doi:10.5477/cis/reis.148.79 Goodbye to Competitive in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis ¿Adiós al corporatismo competitivo en España? Pactos sociales y conflicto en la crisis económica

Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona

Key words Abstract Employers The economic crisis has placed the corporatist framework in Spain Associations under significant strain. Labour unrest has also intensified, shifting to • Labor Disputes the political arena and threatening to overwhelm existing institutional • Corporatism channels. This article evaluates the tendencies toward consensus and • Economic Crisis conflict in democratic Spain, examining the theoretical debate on the • competitive reorientation of national models of corporatism in Southern • Labor Policy Europe within the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). • Unions In addition, it examines the symptoms of erosion in the Spanish corporatist experience within a scenario of economic crisis. The article emphasizes the underlying continuity in the political exchange between government and social partners and concludes that, despite the deterioration of social dialogue, the mechanisms for the production of social pacts in Spain have not completely fractured, and there are possibilities for their reactivation.

Palabras clave Resumen Asociaciones de La crisis económica ha erosionado el marco corporatista para la empresarios producción de políticas socioeconómicas, laborales y de bienestar en • Conflictos laborales España. La conflictividad socio-laboral también se ha visto • Corporatismo intensificada, registrando un desplazamiento hacia el ámbito político y • Crisis económica amenazando con desbordar sus mecanismos de encauzado • Negociación colectiva institucional. El artículo evalúa las tendencias de consenso y conflicto • Política laboral en la España democrática, revisando el debate teórico sobre la • Sindicatos reorientación competitiva de los modelos nacionales de corporatismo en el sur de Europa en el contexto de la Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM). Asimismo, examina los síntomas de desgaste de la experiencia corporatista española dentro del escenario de crisis económica. El artículo subraya la continuidad subyacente del intercambio político entre gobierno y agentes sociales y concluye que, a pesar de su deterioro, el dispositivo de producción de pactos sociales en España no ha llegado a fracturarse y dispone de posibilidades de reactivación. Citation González Begega, Sergio and Luque Balbona, David, (2014). “Goodbye to Competitive Corporatism in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis”.Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 148: 79-102. (http://dx.doi.org/10.5477/cis/reis.148.79)

Sergio González Begega: Universidad de Oviedo | [email protected] David Luque Balbona: Universidad de Oviedo | [email protected]

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 80 Goodbye to Competitive Corporatism in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis

of the economic crisis (2008-2013). The wor- Introduction1 king hypothesis is the underlying continuity The existence of corporatist mechanisms of Spanish corporatism, conceived as a pro- has been one of the identifying elements de- cess of political exchange, even in conditions termining political processes in the majority of tension, such as we find in the current pe- of Western European countries, albeit with riod of crisis. Concretely, the article will exa- different national approaches. The search for mine whether the explanatory frameworks consensus between government and social available regarding corporatist exchange are partners through the negotiation of social effective in characterizing the Spanish cor- pacts has served to channel conflict and has poratist model, or if, on the contrary, they facilitated the development of a stable fra- have lost usefulness. To do this, we will eva- mework for labour relations in Spain and luate the performance of the corporatist sys- other European countries. The creation of a tem in Spain, giving special attention to the corporatist social compact, aimed at promo- most recent stage of competitive corpora- ting long term reforms, constituted a com- tism. The current economic crisis threatens mon process in Spain and other European the coherency of the model of exchange or countries that were transitioning toward de- dialogue that has characterized the relation- mocracy in the 1970s. The experiences of ship between governments and social part- competitive corporatism undertaken two de- ners since the decade of the 1990s. The exis- cades later to arrive at an agreed upon agen- tence of ample participatory experience da for the reform of the state, the la- among social partners in processes of policy formulation has not prevented the gradual bour market and the distribution of income in abandonment, beginning in 2010, of the the context of the Economic and Monetary orientation toward consensus and the inten- Union (EMU), involved the redefinition of the sification of conflict. forms of dialogue under new political and economic challenges. The reactivation of so- In this article we will first review the diffe- cial pacts in the 1990s introduced important rent concepts of neo-corporatism, from its changes in national models of corporatism. initial formulations in the decade of the 1970s At the same time, it established the basis for to the more recent critical approaches explai- a process of political exchange between go- ning the evolution in forms of political ex- vernments and social partners, which, under change between governments and social different institutional configurations, relations partners in Europe. The second section ad- between partners, and different content de- dresses the functionality, objectives and sta- ges of Spain’s experience with corporatism, pending on the country, has revealed a high understood as a system for the production of degree of consistency and continuity within social pacts and as a political process chan- the EMU. nelling labour conflicts. The third section This article examines the stability of the analyses the redefinition of Spanish corpora- Spanish corporatist model within the context tism as competitive corporatism in the 1990s, relating this transformation with the changes that affected corporatist mechanisms in 1 This article forms part of the CABISE research project other European countries within the pre-EMU (Welfare in Southern Europe: a Comparative Analysis) corresponding to Spain’s National Plan for environment. In addition, we assess the con- R+D+i (ref. CSO2012-33976). The authors wish to ex- tinuity of the logic of political exchange bet- press their thanks for the valuable comments made re- ween governments and social partners, des- garding previous versions of this text by Ana Marta Guillén Rodríguez, Holm-Detlev Köhler and Miguel Mar- pite external changes in the institutional tínez Lucio. framework. The fourth section examines the

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 81 impact of the economic crisis on Spanish gories, recognized or licensed (if not created) corporatism, addressing the slowdown in the by the state and granted a deliberate repre- production of social pacts and the risk of sentational monopoly within their respective their breakdown as a consequence of the categories in exchange for observing certain increase in conflict. In the conclusion we dis- controls on their selection of leaders and arti- cuss the underlying continuity of Spanish culation of demands and supports.” corporatism in the context of the economic Beyond this definition, one of the central crisis and address the possibility of its reac- characteristics of corporatism as a system of tivation in the face of rising erosive tensions. exchange between private interests and the state is its capacity to exist in multiple forms and to evolve. As Schmitter indicates (1974: Conceptual and interpretative 92) “[Corporatism is] a concrete, observable challenges: what type and how general system of interest representation many corporatisms which is “compatible” with several different The idea of neo-corporatism or democratic regime-types”. As a result, national corpora- corporatism refers to institutional arrange- tist experiences have acquired their own ments intended to accommodate interest traits in function of the public decision-ma- groups representing civil society in public king sphere in question or the specific num- decision-making. Beyond doubts about the ber and objectives of the participating actors, constitutional and democratic legitimacy of and they present themselves as unique mechanisms for formulating policy that pro- constructions. vide specific private actors access to the po- The political space most often associated litical arena (Habermas, 1989), neo-corpora- with the existence of corporatist practices is tism has been highly functional in channelling the socioeconomic agenda. During the se- conflict and guaranteeing social consensus, cond half of the 20th century, the design of especially under challenging political and policies related to the distribution of income, economic conditions. the labour market and welfare in the majority The term, neo-corporatism, was coined of democratic countries in Europe was sup- to differentiate the experience of the partici- ported by corporatist experiences of greater pation of civil society organizations under a or lesser ambition and intensity. The existen- democratic political system from other histo- ce of corporatist support after making deci- rical forms of accommodating private inter- sions regarding socioeconomic issues is one ests in the structure of the state (Solé, 1990: of the main characteristics of coordinated 51). Schmitter has explained the historical capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001).2 mutation of corporatism as as a result of a The conceptual richness of the term cor- shift from forms of state-based exchange to poratism is not only a result of its diverse others that are socially based, while Lehm- national forms (Molina and Rhodes, 2002). bruch has interpreted it as a process substi- The notion of corporatism encompasses the tuting authoritarian corporatism with liberal institutional structures that accommodate corporatism (Colom González, 1993: 105). exchange between actors, this exchange Schmitter himself (1974: 93-94) defined neo-corporatism as “a system of interest re- presentation in which the constituent units are 2 The existence of a symbiotic relationship between the organized into a limited number of singular, modern capitalist system and formulas of a corporatist political nature are noted in an intuitive, though not sys- compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically tematic, manner in the seminal work in the literature on ordered and functionally differentiated cate- varieties of capitalism (Shonfield, 1965).

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 82 Goodbye to Competitive Corporatism in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis itself, conceived as a political process, and specific to advanced industrial societies” the results that it is capable of generating in (Rodríguez Cabrero, 1985: 86). the form of a social pact. Each one of these Corporatism thus becomes an institutio- elements constitutes a separate factor of nal solution for channelling conflict, which is analysis within corporatist literature, “[which] normalized as a strategy for mobilizing re- has shown a tendency to conflate a number sources of influence within political exchan- of questions that it would be best to keep ge (Colom González, 1993). Conflict, once separate” (Baccaro and Simoni, 2008: 1323). institutionally ordered through instruments The differentiation between corporatist for the expression of discontent, such as the structure and political process allows us to strike, does not introduce risks of rupture, identify two interpretive currents regarding nor does it involve questioning the consen- the operative logic and results of corporatism sual construction of public policies. Such (Solé, 1984; Giner and Pérez Yruela, 1985; risks are only present if one of the actors Schmitter, 1994; Baccaro, 2003; inter alia). explores responses that are not institutio- The first conceives corporatism as a sys- nalized within the corporatist framework, tem of representation of interests, the stabi- which does then involve greater systemic risk lity of which rests on its capacity to produce (Pizzorno, 1978). incentives in the form of results for the actors Initial literature on corporatism focused that form part of it. Thus, corporatism cons- on its functionality as a system for shoring up titutes an instrument to legitimize govern- mechanisms for accumulation and redistri- ment policies before the public, reinforcing bution in the Fordist industrial era (Korpi, the democratic basis of government autho- 1974; Winckler, 1977; Panitch, 1979; inter rity with the incorporation of civil society in- alia). However, this analytical trend would terest groups into public decision-making. soon be substituted by another interested in The stability of the corporatist system de- evaluating the contribution of corporatism to pends on its capacity to regularly generate adjustment processes under coordinated ca- results (social pacts), which become an ex- pitalism. The relationship between corpora- pression of the achievements of this mecha- tism and the capacity to respond to far-rea- nism for political participation (Lehmbruch ching political and economic challenges has and Schmitter, 1982). dominated the research agenda since then, The second understands corporatism as much more than other factors explaining the not only a structure that generates results, activation of processes of corporatist politi- but as a political process itself. Thus it is cal exchange (Siegel, 2005; Hamann and important to analyse the dynamics of political Kelly, 2007; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). As exchange between actors and not only the indicated by Avdagic (2010: 631): “The pre- performance of the system that produces dominant explanation of [the activation of] agreements. From this perspective, the ca- social pacts emphasizes the role of a crisis pacity of resistance and self-reconfiguration or a high economic problem load. A general of corporatism is greater and its collapse less idea running through this literature is that an likely, even when results are not satisfactory agreement on reforms is more likely when a for certain participants. Corporatism, there- country is stuck in a deep crisis that threa- fore, constitutes “something more than a po- tens international competitiveness or when litical strategy for social consensus or politi- exogenous shocks require adjustment across cal agreements between the state, trade multiple policy areas.” unions and business organizations.... [It is,] In reality, most debate over corporatism above all, a model of social structuration has focused on issues of performance, exa-

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 83 mining its capacity to produce consensus petitive terms, interconnecting in this way the around reform initiatives regarding income reform agendas of different European coun- policy, labour markets and welfare and lin- tries. As Rhodes (1998: 165) commented: king this to its survival as a policy-making The new corporatism is distinguished system (Miguélez, 1984; Schmitter, 1994; “from traditional forms of social corporatism Baccaro, 2003). As Avdagic (2010: 631) says, [for its] competitiveness rationale. These “Social pacts are thus generally depicted as pacts (...) have major implications for welfare functional responses to various economic states by bridging, and innovating in linka- problems.” ges... between social security systems and The weakening of corporatist formulas in labour market rules and regulations. All of Europe during the 1980s led a group of them consist of new market conforming po- authors to look for explanations beyond eco- licy mixes. But they are also far from being nomic ones for the deactivation of the dyna- the vehicles for neoliberal hegemony in so- mic of social pacting. Lash and Urry (1987) cial and employment policy-making”. analysed the erosion of European corpora- The paradox detected by Rhodes is that tism as a result of a change in the balance of the dual domestic pressure of rationalising power between the actors in the system and public spending, on the one hand, and assu- weakness. Pierson (1994) related ring national competitiveness in a context of the establishment of policies to rationalize growing European interconnections, on the social spending and to flexibilize the labour other, did not cause the disappearance of market with the loss of relevancy of class national corporatist frameworks. On the con- conflict in post-industrial society. Streeck trary, it reinforced efforts at coordination and and Schmitter (1991) insisted that the trans- reinterpreted them competitively (Alonso, of markets was leading to the 1994). Unexpectedly, it made it possible to loss of functionality of the nation-state as the maintain national corporatist processes in a framework for determining socioeconomic context of globalization and Europeanization. policy. In regard to , this seemed to di- However, this “moribund corporatism” minish in the face of the emergence of a new (Grahl and Teague, 1997: 418) had a greater constellation of actors, who adopted the lo- capacity for resistance than much of the lite- gic of the new corporatism, redefining their rature assumed. In the second half of the traditional redistributive interests in function 1990s and with the EMU as the main challen- of the objectives of controlling costs and pro- ge on the horizon, there was a “surprising ductivity to meet the need to be competitive. reactivation” (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000: The new corporatism of a competitive ra- 44) of corporatist political exchange in Euro- tionality yielded a wave of social pacts regar- pe, which necessitated a revision of argu- ding reform policies in a significant number ments over its supposed demise. However, of European countries aimed at fulfilling con- to survive, national corporatist models had to vergence criteria for the EMU. Macroecono- be reconfigured in depth, abandoning old mic demands for entrance into the EMU pus- forms of social and redistributive corpora- hed many European governments to agree tism from the industrial-Fordist stage. The on a coordinated reform agenda in many new wave of social pacts were agreed upon policy areas. The reform of welfare provisions under a new rationality, with different objec- was aimed at reducing the impact of social tives and based on different structures. spending on the public budget and meeting The logic of corporatist dialogue starting the objectives established regarding public in the 1990s came to be expressed in com- deficits by Maastricht. Agreements over la-

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 84 Goodbye to Competitive Corporatism in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis bour market flexibility and containing wages Regarding corporatist functions post- became instruments for the relative improve- EMU, Grote and Schmitter (2003) indicate ment of national competitiveness and infla- that national forms of corporatism have been tion control. The EMU increased the propen- an effective instrument for balancing busi- sity of governments to seek political ness and trade union demands in the face of cooperation from the main interest groups, the insufficient development of structures for especially in those countries where com- social dialogue on a European scale (see pliance with convergence criteria was more Köhler and González Begega, 2008; Natali difficult (Ebbinghaus and Hassel, 2000; Has- and Pochet, 2009). Euro-corporatism has sel, 2003; Hancke and Rhodes, 2005; Has- been used as a competitive adjustment me- sel, 2006). chanism between national partners, either to Lastly, the internal articulation of social create social consensus regarding the reform pacts took on specific characteristics in each of welfare policies (Hemerick, 2003), or to country; it is in the structure and not the logic assure the containment of wages and avoid of the corporatist political process where it is the loss of international competitiveness possible to detect the differences between (Hancke and Rhodes, 2005; Hassel, 2006; national corporatist models (Baccaro, 2003; Baccaro and Simoni, 2007; Culpepper, 2008). Siegel, 2005). In Italy, Portugal and Finland A broadening of the agenda toward issues major tripartite pacts based on broad coope- related to innovation and the development of ration were reached, which linked income the knowledge-based economy has also policy reforms with labour market and welfa- taken place (Ornston, 2013). re reforms. In Spain, the pacts focused on the latter two spheres, but were not based on major transversal tripartite agreements, but Corporatism in transformation: rather on a complex and fragmented structu- social pacts and conflict in re. In Belgium and Holland, the reactivation democratic spain of corporatist dialogue took place in the form The determination of public policies in demo- of bipartisan negotiations between social cratic Spain has been underpinned by a cor- agents that resulted in social pacts produced poratist experience, which, despite the emer- under threat of unilateral action by the go- gence of conflict of varying degrees and vernment (Avdagic, 2010). duration, is defined by its continuity. As in The survival of corporatism as a system other countries in Southern Europe that also for the formulation of policy in the last two underwent a change in regime at the end of decades has been based on its capacity to the 1970s, the incorporation of trade unions adapt to different expectations and scena- and business leaders in public decision-ma- rios. The flexibility of corporatism conceived king initially filled a triple function: contribu- as a process of political exchange also ex- ting to consolidating , channelling plains its continuity once entrance into the industrial conflict and stabilizing the actors EMU was assured. Post-EMU corporatism is involved (O’Donnel and Schmitter, 1986). For defined based on its multi-functionality and the government, the new framework for cor- the diversity of national trajectories. In any poratist policy formation provided an additio- case and until the onset of the economic cri- nal element of legitimacy. For recently crea- sis in 2008, national corporatist models had ted or legalized business and trade union continued to have the capacity to generate associations, the reward was even greater. political consensus around the reform of or- Their institutionalization as actors in the pu- ganized capitalism in the context of Euro- blic decision-making process fostered their peanization and globalization. organizational consolidation within the poli-

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 85 cy-making system and civil society (Hamman, decisive factor in political stabilization, the 2012). According to Pérez-Díaz (1986), Spa- control of conflict and the development of an nish corporatism was the result of the casual institutional framework for democratic labour encounter between the conflicting interests relations, including the structure for collecti- of government and social partners, within a ve bargaining, the regulation of the labour process of a mutual search for legitimacy market and social policy. This first stage of that, after some initial doubts, ended suc- Spanish corporatism, of an essentially redis- cessfully.3 tributive rationale, with some additional ob- The paradox of Spanish corporatism is jectives related to employment and impro- that its competitive reorientation took place ving productivity, developed despite the lack when it had still not finished defining itself in of a stable institutional framework of macro- a social or Fordist-industrial sense. Spanish concertation. The roots of the persistent ins- corporatism was still in construction when it titutional instability of Spanish corporatism began to experience the pressures that lie in the absence of stable structures to ac- would lead to its internal reform, after ex- commodate political bargaining between ac- hausting its functionality as a support in the tors in this first stage (Molina, 2011). Table 1 process of democratic modernization (Giner, shows the performance of the 1977-1986 1985). Hence, some authors have emphasi- stage in terms of social pacts.4 zed its incomplete (Solé, 1990) or even failed The second stage of Spanish corporatism character (Miguélez, 1984). covers the period between 1992 and 2002. The recognition of these and other inter- In this stage a competitive reorientation of nal transformations has led to debates in the corporatism took place, within the expansive literature on the continuity of the Spanish economic cycle that began in 1994. The main corporatist experience. Thus, a broad range characteristics of this stage are the change of periodizations, based on analyses of the in rationale adopted by the actors in facing system of the production of social pacts, the challenge of convergence toward Econo- have been proposed (inter alia, Pérez Infante, mic and Monetary Union and the fragmenta- 2009; Molina, 2011). In one of them, Gutié- tion of the corporatist structure and agenda. rrez and Guillén (2008) identify three stages As in other European countries, the social that differ in their rationality, objectives and pacts of this stage became an instrument for internal structure. After these, we propose consensual adjustments in different spheres, the existence of a fourth and most recent including employment policy, labour market stage, beginning in 2008, based on a slow- flexibility, the redefinition of key welfare -be down in the production of social pacts and nefits, such as pensions, and the develop- the erosion of corporatist exchange, which ment of a stable framework for collective we address in detail in the fourth section of bargaining with the aim of controlling wages. this article. Table II shows the social pacts reached in this stage. The first stage, from 1977 to 1986, co- rresponds to the period of democratic con- The third stage, the relaunching of centra- solidation. During this period, the emerging lized dialogue, refers to the period between process of corporatist exchange became a 2004 and 2007, and is characterized by the maintenance of the same competitive ratio-

3 Köhler (1995) and Marín Arce (1997) emphasize the initial problems involved in incorporating trade union 4 For a detailed description and analysis of the political organisations into the corporatist system of political dia- process that led to these results for the corporatist fra- logue. mework in terms of social pacting, see CES (1993-2008).

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 86 Goodbye to Competitive Corporatism in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis

TABLE 1. Social pacts during the macro-concertation stage (1977-1986)

Result Nature Signatories Moncloa pacts (1977). Political Government and political parties. Sub- sequent support of social partners. Interconfederal Basic Agreement (ABI) (1979). Bipartite. CEOE / UGT. Interconfederal Framework Agreement (AMI) (1980- Bipartite. CEOE / UGT / USO. 1981). National Employment Agreement (ANE) (1982). Tripartite. Government / CEOE / UGT / CCOO. Interconfederal Agreement (AI) (1983). Bipartite. CEOE / UGT / CCOO. Economic and Social Agreement (AES) (1984-1986). Tripartite. Government / CEOE / UGT.

nale in a post-EMU environment. The main cial dialogue that was structured in different changes affected corporatist structures. The negotiating tables. Table III shows the perfor- government instigated an institutional rede- mance during this stage, with results in diffe- sign oriented toward recovering coordination rent spheres, including vocational training, and introducing a centralized program of so- illegal immigration, the regulation of self-em-

TABLE 2. Social pacts during the stage of fragmented concertation of competitive orientation (1992-2002)

Result Nature Signatories Bipartite Agreement (subsequently tripartite) on Vocational Bipartite / Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO Training and Continuing Education (1992) (renewed every Tripartite. / UGT. four years, in 1996, 2002 and 2006). Interconfederal Agreement on Ordinances and Regula- Bipartite. CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. tions (1994). Agreement on the Consolidation and Rationalization of the Tripartite. Government / CCOO / UGT. Social Security System (1996). Agreement on Employment and Social Protection for the Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME, CCOO / Farm Sector. UGT. Tripartite Agreement on Independent Labour Dispute Re- Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME, CCOO / solution (ASEC I) (1996) (ASEC II in 2001 and ASEC III in UGT. 2003). Interconfederal Agreement for Employment Stability (AIEE) Bipartite. CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. (1997). Agreement on Gaps in Coverage (AICF) (1997). Bipartite. CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. Interconfederal Agreement on Collective Bargaining Bipartite. CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. (AINC) (1997) (revised in 2002 and renewed annually until 2008). Agreement on Part-time Work (1998). Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME/ UGT. Agreement on the Increase of Minimum Pensions (1999). Bipartite Government / CCOO / UGT Agreement on the Constitution of the Foundation for the Bipartite. Government / CCOO / UGT Prevention of Occupational Risks (2000). Agreement on the Improvement and Development of the Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO. Social Security System (2001).

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TABLE 3. Social pacts during the stage of re-centralization and relaunching of tripartite social dialogue (2004.2007)

Result Nature Signatories Declaration for Social Dialogue 2004: Competitiveness, Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO Stable Employment and Social Cohesion. / UGT. Declaration for Social Dialogue in Public Administrations Bipartite. Government / CCOO / UGT / CSI-CSIF. (2004). Agreement on protective action for persons in situations Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO of dependency (2005). / UGT. Agreement on growth and employment (AMCE) (2006). Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. Agreement on Social Security Measures (AMMSS) (2006). Tripartite. Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. Agreement on Basic Statute for Public Employees (2006). Bipartite. Government / CCOO / UGT / CSI-CSIF

ployment, out of court settlement of group social pacts and led trade unions to recover conflicts, different aspects of occupational the political character of the strike. health and safety and other commitments on Starting in 1994, in full reactivation of the matters of dependency, equality, social secu- dynamic of social pacting with a new compe- rity and employment stability, in addition to titive rationale, Spanish corporatism recove- the annual renovation of the Interconfederal red its capacity to control labour conflict. The Agreement on Collective Bargaining (AINC). decline in conflictivity took place in a context Along with the production of social pacts, of a loss in the usefulness of the strike as a corporatist social dialogue in Spain has had vehicle for expressing class tensions and as the clear function of controlling and channe- an instrument of trade union pressure. After a lling conflict, as pointed out by Luque Balbona period of relative stability lasting over a de- (2012). From a perspective that emphasizes cade, with the onset of the economic crisis in the character of corporatism as a political pro- 2008 and in a context of a gradual slowdown cess and its continuity beyond the intermit- in the production of social pacts, the unions tency of social pacts, the analysis of conflicts again explored labour conflict in its dual eco- in democratic Spain has allowed this author to nomic and political dimensions. Graph 1 identify a transformation in the use of the shows the data regarding the number of work strike as a resource for political influence on days lost for each 1000 employees due to the part of trade union organizations. The in- strikes during the democratic period. corporation of trade unions into the corpora- tist political process at the beginning of the 1980s meant a gradual de-politicization of The spanish model of industrial conflict and its reorientation toward competitive corporatism: the business sphere in the framework of in- establishment, continuity and dustrial reconversion. In the opposite sense, a external reconfiguration recovery of conflictivity after the general strike in December 1988 was a response to unilate- Beyond the fluctuations in performance or su- ralism on the part of the government in the perficial differences in the structure of the pro- reform of the labour market and collective bar- duction of social pacts, the internal logic of gaining, which paralysed the production of Spanish corporatism has remained constant

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 88 Goodbye to Competitive Corporatism in Spain? Social Pacting and Conflict in the Economic Crisis

GRAPH 1. Conflict and political exchange (days not worked per 1000 employees due to strikes) (1976-2012)

Notes: The dotted line excludes the seven general strikes on the national level during the period 1988-2012 (14 December 1988, 28 May 1992, 27 January 1994, 20 June 2002, 29 September 2010, 29 March 2012, and 14 November 2012). *The Survey of Strikes and Lockouts (EHCP) for 2010 does not include the general strike of 29 September 2010; “given that it does not have information available from all of the Autonomous Communities”. Participation has been estimated based on the CIS barometer of November 2010 (14%, equivalent to 2.5 million workers). The EHCP for 2012 does not include data on the general strikes of 29 March and 14 November. Participation in these strikes has been estimated based on the CIS barometer of April 2012 (23.4%, equivalent to 3.4 million workers) and that of December 2012 (21.4%, equivalent to 3.1 million workers), respectively. Source: Statistics on Strikes and Lockouts (MTSS) (elaborated by author). since the middle of the 1990s and has confe- countries with deficit problems and/or infla- rred stability on political bargaining between tion that exceeded the convergence objecti- the government and its social partners. The ves, as occurred in Spain, governments had EMU, first as an economic challenge, and af- very clear incentives to opt for social pacts, ter as a reference in making policy decisions, “both to expedite that process of adjustment became the element rationalizing partners’ and reduce the potential social costs of rapid interests and expectations within the corpora- disinflation” (Hancke y Rhodes, 2005: 201). tist political process, first, guiding the trans- The EMU pushed social partners toward formation of Spain’s incomplete corporatism consensus and provided an explanatory fra- toward its competitive form and, secondly, mework to accommodate other causes, ma- securing its institutional consolidation. king it possible to understand why the gover- As in other European countries, the EMU nment was again inclined to share its was a decisive factor in reactivating corpora- prerogatives on matters of policy-making tist exchange, providing it with energy and with social partners and why these partners giving it a new functionality. Not all European were willing to be involved in the process of countries experienced a wave of social pacts corporatist dialogue. The thawing out of Spa- in the 1990s as the pressure from the EMU nish corporatism at the beginning of the 1990s was not evenly distributed. However, in was a response to the willingness of a gover-

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 89 nment in a relatively weak position, that of the tite dialogue with business over this period first legislature of the Partido Popular, to aban- (see Table II), anticipating the reactivation of don unilateralism and return to the path of tripartite exchanges starting in 1996 and negotiation (Hamann, 2005). Finding themsel- emphasizing the greater continuity and resi- ves a minority in the parliament and conside- lience of bipartite dialogue over tripartite in ring the possibility of quickly using up their Spain (Molina and Rhodes, 2011). “”, Aznar, the head of the PP govern- Competitive corporatism is, in reality, the ment, preferred to agree on a reform agenda first type of corporatism to demonstrate real with social partners and initiated an experien- institutional consistency in Spain. However, in ce that would last throughout the legislature comparison to the extensive experiences of (1996-2000), what Hamann (2005) has called pacting in other European countries, the “third-way conservatism”. In the second legis- agenda and structure of the new Spanish cor- lature of the Aznar government, once assured poratism is structured in a highly fragmented entrance into the EMU and with an absolute manner (Alonso, 1994; Espina, 2007). In this majority, the government would have less in- regard, Spain offers no example from the centive for corporatist exchange. In both ca- 1990s of a major tripartite social pact linking ses, the political calculation on the part of the the policy areas of income, labour market and government combined with a clearly functio- welfare (Avdagic, 2010). The negotiation of the nal explanation (the EMU) to explain the acti- reform agenda was carried out through a se- vation of corporatist processes (Hamann and ries of ad hoc bipartite and tripartite structu- Kelly, 2007). res. In addition, the government did not di- Along with the strategic turn of the new rectly participate in determining wages. government, Royo (2006) stresses the impor- However, it did try to have indirect influence tance of trade unions’ institutional learning on wages by inviting the social partners to after the failure of their confrontational stra- participate in the formulation of adjustment tegy put into practice between 1988 and policies for the labour market and welfare in 1994. The unions accepted the invitation of exchange for a commitment to containing the government to join a new corporatist ex- wages in autonomous processes of collective change not only because they accepted its bargaining (Hancke and Rhodes, 2005). new competitive rationale, but also because Oliet Palá (2004) enumerates the basic they realized that the intensity of their prior characteristics of Spain’s new competitive response had weakened them. The three ge- corporatism: 1) inconsistency of the institutio- neral strikes of that period,5 had exhausted nal mechanism to accommodate political bar- their ability to apply political pressure and gaining, with structures with varying levels of had not resulted in reversing the agenda for coordination; 2) incomplete and deficiently labour market reform unilaterally imposed by regulated institutionalization, despite the in- the socialist government. In the business corporation of the social partners in a number sphere, the increase in conflict had also not of public bodies, such as the Economic and been positive for the main trade unions, the Social Council, the National Advisory Com- Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) and the Ge- mission on Collective Agreements and diffe- neral Union of Workers (UGT), who obtained rent bodies that are part of the Social Security poor results in union elections in 1993 and System and the Public Employment Service;6 1994. The strategic turn of the unions was also supported by the maintenance of bipar-

6 Spain lacks legislation regarding institutional partici- pation at the state level that would define the spaces 5 14 December 1988, 28 May 1992 and 27 January 1994. and conditions for incorporating social agents in public

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3) the decentralization and reproduction of the labour market and unemployment pro- national corporatist structures on a regional tections were opposed by the unions and scale, as a result of the process of transferring resulted in failure. This period is marked by a competencies on matters of welfare and em- general strike on 20 June 2002 and the dete- ployment; 4) organizational weakness and rioration of tripartite dialogue in the last 2 deficits in the representation of social part- years of the legislature. ners, who find strong incentives in institutio- The system of production of tripartite so- nalization as an alternative source of social cial pacts was reactivated after the victory of legitimation; and 5) dependency on govern- the in 2004. To accomplish ment initiative for the activation and enginee- this, an ambitious programmatic document ring of exchange, above all tripartite exchan- was presented to the social partners, called ge, in the face of a lack of a formal procedures the Declaration for Social Dialogue, which in any policy sphere establishing the obliga- designed a stable framework for exchanges tion of government to initiate negotiations with between government and social partners for social partners. the entire legislature. In addition to setting a Spanish competitive corporatism has timetable, the document pursued the recen- produced important results, expressed in tralization of exchange and the intensification the form of social pacts, in the reform of the of , articulating a system of social labour market and social protection. In the dialogue round tables (see Table III again). first Popular Party legislature (1996-2000), However, despite this document only super- three bipartite agreements were signed, in- ficial changes were actually introduced in the volving the first reform pacted over the Spa- structure of Spanish corporatism. nish labour market, after those imposed However, beyond structural transforma- unilaterally by the government in 1984 and tions, the characteristic that confers greater 1994. The AIEE, the ACV and the AINC, all continuity on Spanish corporatism, both pre of them from 1997 (see Table II again), veri- and post-EMU, is the existence of a shared fy the competitive turn in Spanish corpora- commitment to improve competitiveness tism and the shared concern of social part- through social dialogue. The competitive ners over issues of flexibility, job creation mantra has been like a glue in Spanish cor- and improving productivity. The other major poratism, as can be seen in the approaches pact representative of this stage of conser- of the unions and employers associations vative consensus, in this case tripartite, is toward collective bargaining. The signing and the Agreement on the Consolidation and renovation of the AINC (see Table III)7 reveals Rationalization of the Social Security Sys- the use of bipartite dialogue, indirectly spon- tem, signed in 1996, and which extended sored by the government, to adapt collective the consensus on the reform of the pension bargaining, contain wages and avoid inflatio- system beyond the parliament. nary tendencies (Hancke and Rhodes, 2005). The second Popular Party government The collaboration of trade unions in wage (2000-2004), supported by an absolute ma- moderation, in exchange for a commitment jority in the parliament, faced an increase in to create employment, was essential to reach conflict. Its attempts to unilaterally regulate the convergence criteria for the EMU and guarantee the competitiveness of Spanish labour costs once within it. The use of auto- decision-making. On the regional level, however, there are laws that regulate the institutional participation of the social partners in six autonomous communities: Madrid, Extremadura, Castilla and León, Galicia, Cantabria and 7 Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining the Balearic Islands. (AENC), from 2010 (see Table IV).

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 91 nomous dialogue between social partners the abandonment of negotiations by the Go- (and not tripartite exchange as in other coun- vernment, bipartite social dialogue continues tries) to adjust the structure of collective bar- to play an important role”. gaining and this, in turn, to guarantee wage In addition, the re-exploration of conflict moderation, was effective. At the same time, on the part of the unions is associated with this characteristic became an element diffe- their loss of influence on the policy agenda rentiating Spanish corporatism, with and with the subordination of the govern- functions of normative production, political ment to the demands for fiscal consolidation consensus and legitimation of actors and no defined by the institutions of the EMU. The centralized determination of wages (Avdagic, narrowing of the national policy framework 2010). Graph 2, with data on wages and in- has led to the reorientation of union protest flation between 1977-2012, shows the suc- strategies, leading them toward a repertoire cess of this strategy that began in 1997 with the first AINC. with greater systemic risk. As Campos Lima and Martín Artiles (2011) have pointed out, the coercive pressure of the objectives of Economic crisis and the containing public spending established by erosion of corporatist political community institutions has led to a weake- dialogue ning (with risk of breakdown) of corporatist political exchange. The government has The economic crisis (2008-2013) has had an launched unilateral reforms, which have led impact on the corporatist process in Spain, the trade unions to react more fiercely. For negatively affecting its performance and al- their part, the CEOE, which has supported tering its capacity to channel conflict. Con- the government’s agenda, particularly regar- flict in this period has certain original charac- ding labour market reform, has undergone a teristics resulting from the exploration of new period of significant internal difficulties.8 repertoires of response on the part of trade unions. At the same time, doubts regarding The erosion of corporatism has been the stability of dialogue between the govern- more gradual and has come later in Spain ment and social partners have arisen. than in other countries in Southern Europe,9 and it has affected the exchange between The slowdown in the system of produc- tion of social pacts, as well as the erosion of the government and social partners with the political process which supports it, is in greater intensity than the bipartite dialogue response to the deterioration of economic between these parties. Regarding the former, conditions in the context of the crisis and the we can differentiate two phases in the period abandonment of the search for consensus in from 2008-2013. Between 2008 and 2009, the reform agenda on the part of the govern- and within the initial context of response to ment. Thus, one of the main characteristics the deterioration of the economic situation of this period is the contrast between the deactivation of tripartite dialogue and the continuity of bipartite exchange. As Molina 8 See El Mundo (09/12/2012), Market Supplement 240: and Miguélez (2013: 26) say, “there is a sharp 2-3. 9 The first period of the crisis was less intense than in contrast between developments in tripartite other European countries. The contraction in GDP in and bipartite negotiations. While austerity 2008 was -3.6% compared to an average of -4.2% policies have brought tripartite bargaining to among the European partners. However, job losses were extremely intense from the start, with an increase in the a crisis as a result of a lack of consensus on unemployment rate from 9.66% to 17.36% between the some critical aspects and, more recently, by first quarters of 2008 and 2009 (EPA data).

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GRAPH 2. Salary increases agreed to through collective bargaining, evolution of real salaries and variations in the Consumer Price Index (IPC).

Source: Newsletter on Labour Statistics (MTSS) and Consumer Price Index (INE) (elaborated by author).

through policies of economic stimulus,10 tri- dered to be concluded, due to the refusal partite exchange between government and of the government and the unions to ac- social partners was even more intense, des- cept the proposals of the CEOE, among pite its poor performance in terms of the sig- which was a five percent reduction in social ning of social pacts.11 However, starting in contributions and the creation of a new 2010, with the worsening of the economic type of employment contract with indemni- situation as a consequence of “the intensifi- fications for loss of employment of 20 days cation of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro per year of employment. The attempt to zone and the acceleration of the process of reactivate dialogue on the part of the go- fiscal consolidation of public administra- vernment between February and June 2010 tions” (CES, 2012: 151), the space for tripar- also failed, given the social partners’ diffe- tite dialogue was drastically reduced. The rent positions; this was resolved by the uni- political response to the Spanish sovereign lateral approval of a reform in the Council debt crisis has led the government toward of Ministers.12 The largest trade unions, the unilateralism. CCOO and the UGT, reacted by calling for the first of three general strikes in this pe- The change in tendency can be detec- riod, for 29 September 2010.13 Despite the ted beginning in July 2009, when negotia- tions on labour market reform were consi-

12 Royal Decree-Law 10/2010 of 16 June, on urgent measures to reform the labour market, ratified by Con- 10 Plan E (Spanish Plan to Stimulate the Economy and gress through Law 35/2010, of 17 September, on urgent Employment). measures to reform the labour market. 11 What stands out is the signing of the Declaration to 13 Previously, there had been general strike among civil promote the economy, employment, competition and service workers in the public administration on June 8, social progress in July, 2008. 2010, to protest the Royal Decree-Law 8/2010 of 20 May,

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 93 deterioration in relations, tripartite social However, tripartite negotiations between dialogue was still able to achieve one final the government and social partners was not result at the beginning of 2011. The Social formally reactivated. As a result, the gover- and Economic Pact for growth, employ- nment approved the reform of the pension ment and guaranteeing pensions, signed 2 system without the agreement of the social February 2011, represented the swan song partners.17 to the spirit of consensus that began in the In contrast to the reduced and very limi- first legislature under Zapatero. The gover- ted tripartite exchange, bipartite dialogue nment returned to unilaterally regulating a has had a high degree of dynamism during reform for the structure of collective bar- the crisis, despite some initial difficulties. It gaining in June 2011, after the failure of has revealed the concerns of social partners dialogue between trade unions and emplo- for improving the capacity of adaptation of yers.14 The social partners considered this collective bargaining agreements to the de- action taken by the government to be a mands of the economic situation, through violation of their collective autonomy. strengthening mechanisms for internal flexi- The arrival of the Popular Party to power bility and recommending wage moderation in November 2011 led to even greater uni- as solutions for containing the loss of jobs. In lateralism, within a context of worsening addition, it has contributed to strengthening economic difficulties and outside pressures the tendency toward decentralizing the co- for reform. The division between the gover- llective bargaining structure (Molina and Mi- nment and trade unions widened after the guélez, 2013). adoption of the second unilaterally imposed The failure of negotiations in 2009 to re- labour market reform in this period,15 the new the AINC, revealed the existence of di- context of which, regarding collective bar- fferent diagnoses regarding the problems gaining, was highly damaging to union in- terests as it “elevated employer’s decisions with collective bargaining and their solu- as the main source for determining the work tions. The absence of a reference document rules in substitution of collective bargai- for the signing of agreements was reflected ning” (Baylos Grau, 2012: 9). Starting in the in the increase in requests for arbitration spring of 2013, there was a certain rappro- before dispute resolution bodies (CES, chement between the government and the 2010). In the face of increasing conflict, the unions on the issue of pensions that see- social partners signed a Commitment to ac- med to indicate a reduction in tensions.16 tion on pending collective bargaining for

on extraordinary measures to reduce the public deficit, but two experts linked to CCOO and UGT formed part which unilaterally revised a series of measures regarding of the group as individuals. On May 16, 2013, the second remuneration and working conditions established in the meeting between the president of the government and Civil Service Agreement (2010-2012) reached by the so- general secretaries of the UGT and CCOO during this cial partners and the government in September 2009 legislature took place, upon specific request for reacti- vation of dialogue made ​​by the unions in the May 1st 14 Royal Decree-Law 7/2011, of 10 June, on urgent mea- demonstrations. Finally, unions and employers suppor- sures to reform collective bargaining. ted the new regulation of access to pensions for part- 15 Royal Decree-Law 3/2012, of 10 February, on urgent time workers (Royal Decree-Law 11/2013, of 2 August, measures to reform the labour market, ratified by Con- for the protection of part-time workers and other urgent gress through Law 3/2012, of July 6, on urgent measures economic and social measures). to reform the labour market 17 Royal Decree-Law 5/2013, of 15 March, on measures 16 In April 2013 an advisory group on the reform of the to promote the continuity of the working lives of older pension system was established; its findings were workers and promote active ageing and Law 23/2013, of forwarded to the Parliamentary Committee of the Toledo 23 December, regulating the Sustainability Factor and Pact. The unions were not formally invited to participate, Revaluation Index in the Social Security Pensions System

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TABLE 4. Social pacts during the economic crisis (2008-2013)

Result Nature Signatories Declaration to boost the economy, employment, com- Tripartite Government / CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / petitiveness and social progress (07/2008). UGT. Public service agreement (2010-2012) (09/2009). Bipartite Government / CCOO / UGT / CSIF Commitment to take action regarding the collective Bipartite CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO/ UGT. bargaining process pending in 2009 (11/2009). Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining Bipartite CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO/ UGT. (AENC I) (2010-2012) (01/2010). Social and economic agreement for growth, employ- Tripartite Government / CEOE-CEPYME, CCOO / ment and pensions (2011) (01/2011). UGT. Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining Bipartite. CEOE-CEPYME / CCOO / UGT. (AENC II) (2012-2014)

2009. In January 2010, they signed an which has been incorporated into the AENC Agreement on Employment and Collective II and tackles one of the main problems of Bargaining (AENC I) (2010-2012), which instability in the labour relations framework provided continuity with a series of inter- that the 2012 Labour Reform introduced confederal agreements on collective bargai- (Merino Segovia, 2012).19 Table IV shows the ning initiated in 1997 with the first AINC and results of social dialogue during the 2008- which included different elements related to 2013 period. the stability of contracts, internal flexibility Along with the difficulties in the perfor- and guidelines for determining wages. In mance of the system of production of social addition, the social partners confirmed their pacts, the most characteristic trait of corpo- willingness to address reform of the collec- ratist dynamics during the crisis has been the tive bargaining structure; however, they resurgence of conflict. Dialogue between go- were unsuccessful in doing so, leading to vernment and social partners has been the government acting unilaterally.18 overwhelmed by a level of conflict unknown The AENC II (2012-2014) is a continuation since the period from 1988 to 1994. The in- of the AENC I, in making a call for a pact on crease in political conflict, marked by three income policy and trying to return the deter- general strikes,20 has been used by the mination of the conditions for collective bar- unions to try to reactivate corporatist ex- gaining to the autonomous sphere of nego- change with the government. But, in parallel, tiations between trade unions and employers. they have also explored other repertoires of Its main novelty is the introduction of an ex- contention of greater systemic threat in coor- plicit demand for the decentralization of co- dination with organizations emerging from llective bargaining within the framework of civil society (Köhler, González Begega and sectoral agreements. However, the govern- Luque Balbona, 2013). ment ignored these advances in its 2012 La- bour Reform. In May 2013, the social part- ners reached an agreement on the renewal of 19 Agreement of the Monitoring Committee of the AENC expired collective bargaining agreements, II on ultra- activity in collective agreements, 23 May 2013. 20 Four, if we include the one held on 27 January 2011, by the minority unions against the Social and Economic Agreement for growth, employment and the guarantee 18 See footnote 14. of pensions, signed by the CCOO and UGT.

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TABLE 5. Motivation and following of the general strikes (2010-2012)

Date Immediate motivation Participants Wage-earners Following (%) (thousands) (annual average, thousands)

29/09/2010 Labour reform 2148.5 15346.8 14.0

29/03/2012 Labour reform 3357.3 14347.2 23.4

14/11/2012 Fiscal adjustment and consolidation 3070.3 14347.2 21.0

Source: CIS barometres for November 2010, April 2012 and December 2012 , and Active Population Survey (INE) (elabo- rated by author).

The intensification of conflict and recour- lly, the non-renewal of the AINC in 2009 did se to the unilateral imposition of a reform not cause an increase in the number of agenda by the government have run parallel strikes related to collective bargaining, which to each other since 2010. The first expres- remained at a number similar to the annual sion of trade union discontent with the na- average for the period covered by the AINC, rrowing of the space for determining natio- which had already declined with the AECN I nal policy and the application of the reform (see Table VI). agenda was in June 2010, with a strike of The main risk to corporatist exchange public sector workers. In September 2010 has not so much been the re-emergence of the first general strike in the 2010-2012 pe- traditional forms of conflict but the explora- riod took place, followed by two others in tion of new protest repertoires on the part March and November in 2012. None of them of trade unions in coordination with new so- were effective in altering the government cial movements. The incorporation of the agenda or in forcing a reactivation of tripar- unions within different citizen platforms and tite social dialogue. Table V shows the data movements has led to the combining of regarding participation in the strikes and the classic forms of labour protest with other motivations behind them. forms of protest, such as the occupation of Economic conflict also increased over the public spaces.21 The three general strikes 2008-2012 period, above all conflicts over non-payment of wages, lay-offs and other regulations regarding employment and for 21 For example, the so-called Marea Verde [Green Tide] other non work-related motives. Paradoxica- demonstrations in defence of public education were ac-

TABLE 6. Evolution in the number of strikes by motivation (1995-2012)

1995-2008 2002-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (average) (average) Arising from collective bargaining 231.0 245.6 239 196 167 141

Not arising from collective bargaining 463.8 453.4 717 758 594 684

Motives not strictly labour related 38.7 25.9 45 30 16 53

Source: Statistics on strikes and lockouts (MTSS) (elaborated by author).

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GRAPH 3. Number of demonstrations by motive for demonstration (2004-2012))

Notes: *2005 without data from the Community of Madrid. Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Ministry of Interior (elaborated by author).

during this period were accompanied by de- monstrations by motive for the years 2004- monstrations in Spain’s major cities. In 2012. The increase in protests for labour addition, the UGT and the CCOO establis- related issues since 2008 and against policy hed a calendar for citizen protest that was and legislative measures since 2010 is stri- particularly intense in the first quarter of king. 2012.22 Graph 3 shows the number of de-

Discussion: a second goodbye companied by two sectoral strikes carried out on 22 May to spanish corporatism? 2012 and 9 May 2013. 22 In 2012, the unions substituted citizen associations as The economic crisis has eroded corporatist the main force behind demonstrations with a total of exchange in Spain. The system for the pro- 18,695 demonstrations. The citizen associations were duction of social pacts in Spain has seriously responsible for calling an annual average of 2,784 de- monstrations (33.3% of the total) during the 2004-07 pe- deteriorated, above all in its tripartite dimen- riod and 7,501 in the 2008-12 period (29.6% of the total). sion, as a result of the refusal to seek con- The unions called for an annual average of 1,461 demons- trations in the 2004-07 period (17.5%) and 8,066 in the sensus in setting the agenda for reforms in 2008-12 period (31.8%). If we also include demonstrations this period of crisis. The disconnection bet- called by individual workers’ committees, the number rises to an annual average of 12,183 for the 2008-12 period ween the government and trade unions has (50% of the total) (Ministry of Interior Annual Statistics). been caused by the former’s abandonment

Reis. Rev.Esp.Investig.Sociol. ISSN-L: 0210-5233. Nº 148, October - December 2014, pp. 79-102 Sergio González Begega and David Luque Balbona 97 of the instruments of social dialogue and the it. Secondly, its deactivation has only been deepening of its unilateral determination of partial, affecting its tripartite dimension, the reform agenda in a context of a narrowing which, in any case, has not suffered dama- framework for the formulation of national po- ges that will prevent its reactivation. In this licy, resulting from the pressure of EU com- regard, it would be a mistake to interpret the munity institutions. increase and redirection of conflict since the In contrast to the freezing of tripartite dia- crisis as a second goodbye to corporatism in logue, whose activation in Spain fundamen- Spain. Its survival in the crisis does not mean, tally depends on the discretion of the gover- however, that social dialogue has not been subjected to strong pressures, which may nment, bipartite dialogue has had a high level lead to a period of internal transformation, of dynamism and resistance in the crisis. similar to what occurred in the 1990s, in or- Despite this, the strengthening of unilatera- der to recover its capacity to produce con- lism in the regulatory activity of the govern- sensus. ment since 2010 has also been a threat to the collective autonomy of the social partners and the functionality of bipartite dialogue in the reform of collective bargaining. Bibliography A third characteristic of the transforma- Alonso, Luis Enrique (1994). “Macro y micro-corpo- tion of Spanish corporatism during the crisis ratismo. Las nuevas estrategias de la concerta- has been the emergence of a new model of ción social”. Revista Internacional de Sociología, conflictivity. The refusal of the government to 8/9: 29-59. negotiate reforms has led the unions to re- Avdagic, Sabina (2010). “When Are Concerted Re- turn to conflict. The three general strikes, forms Feasible? Explaining the Emergence of Social Pacts in Western Europe”. Comparative whose main objective was to force the reac- Political Studies, 43 (5): 628-657. tivation of the system of production of tripar- tite social pacts, were accompanied by the Baccaro, Lucio (2003). “What Is Alive and what Is Dead in the Theory of Corporatism?”. British exploration of new protest repertoires that Journal of Industrial Relations, 41(4): 683-706. raise doubts about the stability of the corpo- — and Simoni, Marco (2007). “Centralized Wage ratist political process. Conflict has intensi- Bargaining and the ‘Celtic Tiger’ Phenomenon”. fied and been redefined in the context of the Industrial Relations, 46(3): 426-455. crisis, no longer functioning as a normal ins- — and — (2008). “Policy Concertation in Europe: trument for union influence within corporatist Understanding Government Choice”. Compara- dialogue. The rediscovery of a protest model tive Political Studies, 41(10): 1323-1348. that transcends the representation of labour Baylos Grau, Antonio (2012). “El sentido general de interests and connects with civil society in a la reforma: la ruptura de los equilibrios organiza- way perhaps more typical of the Transition to tivos y colectivos y la exaltación del poder pri- Democracy, threatens the viability of Spanish vado del empresario”. Revista de Derecho Social, corporatism as an instrument for shaping the 57: 9-18. socioeconomic, welfare and labour agenda. Campos Lima, Maria da Paz and Martín Artiles, An- Despite these tensions, the Spanish mo- tonio (2011). “Crisis and Trade Union Challenges in Portugal and Spain: Between General Strikes del of competitive corporatism established at and Social Pacts”. Transfer: European Review of the beginning of the 1990s, has not fractured Labour and Research, 17(3): 387-402. and offers evidence of underlying continuity. Colom González, Francisco (1993). “Actores�������������� colec- First, because none of the social partners tivos y modelos de conflicto en el Estado de has rejected its continued usefulness as a Bienestar”. Revista Española de Investigaciones process for political dialogue and abandoned Sociológicas, 63: 99-120.

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RECEPTION: June 25, 2013 REVIEW: December 5, 2013 ACCEPTANCE: March 13, 2014

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