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HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 1 Number 43 June 2009 Humanitarian Practice Network HPNManaged by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange In this issue Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI The role of affected states in disaster response 2 Aid and access in Sri Lanka This edition of Humanitarian 4 When the affected state causes the crisis: Exchange features articles the case of Zimbabwe on the role of the affected 7 Humanitarian governance in Ethiopia state in humanitarian action. 10 The silver lining of the tsunami?: disaster Focusing on the 2004 Indian management in Indonesia Ocean tsunami and the 12 Land and displacement in Timor-Leste 2008 Sichuan earthquake, 14 Lessons from the Sichuan earthquake articles on Indonesia and China explore the extent to Practice and policy notes which the willingness and ©REUTERS/Beawiharta 18 Britain and Afghanistan: policy and capacity of these states to expectations manage disaster response 20 Are humanitarians fuelling conflicts? has developed in line with Evidence from eastern Chad and Darfur economic growth, political 23 Lessons from campaigning on Darfur stability and experience. 25 Supporting the capacity of beneficiaries, The surprisingly positive local staff and partners to face violence role the military has played in supporting Humanitarian agencies have tried to alone state-led disaster response, particularly respond, but face hostility and obstruction 27 Stuck in the ‘recovery gap’: the role of in China, is highlighted, and the per- from the central government. humanitarian aid in the Central African ception that only international relief Republic agencies can save lives and alleviate Articles in the policy and practice section 30 Out of site, out of mind? Reflections on suffering challenged. Other articles question British policy and expectations responding to displacement in DRC explore the recent history of humani- in Afghanistan and the effectiveness of 33 Making cash work: a case study from Kenya tarian governance in Ethiopia from the current funding mechanisms in the perspective of the Ethiopian government, Central African Republic. A trio of articles academics and civil society, and a on Darfur examine how to make advocacy government-led cash-for-return pro- approaches more effective, ask whether gramme in Timor-Leste. In different humanitarians are fuelling conflict in Chad ways, both articles highlight the and Darfur and question whether About HPN tensions that can emerge between agencies are doing enough to build local The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas sovereign states and the inter- capacities for protection. Other writers Development Institute is an independent forum national community in the manage- focus on the failure of humanitarian where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, ment and implementation of organisations adequately to support analysis and experience. The views and opinions humanitarian response. displaced people living with host families expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy and not in camps in the Democratic Group or the Overseas Development Institute. Articles looking at the role of the Republic of Congo and how urban cash state in Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe programming has supported people Britain’s leading independent illustrate how state action can recovering from post-election violence in think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues impact negatively on people’s a Kenyan town. circumstances and precipitate Overseas Development Institute crisis. In Sri Lanka, fighting has As always, we welcome any comments 111 Westminster Bridge Road London SE1 7JD constrained humanitarian aid or feedback, which can be sent to United Kingdom and access, while in Zimbabwe [email protected] or to The Coordinator, Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 government policies and political Humanitarian Practice Network, 111 and economic turmoil have seen Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD, HPN e-mail: [email protected] HPN website: www.odihpn.org the collapse of basic services. UK. HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 2 THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES Aid and access in Sri Lanka Nimmi Gowrinathan and Zachariah Mampilly Since the beginning of the decade, Sri Lanka has For government officials, even a tenuous link to the Tamil undergone a number of traumatic events that make the population was worth the effort. Had the government country a particularly challenging environment for refused to provide services to Tamils, nothing would humanitarian workers. As the long civil war nears its end, connect the people of the north-east with the state. Thus, what type of political environment are aid workers likely to both sides reached a compromise that allowed existing encounter in their attempts to help affected civilian institutions to remain in place, while granting the rebels a populations? What are the legacies of the Indian Ocean say in the nature of service provision. tsunami of 2004 and three decades of war on civilian administrative structures? To answer these questions, it is The impact of the tsunami essential to understand the convoluted relationship Following the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 between the government and the Tamil rebellion in the December 2004, the Tsunami Affected Areas Program conflict-affected regions of this long-suffering nation. (TAAP) brought together LTTE aid distribution structures with their government counterparts in a reconstruction The structure of local government in the programme primarily supported by external funds. With war zone more than half of the damage from the tsunami sustained In Sri Lanka, the district-level Government Agent (GA) is the by communities in the north-east (deaths were estimated key local actor in a complicated bureaucracy through which at over 22,000 and the number displaced was over local civil society and international organisations interact 500,000), getting aid to affected communities behind LTTE with the state. A legacy of colonial rule, every district is lines posed significant challenges to the international assigned a GA (officially referred to as the District relief effort. Initially, a consortium was established Secretary), who is responsible for implementing directives comprising representatives from the government, the promulgated by the central government. This remained true rebels and INGOs, designed to give all three a say in even in rebel areas during the worst fighting of the war, regulating the behaviour of aid organisations involved in where a complex arrangement with the government was the reconstruction effort. All sides viewed this as an reached that ensured a relatively high degree of service opportunity to bring the LTTE into the mainstream, and the provision in territories controlled by the Liberation Tigers of rebels initially earned plaudits for their effective Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A hybrid administrative system that reconstruction programmes. mixed rebel and government civil and political institutions came to control the lives of civilians living in Tamil- Meanwhile, negotiations began between the government dominated areas. Thus, while security remained under the and the LTTE on establishing a joint mechanism to control of the insurgents, in health, education and other distribute the substantial financial resources flowing into sectors the rebels worked alongside government personnel the country (close to $3 billion was pledged by various and institutions. Indeed, the insurgency modelled its own donors). Agreement was reached on a Post-Tsunami civil administration on the government’s bureaucratic Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS) in June framework, creating a structure that could both control and 2005, but implementation was blocked by the High Court fill gaps in government provision. due to pressure from anti-LTTE forces, who began to voice their opposition to any settlement that further empowered the insurgents. Bowing to this pressure, the government the insurgency modelled its own reneged on the P-TOMS agreement, arguing that the international community should not legitimise a group it civil administration on the regarded as illegitimate. Agencies including the World government’s bureaucratic Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations eventually came round to the government view. framework Discontent with the joint mechanism helped to bring the radical nationalist government of Mahinda Rajapaksa to This relationship produced both positive and negative power following elections in November 2005. At the same outcomes for the insurgency. On the one hand, it enabled time, the ceasefire that had come into effect in 2002 broke the LTTE to take care of the Tamil population – a key down, and within a year of the tsunami the two camps had demand among the Tamil diaspora, whose support for the polarised. The rise of Rajapaksa’s regime further politicised LTTE has been crucial – without diverting resources from the distribution of humanitarian aid. The effect was to military operations. On the other hand, it left civilians in undermine all cooperative efforts, compromising the efficacy LTTE territory open to manipulation by government forces. and coordination of assistance programmes, most of which THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE HUMANITARIAN 2 exchange HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 3 were financed by foreign aid. time, many INGOs became For the government, the frustrated