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Number 43 June 2009 Humanitarian Practice Network

HPNManaged by Humanitarian Humanitarian Policy Group Exchange

In this issue Commissioned and published by the Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI The role of affected states in disaster response 2 Aid and access in Sri Lanka This edition of Humanitarian 4 When the affected state causes the crisis: Exchange features articles the case of Zimbabwe on the role of the affected 7 Humanitarian governance in Ethiopia state in humanitarian action. 10 The silver lining of the tsunami?: disaster Focusing on the 2004 Indian management in Indonesia Ocean tsunami and the 12 Land and displacement in Timor-Leste 2008 Sichuan earthquake, 14 Lessons from the Sichuan earthquake articles on Indonesia and China explore the extent to Practice and policy notes which the willingness and ©REUTERS/Beawiharta 18 Britain and Afghanistan: policy and capacity of these states to expectations manage disaster response 20 Are humanitarians fuelling conflicts? has developed in line with Evidence from eastern Chad and Darfur economic growth, political 23 Lessons from campaigning on Darfur stability and experience. 25 Supporting the capacity of beneficiaries, The surprisingly positive local staff and partners to face violence role the military has played in supporting Humanitarian agencies have tried to alone state-led disaster response, particularly respond, but face hostility and obstruction 27 Stuck in the ‘recovery gap’: the role of in China, is highlighted, and the per- from the central government. humanitarian aid in the Central African ception that only international relief Republic agencies can save lives and alleviate Articles in the policy and practice section 30 Out of site, out of mind? Reflections on suffering challenged. Other articles question British policy and expectations responding to displacement in DRC explore the recent history of humani- in Afghanistan and the effectiveness of 33 Making cash work: a case study from Kenya tarian governance in Ethiopia from the current funding mechanisms in the perspective of the Ethiopian government, Central African Republic. A trio of articles academics and civil society, and a on Darfur examine how to make advocacy government-led cash-for-return pro- approaches more effective, ask whether gramme in Timor-Leste. In different humanitarians are fuelling conflict in Chad ways, both articles highlight the and Darfur and question whether About HPN tensions that can emerge between agencies are doing enough to build local The Humanitarian Practice Network at the Overseas sovereign states and the inter- capacities for protection. Other writers Development Institute is an independent forum national community in the manage- focus on the failure of humanitarian where field workers, managers and policymakers in the humanitarian sector share information, ment and implementation of organisations adequately to support analysis and experience. The views and opinions humanitarian response. displaced people living with host families expressed in HPN’s publications do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Humanitarian Policy and not in camps in the Democratic Group or the Overseas Development Institute. Articles looking at the role of the Republic of Congo and how urban cash state in Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe programming has supported people Britain’s leading independent illustrate how state action can recovering from post-election violence in think-tank on international development and humanitarian issues impact negatively on people’s a Kenyan town. circumstances and precipitate Overseas Development Institute crisis. In Sri Lanka, fighting has As always, we welcome any comments 111 Westminster Bridge Road London SE1 7JD constrained humanitarian aid or feedback, which can be sent to United Kingdom and access, while in Zimbabwe [email protected] or to The Coordinator, Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 government policies and political Humanitarian Practice Network, 111 and economic turmoil have seen Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD, HPN e-mail: [email protected] HPN website: www.odihpn.org the collapse of basic services. UK. HE43 crc22/6/091:00pmPage2 2 THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES LT military operations. Ontheotherhand,itleftciviliansin LT demand amongthe Tamil forthe diaspora, whosesupport the LTTE totake care ofthe Tamil population–akey outcomes fortheinsurgency. Ontheonehand,itenabled This relationship produced bothpositive andnegative fill gapsingovernment provision. framework, creating astructure thatcouldbothcontrol and civil administration onthegovernment’s bureaucratic and institutions.Indeed,theinsurgency modelleditsown sectors therebels workedalongsidegovernment personnel control oftheinsurgents, inhealth,educationandother dominated areas. Thus, whilesecurityremained underthe came tocontrol thelives ofcivilianslivingin Tamil- mixed rebel andgovernment civilandpoliticalinstitutions T provision interritoriescontrolled by theLiberation Tigers of re where acomplexarrangement withthegovernment was even inrebel areas duringtheworstfightingofwar, promulgated by thecentral government. This remained true Secretary), whoisresponsible forimplementingdirectives (officiallyreferredassigned aGA toastheDistrict with thestate.Alegacyofcolonialrule,every districtis local civilsocietyandinternationalorganisations interact key localactorinacomplicatedbureaucracy through which In SriLanka,thedistrict-level Government isthe Agent(GA) war zone The structure oflocalgovernment inthe conflict-affected regions ofthislong-sufferingnation. between thegovernment andthe Tamil rebellion inthe essential tounderstandtheconvoluted relationship administrative structures? To answer thesequestions,itis tsunami of2004andthree decadesofwaroncivilian populations? What are thelegaciesofIndianOcean encounter intheirattemptstohelpaffectedcivilian what typeofpoliticalenvironment are aidworkerslikelyto humanitarian workers.Asthelongcivilwarnearsitsend, challengingenvironment for country aparticularly undergone anumberoftraumatic events thatmakethe Since thebeginningofdecade,SriLankahas Nimmi Gowrinathan andZachariahMampilly inSri Lanka Aid andaccess amil Eelam(LTTE). Ahybridadministrative system that ached thatensured arelatively highdegree ofservice TE TE HUMANITARIAN

territory opentomanipulationby government forces. has been crucial – without diverting resourceshas beencrucial–withoutdiverting from framework government’s bureaucratic civil administration onthe the insurgency modelleditsown exchange THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES say in the nature of service provision.say inthenature ofservice institutions toremain inplace,whilegranting therebels a both sidesreached acompromise thatallowed existing withthestate. Thus, connect thepeopleofnorth-east r Hadthegovernment theeffort. population wasworth F and coordination ofassistanceprogrammes, mostofwhich compromisingundermine allcooperative the efficacy efforts, the distributionofhumanitarianaid. The effectwasto polarised. The riseofRajapaksa’s politicised regime further down, andwithinayear of thetsunamitwocampshad time, theceasefire thathadcomeintoeffectin2002broke power following electionsinNovember 2005.Atthesame r Discontent withthejointmechanismhelpedtobring Nations eventually cameround tothegovernment view. Bank, theAsianDevelopment BankandtheUnited r international communityshouldnotlegitimiseagroup it r the insurgents. Bowing tothispressure, thegovernment empoweredtheir oppositiontoanysettlementthatfurther due topressure from anti-LTTE forces, whobegantovoice 2005, butimplementationwasblockedby theHighCourt Operational ManagementStructure (P-TOMS) in June donors). Agreement wasreached onaPost-Tsunami the country(closeto$3billionwaspledgedby various distribute thesubstantialfinancialresources flowing into and theLTTE onestablishingajointmechanismto Meanwhile, negotiationsbeganbetween thegovernment re r tobringtheLTTEopportunity intothemainstream, andthe Allsidesviewed thisasan the reconstruction effort. r r comprising representatives from thegovernment, the re lines posedsignificantchallengestotheinternational 500,000), gettingaidtoaffectedcommunitiesbehindLTTE at over 22,000andthenumberdisplacedwasover by more thanhalfofthedamagefrom thetsunamisustained byprogramme externalfunds. primarilysupported With with theirgovernment inareconstruction counterparts (TAAP) brought togetherLTTE aiddistributionstructures December 2004,the Tsunami AffectedAreas Program F The impactofthetsunami adical nationalistgovernment ofMahindaRajapaksa to egarded asillegitimate.Agenciesincludingthe World egulating thebehaviourofaidorganisations involved in designedtogive allthree asayin ebels andINGOs, eneged ontheP-TOMS agreement, arguing thatthe efused toprovide to services Tamils, nothingwould ebels initiallyearnedplauditsfortheireffective or government officials,even atenuouslinktothe Tamil ollowing thedevastating IndianOceantsunamiof26 construction programmes. lief effort. Initially,lief effort. wasestablished aconsortium

communities in the north-east (deathswere estimated communities inthenorth-east HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 3

were financed by foreign aid. time, many INGOs became For the government, the frustrated and left the quality and effectiveness of country. In late 2008, the foreign aid was less import- government attempted to ant than ensuring the eject remaining organis- primacy of the district-level ations from the conflict- GAs in relief and rehabili- affected areas of the north- tation programmes. Thus, east. Although a handful travelling through affected managed to retain a minimal Tamil districts (Trincomalee, presence with local staff, Batticaloa and Mullativu), those who remained rout- one might encounter a group inely faced harassment. of Scientologists leading While the situation in the chants in an orphanage, or north – the area referred to 50 newly constructed homes as the Vanni – was unclear lying abandoned because because of the government’s the heat-absorbent material ban on humanitarian work- used to build them rendered ers and journalists visiting them uninhabitable. the frontline, there were reports of curfews and The return to war heavy security measures, The government’s decision even in local schools. to pursue a final military solution to the conflict in The UN also has had to 2008 again altered the tread carefully. In late 2008, situation in the north-east. ©REUTERS/Stringer at the government’s request By July 2008, the govern- the UN closed several ment had retaken much of branches in Killinochi, forc- the territory once under ing foreign staff to leave rebel control. As we have local colleagues behind as Civilians behind a barbed-wire fence at the Menikfam seen, throughout the con- they drove past lines of THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES flict the government had Vanni refugee camp, Chettekulam, northern Sri Lanka, civilians begging them to maintained a skeletal ad- April 2009 stay. Since then, the activi- ministrative structure in ties of the operational UN LTTE-controlled territory, retaining some semblance of agencies (UNHCR, Habitat, UNDP and UNICEF) have been state control. But this structure was never capable of directly linked to negotiations by senior officials on broader providing adequate services to the civilian population on issues of access and ‘humanitarian pause’. Special its own. While the state re-establishes control over the Representatives have been included on a growing ‘no-entry’ north-east, the needs of the population have increased list after issuing statements of concern, and demands by dramatically. local UN staff for greater access or increased food supplies are often rejected.

while the state re-establishes The government’s reliance on foreign aid to fund reconstruction gives donor governments an opportunity to control over the north-east, the exert pressure for the protection of civilians in the war needs of the population have zone, but such calls have had little effect. Different donors have adopted different approaches. Thus, while the increased dramatically majority of OECD-DAC donors have preferred to attach conditions to their aid regarding international humanitarian norms and human rights, Japan, Russia and Government military victories also changed the rhetoric especially China (currently the largest single donor, towards foreign aid organisations. The Rajapaksa regime contributing over $1 billion in 2008) have given both had become wary of the humanitarian community’s growing military and development aid without requiring involvement in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs in the years assurances on what they deem to be ‘internal matters’. following the tsunami. Recognising that foreign aid personnel could act both as monitors and critics of the Meanwhile, the situation in the ‘cleared areas’ continues military assault, the government continued to accept foreign to deteriorate. Doctors and teachers face harassment on aid but severely restricted the access of aid organisations. their way to work, and fears of abduction mean that far Classifying all INGO involvement as ‘neo-colonial’, fewer students are attending school. A reported five operational NGOs were required to meet government abductions take place daily, often perpetrated by administrators every few weeks for lectures on national government-funded paramilitaries, many of whom were sovereignty and to provide details of their programmes. Over recruited by the Sri Lankan police. Reports also suggest

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that the military escalation has resulted in a Conclusion corresponding rise in sexual assaults at checkpoints. Now that the government has declared a complete victory Humanitarian agencies can provide medical services, but over the insurgency, it is likely that post-conflict recon- no foreign groups are allowed to discuss sexual violence struction funds will flood the island. A strategic plan has with the local population. Conditions in some of the been circulated by the government, bringing all INGO and UN overcrowded internment camps in which some interventions under the direct control of the president. Faced 150,000–200,000 displaced Tamils are forced to live are with rapidly dwindling cash reserves, the Ministry of described by UNHCR as at ‘breaking-point’. Rehabilitation is actively searching out funds, which will have to come from the international community. Humani- By exerting strong control over foreign aid organisations, tarian actors will be expected to assume responsibility for the government claims to be correcting the ‘mistakes’ it components of the government-drafted reconstruction plan, made after the tsunami. In addition to imposing with all activities and programmes administered and regulations on INGO activities, it has embarked on a monitored by the state. The humanitarian community must campaign against groups perceived as ‘terrorist now adapt its approach to relief and rehabilitation efforts in sympathisers’. The heads of international aid organi- Sri Lanka, remaining mindful of the complex nature of sations have been brought before parliament to account administrative structures in the country. Only by under- for relief operations in the conflict zone. Instead of standing the broader political agenda in the service of which building the capacity of local civil society organisations their resources are likely to be used can the international operating in the north-east, the government has harassed community carve out an autonomous position and con- and threatened them. For example, in March 2009 a YMCA tribute to improving the welfare of affected populations. group in Trincomalee gathered clothes and other essential items to deliver to injured civilians at the local hospital. Nimmi Gowrinathan is the Director of South Asia They were prevented from entering the hospital, told to Programs at Operation USA, and a PhD candidate in the leave the supplies with the military, followed home and Department of Political Science at UCLA. Zachariah questioned about their possible relationships with the Mampilly is an Assistant Professor in the Department of injured. Political Science at Vassar College.

When the affected state causes the crisis: the case of Zimbabwe Christophe Fournier and Jonathan Whittall, MSF

Zimbabwe is facing an extraordinary and multi- shortages of essential goods, and basic infrastructure and dimensional crisis. An estimated three million public services have all but collapsed. Zimbabweans have crossed the Limpopo river into South Africa as a matter of survival; more than three-quarters Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has been working in of the remaining population of nine million face serious Zimbabwe since 2000 and has witnessed a continuous food shortages; maternal mortality has tripled since the deterioration of the humanitarian situation.3 The mid-1990s; a cholera epidemic has infected over 90,000 responsibility for this man-made crisis lies in the hands of people, killing over 4,000; one in five adults are HIV the state. positive, and one person dies every four minutes from AIDS; 94% of the population is officially unemployed; A health system unable to cope and thousands were beaten and intimidated by Zimbabwe once boasted one of the best health systems in government security and paramilitary forces during last Africa. Now, this system has collapsed. In a country where year’s elections.1 more than 500,000 people need antiretroviral therapy (ART) and more than 3,000 people die of AIDS-related Political instability and mismanagement have led to diseases every week, the collapse of the healthcare economic crisis, with inflation exceeding a staggering 89 system puts people living with HIV at huge risk. More than sextillion percent; in mid-November 2008, prices were 100,000 patients were put on ART in 2008, just as health doubling on average every 24 hours.2 The economic facilities were closing. Most of these patients are now on collapse has brought industrial and agricultural their own without proper follow-up and access to the production to a virtual standstill; there are severe drugs they need. 1 These figures are from World Food Programme, http://www.wfp.org/ countries/zimbabwe; Human Rights Watch, A Crisis without Limits, 22 Meanwhile, the recent cholera epidemic, which started January 2009, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ before the rainy season in August 2008, was zimbabwe0109web.pdf; WHO Cholera Update, 10 March 2009; unprecedented in scale for Zimbabwe. Cholera is endemic UNAIDS, http://www.unaids.org.zw/zim_hivaidsdata.php; and ‘Zim Unemployment Skyrockets’, Mail & Guardian, 30 January 2009. in some rural parts of Zimbabwe, but has been relatively 2 S. Hanke, New Hyperinflation Index (HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at rare in urban areas where most homes have – or used to THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE 89.7 Sextillion Percent, CATO Institute, 2008, http://cato.org/zimbabwe. 3 MSF, ‘Beyond Cholera: Zimbabwe’s Worsening Crisis’, February 2009.

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sufficient for survival.5 Many health workers have turned to the informal sector or have fled to South Africa and other countries. There is also a widespread shortage of basic medical materials and drugs. Health facilities now accept only foreign currency fee payments – an impossible hurdle for the majority of Zimbabweans.

The international humanitarian response

©REUTERS/Philimon Bulawayo ©REUTERS/Philimon The World Health Organisation (WHO) has focused on providing technical support to the Ministry of Health. However, given that the health system has collapsed, more proactive measures are needed to ensure that basic systems are in place. WHO acknowledged the need A woman administers a sugar solution to her cholera-afflicted child at to change gear and respond to the Budiriro Polyclinic, Harare, March 2009 cholera crisis in rural areas, but this realisation came months after MSF have – treated, piped water and flush toilets. The recent had already followed the cholera epidemic into rural areas outbreak hit Harare’s high-density suburbs, rapidly spread – making it clear that reactivity has not been a strong point to key border areas and subsequently travelled along in the international response to date. major transport routes into rural areas. In all, 90% of Zimbabwe’s districts were affected.4 More broadly, the UN system in Zimbabwe has been slow to acknowledge and respond to the crisis in all its The reasons for the scale of the outbreak are clear: lack of manifestations, not just cholera. Contingency planning

access to clean water, burst and blocked sewage systems has focused prematurely on early recovery – with very little THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES and uncollected refuse overflowing in the streets, all attention on emergency response, at least until recently. symptoms of the breakdown in infrastructure resulting The majority of NGOs in Zimbabwe have historically from Zimbabwe’s political and economic collapse. operated within a development-oriented framework. Although this may have been appropriate previously, this is clearly no longer the case. the responsibility for this man- Political and aid actors – including the UN and donors – made crisis lies in the hands of need to shift their approach and strategy if they are to the state address the humanitarian issues facing Zimbabwe effectively and efficiently. Increased humanitarian aid is necessary, but so too is a move to a more proactive The scale of the cholera epidemic and the health emergency approach based on a recognition of the system’s inability to cope compelled MSF to launch a severity of the crisis – in all its manifestations. Donor massive response. Between August 2008 and March governments and UN agencies must ensure that the 2009, MSF treated more than 55,000 cholera patients. provision of humanitarian aid remains distinct from We have provided care by using government health political processes. Their policies towards Zimbabwe must structures and drawing on the support of government not be implemented at the expense of the humanitarian health personnel; by paying the salaries of Ministry of imperative to ensure that Zimbabweans have unhindered Health staff so that they can continue working; and access to the assistance they need to survive. through our own staff. At the peak of the cholera outbreak, more than 500 MSF staff members were Blurring the lines between political goals and humanitarian working to identify new cholera cases and to treat response will have dire consequences in an already highly patients. The focus of the outbreak shifted from cities to politicised context. The government of Zimbabwe must give rural areas, where access to health care is particularly humanitarian agencies the space they need to function limited. However, cases in Harare are on the rise again independently. Food aid is the clearest example of and the epidemic is far from under control. politicised humanitarian action. Although food distributions have resumed in some locations following the government’s Zimbabwe’s inability to cope with the health crisis is evident 5 Nurses’ salaries may rise in 2009 as various UN agencies, donor in the loss of key health staff, especially nurses. Astro- bodies and NGOs look at paying incentives to Ministry of Health staff. nomical inflation means that a nurse’s salary is simply not However, even with this plan an average nurse would be paid just $60 4 WHO, Daily Cholera Updates, 23 February 2009. a month, barely enough to cover the cost of travel to and from work.

Number 43 • June 2009 5 HE43 crc22/6/091:00pmPage6 6 THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES South Africanconstitution.Even withtheongoingcrisisin international responsibilities butalsothoseenshrinedinthe The SouthAfricangovernment isfailingtomeetnotonlyits to proper healthcare, shelterorsafety. unacceptable continuationoftheirsuffering,withoutaccess Africa, theydonotfindrefuge, butinsteadare facedwithan South Africaasamatterofsurvival. Onarrival inSouth from acountrynotinopenconflict.Zimbabweans fleeto Africa alone,makingthisAfrica’s mostextraordinary exodus three millionZimbabweans have soughtrefuge inSouth also inMozambique,BotswanaandZambia.Anestimated Zimbabweans seekingrefuge notonlyinSouthAfrica,but The dire situationinZimbabwe hasledtoasteadyflow of Zimbabwe’s crisis The cross-border implicationsof the necessaryhumanitarianresponse. acknowledge thescaleofhealthcrisisandfacilitate that theZimbabwean government isunwillingto obtain aworkpermit. This obstructive approach suggests and renew. Onaverage, ittakesaboutthree monthsto Wo internships are performedhave closedandhave nostaff. problematic sincethemajorhospitalswhere these of aseniordoctoratstatehospital. This hasbeen athree-month internshipunderthesupervision undertake ionals. For example,MSFdoctorsare stillrequired to ofthesebadlyneededprofess- acknowledged shortage bringing healthstaffintothecountry–despite MSF hasalsohadtoovercome state-imposedobstaclesto epidemic hasbeeneasier, thoughstilldifficult. nutritional assessments.Responding tothecholera becausewe hadbeenpreventedshortage from conducting assessment ofthemedicalimplicationsthisfood food aid,but,untilrecently, MSFhadnoquantitative estimates thatseven millionZimbabweans are inneedof ments andinterventions. The World Food Programme (WFP) MSF facesrestrictions inimplementingmedicalassess- rigidcontrol overcontinues toexert aidorganisations. Despite glaringhumanitarianneeds,thegovernment broader, lessvisiblecomponentsofthehealthcrisis. authorities have blockedMSF’s attemptstorespond tothe the ministry’s own staff. Attheotherendofscale, cholera patientsinMinistryofHealthstructures alongside r one ministrytothenext.MSFhashadapositive working Zimbabwe’s response tothehumanitariancrisisvaries from The responsibility ofthestate treatment astheysearched forfood. patientstodefaultfrom election, leadingHIV/AIDS unable togetfoodaidforover sixmonthsaftertheJune clinic,MSFpatientswere political purposes.InEpworth MSF clinicstellusthatdistributionsare manipulatedfor ban onNGOactivityduringtheelectionsin2008,patientsat 2009.pdf. Docs/South_Africa/No_refuge_Zimbabweans_in_South_Africa_June_ Zimbabweans inSouthAfrica 6 See elationship withtheMinistryofHealth,treating many HUMANITARIAN rk permitsforinternationalstaffare difficulttoobtain No Refuge, AccessDenied:MedicalandHumanitarianNeedsof exchange , MSF, June2009,http://www.msf.org.za/ 6 Fo African HistoryArchive and theUniversity of Witwatersrand (WITS)’s 7 EmailcommunicationwithHumanRights Watch from theSouth His emailaddress [email protected]. head ofMSF’s Programmes Unit,basedinJohannesburg. from seekingtreatment. r not alwaysrespected. –andmore The riskofdeportation toallthosewholive inthecountry,services thispolicyis tution guarantees accesstohealthcare andotheressential AlthoughtheSouthAfricanconsti- fear ofdeportation. To flee toneighbouringstates. met insidetheircountry, removing theneedforthemto basicneedsshouldbe temporary solution.Zimbabweans’ Africa are urgently needed,itshould be seenasa Africa. Althoughsuchassistanceandprotection inSouth protection forZimbabweans seekingrefuge inSouth appropriate humanitarianassistance,includinglegal Zimbabweans andtoallowdeporting fortheprovision of MSF hascalledonthegovernment ofSouthAfricatostop Conclusion of MédecinsSansFrontières. Dr ChristopheFournier wherever needsare identified. ments ofneedandguarantee thataidagenciescanwork personnel intothecountry, allow independentassess- must liftrestrictions onbringingmedicalsuppliesand others tocarryoutourwork. The Zimbabwean government forindependentaidorganisations suchasMSFand space’ in Zimbabwe willrequire anincrease in‘humanitarian Now more thanever, anadequatehumanitarianresponse andfoodshortages. prevalence ofHIV complete lackofaccesstohealthcare inacontextofhigh must beaddressed withinthebroader healthcrisis–a and resultant economicturmoilinthecountry. Cholera which isjustoneofmanymanifestationsthepolitical cholera epidemic, than thevisibleandwidelyreported the peopleofZimbabwe. The crisisinZimbabwe isbigger action toensure thatstatestructures theneedsof serve accept responsibility forthisstate-formedcrisisandtake ating’. coming from Zimbabwe thatshow thesituationdeterior- and analysis thegeneral humanrightsreporting support r r ‘the massive increases in2005to2006and2008reflect According totheSouthAfricanHistoryArchive (SAHA), 2005 –andonly19approvals. asylum-seekers –more thanhadappliedinthewholeof of2008,there werequarter more than10,000Zimbabwean r these, 710were granted refugee statusand 4,040 were 66,578 newapplicationsforasylumfrom Zimbabweans. Of migrants’. Between 2000andMarch 2008,there were terised Zimbabweans inthecountryas‘voluntary economic Zimbabwe, thegovernment ofSouthAfricahascharac- ejected. Over 62,000casesremain pending.Inthefirst ecently xenophobic violence–detersmanyZimbabweans ecent violenceassociatedwithongoingrepression, and epression related toOperation Murambatsvina andmore r

ced Migration Studies Programme, June2008. achieve this,thegovernment ofZimbabwe willhave to 7 As aresult, manyZimbabweans live inconstant is InternationalCouncilPresident Jonathan Whittall is the THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES 7

©REUTERS/Radu Sigheti umber 43 • June 2009 umber 43 • June N visional Military Administrative Council (the Derg). The Council (the Derg). visional Military Administrative o ith Selassie’s downfall in 1974, power passed to the in 1974, power downfall ith Selassie’s eople’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Eritrean People’s (TPLF), the Eritrean Front Liberation eople’s egime. efuge abroad to begin lives; now, these refugees from the from these refugees now, to begin lives; efuge abroad in affected areas, assistance poured in from self-help in from assistance poured in affected areas, associations and religious and professional organisations, exploited its other bodies. Opponents of the government agitate for reform, attempts to block news of the famine to agent of political change, and the crisis became a powerful Selassie and putting an end to his ultimately dethroning r Disaster management under the Derg Disaster management under the W Pr Derg’s leaders believed that Marxism-Leninism was the key that Marxism-Leninism leaders believed Derg’s famine. Ethiopia from people Ethiopia’s to protecting new policies were became a socialist state: radical including collectivisation and villagisation, introduced, The socialism that vulnerability. rural designed to address against feudalism was to be a political contract followed Meanwhile, thousands were famine – with a vengeance. terror’killed in the so-called ‘red of 1977–78, which purges killing or Party, Revolutionary crushed the Ethiopian People’s imprisoning its leaders and supporters. Others fled, finding r being courted are in Ethiopia. era as investors Derg rural to reduce the Derg taken by The measures another famine in 1983–85. did not prevent vulnerability intensified exacerbated by conditions were Drought Tigrayan such as the conflict with opposition groups P (EPLF) Front Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation INGOs similarly divided were (OLF), splitting the country. 3 A man examines his crop near Korom in northern Tigray province in northernTigray near Korom A man examines his crop 2 1 umanitarian governanceumanitarian Ethiopia in ehabilitation Commission (RRC), was established in 1974, ehabilitation Commission (RRC), was established or decades, Ethiopia has been Ethiopia has or decades, egime eignty lies in its historical self- esponse had historical precedents. For example, the state welcomed For esponse had historical precedents. H Erkineh Teshome and Raven-Roberts Angela Sue Lautze, Armenians fleeing the 1915 genocide in Turkey, and the Ethiopian Red Turkey, Armenians fleeing the 1915 genocide in gas bombing in assistance to victims of Italian mustard provided Cross to has continued to respond Cross The Ethiopian Red Ethiopia in 1936. since. crises ever Ethiopia’s first official DRM organisation, the Relief and Relief the first official DRM organisation, Ethiopia’s R Haile Selassie. of Emperor the downfall six months before the famine that affected failed to prevent The government much of the Sahel in the early 1970s. Although Selassie’s conditions news of the desperate suppressed government This article undertaken1 summarises the findings of research for a of the exploring the role project (HPG) Humanitarian Policy Group Much of the nuance and detail in affected state in disaster response. for the sake of brevity. the original case study has been sacrificed here for the full Please see www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3190.pdf case study. or protest in this article2 Some may find the arguments controversial, that it inadequately portrays the challenges that many humanitarians Ethiopian perspectives largely The study reflects encounter in Ethiopia. in interviews,as expressed and national debates (for publications a new national DRM of as policy), as well instance on the development the authors’ experience of international and national collective disaster institutions in-country. existed prior to this, disaster 3 Although no official DRM organisations r Disaster management under the imperial Disaster management under the r This article history of sketches out the Ethiopian governments’ to responses disasters, charting the complex rela- state with a a strong tionship between and of sovereignty history long, proud assertiveincreasingly INGO donor and assertive sove- communities. Ethiopia’s r consciousness as an independent state, and one which has often defended itself against external aggres- relation- rulers built sion. Successive countries whilst ships with foreign Discussions of outsiders tried to influence domestic politics. including disaster risk management, issues, governance this balance and tension between must acknowledge Ethiopian and foreigner. F eyes linked in the world’s inextricably is The country and disaster. with famine as dependent on often characterised its govern- its people lazy, foreigners, In fact, however, ment obstructionist. Ethiopian governments successive engaged in disaster risk actively have management (DRM). Political will is not at the heartlacking: disasters remain of Ethiopian politics. HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 7 Page pm 1:00 22/6/09 crc HE43 HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 8

between those who engaged in solidarity with rebel forces and those who remained neutral in order to work in Derg- the irony of Band Aid’s song ‘Do controlled areas. The latter were suspected of serving as agents of Western interests, while the former channelled They Know It’s Christmas’ was aid through the rebels’ ‘humanitarian wings’, and did so, it not lost on a people who was claimed, often with minimal oversight.4 followed one of the world’s The increased role of INGOs in Ethiopia coincided with oldest forms of Christianity wider changes in the way government sovereignty was understood, and a growing donor preference for privatised associations for service delivery. Contacts and contracts The imbalance in power and resources between the between donors and INGOs increased, with donors relying government and aid agencies was reflected in attitudes on INGOs to channel their resources and gather towards the media, which many (in the government and in information about what was happening on the ground. Ethiopian society more widely) felt portrayed the country Some INGO directors became self-appointed country unfairly.5 The narrative of Ethiopian famines returning experts, escorting emissaries and celebrities on well- every ten years, only for the country to be ‘salvaged’ by publicised tours of famine areas and providing briefings to international aid, began with the 1983–85 crisis. The ambassadors and journalists. international media paid little attention to Ethiopian efforts to raise funds for famine response, insinuating INGO staff were perceived by Ethiopian officials, residents instead that neither the government nor the Ethiopian and academics as speaking to the world as if representing people had done enough to prevent the recurrence of Ethiopia, portraying themselves as supplanting an famine ten years after the Sahelian crisis of the 1970s. The intransigent state. Massive fundraising events for the portrayal of Ethiopians as heartless and uncaring Ethiopia famine presented INGOs with unprecedented inhabitants of a country of emaciated children, with no opportunities for expansion. Meanwhile, government history, culture or dignity, was galling in the extreme. The officials managed departments with a fraction of the unintended irony of Band Aid’s song ‘Do They Know It’s budgets available to INGOs. At the same time, however, Christmas’ was not lost on a people who followed one of these organisations provided an opportunity for patronage the world’s oldest forms of Christianity. The simplified and lucrative jobs as select and privileged officials secured construct – bad government, helpless people, gallant temporary releases from government posts, while others humanitarians – angered many. Local concerns over media sought to gain benefits for their own communities. depictions of the famine and the role of INGOs in generating these depictions was not directed against The UN supported government institutions and INGO services in themselves, but rather against the media coordinated activities between the growing number of road shows that served these organisations’ budgets. local and international actors and donors in Ethiopia. Its Echoing the sentiments of many in Ethiopia, Mesfin Wolde- main government counterpart, the RRC, had to juggle the Mariam, a leading Ethiopian academic and human rights demands of the government, humanitarian organisations activist and one of the earliest writers on the history of and disaster-affected communities, all under the critical famine in Ethiopia, asserted in 1988: ‘We must pledge as a eyes of the international media and government security people never again to use the skeletal bodies of famine staff. By 1985, the RRC was the largest relief institution of victims to elicit charity from Europe and America’. its kind in Africa, with over 17,000 field workers, a fleet of trucks and offices and warehouses throughout Disaster management under the Transitional government-controlled areas. Through this network it Government of Ethiopia (TGE) distributed a massive amount of relief assistance. Some in After defeating the Derg, the rebels established a the government felt that the RRC (and its successors, for transitional government in Addis Ababa. The Derg’s that matter) was institutionalising a humiliating and economic policies had fared no better than the imperial permanent dependency on foreign aid, and believed that regime’s in overcoming Ethiopia’s seemingly perpetual its relations with INGOs were excessively liberal. crises of poverty, economic underperformance and disaster. Meanwhile, although the RRC – widely recognised as a In response, the new Transitional Government of Ethiopia model for other developing countries – retained its (TGE) produced an array of policies designed to address the autonomy and capacity, donors increasingly channelled causes of disasters, including a National Policy on Disaster resources through INGOs. Prevention and Management (NPDPM), unveiled in 1993. The government also reformed the RRC, which was renamed Thus, while humanitarian action mitigated some of the the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission worst impacts of the famine, the 1980s saw a sharp (DPPC). The NPDPM was, and remains, an inspiring read. Its increase in INGOs’ efforts to reduce Ethiopian government first principle – ‘no human life shall perish for want of relief oversight and supervision of their activities. While the assistance in times of disaster’ – substantially predates the government used registration procedures, project Sphere Standards’ declaration of the humanitarian agreements and bureaucratic inaccessibility to retain imperative. Relations between the government and control over reluctant organisations, INGOs themselves humanitarian actors improved after the policy was adopted used their growing influence with donors to circumvent because there was now a policy framework in place to guide

THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE this supervision. humanitarian action, but the status of INGOs remained

HUMANITARIAN 8 exchange THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES 9 Angela Raven-Roberts umber 43 • June 2009 umber 43 • June N , a former RRC/DPPC/DPPA official, is official, , a former RRC/DPPC/DPPA is the founder of the Livelihoods Program, a Program, is the founder of the Livelihoods eshome Erkineh adical approaches are needed to address vulnerable to address needed are approaches adical elations with their citizens, and continues to feature citizens, elations with their citizens. for its the state to provide by eflecting a failure able to do throughout which it has proven egardless, NGOs present about their role in ‘saving’ role about their NGOs present Within Ethiopia. too real, their realisation all too frequent. Even more Even too frequent. all their realisation too real, r from has come reform The impetus for systems. livelihood state. An international the source: an unexpected quo often the status favour that appears to community seeing the government cautiously, such innovations greets of today in favour at stake lives disregarding as rash, uncertain the future. outcomes in to other disasters has been central Managing famine and seen their have Ethiopian regimes the ways in which r external assistance and in political discourse; strongly portrayed as frequently are international aid organisations r that many persistent narrative to the is resistance There I of one of the longest relationships Africa, Ethiopia has for disaster engagement with external actors Ethiopia, famine from management. In an attempt to drive – imperial, dictatorial and democratic regimes successive in tried feudalism, socialism and capitalism, yet – have crisis the INGOevery foreign calculus for generating static and appears to many as humanitarian aid resources helpless people, gallant self-serving government, (‘bad it is believed in Ethiopia, humanitarians’). In some circles that INGOs crises. Many INGOs recurrent benefit from are Their best-paid of major corporations. the size counterparts, earn less than contrast, by governmental $200 a month. the old RRC/DPPC has dismantled The government This is in keeping with the and is building anew. structure forging modern Ethiopian government: of every practice disasters, while ahead, often in the midst of major of incremental the potential value disregarding is grounded approach This adjustments to bureaucracies. to function in a belief that the state will continue r and substantial policy shift transition major regime every The national DRM policy is also being revised. to date. the international humanitarian the past two years, Over community has been invited to participatethis process, in vision an alternative no agency has put forward but as yet This would appear to be an for DRM in Ethiopia. opportunity is best not missed. It seems clear that reform external actors and between needed in the relationships would we A first step, the Ethiopian state and its citizens. suggest, would be for the humanitarian community to try and institutions from practices aid policies, to see its own and people, government of Ethiopia’s the perspective and the prism of Ethiopian politics, culture through history. Sue Lautze technical support of for the revision firm providing national disaster policy. Ethiopia’s has a long history of engagement with Ethiopia, including serving as head of INGOs country in the 1980s. in the T Program. Policy Advisor for the Livelihoods seen as inefficient, perpetuating an unhealthy perpetuating as inefficient, seen

re E wanted to know what NGOs were up to, and how much up to, and how were what NGOs to know E wanted ogram (PSNP),ogram and for linking relief a primary strategy mergency’ of This led to another reorganisation food aid. RM institutions. The Food Security Coordination Bureau Security Coordination The Food RM institutions. egistration, financial reports and project authorisation. The reports financial authorisation. egistration, and project esponsibilities. Commitment to a revised national DRM esponsibilities. Commitment to a revised Conclusion humbling to all who work are The patterns of vulnerability disasters is all The potential for catastrophic in Ethiopia. problematic. Within the government, these organisations these the government, Within problematic. we undermining efforts and on relief dependence the to break The NPDPM of famine. NGO 41 pages on contained cycle r TG name. in Ethiopia’s raising were money they under the Federal Disaster management of Ethiopia Republic Democratic Republic Democratic the Federal Elections in 1995 brought and a new constitution of Ethiopia (FDRE) to power, Due to federalism. system of established the current 1992 and between in the years rains favourable generally good and many in the democratically- 1998, harvests were that famine had been believed elected government to be abolished. calls for the DPPC defeated, prompting short-lived floods as widespread Optimism was, however, war in 1997. A two-year returned and localised droughts appeals to to respond made donors reluctant with Eritrea was unable to contain the and the government for help, crisis in 1999–2000. was a major The result drought. Ethiopia’s appeal in issued the largest The government a time, it organised history in January 2003. At the same UN ministries, donors, coalition of governmental agencies, expert advisors and INGOs five assistance to the to reform received million or so Ethiopians who regularly ‘e D Net Safety the Productive was established to oversee Pr food that placed those in perpetual need of development opposed to (as programme assistance in a multi-year to aid); and the DPPC was downgraded annual emergency Agency (DPPA), and Preparedness the Disaster Prevention level its access to the highest reduced, its responsibilities of its and the membership constrained of government supervisory committee diluted. ministerial and disbanded the DPPA, In August 2008, the government its ‘rights and obligations’transferred to the Ministry of 400 of 700 DPPA leaving Development, and Rural Agriculture studied and Once an admired, staff unemployed. whimper, it faded without a internationally acclaimed body, after clashing its long-serving removed ungraciously director of humanitarian assistance the role with senior officials over with DRM charged in Ethiopia. Ministry officials now of DRM decentralisation anticipate the increased r started an initiative the DPPA. by policy has been renewed, which mandates that disaster risk management The policy, calls for a greatly government, throughout be mainstreamed DRM management capacity at the highest strengthened within the Debates continue of government. levels It is unclear if or when it will the policy. regarding government be adopted. HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 9 Page pm 1:00 22/6/09 crc HE43 HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 10

References and further reading

Donald Donham, Marxist Modern: An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution (Oxford: James Currey Press, 1999). DPPC, General Guidelines for the Implementation of the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and management (NPDPM) (Addis Ababa: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission, 1995). Kurt Jansson, ‘Section 1: The Emergency Relief Operation – An Inside View’, in Kurt Jansson, Michael Harris and Angela Penrose (eds), The Ethiopian Famine: The Story of the Emergency Relief Operation (London: Zed Books, 1987). Mark Duffield and John Predergast, Without Troops and Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Lawrenceville, GA: Red Sea Press, 2004). RRC, The Challenges of Drought: Ethiopia’s Decade of Struggle in Relief and Rehabilitation (London: H&L Communications Ltd., 1985). Dessalegn Rahmato, ‘Civil Society Organisations in Ethiopia’, in Bahru Zewdu and Siegfried Pausewang (eds), Ethiopia, the Challenge of Democracy from Below (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2002). S. Villumstad and B. Hendrie, ‘New Policy Directions in Disaster Preparedness and Response in Ethiopia’, Disasters, 17(2), 1993. Dawit Wolde-Giorgis, Red Tears: War, Famine, and Revolution in Ethiopia (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1999).

The silver lining of the tsunami?: disaster management in Indonesia Barnaby Willitts-King, independent consultant

The tsunami that struck Aceh, at the western tip of the agement structures have been in place for over 30 years, in Indonesian archipelago, in 2004 killed an estimated 2007 a new disaster management law (known as Law 167,700 people and displaced hundreds of thousands 24/2007) was passed. The law has three important aspects. more. The human tragedy of this and other disasters in First, instead of focusing just on emergency response, Indonesia was also a test of the Indonesian state’s ability to disaster management now represents all aspects of risk respond. Compared to many countries affected by management, particularly prevention. Second, the govern- humanitarian crisis, Indonesia has significant state capacity ment must provide protection against disaster threats as a for response and coordination, through civilian and military basic human right. Third, responsibility for disaster manage- means. The impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami initially ment no longer lies just with the government, but is shared overwhelmed state capacity, while the 2006 earthquake in by all elements of society. The new law has overhauled Yogyakarta showed how a well-organised local government disaster management structures, restructuring BAKORNAS, could mount an effective response. Both experiences gave the poorly performing government body responsible for momentum to changes intended to strengthen disaster disaster manage ment, and giving it a stronger and more management in the country. Specifically, they helped to operational role in directing disaster response. The law also galvanise support for new disaster management legislation, envisages the creation of provincial and district disaster seen as progressive for the region in its focus on risk management agencies with similar levels of authority. reduction and community involvement. These disasters also exposed the Indonesian state to the international humanitarian ‘machinery’ to an unprecedented degree – as compared to many countries well as vice-versa, in terms of aid agencies operating in an environment where a strong state is present.1 affected by humanitarian crisis, Indonesia has significant state A new disaster management approach Indonesia is prone to natural disasters of just about every capacity for response description, from floods to drought. A lower-middle-income country, Indonesia has a strong government and bureauc- racy, as well as the financial resources to implement If successfully implemented, the new law will make a real successful disaster management. Although disaster man- difference to disaster management, in Indonesia. The 1 This article summarises the findings of research undertaken for a challenges involved, however, cannot be underestimated. Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) project exploring the role of the The government agency set up to oversee recovery and affected state in disaster response. The findings of the research will be rehabilitation after the tsunami has been effective, and the

THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE published by HPG later this year. response to the Yogyakarta earthquake was well organised.

HUMANITARIAN 10 exchange THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES 11 umber 43 • June 2009 umber 43 • June N icularly in such a large country, the opportunity for country, icularly in such a large rt ogress has been made in disaster management with the ogress est Papua, it cannot be neutral. it cannot be neutral. est Papua, eligious extremism or regional instability. or regional eligious extremism smart government agencies assess alignment’, whereby international community has been seen as a negative force, negative seen as a has been community international that is inappropriate of assistance provision in the notably of province to the Muslim or bibles products (such as pork sensitivity without cultural aid is delivered Aceh) or where aid workers). dressed (such as immodestly over asserted has increasingly Indonesia its sovereignty In out on its territory. activities carried humanitarian wishes to see aid the Indonesian government particular, the Paris by priorities – as encouraged align with government is capacity in Indonesia There principles on aid effectiveness. and authorities to play a coordination for government their However, national and local level. at role operational for This argues consistent nor reliable. contribution is neither ‘ to build strategies develop of crises and capacity in advance in line work and respond; capacity to coordinate government substitute for or priorities; and with government required. capacity where complement government is accepting that The other side of the coin of alignment independently of the humanitarian action cannot operate in some situations context in which it takes place. Although assistance, an obstacle to delivering the authorities present in they are assumption in Indonesia is that the general however, are, There the right intentions. and have charge the principles of tensions between unresolved and indepen- humanitarian action, specifically neutrality harmonisation and principles of dence, and the Paris is the government where alignment. In particular, doing in campaigns, as it is currently military prosecuting W substituting for to avoid The other difficult issue is how a parallel developing most damagingly by state capacity, based on international expertise. structure administrative relationships Substitution may be easier than developing importantwith the authorities, but it risks sacrificing local efforts and undermining knowledge to strengthen term. In rapid-onset capacity in the longer government it capacity has been wiped out, or where situations where existed in the first place, international expertisenever may be the only option – although in Indonesia the substantial the in elsewhere national capacity that can be redeployed country should not be underestimated. Conclusions Pr and law, passage of the new disaster-management fatalistic beginning to shift, from attitudes to disasters are management approach. acceptance to a proactive it is not certain and energy that the momentum However, evident in Indonesia will be sustained if other currently a faltering economy, for example from emerge, threats r Pa a useful impact comes international agencies to have systems and making them harnessing government through No international agency has the scale to work work better. The analogy of helping 33 provinces. in all of the country’s hose in the right direction the fire to point the government elationships with aid donors Indonesia retains importantIndonesia retains r and agencies eduction. Once again, though, the devil is in the detail of eduction. Once again, 24/2007 and the decentralisation Law between esolved Aceh in – its role in the archipelago espond anywhere National sovereignty and the independence and National sovereignty of humanitarian action to the myriad of mounts responses While Indonesia regularly the emergencies smaller disasters it faces, for larger That to play. international community has had a useful role in terms of state that, is a need to recognise said, there is The government Indonesia is no Somalia. capacity, sophisticated in its dealings with aid donors becoming more and years, and agencies, building on its experience in recent In 2007, the field of disaster management is no exception. with Group Consultative disbanded the the government dependence on aid low its international donors, reflecting It nevertheless important retains flows. with relationships in a aid donors and agencies, and these actors add value of disaster management, in particularnumber of areas by bringing in additional external capacity and funding, building actors, national and local capacity and linking different the where also a number of areas are There international. But government capacity in other provinces may not be as may not in other provinces capacity But government of the diversity and size as the such and factors strong, 17,000 across spread 200 million people country (with of the the complex nature 5,000km) and islands spanning uncertain all make for an society Civil bureaucracy future. 24/2007, momentum on Law in keeping up the was crucial to play an importantand will continue the in influencing role government. may also hamper decentralisation of An ongoing process has a set of key reforms years, recent implementation. In as local a authority and finances to government devolved offers an as possible. In principle, decentralisation level way to supporteffective community-based disaster risk r are inconsistencies legislative implementation. Until r local bodies set out saying how are regulations law, for the allows should function and financial management needed at local they are of funds to where efficient flow disaster management locally managed, responsive level, elusive. could remain structures TNI) (the is also of the Indonesian armed forces The role the context of autocratic including adapting from evolving, TNIThe has civilian leadership. rule to one of democratic to and command structures reach the geographical r are there the tsunami was crucial. However, following in its role between potential conflicts of interest civilians and assisting combating domestic insurgencies was an example, in Aceh there crises. For affected by TNIuncomfortable the local intimidating from transition rule/martialpopulations during emergency law to after the tsunami. them with assistance providing HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 11 Page pm 1:00 22/6/09 crc HE43 HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 12

is a valid one here. Questions remain over whether Barnaby Willitts-King is a freelance consultant based in Indonesia or similar emerging middle-income countries are Kathmandu, working on humanitarian and conflict policy able to back up their assertions of sovereignty and issues. His email address is [email protected]. leadership with the capacity to be effective.

Land and displacement in Timor-Leste Ibere Lopes

A familiar dilemma faced the Timorese government in displacement, a similar pattern of displacement, resettle- developing a strategy to promote the return and ment and arbitrary occupation occurred, resulting in resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs): should it constant changes of occupancy. The lack of property determine property ownership before promoting return, or records only aggravates this already chaotic picture, and should it promote return first, and deal with property issues unregistered transactions make it almost impossible to later? In the end, it chose to promote return and resettlement disentangle the chain of transfers and identify legitimate through a ‘cash for return’ programme, a decision that was owners, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas. heavily criticised by humanitarian agencies – including the UN – who argued that promoting return without first ‘Cash for return’ and the property dilemma resolving property ownership issues would provoke further following the 2006 crisis tensions and cause re-displacement. In April 2006, 600 personnel were dismissed from the Timorese army after protests over alleged discrimination Today, it is clear that the government’s IDP reintegration pro- based on them being from the west of Timor-Leste. The gramme has been largely successful. However, unresolved dismissals sparked tensions that led to widespread violence property disputes are still a source of tension in receiving and the torching of houses, primarily in the capital Dili. communities, and addressing them remains a condition for Frightened families, predominately from the east of the the sustainable reintegration of IDPs. Based on recent country, sought refuge in churches, schools, NGO offices and monitoring reports, this article offers preliminary observa- parks, on vacant land in and around Dili and at the tions on the results of the government’s approach to land international airport. In early 2008, some 30,000 people and property issues within its IDP reintegration strategy. were living in camps in and around Dili, with another 70,000 staying with family or friends. While the causes underpinning Context the violence were many, there is consensus that unresolved Timor-Leste’s history is marked by numerous episodes of land and property issues were an important element. Latent mass displacement. The first occurrences of forced internal tensions between the lorosae (easterners) and loromonu resettlement were reported during the Portuguese colonial (westerners), exacerbated by these communities’ uneven period, and again during the 1974–75 civil war. The access to land and property in Dili after 1999, played an Indonesian occupation, however, accounts for the most important role in fuelling the violence. significant state-sponsored forced displacement program- mes, with entire villages being resettled as part of The newly elected Timorese government made resolving Indonesian counter-insurgency strategy. Further displace- the displacement crisis its main priority. A survey by the ment occurred around the independence referendum in Ministry of Social Solidarity and UNDP found that more 1998–99, when Indonesian troops and pro-Indonesian than 3,000 abandoned houses had been destroyed and militias waged a campaign of violence, destruction and another 2,000 damaged. Discussions between the illegal mass deportations, causing thousands to seek refuge government and international agencies on how to address outside urban areas. In the latest wave of displacement, in the displacement crisis led to an inter-ministerial ‘retreat’, 2006, approximately 100,000 people fled their homes. where the relevant ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders met to outline an action plan. The Ministry of Social Solidarity, the leading agency on IDP Timor-Leste’s history is marked issues, commissioned a Technical Working Group (TWG) to develop a Recovery Strategy to address the consequences by numerous episodes of mass of the 2006 crisis, with a particular focus on promoting displacement sustainable return and reintegration.1

The initial drafts of the Recovery Strategy concentrated on Displacement and its consequences are the main causes of the most immediate impediment to return: the lack of the uncertainty over property rights Timor-Leste currently habitable housing. According to the first version of the faces. In seeking refuge from violence or being physically strategy, IDPs opting to return or resettle would be given a forced to move, many displaced families abandoned their 1 Led by the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the working group involved former homes, leaving them to be occupied by other technical staff from the IOM, UNDP, the Norwegian Refugee Council

THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE displaced people or destroyed. In each episode of (NRC), Belun (a local NGO) and OCHA.

HUMANITARIAN 12 exchange THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES 13 in order 2 umber 43 • June 2009 umber 43 • June N not the only obstacle to return, and resolving them in and resolving to return, not the only obstacle

re ould return to such land reignite tensions between tensions reignite land to such return ould erlapping rights exist, converting property previous rights and long- eintegration. Other factors which impeded return and which impeded return Other factors eintegration. esettlement included fear and insecurity (easterners were esettlement included fear and insecurity of some rice and the delivery egular distribution of free IDPs waiting in at the time. Leaving not available esources eturnees and recipient communities? If IDPs communities? and recipient eturnees had been esettlement, rather than as separate issues. The Ministry issues. than as separate esettlement, rather egistration by recognising ownership rights in undisputed cases, ownership recognising by egistration isolation would not ensure the conditions for sustainable the conditions ensure isolation would not r r not comfortable to predomin- with the idea of returning IDPs communities, and vice versa); ately western in general agencies had the that law enforcement did not believe Meanwhile, even attacks after return. capacity to prevent good, the from far though conditions in the camps were r basic services attractive made them a safer and more Second, of return. conditions in areas given alternative of in Dili, would take years if only clarifying land rights, even and additional measures complex work, legislative r encourage construction on land with contested ownership? contested on land with construction encourage W r in the first illegal occupants because they were displaced Such fears and to return? should they be allowed place, why a number and partsconcerns prompted of the government that property to suggest organisations of international IDP to be clarified before rights needed began. return its had to decide whether to concentrate The government on clarifying property rights first, resources scarce determined, or once such rights were only return promoting first, and dealing with property return rights promoting chose the the government TWG, On the advice of the later. First, outstanding property for two reasons. issues latter, we camps would have been unacceptable. The few existing been unacceptable. camps would have and the the government built by shelters, transitional Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), accommodate could not Refugee Norwegian IDPthe larger population and no suitable land was available units. Although suitable state land on which to build extra allocate it for decided to was identified, the government headquarters.other purposes, such as the new Post Office not only a lengthy and Clarifying land rights would require but also the passage of survey, cadastral expensive Land Law, legislation, particularlyTransitional of a to determine criteria for resolving conflicting claims, rights to determine criteria for resolving of possession, validation adverse through acquired was no There issues. titles and other sensitive previous piece of legislation could chance that such a controversial the and resolving quickly, be debated and approved matter. displacement crisis was an urgent The Recovery Strategy The Recovery was launched in Strategy Recovery The government’s December 2007, and is ongoing at the time of writing. It to IDPhas adopted a holistic approach reintegration, – including land and each obstacle to return treating property issues – as part of a bundle of factors preventing r 2 A Transitional Land Law would provide the legal basis for first would provide Land Law Transitional 2 A r disputed cases where which to resolve establishing the criteria by ov to rights, according term peaceful possession into ownership established legal criteria, and establishing the administrative property to regularise to the government mechanisms and processes and efficiently. rights effectively

©Enrico Leonardi, November 2008 Displaced people wait for resettlement erlapping land rights, a lack of land registry and propertyerlapping land rights, a lack of land registry ith a history of repeated episodes of displacement, ith a history of repeated eturn. Would the government promote return and return promote the government Would eturn. ecords and insufficient legal frameworks to ascertain and insufficient legal frameworks ecords eservations, a plan was developed under which IDPs a plan was developed eservations, equested the inclusion of a ‘cash for return’equested the inclusion of a ‘cash programme. DPs would reinforce the existing ethnic divide (easterners the existing DPs would reinforce ‘recovery package’‘recovery to their of building materials tailored of building shelter to a kit a two-bedroom needs, from Field surveys the Ministry of by materials for minor repairs. Works of Public Social Solidarity and the Ministry which IDPsidentified the houses from had been displaced, of damage. and assessed the level the government strategy, recovery the draft After reviewing r a cash-only regarding reservations had strong TWG The amounts of cash to believing that giving large approach, I would not), the cash, while westerners would have communities and exacerbate social tensions in recipient these Despite expensive. make building materials more r entitled to different would be or resettle opting to return of destruction of their to the level amounts according $4,500 or a new two-bedroom homes. Entitlements were: shelter for houses deemed uninhabitable; $3,000 for damaged houses; $1,500 for partiallyseverely damaged houses; and $500 for houses needing minor repairs. W ov r difficult to determine it was extremely property ownership, whether IDPs land on which they were entitled to the were supposed to build their new homes, and to which they would r HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 13 Page pm 1:00 22/6/09 crc HE43 HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 14

of Social Solidarity formed dialogue teams, which were Outstanding land and property issues, although still a dispatched to IDP camps and recipient communities to potential source of future tension, have not been an encourage IDPs to return and to facilitate their acceptance impediment to sustainable return. Nonetheless, in villages by recipient communities. reporting problems between community members and IDPs land issues are most often cited as the source, indicating The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), in that land and property issues remain contentious, and may cooperation with other organisations including UNDP, contribute to further conflict. Clarifying land rights will not Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARE, the Jesuit Refugee guarantee stability in neighbourhoods receiving IDPs, but it Service (JRS) and Belun, a local NGO that specialises in will play an important role in promoting peace and conflict resolution, assisted the government in imple- preventing future conflict. menting its Recovery Strategy and in monitoring return. By December 2008, the Ministry of Social Solidarity had Ibere Lopes is the Land Policy and Legislation Task Leader in distributed recovery packages to 11,700 IDP families. An the USAID-funded Strengthening Property Rights in Timor- IOM survey conducted with village chiefs shows that 64% Leste project. In 2007, as a Land Rights Adviser in the UNDP of households have returned to their villages of origin. The Support to Government for IDP Reintegration project, he re-displacement rate has remained remarkably low: only was part of the Technical Working Group set up by the 1.03% of returning families were forced to move out of Timorese government to develop an IDP return strategy. their communities after return. The same survey shows that there is little correlation between villages reporting References and further reading re-displacement and villages reporting post-return problems, including outstanding land and property issues. Daniel Fitzpatrick, Land Issues in a Newly Independent East Timor (Canberra: Department of the Parliamentary According to the survey report, re-displacement seems to Library, 2001). be linked with specific factors related to affected families. Chega!, Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Conclusion Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR), 2008. Overall, the government’s Recovery Strategy has Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, International Crisis succeeded in promoting IDP return and resettlement. The Group, March 2008. high return rate and the small number of re-displacements Cynthia Brady and David Timberman, The Crisis in indicate that the cash-only packages have met the needs Timor-Leste: Causes, Consequences and Options for Conflict Management, Prevention and Mitigation (Dili: associated with return. However, at the time of writing no USAID, 2006). hard data is available on how returnees have used the money. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some returnees Andrew Harrington, ‘Ethnicity, Violence and Land and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste’, East Timor Law Journal, invested a large portion of their package in rebuilding their 2007, http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/ARTICLES/ homes; others ‘shared’ part of their cash with members of 2007/ethnicity_violence_land_property_disputes_tim the receiving community, made contributions to or_leste_harrington.html. community peace-making ceremonies or invested in Scott Leckie, Housing, Land, and Property Rights in livelihoods, particularly replacing trading stalls lost during Post-Conflict Societies: Proposals for a New United the violence. There were some reports of misuse, but this Nations Institutional and Policy Framework, Legal and does not seem to have had a negative impact on return Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA, March 2005. and reintegration. A survey by the Asia Foundation on Chefe de Aldeia Survey, September–November 2008 perceptions of security among the population shows that Monitoring Report, IOM, Dili, 2009. only 2% consider IDP returns to be the most serious Liam Chinn and Silas Everet, A Survey of Community- security issue in their neighbourhood, and only 5% of Police Perceptions, The Asia Foundation, East Timor, respondents in areas that have received returnees believe 2009. that social tensions have increased as a result.

Lessons from the Sichuan earthquake Brian Hoyer, independent consultant

At 2:28pm on 12 May 2008, a powerful earthquake struck losses were estimated at $86 billion, with 21m buildings China’s Sichuan Province. Some 87,500 people were damaged. According to a recent DFID report, the killed, 45.5m affected and 14.4m displaced.1 Economic earthquake drove an estimated 10m people below the 1 The fatality figure used here includes 18,500 missing people, which poverty line, with overall poverty in badly affected areas 2 the government has not yet included in their official death toll of increasing from 11% to 35% of the population. Despite 69,200. This figure comes from the UNISDR Press Release, ‘CRED the extent of the devastation, this earthquake was not Disaster Figures: Deaths and Economic Losses Jump in 2008’, 22 China’s first experience with natural disaster. In fact, four January 2009. Other data from IFRC, ‘China: Sichuan Earthquake’, 2 House of Commons International Development Committee, ‘DFID

THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE Operations Updates 8 and 19, 13 February 2009. and China’, Third Report of Session 2008-09 (HC 180-I), 12 March 2009.

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soldiers and armed police had been mobilised.3 Of the nine government working groups set up for the relief effort, six were supported by the military.4

One challenge to learning from the earthquake response is that data has not been made widely available by the government. For example, in the health sector Xinhua News reported that, as of late May, 45,000 medical workers were contributing to care following the earthquake, with 650 devoted to epidemic control.5 A Health Ministry representative also announced that the relief effort had

©Brian Hoyer, July 2008 eliminated the risk of a disease outbreak, and had even brought about a decline in infectious disease incidence in the worst-hit areas, compared to previous years.6 Unfortunately, evidence is not offered Soldiers outside a destroyed school in Yingxiu Town, near the to support this statement, or similar epicentre of the earthquake statements in other sectors. Inform- ation from the few active organis- ations (including Médecins Sans of the ten most destructive earthquakes on record have Frontières, UNCEF, AmeriCares Foundation and Oxfam- occurred in the country, giving China extensive experience Hong Kong) only capture the relatively small-scale in coping with such emergencies – experience that was put activities of these agencies.

to good use in the response to the Sichuan earthquake. THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES The role of the state in the earthquake one challenge to learning from response The response to the earthquake was dominated by the the earthquake response is that Chinese government. Although the government invited data has not been made widely international humanitarian assistance, few international NGOs engaged directly in emergency response, for a available by the government number of reasons. First, Sichuan was probably not a priority for organisations already involved in responding to concurrent disasters including Cyclone Nargis, which While working for a US-based organisation in two of the made landfall in neighbouring Myanmar just ten days worst-affected counties in Sichuan directly following the before the earthquake. Second, lack of access and local earthquake, over the course of three months I experience may have prevented some INGOs from encountered no other international NGO working on the initiating operations in Sichuan. Third, in the context of an ground. This is consistent with the general pattern of economic boom with over 10% annual growth since 2002, minimal INGO engagement in the emergency response. To it is possible that international actors believed that the accomplish our mission to re-establish referral care and Chinese government had the capacity to respond. provide urgently needed medical supplies, I coordinated Although full recovery remains a distant reality for many, all efforts in direct partnership with government agencies the Chinese state-led response to the Sichuan earthquake and the provincial and county-level Health Bureaus. In my has generally been characterised as efficient and day-to-day work, it became clear that the overall success comprehensive. According to the government, despite the of the government’s response was made possible by its extent of the devastation, disease outbreaks were authoritarian position, its experience of managing large avoided, populations in danger from subsequent flooding population movements and natural disasters and the or landslides were safely relocated, medical services were rapid deployment of the military. These three elements generally restored rapidly and a return to the baseline 3 James Mulvenon, ‘The Chinese Military’s Earthquake Response mortality rate was achieved relatively quickly. The direct Leadership Team’, China Leadership Monitor, no. 25, Summer 2008. provision of aid by the Chinese military was a key element 4 Ibid. in the emergency response phase. Officials reported that, 5 Jonathan Watts, ‘China’s Health Challenges after the Earthquake’, within 14 minutes of the earthquake, the central The Lancet, vol. 371, 31 May 2008. government had dispatched the People’s Liberation Army 6 Xinhua News, ‘Health Ministry: No Epidemic Outbreaks in Quake (PLA) to the affected areas, and within days 113,000 Zone’, 18 July 2008.

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enabled the government to avoid or minimise many of the government’s hierarchical approach, and decisions problems common to disaster response. followed the chain of command from national to provincial and down to the prefecture and county levels. Mitigation strategies included an immediate emphasis on In terms of coordination, after working side-by-side with controlling infectious disease through widespread medical my health bureau counterparts daily for nearly three care and surveillance, the provision of tents for shelter months, I did not observe a single complaint about (albeit insufficient in number at the outset and eventually unwarranted time spent meeting donors or international upgraded to temporary, prefabricated structures), aid groups (though there were complaints about the maintenance of security and the rule of law through unaccompanied relief material pouring into the substantial police and military deployments, traffic and provincial airport and bonded warehouses). Unlike the supply-chain management at the regional and local level, direction eventually chosen by the government of as well as the triage of patients, the deployment of Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake, the Chinese qualified volunteers and the efficient management of in- authorities did not immediately establish a parallel relief kind donations. For instance, as large quantities of agency. Instead, relief activities were partitioned along unsolicited foreign medicines and supplies accumulated in the lines of the cluster approach, with the formation of airport warehouses (donated primarily by organisations working groups roughly corresponding with government without a physical presence in Sichuan), the provincial agencies – an important approach for ongoing coherence health bureau coordinated with the government body in in policy and practice.7 charge of volunteers to assign pharmacology students on holiday to sort, translate and test these donations. Additionally, the movement of people was strictly the millions of people affected regulated in the affected areas. For months, police and military roadblocks prevented non-essential personnel by the earthquake stayed in from entering the disaster zone (personnel also sprayed close proximity to their traffic passing through with disinfectant in the belief that this would reduce the risk of disease). These authoritarian destroyed homes measures largely succeeded in saving lives and reducing the secondary disasters of disease, flooding and damage from strong aftershocks; however, these results came at Another partnership strategy used in the aftermath of the the expense of personal liberties, access to affected areas earthquake which may prove a model for long-term and, in some cases, the unquestioned acceptance of sub- recovery was the ‘twinning’ of several badly affected standard living conditions. counties and cities with other Chinese provinces and municipalities. These partnerships aimed to assist Although the Chinese and foreign press have reported affected areas with resources, personnel and moral outrage among some parents who lost children in support for recovery. Teams of doctors, public health collapsed schools, the overall reaction of direct professionals and sanitation and disease control experts beneficiaries as regards the government aid they were immediately dispatched to the affected partner received was outwardly positive. Affected populations county; a reported 1–3% of the annual gross domestic worked to reconstruct markets and establish a home in product of sponsor provinces was pledged towards long- their government-issued tents, while awaiting further term recovery efforts in the affected county for at least instructions from the local authorities. This differs from three years. For example, Wenchuan County, the epicentre my experience in the North-West Frontier Province of the earthquake, was paired with wealthy Guangdong (NWFP) in Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake, Province for long-term reconstruction assistance, where there was an elevated sense of anxiety, especially including the provision of medical personnel to replace in remote rural areas. For example, in the Allai Valley of staff lost in the earthquake, and the training of Wenchuan- NWFP (population around 100,000), insufficient based staff in teaching hospitals in Guangdong. assistance saw virtually every family electing to migrate to camps at a lower elevation or moving to live with The state-led response focused on efficiency in providing relatives elsewhere. Although some seasonal migration resources and services to the largest number of people takes place annually in the region, post-earthquake possible. However, this came at a price; for instance, in migration occurred on a large scale, and was even order to get food to everyone who needed it nutritionally encouraged by some NGOs. By contrast, the millions of deficient instant noodles were provided for days on end in people affected by the Sichuan earthquake, even those some locations. Shelter could not be manufactured quickly living in mountainous rural areas, stayed in close enough (despite temporary state seizure of suitable textile proximity to their destroyed homes. 7 Howard W. French, ‘UN Leader Praises China’s Quake Response’, New York Times, 25 May 2008. These groups included the Emergency In the days and months following the earthquake, many Management and Relief Provision Group, the Masses’ Livelihood familiar disaster response tools and mechanisms were Group, the Seismic Monitoring Group, the Sanitation and Epidemic not utilised: there were no cluster meetings, and the Prevention Group, the Propaganda Group, the Production Restoration Sphere Standards and other guidelines common in the Group, the Safeguarding Infrastructure and Post-Disaster humanitarian community were not in evidence. Instead, a Reconstruction Group, the Water Resources Group and the Public Order Group.

THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES OF THE ROLE coordinated response was achieved through the

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factories), resulting in up to 12 individuals sharing one setting of clear criteria and appropriate restrictions on family-size tent. The absence of water-borne diseases may unsolicited in-kind medical or other supplies, for instance, actually be attributed to a culture of boiling water, rather led to the more efficient use of resources and eased the than the government’s pervasive disinfection campaign. It is supply-chain bottlenecks common in other disasters of clear that action to protect against a secondary disaster did similar magnitude, and overall the response was crucial in not come from abroad but from within China. Although the saving many lives. At the same time, however, greater state deserves praise for its handling of the response, there efforts could have been made to enlist the support of are areas for improvement. specialised international agencies in specific areas, including emergency shelter, livelihoods and health. In the Lessons for the future health sector, for instance, very little attention was paid to In the aftermath of every major recent natural disaster, psychosocial and mental health programmes, especially from the Indian Ocean tsunami to the Pakistan earthquake among elderly people, who may well have benefited from and even the cyclone in Myanmar, a deluge of assistance specialised support from the humanitarian community. from international non-governmental organisations has Finally, although the state deserves praise for its handling had a significant impact. This was not the case in China, of the response, a lack of transparency in terms of specific where very little international assistance was provided data and details of the response have concealed many of and the response was very largely state-led – a vast relief these successes, as well as obscuring areas for effort launched by the Chinese government and carried improvement. out by hundreds of thousands of soldiers, civil servants and civilian volunteers. The government’s approach to the Brian Hoyer is an independent consultant. His email emergency response was effective in several respects; the address is [email protected].

Solving the risk equation: People-centred disaster risk assessment in Ethiopia Tanya Boudreau Network Paper 66

June 2009 THE ROLE OF AFFECTED STATES

We live in a world buffeted by hazards. Some 85% of the world’s population resides in areas affected at least once in the past 30 years by a major earthquake, tropical cyclone, flood or drought. In the last 20 years, well over two million people have been killed by natural disasters. The total number of people affected each year has doubled over the last decade. For these people, it is not a question of whether major hazards will occur, but when. Depending on the vulnerability of the households affected, and the systems set up to protect these populations, these hazards can catapult them into new levels of destitution.

With so many of the world’s people so close to the edge, an active disaster risk management system, capable of both corrective (current disasters) and prospective (future potential disasters) risk management is essential. In Ethiopia the system has to be especially sensitive, able to detect when even a small shock might result in catastrophe. A number of factors have contributed to the continued (and in some cases growing) impoverishment of rural households in Ethiopia. These include population growth, decreasing farm sizes, an inadequate road and market infrastructure, the knock-on effects of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and development policies that focus on crop production in areas that have long since lost their capacity for self-sufficiency.

This paper argues that the information and analysis system recently established within the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture represents a substantial new opportunity for people-centred disaster risk assessment. The national livelihoods database provides the capacity to understand the diverse vulnerabilities of populations and to mathematically link these to hazards – a core requirement for carrying out anticipatory disaster risk assessments. The vulnerability component of the analytical process was previously missing or patchy at best. With the new national livelihoods information system, this gap has been largely filled.

The paper also discusses several methodological and conceptual advancements relevant to disaster risk reduction, including multi-hazard risk analysis, survival and livelihoods protection thresholds and seasonal tools for analysing intra-annual variability.

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PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES Britain and Afghanistan: policy and expectations Jon Bennett, Oxford Development Consultants

Even a cursory reading of events in Afghanistan over the It is also difficult to find technical experts willing to stay on last 12 months would reveal an undeniable sense of the ground for any length of time in a highly volatile and confusion, even panic, in UK policy as each one of its dangerous environment. primary objectives – legitimate government, stabilisation, counter-narcotics and development – is systematically challenged by events on the ground. Senior military officers are on record as saying that the war in the country it is difficult to find technical is un-winnable in any conventional sense. Meanwhile, experts willing to stay on the international aid organisations are caught in a quandary. On the one hand, Afghans say repeatedly that they want ground for any length of time stability and security as a prerequisite to any sustainable recovery; on the other, the proximity of foreign armies compromises aid agencies’ perceived neutrality, making The problem is complicated by the presence of two distinct the distinction between military and humanitarian foreign military forces: first, the Coalition Forces (CF) intervention a matter solely of degree. under Operation Enduring Freedom, which are on a war footing but occasionally involve themselves in ‘Stabilisation’ humanitarian and reconstruction work, political reform, The UK government has explicitly addressed the link information gathering, psychological operations and between military and development strategy with a new special operations; and second, the NATO/ISAF operation, paradigm – ‘stabilisation’. The vision of the ‘Comprehensive under a UN mandate. Both forces are in uniform and both Approach’ to Afghanistan is of a partnership between the are, irrespective of their mandates or functions, Department for International Development (DFID), the indistinguishable to the public, with the image portrayed Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Foreign Office to ‘engage, by one inevitably affecting the degree of acceptance of the stabilise and develop’ the country in a seamless continuum other. News spreads fast, and the bombing of civilians in ranging from ‘kinetic’ engagement (i.e., counter-insurgency) the east understandably colours notions of ‘security’ to Afghan-owned development.1 This echoes an earlier offered by military forces in the south. military doctrine that recognised the inter-relationship between political, military and aid efforts and sought to As a department of government, DFID is of course tied to ‘improve joined-up approaches to civilian-military planning UK foreign policy, which means that, if its role within the and training’.2 PRT in Helmand raises questions over ‘humanitarian space’, such a charge is misplaced. Nevertheless, the What is remarkable is how quickly this alliance between close civil–military nexus (the PRT is inside the British the sword and the ploughshare has evolved in UK military camp) means that very few international NGOs are government thinking. The international community moved prepared to work with the PRT. At the NATO Summit in from NATO-led peacekeeping to counter-insurgency in Strasbourg in April, 11 NGOs, including Oxfam, Christian 2006, and the UK military deployed to Helmand in the Aid, Save the Children, Care and Action Aid, called for aid south of Afghanistan. The chosen vehicle for a delivery and military goals to be de-linked. These agencies ‘comprehensive approach’ has been Provincial claim that the PRTs’ ‘hearts-and-minds’ approach to Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), piloted in Iraq. However, assistance, drawn from counter-insurgency doctrine, ‘is unlike the relatively peaceful north, where PRTs have had not only unsustainable, it is highly unlikely to achieve its a degree of success, Helmand is a conflict zone. It has intended security objectives’.3 been difficult for aid agencies and DFID to focus on reconstruction and development when access to (Re)building the state populations is largely determined by which areas are The PRT concept was originally devised as an element of ‘secured’ by British and Afghan military forces. international military engagement outside Kabul, in Development here requires longer timeframes and a more support of disarmament, demobilisation and nascent sophisticated form of interaction with target beneficiaries. reconstruction efforts.4 In practice, it has evolved to take

1 Speech by International Development Secretary Douglas Alexander, 3 ‘Caught in the Conflict: Civilians and International Security Strategy ‘Afghanistan: From Stabilisation to State-building’, International in Afghanistan’, briefing paper for the NATO Heads of State and Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 17 September 2008, http:// Government Summit, Strasbourg, 3–4 April 2009. www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/sos-afghan-statebuilding.asp. 4 There are currently 26 PRTs in Afghanistan. Until 2006, the UK led 2 UK Ministry of Defence, ‘The Comprehensive Approach’, Joint PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Maymana, before handing these over to

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES Discussion Note 4/05, January 2006. NATO partners. It now leads only the Helmand PRT.

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Network Papers

Network Papers provide longer treatments of particular areas of humanitarian concern. We publish four a year.

14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996) 15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for the Assessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996) 16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III ed. J. Borton (1996) 17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996) 18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflict and Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996) 19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what relief workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997) 20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel ed. S. Davidson (1997) 21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern Sudan Experience by I. Levine (1997) 22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by P. A tkinson (1997) 23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997) 24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by C. Palmer (1998) 25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the new relief ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998) 26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for understanding rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998) 27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aid for disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998) 28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett (1999) 29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: The Experience of the IKAFE Refugee Settlement Programme, Uganda by K. Neefjes (1999) 30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies for Protecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul (1999) 31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being by R. Garfield (1999) 32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000) 33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief Agencies Need to Know by P. Le Billon (2000) 34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations for Accountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000) 35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits and Assessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann (2001) 36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: A Livelihoods Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001) 37 A Bridge Too Far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys (2002) 38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis and Recommendations for Practice by A. Smith (2002) 39 Reconsidering the tools of war: small arms and humanitarian action by R. Muggah with M. Griffiths (2002) 40 Drought, Livestock and Livelihoods: Lessons from the 1999-2001 Emergency Response in the Pastoral Sector in Kenya by Yacob Aklilu and Mike Wekesa (2002) 41 Politically Informed Humanitarian Programming: Using a Political Economy Approach by Sarah Collinson (2002) 42 The Role of Education in Protecting Children in Conflict by Susan Nicolai and Carl Triplehorn (2003) 43 Housing Reconstruction after Conflict and Disaster by Sultan Barakat and Rebecca Roberts (2003) 44 Livelihoods and Protection: Displacement and Vulnerable Communities in Kismaayo, Southern Somalia by Simon Narbeth and Calum McLean (2003) 45 Reproductive health for conflict-affected people: policies, research and Programmes by Therese McGinn, Sara Casey, Susan Purdin and Mendy Marsh (2004) 46 Humanitarian futures: practical policy perspectives by Randolph Kent (2004) 47 Missing the point: an analysis of food security interventions in the Great Lakes by Simon Levine and Claire Chastre (2004) 48 Community-based therapeutic care: a new paradigm for selective feeding in nutritional crises by Steve Collins (2004) 49 Disaster preparedness programmes in India: a cost benefit analysis by Courtenay Cabot Venton and Paul Venton (2004)

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50 Cash relief in a contested area: lessons from Somalia by Degan Ali, Fanta Toure, Tilleke Kiewied (2005) 51 Humanitarian engagement with non-state armed actors: the parameters of negotiated armed access by Max Glaser (2005) 52 Interpreting and using mortaility data in humanitarian emergencies: a primer by Francesco Checchi and Les Roberts (2005) 53 Protecting and assisting older people in emergencies by Jo Wells (2005) 54 Housing reconstruction in post-earthquake Gujarat: a comparative analysis by Jennifer Duyne Barenstein (2006) 55 Understanding and addressing staff turnover in humanitarian agencies by David Loquercio, Mark Hammersley and Ben Emmens (2006) 56 The meaning and measurement of acute malnutrition in emergencies: a primer for decision-makers by Helen Young and Susanne Jaspars (2006) 57 Standards put to the test: implementing the INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crisis and Early Reconstruction by Allison Anderson et al. (2006) 58 Concerning the accountability of humanitarian action by Austen Davis (2007) 59 Contingency planning and humanitarian action: a review of practice by Richard Choularton (2007) 60 Mobile Health Units in emergency operation: a methodological approach by Stéphane Du Mortier and Rudi Coninx (2007) 61 Public health in crisis-affected populations: A practical guide for decision-makers by Francesco Checchi, Michelle Gayer, Rebecca Freeman Grais and Edward J. Mills (2007) 62 Full of promise: how the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism can better protect children by Katy Barnett and Anna Jefferys (2008) 63 Measuring the effectiveness of Supplementary Feeding Programmes in emergencies by Carlos Navarro-Colorado, Frances Mason and Jeremy Shoham (2008) 64 Livelihoods, livestock and humanitarian response: the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards by Cathy Watson and Andy Catley (2008) 65 Food security and livelihoods programming in conflict: a review by Susanne Jaspars and Dan Maxwell (2009) 66 Solving the risk equation: People-centred disaster risk assessment in Ethiopia by Tanya Boudreau (2009) Good Practice Reviews Good Practice Reviews are major, peer-reviewed contributions to humanitarian practice. They are produced periodically. 1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1994) 2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994) 3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: from Nutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jaspars and H. Young (1996) 4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by the ODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996) 5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populations in Emergency Operations: Registration and its Alternatives by J. Telford (1997) 6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for Displaced Populations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998) 7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998) 8 Operational Security Management in Violent Environments by K. Van Brabant (2000) 9 Disaster Risk Reduction: Mitigation and Preparedness in Development and Emergency Programming by John Twigg (2004) 10 Emergency food security interventions, by Daniel Maxwell, Kate Sadler, Amanda Sim, Mercy Mutonyi, Rebecca Egan and Mackinnon Webster (2008)

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on a wider range of objectives related to post-war majority came to the fore as discontent over the division of stabilisation.5 Backed by a new government organisation, political spoils among other ethnic groups after 2001 the inter-departmental Stabilisation Unit, the PRT in intensified. Declining confidence in President Hamid Helmand now adds state-building to its list of tasks, its Karzai’s government has raised doubts about the viability mission being ‘to assist the government of Afghanistan to of the state-building project. Kabul-based central extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development institutions are perceived by many as predatory and of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of corrupt; by backing them, international donors may have operations, and through military presence, enable SSR inadvertently become part of the problem. Some NGOs [security sector reform] and reconstruction efforts’.6 and analysts have argued for a more limited view of what is possible at this stage – investments in provincial or State-building – and by extension state legitimacy – have district programmes may have a more direct impact on been central to DFID’s strategy in Afghanistan since its poverty reduction. office opened in Kabul in late 2001. Afghanistan is a ‘fragile state’, one of the poorest countries in the world, A lack of shared vision and the December 2001 Bonn Agreement saw a collective The UK government as a whole has not had a shared vision determination by donors to lend maximum support to the of the link between security and development. At least new interim government to enable it to build authority until mid-2007, various government departments pursued from the centre. The UK is the third-largest development almost separate approaches towards counter-insurgency, aid donor to Afghanistan (after the US and the European counter-narcotics, peace-building and development – each Commission), giving just over £100 million per year since inherently a legitimate objective, but not necessarily 2004–2005, 80% of which is channelled through the mutually reinforcing. The picture is further complicated by central government. the mismatch between the policies of Afghanistan’s various donors; the UK cannot be immune from what the Along with most donors, the UK government has dominant donor in Afghanistan, the US, is doing elsewhere sometimes acted as though Afghan history started in in the country. For example, the US military’s use of the 2001. This peculiarly ahistorical notion suggests a tabula Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) – an armed but ill- rasa upon which a new vision of statehood can be written. trained counter-insurgency proxy force – has been piloted The implicit assumption is that the historical evolution of in Wardak Province, and is likely to be expanded. However, statehood can be compressed. Thus, the UK’s programme APPF forces may reinforce and legitimise precisely those has been predicated on several assumptions: forms of behaviour that epitomise a lawless state. Local warlords, given a cloak of authority, may conduct activities 1. That the formal political transition process would in furtherance of their own objectives or interests – for result in a stable political settlement for the country as instance the production and trafficking of narcotics or NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND a whole. seeking to gain advantage in local, tribal or ethnic conflicts 2. That building the state from the centre first would and rivalries.8 confer legitimacy upon it; this would then spread to provincial and local levels. 3. That the pillars of growth are the formal institutions of society (the judiciary, the legislature, banking, the the UK government has not had a private sector).7 shared vision of the link between

Building the architecture of a viable state has meant a security and development strong focus on technical assistance and the capacity development of formal state institutions, particularly in the executive branch of government. As a consequence, Perhaps the greatest omission by the major donors relatively little attention has been paid to accountability, including the UK has been the absence of a concerted including the monitoring and advocacy role of civil society effort to gauge public opinion. Only recently has the Asia and other accountability mechanisms. Foundation begun to conduct public opinion polls on issues ranging from the military occupation to government After 2006 the fault lines of this approach became performance.9 Local perceptions of peace operations increasingly visible. Not only was there an intensified suggest that, for some communities in Afghanistan, insurgency and regrouping of the Taliban, but also the assistance is welcome regardless of the donor’s military assumed privileges enjoyed by the Pushtun ethnic identity or political objective. This may provide some 5 ‘A PRT is a civil-military institution that is able to penetrate the more comfort to those who provide humanitarian assistance in unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is the wake of military engagement (the Quick Impact able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of Projects (QIPs) in Helmand, for example). But in the its diplomacy, military, and economic components.’ PRT Handbook, country as a whole, the lack of good national or provincial Edition 2, 31 October 2006. data and security constraints on access to beneficiaries 6 PRT Steering Committee, January 2005, www.isaf6.eurocorps.org. 7 See, for example, Written Answers: Afghan DFID Assistance, 22 April 8 ‘Caught in the Conflict’. 2004, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldhansrd/ 9 Asia Foundation, State Building, Security and Social Change in vo040422/text/40422w01.htm. Afghanistan: Reflections on a Survey of the Afghan People, 2008.

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impede an accurate assessment of project progress. solution, but the more UK government departments talk Moreover, as the Asia Foundation reports, the security of solely to themselves about time-bound ‘targets’, models of one’s family is the primary determinant of Afghan loyalty, statehood and ‘integrated approaches’, the more difficult it and Afghans know better than anyone how inherently will be to achieve a peaceful settlement that matches the precarious their position is if they are seen to be too expectations of the Afghan people. One of the reasons closely aligned to NATO/ISAF forces. Afghans can be ‘hired but not bought’ is that they have an acute sense of history and of the relatively brief presence of The fact that the survival of the Afghan state relies almost foreigners in their country. Reflecting on the ten-year Soviet entirely on external capital and the provision of military occupation of the 1980s, many Afghans know that there is support continues to undermine its domestic legitimacy. nothing unique about this latest attempt to bring ‘peace The dialogue between central government and the and development’ to their country. periphery is characterised by shrewd political bargaining and patronage, rather than common purpose in the pursuit Jon Bennett is Director of Oxford Development Consultants. of durable solutions and lasting peace. There is no easy [email protected]

Are humanitarians fuelling conflicts? Evidence from eastern Chad and Darfur Clea Kahn and Elena Lucchi, MSF

For aid organisations working in eastern Chad and Darfur, ‘minimize the harm they may inadvertently be doing by theft and banditry are among the greatest impediments to being present and providing assistance. Humanitarian the effective implementation of programmes. Vehicle actors need to be aware if aid is used as an instrument of hijackings and attacks on compounds have led to war or if aid is an indirect part of the dynamics of the enormous material losses and delays and reductions in conflict’.2 Such unintended negative consequences may services to conflict-affected populations. The issue has be wide-ranging and extremely complex. been widely discussed by the humanitarian community, and one study on advocacy in Darfur cited insecurity for One of the crucial elements in assessing harm is looking aid workers as the third most common subject in press at the extent to which humanitarian assistance releases issued by humanitarian organisations.1 However, contributes to the overall economy of the conflict. Prior to despite solid evidence to show that stolen humanitarian the expulsion of aid organisations, it was estimated that vehicles, equipment and cash are being used to fuel the the cost of providing assistance in 2009 in Darfur alone war economy, few have asked whether humanitarian was a billion dollars.3 The complexity of the economic principles are being challenged or even undermined. dynamics in eastern Chad and Darfur makes it impossible to see exactly how resources may have been diverted, This is not a new question. In 1995, Médecins Sans manipulated or incorporated into the strategies of parties Frontières (MSF) made the very difficult decision to to the conflict. That said, this kind of investment is withdraw from the heavily militarised refugee camps in inevitably a catalyst for change, both positive and Goma in eastern DRC, rather than allow assistance to be negative. manipulated. In other cases, notably Somalia, Liberia and South Sudan, the humanitarian community has been forced to confront its relationship with armed actors and the cost of providing assistance war economies and take measures to mitigate the negative consequences of aid provision. in 2009 in Darfur alone was a billion dollars This article does not attempt to analyse the overall financial impact of humanitarian operations on the war economy in eastern Chad and Darfur. Instead, it examines some of the trends and, by looking at the financial Over time, analysts have identified a number of ways in indicators from one organisation, identify key issues which assistance can be diverted or manipulated in which need to be addressed. conflict. What is particularly interesting in Darfur and eastern Chad is the extent to which these patterns have, in Principles at stake: ‘do no harm’ and neutrality many respects, been reversed. Do no harm The ‘do no harm’ principle is derived from medical ethics. 2 OCHA, Glossary UN-CMCoord, September 2008, It requires humanitarian organisations to strive to http://ochaonline.un.org. 1 See Humanitarian Advocacy in Darfur: The Challenge of Neutrality, 3 AFP, ‘Year of Failure in Darfur as ICC Spectre Looms over Sudan’, 28

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES HPG Policy Brief 28, October 2007, p. 2. December 2008, . http://www.reliefweb.int.

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appear to be the norm. Certainly, in Chad or Darfur this kind of manipulation is not comparable to the wholesale control by rebel forces seen in Goma’s camps, for example. Moreover, although theft and attacks have resulted in losses of food and other relief goods, the acquisition of these supplies rarely seems to have been the explicit intention.5

neutrality is not only ideological: it also has practical implications

However, aid has a greater economic value, and this can give considerable power to governments and armed actors that are able to influence where, how and to whom it is provided. Management by government or rebel groups of where aid can be delivered can reinforce locations of strategic military interest, for example, or can build support for one side or the other by giving rewards to allies, while denying them to enemies. Humanitarian

©Siw Muller, MSF access maps (available at http://www.unsudanig.org) graphically illustrate this trend.

Crime and the economy of war. One of the more frustrating aspects of working in Chad and Darfur is that Donkeys not trucks: piloting a low-tech response it is virtually impossible to identify the perpetrators of to asset theft crimes, including theft from humanitarian organisations. The fragmentation of armed groups and the tendency of Humanitarian assistance confers legitimacy. For rebel parties to the conflict to use proxy militias or to form groups or armed insurgents, when humanitarians negotiate alliances with local or tribal groups make it very difficult

with them for access to people living in their areas of to attribute responsibility. In addition to identifiable rebel NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND control, this interaction can be used to demonstrate that groups, there is also a plethora of bandits and thieves, they are legitimate, or ‘recognised’. In eastern Chad and apparently operating independently. Criminality is also Darfur, this has been turned on its head: in both areas, responsible for much of the looting experienced by power and legitimacy are derived not from fostering positive humanitarian organisations in Chad and Darfur, and relationships with the humanitarian community, but hence is part of the wider war economy. Criminality through demonstrations of brute force. The result is a flourishes because of impunity: bandits are not ‘Toyota war’, in which the seizure of vehicles by force from apprehended and punished not only because this is humanitarian organisations confers legitimacy. In Darfur difficult, but also – and perhaps especially – because this pattern is particularly clear, as the parties that are there is no interest in doing so. invited to the negotiating table are generally those with the greatest military strength, and asset targeting peaks just Neutrality prior to peace talks. Theft increases as rebel groups with The commitment to neutrality is generally understood as a ever-decreasing accountability to the people they claim to conscious choice not to take sides in a conflict. The represent aim for a seat at the table. principle of neutrality essentially imposes two obligations on neutral parties: (i) maintaining a distance from Humanitarian assistance as an asset in itself. The most hostilities, that is abstaining from actions that would help common example of manipulation of assistance is its or hinder one party or the other; and (ii) taking no part in diversion – particularly in the form of food and non-food political, racial, religious or ideological controversy. items – from the civilian population to armed groups. Although it is clear that, in at least some locations, rebels Neutrality is not only ideological: it also has practical are using IDP and refugee camps as bases,4 this does not implications. Neutrality requires humanitarian organisations to work in such a way that their action does not provide 4 See, for example, UNHCR, ‘Chad: Rebel Infiltration of Oure Cassoni support to either side of the conflict, or is perceived as doing Camp’, 26 May 2006 (www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/news/ opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=4476dbd94); and Reuters, ‘Rebel so. Working in this way allows humanitarians to negotiate Recruitment, Banditry Threaten Chad Camps – UN’, Reuters, 3 access to conflict-affected populations by assuring parties to December 2008 (www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N03353080.htm) the conflict that assistance will not be provided in a way that and ‘Sudan Surrounds, Attacks Volatile Darfur Camp – Witnesses’, 21 unfairly gives one side an advantage over another. August 2007 (http://uk.reuters.com). 5 Interview with WFP representative, May 2007. 5 Interview with WFP representative, May 2007.

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Table 1: Key data Chad (€)Darfur (€) 2008 country budget (MSF OCA) 3,519,484 2,767,414 Value of looted assets and cash 79,918 71,507 % on budget 2.27 % 2.58% Value of fees paid to the government9 20,235 52,485 % on budget 0.57% 1.89% % looted assets and government fees 2.84% 4.47%

In order to assess the extent to which neutrality is affected non-food item delivery. It is also important to note that, by looting in eastern Chad and Darfur, a small sample of although only the financial value of assets has been losses was examined. The figures that follow were calculated here, vehicles and communications equipment calculated from lists of looted assets provided by MSF have a value beyond their monetary worth for armed OCA6 in 2008. Their financial value was calculated using actors, increasing their capacity to wage war. the MSF standard purchasing pricing list, and items that were looted and subsequently recovered are not included As it is usually impossible to identify the perpetrators of in the assessment. Additional costs, such as import taxes7 crimes or their allegiance, we are unable to determine and transport from the purchasing site to the final whether our aid helps or hinders one or more parties to the destination, were not included in the calculations. conflict – or, by extension, if these involuntary contributions However, in order to provide a fair assessment, taxes and compromise our neutrality. However, it is clear that the other fees paid to the government have been included. losses – particularly looted assets – constitute a serious The governments are parties to the conflict and have barrier to the efficient and effective provision of assistance, access to funds received from humanitarians directly. and can contribute to the war economy. This raises a serious While governments often waive fees and exempt challenge for the humanitarian community: can humani- humanitarian agencies from taxation to facilitate tarians be accused of fuelling or prolonging the conflict in maximum support for populations in need, this is not the these two countries? case in Sudan. The government has instead created additional administrative and bureaucratic obstacles to Final thoughts access, most of which have a financial value. Including Although considerable emphasis has been placed in this government fees captures some of the financial impact of article on the possible negative consequences of these impediments. The figures do not include charges assistance, humanitarian aid in both Chad and Darfur has that could not be directly attributed to the government – played a crucial role in the past five years in mitigating the water and electricity, for example.8 negative impact of the conflict on the civilian population. Health indicators have stabilised in the region as a result The overall proportion of looted assets and fees paid was of assistance, and the presence of international actors is 2.84% in Chad, and 4.47% in Darfur. While neither the believed to have had a positive impact on security for the proportion nor the total sums are shocking, the population. contribution to the war economy is nonetheless substantial. It must also be considered that the total Given the limited information and analysis available, it is resources either looted or paid to the two governments in impossible to draw clear conclusions about the extent to taxes, visas and fees by NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC which trends in eastern Chad and Darfur are pushing up would be much larger, particularly given that many of against the limits of humanitarian principles. It is, these are resource-heavy operations, including food and however, possible to point to some serious concerns, and 6 OCA is Operational Centre Amsterdam. This analysis is based solely make recommendations for further study. on the Dutch section of MSF. 7 Custom clearance fees are included in the overall budget of the In financial terms, is there an acceptable threshold of loss mission and are accounted as ‘taxes’. Organisations working in Chad which allows us to define whether the neutrality of a pay 25% in tax for every item they import, with the exception of medi- humanitarian organisation has been compromised? At cation, which carries a 2% levy. This tax was not included in this calcu- what stage does the contribution of the humanitarian lation. In Darfur, import fees are limited to pre-clearance fees (e.g. community to the war economy qualify as ‘doing harm’? In quality certificate, loading/offloading fees, delivery order fees, trans- attempting to avoid doing harm, humanitarians must take port costs, clearance fees). These are impossible to quantify. care not to allow parties to the conflict to dictate the terms 8 The government’s recent expulsion of organisations and seizure of of assistance, or penalise civilians by making the aid they their assets would make for a very different picture for 2009. MSF’s need conditional on the good behaviour of armed actors. assets included medical stocks as well as vehicles, generators, telecommunications material and computers, worth ¤1,196,140. 9 Selected budget lines included entry visas, regularisation fees, stay The humanitarian community can take further action, in and work permits, immigration, registration, medical registration, accordance with its obligations under international law, to airport and exit fees and ID cards. Also included were taxes levied on minimise contributions to the war economy. Article 23 of

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES housing and radio authorisations, as well as bank fees. Geneva Convention IV specifies that: ‘A party shall allow

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free passage of certain goods through its territory … reverse the trend, making responsible behaviour towards subject to the condition that this party is satisfied that the civilian population and humanitarians as much a there are no serious reasons for fearing that: prerequisite for a seat at the negotiating table as the capacity to wage war. a) consignments might be diverted from their destinations b) control might not be effective Clea Kahn and Elena Lucchi are Humanitarian Affairs c) a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts Advisors for MSF Operational Centre Amsterdam. This or the economy of the party’s enemy’. article is written in a personal capacity. Clea’s email address is [email protected], and Elena’s is It follows that, unless an organisation can guarantee the [email protected]. above, there is no corresponding obligation on the part of armed actors to provide access for humanitarians to the References and further reading conflict-affected population. Each organisation thus has an obligation to ensure that it is in full control of its Kate Mackintosh, The Principles of Humanitarian resources, including supervision of the distribution of Action in International Humanitarian Law, HPG Report relief items, verification of distribution reports and spot- 5, March 2000. checks of warehouses. Moreover, an organisation would Nicholas Leader, The Politics of Principle: The Principles have to carry out an analysis of the potential impact of its of Humanitarian Action in Practice, HPG Report 2, March relief work on the local community. In Chad, MSF is taking 2000. increasingly strict steps to reduce exposure to banditry by Mark Bradbury, Nicholas Leader and Kate Mackintosh, reducing the use of resources most valued by armed The ‘Agreement on Ground Rules’ in South Sudan, HPG groups: using donkeys and local trucks instead of Report 4, March 2000. vehicles, for example, and replacing valuable communi- Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil cations equipment with less attractive gear. Wars (London: International African Institute, 2004). It is important as well that political actors, in seeking to D. Thurer, ‘Dunant’s Pyramid: Thoughts on the achieve peace in the region, act conscientiously and ‘Humanitarian Space’, International Review of the Red responsibly. As mentioned above, the legitimacy of armed Cross, vol. 89, no. 865, March 2007. actors in Darfur in particular is gained through irrespon- David Shearer, ‘Aiding or Abetting? Humanitarian Aid and sible behaviour, often at the expense of humanitarian Its Economic Role in Civil War’, in Mats Berdal and David operations. While political processes and humanitarian M. Malone (eds), Greed and Grievance: Economic operations must remain separate, political actors engaged Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). in peace processes should take note of this, and try to RCIEADPLC NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND

Lessons from campaigning on Darfur Jeremy Smith, independent consultant

The scale of the mobilisation of European and American with peaks in the late 1980s and mid-to-late 1990s. Conflict NGOs in response to the human rights and humanitarian escalated again in 2000–2003. Some NGOs, mostly Sudan- crisis in Darfur since 2003 is arguably unprecedented. ese, attempted to sound the alarm, but their warnings were Attracting public and media attention to the crisis has largely ignored until 2003.1 Amnesty International, which been an important part of this response. reported specific human rights violations from 2002, made Darfur an organisational priority in April 2004, while in the This article argues that many campaigning groups have United States the Save Darfur Coalition took shape out of a focused their energies on governments which have relatively ‘Darfur Emergency Summit’ organised by the Holocaust little influence on the situation in Darfur. Yet the apparent Memorial Museum and the American Jewish World Service in success of campaigning on Darfur – in terms of media July 2004. Subsequent years have seen a proliferation of coverage and public and celebrity support – and the initiatives and groups, including the Dream for Darfur and dominant, agenda-setting status of the main campaigning Justice for Darfur campaigns, the Darfur Consortium and the coalitions have made it difficult to identify alternative Globe for Darfur and TeamDarfur groupings.2 approaches focused on actors with more direct influence. The use of certain techniques and the adoption of a high- Of all these groups, only the Darfur Consortium, formed in profile, ‘aggressive’ stance appear almost to have become September 2004, was created by NGOs based in Africa. An ends in themselves, rather than a strategic choice 1 Sharath Srinivasan, Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict determined by what is most likely to bring pressure to bear Prevention: Lessons from Darfur, Minority Rights Group International, upon the most influential targets. September 2006. 2 The term ‘campaigning’, taken to mean ‘an operation energetically The origins of campaigning on Darfur pursued to accomplish a purpose’, is used in deliberate distinction to Darfur has been in a state of simmering conflict for decades, ‘advocacy’, ‘the act of pleading or arguing in favour of a cause’.

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Arab Coalition for Darfur was founded only in May 2008. Operating out of Western Europe and North America, the members of the various other coalitions have focused their efforts on actors situated outside, rather than within, Sudan, and emphasise sticks, rather than carrots: the US and European governments, it is supposed, can and should force the government

of Sudan to stop its nefarious Bensemra ©REUTERS/Zohra actions in Darfur.3

Missing the target Focusing campaigning on Western governments presupposes that they have genuine influence on the behaviour and actions of the A displaced Sudanese woman at Al Salam camp, El Fasher, March 2009 Sudanese government. NGOs have focused on ‘easier’ targets with whom they are more comfortable and with whom they the appropriate political or military response to a crisis such have existing relationships, such as the European Union and as Darfur is, however, not clear, and many are apparently the United Nations, rather than Arab governments or China. uncomfortable with this solution.4

Campaigning organisations have also employed familiar Calling for peacekeepers where there is no peace to keep tactics. High-intensity media work has gone hand-in-hand and no roadmap for peace that could form the basis of a with mobilising the public, coming together in the more comprehensive campaigning agenda is not the only succession of ‘Days for Darfur’ organised across the world. awkward policy position NGOs have manoeuvred Involving a huge amount of effort, these events have at themselves into. The issuance by the International best secured a reaffirmation from Western governments of Criminal Court (ICC) of an arrest warrant for President al- positions already held; at worst, they have forced these Bashir on 4 March fulfils one of the main aims of NGO governments into adopting ‘tough’ positions, to which the campaigns: the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of Sudanese government has responded with even greater human rights violations. Major human rights NGOs intransigence. One respondent working within the media interpret the arrest warrant variously as ‘a victory for notes that the government of Sudan does not ‘care about Darfur’s victims’, ‘a welcome and crucial step’ and ‘a the international media any more, only the Arabic media landmark for international justice’.5 However, whether the and, fundamentally, internal opinion’. unintended consequences – the expulsion of international humanitarian NGOs, the apparent removal of any lingering Policy pitfalls equivocation on the part of African and Arab governments To keep Darfur on the agenda, campaigners have relied on in their support for Bashir and the resultant emboldening simple messages and clear-cut solutions, which they of the government of Sudan – outweigh the long-term believe appeal to their Western government audience. benefits and symbolic importance of the ICC process is an While capturing the complexity of the situation in Darfur and open question. The point is that it is impossible for NGOs generating simple, ‘campaignable’ messages are not to form a judgement as to the relative costs and benefits mutually exclusive ambitions, simple messages suggest because a policy of demanding full compliance with ICC that there are simple solutions. NGOs have repeatedly processes precludes them from formulating any other reverted to peacekeeping or some kind of ‘humanitarian position relating to Darfur. intervention’ as their favoured option, forgoing possible alternatives which could emerge from a deeper and more The message sent to other countries nuanced analysis. The strong media and public engagement Choosing to campaign on Darfur in certain ways and at a with Darfur campaigns has entrenched this effect. This is a high intensity raises the question: ‘if here, why not problem with wider relevance: the risk, acknowledged by elsewhere?’. The parallel with Somalia in particular is some campaigners, is that ‘every time there is an armed striking. Both Somalia and Darfur are affected by complex conflict, the answer is “we want a UN force on the ground”. conflicts which have had disastrous consequences in We do that because we don’t know what [else] to do’. terms of numbers killed and displaced. But while Darfur Whether humanitarian NGOs are best placed to decide on has prompted five years’ sustained international cam- 3 It was only in early 2006, for example, that ‘it became clear [to the 4 Humanitarian Advocacy in Darfur: The Challenge of Neutrality, HPG Save Darfur Coalition] that the engagement of the US government Policy Brief, October 2007. alone would not suffice to find a solution to the crisis in Darfur’. See 5 Press releases from Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group http://savedarfur.org/pages/global_campaigns. and the International Federation for Human Rights, 4 March 2009. PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES

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paigning, mobilisation on Somalia has been slow and vailing winds, believing that criticising one’s allies – privately, limited. It is difficult for NGOs to contend that doing less or or ultimately publicly – is simply not the done thing. operating in different ways in Darfur would be illegitimate, since this is what they have chosen to do in Somalia. Conclusion The main campaigning coalitions working on Darfur have More serious perhaps than a ‘sin of omission’ in Somalia is a attempted to reconsider their position within a wider possible ‘sin of commission’ relating to Chad. In highlighting analysis of Sudan as a whole, and to search for political and condemning Chinese government support for Sudan, solutions broader than simply ‘peacekeeping’. But their while staying relatively silent about French government response to the arrest warrant for Bashir illustrates anew support for Chad, Western NGOs risk being perceived as the problematic nature of campaigning on Darfur: the suggesting that their governments’ foreign policies are legit- warrant has had immediate costs and may well hinder the imate, while others’ are not. To label eastern Chad a ‘second pursuit of structural solutions. These costs may ultimately Darfur’ and to support the deployment of an EU/UN force be outweighed by longer-term gains; the crux is whether inadvertently bolsters Chadian President Idriss Déby. This is the main campaigning coalitions have in mind a clear path in effect to say that Darfur is more important than Chad. by which their actions and strategies could bring about such long-term gains. Coalition dynamics – for or against? The dynamics behind the two main NGO coalitions – the A more effective campaigning approach would involve Save Darfur Coalition in the United States and Globe for focusing on targets with more direct influence on the Darfur in Europe – have evolved in such a way that it is situation; an investment in deeper and more nuanced difficult for NGOs to operate outside these groups. This is not political and situational analysis, including gauging the to say that the messages and techniques they employ have possible unintended consequences of policy demands and gone uncontested. The Save Darfur Coalition has been activities; and the adoption of messages and tactics most criticised for failing to understand the realities on the ground likely to resonate with, and induce action from, genuinely and the consequences of its proposed actions, while MSF- influential actors. Enabling this will require a shift in the France has publicly resisted the contention that the situation primary purpose of campaigning coalitions away from the in Darfur amounts to genocide.6 Some NGOs have chosen to organisation of activities towards the development of a opt out altogether, by deprioritising Darfur, or not engaging more sophisticated joint analysis. with it at all; the majority, however, are blown by the pre- 6 Sam Worthington, President and Chief Executive of InterAction, Jeremy Smith is an independent consultant who conducts quoted in Stephanie Strom and Lydia Polgreen, ‘Darfur Advocacy campaign evaluations and provides advice to NGOs on Group Undergoes a Shake-up’, New York Times, 2 June 2007. strategy and organisational development. RCIEADPLC NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND

Supporting the capacity of beneficiaries, local staff and partners to face violence alone Casey A. Barrs, Cuny Center

The mass expulsion of aid agencies from Sudan in March agencies in Darfur tried to prepare for an uncertain future by 2009 showed in a single stroke just how vital and augmenting such ability. Instead they focused on day-to- vulnerable humanitarian capacity is. The incident offers an day humanitarian maintenance (and did that well given the enormous chance to learn – and not repeat. To restore pressures they faced). But, as has been said often since the capacity in the same way is to risk leaving locals in harm’s Bosnian conflict, it is not enough to meet people’s food and way all over again. Humanitarian policy has proven health needs as long as humanly possible. If they are still ill- resistant to learning, at least in some respects. But now prepared for violence when we are separated, then we have Darfur’s ‘situation has brought the modus operandi of fundamentally failed: according to HPG, ‘The expulsion has international humanitarian assistance agencies into sharp raised key questions about operating modalities and focus’.1 It is a time for serious stocktaking. humanitarian assistance in Sudan’, including ‘the lack of local capacity to take over’.2 Failure to support the right local capacity Public statements by agencies since the expulsion warn of Clearly, humanitarian agencies support many kinds of threats to the survival of millions in Darfur. Are these claims local capacity – but seldom the kind that helps locals exaggerated and perhaps self-serving – or accurate and survive and serve others alone amid violence. self-incriminating? They may be self-incriminating if they reveal that little was done to support the capacity of 1. Physical safety. Which presence-based, programme- beneficiaries, local staff and partners to face violence alone. based, rights-based or camp-based ‘protections’ remain This capacity exists, but there is little evidence that aid after agencies and their beneficiaries are separated? 1 Sara Pantuliano et al., Where to Now? Agency Expulsions in Sudan: Which are portable, adaptable and applicable to the Consequences and Next Steps, ALNAP/HPG, March 2009, p. 1. 2 Ibid., p. 8.

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locales and circumstances people will face next? Which their ability to survive. Instead, as Holmes acknow- programmes support local ability to either accommo- ledged, questions about the treatment of more than date or avoid threats alone? Which boost local skills in 7,000 remaining national staff were only now being information-gathering, communication, safe sites, safe addressed. This should have been anticipated years ago. movement or threat response, ahead of the day when Suppose, for instance, that from 2003 onwards attention there are no more camps or programmes? In Darfur, there had been given to what locally led service delivery in the is little evidence that this was tried beyond the limited face of violence would look like, and how it might be efforts by peacekeepers to build community policing. supported from a distance, if need be. Many reports have concluded that we must support the viable ways that civilians evade threats. But on the When expatriates are evacuated and local staff contrary, ‘one disappointing characteristic of the supported from a distance, risk may simply be protection response in Darfur has been the limited ‘outsourced’ to those staff. This is partly because they emphasis on understanding and supporting community are forced into our mould – even though our own highly self-protection tactics’. The focus instead was on evolved aid machinery, with all its administrative, ‘external protective capacities’ and ‘action by third logistical and financial surge capacity, is not designed to parties’.3 These are ephemeral. survive conflict. Despite efforts to build acceptance, protection and deterrence, agencies still bequeath these 2. Economic survival. If beneficiaries are offered livelihood staff a vulnerable aid architecture which distance aid that needs peace to flourish, but agencies must quit management does not alter. It does not necessarily mid-conflict, then they have essentially failed. Which overcome the operational dangers that cause us to programmes are designed for post-access scenarios in evacuate in the first place. Facing danger alone, local which civilians find it ever more dangerous to access providers thus often improvise tactics that mitigate markets or to work openly? Which not only help locals threats to their work. One area of innovation has been to scale up their assets, while also helping to safeguard deinstitutionalise programmes, a way of coping that is those assets from violence? Which support locals’ own counterintuitive to ingrained visions of institution- efforts to get their household economies onto a threat building. Local service providers have sometimes found footing? It is increasingly recognised that the effect of that, by dissolving into society, they can stay in service external relief programmes is modest relative to the far longer. Unfortunately, we tend to give little thought to greater impact of people’s own efforts to ensure their how local organisations cope.5 economic survival. This may mean that, in some situations, agencies should support local adaptive There are many ways that local capacity for safety, efforts, such as commuting, family separation, non- sustenance and services can be supported before market subsistence or relying on money networks and agencies themselves become incapacitated. It is time for shadow/coping economies. It may mean that agencies aid agencies and donors to do some deep reassessment. should sometimes help locals to protect their assets The dangerous transition being experienced in Darfur is through caching, dispersing, diversifying, dismantling, not an anomaly: over the past three years programme liquidating, redeeming or scorching them, and that they suspensions globally have doubled each year due to might be helped in pre-emptively stripping and insecurity.6 Moreover, suspensions are only one of the transferring their assets. In Darfur, this suggests that several ways that aid work can be prematurely curtailed. agencies should have made more effort to get ahead of Consider the lethal lapses when aid workers are unable to displacement by giving more attention to still-intact rural prevent conflict, continue programmes or transfer work to communities. But instead of trying to help locals to nationals safely, or guarantee asylum and safe havens, or maintain some options in their home areas, or at the very offer protection for repatriation, or prevent the slide from least helping them to be wardens of their own calculated ‘post-conflict’ back to conflict. displacement, agencies largely waited in camps for them to arrive as our wards, stripped and destitute. Building on strategies that locals often employ to escape violence, safeguard their assets and mitigate threats to 3. Local service delivery. Just after the expulsion, the Under- service delivery can be painted by those causing the violence Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, and threats as a violation of neutrality. That is the challenge observed (years too late) that it is ‘particularly important to aid writ large amid internal conflicts. In the worst settings, to consider how to maximize the continuity of operations efforts to ‘project an image of neutrality’ and ‘gain as well as the knowledge base and capacity of national accommodation … do not carry much weight’.7 If, as Fred staff members’.4 Aside from nominal stockpiling and the Cuny concluded years ago, ‘humanitarian neutrality in a civil formation of local committees to perform certain war is a distinctly western concept, not necessarily welcome conventional aid activities, little more had been done to in the third world’,8 then we need to be careful about what help prepare local service providers for dealing with 4 Press Conference by Emergency Relief Coordinator on Sudan, Sri violence alone and contingency plans reportedly did not Lanka, United Nations Department of Public Information, 9 March exist. Planning with local staff and partners should cover, 2009, p. 2. not just their ability to serve but more fundamentally 5 Ian Smillie (ed.), Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in 3 Sara Pantuliano and Sorcha O’Callaghan, The ‘Protection Crisis’: A Humanitarian Crises (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2001). Review of Field-Based Strategies for Humanitarian Protection in Darfur, 6 Abby Stoddard et al., Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES HPG Discussion Paper, December 2006, pp. 8, 11 and 19. Update, HPG Policy Brief 34, April 2009, p. 10.

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we avoid doing in the name of neutrality. If we do not support prone to strife and war bear a responsibility to anticipate the ability of locals to endure future violence because it people’s vulnerabilities and support their capacities might get us forced out, then we in effect privilege our ability through their work.10 It is contrary to all we stand for to to stay today over their ability to survive tomorrow. That puts knowingly leave beneficiaries, local staff and partners in us in the business of giving civilians life-saving shots one harm’s way. day, without supporting their capacity to avoid being shot dead the next. Fortunately, as one prescient report concludes, ‘there is much that aid organizations can do to build on the Conclusion strategies that communities employ’ in order to ‘maintain Many in the aid world have observed the limits of their assets, escape violence, and mitigate threats’.11 If we outsiders’ access and influence amid violence and argue are to learn from the crisis in Darfur, then one thing we for the need to support local capacity for self- must do is consider where things might have stood now preservation. This approach is sensitive and should only had aid there, from 2003 onwards, been more oriented be tried by relief or development agencies that have towards our vulnerability and their capacity. strong situational awareness on the ground, and that hire certain skill sets that they do not yet have. This is Casey A. Barrs is Protection Research Fellow at the challenging but possible. As Mary Anderson asserts, Cuny Center. Tools for applying the orientation of aid argued local capacities can be supported even ‘under conditions for here are proposed in a Cuny Center paper entitled of social and political upheaval, and in countries where Preparedness Support, available from [email protected]. the regime in power imposes limits on NGO work. It is 9 Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. Woodrow, Rising From the Ashes even possible … where the situation is extremely volatile (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 41. 9 and polarized’. Indeed, agencies that work in areas 10 Ibid., p. 33. 7 Ibid., p. 6. 11 Sorcha O’Callaghan and Sara Pantuliano, Protective Action: 8 Frederick C. Cuny with Richard B. Hill, Famine, Conflict and Response: Incorporating Civilian Protection into Humanitarian Response, HPG A Basic Guide (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1999), p. 146. Report 26, December 2007, pp. 4 and 35.

Stuck in the ‘recovery gap’: the role of humanitarian aid in the Central African Republic

Kersten Jauer, UNDP NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND

Over the past two years, humanitarian assistance has made CAR: key facts a decisive contribution to the stabilisation of the Central Total population 4.3 million African Republic while the country’s condition was at its Human Development Index rank 178 out of 179 most critical. Back from the brink of collapse, the benefits of Proportion of the population living on less 67% peace and stability now have to be spread much more than $1 a day widely across this desperately poor and conflict-ridden GDP per capita $402 country if the patient is to recover successfully. However, Life expectancy at birth 43 years while humanitarian assistance is levelling off and may well Sources: UNFPA, IMF, World Economic Outlook, UNDP, CAR government decrease in 2009, development support lags too far behind to pick up the baton. The looming recovery gap now Figure 1: Humanitarian and development aid, 2002–2007 jeopardises CAR’s fragile progress. Humanitarian Improving aid effectiveness Development $251m $244m In November 2008, CAR and its partners launched a new aid Clearance of management system. Widely used in Asia but still rare in debt arrears Africa, the goal of this online database – in line with the Paris Declaration – is to make humanitarian and development aid $126m more transparent, coordinated and effective. Previously, no $117m central data source existed to help decision-makers $81m understand who finances projects, who works in which $63m sectors, in which locations, and where the gaps were. As in many other African states critically dependent on foreign support, the absence of reliable data undermined the effectiveness of the aid being provided. Within months of the 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 system’s launch, detailed information on more than 300 projects was available online. 2005 and 2007, total foreign assistance more than doubled, from about $117 million to $244m. This increase At first sight, data on aid to CAR is encouraging. Between is particularly significant given that CAR had long been a

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‘forgotten crisis’. While aid to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole went up by more than 50% between 1985 and 2005, it fell by almost 60% for CAR. During this time, the country’s development catastrophe slowly turned into a humanitarian emergency, directly affecting more than a million people and forcing up to 300,000 into displacement. After decades of coups, violence and inter- national neglect, CAR now ranks 178 out of 179 on the UN’s Human Development Index. More than two-thirds of the population live ©Pierre Holtz/UNICEF in poverty, and life expectancy is a paltry 43 years. Reaching the Millennium Development Goals has become a distant dream. Kids in CAR: stuck between a violent past and a (hopefully) brighter future An initial positive shift for aid to CAR came in late 2006, when the World Bank, the European Union and others helped to More importantly, large parts of the development machine clear much of the country’s crushing debt arrears, paving had come to a standstill when the country was at its most the way for multilateral development re-engagement via fragile. After a virtual halt to long-term aid during CAR’s the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank. last civil war in 2002–2003, it took almost four years for Greater international attention to CAR’s humanitarian crisis development donors to return. In late 2007, they finally also led to a further increase in foreign assistance. Between pledged some $600m over three years in support of the 2005 and 2007, humanitarian funding jumped by almost country’s first poverty reduction strategy. Yet much of 800%, from $10m to about $78m. New or returning donors these resources are burdened with lead-times of up to two provided most of these additional resources. Accounting for years. In addition, they only cover half of the country’s more than 30% of total assistance in 2007, humanitarian aid basic needs, amounting to $1.3 billion for security sector started to play a catalytic role in CAR’s recovery. reform, economic recovery, infrastructure, healthcare and education. Development aid: too little too late Yet a closer analysis of aid, looking separately at In 2007, the impact of increasing development funding still development and humanitarian support, shows that remained largely invisible in many parts of the country. More catching up on lost decades may well take much longer than than three-quarters of the $158m spent on development hoped. Frequently, development projects are constrained by addressed just four sectors: debt alleviation and refinancing protracted planning and implementation delays, particularly (28%), peacekeeping and rehabilitation of government in low-capacity countries such as CAR. A significant share of capacity (23%), health (14%) and non-specific budget the $166m disbursed for development activities in 2007 support (9%).1 More significantly, less than 20% of came years late, as many projects grappled with development aid was spent in projects outside the capital, restructuring, recruitment and procurement delays, as well Bangui. It is often said that insecurity in the north, which is as a general failure to show satisfactory results. now infested with rebel groups and bandits, severely limited the scope for development activity in the Figure 2: Where the aid goes field. Yet it could equally be argued that this very fragility reinforces the case for aid: Action related to debt $44m (28%) the experience of tangible development Government, peace and civil society $36m (23%) benefits may increase support for the Health $22m (14%) government and thus enhance stability in Non-specific budget support $15m (9%) long-neglected regions. Population/reproduction health $8m (5%) Transport and storage $6m (4%) Humanitarians pick up (some) pieces $6m (4%) Multisector aid In 2007, humanitarian assistance (not Divers social sectors $5m (3%) development aid) made a concrete differ- Education $4m (3%) 1 Specific budget support went mostly to debt and Forestry $3m (2%) salary payments, as well as government capacity rehabilitation. PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES

HUMANITARIAN 28 exchange HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 29

Figure 3: Little development outside the capital

< $1m Chad Sudan > $1m > $3m

> $12m

Bangui

Democratic Republic of Congo

ence in the fragile regions where development progress was contributions), but food distributions accounted for an most needed. Throughout the north, conflict and neglect had even higher share of humanitarian expenditure. destroyed health posts, schools, water pumps, farms and

infrastructure. Almost 90% of humanitarian funds were Meanwhile, economic conditions deteriorated as the global NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND spent in the six northern prefectures, home to more than economic crisis hit the country. According to the 1.2m people. All of these regions received more than $3m in government, diamond mining and timber production (the direct humanitarian spending, and most benefited from two most important economic sectors) fell by some 60% in more than $6m in concrete, visible project expenditure. 2008, leading to massive unemployment in the south. The During 2007, the number of international humanitarian country’s first poverty reduction strategy and donor NGOs working in CAR jumped from five to 20. roundtable in late 2007 had raised enormous popular expectations. Yet, in the current year, humanitarian funding For a number of reasons, however, the impact of this work is likely to fall off significantly. The impact on field activity in remained limited. Of the $78m donors disbursed in the north could be drastic. At the same time, most humanitarian aid in 2007, only around $54m could be development projects are still at the planning stage. Many spent before the end of the year, as significant amounts of basic social services may actually disappear in 2009. funding only arrived in November and December. Most humanitarian organisations only started their operations Stuck in the recovery gap in 2007, and had to devote considerable funds to start-up Why is the transition from a catalytic humanitarian phase investments. More importantly, donors directed almost to effective development support so difficult in a country half of humanitarian aid to only one sector: food security like CAR? Three reasons stand out. First, once foreign aid (43%). A local pooled fund (the Emergency Response networks have broken down, it is very difficult to re- Fund) helped to redress this imbalance by serving under- establish them. Second, fragile countries such as CAR do funded priority projects. Overall, however, the resources not fit well with traditional donor funding mechanisms. available for health, education and water and sanitation Third, appropriately qualified international staff are projects were limited. frequently lacking.

Nothing new in 2008 Over the last 20 years, as the political and economic The situation did not change significantly in 2008. Total situation became more fragile, CAR lost more and more of aid increased by about 20%, but much of the long-term its support network: development donors increasingly development support remained heavily concentrated on disengaged, Western embassies closed, country very few sectors. Even more money stayed in the capital. representatives left and most desk officers stopped Humanitarian funding picked up further (albeit some reporting. By 2007, probably only a handful of officials in statistics overstate progress by double-counting donor Northern development ministries possessed anything

Number 43 • June 2009 29 HE43 crc22/6/091:00pmPage30 30 PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES we government andrebels Butthese events ineasternDRC. world thousandsofpeoplefleeingfightingbetween the In earlyNovember lastyear, televisionimagesshowed the K displacement inDRC to on responding Out ofsite, out ofmind?Reflections more and better support. First, it is important tofight First,itisimportant more andbettersupport. P What todo Coordinator posthasbeenleftvacant foralmostayear. Resident andHumanitarian one example,thevitalUN to thecountry’s disastrous development results. To give contributed inability torecruit therightstaffhascertainly not theroot causeofCAR’s problems, aidagencies’ where suchpersonnelare neededmost. While certainly Sudan), even thoughtheseare precisely thecontexts (orSouthern get-to, low-capacity countriessuchasCAR can onefindhighly-skilledinternationalstaffinhard-to- inhumanitariananddevelopment work.Rarely paradox’ Finally, isaprimeexampleofthefrequent ‘skill CAR traditional donorinstrumentshave failed. population seemsirredeemably mired inpoverty, and theworld’s of professor Paul Collier, the‘bottombillion’ group ofabout50stateswhere, according toOxford chronically sickfordecades.Rather, ofa thecountryispart from whichitcouldquickly‘recover’. hasbeen CAR Ye – mostofthemeagertodisengageasquicklypossible. becameacaseforhumanitariandonors displacement, CAR development aiddriedup. With massive internal traditional mismatch’. Deemedunfitforlong-termsupport, CA knowledge andreconnecting decision-makerstakesyears. R amounts oftimeandresources are required torebuild it. Once thedevelopment aidstructure collapses,enormous difficult forgovernment andaidagencyofficialsfrom CAR. decision-makersbecameincreasingly access toNorthern Getting other thanarudimentaryknowledge ofCAR. camps, butwithlocalfamilies.Inthisway, thecrisisinDRC findrefuge,majority ofdisplacedpeopleinDRC notin the campsmadeforcompellingviewing. Yet thevast in whiteplasticsheetingagainstabackdrop ofblacklava, provincial capital,Goma. With endlessrows ofhutscovered especially thosewithineasystrikingdistanceofthe in theviolencefocusedtheirattentiononlarge camps, Kivulatelast year inresponse totheescalation upon North time. The journalistsandvisitingdignitarieswhodescended militias andgovernment forces, manyforthethird orfourth their homesduetofightingamongandbetween armed Ev utting CAR (andcountrieslikeit)backontrack requiresutting CAR e-establishing aneffective fieldpresence, regaining lost atherine Haver ery month,tensofthousandspeopleare forced toflee t thecountrywasnotafflictedby asudden-onsetcrisis, HUMANITARIAN R has also been the victim of an unfortunate aid‘categoryR hasalsobeenthevictimofanunfortunate re

only aspikeinwhathasbeenlong-runningcrisis. exchange humanitarian organisations done enough to help IDPs in humanitarian organisations doneenoughtohelpIDPs Had debate amonghumanitarianagenciesintheDRC. early 2007toaround 70%inlate2007–prompted serious inhostfamilies–from aroundpercentage 90%in ofIDPs than withhostfamilies. The decrease intheoverall findingshelterincampsrather inDRC numbers ofIDPs A previous spikeinthecrisis,mid-2007,sawincreasing We necessarily reflect thoseoftheUnitedNations. are theauthor’sexpressed inthisarticle anddonot hdptcar.net andhttp://www.hdptcar.net. The views seehttp://dad. on theaidmanagementsysteminCAR address [email protected]. For more information United NationsDevelopment Programme Hisemail inCAR. K r to ensure thatthisprogress isnotlostinthelooming help tothosewhoneeditmost.Now isthetimetodomore done muchtoraise thecountry’s profile, andbringsome since2007has The surge inhumanitarianactivity inCAR mustoffersupport. qualified staff, headquarters country officeslackthecapacitytoselectappropriately UN humanitarian anddevelopment agencies,especiallyinthe Finally,support. itistimefordonors toengagewith r are nottheanswer. countries Rather, these‘bottombillion’ using humanitarianfundsforquasi-development projects, many development donors.Easy‘work-arounds’, suchas programmes themselves, makingthemunattractive to not have theabilitytoexecute large development disengagement sixmonthslater. Likewise, theyoftendo sudden crises,requiring quickhumanitarianaction,with These countriesdonotface failing statessuchasCAR. be created, tobetteraddress theproblems offragile or Second, newfundingcategoriesandmechanismsneedto andbilateral relations aresupport critical. assistance. Research, fieldpresence, headquarters should never beleftwithoutdedicated,specialised v organisational ‘network loss’.Acountrythatstandsatthe vulnerable populations. provide atrulyadequateresponse tothese dispersedand but alsotohumanitarianorganisations, whichhave yet to in hostfamiliesare ofteninvisiblenotonlytojournalists, people have gathered incamps.However, displacedpeople Uganda, wheresuch asDarfurandNorthern mostdisplaced differs markedlyfrom ofAfrica, emergencies inotherparts ecovery gap. equire newformsoffunding,forlong-term,hands-on ery bottom of all important development indicators ery bottomofallimportant ersten Jauer

’v system, toimprove recruitment systems. Where e beenhere before is SeniorInformationManagerforthe HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 31

host families? Had they somehow encouraged the drive to need to respond to continuous displacement has slowed the camps, undermining local coping mechanisms? progress, it was hoped that the RRM would be operational Donors and aid agencies began to realise for the first time by mid-2009. Several NGOs have also begun to experiment that they had surprisingly few answers to basic questions with cash vouchers for IDPs and host families, which had about what life was like for people in host families. previously been tried in DRC only for returnees. The NGO Concern, for example, distributed emergency cash vouchers In mid-2008, several reports examined these questions.1 in January 2009 to over 3,000 households in North Kivu, One, an Oxfam report by this author, argued that a much including host families and IDPs, allowing them to purchase higher priority should be given to assistance to hosted IDPs items including seeds, kitchen supplies and women’s and their host families. It was argued that this was clothing, and to pay school fees. necessary not simply because the needs of these vulnerable groups were being under-addressed, but also because On the whole, however, the rhetoric acknowledging the displaced people usually preferred living with host families, needs of people in host families has yet to be matched a situation seen as ‘physically, emotionally and spiritually’ with large-scale implementation at the programme level. more secure.2 Providing assistance mainly through camps Plans for each cluster to develop a strategy to assist host can undermine traditional coping mechanisms and limit the families have not been followed up, due in part to the choices available to displaced people. The basic principle is competing priorities facing busy cluster coordinators, that people should be able to go where they feel safest and most of whom have many duties on top of their cluster assistance should be provided in ways that support role. As a result, the development of good-quality tools to livelihoods and help to keep families together. respond to the needs of host families at the household level is still in its infancy. At the system level, the basic information needed to be able to direct aid actors to the people should be able to go most vulnerable host communities is still not compiled and shared in ways that can effectively influence decision- where they feel safest and making in real time, before hosting fatigue sets in or assistance should be provided in people are forced to seek shelter in camps. ways that support livelihoods What is hosting, and how can it be and help to keep families supported?4 Displaced people in DRC express a strong preference for together living with host families rather than in camps. Indeed, the main reason cited by IDPs in their decision to stay in a host

family is their negative perception of camps.5 Camps are NOTES POLICY PRACTICE AND Following a renewed focus on these issues, heading into generally seen as crowded, insecure and unhealthy, and 2009 the humanitarian community in DRC introduced are often associated with the kind of violence and disease measures designed to increase support for host families. that plagued camps along the border with Rwanda The 2009 Humanitarian Action Plan included host families following the 1994 genocide. and host communities among targeted populations more explicitly, and one major donor, ECHO, placed a new Hosting involves sharing the most basic elements of a emphasis on vulnerability rather than displacement status in home: a roof over one’s head and food. It rarely involves its programme for 2009. In mid-2008, an inter-agency plan paying for IDPs’ medical costs or school fees. Although was drafted in North Kivu covering assistance to host many IDPs in host families do not receive humanitarian families. OCHA even produced a compelling 30-minute assistance, when food aid is received by hosted IDPs it is documentary showing what life was like for people in host almost always shared with the host family. This is not the families.3 case for non-food items, such as kitchen utensils, blankets and buckets, which are more difficult to share, and are Steps have been taken to implement these plans. The Rapid items often already owned by the host family. Response Mechanism (RRM), which forms the backbone of first-line response to new displacement, has begun to revise Displaced people are expected to contribute to the its approach to target the most vulnerable people – household in whatever ways they can. Although this can including host families and returnees in unstable areas, as involve paying a cash contribution in the form of ‘rent’, well those who have been recently displaced. Although the more often they work in the fields with their hosts, 1 These include Stephen McDowell, Internal Displacement in North collecting wood for small amounts of money to contribute Kivu: Hosting, Camps, and Coping Mechanisms, prepared for UNICEF to the household, fetching water, or doing other domestic DRC and CARE DRC, April 2008; Katherine Haver, Out of Site: Building chores. Sharing humanitarian assistance is also seen as a Better Responses to Displacement in the Democratic Republic of the contribution. In most cases, however, IDPs acknowledge Congo By Helping Host Families, Oxfam, September 2008; and WFP, that they have virtually nothing to contribute, which is a ‘L’enquête de référence sur la capacité d’autosuffisance alimentaire 4 See Katherine Haver, ‘Study on Food Security, Livelihoods and dans les camps des personnes deplacées’, DRC, 2008. Relations among Host Families and IDPs in South Lubero, Nord Kivu, 2 McDowell, Internal Displacement in North Kivu. DRC’, Oxfam GB and CEPROSSAN, 28 May 2008; and McDowell, 3 OCHA, ‘Misère partagée/Shared Misery’, film on compact disc, Internal Displacement in North Kivu, April 2008. Kinshasa, DRC, December 2008. 5 Ibid., p. 13.

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source of frustration for them. At the same time, hosting have been limited to distributions of plastic sheeting. can be a positive experience for both IDPs and hosts. The Providing other materials to create temporary walls in majority of people surveyed said that they would do it homes, building expanded cooking areas or additional again. Nonetheless, obstacles can arise.6 Because hosting rooms and providing household water catchments involves sharing food, it can exacerbate an already could help long-term hosts cope better.8 Cash or precarious food-security situation. When hosting is of vouchers could allow people to make their own shelter short duration and fighting is intermittent, allowing time improvements. UNHCR and CARE, with the support of for people to return and recover, it can be a good way to the Shelter Centre, have begun pilot projects providing cope with a difficult situation. But when it lasts for a long shelter support for host families. time or is experienced repeatedly, hosting needs to be supported to prevent it from breaking down. Although agencies tend not to consider emergency liveli- hoods responses, some forms of livelihoods programming The two main problems experienced by displaced people may be appropriate for longer-term hosting situations, and host families are linked: an inability to access including income generation, micro-finance and sustained sufficient food and a lack of income. Despite the fact that cash transfers for host families. the biggest burden is felt at the household level, the kinds of assistance currently being provided at the household Ways forward level are inadequate to meet these needs. Food and non- Emerging needs in DRC are rarely fully known. In part, this food items distributed to displaced people do not directly lack of knowledge is understandable given that displaced address the problems that many interviewees identified. people are so dispersed, staying with families in villages Food is still largely available in markets for those with scattered over a vast territory with few passable roads. But money to buy it, and most host families already own many in a country where humanitarians have been responding to of the non-food items distributed. This indicates the need IDP crises for more than ten years, it is surprising that there for better assessments and responses that more directly are not better systems in place to monitor displacement. In support people’s ability to make a living. other contexts with equally difficult access challenges, such as Darfur and Somalia, humanitarian actors have developed Some options for programme responses which NGOs, the better information management systems. Reasonably UN and donors might consider to assist IDPs in host accurate data on the numbers and location of IDPs is crucial families, host families and host communities include: in mobilising funds and delivering assistance. It is also crucial in order to mobilise responses to host-community • Cash transfers or vouchers. Unconditional cash- populations before they are completely overwhelmed. transfer schemes are often the easiest and most direct way to meet people’s needs and achieve clear programmatic objectives. This method keeps money in emerging needs in DRC are rarely local markets and can cost less than distributing the actual items. The flexibility of cash also allows it to be fully known used in areas where access to food is difficult, and gives IDPs and host families direct means to pay for the goods or services they deem most important. UNICEF The UN often feels that it needs to produce a consistent and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) plan to expand pilot set of figures for the media on the numbers of IDPs, even project ‘voucher fairs’ to serve IDPs and host families, though this kind of certainty does not reflect reality on the as well as returnees, in the Kivus. ground. Instead, it should adopt more transparently • Cash for work. Cash for work enables people to choose labelled and defined categories of ‘verified’, ‘unverified’ or how and where to spend their money, while channelling even ‘unknown’, for areas where no information exists. investment back into the community. Constructing Especially in accessible parts of North and South Kivu, roads, replanting trees and teaching are all possible there could be more regular monitoring of potential work options. However, a basic level of security and ‘saturation’ in host communities and surveys of the stability is required to ensure that programmes are not decision-making processes of IDPs. Displaced people can interrupted, households must have surplus labour to and should be consulted regarding the kinds of shelter participate and the risk of inflation must be low.7 and assistance arrangements they prefer. However, little Complementary efforts are needed to help vulnerable tangible progress seems to have been made in this area. people who do not have the capacity to work. Agencies such as OCHA and UNHCR have begun to invest • Income-generating activities. These could include in improving ways to track basic statistics, mainly through making or selling soap, carpets or fuel-efficient stoves. revising the methodology used by provincial ‘population Market analysis is essential to ensure that markets are movement committees’. These committees, which are not distorted, and that there is sufficient demand for poorly funded and supported, simply compile information the products and services offered. from organisations on the ground to produce estimated •Shelter needs. Until recently, shelter responses in DRC numbers of IDPs and returnees. On the whole, efforts to 6 Ibid. date have been piecemeal and require much greater 7 Simon Levine and Claire Chastre, Missing the Point: An Analysis of expertise and resources if they are to take root. Food Security Interventions in the Great Lakes, HPN Network Paper 47, 8 McDowell, Internal Displacement in North Kivu, p. 36.

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES July 2004, pp. 13–14.

HUMANITARIAN 32 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 33 , , prepared for , prepared umber 43 • June 2009 umber 43 • June N , HPG Report 19, July 2005. was a policy adviser for Oxfam GB in DRC adviser for Oxfam was a policy rine Haver or IDPs the slums, 55% of household in residing elocation to IDP camps. There was significant demand for resources to support demand for resources was significant There in the longer term, with 84% of households livelihoods some with their livelihoods, planning to rehabilitate (42%) and others with external supportgrants (24%). income was spent on rented accommodation. Some accommodation. income was spent on rented unable to were 43% of households indicated that they eviction and and thus faced possible pay their rent r ely on host families as a de facto, ‘out of sight’ ‘out de facto, as a host families ely on response debated. If humanitarian agencies are going to continue to going to are agencies If humanitarian debated. r with them obligation to provide an they have mechanism, the support they need. Kathe is [email protected]. 2009. Her email address until April •F • a cash- decided to develop Based on these findings, ACF based intervention to support the immediate and longer- needs of IDPsterm livelihood and host communities in on the The decision to use cash was based Town. Nakuru easily accessible and fact that functioning markets were diverse. very and needs were credible, become increasingly have programmes Cash transfer of successful Evaluations years. popular in recent in- highlighted the benefits of cash over have programmes beneficiaries example, cash gives kind distributions. For purchasing dignity and the flexibility to decide their own priorities. Distributing cash is usually less costly and more a efficient than handing out commodities and can have Nevertheless, beneficial impact on the local economy. funds for still hesitant to provide institutional donors are (unconditional and non-earmarked) cash transfers direct Hence, programmes. to support response emergency taken. need to be actively opportunities for innovation After internal technical discussions of programming due to cash transfers opted to use direct options, ACF-US of beneficiaries in this urban setting, the the concentration Missing the Point: An Analysis of Food Security Interventions in the Great Lakes Security Interventions in the Great An Analysis of Food Missing the Point: Dependency and Humanitarian Relief: A Critical Analysis Dependency and Humanitarian Relief: , Oxfam, September 2008. , Oxfam, Internal Displacement in NorthInternal Displacement and Coping Mechanisms Kivu: Hosting, Camps, Out of Site: Building Better Responses to Displacement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo By Republic to Displacement in the Democratic Better Responses Out of Site: Building burned down or looted and livelihoods badly affected; or looted and livelihoods burned down ICEF DRC and CARE DRC, April 2008. DPs in slums were not being met, and supportDPs in slums were for host The immediate needs (food, clothing, rent/housing) of The immediate needs (food, clothing, rent/housing) I communities was lacking. less for IDPsIncome sources were in slum areas The biggest change was in the than before. diverse proportion of people engaged in informal/casual work, 8% to 68% for IDPs from which rose in slums and from 18% to 32% for host communities. Although host families/communities reported lower asset losses (53%) than IDPs in slums (81%), they resources on their remaining pressure faced increased of IDPs.due to the presence aking cash work: a case study from Kenya aking cash work: a case study from vince immediately after the violence erupted, supporting eferences and furthereferences reading re tephen McDowell, tephen McDowell, aul Harvey and Jeremy Lind, aul Harvey and Jeremy atherine Haver, atherine Haver, o Network Paper 47, July 2004. Network Paper P UN partagée/SharedOCHA, ‘Misère DRC, misery’, film on compact disc, Kinshasa, December 2008. K Helping Host Families Simon Levine and Claire Chastre, Chastre, and Claire Simon Levine R S CF-USA began working in Nakuru Town in Rift Valley in Rift Town CF-USA began working in Nakuru More directly, humanitarian organisations in DRCshould organisations humanitarian directly, More host to assistance meaningful provide a way to find fact that rhetorical The the household level. families at into action to translate slow been have commitments more at a deeper and is needed innovation that shows in pilot programmes from results If early level. institutional and North should be shared these promising, Kivu are the displaced population in major camps through emergency the displaced population in major camps through and sanitation and hygiene, nutrition programmes water, the initial emergency non-food distributions. Following assessment was stage, a food security and livelihoods the following The survey revealed conducted in April 2008. key issues: • • • M Silke Pietzsch, ACF-USA in December 2007 led to the Post-election violence in Kenya disruption to transport property, destruction of large-scale of an estimated and labour markets and the displacement Houses the country. 250,000–300,000 people throughout we for police-protected families had to abandon their homes with family or or took refuge camps and urban centres, the host themselves, vulnerable friends. Although already population accommodated and supported the displaced, and assets. resources on their own the pressure increasing A Pr HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 33 Page pm 1:00 22/6/09 crc HE43 HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 34

Table 1: Spending priorities Immediate needs Long term/livelihoods needs Food Productive assets Clothes Business establishment Transport Stock for business, Healthcare Farming Household goods/NFI Small livestock Rent Savings Fuel Rented land Construction materials Debt repayments

presence of easily accessible and functioning markets and was transferred in November 2008, four to five weeks after the availability of credible financial institutions as the first distribution. Meanwhile, beneficiaries were trained potential collaborators. in business management, book-keeping and investment. A second round of post-distribution monitoring was The cash programme conducted in December 2008 to determine household The ECHO-funded programme was implemented between expenditure patterns and priorities, along with an internal June and December 2008. It targeted 1,000 IDP and host evaluation of the programme as a whole. community households in the slum areas of Nakuru Town. Implementation was facilitated through close collaboration Promising results with local community institutions and organisations, as well The two rounds of post-distribution monitoring revealed as the Ministry of Youth and Sport. Programme participants interesting and encouraging results, with the programme benefited individually or as pre-existing groups; others took achieving all four of the objectives set out in the project the opportunity to organise new groups and open group proposal.1 Eighty percent of the beneficiaries were accounts. A baseline survey was conducted after the women. Spending priorities for both immediate and targeting process was completed to assess the economic longer-term livelihood needs are detailed in Table 1. situation of targeted households, enabling later data comparisons. Beneficiary and community mobilisation According to the post-distribution monitoring, 25% of ensured transparency and understanding of the programme households said that they spent the first instalment only on and its conditions. immediate needs, while nearly half (47%) used the cash for both immediate and longer-term needs. After the second The programme team discussed plans for implementing distribution, all but 1% of households spent their cash on the cash transfer component with Equity Bank of Kenya longer-term livelihoods investments; 3% of households (EB), a local finance institution. Although different transfer saved some of the cash from the first distribution, and it is systems were considered, including direct distribution by likely that the first round’s saving contributed to the ACF, Equity Bank was chosen because of the ease and second-round spending, hence the initial saving might be accuracy of monitoring through the bank’s system, its reflected in the later longer-term investment. transparency and accountability and the potential sustainability and longer-term impact encouraged by its micro-finance and savings policy. The security of agency even people emerging from crisis staff was also a consideration. A joint ACF-US and Equity Bank team visited the slum programme areas to facilitate are not simply interested in the opening of bank accounts for the 80% of targeted meeting immediate needs households that did not have them.

The money – €100 per beneficiary household – was Overall, 54% of households reported that they saved a transferred in two instalments: 20% for immediate needs portion of the transferred cash, with an average of €24 and 80% intended to support livelihood recovery and (2,412 KSh) saved per household. Around €12,000 of the investment. The bank, using a simple list of beneficiary €100,000 disbursed in total was saved. Reasons for names and matching bank account numbers, transferred saving included provision to meet future needs and the money within three hours. After the first disbursement, investment and fear that the security situation could in October 2008, post-distribution monitoring assessed the 1 The objectives were: ‘at least 50% of the 1,000 targeted households extent of any misuse (spending on alcohol, drugs or report improved livelihoods conditions as measured against post- prostitution, for instance), or failure to respect the election violence levels; the percentage of cash spent on short-term programme’s rules and procedures. Based on the results, needs compared with percentage invested or used on longer term 114 households were expelled from the programme and needs; the cash is used appropriately by three-quarters of targeted replaced with new beneficiaries. All households, including households; and different utilisation of cash for each of the target

PRACTICE AND PRACTICE POLICY NOTES the new ones, received the second disbursement, which households’.

HUMANITARIAN 34 exchange PRACTICE AND POLICY NOTES 35 umber 43 • June 2009 umber 43 • June N is the Food Security and Livelihood Advisor Security and Livelihood is the Food habilitation responses by NGOs and donors is NGOs and by habilitation responses ell as sustainability. At the time of writing, ACF-USA ell as sustainability. ehabilitation and the rapid recovery of livelihoods. However, of livelihoods. recovery and the rapid ehabilitation programme had started had programme initial after the (six months too late and facilitate needs immediate to to respond violence) r participants of programme the majority had confirmed that, startedthe programme it did, they would have earlier than of the opportunity to take full advantage been unable it initial shock of the from still reeling many were presented: and plan for to think about ready not and were the violence started, process By August, when the targeting the future. their lives. to begin rebuilding ready people were Conclusion: should there be a next time? be a next time? there Conclusion: should that clearly demonstrates The Nakuru cash programme cash transfer implement emergency it is possible to and insecure in densely populated even programmes in closely with local structures, Working urban areas. and Sport and local Youth of this case the Ministry to the host community and the CBOs, facilitated access affected population, and supported and targeting with Equity Bank work. Close collaboration follow-up and continuity of could enhance the sustainability access to of future the provision activities through emergency after the ACF even and credit, micro-finance impact psychosocial positive The finishes. programme and families whereby cash transfers, of direct priorities for able to decide their own individuals are should not be under- spending and investment, of livelihood estimated. Although the timeliness re Allowing important, sooner is not always better. at which specific communities to identify the right point as effectiveness interventions should begin will improve w after six months (in evaluation was planning a follow-up and the rate return June 2009) to look at the economic on targeted impact of the programme longer-term households. in Nakuru can be replicated experience from The positive make humanitarian other contexts and could potentially cost-efficient empowering, participatory, assistance more cash transfer The wider application of direct and sustainable. policies and in the will need changes in donor programmes capacities of NGOs and local financial institutions. ACF-USA in programme transfer cash is implementing a similar direct of Northern supporting areas rural of Uganda, the return this learned from internally displaced people. Lessons with the wider food security will also be shared programme community in due course. and livelihoods Silke Pietzsch and South Sudan. Uganda Kenya, covering for ACF-USA, is [email protected]. Her e-mail address manager for programme Thanks to Mark Henderson, ACF Nakuru team, Sarah the ACF the Nakuru cash programme, and Sport and the Equity Youth of the Ministry of Nyathira Bank team in Nakuru. 100) was the € turn calculation and impact evaluation. 145.43 per participant, of which 68.76% ( otal programme costs per beneficiary amounted to costs per beneficiary amounted otal programme cash transfer itself, and 31.24% supportThe relatively itself, costs. cash transfer high support were costs (mainly on human resources) adequate mobilisation, monitoring and necessary to ensure programming. analysis of this first attempt at urban cash What did we learn? What did we The importance of mobilisation and monitoring in cash and sufficient should be recognised, programmes transfer should be human, logistical and financial resources done well. that these functions are allocated to ensure the affected communities and interacting Getting to know that the intervention is with them is essential to ensure to allow and that sufficient capacity is available appropriate, to adapt to changing needs. Intensive the programme information on timely and accurate monitoring has provided outcomes. Implementing this programme programme within a short as (six months) was a challenge, time-frame More was limited time for monitoring and training. there time should be allocated after the last distribution (at least and support, follow-up as a six months) to ensure as well re as important is implemented is When a programme as what does. It was initially thought that the the programme € deteriorate again. It appears that having bank accounts – accounts bank that having It appears again. deteriorate – encouraged money to put place thus a secure and cent of saving per Sixty-seven money. save people to provisions: into future chose to put money households and spending 11% for future businesses, 52% for future of cash The high percentage investment. 4% for future suggests investment longer-term or allocated to saved not simply are crisis from people emerging that even also immediate needs, but are in meeting interested Albeit on a in the future. to invest planning for and willing as a operated programme transfer small scale, this cash to as enabling people needs as well safety net in meeting shocks. of future in the event themselves prepare All participants had felt pleased that the programme the enabled them to participate by, in, and be recognised of the The transparency system. formal banking especially given appreciated, modalities was programme host of mistrust that persisted in the the high levels Despite the community after the election violence. in urban security risks associated with working inherent its succeeded in reaching the programme slum areas, the the Equity Bank, whereas households through target posed a would have distribution of cash or vouchers direct programme security risk to the ACF-USA much greater keep had to have team and to beneficiaries, who would Using cash – and a the cash in their homes or shelters. to purchase, it – instead of having bank to transfer the transport, also increased and distribute goods store significantly. cost-efficiency of the programme T HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 35 Page pm 1:00 22/6/09 crc HE43 HE43 crc 22/6/09 1:00 pm Page 36

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