It is easy to forget just how momentous an event was the launch of the Social Democratic Party in . Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, David Owen and William Rodgers, former Labour cabinet ministers who became known as ‘the Gang of Four’, launched the most ambitious bid to break the mould of British politics since the Labour Party was created in . Despite the fanfare of the launch, success in by-elections and the favourable attention of the media, the SDP ultimately failed to achieve its potential when put to the test at the general election. Stephen Barber examines the strategy of the SDP, what it wanted to achieve and how. He argues that one of the reasons the SDP failed to achieve its objectives was that its strategy was fundamentally flawed. THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP
here were fundamen- The SDP was to prosecute also demonstrates his ambitions. tal differences amongst its strategy in alliance with the Steel wanted to break the mould the Gang of Four over Liberals. Alliance was important of British politics. Although he strategy right from the to Jenkins at least, since ‘It was made his infamous ‘go back to launch of the new party. going to be difficult enough in your constituencies and prepare TBreaking the mould of British any event to land on the enemy for government’ speech in , politics was a lofty ambition but coast of the two-party system, it is doubtful if Steel believed the one the party felt it could achieve. heavily fortified as it was by the Alliance could win outright, but Academic and founder member distortions of the British elec- he may have believed that it could Stephen Haseler wrote as early toral system. To have engaged in break the two-party dominance. as that the ‘vast unanchored a debilitating preliminary con- Differences in ambitions over popular constituency that exists The divi- test with the inhabitants of the party objectives were not the today not only beckons a “new” sion offshore islands of the system, primary flaw in the SDP’s strat- party but one that, led intelli- who in any event agreed with us egy, however. It was the division gently and sensitively, can sweep between on most policy objectives, would between what was to become the others off the board.’ The have been lunacy.’ This was the Jenkinsites and Owenites that SDP was not to be formed as a the Jenkin- in contrast to Owen, who felt meant the party failed to resolve party of protest, but as a party of that Jenkins and Williams had how it was to achieve these stra- power. sites and bounced the SDP into the Alli- tegic objectives. To win the election out- Owenites ance. However, for much of the right was indeed a highly ambi- SDP, the Liberal Party did not tious strategic objective and one meant the rank as a high consideration. The SDP and Labour which others saw as unrealistic. This implies that the SDP Labour suffered a destabilising Shirley Williams viewed the pros- party failed may have been a threat as well defeat in the general elec- pects for office as longer term, as an opportunity to the Liber- tion, providing the left with the believing it might take twenty to resolve als. David Steel’s adviser, Rich- ammunition and the opportunity years actually to break through how it was ard Holme, recalls that it was the to threaten the moderate leader- but that the party’s incredible Liberals’ strategy to ‘embrace’ ship of the party. As the dust set- success in by-elections suggested to achieve the Social Democrats, with the tled, the Labour left seized upon a a possibility of pushing Labour push towards Alliance com- simple clutch of statistics. Com- into third place. For Williams, its strate- ing distinctly from the Liberals. pared with the result of the the strategy of beating Labour in David Steel’s instinct to encour- general election, the swing from votes if not seats would force pro- gic objec- age the split from Labour and to Labour to the Conservatives was portional representation. tives. form an alliance with the SDP, around per cent. The middle
12 Journal of Liberal History 45 Winter 2004–05 THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP
classes had been attracted to busy at war within itself to wave ‘Glad confident This was a tension which existed Labour while some of the trade goodbye.’ morning’ – from the party’s conception and union vote had shifted to Thatch- Having experienced the the Gang of Four was never resolved. Another (Shirley Williams, er’s Conservatives. destructive divisions within the David Owen, Roy founder member, Matthew Oake- For Tony Benn and the Labour Labour Party, and the power Jenkins and Bill shott, told the Liberal Demo- left, the statistics represented more enjoyed by a minority of vocal Rodgers) at the crat History Group meeting, on than the failure of the Callaghan activists, the Gang of Four formed launch of the the twentieth anniversary of the administration; it was a betrayal a party which was in the control SDP on 26 March birth of the SDP, that, ‘on the day 1981. of the working class for whom of its creators. The SDP was never of the Limehouse Declaration, Labour had been created. This to reflect the culture of Labour. we were not sure if Shirley [Wil- argument was used to push the The ‘ constitution … effec- liams] would accept the last line.’ Labour Party even further left. tively concentrated power at the This line argued for ‘the need for Denis Healey was critical, suggest- centre, specifically at Head Office a realignment of British politics.’ ing that the left ‘never explained and with the party leader.’ The Jenkins was later to describe this how this would persuade workers only people who mattered in as one of the two ‘key sentences who had just voted Tory to vote strategy formation were, there- … This gave clear notice that we Labour next time, or how people fore, the Gang of Four. This is were moving outside a Labour who had not bothered to vote at evidenced by the membership of Party laager. Realignment cannot all could be inspired to man the the powerful Steering Commit- be a purely internal or unilateral barricades of class war.’ tee, which was selected person- act. There must be somebody with The tensions that had existed ally by the Gang. ‘All the major whom to realign.’ The implica- for so many years in the Labour strategic decisions were made tion for this difference was that Party gave way to infighting. The exclusively by the Steering Com- the SDP never decided whether left argued about policies it would mittee.’ That is everything from it was to replace Thatcher’s Tories never be in a position to enact; the creation of, and appointments or Foot’s Labour Party. In his diary, the right split into those fighting to, other committees, to negotia- Tony Benn reflected upon this for the moderate soul of Labour tions with the Liberals. strategic dilemma: and those who were to become Nevertheless, it was only natu- the social democrats. Determined ral that the new party should aim Those who leave the Labour to participate in national politics, to ‘take per cent of the Labour Party and go with David Steel the latter simply abandoned the vote,’ in the words of Bill Rodg- would not expect to win a Labour Party. Austin Mitchell, ers. Roy Jenkins, however, had majority in an election, but they who remained, reflected sadly ambitions for a grand centre alli- might win forty or fifty seats and that the Labour Party ‘was too ance with David Steel’s Liberals. they would then have a choice:
Journal of Liberal History 45 Winter 2004–05 13 THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP to put a Labour government developed from its Dimbleby The Alli- as an influence on the result in power – in which case why Lecture roots. Insufficient atten- since it established Thatcher as a had they resigned simply to put tion was paid to creating policy, ance’s considerable political figure. Labour in power again? – or to as Williams admitted during The Falklands factor is impor- put the Tories in power. So actu- the Crosby by-election. BBC strategy tant in explaining why the strat- ally the members who leave us Political editor John Cole went egy of the SDP failed to break the are on their way to becoming further, suggesting that since both failed to mould, but analysis of the strat- backbench Tory supporters, and Thatcherism and Benn repre- identify egy suggests there was more to it some of them maybe to becom- sented reaction against consensus, than that. The SDP’s strategy was ing Ministers in a right-wing ‘I doubted whether it was possible how it flawed. It was insufficiently robust coalition government. for the Alliance to establish a new to handle the upset of the Falk- politics on the basis of a reaction intended to lands war because the party failed An important question for the SDP against a reaction rather than on a to address the fundamental stra- was which party it would support clear programme of its own.’ Yet, break the tegic issue of which of its main in the event of the much antici- as each by-election illustrated, mould of competitors it planned substan- pated hung parliament. Shirley the section of the electorate most tially to replace. Williams claims it probably would supportive of the Alliance was not British poli- Of the one hundred and have been, reluctantly, the Con- Rodgers’ per cent of Labour ninety-one constituencies where servatives. This itself has implica- voters, but moderate Conserva- tics. It was Alliance candidates came second, tions for the strategy. It is difficult tives disillusioned with the right- one hundred and forty-seven to oppose a competing party to wing Thatcher government. never clear were Conservative-held constitu- the extent of attempting to replace if it wanted encies and forty-four Labour. The it, while simultaneously being pre- Alliance simply could not have pared to work with it in govern- The 1983 results substan- broken the mould by taking only ment. The consensual approach The relative merits of alternative Labour seats. During the most required in a multi-party, PR, sys- strategies open to the SDP can be tially to dismal period in Labour’s elec- tem, needs co-operative strategies. illustrated with an analysis of the toral history, the Alliance came a Yet the strategy for breakthrough general election results. The replace weak second. In twenty-two of was diametrically opposite: it was results show the number of seats the Labour the seats, an extra -per-cent- deliberately aggressive. where the Alliance came second plus swing from Labour to Alli- These strategies are not nec- to the Conservatives and Labour Party or ance was required. The Alliance essarily incompatible. After all, respectively. It might reasonably never threatened Labour in its Paddy Ashdown’s post- be assumed that had it not been the Tories. heartland seats, as it was not seen strategy was unashamedly anti- for the unifying factor of the Falk- as the main alternative to Labour Tory while simultaneously work- lands conflict, the Alliance would in those circumstances. ing closely with New Labour. have taken some of these seats However, the Alliance was able However, to pursue such a strat- from the Conservative Party. From to pose something of a threat to egy requires the centre party to a strategic analysis, however, the the Conservatives. Assuming that decide which of its opponents it Falklands was not the sole rea- the seats won by the Alliance in wishes to defeat and with which son for the SDP’s failure to break were ‘strategy-neutral’ (that it is prepared to work. the mould of British politics. It is they were won despite fail- One of the reasons the SDP was, in fact, the SDP’s equivalent ure to resolve the strategic issue neglected to tackle the great of Dangerfield’s ‘omnibus’ – the of which party it intended to strategic dilemma of who it was First World War – for the Liberals replace), had the Alliance pros- to replace was the level of sup- in the s. The party’s momen- ecuted a determined ‘replace port for the SDP-Liberal Alli- tum had actually faltered before Labour’ strategy, a three per cent ance, reinforced in successive the outbreak of hostilities. The swing from Labour to the Alli- by-election victories. From the Tory party had already begun to ance would have gained a further Limehouse Declaration onwards, recover as the economy at last two seats, a six per cent swing an the party enjoyed significant sup- began to strengthen. Additionally, extra six seats, and a ten per cent port in the polls and new mem- the row over seat distribution with swing no more than sixteen gains. bers continued to join, many of the Liberals had taken the shine off Compare this with a determined whom had never before been the Alliance’s reputation for unity. ‘replace Conservatives’ strategy. A involved in party politics. There Nevertheless, Williams believes further three per cent swing from were advantages in this ambigu- that had it not been for the Falk- Conservative to Alliance would ous situation, since the party lands, the Alliance would have have meant another eight seats; was able to change its attitude been more electorally successful. six per cent twenty-three seats depending on whether it was Furthermore, the then Chairman and ten per cent fifty gains. challenging the Tories or Labour of the Conservative Party, Cecil Furthermore, the seat distribu- in each by-election. This may Parkinson, still places significant tion suggests little about the strat- be why the SDP’s policy hardly emphasis on the Falklands factor egy of the SDP. In the twenty-five
14 Journal of Liberal History 45 Winter 2004–05 THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP constituencies where the Alli- with whom the Alliance could David Owen, Time to Declare (Michael ance came second to Labour, the comfortably form a government. Joseph, ), Chapter . Liberals were the challenger in The strategy of the SDP failed to Ian Wrigglesworth, speaking at a Lib- eral Democrat History Group meet- fourteen and the SDP in eleven. consider this because internally ing, //. In Conservative seats the Liber- the fundamental strategic issue Interview with Richard Holme, St als were second in seventeen with of which of its main competitors James Square, //. the SDP trailing in eight. The dis- it wanted to replace was never Denis Healey, The Time of My Life tribution is relatively even when resolved. (Penguin, ), p. . Austin Mitchell, Four Years in the Death it is considered that Liberals won of the Labour Party (Methuen, ), p. more seats than the SDP, that the . Alliance was considerably closer Conclusion Vincent McKee, Factionalism in the in Tory-held seats and that the The general election pro- SDP (unpublished PhD thesis, Lon- Liberals had a long-established duced the best centre party vote don Guildhall University, ), p. . reputation for grassroots cam- since before the Second World Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, The paigning in many parts of the War, with the Alliance com- Birth, Life and Death of the Social Dem- country. ing within a whisker of Labour’s ocratic Party (Oxford, ), p. . By the time of the general vote. However, the . per cent Ibid. p. . election the Alliance had not only of the vote achieved meant only Matthew Oakshott speaking at a Lib- eral Democrat History Group meet- failed to resolve the strategic issue twenty-three Alliance seats, just ing, // . which was of such crucial impor- six of which went to the SDP. Williams, Jenkins, Rodgers and tance but, unlike the situation The electoral system effectively Owen, The Limehouse Declaration, in by-elections when its stance saved Labour, which won //. could be altered depending on its seats on . per cent of the vote. Jenkins, A Life at the Centre, pp. – . opponent, in the national cam- Meanwhile, Margaret Thatcher’s Tony Benn, The End of an Era: Diaries paign the party could not ben- Conservative Party was returned – (Hutchinson, ), p. . efit from ambiguity. Furthermore, to office with an increased major- Interview with Shirley Williams, by the time of Jenkins’ return to ity of . House of Lords, //. Patricia Lee Sykes, Losing From The the Commons at the Hillhead The Alliance’s strategy failed to Inside: The Cost of Conflict in the British by-election shortly before the identify how it intended to break Social Democratic Party (New Bruns- Falklands conflict, it was becom- the mould of British politics. It wick, ), p. . ing clear that the party’s support was never clear if it wanted sub- For an examination of SDP eco- was beginning to wane. War made stantially to replace the Labour nomic policy, see Robin Marris, ‘The Politics of Rationalism: Reflections that a certainty. The Alliance was Party or the Tories. While the on the Economic Policy of the SDP’. not going to win the elec- Alliance may have challenged For constitutional policy see Wilson tion. Yet the strategy of the SDP Labour on percentage of the vote, Finnie ‘The SDP’s Plans for Britain’s specifically, and of the Alliance it was incapable of challenging Constitution’, in Political Quarterly, generally, did not adapt to reflect the party in its heartland seats. Vol . this more realistic situation. The election demonstrated Lee Sykes, Losing From The Inside, p. . Jenkins’ ‘prime minister-desig- that Labour was not the electoral John Cole, As it Seemed to Me (Wei- nate’ title illustrates that the party enemy of the political centre in denfeld & Nicolson, ), p. . entered the election without a Britain. Subsequent history sug- This article presents a strategic analy- realistic strategic aim of achiev- gests that the Tories, whether in sis. There were other important fac- ing realignment. ‘There must be the debilitated post- envi- tors explaining the SDP’s failure to break the mould and indeed Thatch- somebody with whom to realign’ ronment or in the post-conflict er’s election victory. Crewe and – it was necessary to have a party rejuvenation of , were then King provide an historical analysis and remain the natural electoral which discusses the difficulties for the enemy. Roy Jenkins accepted this; new party given the first-past-the- post electoral system which afforded later Paddy Ashdown understood Labour the time it needed to recover. it. Strategy was flawed in , To a degree, this contradicts the however, because the SDP could experience of the SDP in that it took not resolve this fundamental issue. support largely from the Conserva- tives. See also David Butler and Denis Kavanagh, The British General Election Stephen Barber recently completed a of (Macmillan, ). Ph.D. examining party strategy in George Dangerfield, The Strange British politics. Death of Liberal England (MacGibbon & Kee, ). Stephen Haseler, The Tragedy of Labour Ian Gilmour, Whatever Happened to (Basil Blackwell, ), p. . the Tories (th Estate, ), p. . Interview with Shirley Williams, Interview with Shirley Williams, House of Lords, //. House of Lords, //. Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre Interview with Cecil Parkinson, (Papermac, ), p. . House of Lords, //.
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