Iceland's Involvement in Bribes and Corruption in Namibia's Fishing
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
FCPA & Anti-Bribery
alertFall 2019 FCPA & Anti-Bribery Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP A New York Limited Liability Partnership • One Battery Park Plaza New York, New York 10004-1482 • +1 (212) 837-6000 Attorney advertising. Readers are advised that prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. © 2019 Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP CORRUPTION PERCEPTION SCORE No Data 100 Very Clean 50 0 Very Corrupt Data from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. SCORE COUNTRY/TERRITORY RANK 67 Chile 27 52 Grenada 53 41 India 78 35 Armenia 105 29 Honduras 132 23 Uzbekistan 158 88 Denmark 1 66 Seychelles 28 52 Italy 53 41 Kuwait 78 35 Brazil 105 29 Kyrgyzstan 132 22 Zimbabwe 160 87 New Zealand 2 65 Bahamas 29 52 Oman 53 41 Lesotho 78 35 Côte d’Ivoire 105 29 Laos 132 20 Cambodia 161 85 Finland 3 64 Portugal 30 51 Mauritius 56 41 Trinidad 78 35 Egypt 105 29 Myanmar 132 20 Democratic 161 85 Singapore 3 63 Brunei 31 50 Slovakia 57 and Tobago 35 El Salvador 105 29 Paraguay 132 Republic of the Congo 85 Sweden 3 Darussalam 49 Jordan 58 41 Turkey 78 35 Peru 105 28 Guinea 138 20 Haiti 161 85 Switzerland 3 63 Taiwan 31 49 Saudi Arabia 58 40 Argentina 85 35 Timor-Leste 105 28 Iran 138 20 Turkmenistan 161 84 Norway 7 62 Qatar 33 48 Croatia 60 40 Benin 85 35 Zambia 105 28 Lebanon 138 19 Angola 165 82 Netherlands 8 61 Botswana 34 47 Cuba 61 39 China 87 34 Ecuador 114 28 Mexico 138 19 Chad 165 81 Canada 9 61 Israel 34 47 Malaysia 61 39 Serbia 87 34 Ethiopia 114 28 Papua 138 19 Congo 165 -
Cesifo Working Paper No. 7874 Category 7: Monetary Policy and International Finance
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Gylfason, Thorvaldur; Zoega, Gylfi Working Paper Individual Behavior and Collective Action: The Path to Iceland's Financial Collapse CESifo Working Paper, No. 7874 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Gylfason, Thorvaldur; Zoega, Gylfi (2019) : Individual Behavior and Collective Action: The Path to Iceland's Financial Collapse, CESifo Working Paper, No. 7874, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207265 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten -
Noseweek BREAKING NEWS: FISHROT STINK WAFTS INTO SOUTH AFRICA
noseweek BREAKING NEWS: FISHROT STINK WAFTS INTO SOUTH AFRICA Noseweek Issue #242, 1st December 2019 The so-called Fishrot Files just released by Wikileaks reveal how Samherji, Iceland's fishing conglomerate, colluded with key players in the Namibian fishing industry to gain preferential access to that country's lucrative fishing grounds and fishing quotas. Icelandic citizen Johannes Stephansson worked for Samherji in Namibia where his job was allegedly to gain profitable rights in that country’s fishing industry, however much bribe money it took. Stephansson claims that over a four year period he paid – allegedly on the instructions of his employer – millions of dollars in bribes to high-ranking political figures in Namibia. These were reflected as consultancy fees in Samherji’s financials. In 2016 he decided to call it a day and resigned, but not before downloading more than 40 gigabytes of documents from his employer’s computers. He delivered these to WikiLeaks who handed them to the Doha-based news channel, Al Jazeera. Their investigative unit subsequently uncovered a network of fraud, corruption and money laundering with tentacles extending from Southern Africa to Iceland, Cyprus, Dubai and the Marshall Islands. "It's a blueprint of how foreign companies are stripping Africa's resources for their own benefit and leaving nothing behind," Stefansson says in Al Jazeera’s hour-long documentary, Anatomy of a Bribe: A deep dive into an underworld of corruption, that was broadcast worldwide on the 1st of December. In the programme, a journalist, posing as a representative of wealthy Chinese investors, attempted to obtain fishing quotas for a proposed joint venture with the Namibian fishing company, Omualu. -
Political Control and Perceptions of Corruption in Icelandic Local Government
n Fræðigreinar STJÓRNMÁL & STJÓRNSÝSLA Political control and perceptions of corruption in Icelandic local government Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, Professor of Political Science, University of Iceland Abstract Political control is an important value of democratic governance and without it democratic accountability can hardly mean much. This is why a number of authors have seen politicization of public service appointments and greater control by the centre as a potential counterweight against trends in in recent decades towards more networked and less hierarchical organizational forms of directing public policy. It may help to reassert democratic control. The option of strengthening political control, however, has not been much studied with regard to its likely effects on corruption. Power has the potential to corrupt unless adequately controlled and strengthening political power in a networked environment may create a structure of temptation which conventional deterrents to corruption are unable to curb. The impact of strong political leadership on corruption is here studied in the context of Icelandic local government, making use of institutional variations in the office of Mayor, which provide a unique opportunity for testing the effects of strong political control on corruption. The analysis indicates that municipalities with strong political mayors are likely to be associated with perceptions of corruption even when other factors, such as the structure of temptation and deterrents, are accounted for. Keywords: Political control; bureaucratic autonomy; corruption; strong mayor; Icelandic municipalities Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration Vol 11, Issue 1 ( 1-18 ) © 2015 Contacts: Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson, [email protected] Article first published online June 23rd 2015 on http://www.irpa.is Publisher: Institute of Public Administration and Politics, Gimli, Sæmundargötu 1, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland Stjórnmál & stjórnsýsla 1. -
2016 Annual Report
HAPPY NEW YEAR—2017 31 December 2016 Caprivi Concerned Group 2016 Annual Report CCG PETITION AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS Caprivi Concerned Group (CCG) pe- titioned the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (AfriCHPR), Africa’s highest human rights body which is also a quasi- judicial arm of the African Union in November 2015. The Commission acknowledged re- ceipt of our petition and was seized of it in February 2016 on the basis that the petition met all requirements under Rule 93(2) of its Rules and Procedures, and “it reveals a prima facie” violation of the African Char- ter. Prima facie violation is a legal position or status which technically shifts the dence and arguments on admissibility, the submission burden of proof to the respondent to demonstrate will be transmitted to the Respondent, and is also re- and prove her innocence, that the Charter was not quested to submit her evidence and arguments on ad- violated. missibility with two months. Normally, this is evi- dence and arguments why the respondent would want Following the seizure decision adopted by the the petition to be inadmissible before the Commis- Commission during its Extra-Ordinary Session of sion. 16-25 February 2016 in Banjul (Gambia), CCG was requested to present evidence and arguments However, as it was reported by Namibia’s Attorney on admissibility within two months in accord- General, Mr. Sacky Shanghala in the Namibian par- ance with Rule 105(1) of its Rules of Procedure. liament in September 2016 that Namibia requested an CCG submitted its evidence within a month, in extension of time to submit its evidence and argu- March 2016. -
Organised Crime Situation Report 2000
Council of Europe Organised crime situation report 2000 PC-S-CO (2001) 13E (Provisional) Strasbourg, December 2001 Council of Europe - Organ ised Crime situation report 2000 Document prepared by members and scientific experts of the Group of specialists on criminal law and criminological aspects of organised crime (PC-S-CO): Mr. Kauko AROMAA Director, European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control, affiliated with the UN (HEUNI), P.O. Box 161, FIN-00131 HELSINKI E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Maximilian EDELBACHER Head, Major Crime Bureau, Rossauer Lände 5, A-1090 VIENNA Tel: 43-1-3134-636002, Fax: 43-1-3134-636008 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Thierry GODEFROY CESDIP, Immeuble Edison, 43 Boulevard Vauban, F- 78280 GUYANCOURT Tel: 33-134 521712; Fax: 33-134 521717 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Michael LEVI Professor of Criminology, Cardiff University, Clamorgaan Building, King Edward VII Avenue, GB–CARDIFF CF10 3WT Tel: 44-29-2087 4376, Fax: 44-29-2087 4436 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Toon VAN DER HEIJDEN Senior Policy Advisor on Drugs and Organised Crime, Criminal Intelligence Division, National Police Agency (KLPD), P.O. Box 3016, NL-2700 KX ZOETERMEER Tel: 31-79345 9312, Fax: 31-79345 9152 E-mail: [email protected] Mr. Tom VANDER BEKEN Professor in Criminal Law, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy, Ghent University, Universiteitstraat 4, 9000 GENT Tel: +32-9-264.69.39, Fax: 32-9-236.6971 E-mail: [email protected] 2 Council of Europe - Organ ised Crime situation report 2000 Contents -
The Namibian@30
85 - 2 19 015 Photo: Hans Rack ...and still years telling it like it is! 2 31 August 2015 31 August 2015 3 Foreword Occasions like this 30th anniversary help us to reflect on the fact that passion for journalism, in particular, and civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, in general, are indispensable to human advancement, including the pursuit of material goods. HE people’s paper, the people’s since the paper was by then well-estab- undisputed fastest moving commodity. only by building on the tradition of The company, the people’s institution. lished as the most read, reaching most The internet is testing how journalism Namibian as fiercely independent, an TThere should be no doubt by now Namibians by any comparison. is practised. Our duty is to ensure that we inquiring institution and a defender of that The Namibian is that sort of national Thankfully, all those attempts have adapt to this new technology to continue the public good, especially in service of treasure, and for good reasons. been in vain, and only strengthened the being relevant to you, our audience, be- the poor and vulnerable. After all, as it is The history of the paper is fairly resolve to keep the institution independent cause freedom, peace and the pursuit of said, a caring nation is measured by how well-documented, but less known is of special monied and power interests. happiness can never go out of fashion. well it looks after the weakest members perhaps the fact that the very structure of Lifting that ban 10 years later was also Our duty is to ensure that every one of us of its society. -
June 2016 Is on AffordaBle Housing, for Which We Have Availed an Additional N$300 Million for the Purposes of Land Servicing
Media Monitoring on Urban Development in Namibia Media Monitoring on Urban Development in Namibia is a service provided by Development Workshop Namibia (DWN), a newly registered Namibian NGO with a focus on sustainable urban development and poverty reduction. DWN is part of a world-wide network of Development Workshop (DW) organisations with centres in Canada, Angola and France, and offices in Vietnam and Burkino Faso. It was founded in the 1970s by three architect students in the UK and has been funded by non- governmental organisations, private citizens, and national and international development organisations. In Namibia, DWN’s activities focus on urban related research, effective urban planning for the urban poor, solutions to informal settlements, water & sanitation, and projects specifically targeting disadvantaged segments of the urban youth. Through 40 years of engagement on urban issues mainly in Africa and Asia, the DW network of organisations has acquired significant institutional knowledge and capacity and is well integrated in regional and international networks. The Namibian media provide an important source of information on urban development processes in the country, highlighting current events, opportunities and challenges. The media further provide insight into the different views and perceptions of a variety of actors, be it from government, non- government, private sector, and individuals that reside in Namibia’s towns and settlements. It is therefore hoped that DWN’s Media Monitoring service will provide insights into those different views, with potential use for a variety of institutions and decision-makers that work in the urban environment in Namibia. The Media Monitoring service is currently provided on a monthly basis and monitors the following newspapers: The Namibian, Republikein, Namibian Sun, New Era, Windhoek Observer, Confidente, and Informante. -
Moulding the Icelandic Tax System
MS ritgerð Hagfræði Moulding the Icelandic Tax System Primary-Industry-Based Special Interest Groups, Taxation, Tax Expenditure, Direct and Indirect State Support, and the Shaping of Tax Rules Jóhannes Hraunfjörð Karlsson Leiðbeinandi Þórólfur Geir Matthíasson Hagfræðideild Október 2014 Moulding the Icelandic Tax System Primary-Industry-Based Special Interest Groups, Taxation, Tax Expenditure, Direct and Indirect State Support, and the Shaping of Tax Rules Jóhannes Hraunfjörð Karlsson Lokaverkefni til MS-gráðu í hagfræði Leiðbeinandi: Þórólfur Geir Matthíasson Hagfræðideild Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands Október 2014 Titill ritgerðar. Moulding the Icelandic Tax System/Skattlagning á Íslandi: hvernig mótast hún? Ritgerð þessi er 30 eininga lokaverkefni til MS prófs við Hagfræðideild, Félagsvísindasvið Háskóla Íslands. © 2014 Jóhannes Hraunfjörð Karlsson Ritgerðina má ekki afrita með neinum hætti, svo sem ljósmyndun, prentun, hljóðritun eða á annan hátt að hluta eða í heild, án skriflegs leyfis höfundar. Prentun: Háskólaprent Reykjavík 2014 In memory of my parents Ólöf P. Hraunfjörð 10th July 1932–6th DecemBer 2011 and Karl Árnason 2nd May 1932–28th DecemBer 2012 Acknowledgements I wish to express my gratitude to all those who offered me their help and assistance during the writing of this thesis. My parents offered their constant support and help whenever I needed it. Their encouragement and love has always been a source of inspiration for me, and it is to them I dedicate this thesis. I owe special thanks to my thesis Supervisor, Professor Thórólfur Matthíasson, at the University of Iceland, for the many hours of patient dedication that helped me clarify, organize and express my ideas. Very special thanks to my friend and mentor Mikael M. -
MAKING SENSE of CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS: Who to Ask (And About What?) - Evidence from Iceland
MAKING SENSE OF CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS: Who to Ask (and About What?) - Evidence from Iceland GISSUR ÓLAFUR ERLINGSSON GUNNAR HELGI KRISTINSSON WORKING PAPER SERIES 2016:13 QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG October 2016 ISSN 1653-8919 © 2016 by Gissur Ólafur Erlingsson & Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson. All rights reserved. Making Sense of Corruption Perceptions: Who to Ask (and About What?) - Evidence from Iceland Gissur Ólafur Erlingsson Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson QoG Working Paper Series 2016:13 October 2016 ISSN 1653-8919 ABSTRACT The extent of corruption in Iceland is highly contested. International corruption measures indicate a relatively small amount of corruption, while domestic public opinion suggest a serious corruption problem. Thus, uncertainty prevails about the actual extent of corruption and whose perceptions to rely on. This problem is relevant for corruption research in general. Perceptions are increasingly used as proxies for the actual levels of corruption in comparative research. But we still do not know enough about the accuracy of these proxies or the criteria they must meet in order to give depend- able results. In fact, radical differences exist concerning evaluations of perceptions between those who believe in unbiased learning and those believing perceptual bias to be widespread. The purpose of this article is, therefore, to attempt to gauge which factors may influence how perceptions of corruption are shaped and why differences in corruption perceptions between different groups may be so pronounced. We present findings from original survey data from three parallel surveys – among the ‘public’, experts, and ‘municipal practitioners’ – conducted in Iceland in 2014. -
Exploring Shades of Corrup- Tion Tolerance
EXPLORING SHADES OF CORRUP- TION TOLERANCE Three Lessons from Iceland and Sweden GISSUR ÓLAFUR ERLINGSSON GUNNAR HELGI KRISTINSSON WORKING PAPER SERIES 2018:5 QOG THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTE Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg Box 711, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG October 2018 ISSN 1653-8919 © 2018 by Gissur Ólafur Erlingsson & Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson. All rights reserved. Exploring Shades of Corruption Tolerance: Three Lessons from Iceland and Sweden Gissur Ólafur Erlingsson Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson QoG Working Paper Series 2018:5 October 2018 ISSN 1653-8919 ABSTRACT It is sometimes argued that tolerance for corruption is universally low, i.e. that corruption is shunned among all individuals, in all societies and cultures. Against this backdrop, this paper engages in two interrelated tasks: to descriptively map variations in corruption tolerance in two low-corrupt countries, and exploratively identify factors that influence tolerance of cor- ruption at the individual level. We note that although corruption tends to be widely disliked, there are shades to this dislike. In particular, three results stand out from our analyses. First, we reject the ‘pureness of the people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’-hypothesis, observing that if anything, politicians are less tolerant of corruption than the general public. Second, we find striking differences in corruption tolerance between such homogenous, low-corrupt and in other respects such similar nations as Iceland and Sweden; differences we argue could be traced back to their different paths to representative democracy and strong state-capacity respectively. Third, analysing within-country variations in these countries, we observe that civil-servants generally tend to have a lower tolerance for corruption than do e.g. -
Ijg-Monthly-1911
0 IJG Namibia Monthly November 2019 Research Analysts: Eric van Zyl [email protected] +264 61 383 530 Dylan van Wyk [email protected] +264 61 383 529 Danie van Wyk [email protected] +264 61 383 534 Rosalia Ndamanomhata [email protected] +264 61 383 500 IJG Namibia Monthly November 2019 1 Contents Economic Highlights ................................................................................................................................ 2 IJG/IPPR Business Climate Monitor ........................................................................................................ 3 Public Debt Securities ............................................................................................................................. 4 Building Plans - September ..................................................................................................................... 5 Private Sector Credit Extension - September.......................................................................................... 6 Namibia CPI - September ........................................................................................................................ 7 New Vehicle Sales - September .............................................................................................................. 8 Namibian Asset Performance ................................................................................................................. 9 Equities .................................................................................................................................................