Suba Chandran
Building Trust and Reducing Risks:
Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
Suba Chandran
SASSU Research Report No. 2
July 2005
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 1 Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
Contents
Nuclear Consensus: Crucial Blocks and Blockades...... 5
Lack of official movement on building nuclear confidence ...... 6
Official Belief in Deterrence and Nuclear Rhetoric...... 7
The Rigid Military and Civilian Bureaucracies...... 9
Overcoming the Rigidity: Is there a way out? ...... 11
Reaching Political Understanding: From Nuclear Agreements to a Treaty? ...... 14
The Nuclear Agreements: So Far...... 14
The Nuclear Agreements: What Next?...... 15
Convergences and Divergences: A Nuclear Tally ...... 24
A hypothetical treaty...... 26
Establishing Institutions: Nuclear Confidence Building Centers (NCBCs)...... 27
The Need for Institutions...... 27
From Risk Reduction to Conflict Building...... 29
Nuclear Confidence Building Centers (NCBCs) ...... 30
Conclusion ...... 32
Select Bibliography...... 35
Tables
Table 1: Missile Tests and Reactions since 2001...... 18
Table 2: India and Pakistan Nuclear Posture and Doctrines ...... 25
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Acronyms
AEC Atomic Energy Commission CBM Confidence Building Measure DRDO Defence Research Development Organization ISI Inter Services Intelligence IWT Indus Waters Treaty JWG Joint Working Group KRL Khan Research Laboratories LOC Line of Control MFN Most Favored Nation MND Minimum Nuclear Deterrence MOU Memorandum of Understanding NCBC Nuclear Confidence Building Center NRRC Nuclear Risk Reduction Center NFWP North-West Frontier Province NSAB National Security Advisory Board PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 3 Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
Suba Chandran*
July 2005
Abstract
Since the 1980s there have been at least four crises between India and Pakistan in which the presence of nuclear weapons played a role. Despite the dangers, India and Pakistan have yet to reach a common understanding on nuclear issues due to three important factors: the lack of official movement on nuclear confidence building; the official faith, especially within the civilian and military bureaucracies, in the functioning of nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent; and the rigidity of the bureaucracies to move further and consider developments at track II levels. In nuclear dialogue in particular there is additional pressure exerted by the nuclear bureaucracies in each country that have their own institutional interests and rivalries.
High-level back channel diplomacy of the type witnessed in 1999 and 2003-04 offers a means of overcoming civilian and bureaucratic inertia and establishing a political understanding between New Delhi and Islamabad on nuclear issues. This has the potential to lead to new nuclear agreements, such as an understanding on missile testing or even a common nuclear doctrine, although this would require careful navigation of the convergences and divergences of Indian and Pakistani nuclear policy. New permanent bi- lateral institutional mechanisms to address nuclear issues are also necessary for further progress. Leaving such discussions to ad hoc Joint Working Groups established during every rapprochement process has not worked. These could take the form of Nuclear Confidence Building Centers dedicated to reaching and preserving nuclear stability. A technical committee would discuss and monitor agreements whilst a strategic committee continuously engaged in dialogue on new nuclear security and stability measures.
* Dr Suba Chandran is Assistant Director at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. His research interests include Pakistan, Kashmir, Indo-Pak relations and Terrorism, particularly chemical and biological terrorism and suicide terrorism. This Research Report was written under the terms of the author’s appointment as Junior Research Fellow in the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit (SASSU), Department of Peace Studies, at the University of Bradford.
4 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Suba Chandran
Nuclear Consensus: Crucial Blocks and Blockades
India and Pakistan have been building summits at the highest levels, including nuclear weapons since the 1980s. Since Islamabad (1989), Lahore (1999), Agra then there have been at least four crises (2001) and Islamabad (2004), besides between the two countries – minor and numerous meetings at various regional major – in which the presence of nuclear and international forums.4 There were two weapons played a role, at different levels. major agreements/understandings relating These include the Brasstacks crisis in to bilateral nuclear issues in 1988 and 19871; crisis in 19902; Kargil war in 2001.5 There have also been numerous 19993; and the border confrontation in meetings at the secretary level in the last 2002. Of these four crises, two took place two decades. before and two after the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998. Since the Irrespective of the positive and negative 1980s, there have been four major developments, India and Pakistan are yet to reach concrete understandings on nuclear issues at the state level. There are 1 For an analysis of the Brasstacks crisis from at least three crucial factors for the slow Indian, Pakistani and American perspectives see Kanti Bajpai and others, Brasstacks and Beyond: progress: the lack of official movement on Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia nuclear confidence building; the official (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). faith, especially within the civilian and 2 There are two excellent studies on the 1990 crisis: military bureaucracies, in the functioning P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen Philip Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in of nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent; South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 (New and the rigidity of the bureaucracies to York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); and Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (London: 4 For example, besides these bilateral summits, BCSIA Studies in International Security, 1998). there were five crucial meetings at the highest Also see Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear edge,” levels: two between Indira Gandhi and Zia ul Haq New Yorker, 29 March 1993. While the first two in November 1982 (New Delhi) and March 1983 studies are analytical, Seymour Hersh’s report (New Delhi); one between Rajiv Gandhi and published in 1993, caused a big controversy by Benazir Bhutto in July 1989 (Islamabad); one asserting that nuclear weapons were close to being between Chandrashekar and Nawaz Sharif in used during the conflict. November 1990 (Male); and one between I K 3 Many studies have been undertaken on the Kargil Gujral and Nawaz Sharif in November 1997 (Male). conflict. See the following: Praveen Swami, The There were numerous other meetings, but the above Kargil War (New Delhi: Signpost, 2001); Maj. Gen. mentioned are significant for their content and the Ashok Krishna and P. R. Chari, eds., Kargil: The decisions taken in their aftermath. Tables Turned (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001); Jasjit 5 The 1988 agreement signed between Rajiv Gandhi Singh, ed., Kargil 1999: Pakistan’s Fourth War for and Benazir Bhutto include the “prohibition of Kashmir (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999); A attack on each other’s nuclear installations and K Verma, Kargil (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002); facilities.” The Lahore declaration, signed in 2001 Ashley Tellis and others, Limited Conflicts Under by Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif stated the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani that both India and Pakistan “shall take immediate Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Rand, 2001); steps for reducing the risk of accidental or Shaukat Qadir, “An analysis of the Kargil Conflict,” unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and discuss RUSI Journal, April 2002; Shireen Mazari, The concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating fact from fiction measures for confidence building in the nuclear and (Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, conventional fields, aimed at prevention of 2003). conflict.”
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move further and/or consider who were engaged in back channel developments at track II levels. diplomacy, discussed de-linking nuclear negotiations from developments in Kashmir, while others in Delhi discussed the setting up of Nuclear Risk Reduction Lack of official movement on Centers (NRRCs); withdrawing nuclear building nuclear confidence capable missiles from the borders; and establishing a mechanism to reduce the First, most of the understandings and risk of accidental or unauthorised use of meetings on nuclear issues between India nuclear weapons.8 Tariq Usman Haider, and Pakistan have taken place at track II who led the Pakistani delegation stated and academic levels and not between the before that meeting that they were looking two states’ governments. The only for ‘result-oriented talks’.9 It is believed agreement that is functional was signed by that during this meeting India provided a Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in 1988 draft agreement on prior notification of relating to the non-attack of each others’ missile testing.10 At the end of this nuclear facilities, which also includes a meeting, all that could be agreed upon was requirement to exchange lists of their establishing a “dedicated and secure” respective nuclear installations. Ever since hotline between their Foreign Secretaries the agreement came into effect, both to prevent misunderstandings and “reduce countries have been regularly exchanging risks relevant to nuclear issues.”11 a list every year on January 1.
In December 2004, the second round of What has been achieved besides this? meetings on nuclear confidence building During the Lahore summit, both countries took place. It was expected that during this signed a Memorandum of Understanding meeting both countries would reach an (MOU) on various nuclear issues and it agreement on pre-notification of missile was also agreed in the Islamabad summit tests.12 However, no agreement was in January 2004 to discuss them. These reached due to differences and technical agreements are discussed below. matters. According to an editorial in The Nation, a leading English-language daily While the Kargil conflict intruded before from Pakistan, “the talks could not make any positive developments could take progress because India wanted the place in discussing nuclear issues agreement to be confined to surface-to- following the Lahore memorandum, surface missiles only while Pakistan formal meetings did take place between rightly maintained that it should extend to India and Pakistan after the Islamabad all types.”13 Ultimately, the December summit. The first meeting was at secretary 2004 meeting ended without any concrete level in June 2004 to discuss nuclear agreement. confidence building measures (CBMS).6
Natwar Singh, India’s External Affairs 8 Minister, stated in an interview before this “Pakistan agreed to keep nuke CBMs separate from Kashmir,” Daily Times, 15 June 2004. meeting that nuclear stability was the most 9 “Pak team for result-oriented talks on nuclear important issue on the Congress CBMs,” The Hindustan Times, 18 June 2004. government’s agenda.7 It was also 10 See C. Raja Mohan, “Beyond nuclear stability: reported that J. N. Dixit and Tariq Aziz, Towards military peace and tranquility on the Indo- Pak border,” The Indian Express, 14 December 2004. 6 The meeting took place at New Delhi during 19- 11 Amit Baruah, “India, Pakistan agree on hotline 20 June 2004. The Indian team was led by Sheel for nuclear issues,” The Hindu, 21 June 2004. Kant Sharma Additional Secretary at India’s 12 “Pak-India missile pre-test notice pact on 14th,” External Affairs Ministry and the Pakistani team by The Nation, 10 December 2004; “Pakistan, India to Tariq Usman Haider. Additional Secretary at the discuss agreement on missile tests next week,” The Pakistan Foreign Office. Nation, 12 December 2004. 7 “Nuclear security tops Indo-Pak talks agenda,” 13 See Editorial, “Disagreement on CBMs,” The Hindustan Times, 10 June 2004. Nation, 17 December 2004.
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Clearly nothing substantial is happening at Karamat, former Chief of Army Staff of the governmental level relating to bilateral the Pakistan Army, in a presentation made nuclear confidence building measures. at the University of Bradford provided Given the recent history, one can expect a details on the structure and functions of lack of progress on these issues. Two Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers between reasons have been cited from India and India and Pakistan.16 Pakistan for this non-movement: one, India’s inflexibility Unfortunately the to negotiate on this state both in India crucial issue after and Pakistan does the “undoing of the Clearly nothing substantial is not give Lahore initiative by happening at the governmental importance to, Pakistan and its and worse even direct role in the level relating to bilateral nuclear recognize, these violence let loose in confidence building measures. studies/developm Jammu and ents. In a seminar Kashmir”; and two, held at the Pakistan’s Institute of Peace inflexibility in linking it with “the prior and Conflict Studies in June 2004, a resolution of the J&K issue.”14 But is this former Indian foreign secretary hypothesis true, or are there other issues commented that they (the Ministry of beyond these that are also impeding External Affairs) never gave any progress? importance to those meetings and outcomes at track II levels on nuclear issues.17 Although there may have been inadequate progress between India and Pakistan at the state level, there have been numerous Official Belief in Deterrence positive developments on the potential for and Nuclear Rhetoric nuclear confidence building at track II and academic levels. Since 2000 in particular, The civilian bureaucracies, militaries and many conferences and workshops have political institutions both in India and taken place both inside and outside South Pakistan believe in the existence of Asia on reducing nuclear dangers between deterrence and its functioning, hence they India and Pakistan. Strategic analysts and see no need to take extra measures.18 India the academic community have taken active part in these meetings along with retired officials from the military and Centers,”
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believes that Pakistan did not expand the attack, they will be able to meet it on conflict in Kargil due to its nuclear equal terms.” Later, Shamsad Ahmad, weapons; while Pakistan believes its Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary issued a nuclear weapons deterred India from statement: “We (Pakistan) will not hesitate attacking after the 13 December terrorist to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend strike on latter’s parliament.19 Abdul our territorial integrity.”22 Kalam on the eve of his becoming Indian President stated that nuclear weapons In 2000, during an interview with CNN, prevented war20; while General Musharraf General Musharraf commented that was on record stating that “deterrence Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if its theory” worked for Pakistan in preventing security was threatened.23 Abdul Qadir India from attacking it in 2002.21 Khan in September 2000 warned “India dare not translate its evil designs in the Beyond the official belief in the existence region or else we would destroy big Indian of deterrence, numerous statements made cities within minutes.”24 There were by state officials during crises and normal nuclear threats during and after the border periods, were deliberately over played or confrontation in 2002. In December 2002, underplayed at particular point, and were General Musharraf warned “if Indian dismissed as rhetoric for internal troops moved a single step across the audiences once the crisis was over. In international border or Line of Control, other words, both countries not only they should not expect a conventional war believe in nuclear deterrence but also in from Pakistan.”25 George Fernandes, the the escalation and de-escalation of nuclear then Defence Minister of India stated in rhetoric. During the Kargil war there were January 2003: “I would say that if at least two statements from Pakistan Pakistan has decided that it wants to get broadly mentioning the use of nuclear itself destroyed and erased from the world weapons. In May 1999, Sharif was map, then it may take this step of madness reported to have stated: “Last year’s (of using nuclear weapons against India). (1998) nuclear tests has given Pakistan the But if it wants to survive then it would not confidence to counter ‘any enemy do so.”26 attack’…. They (the people of Pakistan) are confident for the first time in their All these above mentioned statements, in history that in the eventuality of an armed retrospect, were seen as mere rhetoric by the other side, by the civilian bureaucracies, militaries and the political American intelligence. Riedel’s account has been institutions in both countries. Clearly, the referred elsewhere in this essay. 19 Even a avowed anti deterrence analyst such as divide between nuclear signalling and Pervez Hoodbhoy stated in an interview: “There is rhetoric is either thin, or not recognized by little doubt that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons stopped both states. While most outside the state India from attacking after the December 13 attack would consider them as nuclear signalling, by jehadists on the Indian Parliament. So in that sense I agree…that deterrence did work.” See the decision-making apparatus considers it “Deterrence will not always work,” Frontline, Vol. as rhetoric and downplays or overplays it 19, No. 12, 8-21 June 2002. 20 “Nuclear weapons helped avert war: Kalam,” The 22 “Pakistan may use any weapons: Shamshad,” The Hindu, 20 June 2002. News, 31 May 1999. 21 “Deterrence theory has worked: Musharraf,” The 23 “Pak ready to use nukes if threatened: Hindu, 19 June 2002. He was also quoted stating: Musharraf,” The Asian Age, 5 January 2000 “By testing, with outstanding success, the delivery 24 “Abdul Qadeer warns India,” The Statesman, 14 systems of our strategic capability, these men September 2000. validated the reliability, accuracy and the deterrence 25 See “Musharraf had warned of n-war,” The value of Pakistan’s premier surface-to-surface Hindu, 31 December 2002. ballistic missiles systems of the Hatf series, namely 26 “Pakistan would be erased if it uses nukes: Ghauri, Ghaznavi and Abdali…We need to ensure Fernandes,” that the three basic ingredients of this deterrence –
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according to the situation. Nuclear rhetoric The Rigid Military and escalation is taken for granted and both Civilian Bureaucracies sides believe they understand each other. The crucial question in this sense would The rigid civilian and military be: what if during a crisis, serious bureaucracies along with the political signalling is underplayed as rhetoric and institutions also play a crucial role in the 27 not acted upon? slow progress in Indo-Pak issues in general and the nuclear issues in Both India and Pakistan have always particular. The Cold war politics in South underplayed any reports emanating from Asia, the four wars since independence outside on the threat of nuclear escalation (1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999), militancy in as either mischievous or bogus. External Punjab and Kashmir and lack of sufficient research works or statements were institutional exchanges have made these dismissed as either ‘bookish’ without bureaucracies rigid. Besides their knowing the reality or worse having some unwillingness to move from their stated vested interests. In his essay, Bruce positions, they do not trust the other side Riedel, Special Assistant to President Bill and a new proposal is always seen with Clinton and Senior Director for Near East suspect eyes. Options suggested by and South Asia Affairs in the National individuals or institutions outside the Security Council, mentions evidence of government are seen as idealistic and Pakistan “preparing their nuclear arsenals impractical. In most cases they are not for possible deployment” as crucial in Bill even considered for an internal discussion. Clinton’s efforts towards de-escalating the This institutional rigidity further increases, 28 conflict in June 1999. The bureaucracies, when it comes to the question of Kashmir. militaries and political institutions both in India and Pakistan never took such reports An analysis of the formal meetings in the seriously. These reports were always past, especially between the two treated with a cynicism relating to the bureaucracies amplifies their rigidity. failure or the unreliability of American Since the new round of rapprochement intelligence elsewhere, especially in Iraq, began in October 2003, numerous and such reports were deliberately ignored meetings have taken place at technical and underplayed. levels between the secretaries of India and Pakistan. Various confidence building measures have been proposed ranging from security issues to improving popular movement across the Line of Control (LOC) and international border.29 Some of 27 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury has delved specifically the specific issues include talks on nuclear into nuclear signalling during the border confidence building, increasing bus and confrontation in 2002 and concludes “India and Pakistan’s signals were not clear and easily rail services, gas pipelines and the discernible. Indeed, the signals from both New Baglihar dam. The meeting on nuclear Delhi and Islamabad appeared confusing and CBMs, as discussed earlier, did not make ambiguous.” According to him, there were five any breakthrough. The proposal to have major lessons: the signalling was not always read as more bus and rail services across the intended; non-signal perceived as a signal; presence of multiplicity of actors confusing the signal; cross border across the LOC and IB was purposes; and weak understanding. See Rahul Roy- deadlocked for a long period as India and Chaudhury, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, Pakistan failed to reach an understanding and Escalation Control,” in Michael Krepon, on technical issue of what document to Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider eds., Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington DC: Henry L Stimson Centre, 2004), pp. 102-118. 29 Between April 2003 and October 2004, according 28 Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the to a report, nearly 100 CBMs were exchanged 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper between the two countries. See “96 CBMs Series (Center for the Advanced Study of India, exchanged by India, Pak since April 2003,” The University of Pennsylvania), p. 8. Tribune, 31 October 2004.
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use.30 On gas pipelines there has been no proceeding with its plans in Kargil could movement, as India links it with larger be its exclusion from this secret economic objectives of Pakistan granting diplomacy. Even during the current MFN status.31 On Baglihar, both differ in rapprochement, the role played by Tariq principle on the objectives of the dam.32 Aziz, Brajesh Mishra and later J. N. Dixit was significant. A deeper analysis into the reasons for deadlocks or non-movement in these In nuclear dialogue, besides the civilian issues reveals the rigidity prevalent in both and military bureaucracies, there is an the bureaucracies. To an extent, political additional pressure, from the nuclear institutions in both bureaucracies in terms countries are less of the pressure from rigid and have been …the nuclear bureaucracies... scientists. While the willing to take extra governments do not steps. The case of play a crucial role, as a take into account the Vajpayee and pressure group in terms of perceptions of the Sharif and their nuclear bureaucracies preference to have their own interests. on political issues, secret emissaries they play a crucial and conduct silent role, as a pressure diplomacy would group in terms of their reflect this aspect of Indo-Pak relations.33 own interests and how much the One explanation for the Pakistani military government could yield. For example, India and Pakistan would have no 30 India and Pakistan in principle agree to start a bus problems at the political level to declare a service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. India moratorium on further nuclear testing but prefers that the travel be done with Indian and may not be able to do the same on missile Pakistani passports, as has been the case with Kashmiris travelling between the two countries. testing, not only because they perceive Pakistan prefers UN documents or local ones, but missiles as essential for security and not respective passports. The issue has been deterrence, but also because the pressure resolved and both countries have agreed to initiate from the scientific community to continue the bus service from April 2005. See “India, Pakistan seal deal on Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus with missile tests. According to Raj link,” The Hindu, 17 February 2005. Chengappa, Abdul Kalam and 31 Initially India had economic and security Chidmabaram pleaded to Deve Gowda, questions regarding pipelines via Pakistan. Now, the then Indian Prime Minister in 1996 to the main issue is economic, in terms of getting give permission for nuclear tests.34 The MFN status. 32 Pakistan objects to the construction of the dam, as scientists have made numerous statements it fears that it would affect the water flow in the linking missiles with the security of state river Chenab, which is in violation with the Indus both in India and Pakistan. Dr Samar Waters Treaty (IWT) that both countries have Mubarakmand, receipient of Nishan-e- signed. India’s response has been that the dam would not affect the water flow and its construction Imtiaz, the highest civilian award in is well within the IWT. Negotiations between India and Pakistan took place in January 2005, but failed broke this channel. For Niaz Naik’s account of what to resolve the issue. Pakistan has already submitted all have been discussed see Robert G. Wirsing, a set of documents with the World Bank, requesting Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries the latter to appoint a neutral expert to look into the in a Nuclear Age (Armonk, New York: M.E.Sharpe, issue. See “Baglihar dam talks breakdown,” The 2003): 25-33. There was also another account by a News, 7 January 2005; Imtiaz Alam, “Water journalist on the same issue. See Kushanava disputes and Indo-Pak talks,” The News, 10 January Choudhury, “After the Lahore Summit: The Real 2005; “Baglihar: World Bank gets documents from Story,”
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Pakistan, was quoted stating that The rigid bureaucracies – civilian and Pakistan’s missile and nuclear system, has military – in both countries remain crucial made it impregnable and unconquerable.35 to any forward movement in building confidence on nuclear issues and reducing The pressure from the nuclear risks. The political institutions could be bureaucracies as a whole, the internal persuaded, or are perhaps already are competition, if not rivalry, between the convinced of the need for such efforts. various scientific establishments also The issue is how to convince the needs to be taken into account. The bureaucracies that believe in the existence nuclear bureaucracies both in India and of deterrence, do not agree, or worse, Pakistan are not monolithic organizations ignore any non-governmental and track II but have various sub-branches dealing efforts on the need for nuclear risk with different aspects. For example in reductions, and remain rigid in their Pakistan, between the Kahuta Research perceptions vis-à-vis the other? This is the Laboratories (KRL) and Pakistan Atomic main challenge for the political elites and Energy Commission (PAEC), and in India the common populace, who would between the Atomic Energy Commission otherwise have fewer problems in (AEC) and the Defence Research cooperating with each other. Development Organization (DRDO), there is a divide in terms of objectives and functions, but there is also overlap. The differences amongst the nuclear Overcoming the Rigidity: Is institutions also play a role in exerting there a way out? pressure on the government. Both the organizations and the individuals compete If the bureaucracies cannot be convinced, for government’s attention. There have can they be overcome? Have there been been numerous reports about this intra- instances in South Asia in which the competition/rivalry between the various civilian and military bureaucracies have scientific institutions within the country.36 been circumvented? Have there been other initiatives between the governments not involving the bureaucracies or at least 35 “Pakistani scientist says missile programme serious efforts before taking the latter into “wholly indigenous, peaceful” The Nation, 22 confidence? Have such efforts been October 2003. 36 productive and succeeded in achieving This intra competition and/or rivalry is more pronounced in Pakistan’s nuclear bureaucracy, as what the bureaucracies otherwise could there is not only a struggle between the institutions, not? but also between the ‘father’ and ‘step fathers’ of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. According to a report, Since the nuclear tests, there have been “Until the nuclear explosions in 1998, Khan had sole claim over the making of the bomb, and to the two instances in which those who engaged Pakistani public, the name of Khan and KRL stood in the back channel diplomacy bypassed for Pakistan’s nuclear program. After the the civilian and military bureaucracies. As explosions, however, the media reported an ugly mentioned earlier R. K. Mishra and Niaz battle, as both groups of scientists made their bid to Naik in 1999 and Brajesh Mishra and appear as the real bomb makers. This bizarre situation went to such an extreme that the Tariq Aziz in 2003-2004 played a crucial government of Nawaz Sharif had to intervene to role in reducing the distance between the silence the scientists and clarify the contributions of political leadership. These meetings were the two organizations: Uranium had been enriched deliberately kept away from the regular by KRL; other processes, up to the explosions, were handled by PAEC.” See Najum Mushtaq, “Pakistan: channels of communication. Khan forced out,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July/August 2001, control in time of crisis.” See Neil Joeck, “Nuclear
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The first process failed to achieve rapprochement in Kargil.39 When Atal anything significant due to the Kargil Vajpayee was the Prime Minister, it is conflict, but the discussions were intensive believed that the meetings between and focused primarily on reaching on Brajesh Mishra and Tariq Aziz were understanding on Jammu and Kashmir. crucial in reaching an agreement at According to Niaz Islamabad in January Naik’s version of 2004.40 After the what happened Since the nuclear tests, there Islamabad summit in during these January 2004, Tariq meetings, Vajpayee have been two instances in Aziz and J. N. Dixit and Sharif agreed to which those who engaged in played a crucial role in focus on four issues: sustaining the bilateral the back channel diplomacy political process through Both sides should bypassed the civilian and their back channel move beyond meetings.41 According publicly stated military bureaucracies. to a news report, it was positions on these two who were Kashmir. A instrumental in India solution to and Pakistan reaching Kashmir must take into account the the agreement at the end of their talks on interests of India, Pakistan and above nuclear CBMs in June 2004.42 all the Kashmiri people. The solution to Kashmir must be just, fair and feasible. These meetings were purposefully kept The agreed solution to Kashmir must confidential. C. Raja Mohan, a leading be final and not partial.37 commentator and analyst, himself a part of various track II level meetings, wrote that Even during the Kargil conflict, there these meetings, were in fact leaked by were two crucial meetings between the ‘traditional opponents’ (meaning the two emissaries in June 1999, in which bureaucracies) of the peace process, because they were kept of out the decision they came close to reaching an agreement 43 on withdrawal from Kargil.38 making. Unfortunately these meetings could not proceed further, as India decided to opt for Could these channels be influenced to a military response, rather than a political reach broad understanding on nuclear risk
37 Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of 39 For the reasons see Suba Chandran, “One Step War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age, p. 27. Forward, Two Steps backward: Will Vajpayee stand 38 In these two meetings, Nawaz Sharif and firm this time?” Vajpayee sent personal notes on how to de-escalate.
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reduction measures, leading to an This would also help the bureaucracies to agreement between India and Pakistan at work on already defined broad parameters, the political level? The civilian and instead of them working to arrive at an military bureaucracies could then be understanding on what those parameters requested to follow up the broad political could be. This paper assumes this is a understanding with technical and possibility and a better approach towards functional details. This would help both nuclear risk reduction measures between countries to reach an understanding faster India and Pakistan. and also without much of the historical and bureaucratic baggage. For example, R. In this case, clearly, two sets of processes K. Mishra and Niaz Naik were acting would be required: First, reaching a broad purely at the political level, as secret political understanding, at the highest emissaries of Vajpayee and Sharif, levels between India and Pakistan, perhaps without much being divulged to the culminating in a treaty on nuclear risk civilian and military bureaucracies about reduction. Second, a set of permanent their meetings and objectives. If R. K. institutions, more or less insulated from Mishra and Niaz Naik could reach crucial the daily political rhetoric, which would understanding on a complicated issue such be totally dedicated to maintaining nuclear as Kashmir, one is sure that it would be stability and building further confidence easier for persons engaging in back which could be expanded, revised and channel diplomacy to reach an agreement updated on a regular basis. This paper on nuclear issues. proposes a formal bilateral understanding, in the form of either an agreement or treaty for the first; and institutionalizing the measures through constituting Nuclear Confidence Building Centers (NCBC), for the second.
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Reaching Political Understanding: From Nuclear Agreements to a Treaty?
What broad political understanding could destruction of, or damage to, any India and Pakistan reach at the highest nuclear installation or facility in the levels? What has been agreed so far? other country. Each Contracting Party What are the major disagreements? What shall inform the other on 1st January of could be done further? each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities and whenever there is any change.44 The Nuclear Agreements: So Far The second was the memorandum of Two agreements have been signed so far understanding signed between the foreign between India and Pakistan on nuclear secretaries of India and Pakistan in issues. Both have been the result of a February 1999 during the Lahore summit 45 process initiated by charismatic leaders states: who wanted to reach an understanding with the other. The first was the by- The two sides shall engage in bilateral product of the Islamabad summit in 1988 consultations on security concepts, and between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto nuclear doctrines, with a view to and the second was the by-product of the developing measures for confidence Lahore summit in 1999 between Nawaz building in the nuclear and Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee. If there conventional fields, aimed at avoidance is any third agreement, then it could again of conflict. only be a by-product of a major summit, forcing the bureaucracies to proceed The two sides undertake to provide further and not as a result of an each other with advance notification in understanding emanating from long respect of ballistic missile flight tests, meetings of joint working groups. and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard. The first agreement between India and Pakistan on Prohibition of Attack Against The two sides are fully committed to Nuclear Installations and Facilities was undertaking national measures to signed between the foreign secretaries during the Islamabad summit in 1988. It 44 See Agreement between India & Pakistan on states: Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities Each party shall refrain from
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reducing the risks of accidental or context of negotiations on these issues unauthorised use of nuclear weapons in multilateral fora. under their respective control.
The two sides further undertake to notify each, other immediately in the The Nuclear Agreements: event of any accidental, unauthorised or What Next? unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse How to proceed further towards reaching consequences for both sides, or an an understanding at the highest levels? outbreak of a nuclear war between the What should be the focus? Should it two countries, as well as to adopt include a moratorium on further nuclear measures aimed at diminishing the testing? Should it include refraining from possibility of such actions, or such testing long-range missiles, capable of incidents being misinterpreted by the carrying nuclear weapons? Should it other. The two side shall include reaching an understanding on identify/establish the appropriate nuclear doctrines? communication mechanism for this purpose. An analysis of the respective positions of India and Pakistan is essential to reaching The two sides shall continue to abide a conclusion on these questions. There by their respective unilateral have been occasions in which issues moratorium on conducting further related to nuclear risks were discussed at nuclear test explosions unless either the highest levels. During the Agra side, in exercise of its national summit, it was believed that General sovereignty decides that extraordinary Musharraf and Atal Vajpayee discussed events have jeopardised its supreme ways to reduce nuclear risks, with additional inputs being provided by interests. 46 Brajesh Mishra and Abdus Sattar. The two sides shall conclude an According to reports, it was also agreed by agreement on prevention of incidents at both the leaders to form a technical sea in order to ensure safety of committee including members of the foreign and defence ministries, the armed navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft 47 belonging to the two sides. forces and scientific and other experts. But this effort did not proceed, as both The two sides shall periodically review India and Pakistan failed to reach a the implementation of existing consensus at the end. It is widely believed Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that both leaders were ready for a joint statement, but the hawkish elements and where necessary, set up appropriate 48 consultative mechanisms to monitor within the BJP establishment scuttled it. and ensure effective implementation of these CBMs. After the Agra Summit, according to another news report, the Government of The two sides shall undertake a review India asked the Chairman of the Chiefs of of the existing communication links Staff Committee to prepare a blueprint for (e.g. between the respective Directors- a nuclear stabilisation regime with the aim General, Military Operations) with a view to upgrading and improving these 46 This meeting was held between the two leaders at links, and to provide for fail-safe and one-to-one level; Brajesh Mishra and Abdus Sattar secure communications. were asked to provide key inputs on this issue. See “PM, Musharraf agree on nuclear risk reduction,” The Statesman, 16 July 2001. The two sides shall engage in bilateral 47 See “PM, Musharraf agree on nuclear risk consultations on security, disarmament reduction,” The Statesman, 16 July 2001. 48 and non-proliferation issues within the See AG Noorani, “Kargil Diplomacy,” Frontline 16, No.16 (13 August 1999).
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of reducing nuclear tensions and extraordinary events have jeopardised formulating a structure to avoid nuclear its supreme interests.50 accidents.49 Though there were statements on An understanding at the highest political resuming the nuclear tests, they were level, concluding preferably in a treaty, issued more as rhetoric for internal besides pressurizing the civilian and audiences.51 Neither the regional nor the military bureaucracy to move further, bilateral environment calls for nuclear would also have tremendous symbolic testing, at least in the near future. Given value between the two the international countries. The opposition and the understanding to share An understanding at the need to work information in nuclear closely with the installations on the highest political level…besides global community, first January of every pressurizing the civilian and neither India nor year, presently has Pakistan can afford tremendous symbolic military bureaucracy to move to resume nuclear value, especially when further, would also have tests. The economic quoted in newspapers. and political tremendous symbolic value. consequences The proposed treaty would be disastrous. needs to be simple without many Since there is a complications and drafted in a simpler consensus already, which has been language, so that it can be concluded and individually and jointly proclaimed by remain effective. Three issues where there both countries, a moratorium on testing could be broad understanding and could be the first focus of the proposed consensus could be the focus of such a treaty. treaty, without going into detail. These three could include a moratorium on testing, an understanding on missile An Understanding on Missile Testing? testing and agreeing in principle to Would India and Pakistan refrain from establish a common nuclear doctrine. testing their long-range missiles? Various scholars and analysts have suggested it as Moratorium on nuclear testing a measure of nuclear risk reduction.52 There have been unrealistic claims about There are issues that could be included in ‘cap, roll back and eliminate’. Both a formal agreement on which India and nuclear weapons and missiles in South Pakistan would have fewer problems in Asia are here to stay, and perhaps even agreeing with each other. For example, the develop further. Given the ‘prestige’ moratorium on nuclear testing. Both countries have already stated that they will not test any further. The joint statement at 50 “No more nuke tests: India, Pak,” 20 June 2004, the end of the bilateral meeting in June
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factor and the official belief in nuclear tests are seen vital to the maintenance of weapons as providing security, one could ‘minimum credible deterrence’. Since conclude that, even if global nuclear both countries believe in this concept, disarmament (a highly unlikely scenario) there is little chance of an immediate became a reality, India and Pakistan halt.55 Perhaps, over a period, after would be the last states to contribute to adequate testing and especially after the such an effort. Both India and Pakistan are scientific community is satisfied with well aware that the nuclear haves would these tests, it may be reasonable to expect never agree to a complete nuclear both countries to refrain from further disarmament; hence they can keep testing. exploiting the double standards of the nuclear haves, whilst themselves insisting What could be achieved at this stage is an on the rhetoric of their nuclear weapons as agreement that would help both countries ‘weapons of peace’. to be more Any suggestions on transparent in terms confidence building …the missile tests per se do not of testing, size and measures should distance. It is take into account produce adverse reaction; rather interesting to note this reality. the adverse situation makes the that the missile tests per se do not What could India missiles tests provocative. produce adverse and Pakistan agree reaction; rather the on missiles at this adverse situation juncture? Clearly makes the missiles missile tests do increase anxiety, as could tests provocative. Whenever there has be seen in Table 1, thereby providing been a rapprochement between the two temporary instability, especially when countries, the missile tests were not taken relations were not that cordial. as seriously and reactions were not as serious. The reactions from India and Would India and Pakistan refrain from Pakistan to the testing of Shaheen-II in further testing? While it would be an ideal March 2004, is an interesting case that suggestion, it is difficult to conclude that needs to be probed. Commenting on the both countries would agree to it. Both test, the Dawn, in its editorial mentioned: countries believe that missiles are essential for their national security, and (Testing Shaheen II) also marks a high therefore continue testing and production. level of technological expertise, which George Fernandes explaining the rationale one hopes will find peaceful for testing India’s Agni series of missiles, applications in non-military fields for stating in April 2003: “The test firing of the country’s advancement. The hope Agni-III is overdue and we feel the need also will be that the missile test, of for that long-range missile as part of our which New Delhi was informed in policy of deterrence.”53 General Musharraf advance, will not spoil the atmosphere in July 2003 stated: “Our nuclear and of cordiality marking Indo-Pakistan missile programmes are our strength. No relations. Neither Pakistan nor India one can even think of entering into any can afford the kind of lavish spending deal on such national honours.”54
Expecting India and Pakistan to refrain 55 from testing missiles, at this stage, would For example, in March 2004, after testing Shaheen II, surface-to-surface ballistic missile that not yield any positive results. The missile could reach 2000 kms, the statement from the government of Pakistan said: “(The test) reflects 53 “Agni-III test-fire this year: Fernandes,” The Pakistan’s resolve to maintain minimum credible Hindu, 7 April 2003. deterrence as the corner stone of its security 54 “Nuclear programme is our strength: Musharraf,” policy.” See “Pakistan tests its longest-range The Times of India, 4 July 2003. missile,” Dawn, 10 March 2004.
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that has gone into developing their After Dr. Khan’s disgrace, President nuclear programmes.56 Musharraf and the PAEC needed to demonstrate that Pakistan’s strategic capability had not been imperilled. The The Hindu, in its editorial also took a launch of Shaheen-II, a more modern conciliatory approach towards the missile than the Ghauri-II and with a Shaheen-II test, linking the testing with significantly greater range, is obviously the competition between the Pakistan intended to send a reassuring message to Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Pakistanis… India needs to recognise that Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). It the Shaheen-II test, while most unfortunate mentioned: and ill-timed, does not shift the balance of 57 With Ghauri-II, the Khan Laboratories power in favour of Pakistan. could claim to have given Pakistan not only the atomic bomb but also the capability to land it over most of India.
Table 1: Missile Tests and Reactions since 2001
Event Reaction
January 2001: India test Pakistan considered it as part of India’s ambitious fires Agni II nuclear and missile programme posing a threat to its security.1
January 2002: India tests a “Our government has decided that we will not be shorter range version of provoked into responding to India’s test, because... by Agni doing that, we will fall into the Indian way of dealing with the situation.” (Abdus Sattar in an interview to the CNN)1
“The missile test carried out by India and some information, some news even, of maybe a possibility of a nuclear test is most untimely and may I also say provocative.” (General Musharraf in his speech at Washington D.C. in February 2002)1
May 2002: Pakistan tests “Neither India nor the international community is fooled Hatf V, a medium range by these Pakistani antics. Gen. Pervez Musharraf is fully surface to surface ballistic aware of India’s strong retaliatory capability…Pakistan missile faces total annihilation should it dare to use nuclear weapons.” (Sunil Shastri, BJP Party Spokesman)1
56 Editorial, “Shaheen-II test,” Dawn, 11 March 57 Editorial, “Significance of Shaheen II,” The 2004. Hindu, 12 March 2004.
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October 2002: Pakistan “We (India) are not particularly impressed with these tests Ghauri-IV, a missile antics of Pakistan. As is well-known, Pakistan’s medium range surface to missiles are based on clandestinely imported material, surface ballistic missile equipment and technology.” (Foreign Office Statement, quoted in news paper) 1
January 2003: India test “Pakistan has no fears from Agni missiles as far as our fired Agni, a medium national and territorial security is concerned and India has range surface-to-surface not succeeded in establishing that the balance of power in missile. South Asia has been shifted in its favour through such missile tests.’’ (Jamali, Prime Minister of Pakistan)1 March 2003: India test March 2003: Pakistan test fired Abdali in response. fired Prithvi April 2003: George “We have stated before that India is the proliferator in this Fernandes announced that region. India is the one which is proliferating the missile India would test Agni-III programme…It is better that the international community later in 2003. gives attention to it and prevents India from this relentless pursuit of more and more weapons.” (Aziz Ahmed Khan, Spokesman for the Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry)1 March 2004: Pakistan No hostile reaction from India. tests Shaheen-II, surface- to-surface ballistic On the contrary, Masood Khan, Pakistan foreign office missile with longest reach spokesman stated: “I don’t think that the missile test of 2000 kms. would have any adverse impact on the composite dialogue process that we started some time ago.”1 June 2004: Pakistan tests No hostile reaction from India. Ghauri On the contrary, General Musharraf made a specific statement: “the test was not intended to send any political signals outside the country but was necessary for validation of technical parameters.”1 July 2004: India tests “Both countries (Pakistan and India) do the tests. It is a Agni A-1. sovereign right of a country to take any measure for its defence…We reserve the sovereign right to improve our defence capability and same right be granted to other countries.” (Mushahid Hussain, Chairman of Senate foreign relations committee)1
G. Parthasarathy, former Indian High physicist, Dr Mand, is a Punjabi close Commissioner to Pakistan also linked the to the hawkish sections of the Urdu testing of missile with internal politics. He media in Lahore. While he was the wrote: driving force behind the May 1998 nuclear tests, he has also been in charge After disgracing Dr A. Q. Khan, of what was known as the National Pakistan needs a national hero to serve Development Complex in Fatehjang, as the symbol of its proudest where missiles of Chinese origin are “achievements”— the nuclear bomb assembled. Dr. Mand thanked Allah for and the missile programme. The the success of the Shaheen-2 test. He
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rubbished the “achievements” of the 2004, during their nuclear CBM Dr. A. Q. Khan Laboratories in Kahuta, negotiations.60 Efforts to reach an pointing out that merely 2000 out of understanding on pre-notification of Pakistan’s 5000 nuclear scientists missiles were intensely discussed in the worked in Kahuta. He also asserted that December 2004 meeting held at Islamabad Shaheen-2 was far superior to the between the two teams.61 These failed at liquid-fuelled Ghauri missiles the end due to technical differences.62 assembled with North Korean An understanding on missile tests, which assistance in Kahuta.58 already exists between both countries, could then form the second part of the Later, when India tested Prithvi missiles proposed treaty. At a later stage, when during the same month, there was no there is a better understanding, both reaction from the other side; no official countries could enlarge the focus. statements were made linking the test with Attempting an all-comprehensive instability or escalation. Ever since, the understanding on missile tests at this reactions to missile tests have been more juncture would only scuttle any progress. mature.59 This could be linked to the existing rapprochement during this period. A Common Nuclear Doctrine?
Would India and Pakistan be able to reach Could, then, a broad political an understanding over nuclear doctrines? understanding be concluded on missile India has already drafted its nuclear tests which would produce less instability? doctrine63 and it has been extensively In this case, this understanding at the commented upon.64 political level could focus on reaching transparency vis-à-vis the missile tests, so 60 “Pak-India missile pre test notice pact on 14th,” that they did not lead to instability. There The Nation, 10 December 2004; “Pakistan, India to were news reports that both India and discuss agreement on missile tests next week,” The Pakistan would sign a pact on pre- Nation, 12 December 2004. 61 notification of missile tests, in December The talks were even stretched to reach an understanding, as commented by a Pakistani official: “The two sides, however, are determined to 58 G. Parthasarathy, “Power equations in Pakistan: reach the agreement on pre-notification of flight- How it acquired its missiles and bombs,” The testing of missiles and it is for this that they decided Tribune, 25 March 2004. There were contrary to hold further talks on Wednesday.” See perceptions; for example, see Gen. V. P. Malik’s “Inconclusive N-talks extended for today,” The analysis of the implications and reasons for the Nation, 15 December 2004. tests. He wrote: “The aim of the test as stated 62 According a report, quoting a source, the officially was “to ensure the reach of the missile agreement could not be reached “due to varying was sufficient to deter aggression and prevent interpretations of the scope and technical military coercion”. But the un-stated aims appeared parameters involved, the two delegations decided to to be three. One is to demonstrate its strategic reflect further and consult their respective systems.” capability to India. Ever since Operation Parakram, See “Nuclear talks end without agreement: Deal on Pakistan has often accused India of military Sir Creek survey,” Dawn, 16 December 2004. coercion. Two, it may be related to India’s deal with According to Pakistani sources, “India wanted the Israel to buy the Phalcon airborne radar system that agreement to be confined to surface-to-surface has been officially criticised by Pakistan, and missiles only while Pakistan rightly maintained that India’s Agni III missile test, expected to be carried it should extend to all types,” including missiles that out in the near future. Three, to convey to could be fired from submarines. See, “Editorial: Pakistan’s domestic audience that the A. Q. Khan Disagreement on CBMs,” The Nation, 17 December affair had not compromised its nuclear and missile 2004. programmes.” Gen. V. P. Malik, “Missile testing: 63 India’s National Security Advisory Board No way to send political messages,” The Tribune, (NSAB) published a draft nuclear doctrine in 22 March 2004. August 1999. See “Draft Report of National 59 In May and June 2004 Pakistan tested Ghauri: in Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear July 2004, India tested Agni A-1; in August 2004, Doctrine,” India tested Agni-II; in October 2004, Pakistan
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Of the various issues, three remain this policy.66 Bharat Karnad, brings out cornerstones of India’s nuclear doctrine: the dilemma of the no-first-use: no-first-use, inclusion of China as a significant factor and minimum credible ...it beggars the imagination to think deterrence. The no-first-use policy, that any Indian government will at any according to the government means time and for any reason whatsoever risk “nuclear weapons will only be used in exposing the country to nuclear retaliation against a nuclear attack on devastation from an incoming strike Indian territory or on Indian forces even if armed with infirm intelligence anywhere.”65 However, there is no about such an occurrence, without unanimous approval of this policy resorting to a preemptive nuclear attack amongst the strategic community. The of its own to thwart it.67 (first) National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) for example, in January 2003 However, most independent analysts and recommended that India should reconsider the government stand by the no-first-use policy. George Fernandes, the then External Affairs Minister, subsequently made a statement that there was no need for India to review its no-first-use policy. Committee On Security Reviews Progress in He stated: “We have a nuclear doctrine, a Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine,”
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exerted, in India’s case, by Washington corner stones of Pakistan’s nuclear policy? and Beijing...”70 The following could be observed in this regard. Third is India’s emphasis on minimum nuclear deterrence (MND). However, like First Pakistan’s nuclear policy is India Pakistan, the government has specifically specific. Pakistan considers that its nuclear restrained itself from weapons are defining it, leaving ‘security-driven’ many crucial whereas India’s questions unanswered. Pakistan considers that its weapons are 73 MND is further nuclear weapons are ‘security- ‘status-driven’. discussed below. There have been driven’ whereas India’s numerous reports Although Pakistan is weapons are ‘status-driven’. and analysis, yet to publish a formal linking Pakistan’s doctrine, there have bomb with that of been adequate an ‘Islamic Bomb’; statements from the state and also however the Islamic component of both articles/opinions from those considered the bomb and the policy is exaggerated close to the state.71 In addition, there are and not based on reality.74 Certainly, the numerous commentaries on Pakistan’s state in Pakistan, managed either by its nuclear policy and strategy.72 What are the secular polity or the powerful military would never like to use it as an Islamic 70 Bharat Karnad, “Deconstructing the Indian bomb. If there is a failure of the state or Nuclear Doctrine,” in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and the jihadis or the Islamic parties take over Imtiaz H. Bokhari, Arms Race and Nuclear the state, would this policy likely to Developments in South Asia (Islamabad: IPRI, remain?75 That is a different question 2004), pp. 63-64. 71 See the following: Agha Shahi, Zulfikar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar, “Securing Nuclear Peace,” The Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999; General News, 5 October 1999. This article has been widely Aslam Beg, “Dynamics of nuclearized South Asia,” referred in terms of relating it with an official The Nation, 10 May 1999; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, position. The fact that Zulfikar Ali Khan was from “Pakistan’s Nuclear Policies: Attitudes and the military establishment and the rest from the Postures,” in P. R. Chari et al ed., Nuclear Non- foreign office lends credibility to this article; Proliferation in India and Pakistan (New Delhi: another report prepared by the Landau Network Manohar Publishers, 1996). contained interviews from the establishment on 73 Shireen M. Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan’s Pakistan’s nuclear policy. The establishment in Nuclear Doctrine,” in Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Pakistan however later refuted the details in the Imtiaz H. Bokhari, Arms Race and Nuclear report. See Maurizio Martellini and Paolo Cotta- Developments in South Asia (Islamabad: IPRI, Ramusino, ‘Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and 2004), p. 71. nuclear strategy in Pakistan: a concise report of a 74 See the following works on ‘Islamic bomb’: visit by Landau Network–Centro Volta’, Edgar O’ Balance, “The Islamic Bomb,” National
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altogether; it is suffice to mention here capabilities more acute and thereby will that the weapon is purely political and has lower the nuclear threshold.”78 In his no religious connotations whatsoever. interview, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, Director, Strategic Plans Division (SPD) Second, Pakistan does not believe in a no- mentioned: first-use policy and has refused to respond to India’s offer of a no first use agreement. Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at In an interview with NBC in January India. In case that deterrence fails, they 2002, General Musharraf stated: “We will be used if a. India attacks Pakistan (Pakistan) want to denuclearise South and conquers a large part of its territory Asia. We want to sign a No War Pact with (space threshold); b. India destroys a (India).”76 Though its nuclear policy is not large part either of its land or air forces stated formally, the political and military (military threshold); c. India proceeds leadership have stated it in various forums to the economic strangling of Pakistan and occasions. In March 2003, General (economic strangling); d. India pushes Musharraf explained the key aspects Pakistan into political destabilization or briefly: creates a large scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization).79 Pakistan (does) not have global ambitions but was compelled to go Fourth, Pakistan has also been insisting on nuclear due to belligerence in its a minimum nuclear deterrence. However, neighbourhood…We are not into any like India, Pakistan has also restrained arms race with anyone. Minimum from defining what constitutes MND. credible deterrence remains the Abdus Sattar, Foreign Minister of Pakistan cornerstone of our security policy and stated and explained their MND position: towards that end we have defined and quantified for ourselves the notion of Minimum nuclear deterrence will minimum deterrence…Beyond that remain the guiding principle of our quantified notion, Pakistan will not nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot pursue an open-ended strategic be quantified in static numbers. The weapons arms race. In my opinion, in Indian build up will necessitate review the nuclear game, numbers beyond a 77 and reassessment. In order to ensure the point lose their significance. survivability and credibility of the deterrent Pakistan will have to Third, Pakistan also has also hinted that its maintain, preserve and upgrade its nuclear threshold could be lower. Shireen capability. But we shall not engage in Mazari noted that the “increasing any nuclear competition or arms conventional imbalance will make race.”80 Pakistan’s reliance on its nuclear This MND, according to scholars in Pakistan, would not aim at matching India, Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to. Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.26, No.3 pp. 7-25. In India, many fear that Pakistan would eventually fail and the fundamentalists would take over the nuclear weapons. See Gurmeet Kanwal, 78 Shireen M. Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan’s “Pak nukes may end up in Islamist fundamentalist Nuclear Doctrine,” p.75. hands,” The Indian Express, 24 February 2004. 79 Maurizio Martellini and Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, 76 “Pak ready for denuclearisation of S Asia, sign ‘Nuclear safety, nuclear stability and nuclear No War Pact,” Hindustan Times, 24 January 2002. strategy in Pakistan: a concise report of a visit by 77 “Pakistan’s army given new nuclear-capable Landau Network–Centro Volta’, missile,” The Times of India, 7 March 2003. Also
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but its “level will be at a higher numbers’ It appears that both the policies – no-first- level.”81 use and no-war-pact – seem to be political rhetoric. Both countries will keep Fifth, Pakistan has been arguing for a emphasizing them, irrespective of “nuclear restraint regime” for a long knowing that it would not be acceptable to period.82 Though it has not been explained the other side. explicitly what Pakistan means by a nuclear restraint regime, it is understood India and Pakistan: Nuclear Posture that it aims at an understanding on and Doctrines ‘minimum nuclear deterrence’; and an On minimum nuclear deterrence (MND), effort towards regional strategic arms there is a convergence at least at the control – including rhetorical level. But conventional and what constitutes the nuclear weapons MND? There has and perhaps a no- Given the continuing problems been no further war-pact, which of resolving the Kashmir issue explanation on this Pakistan has been crucial issue. Rodney insisting on for a and the continuance of cross Jones asks the long time. A foreign border terrorism, it is highly following questions ministry official vis-à-vis the MND of was quoted saying, unlikely that India would agree India and Pakistan: in February 2004: a no-war-pact. “Does it imply the “There should not sufficiency of small be an open-ended numbers of nuclear race for strategic or weapons? Nuclear conventional arms. It also aims to limit the weapons held in reserve? Low readiness risk of a nuclear conflict and a missile or alert rates of a nuclear force? race.”83 Renunciation of nuclear war fighting? Mainly counter-value targeting?”84 As seen above, the MND as envisaged by India and Pakistan would be determined Convergences and more by India’s nuclear force structure. Divergences: A Nuclear Tally On the other hand, Pakistan, rhetorically, would not like to enter into a nuclear arms Clearly there are elements of divergence race with India – it would like to keep the and some broad convergence between the MND at a ‘higher level’ as Shireen Mazari nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan has commented. (see Table 2). On the policy of no-first- Pervez Musharraf in one of his statements use, there is a clear divergence between made it clear: “We do not want to indulge the two countries. Given Pakistan’s in any arm race but we want to maintain conventional and nuclear structure, it the minimum deterrence level essential for would never agree to a mutual no-first-use our security.”85 Would Pakistan be willing arrangement, while insisting on a no-war- to settle for a nuclear asymmetry with pact. Given the continuing problems of India, if the latter decides to settle for it resolving the Kashmir issue and the with China? W. P. S Sidhu has continuance of cross border terrorism, it is commented that India could settle with highly unlikely that India would agree a China on nuclear force structure with a no-war-pact.
81 Shireen M. Mazari, “Understanding Pakistan’s 84 Rodney Jones, “Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Nuclear Doctrine,” p.75. Postures in South Asia: An Overview,” April 2002, 82 See “A threat to Pakistan security: FO,” Dawn,
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Table 2: India and Pakistan Nuclear Posture and Doctrines
India Pakistan No First Use Yes No Minimum Yes Yes Nuclear Deterrence Regional No and Yes Yes and Indifferent Strategic No: If the restraint regime is to Yes: If the restraint regime would Restraint Regime be strictly region based be between India and Pakistan. excluding China Indifferent: If a strategic regime is Yes: If a strategic regime is to to include China include China Nuclear Yes, if it is global. Yes, if India disarms. Disarmament
ratio of 1:3.86 Would Pakistan then be may not be averse to the idea if China willing to agree on the same? While 1:3 would also become a part of it. India ratio may or may not be acceptable to believes that Pakistan’s nuclear policy is Pakistan; the fact is there are alternatives India specific, while its own policy is not that both countries could pursue. A larger Pakistan specific. According to a report debate needs to be created and sustained published on the Indian embassy’s website both in India and Pakistan on this crucial in Washington during the June 2004 question. meeting “New Delhi has rejected Another issue of convergence, again at the Pakistan’s proposal for a nuclear restraint rhetorical level, is on nuclear regime, pointing out that unlike Pakistan’s disarmament. Pakistan has repeatedly nuclear program, which is India-centric, mentioned that it would give up nuclear India’s is not Pakistan-centric.”87 weapons, if India does so. India has Analysts, outside the government in India claimed that it would give up nuclear have also rejected Pakistan’s proposal for weapons, if there is global nuclear a ‘restraint regime’ as rhetoric and have disarmament. Both are clearly rhetoric, called for an understanding of India’s knowing well that the other party would threat perceptions from other borders. not agree to the demand. Could there be a trilateral understanding On the strategic restraint regime, both including China, India and Pakistan to countries converge and diverge. India is reach a consensus on a nuclear restraint against any strategic regime at the regional regime in South Asia? If India could live level only between India and Pakistan, but in asymmetry with China, would Pakistan then be ready to live in asymmetry with India? Clearly if China is to compete with 86 According to W. P. S. Sidhu, “there are several advantages for India accepting a ratio of 1:3 the US, and India with China and Pakistan between the Indian and Chinese arsenal. First, it with India, there would never be an end to links and pegs the Indian nuclear force to China’s the nuclear race in South Asia or at the and therefore provides a rationale for a build-up in global level. A threshold needs to be future. Second, this ratio is not only more reached, both in South Asia and favourable than the one between China and the two superpowers in the 1960s but would provide parity between India and China in the early decades of the 87 “India, Pakistan agree to keep nuclear weapons next century.” See W. P. S. Sidhu, “China and the safe,” Nuclear vision,” The Indian Express, 22 September
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elsewhere. In South Asia, this threshold Such a treaty, which would acknowledge could be established at a trilateral level the positive contribution of the former, including India, China and Pakistan or at would also put an end to, or at least two bilateral levels including India and undermine, potentially destabilizing Pakistan, and India and China. Natwar reports. Third, it would also reduce the Singh, External Affairs Minister of India, impact of rigid postures amongst the in June 2004 suggested a common nuclear bureaucracies towards reaching an doctrine for the three countries.88 The idea agreement and provide the direction for of a common nuclear doctrine could be them to work further. explored once India and Pakistan, along with China, agree on preliminary issues The proposed treaty between India and and negotiations proceed. Could this Pakistan then could run as follows:90 common doctrine then exclude divergent issues such as the no-first-use, while Reaffirming the continued commitment of including minimum nuclear deterrence their respective governments to the and global disarmament, even if they have principles and purposes of the U.N. only rhetoric significance? Charter; Reiterating the determination of both countries to implementing the Simla Agreement in letter and spirit; Guided by the earlier agreements between their A hypothetical treaty Prime Ministers that an environment of Taking into account the convergences and peace and security is in the supreme divergences, India and Pakistan could sign national interest of both sides and that an agreement, worked silently through resolution of all outstanding issues, back channels. This approach would have including Jammu and Kashmir, is many merits. First, it would be of essential for this purpose; enormous political and psychological value, giving a crucial boost to the The Prime Minister of India and the Prime struggling bilateral rapprochement Minister of Pakistan agree to process. Second, it would also reassure the Refrain from further nuclear testing international community, which is worried Inform each other about any missile tests about Kashmir as a nuclear flash point and in advance regard South Asia as the most dangerous Work towards a common nuclear doctrine place in the world. While there have been for the region, taking into account the serious political and academic efforts security needs of each country towards a safe South Asia, there have also Work towards global nuclear been certain vested, intelligence reports disarmament floated occasionally on nuclear dangers in Establish institutions in both countries South Asia, contributing only to political that would look into political and and nuclear instability. For example, technical issues to achieve the above Seymour Hersh’s article about the nuclear mentioned and also suggest measures to crisis in 1990 between India and improve nuclear stability in the region. Pakistan89 or the recent account of Bruce Riedel, discussed earlier, on Pakistan readying nuclear weapons during the Kargil conflict have been considered as vested stories.
90 The first section of this proposed draft is borrowed from the MOU signed between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan during the Lahore summit. While the mentioning of the UN 88 “Common N-doctrine needed: Natwar,” charter would remain a continuation of the global Hindustan Times, 2 June 2004. rhetoric, the inclusion of Shimla agreement and 89 Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” The Jammu and Kashmir are specific, to convince the New Yorker, March 29, 1993, pp. 92-95. traditional interests of both India and Pakistan.
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Establishing Institutions: Nuclear Confidence Building Centers (NCBCs)
The Need for Institutions through a separate treaty and be made an independent process.
Why do nuclear confidence building or Second, given the nature of sub- risk reduction needs institutions? Why continental politics, its inherent politics cannot the existing means be continued? along with the constant drive to shift the In what way would an institutional status quo either politically or militarily or approach be an both, relations advantage if the between India and present structures Pakistan are likely have failed? …it is essential that India and to remain unstable, at least in the near Pakistan establish institutions 91 The reasons are many; future. While the following are on a permanent basis to look Pakistan would like significant amongst into nuclear issues. to re-write the status them: First, it is quo through sub- essential that India conventional means and Pakistan establish in Jammu and institutions on a permanent basis to look Kashmir, India would also like to rewrite into nuclear issues, instead of leaving it to the status quo in terms of stopping cross ad hoc Joint Working Groups (JWGs). border terrorism through conventional The JWGs are generally established during every rapprochement process and 91 There have been excellent research works linking their performance has waxed and waned instability with nuclear weapons and nuclear depending on the broader political escalation from different perspectives. See the following: Essays by Rodney Jones (“Nuclear atmosphere and specific objectives at a Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: particular period. A JWG on nuclear Structural Factors”) and Michael Krepon, “The issues, whether it meets separately or is Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and part of other such meetings on various Escalation Control in South Asia”) in Michael issues ranging from Siachen to Sir Creek, Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider eds., Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South have always faced the domino effect. A Asia (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Centre, success or a failure in one meeting creates 2004); Varun Sahni, “Explaining India-Pakistan enough ripples to affect the process in the Crises: Beyond the Stability-Instability paradox,” in other. A cursory look into the success Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Imtiaz H. Bokhari, Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia stories would reveal the successful (Islamabad: IPRI, 2004), pp. 133-149; Feroz Hassan functioning of Indus Water Treaty, though Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South with occasional frictions between India Asia,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2003, and Pakistan. One reason for this success Vol.10, No.3, pp. 5, 9-73; Feroz Hassan Khan, “The could perhaps be its insulation through an Independence-Dependence Paradox: Stability Dilemmas in South Asia,” The Arms Control Today, independent treaty. The nuclear October 2003; Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne confidence building/risk reducing eds., The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear institutions could also be established Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001).
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 27 Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
means. While the political leadership is India, a major militant attack as happened likely to remain rigid in terms of in December 2001, has the potential to developing a better understanding both trigger a military confrontation. The need internally and bilaterally, the military for specialised institutions is essential now leadership is seeking to develop new more than ever during this unstable period concepts to break the cycle. The sub- to convey and share messages and continent’s history since the nuclear tests information, so that there is no accidental reveals these dilemmas. Pakistan has been escalation. supporting cross border terrorism as a means to bring India to the negotiating Third, the institutions are important for the table and achieve its objectives. India has growth of a third actor in sub-continental been using politics besides the ‘coercive state in India and diplomacy’ to resist Pakistan – namely such efforts. The threat of nuclear weapons the armed groups Internally, the falling into their hands, again with independent Union government objectives. While in New Delhi has whatever may be the reality in the armed groups been rigid in its Pakistan, remains a serious have been used by approach to the state to achieve improve its relations concern in India. their political with the Kashmiris objectives vis-à-vis in terms of reaching the other state, what a political is significant is the understanding92; hence New Delhi- slow but steady differences between the Srinagar relations will continue to remain objectives of the armed groups and the unproductive. state which has been using the former. In the Indo-Pak context, the link between the The Indian military is developing or has state, especially of Pakistan’s Inter already developed new concepts including Services Intelligence (ISI) and the jihadi limited war and “cold start”. Pakistan organizations are breaking or have already would also remain politically instable, at broken, due to policies pursued by least for the next two years with trouble General Musharraf in post-9/11 period. for General Musharraf and his handpicked The fact that Musharraf himself has been party, running the government – PML (Q) the target of attacks from jihadi groups arising from the MMA, tribal uprisings in reveals this aspect. How much of the the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) jihadi support is still retained by the ISI or and Balochistan and the jihadi and the ISI support by the former, however, sectarian elements in the country.93 In remains a crucial issue, especially in India. Whatever may be the ground situation,
92 Numerous efforts were initiated within India at there have been serious doubts both in the New Delhi-Srinagar level; but they could not be India and elsewhere over ‘rogue elements’ sustained due to the Union government’s both in the ISI and Pakistan’s Army and willingness to expand the focus of negotiations their linkages with the jihadi outside conducting elections for the state legislative organizations. The threat of nuclear assembly and forming the government. The Union government has been reluctant to initiate a dialogue weapons falling into their hands, again on autonomy; worse, it did not even discuss when whatever may be the reality in Pakistan, the J&K State legislative assembly passed a remains a serious concern in India. The resolution on autonomy and send it to the Union scandal involving the nuclear scientist A. Parliament. The government has also failed to sustain any dialogue with the moderate and Q. Khan in Pakistan has only raised separatist forces, outside the J&K government. suspicions and contributes to the 93 I have explained this elsewhere. See Suba perception in India that nuclear weapons Chandran, “Pakistan in 2005: Implications for India in Pakistan are not in safe custody. Given and Indo-Pak Dialogue,” IPCS Issue Brief 28, this element of suspicion, institutions may February 2005.
28 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Suba Chandran
provide vital information, especially NRRCs. The latter formalized towards the during crisis periods, to reassure political end of the Cold War, and started leaderships and stabilise the situation. functioning only in the post cold war period; thus the NRRCs became The idea of an institutional approach is functional when the political relations neither new nor revolutionary. The US between the two superpowers had become and Russia have established Nuclear Risk less crisis prone, if not cordial. In the Reduction Centers (NRRCs) between subcontinent, it is highly unlikely that the them. Between India and Pakistan, it is conflicts, especially the core ones – J&K believed that India was considering the and cross border terrorism – will be idea of setting up a nuclear risk reduction resolved soon. Hence any institutions center during the Agra summit in 2001. would have to function in a highly volatile According to a report, India wanted to atmosphere, and one which is crisis prone. discuss a joint risk reduction center or two In other words, they would not have the centers.94 Three excellent reports have luxury of a ‘post-conflict’ period as already been published on the constitution happened between the US and Russia.96 of nuclear risk reduction centers between India and Pakistan.95 No doubt, any suggestions at Indo-Pak level need to take into account the existing sub-continental nuances but cannot be totally rejected outright. What is needed in From Risk Reduction to the Indo-Pak context is something beyond Confidence building mere technical centers to monitor an agreement signed between the two As mentioned there have been three countries. The NRRCs are an end of the excellent studies/reports on building agreement whereas the NCBCs would be a NRRCs as institutions to reduce nuclear means to further strengthen and expand an risks in South Asia. Should India and initial nuclear treaty between India and Pakistan establish NRRCs to address the Pakistan. The NRRCs have a negative nuclear dangers in South Asia? Or does connotation – they are designed to reduce the Indo-Pak situation warrant something risks, while the NCBCs function would be more than mere NRRCs? The NRRCs positive. They would act as the building were the product of Cold War dynamics; blocks of Indo-Pak nuclear confidence. would they be applicable to the Indo-Pak situation?
India and Pakistan should go beyond risk reduction and aim at confidence building; they should negotiate constituting Nuclear 96 Would the NRRCs as found between the US and Confidence Building Centers (NCBCs). Russia be applicable to the Indo-Pak situation? The NCBCs would be slightly different Expanding the question further, are Cold War from the NRRCs on the following nuclear confidence building measures have accounts. First, the NCBCs could have relevance for South Asia? There have been arguments both supporting and negating these expanded functions as compared to questions. What is surprising in this debate is, that those who believe in deterrence in South Asia and 94 “PM, Musharraf agree on nuclear risk reduction,” argue that if it could work during the Cold War, it The Statesman, 16 July 2001. would also work in South Asia, are the first ones to 95 Rafi uz Zaman Khan, “Nuclear Risk Reduction repudiate that measures that were taken during the Centers,” Cold War may not be applicable in the Indo-Pak
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 29 Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
Second, the NRRCs are the end result or a The Technical Committee by-product of an understanding reached at The technical committee of the NCBCs the end of a strenuous process involving could have the functions that have been numerous bilateral and multi lateral associated with the NRRCs. Zaman Khan agreements on arms control and has suggested that the NRRCs “serve as disarmament. In the Indo-Pak context, an effective, exclusive, and dedicated there are no arms control or disarmament technical means of official communication measures available of any consequence. for the rapid exchange An institutional of accurate and joint commission or factual information.”97 working group is India and Pakistan should go General Karamat and essential on nuclear the Working Report issues to reach beyond risk reduction and aim prepared by the CSIS consensus on at confidence building; they have suggested three building confidence, main functions for the thereby reducing should negotiate constituting NRRCs in terms of nuclear risks. The Nuclear Confidence Building relaying “Special- NCBCs could be messages, Agreement- entrusted with this Centers. mandated messages responsibility, and and Clarification one of its functions messages.”98 would be to suggest measures to promote nuclear arms control They would act as the and keep the MND as “minimum” as monitoring/verification units of technical possible. details. Second, with a renewed focus on the physical safety of nuclear installations both in India and Pakistan, they would Nuclear Confidence Building assist in exchanging information, to Centers (NCBCs) protect them from any attack from non- state actors. Third, they would directly communicate to each other during normal Structure and Functions and crisis periods, thereby eliminating the There would be two NCBCs – one each in dangers of accidental nuclear war India and Pakistan. They would be occurring out of nuclear accidents. They comprised of two committees – technical would function as tools of official and strategic. The technical committee communications by which relevant would comprise technicians to monitor the information is exchanged between the two provisions of an agreement. The strategic countries. committee would primarily act as a political committee comprising members The Strategic Committee drawn from the ministries of external The strategic committee of the NCBCs affairs, home, defence, armed forces, would identify measures to reduce the national security council/advisory board dangers and increase confidence between and at least one member each from the the two countries. They would discuss academic community. The objective of measures that are of both immediate and including members from the National long term concern and advise respective Security Council/Advisory Board and the academic community is to act as a cushion amongst the rigid bureaucracies and provide independent alternatives, with no 97 Rafi uz Zaman Khan, “Nuclear Risk Reduction vested interests. In a sense, the strategic Centers.” committee would be a mixture of 98 See Jehangir Karamat, “Nuclear Risk Reduction members from both tracks I & II. Centres in South Asia” and CSIS Report, “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in South Asia.”
30 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Suba Chandran
governments on what further measures This paper has not looked into the details could be adopted. of what the focus of this committee could be. There has been excellent research The secretaries of respective foreign work published on nuclear risk reduction ministries would lead the strategic suggesting measures including non- committee. The members could be drawn weaponizaton, non-deployment, de- from various departments, including the alerting, de-targeting, induction without home and defence ministries; armed deployment, early warnings, etc.100 It is forces; and importantly the strategic sufficient here to mention that the strategic community. Inclusion of members from committee would look into these issues, strategic community is essential, in order examine their feasibility and make further to provide some space outside the rigidity suggestions. Once agreed by both the emanating civilian and military governments, it would be left to the bureaucracies and also to enhance the technical committee to implement them. nuclear debate in both countries. To an extent, the strategic committee would The strategic committee would also comprise of members from both tracks I discuss nuclear doctrines aiming to reach and II. an understanding at regional and global levels. At the global level, the strategic The strategic committees would have their committee would find more convergences own timetable in terms of bilateral between India and Pakistan, though there meetings, so as to be insulated from the may be many divergences at the regional negative impact of non-movement on level. There could also be a time in the other issues. They would have a fixed future in which India and Pakistan may schedule with a provision to meet during have to discuss nuclear issues with China, emergencies. It has already been agreed to engaging in a trilateral dialogue. The establish a hotline between the foreign strategic committee would lead any such secretaries.99 discussion.
100 See the following essays P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds. The Stability-Instability Paradox, pp. 16-36; Chris Gagne, “Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia: Building on Common Grounds,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., pp. 37-58; Kent Biringer, “Missile threat reduction and monitoring in South Asia,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, eds., pp. 59-82: W. P. S. Sidhu, India’s Security and Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measures (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Centre Report, 1998); Z Mian, R. Rajaraman and M. V. Ramana, ‘Early Warning in South Asia: Constraints and Implications’, Science and Global Security Vol. 11, No 2-3, pp. 109-150; M V Ramana, R. Rajaraman, Zia Mian, “Nuclear Early Warning in South Asia: Problems and 99 Amit Baruah, “India, Pakistan agree on hotline Issues,” Economic and Political Weekly, 17 January for nuclear issues,” The Hindu, 21 June 2004. 2004, Vol.39, No.3, pp. 279-284.
SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT 31 Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
Conclusion
There have been three major summits Terrorism in the present decade have kept, since the nuclear tests in 1998 – the and seem likely to keep the nuclear issue a Lahore Summit (1999), Agra Summit subsidiary one. The long-term (2001) and international Islamabad Summit reactions to the (2004). There have nuclear and missile also been numerous …complete removal of sanctions cooperation in the meetings at the after 9/11 has only confirmed 1980s between technical level China and Pakistan, involving the that ‘nuclear’ aspects of South nuclear tests by secretaries from Asia would always be a India and Pakistan various ministries and the War on from both countries secondary concern. Terrorism prove and also at the how vulnerable the foreign ministerial international levels. Nuclear community has stability in South Asia has been discussed been to nuclear developments in South in all these meetings; beginnings were Asia. India and Pakistan know this well made, proving only to be false starts later. and complete removal of sanctions after 9/11 has only confirmed that ‘nuclear’ As discussed above, three factors aspects of South Asia would always be a remained and will remain crucial in secondary concern. If the Cold War in reaching a bilateral understanding on Afghanistan made the US ignore or make nuclear stability in South Asia. The the nuclear issues secondary, the War on official track (Track I), especially at the Terrorism will make Indo-Pak nuclear and foreign secretaries level, has not made missile pursuits secondary. Apart from significant process and, given the history, occasional planted stories on South Asia it is unlikely that they will reach a as a nuclear flash point and some serious consensus. The unofficial track (Track II) conferences and research publications on has made significant progress in terms of nuclear stability, infrequent external reaching an understanding. Unfortunately pressure remains limited and is fended the official track has not recognized this easily by the strong bureaucracies in India and is also unlikely to do so in the future. and Pakistan. The civilian and military bureaucracies believe in nuclear weapons and nuclear On the positive side, when compared to deterrence, and hence are likely to the civilian and military bureaucracies in continue on there present trajectories with India and Pakistan, perhaps surprisingly respect to their nuclear forces. the political leadership is less rigid and amenable to a consensus on nuclear A fourth factor, though not bilateral, needs stability in South Asia. It needs to be to be added. The international community, underlined that the above assertion is especially the US, is likely to remain limited to nuclear stability and does not wedded to their immediate strategic relate to reaching a consensus on Jammu interests in the region. Unfortunately and Kashmir. The political leadership nuclear weapons and related developments need not worry in terms of the public in South Asia have been secondary to reaction for any understanding on nuclear other strategic interests. The Second Cold issues. On the contrary, they have grounds War in the 1980s and the War on for believing such an understanding would
32 SOUTH ASIAN STRATEGIC STABILITY UNIT Suba Chandran
have popular support. However, the Finally, India and Pakistan should political leadership on both sides may not constitute institutions dedicated to be convinced about whether they would reaching and preserving nuclear stability. receive such popular support for any While a technical committee would consensus on Jammu and Kashmir. In monitor agreements, a strategic committee other words, nuclear weapons and nuclear would continuously engage in taking stability are less of a political issue than adequate measures on nuclear security and Jammu and Kashmir. Hence, the political related new developments. Led by the leadership may be willing to take the extra secretaries from foreign ministries in both step and be amenable to reaching a countries, the strategic committee would consensus on nuclear stability between consist of members from track II and India and Pakistan. would meet independently of other bilateral meetings between India and In this case, the academic and strategic Pakistan. These meetings would have their community outside the government should own schedule so as to prevent any domino pressurize or influence the political effect on non-development on other leadership to take the lead in terms of issues. reaching a broad political understanding on nuclear stability. Such an understanding need not be based on minute technical details, where the political leadership may need technical assistance. Instead, it could focus on what has been agreed at popular and rhetorical levels.
An agreement on a moratorium on nuclear tests, notification on missile testing, establishment of technical institutions, along with agreeing the initiation of a discussion on reaching a common nuclear doctrine could form the beginning of a process at the political level. The respective bureaucracies could then be consulted to implement these provisions subsequently.
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Building Trust and Reducing Risks: Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia
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