Nice Guys Finish First: The Competitive Hypothesis

Charlie L. Hardy Mark Van Vugt University of Kent at Canterbury

Three experimental studies examined the relationship between is one of the major puzzles in the behavioral sciences altruistic behavior and the emergence of status hierarchies today. Across many decades of research, social psychol- within groups. In each study, group members were confronted ogists studying altruism and cooperation have identi- with a social dilemma in which they could either benefit them- fied numerous important factors that affect helping selves or their group. Study 1 revealed that in a reputation behavior, such as empathy (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, environment when contributions were public, people were more Buckley, & Birch, 1981), closeness (Neyer & Lang, altruistic. In both Studies 1 and 2, the most altruistic members 2003), mood (Isen, 1970), values (Omoto & Snyder, gained the highest status in their group and were most fre- 1995; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), quently preferred as cooperative interaction partners. Study 3 and rewards for helping and costs for not helping showed that as the costs of altruism increase, the status rewards (Penner, Dovidio, Schroeder, & Piliavin, 2005; Van also increase. These results support the premise at the heart of Vugt, 1998). Yet, social psychological models of altruism competitive altruism: Individuals may behave altruistically for often do not address where these basic motivations reputation reasons because selective benefits (associated with come from or how they came to be so important in status) accrue to the generous. human evolutionary history (cf. McAndrew, 2002). For evolutionary theorists, altruism has always been some- thing of an enigma. How could any organism engage in actions that seem to benefit others but not themselves? Keywords: altruism; status; reputation; public goods; costly signals Throughout the past decades, two main evolutionary models of altruism have emerged: kin selection theory Humans are social animals. This phrase is often (Hamilton, 1964) and theory stated in the social and evolutionary psychology litera- (Trivers, 1971). These models are well-founded in tures (Aronson, 1999; Buss, 2004; Van Vugt & Van Lange, mathematical theory and they have received over- in press), but what does it actually mean? The answer whelming empirical support (Axelrod, 1984; Burnstein, centers on issues of selfishness and altruism. Whereas Crandall, & Kitayama, 1997; Neyer & Lang, 2003; Van most other mammals help each other only within small Lange & Semin-Goosens, 1998). Yet, questions remain kinship groups, humans have the unique ability to form about the extent to which they can fully account for the and cooperate within large social groups, which include diversity and ubiquity of altruistic patterns in human many genetic strangers (McAndrew, 2002). For example, humans invest time and energy in helping other members Authors’ Note: This article is based on doctoral research of the first in their neighborhood and make frequent donations to author and was supported by an award from the Economic and Social charity (Van Vugt, Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000), they come Research Council (ESRC). Both authors contributed equally to the to each other’s rescue in crises and disasters (Van Vugt & research. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Charlie Hardy, Department of Psychology, University of Samuelson, 1999), they respond to appeals to sacrifice Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP, United Kingdom; for their country during a war (Stern, 1995), and they e-mail: [email protected]. Mark Van Vugt also may be reached via put their lives at risk by helping complete strangers in an e-mail at [email protected]. emergency (Becker & Eagly, 2004). PSPB, Vol. 32 No. 10, October 2006 1402-1413 Altruism, the intention to benefit others at a cost to DOI: 10.1177/0146167206291006 oneself (Batson, 1998; Van Vugt & Van Lange, in press), © 2006 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. 1402 Hardy, Van Vugt / COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM 1403 society (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Van Vugt, Roberts, & altruism toward genetic strangers could evolve if the Hardy, in press). Perhaps as a consequence, social psy- altruistic behavior is reciprocated by the receiving party, chologists have found it difficult to relate their theories either directly or at some point in the future. Two neigh- and findings to the deeper-rooted evolutionary theories bors, for example, might decide to engage in reciprocal of kinship and reciprocity. It appears that something is exchange by looking after each other’s pets when the missing, but what? other is on holiday. Although there is some empirical In this article, we present a novel theory of altruism, support for this theory, among both humans (Axelrod, competitive altruism, which we believe can account for 1984) and other social species such as vampire bats a range of altruistic behaviors among humans in partic- (Wilkinson, 1984), the stability of reciprocal altruism is ular that theories of kinship and reciprocity cannot eas- problematic because altruists may be exploited by indi- ily explain. Competitive altruism is the process through viduals who fail to reciprocate, for example, one neigh- which individuals attempt to outcompete each other bor might move before fulfilling his or her obligation. It in terms of generosity. It emerges because altruism is therefore hard to see how this theory could account enhances the status and reputation of the giver. Status, for altruism in human society where one-off encounters in turn, yields benefits that would be otherwise unat- between strangers are relatively common (Batson, 1998; tainable. We present three experiments in which we test Snyder, Omoto, & Lindsay, 2004). various aspects of the competitive altruism hypothesis So, the mystery about the origins of altruism remains. in small groups involved in a public good dilemma, a Can altruism ever evolve in interactions between genetic task that pits altruistic and selfish motives against each strangers if these actions are not reciprocated? We believe other (Dawes, 1980; Komorita & Parks, 1994; Van Vugt it can if we are willing to consider the idea that altruistic & De Cremer, 1999).1 actions are in fact a signal about the altruist’s personal qualities. Altruism, if publicly displayed, increases the rep- Evolutionary Theories of Altruism: The Missing Link utation and status of the altruists, which makes them Since the inception of evolutionary theory (Darwin, more attractive interaction partners, providing them ben- 1859), theorists have struggled to find a satisfactory solu- efits that are not available to nonaltruists. Reputation tion to the altruism problem (Van Vugt & Van Lange, in effects could be the “selective incentive” (Olsen 1965) press). It was recognized that organisms would some- that motivates certain individuals to do good for society. times engage in self-sacrificial behaviors to benefit oth- But why should groups reward altruists with status? ers but it was not clear how altruism could have been The Competitive Altruism Hypothesis selected for in evolution. After all, favors traits and behaviors that benefit the reproductive One explanation comes from costly signaling theory success of their bearers, allowing these traits and behav- (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Based on observations from iors to spread through a population at the expense of the animal world, Zahavi noted that organisms often less successful designs (Van Vugt, Roberts, et al., in engage in behaviors that are costly to themselves to sig- press). The first successful attempt to solve the altruism nal honest information about themselves. The classic puzzle was Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory example is the peacock’s tail. The tail of a male peacock (kin selection theory). According to this theory, natural handicaps the owner because it is extremely difficult to selection would favor behaviors that benefit either the grow and limits his movement so that he becomes an organisms themselves or those who share their genes, easy catch for predators. This handicap can be selected that is, closely related kin. Thus, caring for a grandchild for, however, because it advertises the peacock’s quality could be seen as adaptive given the genetic related- as a mate or ally. Handicaps such as these benefit sig- ness between grandmother and grandchild. This theory nalers by increasing the likelihood that they may be has received overwhelming empirical support: People chosen as coalition partners or potential mates. behave more altruistically toward those to whom they This theory suggests that altruism might qualify as a are more closely related (see, e.g., Burnstein et al., 1997; handicap. By spending excessive amounts of energy, Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Neyer & time, and money on activities that are essentially Lang, 2003). Yet, it is unclear how kin selection theory unselfish, altruists advertise some desirable underlying could account for altruism toward nonrelated individu- quality that is costly to obtain and therefore hard to als—a common feature of human societies (Van Vugt fake, such as resource control, genetic endowment, et al., 2000)—unless it is assumed that individuals cannot health, or vigor (Smith & Bleige Bird, 2000). The altru- perfectly distinguish between kin and nonkin (the big ist benefits by increasing his or her social status and thus mistake hypothesis; Van Vugt & Van Lange, in press). the likelihood that he or she will be chosen as a mate or Reciprocal altruism theory (Trivers, 1971) proposed ally. Through this, the altruists are able to recoup the another solution to the altruism problem. A design for costs of their display in the long run.2 1404 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

An alternative explanation is derived from indirect display. Second, the behavior must be easily observable reciprocity theory (Alexander, 1987). In this model, to others. Third, the signal must be a reliable indicator support is given to individuals who have helped others, of some underlying trait or characteristic of the signaler, so altruists are sometimes rewarded by the community for example, resource potential, wealth, health, or intel- as a whole. Groups may compensate altruists by giving ligence. Fourth, the behavior must in the long run ben- them status and prestige because by doing so, they can efit the actor who displays it. In light of these conditions, continue to benefit from the presence of these individ- we believe that an ideal arena to conduct some initial uals in their community. By contributing to a public tests of the competitive altruism theory is the public good, an individual may thus build up a reputation for good dilemma task (Komorita & Parks, 1994). being generous, which might make them more attrac- Why might contributing in a public good dilemma tive as future exchange partners. enhance someone’s reputation? First, a contribution to Whatever the precise mechanism, we suggest that a public good is personally costly to the actor. Second, when reputations are at stake, this is likely to induce contributing to a public good has the potential to attract competition. On one hand, people will be competing a large audience of interested observers who all profit if with each other in terms of generosity to advertise the good is provided. Moreover, they can easily compare themselves as future exchange partners, and on the among several contributors, which helps in making other hand, observers are competing for access to the most inferences about the underlying quality of the contribu- altruistic partners, hence, the term “competitive altruism” tors and also provides a competitive environment for (Van Vugt, Roberts, et al., in press). those involved (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Finally, Competitive altruism is presumably widespread in although altruistic contributions to public goods are human societies. The anthropological literature docu- uneconomical, the costs could be recouped in the long ments various examples of excessive public displays of term if altruists were likely to gain nonmaterial benefits altruism and generosity. For example, in a Melanesian such as status and prestige, which might yield long-term tribe, family members organize a party after a relative’s profits, for example, by being chosen as interaction part- death, which includes giving food and gifts to all guests. ners in future reciprocal exchanges (Roberts, 1998). Turtle meat is most valued, presumably because turtle hunting is a dangerous and time-consuming activity. Research Predictions Therefore, a feast of turtle meat is an honest signal for The competitive altruism theory makes a number of the quality of the men in a family (Smith & Bleige Bird, unique predictions about the emergence of altruism, 2000). Similarly, chiefs of local Indian tribes in the which we test here. The first prediction is that high con- Northwest of America once engaged in fierce battles tributors (i.e., altruists) should do significantly worse in of generosity by organizing pot latches, whereby they terms of their immediate outcomes in public good would distribute food and luxury foods to members of dilemmas than should low contributors (Prediction 1). neighboring villages in an attempt to impress them with Second, for competitive altruism to occur, the behav- their wealth (Wright, 2000). The social psychology ior must be visible to others so that they can evaluate literature shows that an increase in the visibility and and respond to it. We therefore predict that contribu- decrease in the anonymity of individuals enhances their tions increase once people realize that their contribu- cooperation in social dilemmas (Axelrod, 1984; Fox & tions are displayed publicly (Prediction 2). Guyer, 1978; Jerdee & Rosen, 1974). Finally, mathemat- Third, although altruism is costly in the short run, ical models show that both altruism as a costly signal there should be compensating benefits in the long run and altruism in indirect reciprocity might be evolution- for those who behave altruistically. In other words, nice ary stable strategies (Gintis, Alden Smith, & Bowles, guys should finish first. One way to recoup the initial 2000; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). costs of altruism is through a gain in social status. Thus, Our aim in this article is to provide a first experi- our next prediction is that high contributors will be mental demonstration of the competitive altruism hypoth- seen as higher in status (Prediction 3a). The altruism- esis in a controlled laboratory setting in which individuals status relationship should, of course, only hold if con- can behave altruistically or selfishly in the context of a tributions are publicly displayed rather than made public good dilemma task. anonymously (Prediction 3b). A discriminant predic- Generosity in Public Good Dilemmas tion also is made: These status effects will not be driven by altruists simply being liked more, perhaps due to a There are presumably several conditions that must be “halo” effect (Thorndike, 1920) whereby altruists are met for competitive altruism to emerge (McAndrew, generally viewed more positively (Prediction 3c). 2002; Smith & Bleige Bird, 2000; Zahavi & Zahavi, Fourth, high contributors are expected to benefit in 1997). First, the behavior must be costly for the actor to the long run from their altruistic displays (although Hardy, Van Vugt / COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM 1405 they are not necessarily aware of these benefits when three using a random number generator to ensure that they behave altruistically). Hence, once the task has fin- friends were not in the same group. ished and another one starts, we expect that they are Introduction to the public good dilemma.Once everyone more likely to be chosen as group leaders (Prediction was seated the task was introduced as a group invest- 4) and interaction partners by other group members ment task to be completed in groups of three in which (Prediction 5). They also should gain more in a subse- people could earn money for themselves and for their quent game (Prediction 6). group. To try to avoid the possibility that participants Finally, the competitive altruism hypothesis suggests may guess the real purpose of the game, they were not that status differences are based in part on the per- told how many rounds of the task they would complete ceived costs of altruism. Observers should be sensitive or that there was going to be a follow-up task. to the size of the costs that people incur in contributing Participants also were informed that it was not finan- to the group fund. Our final study manipulates the cost cially possible to pay every person what they earned in of altruism by giving people either a high monetary the task but that the experimenter would pay the 10 endowment (low-cost altruism) or low endowment highest earners the amount they earned. Winners were (high-cost altruism). Altruists should be awarded with informed by e-mail and sent their money by check. more status the greater the costs of their contributions At the start of the session, participants received an to the group (Prediction 7). endowment of 100 pence (approximately 175 U.S. cents). The present article contains three studies to test sev- They were free to contribute any amount from 0 to 100 eral aspects of the competitive altruism hypothesis. pence to the private fund (p), which is kept by the indi- vidual, and any amount to the group fund (100 – p). STUDY 1: COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM The total amount contributed to the group fund would IN A PUBLIC GOOD DILEMMA be multiplied by 2 and divided equally among the three group members. Thus, the total sum an individual (i)

Study 1 comprised an experimental task with the would earn would be pi + ([100 – p i 1] + [100 – p i 2] + properties of a continuous public good dilemma in [100 – p i 3]) 2/3, where p i 2 and p i 3 are the other which each member of a group of three receives a mon- group members. This payoff structure fulfils the criteria etary endowment and decides how much to contribute for a continuous public good dilemma in that (a) it is to the group versus keep for themselves. Any money financially better for the individual to contribute to the contributed to the group earns a bonus, which is shared private fund, but (b) if every member did this, they equally between the group members and is added to would each be worse off than if they all contribute to the money that members kept for themselves (De the group fund (Dawes, 1980). Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). We tested our first set of Participants were asked to complete a two-part ques- hypotheses by including a manipulation of the reputa- tion relating to their contribution choice: “You have tion environment and by monitoring contributions in a 100 pence, (a) how much do you wish to contribute to further round of the task. In the reputation condition, your personal (private) fund? (b) How much to do you participants received feedback regarding the contribu- wish to contribute to the group fund?” The participants tions of the other members, whereas in the no reputa- were instructed to ensure that the total sum added up tion condition, there was no feedback. to 100 pence, which was checked by one of the experi- mental assistants. Method Manipulation of reputation condition.The reputation PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN and no reputation conditions were created via the feed- Sixty-six students from a high school in the South of back sheets given to each group member after the first round of the task had been completed. Eleven of the England (32 girls, 34 boys; M age = 16.8 years) volunteered to participate. Each participant was randomly allocated groups received a feedback sheet that detailed the indi- to one of two experimental conditions: reputation or vidual contribution decisions of all the group members (reputation condition). The other 11 groups received no reputation. There were 11 groups of 3 participants 3 in each condition. no feedback sheet (no reputation condition). Dependent measures.At the end of the first task, after PROCEDURE the feedback sheets had been given out, each member Upon arrival in the room, participants were issued received a two-part questionnaire designed to measure with an identification number (based simply on the any status differences that may have emerged within the order that they arrived in the room) and seated in adja- group as a result of the task. The first part asked several cent seats. They were randomly assigned to groups of questions (on 7-point scales ranging from low [1] to high 1406 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

TABLE 1: Mean Contribution to the Group Fund in Reputation and No Reputation Conditions (Study 1)

Mean Contribution to the Group Fund (pence)

Overall By Gender

Condition Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Female Round 2 Female Round 1 Male Round 2 Male

Reputation 58.7a 68.2b 52.91 65.62 62.52 69.83

No reputation 56.6a 57.2a 52.31 49.91 62.62 64.22 NOTE: Means with a different subscript differ significantly from each other, p < .05.

[7]) regarding the perceived status and influence of Results each member. For each member (themselves included), they were asked to rate, “Your perception of the ability MANIPULATION CHECK of each member to earn money for the group”; “Your The eight scales relating to the reputation/no repu- perception of the effectiveness of each member at earn- tation manipulation were turned into one scale (α = ing money for the group”; “Your preference for each .86). The mean score was subjected to a one-way group member to act as a representative or spokesper- ANOVA. The result was significant, F(1, 65) = 156.55, son for the group; “Your preference for each group p < .01; participants in the reputation condition felt member to coordinate the group and make a final deci- more visible (M = 4.63, SD = .53) than did those in the sion on the group’s contribution”; “How legitimate do no reputation condition (M = 2.58, SD = .78). Both you feel each group member would be as a representa- scores significantly differed from the scale midpoint; tive or spokesperson for your group?”; and “How willing reputation condition, t(32) = 6.9, no reputation condi- would you be to cooperate with each group member tion, t(32) = 10.44, p < .001. if they were in charge of deciding the amount of the group’s contributions in subsequent trials?” (There was ALTRUISM no self-measure for this question.) A final question mea- Is altruism costly? A one-way ANOVA was conducted sured the liking for the group members by asking, “How on the amount earned (amount in private fund + the much do you like each member of the group?” group bonus) by each group member. Consistent with Second, as a further status measure, we asked par- Prediction 1, the results show that the altruists in each ticipants to indicate the group member (themselves group (those who contributed most to the group fund) included) that they would choose as group leader (this earned significantly less (M = 145.84, SD = 25.53) person would organize the group contributions in a than the other members of their group (M = 166.46, future task). The questionnaire also asked for the par- SD = 24.46), F(1, 64) = 10.12, p < .01.4 ticipants’ gender and e-mail addresses (to inform the highest earners of their earnings). Effect of reputation on altruism. To test Prediction 2 After the questionnaires were completed at the end (altruism increases in reputation condition), a of the first round of the public good task, a second repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on contri- round of the task was completed in which we could bution to the group fund in each round as the within- measure changes in contribution to the group fund participant factor and condition (reputation vs. no after group members received first-round feedback. reputation) as the between-participants factor. The means, displayed in Table 1, support this prediction. Manipulation check of reputation.At the end of the exper- The factor round was significant F(1, 64) = 6.04, p < .01. iment, each participant was asked to indicate how visible There was also a significant interaction between round they felt by rating eight adjectives on a 7-point scales rang- and reputation, F(1, 64) = 7.90, p < .01. Pairwise com- ing from not at all (1) to very much (7), for example, parisons were made for the simple effects within the “When I made my decisions I felt conspicuous . . . interaction, using Sidak corrected 95% confidence anonymous (reversed)” (Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981). intervals. In round 2 only, contributions were higher in Debriefing.At the end of the study, participants were the reputation condition (M = 68.15, SD = 28.85) than informed about the nature of the study and were given in the no reputation condition (M = 57.24, SD = 26.59), the opportunity to ask questions. They would be informed F(1, 64) = 4.34, p < .05, and contributions to the group by e-mail if they were one of the 10 highest earners and fund increased only in the reputation condition, told how to collect their money. The 10 highest earners F(1, 64) = 13.79, p < .01. For those in the no reputation received between 270 pence and 300 pence. condition, contributions remained stable. Hardy, Van Vugt / COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM 1407

that a person elicits from others), and a unique dyadic 5.50 relationship effect. The present study focused only on the target effect of status, that is, do group members agree on who has more versus less status in their group, 5.00 and is this agreement correlated with altruism? In the reputation condition only, target variance accounted for 42% of the total variance in peer status ratings, indi- 4.50 cating that group members did tend to agree on how much status each group member had. Altruism was pos- itively and significantly associated with this target vari- ance (r = .87, p < .05). In the no reputation condition, Mean Status Score 4.00 there was no significant target effect (target variance accounted for 0% of the total variance), indicating that group members did not agree on who had the most 3.50 status in the group. Pairwise comparisons revealed that in the no reputa- Highest Mid Lowest tion condition, there were no significant differences Position in Group as Contributor to Group Fund between the mean status scores for each member, F(2, 19) = .01, ns. In the reputation condition, status scores Condition decreased significantly with decreased contributions to Reputation No Reputation the group fund, F(2, 19) = 15.58 p < .01 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 Relationship between contribution to the group fund and Choice of group leader.A chi-square analysis revealed mean status score, Study 1. that there was a significant association between choice of group leader and reputation condition, χ²(1, N = 66) = 14.10, p < .01. In the reputation condition, the highest STATUS contributor was elected as group leader 82% of the time. In the no reputation condition, there was no agreement A factor analysis was conducted on the six questions on the choice of group leader (highest contributor pertaining to status, which yielded evidence for one fac- elected 36% of the time compared to 33% by chance). tor explaining 71% of the variance. We averaged the This is consistent with Prediction 4. mean ratings across the questions to form one overall status score per participant (α = .92). In line with Prediction 3a, the zero-order correlation between altru- STUDY 2: COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM ism and perceived status was significant (r = .38, p < .01). IN A RESOURCE DILEMMA Those who behaved altruistically received a higher status rating. Also, as predicted, the correlation for the reputa- The results of Study 1 provide the first experimen- tion condition (r = .60) was significantly higher than the tal support for the competitive altruism hypothesis. correlation for the no reputation condition (r = –.13; Altruists received higher status within their group and z = 3.18, p < .01). This shows that the relationship were chosen as group leaders more often. This rela- between altruistic behavior and status was only obtained tionship was found in the reputation condition only. in the reputation condition (Prediction 3b). The aims of Study 2 were to test the generalizability of To rule out the explanation that altruists are simply these results by examining a different form of altruism, liked more generally (Prediction 3c), there was no sig- showing restraint in a resource dilemma and a further nificant relationship between altruism and the liking prediction regarding the long-term benefits of altruism score (r = .01, ns). Thus, altruists were not liked more (Prediction 5). In a resource dilemma, individuals than nonaltruists. Finally, there was no significant cor- behave altruistically by taking a very small amount of a relation between liking and status (r = .03, ns). shared resource for themselves and leaving a large To explore these status results further, the Social amount in the common resource to benefit others; Relations Model (SRM; Kenny, 1998) was used to ana- however, people are always tempted to take more for lyze the round-robin peer ratings on the status mea- themselves (Van Vugt, 2001). In addition, whereas in sures. According to the SRM, an individual’s perception the previous experiment we used an indirect measure of another person can be partitioned into three com- of status (vote for group leader), in Study 2, we ponents: a perceiver effect (how a person views others included some more direct status measures to test our in general), a target effect (the average level of response predictions. 1408 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

Method Participants were told that they were one of the members and were asked to rate their preference for PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN each of the others to play the second task with a scale One hundred and fifty 1st-year students from an ranging from not at all (1) to very strong preference (7). English university (126 women, 24 men; M age = 19.6 After the questionnaires were completed at the end years) participated for course credits. There were of the first round of the resource dilemma, a second 50 groups of 3 participants. All participants were assigned round was completed with all group members. After to the reputation condition from Study 1. this, participants were told that this was the end of the study and that for time reasons there was not going to PROCEDURE be an additional investment task. Participants were randomly assigned to groups in the Debriefing.Participants were debriefed as in Study 1. same way as in Study 1. The procedure also was the The 10 highest earners earned between 200 pence and same, with the exception that the group task was a 400 pence. resource dilemma rather than a public good dilemma. Results Introduction to the resource dilemma.The task was intro- duced as a group task in which people could earn ALTRUISM money for themselves by harvesting monetary units from a common resource. At the start of the task, par- Is altruism costly? A one-way ANOVA was conducted ticipants were informed that their group had access to on the amount earned (amount taken if the group did a common resource of 500 pence (approximately 870 not take more than 500 pence in total). The results U.S. cents). They were then free to take any amount show that the altruists in each group earned signifi- from the common resource and to leave any amount in cantly less (M = 147.45, SD = 93.15) than the other the common for the group. Participants were informed members of their group (M = 207.94, SD = 126.15), that they would keep what they took from the resource F(1, 148) = 9.02, p < .01. Again, this supports Prediction 1. on the condition that the total amount taken from the Effect of reputation on altruism.A repeated-measures resource by the three members was less than or equal to ANOVA was conducted with round as the within- the amount in the resource (500 pence). If the total participants factor, which revealed a significant main amount taken exceeded 500 pence, then each group effect of round, F(1, 149) = 52.49, p < .01. The amount member received nothing (Van Vugt, 2001). removed from the group resource decreased from The first round then started and participants round 1 (M = 141.99, SD = 87.0) to round 2 (M = 126.31, completed the question, “There is 500 pence in the SD = 89.2) once it was clear that the resource decisions common resource, how much of it do you wish to take were public. Again, this result supports Prediction 2. from the resource for yourself?” The decision sheets were collected by the experimental assistants who then STATUS completed the feedback sheets with information about A factor analysis was conducted on the four questions how much each group member had taken from the pertaining to status (influence, prominence, respect, and resource and returned them to the participants. status), yielding evidence for one factor, explaining 75% Dependent measures. At the same time, a two-part ques- of the variance. The variable “prominence” loaded nega- tionnaire designed to measure the perceived status of tively onto this factor and was excluded after a reliability each member also was given to each participant. The first analysis. The alpha on the remaining items was .90. part comprised four questions (adapted from Anderson, The overall zero-order correlation between restraint John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001) that measured various and status was significant (r = –.65, p < .01). In line with status dimensions on 7-point scales ranging from low (1) Prediction 3a, those who behaved altruistically by taking to high (7): “Please rate each member of your group less from the resource were granted higher status. SRM (yourself included) according to your perception of analysis revealed that the target variance accounted for their status within the group?” “ ...their prominence...” 54% of the total variance in peer status ratings, indicating “...their respect...” and “...their influence....” that group members did tend to agree on how much These questions enabled us to assess status perceptions status each group member had. Altruism was significantly more directly than in Study 1 (vote for leadership). The associated with this target variance (r = –.76, p < .05). same liking question was included. Pairwise comparisons revealed that status scores Thereafter, it was explained that there was to be a decreased significantly with decreasing altruistic behav- second, additional task in which for budgetary reasons, ior in the dilemma (p < .01). The most altruistic (who only two members could participate and earn money. took least) gained significantly higher status (M = 5.18, Hardy, Van Vugt / COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM 1409

TABLE 2: Computer-Manipulated Endowment Assignments would receive more in this game than would nonaltruists Endowment (Prediction 6).

Contribution High Low Method

High £5/£10 (Player A) £5/£5 (Player B) PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN Low £1/£10 (Player C) £1/£5 (Player D) Thirty-seven students from an English university (27 women, 10 men; M age = 20.8 years) volunteered to participate. Initially, the participants were observers of SD = .47) than the second most altruistic, who gained sig- a public good game that was being played by four bogus nificantly higher status (M = 4.61, SD = .50) than the least group members via the computer. In a follow-up task, altruistic of the three (M = 3.87, SD = .83), F(2, 147) = each participant was assigned one of these bogus group 56.42, p < .01.5 As in Study 1, we found no substantial cor- members with whom to interact. relation between altruism and liking (r = .10, ns) or between liking and status (r = .09, ns; Prediction 3c). PROCEDURE Preference for future interaction partner.A univariate Participants completed the experiment in individual ANOVA was conducted with position as altruist in the cubicles in front of a computer screen, and all instruc- group (took least, took midamount, took most from the tions for the task were presented on this screen. They resource) as the within-participants factor and partner arrived at the laboratory in groups of five people each. preference (1 = not at all, 7 = very strong preference) as the Before the experiment started, each participant was dependent variable to test Prediction 5. The factor, informed that they were a member of a five-person position, was significant F(2, 147) = 77.43, p < .01. group. Each member was assigned a unique letter code Pairwise comparisons revealed that altruists were more from A to E. In reality, the participant always received strongly preferred as interaction partners. The most the code E. altruistic member (who took least) was preferred sig- The public goods dilemma task. Participants were told nificantly more (M = 5.77, SD = 0.83) than the mid- that they would be an observer initially. Their role altruist, who was preferred significantly more (M = 4.93, would be to observe the other group members playing SD = 1.25) than the least altruistic person, who was one round of a public goods task before they them- preferred the least (M = 3.21, SD = 1.49), F(2, 147) = selves would join in. The participants were then intro- 77.43, p < .01. This suggests that there may be long-term duced to the task in much the same way as in Study 1. benefits for altruists in terms of being included in They were told that the computer would randomly future coalitions (Prediction 5). assign an endowment to each of the four group members. In reality, the endowments were fixed (see STUDY 3: COSTLY ALTRUISM GIVES STATUS Table 2). Thus, members in the high endowment con- dition (A, C) always received £10, whereas members in Study 2 provided further support for the competitive the low endowment condition received £5 (B, D). In altruism hypothesis in a different altruism domain, addition, the participants observed during the game showing restraint in a resource dilemma. The final that A and B were the high contributors (£5 each) and study extends the previous research by examining the C and D the low contributors (£1 each). We predicted relation between status and the costs of altruism in a that B (low endowment, high contribution) would be public good dilemma (much the same as in Study 1). seen as most altruistic. We manipulated the endowment size per group Dependent measures. After the first task was finished, par- member (high or low) as well as their contribution to ticipants completed a two-part questionnaire designed to the group fund (high or low) to test whether costly measure the perceived status of each member. The first altruism (those who gave everything they had) were part comprised the same status questions as in Study 2 awarded greater status (Prediction 7). In addition, (with the exception of the prominence question). we tested a further long-term benefit of altruism After the end of the first task, we explained that (Prediction 6) by including a dyadic Dictator game there was to be a second task in which, for budgetary after the initial public goods game had been played. In reasons, only two members could participate. Participants a Dictator game, the first player, the “dictator,” divides were told that they were one of the members and were an endowment between himself or herself and another asked to rate their preference for each of the others to person who simply receives what the dictator has allocated. play the second task on a scale ranging from not at all We predicted that altruists in the public goods task (1) to very strong preference (7). 1410 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

TABLE 3: Mean Status of Each Player Across Resource Pairwise comparisons show that B received higher and Contribution Conditions status than each of the other players. In order of status, Player M Status SD Player B received highest status (M = 8.09) followed by A (high endowment, high contribution; M = 6.00), A High resources/high contribution 6.00 1.56 a D (low endowment, low contribution; M = 3.86), and B Low resources/high contribution 8.09b 0.79 C High resources/low contribution 2.66 1.75 finally C (high endowment, low contribution; M = c 2.66); all these differences were significant, F(3, 34) = D Low resources/low contribution 3.86d 1.09 117.77, p < .01. This supports Prediction 7. NOTE: Means with a different subscript differ significantly from each other, p < .01. Preferred partner.A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted with partner preference as the within- participants factor. The main effect of partner preference is We then told the participants that they would play the significant, F(3, 108) = 159.03, p < .01. Pairwise compar- second task, with a randomly selected partner, and that isons reveal that player B was the most preferred partner they could distribute £5 between themselves and their (M = 8.35, SD =.79), relative to A (M = 6.08, SD = 2.02), partner. Each person would receive what they had been D (M = 2.89, SD = 1.47), and C (M = 1.97, SD = 1.66); allocated. The allocation was the main dependent mea- F(3, 34) = 170.95, p < .01, which supports Prediction 5. sure. (The partner assignment was part of the design of Dictator game.In line with Prediction 6, the zero- the experiment—each participant was assigned one order correlation between the amount that the com- computerized player as a partner.) puterized partner gave in the public goods game and Debriefing. When the task was finished, the partici- the amount of money they received from the partici- pants were debriefed and given the opportunity to ask pant in the subsequent Dictator game was significant questions. Nobody expressed any suspicion regarding (r = .87, p < .01). A univariate ANOVA revealed that Player the experiment. They were then paid according to what B received the highest sum of money (MB = 212.97), fol- they earned. lowed by MA (152.30), MD (77.30), and MC (29.19); F(3, 33) = 47.53 p < .01. This suggests that at the end of this Results game, altruists were better off than nonaltruists.

MANIPULATION CHECK GENERAL DISCUSSION The manipulation check, “Which player do you think incurred the greatest cost in the task?” revealed that player B (low endowment, high contribution)was In three studies, we found support for several pre- identified as the most altruistic person in the game dictions derived from the competitive altruism hypoth- (87%), with player A (high endowment, high contribu- esis. Here, we interpret the main research findings in tion) chosen by only 13%. A chi-square analysis reveals light of this novel theory and discuss some implications that this difference is significant, χ²(1, N = 37) = 19.70, from this research. p < .01. Nice Guys Finish First STATUS To explain how altruism in larger groups might come Who gets status? A factor analysis was conducted on about, we argued that people sometimes compete with the three questions pertaining to status (influence, each other in terms of generosity because being seen as respect, and status), yielding evidence for one factor, an altruist might produce long-term benefits. A first con- explaining 65% of the variance. The alpha was .80 for dition for competitive altruism is that the altruism must the overall status measure. be costly in the short run. This is true by definition A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to (Penner et al., 2005; Van Vugt & Van Lange, in press) and examine differences in overall status scores across the it was confirmed in the first two experiments in which the manipulations, with contribution (high or low) and most altruistic group members earned the least in the endowment (high or low) as two within-participants games, either because they contributed relatively more to variables. There was a significant interaction between the group fund (Study 1) or they took relatively less from contribution and endowment, F(1, 36) = 5.54, p < .05. a common resource (Study 2). Thus, there are significant Main effects of contribution, F(1, 36) = 170.70, and short-term costs associated with altruism that might pre- endowment, F(1, 36) = 87.96, also were significant (ps < vent opportunists from engaging in such actions. .01) and will be interpreted in light of the interaction. A second condition is that there must be compen- The means are shown in Table 3. sating benefits in the long run. Of course, people need Hardy, Van Vugt / COMPETITIVE ALTRUISM 1411 not be aware of these benefits when they make their ini- following suggestions. First, altruists are more preferred tial decisions, and in our experiments, there is no rea- as interaction partners. This is not surprising because son to assume that people knew about these long-term people who are cooperative are generally viewed as benefits. We have tapped into these long-term benefits more desirable group members (Moreland & Levine, by examining the status consequences of altruism. 1982). Thus, altruism might be an indication of being a Our findings unequivocally show that altruistic group committed and resourceful group member, which is members received more status. They were more important for most working groups. Second, our find- respected, held in higher esteem, and were more likely ings show that altruists were preferred as group leaders, to be chosen as group leaders. This was not the result of suggesting that people might attribute leader-like a halo effect because there was no evidence that altru- attributes to altruists. This is comparable with the ists were generally better liked. Although respected, results of Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck (2001), altruists may have been regarded as being slightly who found that public donations to a charity enhanced deviant group members, which would have reduced people’s political reputation. Generosity, honesty, respon- their appeal (Moreland & Levine, 1982). sibility, and fairness are indeed seen as prototypical In the real world, many benefits accrue to those occu- leadership qualities (Lord & Maher, 1991). Finally, pying high-status positions in society, such as power, altruists also might be seen as attractive romantic part- wealth, a better health, a more positive mood, higher ners by members of the opposite gender, presumably self-esteem, and reduced stress levels (Bass, 1990; because altruism signals resource potential (Jensen- Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Marmot, 2004; Campbell, Graziano, & West, 1995). In sum, people Van Vugt, in press). We were obviously unable to mea- who display altruistic actions might be seen as possess- sure the long-term beneficial effects of status here. Yet, ing a broad class of desirable traits and qualities. in two studies, we found that altruists were preferred as exchange partners in a follow-up investment task in Limitations, Strengths, and Implications of Research which they could earn extra money. This suggests that altruism pays in the long run because it provides oppor- There are several limitations of this research. First, tunities unavailable to nonaltruists. Building a repu- the amount of money in the experiments was rather tation as an altruist may therefore be an attractive small, with participants receiving endowments of as long-term strategy, but whether it is beneficial in the real little as 100 pence (Study 1). If the earnings would be world remains yet to be seen. trivial, then we would expect everyone to give away their full endowment to the group. Yet, consistent with Altruism Must be Observable previous research (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999), group members contributed about 60% of their endow- Competitive altruism also predicts that people should ment, and many contributed nothing at all. Further- be more altruistic in a public setting where they have a more, differences in altruism were consistently related chance to earn a reputation than in a private situation. to whether there was an opportunity to advertise gen- In support of this prediction, we found that group con- erosity, suggesting that participants acted as if the tributions increased in our experiments when people money was valuable to them. Futhermore, Study 3 knew that their decisions were monitored by others. showed that as the costs of altruism rose, the status ben- Furthermore, only in the reputation condition was there efits also increased, suggesting that observers were very a correlation between altruism and status. Thus, the sensitive to this information. public nature of the situation provides a good opportu- A second limitation is that based on the first two stud- nity to advertise one’s generosity (Henrich & Gil-White, ies, we cannot completely discard the fact that people 2001). This implies that people should show a prefer- might prefer altruists as future interaction partners to ence for showing altruism in situations that facilitate exploit them later. In Study 2, for example, it is possible such broadcast opportunities, and the provision of public that people chose the altruist as partner in the follow-up goods is certainly one such domain (Smith & Bleige game because they could then exploit their benevo- Bird, 2000). lence. We can effectively rule out this explanation for Altruism as a Signal two reasons. First, a post hoc analysis of the data in Study 2 shows that there is no correlation between the partici- A fourth prediction from the competitive altruism pant’s own altruistic behavior in the game and their hypothesis is that altruism must be a reliable indicator preference for the altruist (r = –.11, ns). Furthermore, in of some underlying personality trait or quality. In other the Dictator game in Study 3, participants gave away words, not everyone can afford to be generous all the more money to altruists than nonaltruists. time (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). We have not looked A strength of this research also is worth discussing. In into this systematically in our studies but we make the our view, competitive altruism provides a more realistic 1412 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN account of how cooperation in large groups comes are borne by the individual. Thus, individual contributors are altruis- about than evolutionary models based on kinship altru- tically helping the group at a cost to themselves. 2. We are not arguing that people are always consciously aware of ism or reciprocal altruism. These models have much dif- the possible long-term benefits of altruism. In many situations, the ficulty in explaining altruism beyond the family or dyad potential benefits are uncertain and people take a real risk by being (Van Vugt, Roberts, et al., in press). Yet, there is over- altruistic. We are also not arguing that altruism is solely guided by reputation concerns. There may be many proximal motives for altru- whelming evidence that humans often engage in self- ism (such as empathy, guilt, and a prosocial orientation) and we are sacrificial behaviors to help other people without not discarding these (Omoto & Snyder, 1995). All we are saying is that expecting a direct return (Penner et al., 2005; Van Vugt an altruistic trait could only evolve if it contributes ultimately to the (reproductive) success of an individual. Competitive altruism sug- et al., 2000). Competitive altruism provides one expla- gests one potential benefit to helpers, which is based on reputation nation. By being generous in public, people can adver- rather than on kinship or reciprocal altruism. tise their qualities as potential exchange partners, 3. Previous research has shown that even in anonymous situations in the laboratory, participants feel that they are being watched and, as reaping the benefits later on, and the larger the group, a result, act more altruistically (Hayley & Fessler, 2005). We included the better the advertisement opportunities. Competitive the reputation/no reputation manipulation (instead of testing the altruism also could explain helping between groups. predictions against chance) because we were interested to see if there were reputation concerns at work even in the condition where people Consistent with the competitive altruism hypothesis, did not know what others had contributed. We did not find any evi- Nadler (2002) recently showed that high-status groups dence of this so the no-reputation condition was discarded in Study 2. offer help to lower status groups to maintain their privi- 4. No specific predictions were made in our studies regarding gender differences in altruistic behavior. In Study 1, a repeated- leged position in the social hierarchy. We do not claim, measures ANOVA was conducted with gender as a between-participants however, that our theory explains all forms of altruism factor. 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