme de la d´ecision correcte [TRADUCTION] « sous le couvert » de la norme de la d´ecision raison- nable.8 D’autres ont egalement´ exprim´e des r´eserves sur le manque d’uniformit´e et la confusion dans l’application des normes.9 La question qui se pose donc est de savoir s’il existe un moyen de respecter les principes sous-tendant le contrˆole judiciaire qui avaient et´´ e expliqu´es si el´´ egamment et d´efinitivement dans l’arrˆet Dunsmuir tout en facilitant leur application.
8 David Mullan, « Unresolved Issues on Standard of Review in Canadian Judi- cial Review of Administrative Action — The Top Fifteen! » (2013) 42 Adv. Q. 1, p. 76-81. Il cite en exemple Colombie-Britannique (Workers’ Compensation Board) c. Figliola, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 422; Canada (Commission canadienne des droits de la personne) c. Canada (Procureur g´en´eral), [2011] 3 R.C.S. 471 (Mowat); Alberta (Education)´ c. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), [2012] 2 R.C.S. 345; Halifax (Regional Municipality) c. Canada (Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux), [2012] 2 R.C.S. 108. Voir egalement´ Lauren J. Wihak, « Whither the correctness standard of review? Dun- smuir, six years later » (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 173, p. 174-175 et 183. 9 Voir Lorne Sossin, “The Complexity of Coherence: Justice LeBel’s Adminis- trative Law” (2015), 70:2 S.C.L.R. (2d) 145; l’hon. John M. Evans, « Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter? » (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 101; David Philip Jones, c.r., “The Year in Review: Recent Develop- ments in Administrative Law” (pr´epar´e pour la conf´erence nationale sur le droit admin istratif, le droit du travail et de l’emploi 2015 de l’Association du Barreau canadien); Wihak; Matthew Lewans, « Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir » (2012), 38 Queen’s L.J. 59; Paul Daly, « Dunsmuir’s Flaws Ex- posed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review » (2012), 58 McGill L.J. 483; l’hon. juge David Stratas, « The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency », 17 f´evrier 2016 (en ligne). 78 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
28 La r´eforme du syst`eme actuel la plus evidente´ et celle qui est pro- pos´ee le plus souvent consiste en l’adoption d’une norme de contrˆole unique, celle de la d´ecision raisonnable. Avant de l’accepter, il importe de ne pas perdre de vue les imp´eratifs li´es a` la primaut´e du droit du con- trˆole judiciaire. La Cour traite des rapports entre le contrˆole judiciaire et la primaut´e du droit dans les premiers paragraphes de son analyse dans l’arrˆet Dunsmuir : Sur le plan constitutionnel, le contrˆole judiciaire est intimement li´e au maintien de la primaut´e du droit. C’est essentiellement cette assise constitutionnelle qui explique sa raison d’ˆetre et oriente sa fonction et son application. Le contrˆole judiciaire s’int´eresse a` la tension sous- jacente a` la relation entre la primaut´e du droit et le principe d´emocra- tique fondamental, qui se traduit par la prise de mesures l´egislatives pour cr´eer divers organismes administratifs et les investir de larges pouvoirs. Lorsqu’elles s’acquittent de leurs fonctions constitutionnel- les de contrˆole judiciaire, les cours de justice doivent tenir compte de la n´ecessit´e non seulement de maintenir la primaut´e du droit, mais egalement´ d’´eviter toute immixtion injustifi´ee dans l’exercice de fonctions administratives en certaines mati`eres d´etermin´ees par le l´egislateur. La primaut´e du droit veut que tout exercice de l’autorit´e publique proc`ede de la loi. Tout pouvoir d´ecisionnel est l´egalement circonscrit par la loi habilitante, la common law, le droit civil ou la Constitution. Le contrˆole judiciaire permet aux cours de justice de s’assurer que les pouvoirs l´egaux sont exerc´es dans les limites fix´ees par le l´egislateur. Il vise a` assurer la l´egalit´e, la rationalit´e et l’´equit´e du processus ad- ministratif et de la d´ecision rendue. [par. 27-28] 29 Ainsi, « [l]’organe l´egislatif du gouvernement ne peut supprimer le pouvoir judiciaire de s’assurer que les actes et les d´ecisions d’un organ- isme administratif sont conformes aux pouvoirs constitutionnels du gouvernement [.. .] En r´esum´e, le contrˆole judiciaire b´en´eficie de la pro- tection constitutionnelle au Canada, surtout lorsqu’il s’agit de d´efinir les limites de la comp´etence et de les faire respecter » (Dunsmuir, par. 31). 30 Il convient de noter que le contrˆole judiciaire « joue un rˆole constitu- tionnel important en assurant la supr´ematie l´egislative », ce qui se traduit par « la reconnaissance du fait que les cours de justice n’ont pas le pouvoir exclusif de statuer sur toutes les questions de droit, ce qui temp`ere la conception judiciaris´ee de la primaut´e du droit » (Dunsmuir, par. 30, citant le juge Thomas Cromwell, « Appellate Review: Policy and Pragmatism », dans 2006 Isaac Pitblado Lectures, p. V-12). Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 79
31 Rien de ce que la Cour dit dans l’arrˆet Dunsmuir a` propos de la primaut´e du droit ne laisse entendre que, pour assurer le respect des pouvoirs constitutionnels, il faut qu’il y ait un certain nombre de normes de contrˆole. En fait, tout ce qui est exig´e c’est qu’il y ait des contrˆoles judiciaires pour faire en sorte notamment que les d´ecideurs administratifs n’exercent pas de pouvoirs qui ne leur sont pas impartis. Je ne vois rien dans son analyse des principes de primaut´e du droit qui empˆecherait l’adoption d’une seule norme de contrˆole, tant que cette derni`ere permet la d´ef´erence a` l’´egard du d´ecideur et la possibilit´e de conclure, lorsque la primaut´e du droit l’exige, qu’il ne peut y avoir qu’une seule issue, comme dans le cas des quatre cat´egories de questions soumises a` l’application de la norme de la d´ecision correcte suivant Dunsmuir. 32 L’adoption d’une norme unique de la d´ecision raisonnable appelle toujours la d´emarche enonc´´ ee dans Dunsmuir, c’est-`a-dire: Le caract`ere raisonnable tient [...] a` l’appartenance de la d´ecision aux issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit. [par. 47] 33 Envisager l’analyse en posant la question de savoir si la d´ecision ap- partient aux issues pouvant se justifier pr´esente l’avantage de bien cadrer avec les principes qui animaient l’une et l’autre des deux anciennes cat´e- gories de contrˆole judiciaire. Les cours de justice peuvent circonscrire largement la gamme des issues dans les cas o`u les d´ecideurs — ou le type de questions — appelaient traditionnellement une d´emarche em- preinte de d´ef´erence et etroitement´ — en reconnaissant une seule issue « pouvant se justifier » — dans les cas o`u les questions entraˆınaient auparavant l’application de la norme de la d´ecision correcte. La plupart des d´ecisions continueront a` commander la d´ef´erence, comme l’explique la Cour dans Dunsmuir, ce qui signifie, pour citer le juge Evans: [TRADUCTION] ... [qu’] une cour de justice sera plus encline a` conclure a` l’existence de plusieurs choix interpr´etatifs raisonnables et a` faire preuve de d´ef- erence´ dans les cas o`u le pouvoir du tribunal administratif lui est con- f´er´e en termes larges. Si, par exemple, ce tribunal est habilit´e a` trancher des questions d’int´erˆet public, il se peut que la cour si´egeant en r´evision d´ecide qu’il dispose de plusieurs choix lorsqu’il s’agit de d´eterminer les facteurs d´ecisionnels a` consid´erer. Les questions de droit se mueront imperceptiblement en questions relatives a` l’exercice du pouvoir discr´etionnaire. Le contrˆole selon la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable permet a` la cour de d´ecider si les facteurs dont le tribunal a tenu compte sont li´es sur le plan rationnel aux 80 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
objectifs de la loi, qui sont en g´en´eral multiples. Il n’incombe pas a` la cour de choisir les facteurs que le tribunal devait consid´erer, et en- core moins de les soupeser a` nouveau. [Note de bas de page omise; p. 110] 34 Mˆeme lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpr´eter une loi, l’exercice d’interpr´etation se soldera g´en´eralement par plusieurs issues raisonnables. La Cour dans l’arrˆet Agraira c. Canada (S´ecurit´e publique et Protection civile), [2013] 2 R.C.S. 559, par exemple, a conclu que le ministre disposait d’une lati- tude consid´erable dans l’interpr´etation d’une disposition l´egislative pr´evoyant comme crit`ere de d´ecision « l’int´erˆet national ». 35 Or, il se peut qu’en de rares occasions il n’y ait qu’une seule issue « pouvant se justifier ». Dans l’arrˆet Mowat, par exemple, la Cour estime qu’il ressort clairement apr`es l’application des outils ordinaires d’interpr´etation l´egislative que l’organe administratif dont la d´ecision est contrˆol´ee n’a pas le pouvoir d’adjuger les d´epens dans le contexte. Dans les circonstances particuli`eres de l’affaire, aucun autre r´esultat n’appartient aux issues raisonnables. De mˆeme, la Cour a infirm´e des d´ecisions qui vont a` l’encontre de l’objet d’un r´egime l´egal ou du choix politique qui le sous-tend (Halifax). 36 En revanche, les quatre cat´egories de questions qui commandent la norme de la d´ecision correcte suivant Dunsmuir sur le fondement des principes de la primaut´e du droit n’emportent toujours qu’une seule issue raisonnable. 37 Je reconnais qu’aucune tentative de simplification ne peut n´ecessaire- ment garantir l’uniformit´e. Mˆeme a` la lumi`ere du cadre etabli´ par l’arrˆet Dunsmuir, il est arriv´e que des juges de la Cour, ayant appliqu´e la mˆeme norme, aient exprim´e des conclusions diff´erentes quant a` son effet sur la d´ecision.10 Le but consiste non pas a` traiter toutes les situations pos- sibles, mais a` faire fond sur les th´eories elabor´´ ees dans Dunsmuir et a` les appliquer sans devoir classer les affaires dans des cat´egories artificielles.
10 Voir M.M. c. Etats-Unis´ d’Am´erique, [2015] 3 R.C.S. 973; Kanthasamy c. Canada (Citoyennet´e et Immigration), [2015] 3 R.C.S. 909; Tervita Corp. c. Canada (Commissaire de la concurrence), [2015] 1 R.C.S. 161; Ontario (Commission de l’´energie) c. Ontario Power Generation Inc., [2015] 3 R.C.S. 147; Pˆates & Papier Irving. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 81
38 Cependant, mˆeme si la fusion des deux normes de contrˆole restantes ne suscitait pas beaucoup d’app´etit, je suis d’avis qu’il serait n´eanmoins b´en´efique de suivre le mod`ele incontournable d´evelopp´e dans Dunsmuir, en appliquant la norme r´esiduelle de la « d´ecision correcte » seulement dans les quatre circonstances enum´´ er´ees dans cet arrˆet. 39 Or, comme je l’ai signal´e, il suffit en l’esp`ece d’appliquer la d´e- marche habituelle pour le contrˆole selon la norme de la d´ecision raison- nable. La question en litige est celle de savoir si l’interpr´etation par l’arbitre des art. 240 a` 246 du Code etait´ raisonnable. Le texte, le con- texte, le discours du ministre lors du d´epˆot du projet de loi et les avis de la tr`es grande majorit´e des arbitres et auteurs en droit du travail viennent confirmer que l’objet global du r´egime l´egal consiste a` assurer aux em- ploy´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es une protection, pr´evue a` la partie III du Code, contre le cong´ediement sans motif. L’autre interpr´etation, suivant laquelle le versement d’une indemnit´e de d´epart suffit, n’appartient pas aux « issues possibles acceptables pouvant se justifier au regard des faits et du droit », car elle mine compl`etement l’objet du r´egime en permettant aux employeurs, a` leur choix, de priver les employ´es de l’ensemble int´e- gral des mesures de r´eparation cr´e´ees par le Parlement a` leur intention. Les droits des employ´es doivent etreˆ fond´es sur l’intention du Parlement, non sur l’avis personnel d’un employeur ou d’un arbitre. 40 La d´ecision de l’arbitre, M. Schiff, etait´ donc raisonnable. 41 Rappelons que le Parlement a apport´e des modifications au Code en 1971, dont les dispositions pr´evoyant l’indemnit´e minimale a` verser a` l’employ´e licenci´e ayant travaill´e pendant un certain nombre de mois cons´ecutifs pourvu qu’il ne s’agisse pas d’un cong´ediement pour une juste cause ou justifi´e. Ces r`egles se trouvent maintenant aux par. 230(1) et 235(1) du Code, dans la partie III. Leur ediction´ n’a pas eu pour effet de codifier ni d’´eteindre les r`egles de common law; elle offrait plutˆot une alternative extrajudiciaire en pr´evoyant des droits minimaux a` l’intention des employ´es cong´edi´es d´esireux d’´eviter les d´epenses et l’incertitude li´es a` une action en justice (rapport Arthurs, p. 182-183). 42 En 1978, le Parlement a de nouveau modifi´e le Code et etabli´ le r´e- gime de cong´ediement injuste, qui est pr´evu dans la version actuelle aux art. 240 a` 246 a` la partie III. La question centrale dont nous sommes saisis concerne l’effet des modifications de 1978 sur les droits des em- ploy´es non syndiqu´es ayant et´´ e licenci´es. Lors du d´epˆot du projet de loi, 82 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
le ministre du Travail de l’´epoque, l’honorable John Munro, a tenu les propos suivants: Nous esp´erons que les [modifications] donneront a` ces travailleurs non syndiqu´es au moins une partie des normes minimales que les travailleurs syndiqu´es ont obtenues et qui font maintenant partie de toutes les conventions collectives. Nous ne voulons pas pr´etendre que les normes etablies´ par le bill seront exactement celles que pr´evoient les conventions collections. Nous voulons cependant etablir´ des normes minimales. [Italiques ajout´es.] (D´ebats de la Chambre des communes, vol. II, 3e sess., 30e l´egis., 13 d´ec. 1977, p. 1832) 43 Il a expliqu´e ainsi l’objet des nouvelles dispositions sur le cong´edie- ment injuste devant le Comit´e permanent du Travail, de la Main-d’œuvre et de l’Immigration en mars 1978: Cette disposition fournit aux employ´es qui ne sont pas repr´esent´es par un syndicat, y compris les cadres et les membres de professions lib´erales, un droit d’appel contre tout cong´ediement arbitraire; ce droit assure une protection dont, selon le gouvernement, tous les travailleurs doivent b´en´eficier et qui figure egalement´ dans toutes les conventions collectives. (Chambre des communes, Proc`es-verbaux et t´emoignages du Comit´e permanent du Travail, de la Main d’œuvre et de l’Immigration, con- cernant Bill C-8, Loi modifiant le Code canadien du travail, nº 11, 3e sess., 30e l´egis., 16 mars 1978, p. 46-47) 44 Vu que cette d´eclaration mentionne le droit des employ´es a` une pro- tection dont « tous les travailleurs [...] doivent b´en´eficier » contre le con- g´ediement arbitraire et le fait qu’une telle protection « figure egalement´ dans toutes les conventions collectives », il est difficile a` mon avis de ne pas conclure que le Parlement entendait donner aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es des droits en cas de cong´ediement qui, s’ils ne sont pas identiques a` ceux des employ´es syndiqu´es, y sont certainement analogues. 45 En outre, l’intention du Parlement etait´ manifeste au mois d’aoˆut pr´e- c´edent, lorsque le ministre a reconnu que les termes « juste » et « in- juste » pouvaient sembler ambigus de prime abord, mais que la jurispru- dence arbitrale consid´erable issue du mouvement syndical eclairerait´ la trajectoire dans le champ du cong´ediement d’employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es: Il est parfois difficile de d´efinir les expressions « juste » et « in- juste ». Nous avons toutefois une volumineuse jurisprudence sur les Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 83
cong´ediements dans le secteur organis´e. Elle renferme des pr´ec´edents qui permettront aux arbitres de trancher la question de savoir si un licenciement est justifi´e ou s’il ne l’est pas. Chaque cas doit etreˆ d´e- cid´e d’apr`es les circonstances, mais l’application des principes de justice et de bon sens a nettement etabli´ ce qu’est un cong´ediement juste ou injuste. (Hon. John Munro, « Les 14 points Munro: l’am´elioration de la situa- tion des travailleurs non syndiqu´es » (1977), 77 La gazette du travail, 418, p. 420-421.) 46 Et c’est ainsi que les auteurs en droit du travail et presque tous les arbitres nomm´es pour appliquer les nouvelles dispositions de 1978 pr´evues aux articles 240 a` 246 les ont interpr´et´ees: elles avaient pour objet de pr´esenter une alternative l´egislative aux r`egles de common law r´egissant le cong´ediement et d’harmoniser les mesures de protection contre le cong´ediement injuste offertes aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es avec celles offertes aux syndiqu´es (G. England, « Unjust Dis- missal in the Federal Jurisdiction: The First Three Years » (1982), 12 Man. L.J. 9, p. 10; I. Christie, Employment Law in Canada (2e ed.,´ 1993), p. 669; rapport Arthurs, p. 182-183). 47 Les modifications de 1978 avaient pour effet de restreindre l’application du par. 230(1) (pr´eavis) et du par. 235(1) (indemnit´e de d´e- part minimale) aux situations non vis´ees par les dispositions sur le con- g´ediement injuste. Par exemple, les prescriptions en mati`ere de pr´eavis et d’indemnit´e de d´epart pr´evues aux par. 230(1) et 235(1) s’appliquent aux directeurs, a` ceux qui sont mis a` pied en raison d’un manque de travail ou d’une suppression de poste et, dans le cas du par. 230(1), aux em- ploy´es ayant travaill´e pour l’employeur pour plus de trois mois cons´ecu- tifs, mais moins de 12 mois. Autrement dit, les par. 230(1) et 235(1) n’offrent pas une alternative aux dispositions sur le cong´ediement in- juste; elles s’appliquent seulement a` ceux qui ne se pr´evalent pas des art. 240 a` 246 ou ne peuvent s’en pr´evaloir (Redlon Agencies, par. 38-39; Wolf Lake First Nation c. Young, 1997 CanLII 5057, par. 50). 48 Le bien-fond´e de l’interpr´etation faisant consensus au sein des arbi- tres ayant examin´e les dispositions sur le cong´ediement injuste a et´´ e con- firm´e par le prof Arthurs dans son rapport de 2006 sur la partie III du Code r´edig´e a` la demande du ministre du Travail de l’´epoque. Pour ses travaux, le prof. Arthurs a etabli´ un secr´etariat de Commission constitu´e de 16 membres, fait appel a` deux comit´es consultatifs (l’un form´e d’experts impartiaux et l’autre de repr´esentants des employ´es et des em- ployeurs), a tenu deux tables rondes mettant en pr´esence 38 participants 84 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
provenant de pr`es de 20 universit´es et de groupes industriels et consult´e 23 rapports de recherches ind´ependantes men´ees par des experts canadiens et etrangers.´ En plus, les employ´es de la Commission lui ont fourni neuf autres rapports sur divers sujets, dont des comparaisons entre la partie III et la l´egislation en mati`ere de normes du travail des ressorts canadiens et d’autres pays. La Commission a entendu 171 groupes et par- ticuliers lors des audiences publiques et a re¸cu plus de 154 m´emoires de toutes sortes. Elle a egalement´ organis´e des r´eunions avec des organisa- tions repr´esentant les employ´es, les employeurs et la collectivit´e, ainsi que des responsables de l’application des normes du travail et des praticiens. 49 A` l’issue de son vaste examen de la partie III du Code et de son appli- cation, le prof. Arthurs confirme que les nouvelles dispositions sur le cong´ediement injuste avaient pour but d’accorder « aux travailleurs non syndiqu´es une protection contre le cong´ediement injuste assez compara- ble a` celle dont jouissent les travailleurs syndiqu´es en vertu de leur con- vention collective » (p. 183 (italiques ajout´es)) : ... au fil des ann´ees, le syst`eme d’arbitrage a non seulement combl´e nombre des lacunes proc´edurales que comportait le recours du droit commun, mais il a egalement´ modifi´e de mani`ere importante les vieilles r`egles du droit civil et de la common law applicables au con- g´ediement injuste. [L]es arbitres, s’inspirant abondamment de la ju- risprudence etablie´ avec les ann´ees par les arbitres des milieux de travail syndiqu´es, ont elabor´´ e des r`egles qui leur sont propres et qui conf`erent aux travailleurs de comp´etence f´ed´erale non syndiqu´es une protection fondamentale et proc´edurale relativement etendue.´ [..] [C]ette situation a co¨ıncid´e avec l’adoption d’attitudes et de pratiques progressistes dans le domaine de la discipline en milieu de travail — elle en a sans doute acc´el´er´e l’adoption — , dont bon nombre etaient´ egalement´ pr´econis´ees par les sp´ecialistes des ressources humaines et des relations industrielles a` titre de pratique exemplaire [p. 189]. (Voir egalement´ G. Trudeau, « Is Reinstatement a Remedy Suitable to At-Will Employees? » (1991), 30 Indus. Rel. 302, p. 312-313.) 50 Le nouveau r´egime pr´evu par le Code offrait egalement´ aux employ´es cong´edi´es une solution extrajudiciaire abordable leur permettant d’obtenir des r´eparations utiles et bien plus diversifi´ees que celles que pr´evoit la common law. Pour citer le prof. Arthurs: En common law [...] les employeurs qui d´esirent r´eorganiser ou r´eduire leurs effectifs pour des raisons d’affaires sont tenus de donner un pr´eavis « raisonnable » aux employ´es qu’ils entendent licencier, Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 85
sauf si le contrat de travail stipule d’autres conditions. Bien entendu, comme pour les autres protections dont jouissent en principe les travailleurs en vertu du droit commun, cette protection a toujours et´´ e difficile a` mettre en application. N´eanmoins, tel est encore aujourd’hui l’´etat du droit commun, et la Partie III ne renferme aucune disposition pour le modifier. Elle etablit´ toutefois une proc´e- dure diff´erente, plus accessible, en vertu de laquelle les travailleurs licenci´es pour des raisons d’affaires ou des raisons economiques´ peuvent r´eclamer un pr´eavis et une indemnit´e sans avoir a` intenter une poursuite...... L’un des grands m´erites [...] est donc de suppl´eer aux principales lacunes du recours civil. Elle offre des mesures r´eparatrices efficaces et elle supprime les obstacles a` l’acc`es a` la justice que repr´esentent les coˆuts. Elle concr´etise ainsi un principe universellement reconnu —a ` savoir que nul ne devrait etreˆ cong´edi´e sans cause. On peut donc consid´erer la Partie III comme un exercice de r´eforme de la justice de droit commun. [p. 183 et 188] 51 L’enseignement le plus important de la jurisprudence arbitrale a` pro- pos des nouvelles dispositions est sa d´efinition de ce qui constitue un « cong´ediement injuste ». Certes, comme le fait remarquer la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale, le terme « injuste » est un outil familier dans l’arsenal des juristes et joue un rˆole g´en´eral, voire embl´ematique. Or, dans le con- texte de la n´egociation collective, ce terme a une d´efinition pr´ecise et bien comprise — et non moins embl´ematique — : les employ´es vis´es par une convention collective sont prot´eg´es contre le cong´ediement injuste; ils ne peuvent etreˆ cong´edi´es que pour une juste cause. Il incombe a` l’employeur de fournir les motifs d´emontrant en quoi le cong´ediement est justifi´e, et l’employ´e jouit d’importantes mesures de r´eparation, dont la r´eint´egration dans l’emploi et des mesures disciplinaires progressives. Tout comme le pr´evoyaient les dispositions adopt´ees en 1978, les mesures de protection actuelles contre le cong´ediement injuste ne s’appliquent pas en cas de licenciement ou de suppression de poste. 52 Il est int´eressant de noter que les arbitres ne s’estiment pas oblig´es par leur mandat d’appliquer automatiquement la jurisprudence issue de l’arbitrage des conventions collectives ou d’ordonner une quelconque r´eparation. Au contraire, s’ils s’en sont [TRADUCTION] « inspir´es enorm´´ ement », ils l’ont egalement´ « modifi´ee de sorte qu’elle tienne compte des diff´erences propres au secteur non syndicalis´e » (Christie, p. 688). 86 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
53 A` ce jour, la sentence rendue en 1979 par le prof. George W. Adams dans l’affaire Roberts c. Bank of Nova Scotia (1979), 1 L.A.C. (3d) 259, constitue toujours le mod`ele th´eorique accept´e. Elle met en lumi`ere ce qui est g´en´eralement entendu par les termes « juste cause » ou « justifi´e » et « cong´ediement injuste »: [TRADUCTION] Je suis d’avis que le l´egislateur, en evoquant´ la notion d’« injustice » quand il a r´edig´e [les art. 240 a` 246], avait a` l’esprit le droit qu’ont la plupart des syndiqu´es en vertu de leur convention collective, a` savoir le droit de n’ˆetre cong´edi´e que pour une « juste cause ». Je suis de cet avis parce que la norme de common law est celle de la simple « cause » de cong´ediement, tandis que le terme « injuste » r´ev`ele une d´emarche bien plus qualitative en mati`ere de cong´ediement. En effet, dans le contexte moderne des relations du travail, le terme est bien compris — une sorte de common law du boulot, si on veut (voir Cox, « Reflections Upon Labour Arbitration », 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1958), p. 1492). Ceci dit, je ne nie pas que la loi soit muette a` l’´egard d’une myriade de consid´erations importantes qui jouent, dans certains cas, sur la d´efinition pr´ecise de ce qui est « juste » et ne l’est pas [p. 264-265]. 54 Selon lui, le Parlement devait aussi avoir a` l’esprit le concept des sanctions progressives (p. 265-266), selon lequel, en r`egle g´en´erale, l’employeur qui cherche a` justifier le cong´ediement doit d´emontrer qu’il a signal´e les probl`emes de rendement a` l’employ´e, cherch´e avec lui ou elle a` les corriger et appliqu´e « un eventail´ de sanctions progressives avant de recourir a` la mesure ultime du renvoi » (rapport Arthurs, p. 100; Christie, p. 690-691). 55 Le professeur Adams explique en ces termes pourquoi il estime que les sanctions progressives faisaient partie du r´egime: [TRADUCTION] Dans le secteur syndiqu´e, les arbitres ont adopt´e le concept des sanc- tions progressives, sous r´eserve de dispositions contraires dans le texte de la convention collective...... lorsqu’il a adopt´e la disposition en cause, le l´egislateur devait avoir ce concept fondamental a` l’esprit, car il touche a` l’essence mˆeme de ce qui est « juste » dans le contexte des relations du travail. [A]u fond, je suis d’avis que d`es l’´ediction [des art. 240 a` 246], tous les employeurs vis´es par cette nouvelle disposition se sont vu con- f´erer les pouvoirs leur permettant de faire respecter les prescriptions en mati`ere de sanctions progressives. Soit dit en tout respect, [une] Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 87
interpr´etation contraire, plus technique, [...] irait tout simplement a` l’encontre de l’objet de cette loi et en diluerait les effets. [R´ef´erences omises.] (Roberts, p. 265-266) 56 Toutefois, il a egalement´ mis en garde contre une application rigide de la jurisprudence issue de l’arbitrage de conventions collectives, rappe- lant que le Code vise divers contextes d’emploi: [TRADUCTION] Or, je ne veux pas dire par l`a que les arbitres doivent importer les r`egles applicables aux conventions collectives dans les affaires dis- ciplinaires a` la l´eg`ere et sans les adapter. Il faut qu’ils soient ex- trˆemement sensibles a` la diversit´e des contextes d’emploi vis´es par la nouvelle disposition du Code, car plusieurs ne cadrent pas facilement avec le mod`ele « industriel » en mati`ere de discipline. Dans ces cas, les adaptations n´ecessaires peuvent etreˆ apport´ees. Ainsi, je dois de- mander s’il n’y aurait pas lieu d’exiger l’application de suspensions dans l’industrie bancaire. (Roberts, p. 266) 57 Le professeur Adams a finalement conclu au cong´ediement injuste dans l’affaire dont il etait´ saisi. Toutefois, selon lui, r´eint´egrer Mme Rob- erts dans son emploi ne constituait pas une r´eparation ad´equate dans les circonstances. Il a plutˆot ordonn´e a` son egard´ le versement d’une in- demnit´e equivalant´ a` cinq mois de salaire. 58 L’interpr´etation des nouvelles dispositions exprim´ee dans la sanction Roberts fera consensus. C’est egalement´ l’interpr´etation que retiendra le professeur Gordon Simmons dans le rapport r´ealis´e a` la demande de Travail Canada pour expliquer les dispositions: Pour des indications sur ce qui constitue un cong´ediement juste ou injuste, nous disposons de pr`es de trois d´ecennies de d´ecisions d’arbitres ou de conseils d’arbitrage etablis´ conform´ement a` des con- ventions collectives. Aucune r`egle pr´ecise n’existe et chaque situa- tion doit etreˆ r´egl´ee selon ses circonstances propres. Toutefois, la ju- risprudence qui a pris forme petit a` petit peut servir de guide quant a` ce qui a traditionnellement et´´ e consid´er´e comme un motif suffisant ou insuffisant de cong´ediement juste. (C. Gordon Simmons, Le cong´ediement: Le cong´ediement, aux ter- mes de la division V.7 de la partie III du Code canadien du Travail (1979), p. 1) 88 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
59 Avant la rupture effectu´ee par l’arbitre T. W. Wakeling en tranchant Knopp c. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd., [1994] C.L.A.D. No. 172 (QL) — , la voie etait´ claire: un employ´e pouvait seulement etreˆ con- g´edi´e pour une juste cause, au sens o`u il fallait entendre ce terme dans le contexte de la n´egociation collective. Le r´evisionnisme pratiqu´e par l’arbitre Wakeling l’a men´e a` conclure que les r`egles de common law s’appliquaient et que le fait pour l’employeur de respecter les prescrip- tions des par. 230(1) et 235 du Code ou, celles pr´evues par la common law si elles etaient´ plus g´en´ereuses, suffisait pour que le cong´ediement ne soit pas injuste. La Cour d’appel f´ed´erale a repris son interpr´etation en l’esp`ece. 60 Parmi plus de 1740 sentences arbitrales et d´ecisions rendues depuis l’adoption du r´egime de cong´ediement injuste, mes coll`egues ont compt´e seulement 28 d´ecisions qui ont suivi la d´emarche pr´econis´ee par M. Wakeling (R. Ruslim, « Unjust Dismissal under the Canada Labour Code: New Law, Old Statute » (2014), 5:2 U.W.O. J. Leg. Stud. 3 (en ligne), p. 28). Parmi ces 28 d´ecisions, 10 ont et´´ e rendues apr`es la d´eci- sion de la Cour f´ed´erale en l’esp`ece et ne comptent donc pas lorsqu’il s’agit de d´eterminer le degr´e de « discorde » au sein des arbitres avant la pr´esente affaire (Sharma c. Maple Star Transport Ltd., 2015 CanLII 43356; G & R Contracting Ltd. and Sandhu, Re, 2015 CarswellNat 7465 (WL Can.); Pare c. Corus Entertainment Inc., [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 103 (QL); Madill c. Spruce Hollow Heavy Haul Ltd., [2015] C.L.A.D. No. 114 (QL); Swanson and Qualicum First Nation, Re (2015), 26 C.C.E.L. (4th) 139; O’Brien c. Mushuau Innu First Nation, 2015 CanLII 20942; Newman c. Northern Thunderbird Air Inc., [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 248 (QL); Taypotat c. Muscowpetung First Nation, [2014] C.L.A.D. No. 53 (QL); Payne and Bank of Montreal, Re (2015), 16 C.C.E.L. (4th) 114 et Sharma and Beacon Transit Lines Inc., Re, 2013 CarswellNat 4148 (WL Can.)). 61 Il reste donc 18 affaires ayant appliqu´e cette d´emarche, dont trois ayant et´´ e tranch´ee par l’arbitre Wakeling lui-mˆeme. Autrement dit, le « d´esaccord [qui] perdure depuis au moins une vingtaine d’ann´ees » selon mes coll`egues est form´e tout au plus de 18 affaires sur plus de 1700. On parle ici d’une goutte d’eau dans la mer qu’on tente d’´elever a` une s´eparation des eaux jurisprudentielles. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 89
62 Mˆeme EACL conc`ede dans son m´emoire que [TRADUCTION] « [l]a majorit´e des arbitres ont conclu que les employ´es ne peuvent etreˆ cong´e- di´es que pour une juste cause ». Ce consensus n’est gu`ere surprenant, compte tenu des objectifs incontest´es du r´egime de cong´ediement injuste et de leur incompatibilit´e avec les mesures que pr´evoient les r`egles de common law. 63 En fait, la pr´emisse fondamentale du r´egime de common law, a` savoir qu’il existe un droit de cong´edier un employ´e sans motif moyennant un pr´eavis raisonnable, a et´´ e remplac´ee compl`etement par un r´egime pr´evu dans le Code exigeant que le cong´ediement soit motiv´e. En outre, la con- stellation des r´eparations a` la disposition de l’arbitre — notamment la r´e- int´egration dans l’emploi et les autres mesures equitables´ qu’il peut ac- corder en vertu de l’al. 242(4)c) — est incompatible avec un tel droit. Si l’employeur etait´ autoris´e par le Code a` cong´edier un employ´e sans motif a` la seule condition qu’il verse a` ce dernier une indemnit´e de d´epart ad´e- quate, la pluralit´e des r´eparations que mettent les art. 240 a` 245 a` la dis- position de l’arbitre ne servirait pratiquement a` rien. 64 Certes, l’art. 246 permet a` l’employ´e cong´edi´e de revendiquer les r´ep- arations de common law que constituent le pr´eavis raisonnable ou l’indemnit´e en guise et lieu de pr´eavis devant les cours de justice civile plutˆot que de se pr´evaloir des dispositions sur le cong´ediement et des r´eparations offertes par le Code. Cependant, s’il choisit de faire valoir ses droits par la proc´edure de cong´ediement injuste du Code, seules ces dis- positions sont applicables. A` ce propos, citons un passage du rapport Arthurs : ... les diff´erences les plus importantes entre les deux cat´egories de recours r´esident ailleurs. La premi`ere diff´erence a trait aux mesures de redressement. S’il a gain de cause dans une poursuite civile, l’employ´e a droit a` des dom- mages-int´erˆets equivalant´ a` l’indemnit´e qu’il aurait re¸cue si on avait laiss´e le contrat de travail suivre son cours normal — c’est-`a-dire pour toute p´eriode de pr´eavis qui aurait et´´ e jug´ee « raisonnable ». Lorsqu’un employeur a et´´ e injuste ou arbitraire dans sa fa¸con de con- g´edier un employ´e, celui-ci peut b´en´eficier de dommages-int´erˆets ad- ditionnels. En revanche, si un employ´e a gain de cause devant un arbitre en vertu de la Partie III, l’employeur est tenu de le r´eint´egrer dans son poste et de lui verser une indemnit´e, non seulement pour la dur´ee de la p´eriode de pr´eavis, mais pour toutes les pertes attribu- ables au cong´ediement. Ces mesures de redressement peuvent etreˆ 90 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
plus etendues´ et plus coˆuteuses que celles qu’un tribunal de droit commun peut accorder. [Italiques ajout´es; p. 188.] 65 Il vaut la peine de mentionner que le r´egime pr´evu dans le Code, qui a et´´ e adopt´e en 1978, etait´ pr´ec´ed´e d’une protection semblable contre le cong´ediement injuste prise en Nouvelle-Ecosse´ en 1975, et suivi d’un r´egime semblable au Qu´ebec en 197911. Contrairement a` ceux d’autres provinces, les r´egimes de la Nouvelle-Ecosse´ et du Qu´ebec pr´esentent des similitudes structurelles importantes avec la loi f´ed´erale. Ils s’appliquent seulement si l’employ´e a travaill´e pendant un certain temps et ne s’appliquent pas en cas de licenciement pour des raisons economi-´ ques ou de mise a` pied. A` l’instar du r´egime f´ed´eral, les deux r´egimes provinciaux ont syst´ematiquement donn´e lieu a` l’interpr´etation selon la- quelle ils interdisent le cong´ediement non motiv´e. Ils pr´evoient une large fourchette de r´eparations, comme la r´eint´egration dans l’emploi et l’indemnisation. 66 Il importe egalement,´ a` mon avis, de souligner que la Cour dans Syndicat de la fonction publique du Qu´ebec c. Qu´ebec (Procureur g´en- eral)´ , [2010] 2 R.C.S. 61, a conclu a` propos de la disposition sur le con- g´ediement injuste de la loi qu´eb´ecoise que « [s]e pr´esentant sous une forme proc´edurale », elle cr´ee « une norme substantielle du travail » (par. 10). Il serait injustifiable de ne pas appliquer la mˆeme m´ethode d’analyse a` la disposition sur le cong´ediement injustice contenue dans le Code et de caract´eriser plutˆot la disposition de simple m´ecanisme proc´edural.
11 An Act to Amend Chapter 10 of the Acts of 1972, the Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1975, c. 50, art. 4; Loi sur les normes du travail, L.Q. 1979, c. 45, art. 124. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Abella, J. 91
67 Les nouveaux recours pr´evus a` l’intention des employ´es non syndi- qu´es d`es 1978 reprennent ceux qui existent g´en´eralement dans le con- texte de la n´egociation collective. C’est ce que le Parlement entendait, selon le ministre Munro. Si, au contraire, le Parlement avait eu l’intention de maintenir les r`egles de common law parall`element au r´e- gime pr´evu par le Code, il en r´esulterait une situation juridique incongrue : les protections conf´er´ees par une loi aux employ´es — motif du con- g´ediement, r´eint´egration dans l’emploi et mesures equitables´ de r´epara- tion — pourraient etreˆ supplant´ees par le droit de l’employeur, pr´evu par la common law, de cong´edier n’importe qui pour n’importe quel motif a` condition qu’il donne un pr´eavis raisonnable ou verse une indemnit´e en guise et lieu de pr´eavis. Une telle inf´erence bouleverse la conception du rapport entre la common law et les lois, tout particuli`erement en ce qui a trait a` la protection des employ´es, car elle signifierait qu’un r´egime de common law plus restrictif serait maintenu malgr´e l’adoption de disposi- tions l´egales contraires conf´erant des avantages (Machtinger c. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 R.C.S. 986, p. 1003; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 R.C.S. 27, par. 36). 68 Par ailleurs, l’argument invoqu´e par AECL selon lequel il peut etreˆ mis fin a` l’emploi sans motif moyennant le pr´eavis minimal ou l’indemnit´e en guise et lieu de pr´eavis aurait pour effet de rendre inutiles les r´eparations a` l’encontre du cong´ediement injuste. L’obligation de fournir les motifs du cong´ediement pr´evue au par. 241(1), par exemple, serait inutile. De plus, la possibilit´e, pr´evue a` l’al. 242(4)b), d’ordonner la r´eint´egration de l’employ´e dans son poste si l’employeur pouvait sim- plement le cong´edier a` nouveau en lui donnant cette fois-ci le pr´eavis et l’indemnit´e de d´epart ne servirait a` rien. Ces cons´equences cr´eent de l’incoh´erence juridique. C’est seulement en concluant que les art. 240 a` 246 ont ecart´´ e le droit que la common law reconnaˆıt a` l’employeur de cong´edier un employ´e sans motif moyennant le pr´eavis raisonnable que le r´egime et ses r´eparations se tiennent. 69 C’est ainsi que les dispositions de 1978 ont presque toujours et´´ e inter- pr´et´ees, y compris, raisonnablement, par l’arbitre ayant entendu la plainte de M. Wilson. Cette interpr´etation est fond´ee sur l’intention du Parle- ment, le libell´e de la loi, la jurisprudence arbitrale et les pratiques dans le domaine des relations du travail. Toute autre conclusion contredit fonda- mentalement l’intention du Parlement, qui est d’apporter une solution de droit. Je suis d’avis d’accueillir l’appel avec d´epens devant toutes les cours et de r´etablir la d´ecision de l’arbitre. 92 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
McLachlin, J.C.C., Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, JJ.:
70 Nous sommes d’accord avec la juge Abella pour dire que, selon le cadre actuel, la norme de contrˆole applicable est celle de la d´ecision raisonnable. Nous souscrivons egalement´ a` la solution que propose la juge Abella pour trancher le pr´esent pourvoi au fond et a` son analyse des deux interpr´etations contradictoires propos´ees a` la Cour a` l’´egard des dis- positions du Code canadien du travail, L.R.C. 1985, c. L-2, sur le con- g´ediement injuste. La d´ecision de l’arbitre Schiff etait´ raisonnable, et il convient de la r´etablir. Nous reconnaissons les efforts d´eploy´es par la juge Abella en vue de stimuler la discussion sur le moyen de clarifier ou de simplifier notre jurisprudence sur la norme de contrˆole dans le but de favoriser la certitude et la pr´evisibilit´e. Toutefois, comme l’affaire dont nous sommes saisis ne n´ecessite pas que l’on se prononce sur cette ques- tion, nous ne sommes pas dispos´es pour l’instant a` souscrire a` une quel- conque proposition de r´eforme du cadre actuel relatif a` la norme de contrˆole.
Cromwell, J.:
71 Pour les motifs qu’elle exprime aux par. 15 a` 18 et 38 a` 40, je suis d’accord avec la juge Abella pour dire que la norme de contrˆole applica- ble est celle de la d´ecision raisonnable. Je conviens egalement,´ pour les raisons expos´ees aux par. 41 a` 69 de ses motifs, que la d´ecision de l’arbitre est raisonnable. Par cons´equent, je partage l’avis de ma coll`egue selon qui l’appel doit etreˆ accueilli avec d´epens devant toutes les cours, et la d´ecision de l’arbitre r´etablie. Toutefois, je tiens a` mentionner deux points. 72 Premi`erement, soit dit en tout respect, je ne vois pas la n´ecessit´e d’une autre r´eforme fondamentale de notre jurisprudence sur la norme de contrˆole et, par cons´equent, ne souscris pas a` la d´emarche pr´econis´ee par ma coll`egue en obiter. A` mon avis, l’arrˆet Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Bruns- wick, 2008 CSC 9, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 190, etablit´ le bon cadre permettant de d´eterminer la norme applicable a` un contrˆole judiciaire. Indubitable- ment, ce cadre peut etreˆ raffin´e — et le sera — de sorte que le choix de la norme de contrˆole applicable se r´ev´elera plus facilement et plus constam- ment. Le cadre elabor´´ e dans Dunsmuir est solide et ne n´ecessite pas d’ˆetre repens´e en profondeur. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 93
73 Deuxi`emement — et dans la mˆeme veine — , je tiens a` manifester mon accord avec la juge Abella a` propos du par. 18 de ses motifs dans lequel elle rejette la d´emarche pr´econis´ee par la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale, qui tente « d’´etalonner la norme en appliquant des degr´es potentiellement ind´etermin´es de d´ef´erence ». Certes, la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable, bien qu’elle « constitue une norme unique », « s’adapte au contexte » (voir p. ex. Canada (Citoyennet´e et Immigration) c. Khosa, 2009 CSC 12, [2009] 1 R.C.S. 339, par. 59; Catalyst Paper Corp. c. North Cowichan (District), 2012 CSC 2, [2012] 1 R.C.S. 5, par. 18; Syndicat canadien des communications, de l’´energie et du papier, section locale 30 c. Pˆates & Papier Irving, Lt´ee, 2013 CSC 34, [2013] 2 R.C.S. 458, par. 74). Par cons´equent, le caract`ere raisonnable « s’appr´ecie dans le contexte du type particulier de processus d´ecisionnel en cause et de l’ensemble des facteurs pertinents » (Catalyst Paper Corp., par. 18). Or, a` mon avis, ouvrir la porte au contrˆole judiciaire selon une norme de la d´ecision raisonnable repens´ee et caract´eris´ee par des degr´es de contrˆole apparemment illimit´es — la d´emarche de la marge d’appr´eciation elabor´´ ee par la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale — ne constitue pas une evolution´ souhaitable de la jurisprudence en la mati`ere.
Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. (dissidents) (Moldaver, J., souscrivant a` leur opinion):
74 Un d´esaccord r`egne au sein des arbitres en droit du travail sur la ques- tion de savoir s’il est l´egal pour un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale de cong´edier sans motif un employ´e non syndiqu´e. Ce d´esaccord perdure depuis au moins une vingtaine d’ann´ees. Les employeurs et les employ´es r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale sont ainsi plong´es dans l’incertitude quant aux tenants et aboutissants de leur lien d’emploi. En l’esp`ece, l’arbitre a conclu que le Code canadien du travail, L.R.C. 1985, c. L-2 (le « C.c.T. »), ne permet que les cong´ediements motiv´es. Saisies d’une demande de contrˆole judiciaire, la Cour f´ed´erale et la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale ont exprim´e un avis diff´erent, jugeant que le C.c.T. permettait les cong´ediements non motiv´es (2013 CF 733; 2015 CAF 17, [2015] 4 R.C.F. 467). La demande de contrˆole judiciaire a et´´ e accueillie, et l’affaire a et´´ e renvoy´ee a` l’arbitre pour qu’il ordonne la r´eparation appropri´ee. 75 Nous sommes du mˆeme avis que la Cour f´ed´erale et la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale. Un cong´ediement non motiv´e n’est pas en soi injuste, d`es lors qu’un pr´eavis suffisant a et´´ e donn´e. Toutefois, ce type de cong´ediement 94 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
ne permet pas a` l’employeur de se soustraire a` un contrˆole arbitral ou judiciaire, si l’employ´e d´ecide de contester la l´egalit´e de son cong´edie- ment. En l’esp`ece, l’arbitre a retenu l’interpr´etation contraire: un con- g´ediement non motiv´e est n´ecessairement injuste. L’interpr´etation par l’arbitre des art. 240 a` 246 du C.c.T etant´ incompatible avec le texte, le contexte et l’objet de ces dispositions, elle doit etreˆ ecart´´ ee.
I. Norme de contrˆole 76 Pour les motifs qui suivent, nous sommes d’avis que la question pr´e- cise de droit pur que soul`eve le pourvoi doit etreˆ r´esolue en appliquant la norme de la d´ecision correcte. 77 Les parties devant la Cour ont convenu que la norme applicable est celle de la d´ecision raisonnable. Toutefois, la norme de contrˆole applica- ble a` un cas donn´e est une question de droit, et « l’accord des parties ne peut etreˆ concluant sur ce point » (Monsanto Canada Inc. c. Ontario (Surintendant des services financiers), 2004 CSC 54, [2004] 3 R.C.S. 152, par. 6). Notre coll`egue, la juge Abella, a d’ailleurs r´esum´e la ques- tion de fa¸con succincte dans l’arrˆet Celgene Corp. c. Canada (Procureur g´en´eral), 2011 CSC 1, [2011] 1 R.C.S. 3, par. 33, en faisant observer que « [l]es parties ne devraient certes pas avoir la facult´e de se soustraire, d’un commun accord, a` l’application de la norme de contrˆole ap- propri´ee » (italiques dans l’original). 78 Nous avons pris connaissance de la r´eforme que propose la juge Abella a` la norme de contrˆole, qu’elle pr´esente express´ement en obiter dicta. Bien que nous admirions l’esprit constructif qui sous-tend la d´e- marche, et bien que nous ayons des r´eserves quant a` son bien-fond´e, nous croyons pr´ef´erable de r´eserver toute discussion portant sur cette mati`ere ayant d´ej`a fait couler beaucoup d’encre a` une d´ecision judiciaire.
A. La primaut´e du droit justifie l’application de la norme de la d´ecision correcte en l’esp`ece 79 A` notre avis, la pr´esente affaire soul`eve de s´erieuses questions rela- tives au respect du principe de la primaut´e du droit en raison de la pr´esomption voulant que la d´ef´erence s’impose d`es qu’il s’agit du con- trˆole de l’interpr´etation, par un d´ecideur, de sa propre loi constitutive. Dans le contexte sp´ecifique du pr´esent dossier, la norme de la d´ecision correcte est celle qui doit etreˆ appliqu´ee. Conclure le contraire revient a` abandonner la primaut´e du droit au b´en´efice d’une d´ef´erence aveugle a` l’Administration. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 95
80 La Cour a reconnu que, lorsque la d´ef´erence est de mise, l’interpr´etation que le d´ecideur fait de la loi est raisonnable si elle appar- tient aux issues acceptables et intelligibles (Dunsmuir c. Nouveau-Bruns- wick, 2008 CSC 9, [2008] 1 R.C.S. 190, par. 47). A` titre d’´enonc´e g´en- eral,´ nous en convenons. 81 Toutefois, une telle d´ef´erence quant a` des questions d’interpr´etation l´egislative emporte la possibilit´e que deux d´ecideurs donnent des inter- pr´etations contraires d’une mˆeme disposition et cr´eent [TRADUCTION] « une incertitude juridique inutile [´etant donn´e que] les droits individuels d´ependent non pas de la loi, mais de l’identit´e du d´ecideur » (J. M. Ev- ans, « Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Mat- ter? » (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 101, p. 105). Le juge Stratas, de la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale, n’y est pas all´e de main morte pour exprimer cette pr´e- occupation dans la pr´esente affaire, laquelle avait d´ej`a et´´ e soulev´ee auparavant (voir p. ex. Altus Group Ltd. c. Calgary (City), 2015 ABCA 86, 599 A.R. 223, par. 31 a` 33; Abdoulrab c. Ontario Labour Relations Board, 2009 ONCA 491, 95 O.R. (3d) 641, par. 48; Taub c. Investment Dealers Assn. of Canada, 2009 ONCA 628, 98 O.R. (3d) 169, par. 65 a` 67). 82 En th´eorie, ces d´esaccords peuvent durer ind´efiniment. En effet, les tribunaux administratifs ne sont pas li´es par le principe de l’autorit´e du pr´ec´edent, et bon nombre d’entre eux — comme les arbitres du travail dans le cas qui nous occupe — ne disposent pas d’un cadre institutionnel leur permettant de d´ebattre les questions ouvertement et favorisant l’´emergence d’un consensus. 83 C’est pr´ecis´ement ce qui s’est produit en l’esp`ece. Pendant des d´ecen- nies, les arbitres du travail dans tout le pays ont propos´e des interpr´eta- tions contradictoires des dispositions de la partie III du C.c.T. relatives au cong´ediement injuste. Ces interpr´etations contradictoires vont a` l’essence mˆeme du r´egime f´ed´eral du droit du travail : est-il jamais possible pour un employeur de cong´edier sans motif un employ´e non syndiqu´e? Certains arbitres r´epondent oui, d’autres non. Les cours si´egeant en r´evi- sion ont jug´e les deux interpr´etations raisonnables (voir p. ex. motifs de la Cour f´ed´erale et Pierre c. Conseil tribal de Roseau River, [1993] 3 C.F. 756 (1re inst.)). 84 La primaut´e du droit et la promesse d’une gouvernance ordonn´ee en souffrent. Lorsque l’application de la norme de la d´ecision raisonnable a pour effet de mettre des interpr´etations contradictoires a` l’abri de toute intervention judiciaire, c’est l’identit´e du d´ecideur, et non la loi, qui d´e- 96 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
termine l’issue des plaintes individuelles. En pareil cas, les caprices de l’Administration ont pr´es´eance sur « le principe plus g´en´eral de l’ordre normatif » (Colombie-Britannique (Procureur g´en´eral) c. Christie, 2007 CSC 21, [2007] 1 R.C.S. 873, par. 20; Renvoi relatif a` la s´ecession du Qu´ebec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217, par. 71; Renvoi: Droits linguistiques au Manitoba, [1985] 1 R.C.S. 721, p. 747 a` 752). 85 Encore plus troublant, une telle situation remet en cause le principe fondamental de notre syst`eme juridique suivant lequel « il y a une seule loi pour tous » (Renvoi relatif a` la s´ecession, par. 71), etant´ donn´e que, concr`etement, le sens de la loi d´epend du d´ecideur appel´e a` trancher le diff´erend. Il va sans dire que le principe de la primaut´e du droit, sur le- quel notre Constitution est express´ement fond´ee, exige que l’on applique une norme plus universelle. 86 Les valeurs fondamentales que sont la certitude et la pr´evisibilit´e— elles-mˆemes des el´´ ements centraux de la primaut´e du droit (T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (2010), p. 37) — s’en trouvent egalement´ compromises. En l’esp`ece, laisser la jurisprudence arbitrale partag´ee signifie brouiller une caract´eristique essentielle du r´egime f´ed´eral en mati`ere de relations de travail: les employeurs r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale ne savent pas dans quels cas et selon quelles modalit´es ils peuvent cong´edier leurs em- ploy´es, et les employ´es vivent dans l’incertitude quant a` leur s´ecurit´e d’emploi. 87 Cette jurisprudence arbitrale contradictoire n’a pas seulement provoqu´e une incertitude g´en´eralis´ee. Elle cr´ee le risque que le mˆeme employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale soit assujetti a` des interpr´eta- tions l´egislatives contradictoires, a` telle enseigne que dans un cas on jugerait qu’il serait autoris´e a` cong´edier sans motif un employ´e alors que dans un autre on jugerait qu’il ne le serait pas. Comme le juge Rothstein l’indique dans son opinion concordante dans l’arrˆet Canada (Citoyennet´e et Immigration) c. Khosa, 2009 CSC 12, [2009] 1 R.C.S. 339, par. 90, « [l]e manque de coh´erence dans l’application des r`egles de droit mine l’int´egrit´e de la primaut´e du droit ». Et ceci n’est pas pure sp´eculation; c’est d´ej`a arriv´e a` Energie´ Atomique du Canada Limit´ee, intim´ee en l’esp`ece (voir motifs de la Cour f´ed´erale et Champagne c. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., 2012 CanLII 97650 (C.L.A.D.)). Nous faisons nˆotres les propos de la juge McLachlin (maintenant juge en chef) dans ses motifs concordants dans l’arrˆet British Columbia Telephone Co. c. Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.) Ltd., [1995] 2 R.C.S. 739, dans lequel elle souligne que Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 97
l’intervention judiciaire peut se r´ev´eler n´ecessaire pour r´esoudre le probl`eme d’interpr´etations administratives contradictoires: Nous ne devons pas oublier que les parties aux prises avec des probl`emes de la sorte offrent souvent des services d’une importance consid´erable pour le public. Il appartient au syst`eme juridique de leur donner des directives claires sur leurs obligations l´egales, de fa¸con a` ce qu’elles puissent fournir les services exig´es d’elles, d’une fa¸con efficace et l´egale. Lorsque deux conseils diff´erents ont d´efini de fa¸con contradictoire les obligations l´egales d’un organisme, il est im- portant que cet organisme dispose des moyens de d´eterminer quelle est l’obligation qui doit pr´evaloir et quelle est celle dont il doit s’acquitter. Les conseils eux-mˆemes ne peuvent faire cette d´etermi- nation. Le seul organisme habilit´e a` le faire est une cour de justice. [par. 79] 88 Enfin, l’existence de divergences persistantes entre les d´ecideurs compromet la raison d’ˆetre mˆeme de la d´ef´erence. En effet, il est il- logique de s’en remettre a` l’interpr´etation d’un d´ecideur alors que, manifestement, d’autres d´ecideurs saisis de cas semblables — et dont les d´ecisions commandent tout autant le respect — sont parvenus a` un r´esultat diff´erent. La retenue en pareil cas favorise arbitrairement l’expertise du d´ecideur dont la d´ecision est l’objet du contrˆole judiciaire au d´etriment de celle d’autres d´ecideurs dans un cas semblable. 89 Nous estimons donc qu’en pr´esence de divergences persistantes entre des d´ecideurs administratifs concernant l’interpr´etation d’une loi a` la- quelle le l´egislateur voulait manifestement ne donner qu’un seul sens, c’est la norme de la d´ecision correcte qui doit etreˆ appliqu´ee. Ces diver- gences persistantes tiennent pour acquis que les deux interpr´etations sont raisonnables, puisque, bien evidemment,´ la d´ecision qui en contredit une autre et qui est d´eraisonnable sera annul´ee a` l’issue d’un contrˆole judiciaire, ce qui mettra fin aux divergences. De plus, nous tenons a` pr´eciser qu’il importe peu que l’interpr´etation faisant « consensus » dont parlent les juges majoritaires soit contredite par une seule ou par une centaine de d´ecisions; d`es lors qu’une d´ecision contraire existe, mˆeme si raisonnable, son existence mˆeme mine le principe de la primaut´e du droit (L. J. Wihak, « Whither the correctness standard of review? Dunsmuir, six years later » (2014), 27 C.J.A.L.P. 173, p. 197). 90 Une telle divergence persistante existe en l’esp`ece. Mˆeme si les juges majoritaires affirment que « presque tous » les arbitres adh`erent a` l’interpr´etation du r´egime l´egislatif qu’a retenue l’arbitre dans la pr´esente affaire (par. 46), un nombre consid´erable de d´ecisions vont dans le sens 98 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
contraire (voir p. ex. Sharma c. Maple Star Transport Ltd., 2015 CanLII 43356; G & R Contracting Ltd. and Sandhu, Re, 2015 CarswellNat 7465 (WL Can.); Pare c. Corus Entertainment Inc., [2015] C.L.A.D. nº 103 (QL); Madill c. Spruce Hollow Heavy Haul Ltd., [2015] C.L.A.D. nº 114 (QL); Swanson and Qualicum First Nation, Re (2015), 26 C.C.E.L. (4th) 139; O’Brien c. Mushuau Innu First Nation, 2015 CanLII 20942; Newman c. Northern Thunderbird Air Inc., [2014] C.L.A.D. nº 248 (QL); Taypotat c. Muscowpetung First Nation, [2014] C.L.A.D. nº 53 (QL); Payne and Bank of Montreal, Re (2015), 16 C.C.E.L. (4th) 114; Sharma and Beacon Transit Lines Inc., Re, 2013 CarswellNat 4148 (WL Can.); Klein c. Royal Canadian Mint, 2013 CLLC ¶ 210-013; Paul c. National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2012 CanLII 85154; Palmer c. Dempsey Laird Trucking Ltd., 2012 CarswellNat 1620 (WL Can.); Gouchey c. Sturgeon Lake Cree Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3430 (WL Can.); Stark c. Tl’azt’en Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3074 (WL Can.); Dominic c. Tl’azt’en Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3085 (WL Can.); McCloud c. Samson Cree Nation, [2011] C.L.A.D. No. 119 (QL); Prosper c. PPADC Management Co., [2010] C.L.A.D. No. 430 (QL); Perley c. Maliseet First Nation at Tobique, 2010 CarswellNat 4618 (WL Can.); Daniels c. Whitecap Dakota First Nation, [2008] C.L.A.D. No. 135 (QL); Armsworthy c. L.H. & Co., [2005] C.L.A.D. No. 161 (QL); Indian Resource Council of Canada and Whitecap (Re), 2003 Car- swellNat 7342 (WL Can.); Cooper c. Exalta Transport Services Ltd., [2002] C.L.A.D. No. 612 (QL); Chalifoux c. Driftpile First Nation, [2000] C.L.A.D. No. 368 (QL); Halkowich and Fairford First Nation, [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 486 (QL); D. McCool Transport Ltd. and Bosma, [1998] C.L.A.D. No. 315 (QL), par. 12 et suiv.; Jalbert c. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd., [1996] C.L.A.D. nº 631 (QL); Knopp c. Westcan Bulk Transport Ltd., [1994] C.L.A.D. nº 172 (QL)). 91 Il ne s’agit pas ici d’une liste exhaustive, mais plutˆot d’une liste ser- vant a` illustrer l’existence d’une divergence entre les arbitres sur la ques- tion de savoir si le C.c.T. permet a` un employeur de cong´edier un em- ploy´e sans motif. C’est l’existence mˆeme de cette divergence qui mine la primaut´e du droit et exige l’application de la norme de la d´ecision cor- recte en l’esp`ece. Qui plus est, il s’agit d’une question d’importance g´en´erale, qui a une incidence sur le fondement du lien d’emploi de mil- liers de Canadiennes et de Canadiens. Il importe d’ajouter que les ques- tions relatives au cong´ediement d’employ´es f´ed´eraux ne rel`event pas ex- clusivement d’arbitres en droit du travail. Comme nous l’expliquons plus loin, les cours civiles sont egalement´ comp´etentes a` plusieurs egards´ en Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 99
ce domaine. La question pr´ecise de droit pur que soul`eve la pr´esente af- faire touche a` l’essence mˆeme du lien d’emploi f´ed´eral. Par cons´equent, il est essentiel que la coh´erence pr´eside a` la d´efinition de la nature de ce lien. 92 Nous passons maintenant a` l’analyse au fond de l’affaire et appli- quons la norme de la d´ecision correcte pour les raisons donn´ees pr´ec´edemment.
II. Dispositions l´egislatives 93 Le pr´esent pourvoi concerne les rapports entre les dispositions de la partie III du C.c.T. qui r´egit les employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es. 94 L’article 230 du C.c.T. codifie les r`egles de common law relatives au pr´eavis et a` l’indemnit´e en tenant lieu en cas de licenciement non motiv´e: 230 (1) Sauf cas pr´evu au paragraphe (2) et sauf s’il s’agit d’un con- g´ediement justifi´e, l’employeur qui licencie un employ´e qui travaille pour lui sans interruption depuis au moins trois mois est tenu: a) soit de donner a` l’employ´e un pr´eavis de licenciement ecrit´ d’au moins deux semaines; b) soit de verser, en guise et lieu de pr´eavis, une in- demnit´e egale´ a` deux semaines de salaire au taux r´egulier pour le nombre d’heures de travail normal. (2) En cas de suppression d’un poste, l’employeur li´e par une con- vention collective autorisant un employ´e ainsi devenu surnum´eraire a` supplanter un autre employ´e ayant moins d’anciennet´e que lui est tenu: a) soit de donner au syndicat signataire de la convention collective et a` l’employ´e un pr´eavis de suppression de poste, d’au moins deux semaines, et de placer une copie du pr´eavis dans un endroit bien en vue a` l’int´erieur de l’´etablissement o`u l’employ´e travaille; b) soit de verser a` l’employ´e licenci´e en raison de la sup- pression du poste deux semaines de salaire au taux r´egulier. (3) Sauf disposition contraire d’un r`eglement, la mise a` pied est, pour l’application de la pr´esente section, assimil´ee au licenciement. 95 L’article 235 du C.c.T. pr´ecise l’indemnit´e de d´epart minimale devant etreˆ vers´ee a` l’employ´e en cas de licenciement non motiv´e: 235 (1) L’employeur qui licencie un employ´e qui travaille pour lui sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois est tenu, sauf en cas de 100 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
cong´ediement justifi´e, de verser a` celui-ci le plus elev´´ e des montants suivants: a) deux jours de salaire, au taux r´egulier et pour le nom- bre d’heures de travail normal, pour chaque ann´ee de service; b) cinq jours de salaire, au taux r´egulier et pour le nom- bre d’heures de travail normal. (2) Pour l’application de la pr´esente section: a) sauf disposition contraire d’un r`eglement, la mise a` pied est assimil´ee au licenciement. 96 Les articles 240 a` 245 du C.c.T. pr´evoient une proc´edure suivant la- quelle l’employ´e qui se croit injustement cong´edi´e peut d´eposer une plainte aupr`es d’un inspecteur, apr`es quoi un arbitre peut etreˆ d´esign´e pour d´ecider si le cong´ediement etait´ injuste et ordonner la r´eparation qu’il estime appropri´ee dans les circonstances. Les articles 240 a` 242 sont pertinents en l’esp`ece: 240(1) Sous r´eserve des paragraphes (2) et 242(3.1), toute personne qui se croit injustement cong´edi´ee peut d´eposer une plainte ecrite´ aupr`es d’un inspecteur si: a) d’une part, elle travaille sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois pour le mˆeme employeur; b) d’autre part, elle ne fait pas partie d’un groupe d’employ´es r´egis par une convention collective. (2) Sous r´eserve du paragraphe (3), la plainte doit etreˆ d´epos´ee dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours qui suivent la date du cong´ediement. (3) Le ministre peut proroger le d´elai fix´e au paragraphe (2) dans les cas o`u il est convaincu que l’int´eress´e a d´epos´e sa plainte a` temps, mais aupr`es d’un fonctionnaire qu’il croyait, a` tort, habilit´e a` la recevoir. 241 (1) La personne cong´edi´ee vis´ee au paragraphe 240(1) ou tout inspecteur peut demander par ecrit´ a` l’employeur de lui faire connaˆı- tre les motifs du cong´ediement; le cas ech´´ eant, l’employeur est tenu de lui fournir une d´eclaration ecrite´ a` cet effet dans les quinze jours qui suivent la demande. (2) D`es r´eception de la plainte, l’inspecteur s’efforce de concilier les parties ou confie cette tˆache a` un autre inspecteur. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 101
(3) Si la conciliation n’aboutit pas dans un d´elai qu’il estime raison- nable en l’occurrence, l’inspecteur, sur demande ecrite´ du plaignant a` l’effet de saisir un arbitre du cas: a) fait rapport au ministre de l’´echec de son intervention; b) transmet au ministre la plainte, l’´eventuelle d´eclara- tion de l’employeur sur les motifs du cong´ediement et tous autres d´eclarations ou documents relatifs a` la plainte. 242 (1) Sur r´eception du rapport vis´e au paragraphe 241(3), le minis- tre peut d´esigner en qualit´e d’arbitre la personne qu’il juge qualifi´ee pour entendre et trancher l’affaire et lui transmettre la plainte ainsi que l’´eventuelle d´eclaration de l’employeur sur les motifs du cong´ediement. (2) Pour l’examen du cas dont il est saisi, l’arbitre: a) dispose du d´elai fix´e par r`eglement du gouverneur en conseil; b) fixe lui-mˆeme sa proc´edure, sous r´eserve de la double obligation de donner a` chaque partie toute possibilit´e de lui pr´esenter des el´´ ements de preuve et des obser- vations, d’une part, et de tenir compte de l’information contenue dans le dossier, d’autre part; c) est investi des pouvoirs conf´er´es au Conseil canadien des relations industrielles par les alin´eas 16a), b) et c). (3) Sous r´eserve du paragraphe (3.1), l’arbitre: a) d´ecide si le cong´ediement etait´ injuste; b) transmet une copie de sa d´ecision, motifs a` l’appui, a` chaque partie ainsi qu’au ministre. (3.1) L’arbitre ne peut proc´eder a` l’instruction de la plainte dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants: a) le plaignant a et´´ e licenci´e en raison du manque de travail ou de la suppression d’un poste; b) la pr´esente loi ou une autre loi f´ed´erale pr´evoit un au- tre recours. (4) S’il d´ecide que le cong´ediement etait´ injuste, l’arbitre peut, par ordonnance, enjoindre a` l’employeur: a) de payer au plaignant une indemnit´e equivalant,´ au maximum, au salaire qu’il aurait normalement gagn´e s’il n’avait pas et´´ e cong´edi´e; b) de r´eint´egrer le plaignant dans son emploi; 102 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
c) de prendre toute autre mesure qu’il juge equitable´ de lui imposer et de nature a` contrebalancer les effets du cong´ediement ou a` y rem´edier. 97 La proc´edure relative au cong´ediement injuste enonc´´ ee aux art. 240 a` 245 n’est pas le seul m´ecanisme auquel peut recourir l’employ´e r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale pour contester la l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement. En effet, l’article 246 du C.c.T. pr´eserve explicitement son droit d’exercer un recours civil devant les tribunaux. 246 Les articles 240 a` 245 n’ont pas pour effet de suspendre ou de modifier le recours civil que l’employ´e peut exercer contre son employeur. 98 Il importe egalement´ de mentionner le par. 168(1) du C.c.T., qui pr´e- serve l’application des r`egles de common law en mati`ere d’emploi et des contrats d’emploi dans la mesure o`u ceux-ci conf`erent aux employ´es des droits ou avantages plus g´en´ereux que ceux que leur accorde la partie III du C.c.T.: 168 (1) La pr´esente partie, r`eglements d’application compris, l’emporte sur les r`egles de droit, usages, contrats ou arrangements incompatibles mais n’a pas pour effet de porter atteinte aux droits ou avantages acquis par un employ´e sous leur r´egime et plus favorables que ceux que lui accorde la pr´esente partie.
III. Analyse 99 Appliquant la norme de la d´ecision correcte, nous sommes d’avis que le C.c.T. permet a` un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale de con- g´edier un employ´e sans motif, a` condition qu’il donne le pr´eavis requis et verse l’indemnit´e de d´epart pr´evue. Toutefois, un tel cong´ediement n’empˆeche pas l’employ´e(e) de se pr´evaloir de la proc´edure relative aux cong´ediements injustes enonc´´ ee aux art. 240 a` 245 du C.c.T. [TRADUC- TION] « [R]ien dans l’article 240 du Code canadien du travail ni dans les dispositions voisines ne garantit la s´ecurit´e d’emploi aux employ´es des organismes r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale mˆeme si ces employ´es ne fournissent a` leur employeur aucune juste cause de cong´ediement » (D. Harris, Wrongful Dismissal (feuilles mobiles), p. 6-14). Un employeur peut donc [TRADUCTION] « licencier un employ´e a` bon droit en lui donnant un pr´eavis ou en lui versant une indemnit´e conform´ement aux par. 230(1) et 235(1) » (H. A. Levitt, The Law of Dismissal in Canada, 3e ed.´ (feuilles mobiles), p. 2-126.1). 100 Il convient de signaler tout d’abord que les art. 230 et 235 parlent de « licenciement », alors qu’aux art. 240 a` 245 il est question de « con- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 103
g´ediement ». Les articles 230 et 235 s’appliquent a` tout cas de licencie- ment, y compris le licenciement d’un cadre et celui d’un licenciement pour manque de travail ou suppression de poste. Les articles 240 a` 245 ne s’appliquent qu’`a l’employ´e qui est « cong´edi´e ». Etant´ donn´e que le litige porte en l’esp`ece sur l’interpr´etation du « cong´ediement injuste », nous nous en tiendrons pour la suite au terme « cong´ediement », sauf si le contexte s’y oppose. 101 L’arbitre en l’instance a et´´ e appel´e a` d´ecider si un cong´ediement non motiv´e mais avec versement d’une indemnit´e tenant lieu de pr´eavis, con- stitue n´eanmoins un cong´ediement injuste. La question limit´ee que nous examinons est celle de savoir si un cong´ediement non motiv´e est auto- matiquement un cong´ediement injuste qui donne dans tous les cas a` l’employ´e droit a` la r´eparation pr´evue au par. 242(4)? Ou bien — et c’´etait l’avis de la Cour f´ed´erale et de la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale dans la pr´esente affaire — un cong´ediement non motiv´e est-il possiblement un cong´ediement injuste (selon les circonstances) susceptible de justifier l’octroi de la r´eparation pr´evue au par. 242(4)? 102 Il s’agit d’une pure question d’interpr´etation l´egislative. Il convient donc dans un premier temps de revenir sur le principe moderne d’interpr´etation des lois expos´e dans Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 R.C.S. 27, par. 21, citant E. A. Driedger, Construction of Stat- utes (2e ed.´ 1983), a` la p. 87: Aujourd’hui il n’y a qu’un seul principe ou solution: il faut lire les termes d’une loi dans leur contexte global en suivant le sens ordinaire et grammatical qui s’harmonise avec [l’´economie] de la loi, l’objet de la loi et l’intention du l´egislateur. Ce principe moderne d’interpr´etation exige que les lois soient « inter- pr´et´ees de mani`ere a` donner aux mots leur sens ordinaire le plus evident´ qui s’harmonise avec le contexte et l’objet vis´e par la loi dans laquelle ils sont employ´es » (CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. c. Canada (Procureur g´en´eral), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 743, par. 14; Rizzo Shoes, par. 41). Lorsqu’un tribunal interpr`ete une loi, il doit [TRADUCTION] « rechercher non pas ce que le l´egislateur a voulu dire, mais plutˆot le v´eritable sens de ce qu’il a dit » (Black-Clawson International Ltd. c. Papierwerke Waldhof- Aschaffenburg A.G., [1975] A.C. 591 (H.L.), p. 613, (lord Reid)). Selon nous, le v´eritable sens exprim´e par le l´egislateur est clair: il est loisible a` 104 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale de cong´edier un employ´e sans motif. 103 Le terme « cong´ediement injuste » n’est pas d´efini dans le C.c.T. L’employ´e qui « se croit » injustement cong´edi´e a le droit de porter plainte (par. 240(1)). Ce droit s’´eteint 90 jours apr`es le cong´ediement, et l’employ´e ne peut alors plus se pr´evaloir de la proc´edure pr´evue aux art. 240 a` 245 pour contester la l´egalit´e du cong´ediement (par. 240(2)). Sur demande, l’employeur doit faire connaˆıtre par ecrit´ les motifs du con- g´ediement (art. 241). Si l’arbitre conclut qu’un cong´ediement est injuste, il peut accorder une r´eparation, et notamment la r´eint´egration du plaignant dans son emploi (par. 242(4)). Nous estimons que les art. 240 a` 245 cr´eent un m´ecanisme proc´edural suppl´ementaire de plainte a` l’encontre d’un cong´ediement et instaurent une mesure de r´eparation ad- ditionnelle. Toutefois, ils ne pr´ecisent pas ce qui peut constituer un con- g´ediement injuste. 104 Examinant isol´ement les dispositions du C.c.T. relatives au cong´edie- ment injuste, il pourrait etreˆ possible de conclure que le l´egislateur a voulu interdire tous les cong´ediements non motiv´es. Comme les juges majoritaires le font remarquer, deux el´´ ements de ces dispositions n’existent pas en common law et pourraient donner l’impression qu’un r´egime de cong´ediement justifi´e a et´´ e instaur´e: l’obligation de l’employeur de faire connaˆıtre les motifs du cong´ediement sur demande (art. 241) et le pouvoir de l’arbitre d’ordonner la r´eint´egration s’il l’estime appropri´e (al. 242(4)b)). Etant´ donn´e que ces pouvoirs ou r´epa- rations n’existent pas en common law, les juges majoritaires font valoir que le l´egislateur a cr´e´e une « alternative l´egislative » (par. 46) a` la com- mon law, soit un r´egime permettant seulement le cong´ediement justifi´e de l’employ´e par un employeur de comp´etence f´ed´erale.
A. Probl`emes avec le raisonnement des juges majoritaires 105 Il est bien etabli´ qu’un texte de loi doit « etreˆ interpr´et´e de mani`ere a` eviter´ les absurdit´es et a` donner un sens a` tous les mots utilis´es par le l´egislateur » (R. c. G. (B.), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 475, par. 69). Avec respect, conclure que les art. 240 a` 245 interdisent a` l’employeur de cong´edier un employ´e sans juste cause engendre une absurdit´e : deux cat´egories identi- ques de personnes seraient trait´ees diff´eremment en raison d’une distinc- tion arbitraire ou d´epourvue de logique (Berardinelli c. Ontario Housing Corp., [1979] 1 R.C.S. 275, p. 280). Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 105
106 Les articles 240 a` 245 ne s’appliquent pas lorsqu’un employ´e conteste la l´egalit´e de son cong´ediement devant les tribunaux civils, ni apr`es l’expiration du d´elai de 90 jours (par. 240(2)) ou si le ministre ne d´esigne pas d’arbitre conform´ement au par. 242(1). Ces dispositions ne s’appliquent pas non plus aux employ´es qui occupent un poste de directeur (par. 167(3)) ou aux employ´es qui ont travaill´e moins de 12 mois cons´ecutifs (al. 240(1)a)). La common law continue de s’appliquer « l`a o`u la Loi est silencieuse ou [si] en raison de ses termes [elle] ne peut s’appliquer » (Gendron c. Syndicat des approvisionnements et services de l’Alliance de la Fonction publique du Canada, section locale 50057, [1990] 1 R.C.S. 1298, p. 1319). La common law doit donc continuer de s’appliquer a` ces employ´es. 107 En common law, un employeur peut cong´edier un employ´e sans motif parce que « [l]e droit de l’employeur de mettre fin a` l’emploi moyennant le pr´eavis requis est la simple contrepartie du droit de l’employ´e de don- ner sa d´emission moyennant le pr´eavis requis » (Dunsmuir, par. 105). Les tribunaux civils ont toujours appliqu´e les r`egles de common law aux employ´es f´ed´eraux assujettis a` la partie III du C.c.T. (voir p. ex. Lum c. Shaw Communications Inc., 2004 NBCA 35, 270 N.B.R. (2d) 141; Cornelson c. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2014 ABQB 436; Nelson c. Champion Feed Services Inc., 2010 ABQB 409, 30 Alta. L.R. (5th) 162; Chandran c. National Bank of Canada, 2011 ONSC 777, 89 C.C.E.L. (3d) 256; Paquette c. TeraGo Networks Inc., 2015 ONSC 4189, 2015 CLLC ¶210-056; Vist c. Best Theratronics, 2014 ONSC 2867, 2014 CLLC ¶210-038; Wallace c. Toronto-Dominion Bank (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 161 (C.A.); Ryder c. Carry The Kettle First Nation, 2002 SKQB 32, 215 Sask. R. 239; Nardocchio c. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1979), 41 N.S.R. (2d) 26; Wilson c. Sliammon First Nation, 2002 BCSC 190; Chadee c. Norway House First Nation (1996), 113 Man. R. (2d) 110; Spilburg c. Total Transportation Solutions Inc., [2014] O.J. No. 2903 (Q.L.); Lazarus c. Information Communication Services (ICS) Inc., [2015] O.J. No. 5304 (Q.L.); Jackson c. Gitxsan Treaty Society, 2005 BCSC 1112, 43 C.C.E.L. (3d) 179; Beatty c. Best Theratronics Ltd., 2014 ONSC 3376, 18 C.C.E.L. (4th) 64; Schimanski c. B & D Walter Trucking Ltd., 2014 ABPC 288; Logan c. Progressive Air Service Ltd., [1997] B.C.J. nº 129 (QL) (Cour prov.); Rodgers c. Sun Radio Ltd. (1991), 109 N.S.R. (2d) 415 (C.S. (1re inst.))). 108 Si les art. 240 a` 245 interdisaient le cong´ediement non motiv´e d’un employ´e f´ed´eral alors que l’art. 246 prot`ege le droit d’un employ´e d’intenter une poursuite pour cong´ediement ill´egal devant les tribunaux 106 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
civils, il en r´esulterait qu’un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation f´ed´erale pourrait cong´edier un employ´e sans motif (moyennant un pr´eavis accept- able) pour autant que l’employ´e conteste la l´egalit´e du cong´ediement de- vant les tribunaux civils, mais il ne pourrait cong´edier sans motif (malgr´e un pr´eavis acceptable) ce mˆeme employ´e dans le cas o`u ce dernier s’y oppose en vertu des dispositions du C.c.T. relatives au cong´ediement in- juste. Le fondement juridique du lien d’emploi serait donc fonction du choix par l’employ´e, apr`es le fait, du m´ecanisme de contestation de la l´egalit´e de son cong´ediement. En effet, cela signifierait que l’employeur ne pourrait connaˆıtre ses obligations a` l’avance, car la teneur de celles-ci d´ependrait du pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre ou du choix par l’employ´e d’une voie de recours apr`es coup, ce qui serait absurde. Comme nous devons pr´esumer que le l´egislateur ne peut avoir voulu des cons´equences absurdes (Rizzo Shoes, par. 27), nous ne pouvons souscrire a` l’interpr´etation que pr´econisent les juges majoritaires. 109 En outre, nous signalons qu’aux termes du par. 242(3), l’arbitre « d´e- cide » si le cong´ediement etait´ injuste. Si l’interpr´etation des juges majoritaires etait´ la seule qui soit raisonnable (c’est-`a-dire si c’´etait l’interpr´etation correcte), cela signifierait que, dans le cas o`u l’employeur cong´edie un employ´e sans motif moyennant le pr´eavis acceptable et l’indemnit´e de d´epart, il n’y aurait rien a` d´ecider pour l’arbitre. Il serait oblig´e, non pas de d´ecider, mais de conclure automatiquement que le cong´ediement etait´ injuste; une telle interpr´etation s’´ecarte clairement du sens ordinaire des mots employ´es par le l´egislateur. 110 Selon les juges majoritaires, il existe une interpr´etation faisant « con- sensus » (par. 58) des dispositions sur le cong´ediement injuste qui etaye´ leur interpr´etation. Ils pr´etendent que ce consensus provient de « plus de 1740 sentences arbitrales et d´ecisions rendues depuis l’adoption du r´e- gime de cong´ediement injuste » (par. 60). Ils comparent ce nombre a` celui, bien inf´erieur, des « 28 d´ecisions qui ont suivi la d´emarche pr´econis´ee par M. Wakeling » (par. 60). Or, cette comparaison n’est tout simplement pas exacte. Cette jurisprudence repr´esente l’ensemble des d´ecisions rendues au sujet des art. 240 a` 245 du C.c.T.12 La grande
12 Le passage d’o`u proviennent ces donn´ees est ainsi r´edig´e [TRADUCTION]: [v]u que les art. 240 a` 246 du C.c.T. existent depuis plus de 35 ans et ont et´´ e examin´es dans plus de 1740 sentences et d´ecisions avant l’affaire Wilson, il est difficile de croire qu’une vieille loi ait pu donner naissance a` un tout nouveau droit (notes de bas de page omises) » (voir R. Ruslim, « Unjust Dismissal under Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 107
majorit´e d’entre elles n’ont aucun rapport avec cette interpr´etation faisant « consensus » que les juges majoritaires invoquent, car elles portent sur des questions aussi vari´ees que celle de savoir si un employeur est as- sujetti au C.c.T., s’il y a eu cong´ediement, si la demande est prescrite, si l’employeur a donn´e une juste cause de cong´ediement ainsi que sur la port´ee du pouvoir accord´e a` l’arbitre, des questions de proc´edure, la sig- nification de l’expression « en raison du manque de travail ou de la sup- pression d’un poste » et, dans un petit nombre d’affaires, la question de savoir si l’employeur peut cong´edier un employ´e sans motif moyennant le pr´eavis acceptable et le versement de l’indemnit´e de d´epart.13 111 Quoi qu’il en soit, nous voyons mal comment le nombre de sentences arbitrales etayant´ l’une ou l’autre position serait d’une quelconque perti- nence a` l’´egard de la question d’interpr´etation l´egislative qui se pose en l’esp`ece. Comme la Cour le dit: il serait « inappropri´e de faire le d´ecompte des d´ecisions appuyant les diverses interpr´etations divergentes et d’appliquer celle qui recueille le “plus haut total” » (Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership c. Rex, 2002 CSC 42, [2002] 2 R.C.S. 559, par. 30).
B. La bonne interpr´etation 112 La faille fondamentale dans l’interpr´etation par les juges majoritaires des dispositions en question, c’est qu’ils les consid`erent isol´ement. Il faut interpr´eter les dispositions relatives au cong´ediement injuste du C.c.T. dans leur contexte global, afin d’en d´egager le sens dans le cadre d’un r´egime juridique complet et coh´erent (Rizzo Shoes, par. 21). Deux as- pects du contexte global sont pertinents: la comp´etence concurrente des tribunaux civils et administratifs et la partie III du C.c.T. dans son ensemble.
C. Comp´etence concurrente des tribunaux civils et administratifs 113 Les articles 240 a` 245 du C.c.T. cr´eent un m´ecanisme permettant a` l’employ´e de contester la l´egalit´e de son cong´ediement. Ce m´ecanisme existe en parall`ele avec la comp´etence des tribunaux civils d’accorder une r´eparation en cas de cong´ediement ill´egal, sous r´eserve de l’application de la doctrine de la pr´eclusion d´ecoulant d’une question
the Canada Labour Code: New Law, Old Statute » (2014), 5:2 U.W.O.J.Leg. Stud. 3 (online), p. 28). 13 Pour un r´esum´e de la vari´et´e de sujets dont traitent les sentences arbitrales rendues a` propos des art. 240 a` 245 du C.c.T., voir Levitt, p. 2-1 a` 2-172. 108 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
d´ej`a tranch´ee (par. 246(1); Pereira c. Bank of Nova Scotia (2007), 60 C.C.E.L. (3d) 267 (C.S.J. Ont.); Levitt, p. 2-1). Il est donc toujours loisible a` un employ´e de contester devant les tribunaux civils la l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement, mˆeme s’il s’est pr´evalu auparavant de la proc´edure relative au cong´ediement injuste pr´evue dans le C.c.T. (par. 246(1); Wylie c. Larche Communications Inc., 2015 ONSC 4747, par. 76 (CanLII)). 114 Mˆeme si le C.c.T. fixe un d´elai de 90 jours pour le d´epˆot d’une plainte de cong´ediement injuste (par. 240(2)), le droit d’un employ´e d’intenter un recours devant les tribunaux civils pour cong´ediement ill´egal est quant a` lui assujetti au d´elai de prescription provincial (habituellement entre deux et six ans) (Ng c. Bank of Montreal, 2010 ONSC 5692, 87 C.C.E.L. (3d) 86, par. 17-18; Canadian National Railway Co. c. Benson, 2004 MBQB 210, 188 Man. R. (2d) 218, par. 51; Limitation Act, S.B.C. 2012, c. 13, par. 6(1); Limitations Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. L-12, par. 3(1); The Limitations Act, S.S. 2004, c. L-16.1, art. 5; Loi sur la prescription, C.P.L.M., c. L150, par. 2(1); Loi de 2002 sur la prescription des actions, L.O. 2002, c. 24, ann. B, art. 4; Code civil du Qu´ebec, art. 2925; Loi sur la prescription, L.N.B. 2009, c. L-8.5, par. 5(1); Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 258, par. 2(1); Statute of Limitations, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. S-7, par. 2(1); Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1, art. 9; Loi sur les prescriptions, L.R.T.N.-O. 1988, c. L-8, par. 2(1); Loi sur la pre- scription, L.R.Y. 2002, c. 139, par. 2(1); Loi sur les prescriptions, L.R.T.N.-O. (Nu.) 1988, c. L-8, par. 2(1)). 115 Toutefois, nous tenons a` pr´eciser que ce ne sont que les arbitres — d´esign´es par le ministre en vertu de son pouvoir discr´etionnaire — qui peuvent appliquer les art. 240 a` 245 du C.c.T., puisqu’une plainte de con- g´ediement injuste est d´epos´ee aupr`es d’un inspecteur et tranch´ee par un arbitre (par. 240(1) et par. 242(1)). Il n’en demeure pas moins qu’il s’agit d’une plainte relative a` la l´egalit´e du cong´ediement. Les tribunaux civils sont egalement´ comp´etents pour se prononcer sur la l´egalit´e du cong´edie- ment d’un employ´e f´ed´eral. Les arbitres n’ont pas l’exclusivit´e a` cet egard.´ L’employ´e a donc deux options: se pr´evaloir de la proc´edure rela- tive au cong´ediement injuste du C.c.T. ou intenter une action pour con- g´ediement ill´egal devant les tribunaux civils. 116 Les tribunaux et les arbitres ont une comp´etence concurrente a` l’´egard de la question fondamentale de la l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement. La l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement d´epend du fondement juridique de la relation d’emploi: dans un r´egime de cong´ediement justifi´e, tous les cong´edie- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 109
ments sans juste cause sont ill´egaux. En revanche, dans un r´egime de cong´ediement sans motif, le cong´ediement sans juste cause est l´egal s’il est assorti d’un pr´eavis et d’une indemnit´e de d´epart ad´equats. Il est im- possible de se prononcer sur la l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement sans avoir au pr´ealable d´etermin´e le fondement juridique du lien d’emploi. Etant´ donn´e que les tribunaux civils et les arbitres ont comp´etence concurrente pour d´ecider de la l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement, ils doivent donc aborder l’analyse a` partir du mˆeme fondement juridique du lien d’emploi. 117 Par cons´equent, nous ne partageons pas l’opinion des juges majoritaires selon laquelle l’ajout de la proc´edure relative au cong´edie- ment injuste au C.c.T. a eu pour effet de modifier le fondement juridique du lien d’emploi f´ed´eral. Le l´egislateur a express´ement pr´eserv´e la com- p´etence des tribunaux civils a` l’´egard de la l´egalit´e des cong´ediements, tout en leur niant la possibilit´e d’interpr´eter et d’appliquer les disposi- tions du C.c.T. portant sur le cong´ediement injuste. Le fondement juridique du lien d’emploi ne saurait changer selon que c’est un arbitre ou un juge qui se prononce sur la question en premi`ere instance. Le l´egis- lateur ne peut donc avoir eu l’intention de modifier le fondement juridique du lien d’emploi simplement en ajoutant la proc´edure relative au cong´ediement injuste au C.c.T.
D. Articles 230 et 235 118 Notre interpr´etation trouve appui dans le libell´e des art. 230 et 235 du C.c.T. Puisque ces dispositions ne s’appliquent pas aux cong´ediements justifi´es (par. 230(1) et par. 235(1)), elles doivent n´ecessairement s’appliquer aux cong´ediements non motiv´es. Autrement, elles seraient in- utiles. En pr´evoyant que les employ´es licenci´es (ou cong´edi´es) sans mo- tif ont droit a` un pr´eavis et a` une indemnit´e minimums, le l´egislateur a clairement voulu permettre aux employeurs r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´er- ale de cong´edier leurs employ´es non syndiqu´es sans motif. 119 Les juges majoritaires ne sont pas de cet avis et affirment que les art. 230 et 235 du C.c.T. « s’appliquent aux directeurs, a` ceux qui sont mis a` pied en raison d’un manque de travail ou d’une suppression de poste et, dans le cas du par. 230(1), aux employ´es ayant travaill´e pour l’employeur pour plus de trois mois cons´ecutifs, mais moins de douze mois » (par. 47). Toutefois, cette interpr´etation ne saurait tenir, car, sui- vant celle-ci, tous les autres employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es qui sont cong´edi´es, mais choisissent de ne pas contester la l´egalit´e de leur con- g´ediement, n’auraient droit a` rien de la part de l’employeur. En outre, si 110 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
ces dispositions ne s’appliquaient pas aux employ´es f´ed´eraux qui font appel aux tribunaux civils pour contester la l´egalit´e de leur cong´edie- ment, ceux-ci n’auraient droit a` aucun pr´eavis ou indemnit´e de d´epart a` moins que la common law en pr´evoie (C.c.T., art. 168). 120 A` notre sens, les art. 230 et 235 pr´evoient un pr´eavis et une indemnit´e de d´epart minimums a` l’intention de tous les employ´es tombant sous le coup de la partie III du C.c.T., que ces derniers contestent ou non la l´egalit´e de leur cong´ediement et sans egard´ a` la voie de recours et au moment qu’ils choisissent pour ce faire. Toute autre conclusion minerait les dispositions que le l´egislateur entendait voir appliquer a` tous les em- ploy´es non syndiqu´es. 121 Par cons´equent, il faut partir du principe que la partie III du C.c.T. permet aux employeurs r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale de cong´edier leurs employ´es sans motif. Toute autre conclusion ferait fi du texte des art. 230 et 235 du C.c.T. La question qui se pose est donc de savoir si l’ajout des dispositions relatives au cong´ediement injuste aux art. 240 a` 245 a fondamentalement modifi´e le lien d’emploi etabli´ par le C.c.T.
Historique l´egislatif 122 En 1978, le l´egislateur a edict´´ e les art. 240 a` 245 (S.C. 1977-78, c. 27, art. 21). Il suppl´eait ainsi aux autres dispositions de la partie III du C.c.T. Les art. 230 et 235, qui dataient de 1971 (S.R.C. 1970, c. 17 (2e suppl.), art. 16), etaient´ ainsi libell´es a` l’origine:« sauf si l’emploi prend fin par voie de cong´ediement pour une juste cause ». Lors de la r´eforme l´egisla- tive de 1985, l’expression a et´´ e remplac´ee par celle-ci: « sauf s’il s’agit d’un cong´ediement justifi´e ». Le l´egislateur a [TRADUCTION] « jug´e bon de recourir a` ce crit`ere du cong´ediement justifi´e a` quelques re- prises » (Knopp, par. 68). Toutefois, sa d´ecision eclair´´ ee de ne pas utiliser les mots « cong´ediement justifi´e » aux par. 240 a` 245 en 1978 etaye´ la conclusion selon laquelle il n’entendait pas mettre sur pied un r´egime de cong´ediement justifi´e a` l’intention des employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es (ibid.). 123 Les juges majoritaires s’appuient n´eanmoins sur une d´eclaration faite en 1978 par le ministre du Travail a` l’intention du Comit´e permanent du Travail, de la Main-d’œuvre et de l’Immigration pour appuyer leur pr´etention selon laquelle les modifications apport´ees au C.c.T. avaient pour objet de « donner aux employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es des droits en cas de cong´ediement qui, s’ils ne sont pas identiques a` ceux des em- ploy´es syndiqu´es, y sont certainement analogues » (par. 44). Toutefois, Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 111
comme le font remarquer les juges majoritaires, le ministre a egalement´ ajout´e: Nous esp´erons que les parties III et IV du bill donneront a` ces travail- leurs non syndiqu´es au moins une partie des normes minimales que les travailleurs syndiqu´es ont obtenues et qui font maintenant partie de toutes les conventions collectives. Nous ne voulons pas pr´etendre que les normes etablies´ par le bill seront exactement celles que pr´evoient les conventions collectives. Nous voulons cependant etablir´ des normes minimales. (D´ebats de la Chambre des Communes, vol. II, 3e sess., 30e l´eg., 13 d´ec. 1977, p. 1831) 124 Ce passage des d´ebats reproduits dans le Hansard affaiblit la conclu- sion des juges majoritaires selon laquelle le l´egislateur souhaitait que les non syndiqu´es b´en´eficient de droits identiques a` ceux des syndiqu´es puisque le ministre a express´ement ni´e toute intention de cette nature dans son discours a` la Chambre des communes. De plus, dans un article promotionnel distribu´e aux employ´es f´ed´eraux a` l’´epoque des modifica- tions, le ministre affirme que les dispositions relatives au cong´ediement injuste « donner[ont] au travailleur non syndiqu´e un moyen d’en appeler contre un cong´ediement qu’il estime injuste ». Il a aussi d´eclar´e qu’elles visaient a` limiter le droit d’appel aux « cong´ediements impos´es comme mesure disciplinaire » en vue de « d´ecourager les employeurs de con- g´edier des gens injustement et arbitrairement » (Hon. J. Munro, « Les 14 points Munro: l’am´elioration de la situation des travailleurs non syndi- qu´es » (1977), 77 La Gazette du travail 418, p. 420-421 (je souligne)). C’est une assise bien fragile ne permettant pas de conclure que le l´egis- lateur souhaitait modifier la relation d’emploi fond´ee sur la common law en interdisant tous les cong´ediements non motiv´es.
E. Pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre 125 Une autre raison nous incite a` remettre en question l’opinion de notre coll`egue selon laquelle le l´egislateur a voulu conf´erer de nouveaux droits substantiels aux employ´es r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale equivalents´ a` ceux que les conventions collectives pr´evoient a` l’intention des syndi- qu´es. Aux termes du par. 242(1), sur r´eception du rapport d’un en- quˆeteur, le ministre « peut » d´esigner un arbitre qui entendra la plainte de cong´ediement injuste. Le ministre n’est pas oblig´e de le faire. D’ailleurs, comme l’a relev´e Geoffrey England, au cours des deux premi`eres ann´ees qui ont suivi l’adoption des dispositions en question [TRADUCTION] « le ministre a refus´e l’arbitrage dans 19 % des cas o`u il avait et´´ e de- 112 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
mand´e » (England, p. 11). A` notre connaissance, aucun droit substantiel de cette nature issu d’une convention collective n’est tributaire de l’exercice du pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre. 126 Si les art. 240 a` 245 conf´eraient effectivement aux employ´es le droit a` la protection contre les cong´ediements non motiv´es en instaurant un r´e- gime f´ed´eral de cong´ediement justifi´e, ce droit substantiel a` la s´ecurit´e d’emploi d´ependrait de l’exercice du pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre. Si le ministre choisit de ne pas d´esigner d’arbitre, l’employ´e ne dispose d’aucun recours pour faire valoir son droit de n’ˆetre cong´edi´e que pour une juste cause — la seule option consisterait alors a` intenter devant les tribunaux civils une action pour cong´ediement ill´egal fond´ee sur la com- mon law. Il reviendrait en fait au ministre de d´ecider dans tous les cas si l’employeur pouvait cong´edier son employ´e sans motif. Le fondement juridique du lien d’emploi dans le cas des employ´es r´egis par la l´egisla- tion f´ed´erale ne saurait d´ependre du pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre. Nous ne pouvons par cons´equent souscrire a` l’id´ee que l’ajout des art. 240 a` 245 dans le C.c.T. a eu pour effet d’instaurer un r´egime de con- g´ediement justifi´e.
F. La common law continue de s’appliquer 127 Comme nous l’avons dit, le lien d’emploi en common law constitue une relation contractuelle individuelle. La « r´esiliation mˆeme du contrat ne constitue pas un acte fautif en droit » (Vorvis c. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1085, p. 1096, le juge McIntyre). Au contraire, en common law, chaque contrat de travail con- tient une condition implicite selon laquelle l’employeur et l’employ´e ont le droit de r´esilier le contrat sur pr´eavis raisonnable, sauf s’il existe une juste cause de cong´ediement sans pr´eavis (Machtinger c. HOJ Industries Ltd., [1992] 1 R.C.S. 986, p. 998). L’application d’une telle condition implicite est restreinte par les diverses lois sur les normes du travail en vigueur au Canada. En effet, la plupart des provinces ont pr´ecis´e par voie l´egislative le pr´eavis minimum et l’indemnit´e en tenant lieu applicables a` la r´esiliation d’un contrat d’emploi. 128 Il existe une r`egle bien etablie´ d’interpr´etation l´egislative selon la- quelle [TRADUCTION] « [e]n cas de chevauchement entre la loi et la common law, les deux sont r´eput´es s’appliquer » (R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (6e ed.´ 2014), §17.24). Par cons´equent, les lois doivent recevoir une interpr´etation compatible avec les r`egles de common law a` moins que le l´egislateur ait clairement et sans equivoque´ Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 113
exprim´e l’intention contraire (Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada c. T. Eaton Co., [1956] R.C.S. 610, p. 614; Slaight Communications Inc. c. Davidson, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 1038, p. 1077; Parry Sound (District), Conseil d’administration des services sociaux c. S.E.E.F.P.O., section locale 324, 2003 CSC 42, [2003] 2 R.C.S. 157). 129 L’article 168 du C.c.T. pr´eserve express´ement l’application continue de la common law aux liens d’emploi r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale. Il y a donc chevauchement de la l´egislation et de la common law. En l’absence de termes clairs et non ambigus exprimant l’intention du l´egis- lateur de modifier la common law par l’ajout des dispositions sur le con- g´ediement injuste aux art. 240 a` 245, il nous faut interpr´eter le C.c.T. de mani`ere compatible avec la common law, tout particuli`erement parce que le l´egislateur a pr´eserv´e express´ement l’application de cette derni`ere en adoptant l’art. 168. Les juges majoritaires n’ont point´e aucune telle dis- position claire et non ambigu¨e. Il nous faut donc interpr´eter le C.c.T. d’une mani`ere compatible avec la common law, c’est-`a-dire que le fondement contractuel du lien d’emploi individuel continue de s’appliquer et il n’est pas cat´egoriquement interdit aux employeurs f´ed´er- aux de cong´edier sans motif les employ´es f´ed´eraux non syndiqu´es. Plus pr´ecis´ement, il faut comprendre que le l´egislateur, en adoptant les art. 240 a` 245 et l’art. 246, a pr´eserv´e la comp´etence des tribunaux civils en mati`ere de l´egalit´e du cong´ediement et n’a pas modifi´e de fa¸con fonda- mentale la nature de la relation d’emploi. Le l´egislateur a simplement cr´e´e un autre m´ecanisme proc´edural permettant aux employ´es de con- tester la l´egalit´e de leur cong´ediement et pr´evoyant en outre la r´eint´egra- tion comme mesure de r´eparation. 130 Nous faisons egalement´ observer que l’art. 168 enonce´ que la partie III du C.c.T. « n’a pas pour effet de porter atteinte aux droits ou avantages acquis par un employ´e sous le [...] r´egime [de r`egles de droit, usages, contrats ou arrangements] », dans la mesure o`u ceux-ci conf`erent aux employ´es des droits ou avantages plus g´en´ereux que ceux que leur accorde la partie III du C.c.T. Ce passage de la disposition serait d´enu´e de sens si le l´egislateur n’avait pas eu l’intention de pr´eserver l’application de la common law. 131 Nous sommes d’avis que la conception qu’ont les juges majoritaires du rˆole continu de la common law dans le lien d’emploi f´ed´eral est in- trins`equement contradictoire. Il ressort implicitement de leurs motifs que le l´egislateur n’avait pas l’intention d’´ecarter les r`egles de common law r´egissant le cong´ediement ill´egal en edictant´ les art. 240 a` 245. En effet, 114 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
selon eux, le l´egislateur avait l’intention « d’´etablir un r´egime l´egal al- ternatif offrant des protections g´en´ereuses tr`es semblables a` celles dont jouissent les employ´es prot´eg´es par une convention collective » (par. 1) mais affirment egalement´ que « la pr´emisse fondamentale du r´egime de common law, a` savoir qu’il existe un droit de cong´edier un employ´e sans motif moyennant un pr´eavis raisonnable » a et´´ e « remplac´ee compl`ete- ment » par ce r´egime (par. 63). Ils pr´etendent egalement´ que l’art. 246 permet a` l’employ´e de « revendiquer les r´eparations de common law que constituent le pr´eavis raisonnable ou l’indemnit´e en guise et lieu » (par. 64). Autrement dit, suivant leur raisonnement, lorsqu’il s’agit de d´efinir le fondement du lien d’emploi f´ed´eral, la common law ne s’appliquerait plus dans les cas o`u l’employ´e cherche a` obtenir une r´eparation vis´ee a` l’art. 242 du C.c.T., mais continuerait de s’appliquer dans les cas o`u l’employ´e conteste son cong´ediement devant les tribunaux civils. Selon les juges majoritaires, dans le premier cas, la common law a et´´ e rem- plac´ee compl`etement par le r´egime l´egal (par. 63), tandis que dans le second, le r´egime l´egal constitue a` leurs yeux une simple « alternative » (par. 41). 132 Avec respect, on ne peut, de fa¸con coh´erente, affirmer une chose et son contraire. Les juges majoritaires ne peuvent pr´etendre a` l’existence d’un r´egime l´egal de cong´ediement justifi´e qui ecarte´ la common law, tout en reconnaissant l’application continue des r`egles de common law r´egissant la r´esiliation du contrat d’emploi. Les deux propositions juridi- ques ne sauraient tout simplement pas coexister. 133 Comme nous le disions pr´ec´edemment, il incombe aux juges majoritaires de d´emontrer l’intention claire et non ambigu¨e de la part du l´egislateur d’´ecarter la common law. A` notre humble avis, cela n’est pas possible. En fait, selon eux, c’est notre interpr´etation qui « bouleverse la conception du rapport entre la common law et les lois », car elle signifierait qu’ « un r´egime de common law plus restrictif serait maintenu malgr´e l’adoption de dispositions l´egales contraires conf´erant des avantages » (par. 67). Avec respect, ce raisonnement est circulaire. Il tient pour acquis que la question est de savoir si le l´egislateur a voulu ecarter´ la common law en adoptant par voie l´egislative des mesures plus « g´en´ereuses ». Le simple fait que la loi conf`ere des avantages ne permet pas de d´eterminer si la common law continue de s’appliquer. Le l´egis- lateur peut cr´eer une autre voie de droit pour la contestation de la l´egalit´e d’un cong´ediement sans pour autant ecarter´ implicitement les r`egles de common law applicables aux liens d’emploi. En effet, c’est ce que la Cour a reconnu dans l’arrˆet Dunsmuir en concluant au caract`ere d´er- Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 115
aisonnable de la d´ecision de l’arbitre justement parce qu’elle aurait eu pour effet de cr´eer a` l’´egard des employ´es non syndiqu´es un r´egime de cong´ediement justifi´e alors que le l´egislateur avait instaur´e un m´ecan- isme de grief pour la contestation des cong´ediements sans toutefois ex- primer explicitement son intention d’´ecarter la common law (par. 75).
Comparaison avec d’autres r´egimes 134 Notre conclusion est en outre etay´´ ee par une comparaison du r´egime f´ed´eral avec ceux des provinces qui ont cr´e´e un r´egime de cong´ediement justifi´e. Et lorsqu’elles l’ont fait, ce fˆut express´ement. En Nouvelle- Ecosse,´ le par. 71(1) du Labour Standards Code, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 246 (« LSC »), interdit express´ement aux employeurs de cong´edier certains employ´es sans juste cause. Il est ainsi r´edig´e: [TRADUCTION] 71 (1) Lorsqu’une personne est au service d’un employeur pendant dix ans ou plus, ce dernier ne peut la cong´edier ou la suspendre sans juste cause a` moins qu’elle ne soit vis´ee a` l’alin´ea (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) ou (i) du paragraphe 3 de l’article 72. (2) La personne cong´edi´ee ou suspendue sans juste cause peut d´e- poser une plainte aupr`es du directeur conform´ement a` l’article 21. (3) La personne qui a d´epos´e une plainte en vertu du paragraphe (2) et est insatisfaite de l’examen qui en a et´´ e fait peut en d´eposer une autre aupr`es de la Commission conform´ement a` l’article 23; la plainte est alors r´eput´ee etreˆ une plainte au sens du paragraphe (1) de l’article 23. L’article 72 du LSC de la Nouvelle-Ecosse´ permet aux employeurs de cong´edier tous les autres employ´es sans motif moyennant un pr´eavis ad´e- quat ou le versement d’une indemnit´e tenant lieu de pr´eavis. Cette loi ne pr´eserve pas la comp´etence des tribunaux civils quant a` la l´egalit´e du cong´ediement des employ´es tombant sous le coup des art. 71 et 72. En fait, le directeur et la Commission ont comp´etence exclusive pour se pro- noncer sur la l´egalit´e du cong´ediement et pour ordonner une r´eparation s’il y a lieu (art. 21, 23 et 78). De plus, l’employ´e dispose toujours du droit de d´eposer une plainte aupr`es du directeur et de la Commission. Ainsi, contrairement a` ce que pr´evoit le C.c.T., en Nouvelle-Ecosse,´ le droit de l’employ´e a` l’examen de sa plainte et a` une d´ecision ne d´epend pas du pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre (par. 71(2) et 71(3)). 135 De mˆeme, au Qu´ebec, les employ´es qui travaillent pour une en- treprise depuis au moins deux ans ne peuvent etreˆ cong´edi´es que pour 116 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
une « cause juste et suffisante » (Loi sur les normes du travail, RLRQ c. N-1.1, art. 124 (« LNT »)). Tout comme en Nouvelle-Ecosse,´ si une plainte est soumise a` l’´egard d’un cong´ediement, mais qu’aucun r`egle- ment n’intervient, « la Commission des normes, de l’´equit´e, de la sant´e et de la s´ecurit´e du travail [.. .] d´ef`ere sans d´elai la plainte au Tribunal ad- ministratif du travail » (art. 126). Au Qu´ebec, l’employ´e a toujours le droit au r`eglement de sa plainte ou a` une d´ecision sur celle-ci. Ce droit ne d´epend pas du pouvoir discr´etionnaire du ministre. 136 Tant la l´egislature du Qu´ebec que celle de la Nouvelle-Ecosse´ ont de toute evidence´ voulu etablir,´ a` l’´egard de certains employ´es, des r´egimes de cong´ediement justifi´e en interdisant express´ement les cong´ediements sans motif. Malgr´e les similitudes avec le r´egime f´ed´eral en mati`ere de pr´eavis minimal (LNT art. 82 et par. 82.1(3); LSC par. 72(1)) et de recours civils possibles (LNT art. 82, par. 4; LSC art. 6), il demeure que la LNT ne permet que les cong´ediements pour une « cause juste et suf- fisante » (art. 124), tandis que la LSC dispose que l’employeur ne peut cong´edier ou suspendre un employ´e « sans juste cause » (art. 71). Malgr´e l’affirmation a` l’effet contraire de la part des juges majoritaires (par. 65), ces deux r´egimes provinciaux et les dispositions du C.c.T. diff`erent a` un point tel qu’on ne peut qualifier de « semblable » la protection accord´ee par chacun. Le l´egislateur n’a pu vouloir interdire les cong´ediements non motiv´es, car il aurait dˆu, pour ce faire, utiliser des termes aussi clairs et non ambigus. Ceci ressort d’autant plus que la LSC a et´´ e adopt´ee avant les art. 240 a` 245 du C.c.T.; le l´egislateur s’est pourtant abstenu d’opter pour des termes clairs et non ambigus. Les r´egimes en vigueur en Nou- velle-Ecosse´ et au Qu´ebec ne permettent pas de conclure que tous les cong´ediements non motiv´es sont automatiquement injustes suivant le C.c.T. Si, comme le fait remarquer a` bon droit notre coll`egue, ces deux r´egimes « ont syst´ematiquement donn´e lieu a` l’interpr´etation selon la- quelle ils interdisent le cong´ediement non motiv´e » (par. 65), c’est qu’ils interdisent effectivement le cong´ediement non motiv´e, et ce clairement, contrairement au C.c.T. 137 En effet, nous signalons que d’autres provinces ont mis en place des m´ecanismes alternatifs de contestation de la l´egalit´e du cong´ediement tout en maintenant le r´egime de common law de cong´ediement sans mo- tif (voir p. ex. Loi relative aux relations de travail dans les services pub- lics, L.R.N.-B. 1973, c. P-25, par. 97(2.1) et art. 100.1; Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 113, art. 74 a` 86.2; Loi sur les normes d’emploi, L.N.-B. 1982, c. E-7.2, art. 61 a` 76; Employment Standards Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 117
Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-6.2, art. 30; Labour Standards Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. L-2, art. 62 et 68 a` 73). 138 De plus, dans presque tous les ressorts o`u il peut y avoir cong´edie- ment non motiv´e, la possibilit´e de r´eint´egrer l’employ´e cong´edi´e ill´egale- ment, par exemple, pour des raisons illicites ou discriminatoires existe (Employment Standards Act (C.-B.), art. 79; Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-9, art. 82 et par. 89(1); The Saskatchewan Em- ployment Act, S.S. 2013, c. S-15.1, par. 2-97(1) et 3-36(1); Code des normes d’emploi, C.P.L.M., c. E110, art. 96.1; Loi de 2000 sur les normes d’emploi, L.O. 2000, c. 41, art. 104; Loi sur les normes d’emploi (N.-B.), art. 65; Labour Standards Act (T.-N.-L.), art. 78). 139 Il ne fait aucun doute que le cong´ediement non motiv´e demeure permis dans ces ressorts, et ce mˆeme lorsqu’il y existe un m´ecanisme de grief ou un autre recours alternatif de contestation de la l´egalit´e du con- g´ediement (voir p. ex. Dunsmuir, par. 75). La simple existence de tels recours et la possibilit´e d’une r´eint´egration dans certaines circonstances ne transforment pas automatiquement un r´egime de cong´ediement non motiv´e en un r´egime de cong´ediement justifi´e. Selon nous, le C.c.T. s’apparente davantage au premier r´egime qu’`a ceux en vigueur en Nou- velle-Ecosse´ et au Qu´ebec.
G. Rˆole des mesures de r´eparation 140 Les juges majoritaires affirment egalement´ qu’une interpr´etation autorisant les cong´ediements non motiv´es par les employeurs r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale « aurait pour effet de rendre inutiles les r´eparations a` l’encontre du cong´ediement injuste » (par. 68). Or, ce n’est pas le cas, et ce pour deux raisons. Premi`erement, l’obligation pour l’employeur de faire connaˆıtre sur demande les motifs du cong´ediement permet simple- ment a` l’enquˆeteur et a` l’arbitre de recueillir des el´´ ements de preuve; il ne s’agit pas d’une transformation compl`ete de la nature du lien d’emploi. Deuxi`emement, la r´eint´egration dans l’emploi cadre bien avec un r´egime de cong´ediement non motiv´e. 141 Aux termes de l’art. 241 du C.c.T., l’employ´e cong´edi´e ou l’inspecteur peut « demander par ecrit´ a` l’employeur de lui faire connaˆı- tre les motifs du cong´ediement ». Cette disposition enonce´ egalement´ les conditions auxquelles l’inspecteur peut tenter de r´egler la plainte (par. 241(2) et 241(3)). A` notre sens, la disposition a pour objet de permettre a` l’employ´e et a` l’inspecteur de demander a` l’employeur d’exposer sa posi- tion: si ce dernier pr´etend qu’il s’agit d’un cong´ediement motiv´e, il doit 118 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
l’affirmer par ecrit´ dans sa d´eclaration relative aux motifs du cong´edie- ment. Si l’employ´e a et´´ e cong´edi´e en raison du manque de travail ou de la suppression d’un poste, la d´eclaration en fera etat.´ Si l’employeur a cong´edi´e l’employ´e sans motif, il pr´ecisera ce fait dans la d´eclaration de sorte que l’inspecteur — ou au besoin l’arbitre — puisse d´ecider si le pr´eavis et l’indemnit´e de d´epart sont suffisants. L’obligation de faire connaˆıtre les motifs permet egalement´ de d´eceler les cong´ediements dis- criminatoires ou qui constitueraient des repr´esailles, qu’ils soient justifi´es ou non motiv´es. Cette proc´edure est semblable au processus de commu- nication pr´ealable dans une action civile. Nous voyons mal comment une interpr´etation selon laquelle les art. 240 a` 245 du C.c.T. cr´eent un r´egime de cong´ediement non motiv´e puisse nuire a` l’application de cette disposi- tion relative a` la preuve. 142 En outre, affirmer que le C.c.T. permet aux employeurs de cong´edier des employ´es sans motif ne rend pas inutile la r´eparation possible de la r´eint´egration dans l’emploi. Comme nous l’avons soulign´e, cette r´epara- tion existe dans presque toutes les provinces, peu importe que le r´egime y permette ou non le cong´ediement non motiv´e. Par exemple, la r´eint´e- gration dans l’emploi est couramment ordonn´ee dans les cas o`u [TRA- DUCTION] « les prescriptions l´egales ou les protections en mati`ere d’emploi ne sont pas respect´ees ou le licenciement enfreint un code des droits de la personne applicable » (J.T. Casey, dir, Remedies in Labour, Employment and Human Rights Law (feuilles mobiles), p. 4-4 (notes de bas de page omises); voir aussi Lemieux B´elanger c. Les Commissaires d’Ecoles´ pour la Municipalit´e de St -Gervais, [1970] S.C.R. 948, p. 952; Kelso c. Sa Majest´e La Reine, [1981] 1 R.C.S. 199, p. 210). Aussi, pr´esentement, aux termes du C.c.T., les arbitres ordonnent la r´eint´egra- tion si, a` leur avis d’expert, l’employeur et l’employ´e sont en mesure de maintenir une relation d’emploi saine et productive. Si l’arbitre croit que l’employeur cong´ediera simplement a` nouveau l’employ´e, il n’ordonnera pas la r´eint´egration. Dans Ridley c. Gitxaala Nation, [2009] C.L.A.D. No. 267 (QL), au par. 3, par exemple, l’arbitre a conclu que la r´eint´egra- tion ne convenait pas quand [TRADUCTION] « il est fort probable qu’elle soit suivie d’un deuxi`eme cong´ediement dans un court laps de temps ». Aucune raison ne permet de croire que cette pratique changerait si la Cour confirmait le droit des employeurs r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale de cong´edier leurs employ´es sans motif moyennant le pr´eavis et l’indemnit´e de d´epart ad´equats. 143 L’arbitre dispose de pouvoirs consid´erables pour ordonner des mesures de r´eparation dans le cas o`u un employeur r´egi par la l´egislation Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. Cˆot´e, Brown, JJ. 119
f´ed´erale cong´edie un employ´e sans motif. En effet, l’employeur est tenu de donner un pr´eavis ad´equat et une indemnit´e de d´epart. Si l’employ´e d´epose une plainte aupr`es d’un arbitre ayant comp´etence pour l’entendre, ce dernier d´ecide si le pr´eavis et le montant de l’indemnit´e « repr´esentent, en r´ealit´e, le traitement que l’employeur aurait dˆu verser a` l’employ´e soit au cours de la p´eriode de pr´eavis raisonnable soit comme salaire tenant lieu de pr´eavis » (Wallace c. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 R.C.S. 701, par. 66). L’arbitre peut faire ceci en comparant la somme a` laquelle l’employ´e aurait droit en vertu des r`egles de common law avec le minimum prescrit par la loi aux art. 230 et 235 et en accord- ant la somme la plus elev´´ ee a` l’employ´e. Ce pouvoir est conf´er´e a` l’arbitre par l’art. 168, qui pr´eserve l’application des r`egles de common law lorsqu’elles accordent a` l’employ´e des avantages plus favorables que ceux que pr´evoit le C.c.T. 144 De plus, si l’arbitre conclut a` un cong´ediement injuste en raison de la fa¸con dont il s’est produit, il peut accorder la r´eparation qu’il juge indi- qu´ee, qu’il s’agisse de dommages-int´erˆets compensatoires, de dom- mages-int´erˆets punitifs ou, dans les cas qui s’y prˆetent, la r´eint´egration. Les arbitres accordent fr´equemment des dommages-int´erˆets pour pr´ejudice moral ou des dommages punitifs lorsque les employeurs se sont comport´es de fa¸con inacceptable ou ont fait preuve de mauvaise foi (voir p. ex. Poulter c. Gull Bay First Nation, 2011 CarswellNat 3466 (WL Can.) (10 000 $ a et´´ e accord´e a` un employ´e pour cong´ediement d´eguis´e, par suite d’actes d’intimidation, d’humiliation et de harc`ele- ment); Morrisseau c. Tootinaowaziibeeng First Nation (2004), 39 C.C.E.L. (3d) 134 (une somme additionnelle equivalant´ a` trois mois de salaire et d’avantages sociaux accord´es en raison de l’insensibilit´e de l’employeur au moment du cong´ediement de l’employ´e); Parrish & Heinbecker, Ltd. and Knight, Re, 2006 CarswellNat 6950 (WL Can.) (dommages-int´erˆets punitifs d’une somme equivalant´ a` quatre mois de salaire accord´es a` l’employ´e par suite du comportement de l’employeur l’ayant cong´edi´e sans motif ni pr´eavis)). Ces r´eparations peuvent etreˆ ac- cord´ees par les tribunaux civils et elles le sont souvent par suite de con- g´ediements ill´egaux. Elles sont egalement´ a` la port´ee des employ´es qui contestent la l´egalit´e de leur cong´ediement en vertu des dispositions d’arbitrage du C.c.T. 145 Le cong´ediement justifi´e est egalement´ permis. Si l’existence d’une juste cause est etablie,´ aucun pr´eavis ni indemnit´e de d´epart n’est obli- gatoire. L’arbitre a le pouvoir de d´ecider si une juste cause a et´´ e etablie.´ Dans la n´egative, l’arbitre peut ordonner les mesures qu’il estime ap- 120 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
propri´ees, dont la r´eint´egration. La r´eint´egration n’est possible que si l’employ´e la demande et que si les rapports employeur-employ´e ne se sont pas trop d´et´erior´es (Levitt, p. 2-119 a` 2-120).
H. R´esum´e de l’interpr´etation correcte 146 L’objet des art. 240 a` 245 est de pr´evoir a` l’intention des employ´es qui souhaitent contester la l´egalit´e de leur cong´ediement un m´ecanisme proc´edural peu coˆuteux, efficient et efficace. Comme le ministre l’a fait remarquer devant le Comit´e permanent du Travail, de la Main-d’œuvre et de l’Immigration et a` la Chambre des communes en 1978, les em- ploy´es vis´es par une convention collective disposent d’un m´ecanisme semblable, celui du grief, pour contester la l´egalit´e de leur cong´ediement. 147 Cette proc´edure est plus efficiente, voire plus efficace, qu’un recours civil: les r`egles de preuve sont moins strictes, l’arbitre expert est bien au fait des nuances factuelles des liens d’emploi et les d´elais sont plus courts. C’est « a` l’´egard des diff´erends entre employeurs et employ´es un mode de r`eglement rapide et peu coˆuteux permettant d’´eviter la voie judiciaire » (Dunsmuir, par. 69). D’autres r´eparations sont pr´evues a` l’intention des employ´es qui se pr´evalent des dispositions relatives au cong´ediement injuste. En ce sens, ces dispositions du C.c.T. donnent aux employ´es cong´edi´es vis´es par la l´egislation f´ed´erale un acc`es accru a` la justice. 148 Toutefois, un m´ecanisme proc´edural qui elargit´ l’acc`es a` la justice ne modifie pas pour autant la nature du lien d’emploi. Ce m´ecanisme — tributaire de l’exercice par le ministre de son pouvoir discr´etionnaire — n’est donc pas le seul dont un employ´e f´ed´eral peut se pr´evaloir pour contester la l´egalit´e de son cong´ediement. Il peut aussi s’adresser aux tribunaux civils. Les dispositions relatives au cong´ediement injuste of- frent simplement un autre recours aux employ´es r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale. La common law continue de s’appliquer, et les employeurs r´e- gis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale ont le droit de cong´edier leurs employ´es sans motif, moyennant le pr´eavis et l’indemnit´e de d´epart les plus g´en´er- eux parmi ceux pr´evus aux art. 230 et 235 du C.c.T., au contrat d’emploi ou en common law. Les arbitres et les tribunaux judiciaires poss`edent des comp´etences concurrentes pour appr´ecier le pr´eavis et l’indemnit´e et d’ordonner toute autre r´eparation pouvant se justifier dans les circon- stances. L’employeur ne peut se soustraire a` l’examen par un arbitre ou une cour de justice, du simple fait qu’il a donn´e un pr´eavis et vers´e une indemnit´e. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 121
IV. Conclusion 149 Nous sommes d’accord avec la Cour f´ed´erale et la Cour d’appel f´ed´erale pour dire que le Code canadien du travail n’interdit pas aux em- ployeurs r´egis par la l´egislation f´ed´erale de cong´edier leurs employ´es sans motif. Il s’ensuit que la d´ecision de l’arbitre doit etreˆ annul´ee. Par cons´equent, nous sommes d’avis de rejeter le pourvoi.
Appeal allowed. Pourvoi accueilli.
Appendix
Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2
PART III — Standard Hours, Wages, Vacations and Holidays DIVISION X — Individual Terminations of Employment Notice or wages in lieu of notice 230 (1) Except where subsection (2) applies, an employer who termi- nates the employment of an employee who has completed three consecu- tive months of continuous employment by the employer shall, except where the termination is by way of dismissal for just cause, give the em- ployee either (a) notice in writing, at least two weeks before a date specified in the notice, of the employer’s intention to terminate his employment on that date, or (b) two weeks wages at his regular rate of wages for his regular hours of work, in lieu of the notice.
Notice to trade union in certain circumstances (2) Where an employer is bound by a collective agreement that contains a provision authorizing an employee who is bound by the collective agreement and whose position becomes redundant to displace another employee on the basis of seniority, and the position of an employee who is so authorized becomes redundant, the employer shall (a) give at least two weeks notice in writing to the trade union that is a party to the collective agreement and to the em- ployee that the position of the employee has become redun- 122 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
dant and post a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place within the industrial establishment in which the employee is employed; or (b) pay to any employee whose employment is terminated as a result of the redundancy of the position two weeks wages at his regular rate of wages.
Where employer deemed to terminate employment (3) Except where otherwise prescribed by regulation, an employer shall, for the purposes of this Division, be deemed to have terminated the em- ployment of an employee when the employer lays off that employee.
DIVISION XI — Severance Pay Minimum rate 235 (1) An employer who terminates the employment of an employee who has completed twelve consecutive months of continuous employ- ment by the employer shall, except where the termination is by way of dismissal for just cause, pay to the employee the greater of (a) two days wages at the employee’s regular rate of wages for his regular hours of work in respect of each completed year of employment that is within the term of the employee’s continuous employment by the employer, and (b) five days wages at the employee’s regular rate of wages for his regular hours of work.
Circumstances deemed to be termination and deemed not to be termination (2) For the purposes of this Division, (a) except where otherwise provided by regulation, an em- ployer shall be deemed to have terminated the employment of an employee when the employer lays off that employee.
DIVISION XIV — Unjust Dismissal Complaint to inspector for unjust dismissal 240 (1) Subject to subsections (2) and 242(3.1), any person (a) who has completed twelve consecutive months of continu- ous employment by an employer, and Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 123
(b) who is not a member of a group of employees subject to a collective agreement, may make a complaint in writing to an inspector if the employee has been dismissed and considers the dismissal to be unjust.
Time for making complaint (2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint under subsection (1) shall be made within ninety days from the date on which the person making the complaint was dismissed.
Extension of time (3) The Minister may extend the period of time referred to in subsection (2) where the Minister is satisfied that a complaint was made in that pe- riod to a government official who had no authority to deal with the com- plaint but that the person making the complaint believed the official had that authority.
Reasons for dismissal 241 (1) Where an employer dismisses a person described in subsection 240(1), the person who was dismissed or any inspector may make a re- quest in writing to the employer to provide a written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal, and any employer who receives such a request shall provide the person who made the request with such a statement within fifteen days after the request is made.
Inspector to assist parties (2) On receipt of a complaint made under subsection 240(1), an inspector shall endeavour to assist the parties to the complaint to settle the com- plaint or cause another inspector to do so.
Where complaint not settled within reasonable time (3) Where a complaint is not settled under subsection (2) within such period as the inspector endeavouring to assist the parties pursuant to that subsection considers to be reasonable in the circumstances, the inspector shall, on the written request of the person who made the complaint that the complaint be referred to an adjudicator under subsection 242(1), (a) report to the Minister that the endeavour to assist the parties to settle the complaint has not succeeded; and 124 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
(b) deliver to the Minister the complaint made under subsec- tion 240(1), any written statement giving the reasons for the dismissal provided pursuant to subsection (1) and any other statements or documents the inspector has that relate to the complaint.
Reference to adjudicator 242 (1) The Minister may, on receipt of a report pursuant to subsection 241(3), appoint any person that the Minister considers appropriate as an adjudicator to hear and adjudicate on the complaint in respect of which the report was made, and refer the complaint to the adjudicator along with any statement provided pursuant to subsection 241(1).
Powers of adjudicator (2) An adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under subsec- tion (1) (a) shall consider the complaint within such time as the Gover- nor in Council may by regulation prescribe; (b) shall determine the procedure to be followed, but shall give full opportunity to the parties to the complaint to present evidence and make submissions to the adjudicator and shall consider the information relating to the complaint; and (c) has, in relation to any complaint before the adjudicator, the powers conferred on the Canada Industrial Relations Board, in relation to any proceeding before the Board, under paragraphs 16(a), (b) and (c).
Decision of adjudicator (3) Subject to subsection (3.1), an adjudicator to whom a complaint has been referred under subsection (1) shall (a) consider whether the dismissal of the person who made the complaint was unjust and render a decision thereon; and (b) send a copy of the decision with the reasons therefor to each party to the complaint and to the Minister. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 125
Limitation on complaints (3.1) No complaint shall be considered by an adjudicator under subsec- tion (3) in respect of a person where (a) that person has been laid off because of lack of work or because of the discontinuance of a function; or (b) a procedure for redress has been provided elsewhere in or under this or any other Act of Parliament.
Where unjust dismissal (4) Where an adjudicator decides pursuant to subsection (3) that a person has been unjustly dismissed, the adjudicator may, by order, require the employer who dismissed the person to (a) pay the person compensation not exceeding the amount of money that is equivalent to the remuneration that would, but for the dismissal, have been paid by the employer to the person; (b) reinstate the person in his employ; and (c) do any other like thing that it is equitable to require the employer to do in order to remedy or counteract any conse- quence of the dismissal.
Decisions not to be reviewed by court 243 (1) Every order of an adjudicator appointed under subsection 242(1) is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court.
No review by certiorari, etc. (2) No order shall be made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo war- ranto or otherwise, to question, review, prohibit or restrain an adjudica- tor in any proceedings of the adjudicator under section 242.
Enforcement of orders 244 (1) Any person affected by an order of an adjudicator under subsec- tion 242(4), or the Minister on the request of any such person, may, after fourteen days from the date on which the order is made, or from the date provided in it for compliance, whichever is the later date, file in the Fed- eral Court a copy of the order, exclusive of the reasons therefor. 126 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Idem (2) On filing in the Federal Court under subsection (1), an order of an adjudicator shall be registered in the Court and, when registered, has the same force and effect, and all proceedings may be taken thereon, as if the order were a judgment obtained in that Court.
Regulations 245 The Governor in Council may make regulations for the purposes of this Division defining the absences from employment that shall be deemed not to have interrupted continuity of employment.
Civil remedy 246 (1) No civil remedy of an employee against his employer is sus- pended or affected by sections 240 to 245.
Application of section 189 (2) Section 189 applies for the purposes of this Division.
Annexe
Code canadien du travail, L.R.C. 1985, c. L-2
PARTIE III — Dur´ee normale du travail, salaire, cong´es et jours f´eri´es SECTION X — Licenciements individuels Pr´eavis ou indemnit´e 230 (1) Sauf cas pr´evu au paragraphe (2) et sauf s’il s’agit d’un con- g´ediement justifi´e, l’employeur qui licencie un employ´e qui travaille pour lui sans interruption depuis au moins trois mois est tenu: a) soit de donner a` l’employ´e un pr´eavis de licenciement ecrit´ d’au moins deux semaines; b) soit de verser, en guise et lieu de pr´eavis, une indemnit´e egale´ a` deux semaines de salaire au taux r´egulier pour le nombre d’heures de travail normal. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 127
Pr´eavis au syndicat (2) En cas de suppression d’un poste, l’employeur li´e par une convention collective autorisant un employ´e ainsi devenu surnum´eraire a` supplanter un autre employ´e ayant moins d’anciennet´e que lui est tenu: a) soit de donner au syndicat signataire de la convention col- lective et a` l’employ´e un pr´eavis de suppression de poste, d’au moins deux semaines, et de placer une copie du pr´eavis dans un endroit bien en vue a` l’int´erieur de l’´etablissement o`u l’employ´e travaille; b) soit de verser a` l’employ´e licenci´e en raison de la suppres- sion du poste deux semaines de salaire au taux r´egulier.
Assimilation (3) Sauf disposition contraire d’un r`eglement, la mise a` pied est, pour l’application de la pr´esente section, assimil´ee au licenciement.
SECTION XI — Indemnit´e de d´epart Minimum 235 (1) L’employeur qui licencie un employ´e qui travaille pour lui sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois est tenu, sauf en cas de con- g´ediement justifi´e, de verser a` celui-ci le plus elev´´ e des montants suivants: a) deux jours de salaire, au taux r´egulier et pour le nombre d’heures de travail normal, pour chaque ann´ee de service; b) cinq jours de salaire, au taux r´egulier et pour le nombre d’heures de travail normal.
Pr´esomptions (2) Pour l’application de la pr´esente section a) sauf disposition contraire d’un r`eglement, la mise a` pied est assimil´ee au licenciement. 128 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
SECTION XIV — Cong´ediement injuste Plainte 240 (1) Sous r´eserve des paragraphes (2) et 242(3.1), toute personne qui se croit injustement cong´edi´ee peut d´eposer une plainte ecrite´ aupr`es d’un inspecteur si: a) d’une part, elle travaille sans interruption depuis au moins douze mois pour le mˆeme employeur; b) d’autre part, elle ne fait pas partie d’un groupe d’employ´es r´egis par une convention collective.
D´elai (2) Sous r´eserve du paragraphe (3), la plainte doit etreˆ d´epos´ee dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours qui suivent la date du cong´ediement.
Prorogation de d´elai (3) Le ministre peut proroger le d´elai fix´e au paragraphe (2) dans les cas o`u il est convaincu que l’int´eress´e a d´epos´e sa plainte a` temps mais aupr`es d’un fonctionnaire qu’il croyait, a` tort, habilit´e a` la recevoir.
Motifs du cong´ediement 241 (1) La personne cong´edi´ee vis´ee au paragraphe 240(1) ou tout in- specteur peut demander par ecrit´ a` l’employeur de lui faire connaˆıtre les motifs du cong´ediement; le cas ech´´ eant, l’employeur est tenu de lui fournir une d´eclaration ecrite´ a` cet effet dans les quinze jours qui suivent la demande.
Conciliation par l’inspecteur (2) D`es r´eception de la plainte, l’inspecteur s’efforce de concilier les par- ties ou confie cette tˆache a` un autre inspecteur.
Cas d’´echec (3) Si la conciliation n’aboutit pas dans un d´elai qu’il estime raisonnable en l’occurrence, l’inspecteur, sur demande ecrite´ du plaignant a` l’effet de saisir un arbitre du cas: a) fait rapport au ministre de l’´echec de son intervention; b) transmet au ministre la plainte, l’´eventuelle d´eclaration de l’employeur sur les motifs du cong´ediement et tous autres d´eclarations ou documents relatifs a` la plainte. Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 129
Renvoi a` un arbitre 242 (1) Sur r´eception du rapport vis´e au paragraphe 241(3), le ministre peut d´esigner en qualit´e d’arbitre la personne qu’il juge qualifi´ee pour entendre et trancher l’affaire et lui transmettre la plainte ainsi que l’´eventuelle d´eclaration de l’employeur sur les motifs du cong´ediement.
Pouvoirs de l’arbitre (2) Pour l’examen du cas dont il est saisi, l’arbitre: a) dispose du d´elai fix´e par r`eglement du gouverneur en conseil; b) fixe lui-mˆeme sa proc´edure, sous r´eserve de la double obli- gation de donner a` chaque partie toute possibilit´e de lui pr´e- senter des el´´ ements de preuve et des observations, d’une part, et de tenir compte de l’information contenue dans le dossier, d’autre part; c) est investi des pouvoirs conf´er´es au Conseil canadien des relations industrielles par les alin´eas 16a), b) et c).
D´ecision de l’arbitre (3) Sous r´eserve du paragraphe (3.1), l’arbitre: a) d´ecide si le cong´ediement etait´ injuste; b) transmet une copie de sa d´ecision, motifs a` l’appui, a` chaque partie ainsi qu’au ministre.
Restriction (3.1) L’arbitre ne peut proc´eder a` l’instruction de la plainte dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants: a) le plaignant a et´´ e licenci´e en raison du manque de travail ou de la suppression d’un poste; b) la pr´esente loi ou une autre loi f´ed´erale pr´evoit un autre recours. 130 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Cas de cong´ediement injuste (4) S’il d´ecide que le cong´ediement etait´ injuste, l’arbitre peut, par or- donnance, enjoindre a` l’employeur: a) de payer au plaignant une indemnit´e equivalant,´ au maxi- mum, au salaire qu’il aurait normalement gagn´e s’il n’avait pas et´´ e cong´edi´e; b) de r´eint´egrer le plaignant dans son emploi; c) de prendre toute autre mesure qu’il juge equitable´ de lui imposer et de nature a` contrebalancer les effets du con- g´ediement ou a` y rem´edier.
Caract`ere d´efinitif des d´ecisions 243 (1) Les ordonnances de l’arbitre d´esign´e en vertu du paragraphe 242(1) sont d´efinitives et non susceptibles de recours judiciaires.
Interdiction de recours extraordinaires (2) Il n’est admis aucun recours ou d´ecision judiciaire — notamment par voie d’injonction, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de quo warranto — visant a` contester, r´eviser, empˆecher ou limiter l’action d’un arbitre ex- erc´ee dans le cadre de l’article 242.
Ex´ecution des ordonnances 244 (1) La personne int´eress´ee par l’ordonnance d’un arbitre vis´ee au paragraphe 242(4), ou le ministre, sur demande de celle-ci, peut, apr`es l’expiration d’un d´elai de quatorze jours suivant la date de l’ordonnance ou la date d’ex´ecution qui y est fix´ee, si celle-ci est post´erieure, d´eposer a` la Cour f´ed´erale une copie du dispositif de l’ordonnance.
Enregistrement (2) D`es le d´epˆot de l’ordonnance de l’arbitre, la Cour f´ed´erale proc`ede a` l’enregistrement de celle-ci; l’enregistrement conf`ere a` l’ordonnance valeur de jugement de ce tribunal et, d`es lors, toutes les proc´edures d’ex´ecution applicables a` un tel jugement peuvent etreˆ engag´ees a` son egard.´ Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. 131
R`eglements 245 Le gouverneur en conseil peut, par r`eglement, pr´eciser, pour l’application de la pr´esente section, les cas d’absence qui n’ont pas pour effet d’interrompre le service chez l’employeur.
Recours 246 (1) Les articles 240 a` 245 n’ont pas pour effet de suspendre ou de modifier le recours civil que l’employ´e peut exercer contre son employeur.
Application de l’art. 189 (2) L’article 189 s’applique dans le cadre de la pr´esente section. 132 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
[Indexed as: Sather v. Canada (Deputy Head, Correctional Service)] Donald James Sather, Applicant and Deputy Head (Correctional Service of Canada), Respondent Federal Court of Appeal Docket: A-282-15 2016 FCA 149 J.D. Denis Pelletier, Wyman W. Webb, Yves de Montigny JJ.A. Heard: May 11, 2016 Judgment: May 12, 2016 Labour and employment law –––– Public service employees — Termination of employment — Dismissal — Dismissal for cause –––– Applicant was al- leged to have committed infraction of Commissioner’s Code of Discipline when he committed act of personal or sexual harassment against another staff member by sexually assaulting complainant — Applicant was dismissed from employ- ment — Applicant grieved dismissal, not testifying on his own behalf — Appli- cant’s defence was that sexual relations were consensual and sought to establish defence by attacking complainant’s credibility — Adjudicator, having consid- ered all evidence, found that while some of complainant’s evidence was not credible, her evidence that she did not consent to having sexual relations with applicant was credible — Adjudicator dismissed grievance — Applicant applied for judicial review of decision — Application dismissed — Question of whether complainant consented to have sexual relations with applicant at time those rela- tions occurred was pure question of fact and as result applicant must show that adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable — Adjudicator’s assessment of evi- dence was not such that it led him to conclusion that was outside range of possi- ble acceptable outcomes — Adjudicator’s conclusion that complainant should be believed when she said that she did not consent to sexual relations with appli- cant would not be interfered with. Labour and employment law –––– Labour law — Discipline and termina- tion — Remedies — Damages and compensation — Miscellaneous –––– Ap- plicant was alleged to have committed infraction of Commissioner’s Code of Discipline when he committed act of personal or sexual harassment against an- other staff member by sexually assaulting complainant — Applicant was dis- missed from employment — Applicant grieved dismissal, not testifying on his own behalf — Issue of employer’s bad faith and lack of procedural fairness was raised — Adjudicator ordered full disclosure — Adjudicator dismissed griev- ance — Applicant applied for judicial review of decision — Application dis- Sather v. Canada (Dep. Head, Correctional Service) 133 missed — Adjudicator’s order for full disclosure remedied any potential breach of procedural fairness — Employer’s possible bias did not affect fairness of pro- ceedings before adjudicator. Labour and employment law –––– Public service employees — Termination of employment — Practice and procedure –––– Applicant was alleged to have committed infraction of Commissioner’s Code of Discipline when he committed act of personal or sexual harassment against another staff member by sexually assaulting complainant — Applicant was dismissed from employment — Appli- cant grieved dismissal, not testifying on his own behalf — Issue of employer’s bad faith and lack of procedural fairness was raised — Adjudicator ordered full disclosure — Adjudicator dismissed grievance — Applicant applied for judicial review of decision — Application dismissed — Adjudicator’s order for full dis- closure remedied any potential breach of procedural fairness — Employer’s pos- sible bias did not affect fairness of proceedings before adjudicator. Cases considered by J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.: Housen v. Nikolaisen (2002), 2002 SCC 33, 2002 CarswellSask 178, 2002 Car- swellSask 179, [2002] S.C.J. No. 31, 286 N.R. 1, 10 C.C.L.T. (3d) 157, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [2002] 7 W.W.R. 1, 219 Sask. R. 1, 272 W.A.C. 1, 30 M.P.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, REJB 2002-29758, 2002 CSC 33 (S.C.C.) — followed R. v. A. (J.) (2011), 2011 SCC 28, 2011 CarswellOnt 3515, 2011 CarswellOnt 3516, [2011] S.C.J. No. 28, (sub nom. R. v. J.A.) 84 C.R. (6th) 1, 417 N.R. 1, 335 D.L.R. (4th) 108, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 1, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440, 279 O.A.C. 1, 108 O.R. (3d) 400 (S.C.C.) — followed R. v. Ewanchuk (1999), 1999 CarswellAlta 99, 1999 CarswellAlta 100, 131 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 169 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 235 N.R. 323, 22 C.R. (5th) 1, 232 A.R. 1, 195 W.A.C. 1, 68 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 6 W.W.R. 333, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) — followed Statutes considered: Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board Act, S.C. 2013, c. 40, s. 365 Generally — referred to
APPLICATION for judicial review of decision reported at Sather v. Deputy Head (Correctional Service of Canada) (2015), 2015 PSLREB 45, 2015 CRTEFP 45, 2015 CarswellNat 1854, 2015 CarswellNat 1855 (Can. P.S.L.R.E.B.).
Michael Prokosh, for Applicant Barry Benkendorf, for Respondent 134 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.:
1 Mr. Sather (the Applicant) brings this application for judicial review of the decision of an adjudicator appointed pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board Act, S.C. 2013, c. 40, s. 365, dismissing his grievance of his dismissal from employment with the Cor- rectional Service of Canada (the Employer). The adjudicator’s decision is cited as 2015 PSLREB 45 (Can. P.S.L.R.E.B.) (the Decision). The basis of the dismissal was the allegation that the Applicant committed an in- fraction of the Commissioner’s Code of Discipline when he committed an act of personal or sexual harassment against another staff member by sexually assaulting the complainant. The Applicant grieved his dismissal and, while he did not testify on his own behalf, his defence was that the sexual relations between him and the complainant were consensual. He sought to establish this defence by attacking the complainant’s credibility. 2 The adjudicator, having considered all the evidence, found that while some of the complainant’s evidence was not credible, her evidence that she did not consent to having sexual relations with the Applicant was credible. He went on to find that he was entitled to draw an adverse in- ference from the fact that the Applicant did not testify as to his version of events. The adjudicator, therefore, dismissed the grievance. 3 Before us, the Applicant renewed his attack on the complainant’s credibility. Counsel for the Applicant conceded that the adjudicator was free to believe the complainant with respect to some aspects of her evi- dence and to disbelieve her with respect to other aspects. He also con- ceded, following the teachings of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.) as re-affirmed in R. v. A. (J.), 2011 SCC 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (S.C.C.), at paragraph 34, that con- sent means consent to the sexual acts in question at the time they oc- curred. However, counsel for the Applicant also relies on paragraph 30 of the Ewanchuk decision in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that: The complainant’s statement that she did not consent is a matter of credibility to be weighed in light of all the evidence including any ambiguous conduct. The question at this stage is purely one of credi- bility, and whether the totality of the complainant’s conduct is con- sistent with her claim of non-consent. 4 Counsel’s submissions were essentially that when all of the evidence is considered, including the instances where the adjudicator found that Sather v. Canada (Dep. Head, Correctional Service) Pelletier J.A. 135
the complainant was not credible with respect to specific items, the adju- dicator could not reasonably conclude that the complainant’s evidence that she did not consent to having sexual relations with the Applicant was credible. 5 The standard of review of the decision of an arbitrator is reasonable- ness with respect to questions of fact. The question as to whether the complainant consented to have sexual relations with the complainant at the time those relations occurred is a pure question of fact. As a result, the Applicant must show, as he attempted to do, that the adjudicator’s decision was unreasonable. 6 The adjudicator began his analysis by recognizing that in civil mat- ters, there is only one standard of proof and that is proof on a balance of probabilities. He then quoted extensively from the Ewanchuk and A. (J.) cases on the issue of consent. The adjudicator then reviewed the evi- dence, acknowledging the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence to which counsel for the Applicant drew his attention. He drew conclu- sions as to which parts of the complainant’s evidence he believed and which he did not. On the crucial issue of consent, the adjudicator found that the complainant’s evidence was “clear that she was not consenting to any sexual activity”: see the Decision at paragraph 166. After consider- ing the Applicant’s argument as to the improbability of certain evidence, which the Employer relied upon to establish the timeline of events, the adjudicator concluded: After considering all the evidence, I accept as credible that the com- plainant’s evidence shows on the balance of probabilities, she was sexually assaulted by the grievor. See the Decision at paragraph 170 7 After having come to this conclusion, the adjudicator then addressed the issue of adverse inference. He noted that there is no presumption of innocence in civil cases. He then stated that the Applicant’s failure to testify should result in an adverse inference that his evidence with re- spect to sexual assault would not be helpful to his case: see the Decision at paragraphs 173-175. 8 Only two people were present when the sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Only one of them gave evidence. If the complainant is not believed, there is no other evidence in relation to her consent. The adju- dicator clearly understood this: The complainant’s evidence is uncontradicted as only she and the grievor were in the truck and he did not testify. It follows that the 136 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
only way [the Employer] could not have met its onus to establish that the sexual assault took place was if the evidence disclosed that the complainant lacked credibility. Even though a complainant’s testi- mony may lack credibility on some issues, her testimony on the sub- stance of the allegations may pass scrutiny. She can be believed on some matters and not believed on others while still warranting a find- ing that she was assaulted. See the Decision at paragraph 160 (emphasis added) 9 Counsel for the Applicant relied on the proposition that the Employer could not succeed if the complainant lacked credibility. As noted, he conceded that the critical issue was whether the complainant was to be believed when she said she did not consent to the sexual relations but argued that in light of the omissions, inconsistencies, and improbabilities to which he pointed, the complainant should be found to lack credibility and, therefore, it was unreasonable for the adjudicator to find her credi- ble on the issue of consent. It seems to me that this amounts to arguing that a tribunal should assess a complainant’s credibility globally and then either believe all or none of the complainant’s evidence. This is the op- posite of what is taught in Ewanchuk. 10 In support of this line of argument, he painstakingly took us through the evidence and invited us to draw inferences adverse to the complain- ant. It hardly needs to be said that this is not our role. The adjudicator heard all of the evidence, saw all of the witnesses and, to quote from R. D. Gibbens in “Appellate Review of Findings of Fact” (1991-92), 13 Ad- vocates’ Q. 445, at p. 446, quoted with approval in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.) at paragraph 14: The insight gained by the trial judge who has lived with the case for several days, weeks or even months may be far deeper than that of the Court of Appeal whose view of the case is much more limited and narrow, often being shaped and distorted by the various orders or rulings being challenged. 11 In these circumstances, the adjudicator is the trial judge. He lived with this case over several months and was intimately familiar with all of the evidence. While I have considered the portions of the evidence to which counsel drew our attention, that evidence must be assessed in the light of the whole of the evidence. The adjudicator was in a position to do this. We are not. I was not persuaded that the adjudicator’s assessment of the evidence was such that it led him to a conclusion that was outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes. I would not interfere with the adjudicator’s conclusion that the complainant should be believed when Sather v. Canada (Dep. Head, Correctional Service) Montigny J.A. 137
she says that she did not consent to sexual relations with the Applicant and that, as a result, she was sexually assaulted. 12 As to the issue of drawing an adverse inference, the Decision makes it clear that the adjudicator decided the issue of the complainant’s credibil- ity before he considered the effect of the Applicant’s failure to testify. As I read the Decision, the adjudicator treated the adverse inference as sim- ply tending to confirm the conclusion to which he had come after a re- view of all the evidence. Since this issue is not determinative of the re- sult, it is not necessary to say any more about it. 13 The Applicant also raised the issue of the Employer’s bad faith and lack of procedural fairness. While the Employer’s initial disclosure of its investigation report was clearly unsatisfactory in its liberal use of redac- tions, the adjudicator ordered full disclosure, which remedied any poten- tial breach of procedural fairness. The Employer’s possible bias does not affect the fairness of the proceedings before the adjudicator. 14 As a result, I would dismiss the application for judicial review with costs.
Wyman W. Webb J.A.:
I agree.
Yves de Montigny J.A.:
I agree. Application dismissed. 138 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
[Indexed as: Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota] Darren Sproule, Plaintiff/Respondent on the Motion and Tony Graham Lexus Toyota; Graham Automotives Sales Inc.; Tony Graham Motors (1980) Limited; Tony Graham Kanata Limited; Tony Graham Motors Limited, 1618507 Ontario Limited; 1180632 Ontario Limited; 1180633 Ontario Limited; 1514532 Ontario Limited; 1618508 Ontario Limited; Maureen Graham and Elizabeth Graham, Defendants/ Moving Party Ontario Superior Court of Justice Docket: 14-61172 2016 ONSC 2220 Robert L. Maranger J. Heard: March 8, 2016 Judgment: May 12, 2016* Labour and employment law –––– Employment law — Termination and dis- missal — Practice and procedure — Summary proceedings –––– Plaintiff was manager of one of car dealerships owned and operated by group of automo- tive companies — Plaintiff brought action for wrongful dismissal — Eight de- fendants brought motion for summary judgment to have claims dismissed by reason of there being no cause of action against them — Motion granted — There was no allegation of fraud, deceit, dishonesty or want of authority regard- ing two personally named defendants — Pleadings did not allege facts, nor was there any evidence before court, to support piercing corporate veil — Defend- ants conceded there was potential for finding that operating companies were “common employer”, but defendants’ position that holding companies could not be found to be common employers was accepted — Fact that six holding com- panies were intermingled financially, even to great extent, would not result in finding that these companies had effective control over employee — These com- panies were holding companies; they did not exercise any control over employ- ees, directly or indirectly — Doctrine of common employer had no application to them — There was no genuine issue for trial pertaining to eight defendants in question.
* Additional reasons at Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota (2016), 2016 CarswellOnt 10964, 2016 ONSC 4565 (Ont. S.C.J.), respecting costs. Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota Robert L. Maranger J. 139
Cases considered by Robert L. Maranger J.: Asselin v. Gazarek Realty Holdings Ltd. (2011), 2011 ONSC 5871, 2011 Cars- wellOnt 11417 (Ont. S.C.J.) — followed Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd. v. Ontario (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1680, 8 C.C.E.L. (3d) 186, 200 D.L.R. (4th) 289, 14 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 54 O.R. (3d) 161, 147 O.A.C. 275, 2002 C.L.L.C. 210-008, [2001] O.J. No. 1879, [2001] O.T.C. 257 (Ont. C.A.) — followed Hryniak v. Mauldin (2014), 2014 CarswellOnt 640, 2014 CarswellOnt 641, 37 R.P.R. (5th) 1, [2014] S.C.J. No. 7, 46 C.P.C. (7th) 217, 27 C.L.R. (4th) 1, (sub nom. Hryniak v. Mauldin) 366 D.L.R. (4th) 641, 2014 CSC 7, 453 N.R. 51, 12 C.C.E.L. (4th) 1, 314 O.A.C. 1, 95 E.T.R. (3d) 1, 21 B.L.R. (5th) 248, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, [2014] A.C.S. No. 7, 2014 SCC 7 (S.C.C.) — followed Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. (1995), 129 D.L.R. (4th) 711, 9 C.C.L.S. 97, 23 B.L.R. (2d) 165, 87 O.A.C. 129, (sub nom. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. v. Peoples Jewellers Ltd.) 26 O.R. (3d) 481, 1995 Cars- wellOnt 1203, [1995] O.J. No. 3556 (Ont. C.A.) — considered Rules considered: Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 R. 20 — considered R. 20.04(2.1) [en. O. Reg. 438/08] — considered
MOTION by certain defendants for summary judgment to have wrongful dis- missal claims dismissed as against them.
Andrew B. Lister, Chantal Beaupr´e, for Plaintiff / Respondent on the Motion Jim Anstey, for Defendants / Moving Party
Robert L. Maranger J.: Introduction 1 This was a motion for a summary judgment by eight of the named defendants to have the claims dismissed by reason of there being no cause of action against them. 2 The motion arises in the context of a wrongful dismissal action. 3 The plaintiff was the manager of one of the car dealerships owned and operated by the Tony Graham automotive companies, namely the Nissan Infiniti automotive dealership. 4 The fundamental issue to be determined on this motion is whether the evidence presented supports the proposition that the eight moving de- fendants were never at any time during the course of the plaintiff’s em- ployment “common and related employers”. 140 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Summary judgment motions: 5 Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 stipu- lates that a defendant may, after delivering his or her statement of de- fence, move with appropriate affidavit material or other evidence for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim in the statement of claim. The court is mandated to grant summary judgment if it is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial respecting a claim or defence. 6 Rule 20.04 (2.1) provides that: In determining under clause (2)(a) whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties and, if the determination is being made by a judge, the judge may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, un- less it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial: 1. Weighing the evidence. 2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent. 3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence. 7 The Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 (S.C.C.), set out the governing princi- ples to be applied by trial judges respecting the determination of rule 20 summary judgment motions. At paras. 47, 49-51 and 66 Justice Karakat- sanis indicated the following: [47] Summary judgment motions must be granted whenever there is no genuine issue requiring a trial (Rule 20.04(2)(a)). In outlining how to determine whether there is such an issue, I focus on the goals and principles that underlie whether to grant motions for summary judg- ment. Such an approach allows the application of the rule to evolve organically, lest categories of cases be taken as rules or preconditions which may hinder the system’s transformation by discouraging the use of summary judgment...... [49] There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a mo- tion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) al- lows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportion- ate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result. Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota Robert L. Maranger J. 141
[50] These principles are interconnected and all speak to whether summary judgment will provide fair and just adjudication. When a summary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary facts and resolve the dispute, proceeding to trial would generally not be proportionate, timely or cost-effective. Similarly, a process that does not give a judge confidence in her conclusions can never be the proportionate way to resolve the dispute. It bears reiterating that the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to re- solve the dispute. [51] Often, concerns about credibility or clarification of the evidence can be addressed by calling oral evidence on the motion itself. How- ever, there may be cases where, given the nature of the issues and the evidence required, the judge cannot make the necessary findings of fact, or apply the legal principles to reach a just and fair determination...... [66] On a motion for summary judgment under Rule 20.04, the judge should first determine if there is a genuine issue requiring trial based only on the evidence before her, without using the new fact-finding powers. There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial if the sum- mary judgment process provides her with the evidence required to fairly and justly adjudicate the dispute and is a timely, affordable and proportionate procedure, under Rule 20.04(2)(a). If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, she should then determine if the need for a trial can be avoided by using the new powers under Rules 20.04(2.1) and (2.2). She may, at her discretion, use those powers, provided that their use is not against the interest of justice. Their use will not be against the interest of justice if they will lead to a fair and just result and will serve the goals of timeliness, affordability and proportionality in light of the litigation as a whole.
Position of the Defendants/moving parties: 8 The moving party submits that the two individuals named as defend- ants, Maureen and Elizabeth Graham, were at all material times directors of Graham Automotive Sales Inc., and as such were not employers. There is no justification in any of the evidence for piercing the corporate veil. 9 The moving party further submits that six of the companies named in the statement of claim are simply holding companies and as such have 142 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
nothing to do with the employment of the plaintiff. Consequently, no cause of action exists against them.
Position of the Plaintiff/respondent in the motion 10 The plaintiff submits that all of the corporate defendants are, in es- sence, one in the same: their assets are intermingled, they hold the same directing minds and the same shareholders, they share common employ- ees and they are all operated as one inseparable business endeavor, known as “Tony Graham Automotive”. 11 Furthermore, the named individuals Maureen and Elizabeth Graham are the sole directing minds of all of the corporate defendants. They man- age the day-to-day affairs of the Companies and have the final say on all major decisions involving these companies. 12 The plaintiff takes the position that Maureen and Elizabeth Graham made the decision to terminate his employment.
Findings of fact: 13 After considering the pleadings, the affidavit of Darren Sproule, the affidavit of Geoff Colley, all of the exhibits attached thereto, the tran- scripts of the cross-examinations on the affidavits, and the factums filed, I am able to confidently make the following findings of fact: • In 1998 Darren Sproule (the plaintiff) was first employed by Tony Graham, the patriarch of the Graham family at two of his dealerships. • In 2006 the plaintiff was promoted to General Manager of the Graham family’s Nissan and Infiniti dealership, which operated under the corporate name of Graham Automotive Sales Inc. • The plaintiff’s employment ended in May 2014. At that point in time Maureen and Elizabeth Graham were the directors and oper- ating minds of all of the companies. They decided to sell Graham Automotive Sales Inc. (the Infiniti Nissan dealership). • Maureen Graham and Elizabeth Graham are the daughter and wife of Tony Graham; they were at all material times the controlling and operating minds of the Graham family companies. They were the directors of all of the companies in May 2014 and remain the directors of these companies today. • The companies were/are divided into two groups: operating com- panies, and holding companies. Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota Robert L. Maranger J. 143
• The operating companies and their function at the relevant times were as follows: I. Graham Automotive Sales Inc. (GAS) operated a Nissan and Infiniti dealership located at 2185 Rob- ertson Road in the city of Ottawa; II. Tony Graham Luxury Automobiles Ltd. operated a Lexus dealership located at 299 W. Hunt Club Road in the city of Ottawa; III. Tony Graham Motors (1980) Ltd. operated a Toyota dealership at 1855 Merivale Road in the city of Ottawa; IV. Tony Graham Kanata Ltd. operated a Toyota dealer- ship at 2500 Palladium Drive in the city of Ottawa. • The holding companies and their respective functions at the rele- vant times were as follows: I. Tony Graham Motors Ltd. (TGM) holds the major- ity of, or a significant number of, the shares of the operating companies and is the umbrella company for all of the operating companies; II. 1180632 Ontario Ltd. holds certain of the Graham family real estate investments. The real estate in- cludes property upon which some businesses are op- erated and/or are linked to business operations. III. 1180633 Ontario Ltd. also holds certain of the Gra- ham family real estate investments. IV. 1514532 Ontario Ltd. holds other investments. The majority of the shares are held by the operating companies. V. 1618507 Ontario Ltd. is a holding company. The shares are mainly held by Patrick Graham. It is in the nature of a trust. It holds a significant number of the shares in TGM. VI. 1618508 Ontario Ltd. is a holding company like 1618507; however, the shares are mainly owned by Maureen Graham. • The Plaintiff was at all times material paid by GAS. 144 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
• The holding companies and the operating companies are intermin- gled. The entire group of companies is/was commonly referred to as the Tony Graham Automotive Group. • The defendants treated the corporate group as a common enter- prise from a human resource, financing and promotional perspective. • The holding companies did not engage in any of the operations of the dealership that employed the Plaintiff. • It cannot be said that the holding companies had any control over the Plaintiff’s employment. • The two personal Defendants did not act outside of their roles as directors nor did they commit a tortious act on any evidence pre- sented at this motion.
Analysis: Personal Defendants 14 Maureen and Elizabeth Graham are the directing minds of the operat- ing companies that form part of the Tony Graham automotive compa- nies. In order to attract personal liability for their actions as corporate officers there would have to be certain specific available findings on the evidence. In Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 25, the Ontario Court of Appeal indicated: The decided cases in which employees and officers of companies have been found personally liable for actions ostensibly carried out under a corporate name are fact-specific. In the absence of findings of fraud, deceit, dishonesty or want of authority on the part of em- ployees or officers, they are also rare. Those cases in which the cor- porate veil has been pierced usually involve transactions where the use of the corporate structure was a sham from the outset or was an afterthought to a deal which had gone sour. There is also a considera- ble body of case-law wherein injured parties to actions for breach of contract have attempted to extend liability to the principals of the company by pleading that the principals were privy to the tort of in- ducing breach of contract between the company and the plaintiff: see Ontario Store Fixtures Inc. v. Mmmuffins Inc. (1989), 1989 CanLII 4229 (ON SC), 70 O.R. (2d) 42 (H.C.J.), and the cases referred to therein. Additionally there have been attempts by injured parties to attach liability to the principals of failed businesses through insol- vency litigation. In every case, however, the facts giving rise to per- sonal liability were specifically pleaded. Absent allegations which fit Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota Robert L. Maranger J. 145
within the categories described above, officers or employees of lim- ited companies are protected from personal liability unless it can be shown that their actions are themselves tortious or exhibit a separate identity or interest from that of the company so as to make the act or conduct complained of their own. 15 The two personal defendants in this case carried out all of their corpo- rate responsibilities with the authority vested in them. The Plaintiff sim- ply asserts that because they were the controlling minds on all relevant matters involving the running of the companies they are correctly named as party defendants. I disagree with this proposition. There is no allega- tion of fraud, deceit, dishonesty or a want of authority regarding the two personally named defendants. The pleadings do not allege facts, nor is there any evidence before the court, to support piercing the corporate veil in the circumstances of this case. 16 There is no genuine issue for trial in relation to this issue, and for all of the above reasons the summary judgment motion to dismiss the claim against the personal defendants is granted.
Analysis: Holding Companies as Common Employers 17 The plaintiff alleges that the 10 corporate defendants named in the statement of claim are common employers by virtue of the fact that the operating and holding companies are intermingled from the perspective of finances, human resources, accounting records, and that the account- ing records list all of the companies as “Tony Graham Automotive Group”. He submits that the issue of the application of the doctrine of “common employers” is something that should be determined only after trial. 18 In Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd. v. Ontario (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), the Court of Appeal set out following principles respecting the application of the common employer doctrine at paragraphs 30-33: [30] The common employer doctrine, in its common law context, has been considered by several Canadian courts in recent years. The leading case is probably Sinclair v. Dover Engineering Services Ltd. (1987), 1987 CanLII 2692 (BC SC), 11 B.C.L.R. (2d) 176 (S.C.), affd (1988), 1988 CanLII 3358 (BC CA), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 297 (B.C.C.A.) (“Sinclair”). In that case, Sinclair, a professional engi- neer, held himself out to the public as an employee of Dover Engi- neering Services Ltd. (“Dover”). He was paid by Cyril Management Limited (“Cyril”). When Sinclair was dismissed, he sued both corpo- rations. Wood J. held that both companies were jointly and severally 146 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
liable for damages for wrongful dismissal. In reasoning that we find particularly persuasive, he said, at p. 181 B.C.L.R.: The first serious issue raised may be simply stated as one of determining with whom the plaintiff contracted for em- ployment in January 1973. The defendants argue that an employee can only contract for employment with a single employer and that, in this case, that single entity was ob- viously Dover. I see no reason why such an inflexible notion of contract must necessarily be imposed upon the modern employ- ment relationship. Recognizing the situation for what it was, I see no reason, in fact or in law, why both Dover and Cyril should not be regarded jointly as the plaintiff’s employer. The old-fashioned notion that no man can serve two masters fails to recognize the realities of modern-day business, accounting and tax considerations. There is nothing sinister or irregular about the apparently complex intercorporate relationship existing between Cyril and Dover. It is, in fact, a perfectly normal arrange- ment frequently encountered in the business world in one form or another. Similar arrangements may result from corporate take-overs, from tax planning considerations, or from other legitimate business motives too numerous to catalogue. As long as there exists a sufficient degree of relationship between the different legal entities who apparently com- pete for the role of employer, there is no reason in law or in equity why they ought not all to be regarded as one for the purpose of determining liability for obligations owed to those employees who, in effect, have served all without regard for any precise notion of to whom they were bound in contract. What will constitute a sufficient degree of re- lationship will depend, in each case, on the details of such relationship, including such factors as individual share- holdings, corporate shareholdings, and interlocking direc- torships. The essence of that relationship will be the ele- ment of common control...... [31] In Ontario, the common employer doctrine has been considered in several cases. In Gray v. Standard Trustco Ltd. (1994), 1994 Can- Sproule v. Tony Graham Lexus Toyota Robert L. Maranger J. 147
LII 7472 (ON SC), 8 C.C.E.L. (2d) 46, 29 C.B.R. (3d) 22 (Ont. Gen. Div.), Ground J. said, at p. 47 C.C.E.L.: ... it seems clear that, for purposes of a wrongful dismissal claim, an individual may be held to be an employee of more than one corporation in a related group of corpora- tions. One must find evidence of an intention to create an employer/employee relationship between the individual and the respective corporations within the group. [32] In Jones v. CAE Industries Ltd. (1991), 40 C.C.E.L. 236 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (“Jones”), Adams J. reviewed many of the leading author- ities and observed, at p. 249: The true employer must be ascertained on the basis of where effective control over the employee resides ... I stress again that an employment relationship is not simply a matter of form and technical corporate structure. 19 In Asselin v. Gazarek Realty Holdings Ltd., 2011 ONSC 5871 (Ont. S.C.J.), Conway J. set out some of the key principles on the issue of finding a group of companies to be common employers. At paragraphs 22-24 of that decision she indicates: [22] The Ontario Court of Appeal approved the common law doc- trine as articulated in Dover, as well as in subsequent other cases, in Downtown Eatery (1993) Ltd. v. Ontario, 2001 CanLII 8538 (ON CA), 2001 CarswellOnt 1680, 200 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (C.A.). In Down- town, the plaintiff was terminated from his employment at a night- club called For Your Eyes Only. He had originally sued the company that served as a “paymaster” for the employees but in later proceed- ings sought to recover from a number of other related companies in- volved in the nightclub operation - one company owned the prem- ises, one owned the trademark and licenses, one owned the chattels and equipment, and one acted as paymaster. [23] The court held that there was a “highly integrated or seamless group of companies which together operated all aspects of the For Your Eyes Only nightclub” (para. 34). It held that the whole consor- tium operated the nightclub and that all of the companies could be regarded as common employers and liable for the plaintiff’s claim. The court’s concern was that a complex corporate structure not be permitted to defeat the legitimate entitlements of wrongfully dis- missed employees: Downtown, at para. 36. [24] The issue in the common employer cases, and what the courts look at, is “where effective control over the employee resides” (Downtown, at para. 33). If the plaintiff’s employment is controlled 148 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
by more than one company, or by a group of companies, then in the appropriate case all of those companies may be viewed as his collec- tive employer, regardless of who the actual employer is: see Down- town, at paras. 30 to 40. 20 The defendants have conceded that there is a potential for a finding at the conclusion of the trial that the operating companies were one “com- mon employer”. The evidence may potentially lead to the conclusion that they all had “effective control over the employee”. However, the defend- ants’ position with respect to the holding companies is that there is no genuine issue for trial, in that there is no evidence that could possibly give rise to a finding that the holding companies are common employers. 21 I agree with the position advocated by the defendants. The fact that these companies are intermingled financially, even to a great extent, will not result in a finding that they had effective control over the employee. They are holding companies — nothing more, nothing less. They do not exercise directly or indirectly any control over the employees. The doc- trine of common employer has no application to them on any analysis of the evidence. As such there is no genuine issue for trial. 22 Therefore, for all of the above reasons the summary judgment motion dismissing the claims against the six referenced holding companies and the two personally named defendants is granted.
Costs: 23 If the parties are unable to agree on the issue of costs, I will accept two pages of written argument within 15 days of release of this judgment from the moving party (defendants) and the responding party will be al- lowed seven days thereafter to file their written argument on this issue. Motion granted. Watson v. TrojanOne Ltd. 149
[Indexed as: Watson v. TrojanOne Ltd.] Gary Watson, Plaintiff and TrojanOne Ltd., Mark Harrison and Graham Lee, Defendants Ontario Superior Court of Justice Docket: CV-15-534821 2016 ONSC 2740 Perell J. Heard: April 19, 2016 Judgment: April 25, 2016 Business associations –––– Specific matters of corporate organization — Di- rectors and officers — Liabilities — Miscellaneous –––– Plaintiff employee alleged that he was subjected to pattern of harassing and bullying conduct by defendant officers of defendant corporate employer such that he was unable to continue working in hostile and poisoned work environment — Employee brought action against defendants, including with claim that outrageous conduct of officers constituted separate actionable wrong that deserved censure — Of- ficers brought motion for relief, including to strike out action as against them on basis that claim was properly only against employer — Motion dismissed — Of- ficer of corporation could be separately liable if officer engaged in his or her own tortious conduct for his or her own purposes independent of purposes of corporation — While pleading did not explicitly mention tort of intentional in- fliction of mental distress, elements of tort were present — Employee alleged independent wrongdoing by officers and claim against them should not be struck out. Civil practice and procedure –––– Pleadings — Application for particu- lars — Grounds for refusal — Knowledge of applicant –––– Plaintiff em- ployee alleged that he was subjected to pattern of harassing and bullying con- duct by defendant officers of defendant corporate employer such that he was unable to continue working in hostile and poisoned work environment — Em- ployee brought action against defendants — Officers brought motion for relief, including demand for particulars — Motion dismissed — Order for particulars was discretionary and must be just in circumstances of case — Officers did not depose that they needed particulars to plead, and they could not say that facts were outside their own knowledge as allegations concerned their conduct — Of- ficer had not made out case for particulars — Most of requests were matter for examinations for discovery and were not proper demand for particulars. 150 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Cases considered by Perell J.: Big Green Property Services Ltd. v. Guelph Campus Co-operative (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 4639, 78 O.R. (3d) 775, [2005] O.J. No. 4082 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Correia v. Canac Kitchens (2008), 2008 ONCA 506, 2008 CarswellOnt 3712, 67 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 294 D.L.R. (4th) 525, 58 C.C.L.T. (3d) 29, 91 O.R. (3d) 353, 240 O.A.C. 153, [2008] O.J. No. 2497, 2009 C.L.L.C. 210-001 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Fairbairn v. Sage (1925), 56 O.L.R. 462, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 536, 1925 Carswell- Ont 199 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Hino Motors Canada Ltd. v. Kell (2010), 2010 ONSC 1329, 2010 CarswellOnt 1595, [2010] O.J. No. 1105 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. (1995), 129 D.L.R. (4th) 711, 9 C.C.L.S. 97, 23 B.L.R. (2d) 165, 87 O.A.C. 129, (sub nom. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. v. Peoples Jewellers Ltd.) 26 O.R. (3d) 481, 1995 Cars- wellOnt 1203, [1995] O.J. No. 3556 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Normart Management Ltd. v. West Hill Redevelopment Co. (1998), 155 D.L.R. (4th) 627, 37 O.R. (3d) 97, 1998 CarswellOnt 251, 17 C.P.C. (4th) 170, [1998] O.J. No. 391, 113 O.A.C. 375, 41 C.C.L.T. (2d) 282 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Ontario v. Rothmans Inc. (2016), 2016 ONSC 59, 2016 CarswellOnt 567 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to Physicians Services Inc. v. Cass (1971), [1971] 2 O.R. 626, 1971 CarswellOnt 655, [1971] O.J. No. 1561 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Piresferreira v. Ayotte (2010), 2010 ONCA 384, 2010 CarswellOnt 3551, 82 C.C.E.L. (3d) 14, 74 C.C.L.T. (3d) 163, [2010] O.J. No. 2224, 2010 C.L.L.C. 210-037, 263 O.A.C. 347, 319 D.L.R. (4th) 665 (Ont. C.A.) — re- ferred to Said v. Butt (1920), [1920] 3 K.B. 497, [1920] All E.R. Rep. 232, 90 L.J.K.B. 239, 124 L.T. 413 (Eng. K.B.) — considered Schembri v. Way (2012), 2012 ONCA 620, 2012 CarswellOnt 11632, 112 O.R. (2d) 241, 7 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to Steiner v. Lindzon (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 122, 1 C.P.C. 237, 1976 CarswellOnt 296, [1976] O.J. No. 2301 (Ont. H.C.) — referred to
MOTION by defendant officers of defendant employer to strike out plaintiff em- ployee’s action as against them personally or to demand particulars.
Lia Moody, for Plaintiff Peter-Paul E. Du Vernet, for Defendants Watson v. TrojanOne Ltd. Perell J. 151
Perell J.:
1 In an employment law action commenced as a simplified procedure, although for amounts in excess of the monetary limits for a simplified procedure, Gary Watson sues TrojanOne Ltd., his former employer, Mark Harrison, who is TrojanOne’s President and CEO, and Graham Lee, who is TrojanOne’s Chief Creative Officer. Mr. Harrison and Mr. Lee move to have the action against them struck out and dismissed. 2 Mr. Watson commenced his action on August 20, 2015. The Defend- ants have yet to deliver a Statement of Defence. On September 3, 2015, the Defendants served a Demand for Particulars with approximately 100 questions. On September 18, 2015, Mr. Watson provided a Response to Demand for Particulars. Some questions were answered with others re- fused with the explanation that the question was improper as a fishing expedition or as a request for evidence. The Defendants took the position that the Response was inadequate, and despite further particulars later being provided, the Defendants persist in demanding still more particulars. 3 Messrs. Harrison’s and Lee’s motion to strike is a variant of the well- worn pleadings motion argument that when the plaintiff’s cause of action (which in the immediate case is a constructive dismissal claim) is against a corporation (which in the immediate case is a corporate employer), the plaintiff does not have a claim against the officers of the corporation (which in the immediate case are Messrs. Harrison and Lee). 4 This venerable argument is based on the law associated with the sepa- rate legal status of a corporation from its owners and managers and with the Rule from Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (Eng. K.B.). At common law, the officers of a corporation are not liable for what they do within their authority and on behalf of their corporation, but subject to the Rule in Said v. Butt, they are liable to the plaintiff in an action against the corporation, if there is some conduct on the officer’s part that is either tortious in itself or that is independent misconduct from that of the corpo- ration: Normart Management Ltd. v. West Hill Redevelopment Co. (1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.); Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. ScotiaMcLeod Inc. (1995), 26 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.); Schembri v. Way, 2012 ONCA 620 (Ont. C.A.). 5 The Rule in Said v. Butt concerns the tort of inducing breach of con- tract, and the rule is that in the absence of separate conduct which is mala fide and against the best interests of the corporation, a corporate 152 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
officer or employee may not be sued for inducing breach of contract where a claim for breach of contract is available against the corporation: Hino Motors Canada Ltd. v. Kell, 2010 ONSC 1329 (Ont. S.C.J. [Com- mercial List]) at para. 23. 6 Thus, an officer of a corporation can be separately liable, if the of- ficer engaged in his or her own tortious conduct or for his or her own purposes independent of the purposes of the corporation; however, the pleading against the officer of a corporation must address specifically the cause of action asserted against the officer and explain why he or she is being sued separately from the corporation: Schembri v. Way, supra at paras. 29-32. 7 I shall set out the pleadings that focus on Messrs. Harrison’s and Lee’s conduct below. Before doing so, I foreshadow to say that my read- ing of the Statement of Claim does not reveal any reason to strike out the claim against them. As I read Mr. Watson’s Statement of Claim, Troja- nOne is being sued for breach of an employment contract, but Messrs. Harrison and Lee are not being sued for the tort of inducing the breach of that employment contract; rather they are being sued for misconduct on their own part that is either tortious in itself or is independent misconduct from that of the corporation. As pleaded, Messrs. Harrison’s and Lee’s conduct was within the scope of their employment, for which TrojanOne is responsible, and Messrs. Harrison’s and Lee’s conduct is also indepen- dently actionable. 8 For present purposes, which include determining the motion to strike and also the request for particulars, the pertinent paragraphs of the State- ment of Claim are paragraphs 1-5, 9-12, 15-22, and 40-42, which state: 1. The plaintiff claims against the defendants or any of them: (a) $100,000.00 for damages for wrongful dismissal dur- ing the applicable notice period; (b) $10,000.00 for damages for the loss of group benefits during the applicable notice period, the particulars of which will be provided prior to or at trial; (c) $50,000.00 for damages for breach of contract; (d) $100,000.00 for damages for breach of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990 c. H.19, and/or the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.1, for bullying, harassment and the creation of a poisoned work environment; Watson v. TrojanOne Ltd. Perell J. 153
(e) $50,000.00 for damages for breach of the defendants’ common law duty to act honestly in the performance of their contractual obligations owed to the plaintiff; (f) $10,000.00 for damages for mental distress; (g) $250,000.00 for aggravated and punitive damages; ... The Parties 2. The plaintiff, Gary Watson (“Gary”), is 51 years of age. Gary and his family reside in the City of Oakville, in the Province of Ontario. 3. The corporate defendant, TrojanOne Ltd. (the “defendant” or “TrojanOne”), is a company incorporated pursuant to the laws of On- tario. TrojanOne is primarily engaged in the business of, inter alia, marketing and public relations, and has its headquarters in Toronto, Ontario. The defendant is a national enterprise, with offices in both Montreal, Quebec and Vancouver, British Columbia. 4. The individual defendant Mark Harrison is the President and CEO of TrojanOne. The individual defendant Graham Lee is the Chief Creative Officer of TrojanOne. Background 5. Gary commenced employment with the defendant on or about Au- gust 11, 2014. He was employed in the executive capacity of Execu- tive Creative Director, reporting directly to the defendant’s President...... Harassment and Creation of Poisoned Work Environment 9. In or around October 2014, shortly after Gary had commenced em- ployment, he began to be subjected to a pattern of harassing and bul- lying conduct by the defendant’s senior management, Mark Harrison (“Harrison”) and Graham Lee (“Lee”). 10. Gary states, and the fact is, that from October 2014 to on or about June 3, 2015, the individual defendants engendered a poisoned work environment by making racially insensitive, homophobic and sexist remarks, and by engaging in abusive and harassing behaviour, which included but was not limited to the following: (a) October 2014 - Gary was approached by Harrison, who said, “I heard you shit the bed at Mattel”, or words to that effect, in reference to a client meeting a day earlier. When Gary asked Harrison if he had read the presentation deck, Harrison threatened him. 154 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
(b) November 2014 - In a leadership team meeting, Gary queried why the defendant did not have a standardized template for presentations. In response to Gary’s rea- sonable question (a question which, Gary states, he was required to ask in his executive position), Lee be- rated Gary in front of the leadership team, asking: “‘What fucking right do you have to come in here af- ter 3 months and start criticizing our decks?” Lee then launched into an abusive and intimidating tirade. (c) Late November 2014 - During a one-on-one meeting with Harrison that was completely unrelated to Gary or Gary’s performance as Executive Creative Direc- tor, Harrison advised Gary that one of his former cli- ents at a previous agency had warned Harrison from touching Gary with a “ten foot pole”. (d) Late 2014 - During a discussion on a Nissan project, Harrison made the comment, “Everyone knows Asians can’t drive”, or words to that effect, with an Asian employee in attendance. (e) January 2015 - During a status meeting with senior staff, the Creative Traffic Manager (who is Jewish) advised that she was able to save money on an indus- try award show. Harrison responded, in front of senior staff, that that was “very Jewish” of her. (f) Early February 2015 - During a status meeting with senior staff, Harrison berated an employee for not having changed his voicemail from the one that he was using over the holiday period, stating “Change your fucking voicemail”, or words to that effect. With respect to the fact that this employee had mentioned that he was away with his girlfriend over the holiday period, Lee remarked that he only did so in order to ensure that those who called knew he “wasn’t gay”. (g) In a team meeting with several women present, Harri- son said “I’m Jewish in the front and black in the back”, referring to his genitalia. 11. In addition to the above, Gary states, and the fact is, that his role as Executive [Creative Director] was consistently undermined by Harrison, who regularly belittled him in front of senior agency personnel. 12. On account of the poisoned and hostile work environment that Gary was forced to work within, Gary began to suffer from severe Watson v. TrojanOne Ltd. Perell J. 155
anxiety and depression, for which he sought and received medical treatment and therapy. ... Constructive Dismissal 15. The harassing, insensitive and illegal conduct of the defendant’s senior management culminated in the events of June 3, 2015. Gary was a witness to a boardroom meeting, although not participating di- rectly, where several other TrojanOne employees, including Lee and the Creative Traffic Manager, were seated around a table. At one point in the meeting Lee threatened those around the table that “I like to beat people down until they leave”. Gary was appalled by this. As a direct result of spending the previous 9 months in an increasingly poisoned and hostile work environment, Gary sent a private text mes- sage to the Creative Traffic Manager questioning the appropriateness of Lee’s comment. Lee managed to read this private message and charged towards Gary’s desk. He purposely got as physically close to Gary as possible yelling “If you have something to say to me, say it to my face you little fucking prick”. When Gary requested that they go somewhere private to speak, Lee replied “I am fed up with your fucking bullshit” and walked away. This altercation took place in front of a number of employees that reported directly to Gary. 16. As a result of this public altercation in which Gary was physi- cally threatened and verbally abused, Gary was unable to continue working and was forced by the defendants’ conduct to take a leave of absence immediately for medical reasons. 17. Gary states, and the fact is, that the events of June 3, 2015, cou- pled with the poisoned and hostile work environment created by the individual defendants over the prior 9 months of Gary’s employment, clearly demonstrated that TrojanOne no longer intended to be bound by its contract of employment with Gary. 18. Gary pleads that the defendant failed to adequately prevent and/or respond to harassment in the workplace, and that, in fact, the poisonous work environment was perpetuated by the very individuals charged with keeping the workplace free from harassment. On ac- count of the fact that these individuals were also Gary’s direct superi- ors, Gary felt increasingly uncomfortable, anxious and distressed as a result of their actions. After 9 months of harassing and hostile beha- viour culminated in being publicly berated and sworn at in front his peers and subordinates, Gary no longer believed that a future em- ployment relationship was tenable. 156 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
19. Gary therefore pleads that the defendants’ actions and omissions as described above contravened essential terms of his employment, resulting in a constructive dismissal. 20. Gary pleads that [at] all material times the individual defendants were acting within their capacity as agents of the corporate defen- dant. Accordingly, TrojanOne is vicariously liable for damages caused to Gary by their misconduct. In the alternative, if the indivi- dual defendants or either of them was acting outside the scope of their duties and responsibilities for the corporate defendant, then Gary pleads that they are individually liable for any damages caused to him by their misconduct. 21. Gary specifically pleads that there were no terms of employment, express or implied, which allowed the defendants to treat Gary in the way that they did, including their creation, tolerance, and/or exacer- bation of bullying and a toxic work environment. 22. As a result of the conduct of the defendants, as described above, it became impossible for Gary to continue his employment and he had no choice but to treat his employment as being terminated. ... Aggravated and Punitive Damages 40. Gary pleads that the defendants’ outrageous conduct constitutes a separate actionable wrong which is deserving of censure. The de- fendants treated Gary in a malicious, high-handed, arrogant and con- temptuous manner. Gary pleads that the defendants’ deliberate crea- tion and condonation of a poisoned work environment merits an award of punitive damages by this Honourable Court. 41. As such, Gary claims for aggravated and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.00. 42. Gary has taken, and continues to take, diligent steps to mitigate his damages. However, to date, Gary remains under medical care and has been unable to secure new employment. 9 In an argument with which I agree, Mr. Watson submits that although the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is not explicitly men- tioned, all of the constituent elements are present; namely: (1) the defen- dant’s actions are flagrant and outrageous; (2) the defendant intends to harm the plaintiff or the defendant knows that his or her conduct will cause harm; and, (3) the plaintiff suffers a visible and provable illness: Piresferreira v. Ayotte, 2010 ONCA 384 (Ont. C.A.); Correia v. Canac Kitchens, 2008 ONCA 506 (Ont. C.A.). Watson v. TrojanOne Ltd. Perell J. 157
10 In other words, Mr. Watson does indeed allege independent wrongdo- ing by Messrs. Harrison and Lee. The claim against them, therefore, should not be struck out. 11 I turn now to the matter of the Defendants’ Demand for Particulars, and I shall use Demand 1 from the Demand for Particulars as an example of the nature of the Defendants’ request for particularization; visualize: 1. Paragraph 10 (a): To provide particulars in respect of the allega- tions at paragraph 10(a) of the Statement of Claim, including: (a) What specific actions and/or statements on the part of Mark Harrison does the Plaintiff allege constituted a threat against the Plaintiff; (b) The specific date(s), time(s) and location(s) of the aforemen- tioned circumstances; (c) The names of the representatives of TrojanOne who were pre- sent during the alleged incident; and (d) Any other facts alleged to be supportive of paragraph 10(a) of the Statement of Claim. 12 Similar demands for particulars are made for paragraphs 10(b), (d), (e), 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, and 32 of the Statement of Claim. 13 An order for particulars is a discretionary order, and the court must be satisfied that the order is just in the circumstances of each case: Fairbairn v. Sage (1925), 56 O.L.R. 462 (Ont. C.A.) at 471. Particulars for pleadings are normally ordered only if: (a) they are not within the knowledge of the party demanding them; and (b) they are necessary to enable the other party to plead his or her response: Fairbairn v. Sage, supra; Physicians Services Inc. v. Cass, [1971] 2 O.R. 626 (Ont. C.A.). 14 In exercising their discretion to order particulars, the focus is on the parties’ ability to plead a response and the court takes a realistic and pragmatic approach that recognizes that not every claim is capable of being pleaded with the same degree of particularity and that subsequent stages in the litigation may clarify and narrow the issues: Ontario v. Rothmans Inc., 2016 ONSC 59 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 84. 15 The standard for particulars is the same for both ordinary actions and also actions governed by the rules for a simplified procedure: Big Green Property Services Ltd. v. Guelph Campus Co-operative (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 775 (Ont. S.C.J.). 16 A motion for particulars usually will not be granted unless the mov- ing party deposes that the particulars are not within his or her knowledge 158 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
and that they are needed to plead; however, a supporting affidavit is not required if the allegations are so general and bald that it is clear that particulars of them are necessary: Steiner v. Lindzon (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 122 (Ont. H.C.); Ontario v. Rothmans Inc., supra. 17 The Defendants have not deposed that they need particulars to plead, and since the allegations concern the conduct of Messrs. Harrison and Lee, they cannot say that the facts are outside their own knowledge. Put shortly, Messrs. Harrison and Lee have not made out a case for particu- lars. Most of the Defendants’ demands; for example, the requests for facts supportive of an allegation in the Statement of Claim, are a matter for examinations for discovery and are not a proper demand for particulars. 18 The Defendants’ request for particulars should be dismissed. 19 So far, I have not mentioned that the Defendants object to Mr. Wat- son’s claim as inappropriate for the simplified procedure because it ex- ceeds the monetary jurisdiction for a simplified procedure claim. The an- swer to this objection is already found within Rule 76 which makes the simplified procedure available in all cases subject to the defendant’s ob- jection, in which case, the action will proceed under the normal rules. In any event, the Defendants’ objection has no bearing on the demand for particulars or their motion to strike the claims as against Messrs. Harri- son and Lee. 20 For the above reasons, I dismiss the Defendants’ motion with costs of $3,000, all inclusive. Motion dismissed. Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. 159
[Indexed as: Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd.] Tammy Cooper, Complainant and Alberta Human Rights Commission (Director), Director and 133668899 Ltd. (o/a Best Western Strathmore Inn), Respondent Alberta Human Rights Tribunal Docket: S2010/12/0287 2015 AHRC 6 Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair Judgment: March 11, 2015 Human rights –––– What constitutes discrimination — Disability — Mental disability — Employment — Termination and layoff –––– Complainant em- ployee was employed as general manager of hotel owned by employer — Em- ployee gave employer medical note from doctor requesting immediate medical leave due to stress from working conditions — Employer reacted negatively to request, and at end of second discussion with employee, terminated employee’s employment — Employee was off work for one year, receiving employment in- surance medical benefits for two months — Employee brought complaint alleg- ing discrimination — Complaint allowed — Employer breached s. 7 of Alberta Human Rights Act — Employee showed prima facie case of discrimination — Employee suffered from medical disability, which was protected ground under Act — While stress may not constitute discrimination in some circumstances, in this case, doctor identified stress as mental illness — Employee experienced ad- verse impact as her employment relationship was terminated — There was nexus between employee’s mental disability and her employment relationship ending — Employer did not establish there was reasonable justification for their actions or that it accommodated employee to point of undue hardship — Em- ployee was awarded three months’ lost wages as of date her medical benefits ended and $15,000 in general damages. Human rights –––– Duty to accommodate — Undue hardship –––– Complain- ant employee was employed as general manager of hotel owned by employer — Employee gave employer medical note from doctor requesting immediate medi- cal leave due to stress from working conditions — Employer reacted negatively to request, and at end of second discussion with employee, terminated em- ployee’s employment — Employee was off work for one year, receiving em- ployment insurance medical benefits for two months — Employee brought com- plaint alleging discrimination — Complaint allowed — Employer breached s. 7 of Alberta Human Rights Act — Employee showed prima facie case of discrimi- nation — Employer did not establish there was reasonable justification for their 160 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th) actions — Employee did not quit, and her comments that she would not finish her shifts meant she was going on immediate leave, rather than quitting — Em- ployer did not show that it accommodated employee to point of undue hard- ship — While it was understandable that employer might overreact to temporary loss of their prime employee, employer had duty to discuss reasonable accom- modation with employee. Human rights –––– Remedies — Damages — Wage loss –––– Complainant employee was employed as general manager of hotel owned by employer — Employee gave employer medical note from doctor requesting immediate medi- cal leave due to stress from working conditions — Employer reacted negatively to request, and at end of second discussion with employee, terminated em- ployee’s employment — Employee was off work for one year, receiving em- ployment insurance (EI) medical benefits for two months — Employee brought complaint alleging discrimination — Complaint allowed — Employer breached s. 7 of Alberta Human Rights Act — Employee showed prima facie case of dis- crimination — Employer did not establish there was reasonable justification for their actions or that it accommodated employee to point of undue hardship — No lost wages were payable during two-month period when employee was on medical leave and receiving EI medical benefits — If employee had been al- lowed to return to hotel after her medical leave, she would have continued to work in her position for period of time — Employee was negatively affected by manner of termination which impacted her ability to work — It was not ac- cepted that employee was unable to work for full year due to psychological rea- sons — Employee was awarded three months’ lost wages as of date her medical benefits ended. Human rights –––– Remedies — Damages — General damages –––– Com- plainant employee was employed as general manager of hotel owned by em- ployer — Employee gave employer medical note from doctor requesting imme- diate medical leave due to stress from working conditions — Employer reacted negatively to request, and at end of second discussion with employee, termi- nated employee’s employment — Employee was off work for one year, receiv- ing employment insurance medical benefits for two months — Employee brought complaint alleging discrimination — Complaint allowed — Employer breached s. 7 of Alberta Human Rights Act — Employee showed prima facie case of discrimination — Employer did not establish there was reasonable justi- fication for their actions or that it accommodated employee to point of undue hardship — Given injury to dignity and self-respect that employee experienced, she was awarded $15,000 in general damages for pain and suffering — Em- ployer terminated employee’s employment in negative fashion significantly im- pacting employee — Purpose of general damages in human rights was not to punish respondent, but to put complainant back in place she would have been had there not been discrimination. Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. 161
Cases considered by Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair: Fuernkranz v. Smurfit-MBI (2004), 2004 AHRC 11 (Alta. H.R. & Cit. Comm.) — referred to M. v. Town of D. (2011), 2011 AHRC 4 (Alta. H.R.T.) — distinguished Matheson v. Okanagan Similkameen School District No. 53 (2009), 2009 BCHRT 112, 2009 CarswellBC 880, [2009] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 112 (B.C. Human Rights Trib.) — considered Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) (2012), 2012 SCC 61, 2012 CarswellBC 3446, 2012 CarswellBC 3447, 351 D.L.R. (4th) 451, [2012] 12 W.W.R. 637, 38 B.C.L.R. (5th) 1, 436 N.R. 152, (sub nom. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore) 328 B.C.A.C. 1, (sub nom. British Columbia (Ministry of Education) v. Moore) 558 W.A.C. 1, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360, 75 C.H.R.R. D/369, [2012] A.C.S. No. 61, [2012] S.C.J. No. 61 (S.C.C.) — followed O’Brien v. Phoenix Restorations Ltd. (2009), 2009 BCHRT 203, 2009 Car- swellBC 1605 (B.C. Human Rights Trib.) — referred to Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) c. Montr´eal (Ville) (2000), 2000 SCC 27, 2000 CarswellQue 649, 2000 Car- swellQue 650, (sub nom. Ville de Montr´eal v. Mercier) 2000 C.L.L.C. 230- 020, (sub nom. Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montreal (City)) 185 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 50 C.C.E.L. (2d) 247, [2000] L.V.I. 3115-1, (sub nom. Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montr´eal (Ville)) 253 N.R. 107, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665, (sub nom. Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) v. Montr´eal (City)) 74 C.R.R. (2d) 80, [2000] S.C.J. No. 24, 37 C.H.R.R. D/271 (S.C.C.) — referred to Renaud v. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 (1992), [1992] 6 W.W.R. 193, (sub nom. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud) 95 D.L.R. (4th) 577, (sub nom. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud) [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970, (sub nom. Renaud v. Board of Education of Central Okanagan No. 23) 13 B.C.A.C. 245, (sub nom. Renaud v. Board of Education of Central Okanagan No. 23) 24 W.A.C. 245, (sub nom. Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud) 92 C.L.L.C. 17,032, 141 N.R. 185, 71 B.C.L.R. (2d) 145, 1992 CarswellBC 257, 16 C.H.R.R. D/425, 1992 CarswellBC 910, [1992] S.C.J. No. 75, EYB 1992-67039 (S.C.C.) — followed Simpson v. Oil City Hospitality Inc. (2012), 75 C.H.R.R. D/330, 2012 AHRC 8, 2012 CarswellAlta 2420 (Alta. H.R.T.) — referred to Walsh v. Mobil Oil Canada (2013), 2013 ABCA 238, 2013 CarswellAlta 1109, [2013] 9 W.W.R. 56, 82 Alta. L.R. (5th) 146, 2013 C.L.L.C. 230-032, 553 A.R. 360, 583 W.A.C. 360, 364 D.L.R. (4th) 508, [2013] A.J. No. 695, 77 C.H.R.R. D/361 (Alta. C.A.) — referred to 162 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Statutes considered: Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5 Generally — referred to s. 7 — considered s. 7(1)(a) — considered s. 7(1)(b) — considered s. 29 — considered s. 44(1)(h) “mental disability” — considered Judgment Interest Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-1 Generally — referred to
HEARING of complaint by employee alleging discrimination by employer.
Tammy Cooper, for herself Jim Foster, for Director of Alberta Human Rights Commission Michael Aasen, for Respondent, 133668899 Ltd. (o/a Best Western Strathmore Inn)
Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair: Introduction 1 On December 1, 2010, the complainant, Ms. Tammy Cooper, made a complaint alleging that the respondent, Best Western Strathmore Inn (Best Western Strathmore or the Hotel) discriminated against her on the ground of mental disability in the area of employment practices contrary to section 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Alberta Human Rights Act, (the Act):1 7(1) No employer shall (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ any person, or (b) discriminate against any person with regard to em- ployment or any term or condition of employment, because of the race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical disa- bility, mental disability, age, ancestry, place of origin, marital status, source of income, family status or sexual orientation of that person or of any other person. 2 Ms. Cooper alleges that she was fired the same day that she told her employers, Mr. Mark (Sung) Lee and Ms. Jun Li, that she had been put on a medical leave of absence. Ms. Cooper says that her doctor put her
1 Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c.A-25.5 Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 163
on sick leave for stress, depression and insomnia. Ms. Cooper alleges that after speaking to her employers she was terminated and forbidden to return to the Best Western Strathmore property. 3 The respondent argues that it had agreed to let Ms. Cooper go on medical leave, but that she voluntarily quit after an argument over the phone. Mr. Lee says that Ms. Cooper’s husband swore at him, made ra- cist comments, and that this permanently damaged the em- ployer/employee relationship. 4 The director of the Alberta Human Rights Commission has carriage of this complaint pursuant to section 29 of the Act.
Issues Issue 1: Has Ms. Cooper established on the balance of probabilities that she was discriminated against on the basis of mental disability in the area of employment contrary to section 7(1)(a) and/or (b) of the Act? (a) Has Ms. Cooper established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of mental disability, in the area of employment? (b) If there was prima facie discrimination, has Best Western Strathmore shown that the discrimination did not occur, there was a reasonable justification for the discrimination or that it accom- modated the complainant to the point of undue hardship?
Issue 2: If section 7(1)(a) and/or (b) of the Act have been contravened, what is the appropriate remedy?
Background 5 The complainant adopted the director’s arguments. Director’s counsel called three witnesses to give evidence at the hearing: • Ms. Tammy Cooper, the complainant; • Ms. Maryellen Melville, the supervisor for housekeeping; and • Ms. Laura Sanderman, a front desk clerk. 6 The respondent called two witnesses to give evidence at the hearing: Best Western Strathmore owners and Ms. Cooper’s supervisors, Mr. Lee and Ms. Li. 7 Mr. Lee and Ms. Li are married and each own a 50 per cent share in the Best Western Strathmore. They also operate a Best Western hotel in 164 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Cold Lake. They bought the Best Western Strathmore in August 2007 and hired Ms. Cooper on July 14, 2008 as the general manager. The re- spondents live in Cold Lake and spend most of their time operating the Cold Lake Best Western. 8 Ms. Cooper had primary responsibility for the operation of the Best Western Strathmore, including overseeing all of the Hotel operations, hiring and firing employees, and supervision of staff. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li visited Ms. Cooper at the Hotel about two to four times between July 2008 and February 5, 2010. Mr. Lee and Ms. Cooper spoke on the phone every day regarding the operation of the Best Western Strathmore. 9 Ms. Cooper gave evidence that her duties as a general manager caused her to work long hours. The Hotel was not making money and so staff had been cut back. Ms. Cooper at times took on extra tasks in addi- tion to her managerial duties including housekeeping, servicing the breakfast buffet, shopping for food, painting and pool repair. The respon- dents say that the Best Western Strathmore was a small operation and the Hotel often had only a small portion of rooms booked. At other times, a group would book many rooms. This fluctuation meant that the general manager had to fill in where necessary. The Hotel was losing $250,000 to $290,000 per year in 2009 and 2010. 10 Ms. Cooper gave evidence that the long hours and stressful work at Best Western Strathmore was having an effect on her home life. She and her husband were not getting along and she was having difficulty sleep- ing. Ms. Cooper’s evidence was that she cried on the phone to Mr. Lee several times and told him that she could not handle the stress. She says that she asked for additional staffing at the Hotel, but Mr. Lee refused. 11 Ms. Cooper reported to Mr. Lee and mostly talked to Mr. Lee, and not Ms. Li, about the Hotel. Mr. Lee says that he does not remember a single time that Ms. Cooper cried on the phone to him or indicated that she was stressed. He says Ms. Cooper did not appear unhappy. Ms. Cooper did her job and took care of the Best Western Strathmore so that Mr. Lee and Ms. Li could concentrate on Cold Lake. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li gave evidence that Ms. Cooper was happy and positive when they visited her at the Hotel or spoke to her on the phone.
The complainant’s evidence regarding February 5, 2010 events 12 On February 5, 2010 Ms. Cooper made a doctor’s appointment be- cause she felt stressed and was having difficulty sleeping. She thought that the doctor might recommend some sleeping pills. However, Ms. Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 165
Cooper testified that when she arrived at the office she burst into tears for several minutes and was unable to explain the problem to her doctor. Dr. Greg Fitzgerald told Ms. Cooper that she should leave work on medi- cal disability. Dr. Fitzgerald did not testify. Ms. Cooper was given a medical note dated February 5, 2010 that said: “Off work Feb 10/10 due to medical illness (stress). Off till further notice.” (Dr. Fitzgerald’s Medi- cal Note) (Exhibit 4) 13 Ms. Cooper testified that she was given two medications on that first day, one for depression and one for insomnia. In preparation for the hear- ing Ms. Cooper also submitted a letter dated September 26, 2013 from Dr. Fitzgerald’s colleague, Dr. Jacqueline McDougall, who shares patient files with him at the Strathcona Family Medicine Centre. 14 Ms. Cooper left Dr. Fitzgerald’s office, filled her prescriptions and went back to the Hotel to fax the medical note to Mr. Lee in Cold Lake. She faxed the note and then called Mr. Lee to talk in person on the phone. She asked her colleagues Ms. Maryellen Melville and Mr. John McBain to listen in on the speaker phone to her conversation with Mr. Lee. Ms. Melville testified that she heard Mr. Lee ask several times if Ms. Cooper was quitting. Ms. Melville gave evidence that Ms. Cooper replied several times that she was not quitting. 15 Ms. Cooper spoke to Mr. Lee and Ms. Li again later that day on her mobile phone. Mr. Lee asked her if she was leaving. Ms. Cooper testified that she said she just needed some time to heal. She told Mr. Lee that she was not leaving. He asked when she would be returning and Ms. Cooper said that she was not sure. Ms. Cooper says that Mr. Lee then told her that he was “done” with her. He said that she could not enter the Hotel property again. Ms. Cooper asked for her Record of Employment (ROE) and Mr. Lee refused to send her one. At that point Ms. Cooper’s husband got on the phone and had a conversation with Mr. Lee. Ms. Cooper could not hear the entire conversation, but she testified that she did not hear her husband use any racial epitaphs. She agreed with Mr. Lee that it was a heated conversation.
The respondent’s evidence regarding February 5, 2010 events 16 Mr. Lee says that he had not seen the fax when he received a call from Ms. Cooper. He thought she was calling to talk about the Hotel and was very surprised to hear that she had to go on medical leave. 17 Ms. Li testified that, when she spoke to Ms. Cooper, she had only received the cover page of the faxed medical note (Fax Cover Page). Ms. 166 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
Li was in the middle of transitioning Best Western’s reservation system. When she read the Fax Cover Page she panicked. Ms. Li testified that all she saw was that Ms. Cooper’s last day was on February 9, 2010. 18 Mr. Lee testified that the Cold Lake Best Western makes 10 times the revenue of the Best Western Strathmore. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li already had many commitments: they were in the middle of installing a new reserva- tion system, Mr. Lee was overseeing an eight million dollar addition to the Cold Lake property, and their daughter was four years old and needed constant care. The respondents both said that they did not know how they could take care of the Best Western Strathmore without Ms. Cooper. Ms. Li found Mr. Lee and they decided to call the Hotel to see what Ms. Cooper had put in place for her absence. They testified that they spoke to the front desk clerk, Ms. Mary Jenkins, who said that two laundry employees had quit that day, two of the front desk agents were new to the job and Ms. Jenkins, herself, was leaving on a 10-day holiday that night. Ms. Li and Mr. Lee testified that they felt the Hotel was in a mess. 19 The respondent owners said that they called Ms. Cooper on her cell phone. Ms. Cooper answered and told them that she was not quitting but that she needed some time away for health reasons. Ms. Li testified that she felt relief that Ms. Cooper would be returning. Ms. Cooper could not tell them when she would return. Mr. Lee said that Ms. Cooper and he began to argue about a situation that had developed resulting in the two laundry employees quitting. Mr. Lee and Ms. Cooper had had an earlier disagreement about how to handle a situation of one of the laundry em- ployees potentially stealing tips. Mr. Lee testified that he said, “you are leaving this place in a... in an absolute mess.” 20 Mr. Lee says that is when Ms. Cooper got very upset. The respondent owners testified that Ms. Cooper then said that she might as well quit and she would not be coming in to complete her final shifts. Shortly after, Ms. Cooper’s husband, Mr. Cooper, took the phone and began to yell at Mr. Lee. Mr. Lee said that Mr. Cooper swore at him several times using the f-word. Mr. Lee alleges that Mr. Cooper used racial epitaphs. Mr. Lee then hung up the phone. 21 Mr. Lee called the Best Western Strathmore and told Ms. Jenkins to pack up Ms. Cooper’s personal items. He asked Ms. Jenkins not to let Ms. Cooper or her husband back onto the property. Mr. Lee says that he did not tell Ms. Jenkins that Ms. Cooper had been fired. Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 167
22 Mr. Lee testified that there was no chance to discuss Ms. Cooper’s medical leave further because she quit. Ms. Li felt that the em- ployer/employee relationship had been irreparably damaged by Mr. Cooper, who had sworn at them.
Evidence on events after the February 5, 2010 phone calls 23 Ms. Cooper went to the Best Western Strathmore to pick up her be- longings. Ms. Jenkins had packed up Ms. Cooper’s personal items and Ms. Jenkins asked her not to tell Mr. Lee that Ms. Jenkins had let Ms. Cooper back on the property. Mr. Lee testified that he had told Ms. Jen- kins not to let the Coopers back on the property because he feared what they would do to the property. 24 Within approximately two weeks Ms. Cooper received a ROE which claimed that she had quit. An employment standards officer approved her benefits as if Ms. Cooper’s employment had been terminated or she had been let go. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li appealed this decision and argued that Ms. Cooper had resigned from the Best Western Strathmore. On June 16, 2011 a Judge of the Provincial Court dismissed the appeal because there was not enough evidence to make a determination that Ms. Cooper had quit or resigned. 25 Ms. Cooper gave evidence that she stayed on Employment Insurance (EI) medical benefits from February 7, 2010 to April 10, 2010. She re- ceived further EI benefits from April 11, 2010 to January 11, 2011. On January 24, 2011 she found a job at 7-11 and worked part-time to full- time hours. In February 2011 she began an emergency responder pro- gram at the Southern Alberta Institute of Technology. She began work- ing part-time for Victim Services in March 2011 and moved to full-time in May 2011.
(a) Has Ms. Cooper established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of mental disability, in the area of employment? 26 As per Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education),2 Ms. Cooper must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination: ... to demonstrate prima facie discrimination, complainants are re- quired to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrim-
2 Moore v. British Columbia (Ministry of Education), [2012] 3 S.C.R. 360 (S.C.C.) at para 33 168 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
ination under the Code; that they experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the protected characteristic was a fac- tor in the adverse impact. 27 Once she has met this test, the evidentiary burden shifts to the respon- dent to show that there was no discrimination, a reasonable justification for the discrimination, or that the Best Western Strathmore accommo- dated Ms. Cooper to the point of undue hardship.
Step 1: Did Ms. Cooper have a characteristic protected under the Act? 28 The director argues that the complainant provided two doctor’s notes, which are sufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Cooper has a mental dis- ability protected under the Act. Ms. Cooper sent a note from her doctor, Dr. Fitzgerald, by fax to Mr. Lee and Ms. Li. It was dated February 5, 2010 and read: “Off work Feb 10/10 due to medical illness (stress). Off till further notice.” [Dr. Fitzgerald’s Medical Note] 29 Ms. Cooper further testified that she was prescribed sleeping medica- tion and anti-depressants at a February 5th, 2010 doctor’s appointment and returned for a follow-up appointment the week after that. 30 The respondent argues that Ms. Cooper has not met the first step of Moore, supra, and that she did not provide expert evidence that she had a medical illness under the Act. The respondent argues that Ms. Cooper suffered from the normal stress of a general manager position, but that this is not a mental disability.
Confirmation of medical disability 31 The definition of “mental disability” under section 44(1)(h) of the Act states: “mental disability” means any mental disorder, developmental disor- der or learning disorder, regardless of the cause or duration of the disorder; 32 The medical note from Dr. Fitzgerald, which was presented to Ms. Cooper’s employers, diagnosed her with a “medical illness (stress).” Considering the entirety of the information, I find that Ms. Cooper did suffer from a medical disability, which is a protected ground under the Act. In reaching this finding I have considered: • the specific wording of Dr. Fitzgerald’s note identified stress as a medical illness in Ms. Cooper’s situation, • Ms. Cooper’s evidence was that she also suffered from depression and insomnia at the time of the termination, and Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 169
• the information contained in Exhibit 10 confirmed that Ms. Cooper was on medical EI benefits until soon after the end of March 2010. 33 Ms. Cooper also provided additional information to the Tribunal from Dr. McDougall, a colleague of Dr. Fitzgerald’s. However, Dr. McDou- gall’s note is hearsay and I have not accorded it any significant weight in my deliberations. I note only that Dr. McDougall’s letter is generally consistent with Ms. Cooper’s testimony regarding her interactions with Dr. Fitzgerald and the diagnosis of extreme stress, depression and insomnia. 34 I also find that Ms. Cooper brings herself within the protection of the Act through the actions of Mr. Lee and Ms. Li, who clearly through their negative reaction and comments to Ms. Cooper’s request for stress leave perceived her to have a disability.3 The comments were not directed to inadequacy of medical information or doubt about the disability but rather to the news that Ms. Cooper had a medical issue and needed time off. Mr. Lee testified that he took her at her word that she needed to go on an immediate leave yet he responded with negative comments related particularly to her disability or perceived disability. While I acknowledge that the employer could have asked for further medical information after receiving Dr. Fitzgerald’s note, a contextual analysis which includes as- sessing the medical information that was provided as well as the actions of the employer upon receiving the information, is sufficient to support a medical disability or perceived disability protected under the Act. 35 I agree that “stress” in certain circumstances may not constitute a dis- ability for human rights purposes. However, the cases put forward by the respondent are clearly distinguishable. In Matheson v. Okanagan Similkameen School District No. 53,4 the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal noted that workplace stress resulting from an employer investigating performance problems or from problems with a supervisor is not enough on its own to constitute a disability. However, in Matheson the employee did not produce any medical information supporting her position to her employer. Here, Ms. Cooper provided a doctor’s note that
3 Qu´ebec (Commission des droits de la personne & des droits de la jeunesse) c. Montr´eal (Ville), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 665 (S.C.C.) 4 Matheson v. Okanagan Similkameen School District No. 53, 2009 BCHRT 112 (B.C. Human Rights Trib.) 170 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
identified stress as a mental illness and requested an accommodation; ad- ditional evidence was provided as to her depression and insomnia and Ms. Cooper was off on medical EI benefits for a significant period of time. 36 The respondent provided the Tribunal with two other cases to demon- strate that work-related stress is not a disability: Fuernkranz v. Smurfit- MBI,5 and O’Brien v. Phoenix Restorations Ltd.6 Fuernkranz addresses potential harassment in the workplace and not a claim of refusing accom- modation. Mr. Fuernkranz had been permitted by his employer to take medical stress leave. Fuernkranz does not go into any analysis regarding whether the complainant had a mental disability, and instead focuses on the disclosure of personal medical information in the workplace. O’Brien addresses a medical leave that was requested for having flu-like symp- toms for two weeks. These two cases are not helpful in determining whether Ms. Cooper has a mental disability covered under the Act. 37 The respondent also refers to M. v. Town of D.,7 a decision of the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal. In Town of D., the complainant, L.M., had a personality conflict with the director. L.M. went on an extended disability leave, but when she returned, her doctor said that she could only return to a position where she no longer worked with her supervisor. The Town of D. refused to grant her request. The Tribunal could not find any evidence that L.M.’s supervisor was being discriminatory, or any ev- idence that there was a nexus between such discrimination and a mental disability. 38 Again, the situation in Town of D. is distinguishable on the facts. The stress in Town of D. was related to workplace conflict with a supervisor and the issue of stress as a disability was not really fully examined due to the findings of no discrimination. 39 A review of the entire context of the series of events in Ms. Cooper’s complaint confirms that Ms. Cooper had a disability, and the respondent through their actions perceived her to have a disability, bringing her within the protected grounds of the Act.
5 Fuernkranz v. Smurfit-MBI, 2004 AHRC 11 (Alta. H.R. & Cit. Comm.) 6 O’Brien v. Phoenix Restorations Ltd., 2009 BCHRT 203 (B.C. Human Rights Trib.) 7 M. v. Town of D., 2011 AHRC 4 (Alta. H.R.T.) Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 171
Step 2: Did Ms. Cooper experience an adverse impact? 40 The employment relationship between Ms. Cooper and the Best Western Strathmore came to an end on February 5, 2010. Mr. Lee called Ms. Jenkins and told her to pack Ms. Cooper’s things and not permit her back on the property. Two weeks later Ms. Cooper received an ROE end- ing the employment relationship. Ms. Cooper experienced an adverse im- pact in being unable to continue her position as general manager of the Best Western Strathmore.
Step 3: Is there a link or nexus between the adverse impact and Ms. Cooper’s mental disability? 41 Ms. Cooper says that she was fired after she produced Dr. Fitzger- ald’s medical note stating that she needed some time off for a medical illness. The respondent says that Ms. Cooper quit and the employment relationship broke down after an argument on the phone. Both parties agree that Ms. Cooper faxed a medical note on February 5, 2010 to the Cold Lake Best Western, and then called Mr. Lee to confirm that he had received it (the First Phone Call). Mr. Lee accepted the note, at face value, that indicated Ms. Cooper needed immediate time off for medical reasons. 42 When Ms. Cooper first spoke to Mr. Lee about the medical note, Ms. Cooper asked Ms. Melville and a staff person named Mr. McBain, to listen in on the speaker phone. Ms. Cooper and Ms. Melville gave evi- dence that Mr. Lee asked several times if Ms. Cooper was quitting. Mr. Lee however testified that he did not ask Ms. Cooper if she was quitting. Mr. Lee and Ms. Cooper both gave evidence that no decisions were made during this First Phone Call and the parties hung up within a short period of time. 43 After the First Phone Call, Mr. Lee met up with Ms. Li, who had by now received the Fax Cover Page, but not the actual medical note. They sat down and called Ms. Melville at the front desk of the Best Western Strathmore to find out whether Ms. Cooper had made arrangements for her medical leave. Ms. Li said that at this point she had not even read the medical note, or spoke to Mr. Lee about it. Ms. Li had only read the Fax Cover Page that stated: Hi Jun and Mark. I had to go to the Dr today as I have been very upset because of the level of stress at work my doctor has requested that I go on medical leave immediately. My last day will be on Feb 9, 172 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
10 my note is enclosed. Can I have my ROE before Tuesday. Thanks and sorry for any inconvenience this may cause you (Exhibit 4) 44 Ms. Li had focused in on the words “... my last day will be on Feb 9, 10” and had panicked about how they would manage without Ms. Cooper. Ms. Li gave evidence that she only found out that Ms. Cooper would be returning when Mr. Lee and Ms. Li called Ms. Cooper on her mobile phone, immediately after the First Phone Call (the Second Phone Call). 45 During the Second Phone Call, Mr. Lee and Ms. Li were on speaker phone, but Mr. Lee did most of the talking. His evidence was that he opened the conversation by asking Ms. Cooper what was going on: “Mary tells me that things are not in good shape here. Can you please umm tell me ... tell me what’s going on?” Mr. Lee remembers that Ms. Cooper said that she had been given a doctor’s note. They spoke about the situation with the laundry staff. Mr. Lee responded that the staffing situation was not his fault and said: I think I said to her you know you’re ... you are leaving this place in a... in an absolute mess. Like you ... you know if you needed time to ... to heal yourself you should have talked to me prior to ... like I talk to you everyday. Like you ... like you didn’t mention anything of this. If you needed some time you know, you could have ... we could have talked about it ... We could have made arrangements. Jun and I could have ... you know come down and ... and relieved you but you know we first of all had to get ourselves ready in Cold Lake to do any of that stuff. So I told her that she is leaving it in a very irrespon- sible way. Then ... then that’s when she got really upset. Then she said to me after that ... uuuh she said to me well if that’s the way you feel then I’m not even going to come in this weekend to check out on things, to see if things are ok. 46 After that the conversation broke down. Mr. Lee says that Ms. Cooper demanded her ROE. 47 Ms. Cooper testified that Mr. Lee asked several times if she was quit- ting. She testified that he asked questions such as, “Are you serious” and she alleges that Mr. Lee called her “fucking crazy” and told her she should not take time off work, but should be seeing a psychiatrist. Ms. Cooper alleges that Mr. Lee told her that she was “done” and should not step on Hotel property again. At the end of the Second Phone Call it was obvious to Ms. Cooper that she had been fired because she had been told not to step on Hotel property again. Ms. Cooper testified that she had not quit. Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 173
48 I accept Ms. Cooper’s evidence that she did not quit. I also accept that there was a heated conversation during the Second Phone Call. However, I believe that the conversation became heated because of the reluctance of Mr. Lee and Ms. Li to accept that Ms. Cooper needed medical leave. 49 Mr. Lee’s actions of calling the Hotel front desk to tell them to pack Ms. Cooper’s things and then not permitting her back on the property was clearly related to her request for medical leave and Mr. Lee’s nega- tive reaction to the medical leave. Mr. Lee’s critical comments about leaving the Hotel “in a very irresponsible way” were also directly linked to Ms. Cooper’s request for medical leave and also support that the ad- verse actions were taken on the basis of perceived disability. 50 The director has met the onus of proving that there was a nexus be- tween Ms. Cooper’s mental disability and the employment relationship ending. Ms. Cooper produced a medical note requesting a leave, her em- ployer called to discuss the medical leave, and by the end of the conver- sation, Ms. Cooper was not permitted back on Hotel property. 51 The onus therefore shifts to the Best Western Strathmore to demon- strate that there was no discrimination, that there was a reasonable justifi- cation for its actions, or that it reasonably accommodated Ms. Cooper to the point of undue hardship.
(b) Has the Best Western Strathmore shown that the discrimination did not occur, there was a reasonable justification for the discrimination or that it accommodated the complainant to the point of undue hardship? 52 The respondent owners argued that there was a reasonable justifica- tion for their actions. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li said that Ms. Cooper quit and therefore they did not have an opportunity to accommodate her disability. 53 I find that Ms. Cooper did say that she would not come back to finish off her shifts. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li’s interpretation of this was that Ms. Cooper was quitting; however, in the overall context of the evidence and the information provided to them by Ms. Cooper, this was not a reasona- ble interpretation. I find that Ms. Cooper stating that she was not coming back to finish her shifts meant that she would go on medical leave imme- diately, not that she was quitting. During the First Phone Call, it was confirmed in Ms. Melville’s testimony that Mr. Lee asked Ms. Cooper again and again if this meant she was quitting. The evidence was that Ms. Cooper indicated she was not quitting. Ms. Li’s evidence of the Sec- 174 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
ond Phone Call was that Ms. Cooper said, “... if that’s how you feel, I might as well just quit” indicating a hopelessness, but in my view not a voluntary and firm intention to quit. Similarly I find that Ms. Cooper requesting her ROE was in the context of her already having been fired and needing the documentation, and was not said to inform Mr. Lee and Ms. Li that she was quitting. 54 The director called Ms. Sanderman as a witness to say that she had been told by Ms. Jenkins that Ms. Cooper had been fired. I have not placed any weight on this evidence given its hearsay nature and given that this information is only Ms. Jenkins’ interpretation of what she heard on the phone. 55 I accept Ms. Cooper’s evidence that she did not say she was quitting and I find that it was unreasonable, given the entirety of the circum- stances for Mr. Lee and Ms. Li to interpret the conversation as Ms. Cooper quitting her job. Ms. Cooper asked for accommodation, the evi- dence from all parties was that Mr. Lee was upset and not amenable to accommodation resulting in the escalation of the situation. I accept that Ms. Cooper did not quit and Mr. Lee’s actions of instructing Best West- ern Strathmore staff to refuse her entry to the property were not justified and indeed confirmed that Ms. Cooper’s employment had been termi- nated because of Ms. Cooper’s disability and request for medical leave.
Duty to accommodate 56 The respondent owners were aware that Ms. Cooper had provided a medical reason for needing time away from work. By Mr. Lee’s account, he and Ms. Li called the Best Western Strathmore to find out what plans Ms. Cooper had made to be away from work. Ms. Cooper’s absence was not a holiday or planned leave of absence. Ms. Cooper had gone to the doctor that morning expecting to be prescribed with sleeping pills, and instead was told to take a medical leave. Instead of discussing how Mr. Lee could accommodate Ms. Cooper’s medical absence from the Hotel, he said “... I told her that she is leaving it in a very irresponsible way.” He told her that arrangements could have been made and that he would have helped, but she was being irresponsible with how she was handling her medical absence. Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 175
57 Renaud v. Central Okanagan School District No. 238 states that the complainant must assist in the duty to accommodate. However it states that, “...the employer is in the best position to determine how the com- plainant can be accommodated without undue interference in the opera- tion of the employer’s business.” Ms. Cooper initiated a request for ac- commodation. The respondent owners had a duty to consider what accommodations could be permitted to the point of undue hardship. This could have included permitting her time off, providing her with an ROE for her to get medical benefits, or at the very least beginning a discussion regarding options and concerns. 58 Mr. Lee and Ms. Li are the owners of a large hotel in Cold Lake and a second hotel in Strathmore. As business owners it is expected that they would address a request for medical leave with a professional attitude, and look for a reasonable accommodation. Instead Mr. Lee accused Ms. Cooper of being irresponsible, leaving the Hotel in a mess, and said that she should have given more notice of her medical leave. Ms. Cooper had no more notice of her medical leave than what she had provided to the respondent. 59 It is understandable, given all of the responsibilities that Mr. Lee and Ms. Li had undertaken, that they might initially over react to the tempo- rary loss of their prime employee in Strathmore. Ms. Li testified that she panicked when she read the Fax Cover Page. Mr. Lee said that he blacked out for a moment when he found out that Ms. Cooper was leav- ing. However, once they had a chance to digest the information and even after they hung up from the Second Phone Call, they still had a duty to consider Ms. Cooper’s requested accommodation. They should have con- tacted her again, engaged in the “accommodation conversation,” assessed the requested time off and then reassessed upon her return, whether any employment issues needed to be addressed. 60 I find the comments filled out in the ROE by Mr. Lee and Ms. Li informative: Tammy Cooper quit without notice leaving the hotel and its staff in a bad situation. Cheque was withheld from her for the allowed 10 days as per Employment Standards.
8 Renaud v. Central Okanagan School District No. 23, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 (S.C.C.) at p 994. 176 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
61 Not only did Mr. Lee and Ms. Li act quickly to ban Ms. Cooper from the property, they did not stop later to consider their duties as an em- ployer. The respondent did not provide further evidence or arguments of how it accommodated Ms. Cooper to the point of undue hardship. Mr. Lee and Ms. Li readily admit that they did not discuss or consider ac- commodating Ms. Cooper because they did not proceed to that stage. 62 The Best Western Strathmore did not provide a reasonable justifica- tion for their conduct or show that it accommodated Ms. Cooper to the point of undue hardship.
Remedy 63 Section 32 of the Act provides that a Tribunal may order a remedy where it is found that a complaint has merit. The director asks for a mini- mum of $10,000 in damages for pain and suffering, plus Ms. Cooper’s loss of income for approximately 12 months. The director further re- quests the respondent employers to participate in an educational session on the duty to accommodate and for interest pursuant to the Judgment Interest Act.9 64 The respondent argues for a modest award of damages in the area of $3,000 for pain and suffering. The respondent says that Ms. Cooper has not provided medical evidence that she was unable to work for a full year after her medical leave began. The respondent argues that two months would be an appropriate amount for lost income. The respondent says that this is not an appropriate case for educational training because the discrimination was an isolated incident. 65 After termination Ms. Cooper said that she had to fight for every little thing. She was scared to apply for jobs in case she could not deal with a similar situation that arose while she was still on anti-depressants. She testified that the experience made her fearful of finding another position where she would have the same problems. She delayed finding work be- cause of this fear. 66 The evidence shows that Ms. Cooper was on medical benefits until the early April 2010. Ms. Cooper testified that she began working again approximately one year after she had been placed on sick leave. During her time off she looked around for a job but felt it would be unsafe to work. Cooper felt fearful returning to work and not being able to handle
9 Judgment Interest Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-1 Cooper v. 133668899 Ltd. Melissa L. Luhtanen, Chair 177
a stressful situation such as the one she had been through. She was wor- ried that she would be treated disrespectfully and she felt fragile. It was also difficult to find a job in Strathmore because there were not many businesses that were hiring. 67 Ms. Cooper was on medical EI benefits for two months. Without fur- ther medical evidence, I assess that Ms. Cooper’s medical leave of ap- proximately two months was necessary to address her original disabili- ties and as such I find that Ms. Cooper was not able to work during this time frame. Accordingly, no lost wages are payable over the time period of her medical leave. 68 In terms of when Ms. Cooper was able to return to the workforce I must balance several factors. I am convinced, given Ms. Cooper’s tenure with the Hotel and her important role, if she had been allowed to return to the Hotel after her disability leave, Ms. Cooper would have continued to work in her position for a period of time. 69 I also accept from Ms. Cooper’s evidence that she was significantly negatively affected for a period of time by the manner of the termination of her employment which directly impacted her ability to work and ob- tain a similar job. Damages can be awarded in this context.10 However, I cannot accept, without medical or other professional evidence that she was unable, for psychological reasons, to work for the full period of a year following the termination. Considering all of these factors I award three months’ lost wages calculated from April 10, 2010 onward; April 10, 2010 being the date at which her medical benefits appear to have ended. I have awarded only three months’ lost wages, as I believe, in addition to her two months of medical leave, Ms. Cooper, at that point, was medically well and could have mitigated her damages and found a replacement job. I note Ms. Cooper gave evidence that, had she been well, she could have obtained at least some hours at Victims’ Services where she had previously volunteered. 70 I request that counsel calculate the lost wages owed to Ms. Cooper based on gross income reflected in her T4 slip. Any repayment for EI benefits should be undertaken with EI. I retain jurisdiction to deal with any questions of calculation. 71 The purpose of general damages in human rights is not to punish the respondent, but to put the complainant back in the place she would have
10 Walsh v. Mobil Oil Canada, 2013 ABCA 238 (Alta. C.A.) 178 CANADIAN CASES ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 32 C.C.E.L. (4th)
been had there not been discrimination. The award of general damages is discretionary. I find, given the facts of this case and the injury to dignity and self-respect that Ms. Cooper experienced, she is entitled to $15,000 in damages for pain and suffering. The respondent owners terminated her employment in a negative fashion significantly impacting Ms. Cooper. This award is in line with similar awards in recent Alberta jurisprudence.11 72 While I understand how difficult it is to run two hotels in two differ- ent cities, employers must be knowledgeable about their human rights obligations. While I feel that an educational session would be a great advantage to Mr. Lee and Ms. Li and the two hotels they operate, I will only strongly recommend that they proceed with that of their own ac- cord. I therefore make no ruling regarding an educational session. 73 In addition to lost wages and general damages I order interest payable pursuant to the Judgment Interest Act: • on the lost wages over the awarded three-month time frame, cal- culated from the date the disability benefits ceased on April 10, 2010; • on the general damages award payable from the date of the contra- vention of the Act, being the date Ms. Cooper was fired February 5, 2010.
Decision 74 For all of the foregoing reasons I find that there is merit to the com- plaint, the respondent breached section 7 of the Act and I have awarded lost wages and damages as previously set out. Complaint allowed.
11 Simpson v. Oil City Hospitality Inc., 2012 AHRC 8 (Alta. H.R.T.)