Unusual Campaign: Ngos'long Battle to End Contra
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
UNUSUAL CAMPAIGN: NGOS‘LONG BATTLE TO END CONTRA AID By PAUL THOMAS DEAN A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY Department of History May 2011 © Copyright Paul Thomas Dean, 2011 All Rights Reserved © Copyright Paul Thomas Dean, 2011 All Rights Reserved ii To the Faculty of Washington State University: The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of Paul Thomas Dean find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted. ___________________________________ Noriko Kawamura Ph.D., Chair ___________________________________ Raymond Sun, Ph.D. ___________________________________ Robert Bauman, Ph.D. iii UNUSUAL CAMPAIGN: NG0S‘LONG BATTLE TO END CONTRA AID Abstract by Paul Dean, Ph.D. Washington State University May 2011 Chair: Noriko Kawamura In April 1985 the Reagan administration asked for $14 million in nonmilitary Contra aid. The House of Representatives rejected the request by a vote of 215 to 213. Shocked CIA director William Casey credited non-governmental organizations (NGOs) saying, ―If Tip O‘Neill didn‘t have Maryknoll nuns who wrote letters, we would have a contra program.‖ The Reagan administration‘s efforts to discredit, harass, and undermine various NGO‘s throughout the 1980s showed how powerful they believed the movement of NGOs to be. Finally, after the House of Representatives narrowly voted down renewed funding for the Contras in February 1988, both the leaders of the anti-Contra aid and the Contra aid backers credited or blamed NGOs for the defeat of Contra funding. This study examines how and why NGOs were able to play a decisive role in the decision making of United States foreign policy over the Sandinista-Contra conflict in Nicaragua. This study defines NGOs as a non-state actor who attempted to influence United States foreign policy, and focuses on NGOs that were propelled by altruism rather than profit. Some of these groups were formed specifically to influence United States foreign policy. Others believed that influencing foreign policy fit within their preexisting purposes to work for the peace and prosperity of citizens of every nation. After years of trial and error these religious and humanitarian organizations found that they could influence United States iv foreign policy with a mixture of grass roots organizing, strategic alliances with political parties, and targeted political pressure. This study primarily utilized the papers of Democrat Representative David Bonior and House Speaker, Tip O‘Neill, who kept extensive records of the efforts of various NGOs who worked to change US foreign policy. It also examined published works from members of the Reagan Administration, debates in congress, US government publications, and influential US periodicals who reported on the major actors of the US policy toward Nicaragua as Congressional debates unfolded. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ iv-v CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1 2. PRESIDENT REAGAN‘S CONTRA POLICY ......................................... 9 3. NGOS‘ MOTIVATION TO OPPOSE PRESIDENT REAGAN ..............25 4. LEARNING HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSE REAGAN .............46 5. AN ALTERNATE POLICY TRACK .......................................................68 6. AFTER THE PEACE PROCESS ..............................................................86 7. COUNTDOWN 87 ..................................................................................102 8. POLITICAL PRESSURE ........................................................................127 9. LAST-MINUTE LOBBYING ................................................................152 10. FINAL WORDS AND FINAL VOTES .................................................174 11. APPLAUDING THE VICTORS AND ASSIGNING BLAME .............202 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................212 APPENDIX A. HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 444 .............................................................219 vi CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ―If Tip O‘Neill didn‘t have Maryknoll nuns who wrote letters, we would have a Contra program.‖ William Casey, 1986 The primary objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played a decisive role in United States foreign policy during the Sandinista-Contra1 conflict in Nicaragua. For the purpose of this study I will define an NGO as a non-state actor who attempts to influence United States foreign policy. Books like Bitter Fruit have shown that NGOs can and do influence United States foreign policy. 2 For this study I will concentrate on NGOs that were primarily propelled by humanitarian causes rather than profit. Some of these groups were formed specifically to influence United States foreign policy: for example, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Witness for Peace, and Countdown 87. Others, like individual churches and denominations, believed that influencing foreign policy fit within their preexisting purposes to work for the peace and prosperity of citizens of every nation. After years of 1 Short for Contra-revolucionarios. There is some difference of opinion on whether Contras should be capitalized. Typically the word is not capitalized when it is used more as a description than an entity. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, it makes sense to capitalize the word because the group of those who opposed the Sandinistas eventually became an entity and were commonly referred to as the Contras in the United States. 2 Stephen Schlesinger, and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. (New York: Doubleday, 1983). The business NGO that influenced United States foreign policy in this case was the United Fruit Company. 1 trial and error these religious and humanitarian organizations found that they could influence United States foreign policy with a mixture of grass roots organizing, strategic alliances with political parties, and targeted political pressure. During the Reagan administration the battle over Contra aid filled the halls of Congress, the pages and broadcasts of various media venues, and the streets of United States cities. The Central American peace movement of the 1980s alone mobilized more than one hundred thousand United States citizens to contest United States interference in Nicaragua.3 The Congress, divided and contentious, split along dueling paradigms liberal Democrats who refused to allow another ―Vietnam,‖ and conservative Republicans who would not let an appeasement-centered foreign policy permit another ―Cuba,‖ or ―Iran.‖ The Vietnam War had shattered the bipartisan ideological consensus that had supported U.S. foreign policy since World War II, and the fight over military support for Nicaraguan Contras brought that fact to the forefront. The ideologically charged and desperate setting poisoned political discourse and justified frequent blurring of traditional spheres of power. Democrats in Congress appeared willing to forge their own foreign policy, and members of the Reagan administration blatantly disregarded legislation. Despite President Ronald Reagan‘s popularity, and the impressive amount of political capital he spent on the issue, he was unable to triumph completely over the various anti- Contra coalitions. The Contra issue throughout the 1980s remained poorly understood and unpopular with the United States general public. The average citizen did not understand the connection between the Communist Sandinistas and the broader Cold War 3 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) xvi. 2 concerns, but they opposed the idea of sending American troops to Nicaragua. They were not certain whether or not the Contras were freedom fighters or left over thugs from the previous Nicaraguan government, but they were sure that they opposed needless human suffering, and responded in extraordinary ways when confronted with descriptions of collateral damage relayed by concerned NGOs. Scholars examined different actors in the complicated struggle even while the battle raged. Their works described various disturbing aspects of the Contra-Sandinista struggle, including the manipulation of media and the well publicized covert nature of the United States involvement. Like the majority of Latin Americanists during the conflict, most of the books published in the 1980s were generally critical of the Reagan administration‘s policies, and advocated a more ―sensible and humane‖ approach.4 However the literature failed to describe or make sense of dynamic events and changing circumstances. After the fall of the Sandinistas, several books came out analyzing the traditional actors in the events in Nicaragua. Richard Sobel in, Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, examined the role of public opinion on Contra funding. He discovered that the public was decisively against Contra aid, but that Congress typically voted for the aid anyway, albeit with significant restraints. Public opinion did limit President Reagan‘s options in policy decisions as Congress acted as an intermediary between the president 4 A sampling of the literature published in the 1980s would include: Thomas W. Walker, (ed) Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War