Tough Love. Managerial State and Research Evaluation in Poland
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See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236596465 TOUGH LOVE. MANAGERIAL STATE AND RESEARCH EVALUATION IN POLAND Article · January 2010 CITATIONS READS 0 30 1 author: Dominik Antonowicz Nicolaus Copernicus University 95 PUBLICATIONS 823 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: High participation systems of higher education View project [IN POLISH] Ustawa 2.0 (Law 2.0) - Polish Higher Education Reforms View project All content following this page was uploaded by Dominik Antonowicz on 16 May 2014. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. Kultura i Edukacja 2010, No. 5 (79) ISSN 1230-266X Dominik Antonowicz TOUGH LOVE. MANAGERIAL STATE AND RESEARCH EVALUATION IN POLAND 1. Introduction In the beginning I would like to make two important points. First, the main idea behind this paper is to enrich the existing public discussion in Poland that insofar has taken place only within the academic community. By doing so, this paper takes the point of view of an average taxpayer because her/his point of view is largely miss- ing, which makes the debate incomplete. Secondly, the policy in science and higher education must take into account wider historical, political and economic context. Since now, most of the mainstream discussions on science and higher education have been completely decoupled from any wider context. Its only explanation was the assumption that science and higher education is so unique and notable that has to be read, treated and understood separately. Th e starting point of this paper is rather opposite. In order to understand the recent changes in scientifi c policy one needs to explore it from the perspective of an average tax-payer and see transformations of scientifi c policy as a wider project of the falling welfare state. 2. From welfare to managerial state. Political u-turn Th e evaluative model of scientifi c policy is an integral part of managerial state and liberal model of public policy. It was brought to mainstream politics with fi rst signs of the falling welfare-state model. Ideological foundation of managerial state and evaluative model of public policy were market mechanisms and consumers’ choic- Tough Love. Managerial State and Research Evaluation in Poland 45 es. Th e “market state” or “managerial state” revolutionized public policy in the USA and Western Europe (in particular the UK) in the beginning of the 80s. Th is un- precedented political u-turn had a major impact on the public realm. Th e manage- rial approach has a number of names such as “manageralism”; “new public manage- ment”, “market based public administration” , the post bureaucratic paradigm (or entrepreneurial government) or “entrepreneurial government” . Th e fi rst distinctive feature of the political u-turn in public policy involved separation steering from rowing. Th e government involvement does not always involve government provision trough bureaucratic means. In practice, it meant allowing private and non-profi t organizations to provide public services. In gen- eral, it was also related to the transfer of ideology and business techniques from the private sector to the public realm . It was built on an assumption that public aims could be equally delivered by public and private organizations. What really counts in the public realm is what works. Hence, it is outcomes, not ownership, which matter in the modern public service. Th erefore the traditional political de- bate about private and public ownership became no longer meaningful so long as the tasks are performed. It was a radical move in the context of the welfare-state that put strong emphasis on equal distribution of public service and process of provisions services. It was more process oriented that outcomes-oriented perform- ance. Th e introduction of the liberal public policy was a necessary measure to undertake in order to rescue a falling welfare state and stop further economic downfall. It led to establishment of market mechanisms in order to direct public organizations in three major directions Effi ciency, Economy, Eff ectiveness (3E) pushing to a far reaching austerity in public spending but also critical approach to existing means of funding public sector . Th e second major feature of the transformation from the welfare-state to the managerial one was to direct the spotlight on the accountability of public sector institutions. Any public institutions or institutions that deliver public goals must be ready to justify tax-payers money spent on them. But as shows, the principal– agent problem or agency dilemma interests of both sides can be very diff erent or sometimes contradictory. Th e fi scal responsibility was obligatory to all public sec- tor organizations, but accountability involves much more than just correct alloca- tion of fi nancial resources. It puts strong emphasis on eff ective and effi cient use of public fi nancial resources. Accountability replaced institutional trust typical for the welfare-state, in which government (on behalf of taxpayers) let public institutions do their best in order to achieve what is required from them. In higher education a symbol of institutional trust became the British University Grant Committee founded in 1919 by the Ministry of Treasure. It was an independent agency estab- 46 Dominik Antonowicz lished to provide funding for higher education institutions. From the very begin- ning it was a means to channel funds to universities according to unknown criteria. Th e UGC’s role at this time was to examine the fi nancial needs of the universities and to advise on grants. But it did not have a permit to plan for the development of universities. It was believed that if universities had known the fi nancial algo- rithm they might have changed their activities, violated institutional autonomy and academic freedom. In the past universities did not have to be accountable because as professional organizations they enjoyed a high degree of public trust. In gen- eral it was believed that universities know best for and how to spend public mon- ey. Neither the government, nor UGC interfere in universities’ performance, inter- nal aff airs or balance between teaching and research. Nobody dares question the ethics and professional integrity of the academic profession. But in the postwar decades – initially unconditional – trust gradually became questioned because radical increase of the number of higher education institutions forced the govern- ment to be more economic in planning public spending on research. Th e third feature, and a natural consequence of the liberal u-turn in public policy was application of a simple rule who pays the piper called the tune. Institu- tional trust and generosity of welfare state was replaced by contractual relationship and market mechanisms that should have provided effi ciency and eff ectiveness. Th e government contracted out various services and introduced compulsory ten- dering in the public sector, there was clearly a room and need for institutional mechanisms that would secure public interest. Th is form of relations between the government and public sector institutions can be defi ned as quasi-market relations or state’s managed market. In contrast to welfare state, the managerial state develop public policy that could be characterized as goal-oriented and with a strong pres- sure on public accountability. Th is led to introduction of that evaluative mecha- nisms in order to secure public interest and help to achieve public goals. Decen- tralization of the state and contracting out public services requires better outcomes control. Th e managerial state became an anti-welfare state more distrustful toward its institutions. Eff ectiveness, effi ciency and control of public spending became key drivers for the change in public policy. Aft er the policies of the golden age of expansion, European welfare states have been shaped by the “politics of austerity”. Th e rhetoric of a “crisis” in the welfare state has been developed since the 1970s. From this time we have observed radical fi scal reforms, modernization of government and the end of the welfare state as we know it. Th e balance between state and market in meeting people’s needs (so far met by public sector healthcare and pensions, and possibly including education) shift ed towards the market. Following the changes in the model of a state, public Tough Love. Managerial State and Research Evaluation in Poland 47 policy in science and higher education turned into a more competitive model, in which the central role was attached to evaluative mechanisms. 3. Evaluation as an instrument of scientific policy Th e policy of institutional trust of the welfare-state does not pay any special attention to the achievement of results. Universities used to be self-governing and autonomous organizations, free to set their own missions, goals and agendas. Th e government, taxpayers had little impact on their activities but this kind of policy was possible when research was conducted in a few universities by a small number of academics. Spending on research was so insignifi cant in the national budget that there was no use paying too much attention to what they were spent on. Th e research (in particu- lar conducted at universities) did not have a great impact on the economic develop- ment. It was mostly basic research that did not aff ect the world outside the ivory tower. Since 1960s the fi nancial expectations of a growing number of higher educa- tion institutions has gone up rapidly and they exceeded national budget limits. Th ere was a number of social processes that had a major impact on revolution of policy of institutional trust. It was (a) massifi cation of research activity, (b) in- crease in the instrumental role of research conduct at universities and research institutes, (c) growing pressure on accountability of higher education institutions.