It is easy to forget just how momentous an event was the launch of the Social Democratic Party in . Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, David Owen and William Rodgers, former Labour cabinet ministers who became known as ‘the Gang of Four’, launched the most ambitious bid to break the mould of British politics since the Labour Party was created in . Despite the fanfare of the launch, success in by-elections and the favourable attention of the media, the SDP ultimately failed to achieve its potential when put to the test at the general election. Stephen Barber examines the strategy of the SDP, what it wanted to achieve and how. He argues that one of the reasons the SDP failed to achieve its objectives was that its strategy was fundamentally flawed. THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP here were fundamen- The SDP was to prosecute also demonstrates his ambitions. tal differences amongst its strategy in alliance with the Steel wanted to break the mould the Gang of Four over Liberals. Alliance was important of British politics. Although he strategy right from the to Jenkins at least, since ‘It was made his infamous ‘go back to launch of the new party. going to be difficult enough in your constituencies and prepare TBreaking the mould of British any event to land on the enemy for government’ speech in , politics was a lofty ambition but coast of the two-party system, it is doubtful if Steel believed the one the party felt it could achieve. heavily fortified as it was by the Alliance could win outright, but Academic and founder member distortions of the British elec- he may have believed that it could Stephen Haseler wrote as early toral system. To have engaged in break the two-party dominance. as that the ‘vast unanchored a debilitating preliminary con- Differences in ambitions over popular constituency that exists The divi- test with the inhabitants of the party objectives were not the today not only beckons a “new” sion offshore islands of the system, primary flaw in the SDP’s strat- party but one that, led intelli- who in any event agreed with us egy, however. It was the division gently and sensitively, can sweep between on most policy objectives, would between what was to become the others off the board.’ The have been lunacy.’ This was the Jenkinsites and Owenites that SDP was not to be formed as a the Jenkin- in contrast to Owen, who felt meant the party failed to resolve party of protest, but as a party of that Jenkins and Williams had how it was to achieve these stra- power. sites and bounced the SDP into the Alli- tegic objectives. To win the election out- Owenites ance. However, for much of the right was indeed a highly ambi- SDP, the Liberal Party did not tious strategic objective and one meant the rank as a high consideration. The SDP and Labour which others saw as unrealistic. This implies that the SDP Labour suffered a destabilising Shirley Williams viewed the pros- party failed may have been a threat as well defeat in the general elec- pects for office as longer term, as an opportunity to the Liber- tion, providing the left with the believing it might take twenty to resolve als. David Steel’s adviser, Rich- ammunition and the opportunity years actually to break through how it was ard Holme, recalls that it was the to threaten the moderate leader- but that the party’s incredible Liberals’ strategy to ‘embrace’ ship of the party. As the dust set- success in by-elections suggested to achieve the Social Democrats, with the tled, the Labour left seized upon a a possibility of pushing Labour push towards Alliance com- simple clutch of statistics. Com- into third place. For Williams, its strate- ing distinctly from the Liberals. pared with the result of the the strategy of beating Labour in David Steel’s instinct to encour- general election, the swing from votes if not seats would force pro- gic objec- age the split from Labour and to Labour to the Conservatives was portional representation. tives. form an alliance with the SDP, around per cent. The middle 12 Journal of Liberal History 45 Winter 2004–05 THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP classes had been attracted to busy at war within itself to wave ‘Glad confident This was a tension which existed Labour while some of the trade goodbye.’ morning’ – from the party’s conception and union vote had shifted to Thatch- Having experienced the the Gang of Four was never resolved. Another (Shirley Williams, er’s Conservatives. destructive divisions within the David Owen, Roy founder member, Matthew Oake- For Tony Benn and the Labour Labour Party, and the power Jenkins and Bill shott, told the Liberal Demo- left, the statistics represented more enjoyed by a minority of vocal Rodgers) at the crat History Group meeting, on than the failure of the Callaghan activists, the Gang of Four formed launch of the the twentieth anniversary of the administration; it was a betrayal a party which was in the control SDP on 26 March birth of the SDP, that, ‘on the day 1981. of the working class for whom of its creators. The SDP was never of the Limehouse Declaration, Labour had been created. This to reflect the culture of Labour. we were not sure if Shirley [Wil- argument was used to push the The ‘ constitution … effec- liams] would accept the last line.’ Labour Party even further left. tively concentrated power at the This line argued for ‘the need for Denis Healey was critical, suggest- centre, specifically at Head Office a realignment of British politics.’ ing that the left ‘never explained and with the party leader.’ The Jenkins was later to describe this how this would persuade workers only people who mattered in as one of the two ‘key sentences who had just voted Tory to vote strategy formation were, there- … This gave clear notice that we Labour next time, or how people fore, the Gang of Four. This is were moving outside a Labour who had not bothered to vote at evidenced by the membership of Party laager. Realignment cannot all could be inspired to man the the powerful Steering Commit- be a purely internal or unilateral barricades of class war.’ tee, which was selected person- act. There must be somebody with The tensions that had existed ally by the Gang. ‘All the major whom to realign.’ The implica- for so many years in the Labour strategic decisions were made tion for this difference was that Party gave way to infighting. The exclusively by the Steering Com- the SDP never decided whether left argued about policies it would mittee.’ That is everything from it was to replace Thatcher’s Tories never be in a position to enact; the creation of, and appointments or Foot’s Labour Party. In his diary, the right split into those fighting to, other committees, to negotia- Tony Benn reflected upon this for the moderate soul of Labour tions with the Liberals. strategic dilemma: and those who were to become Nevertheless, it was only natu- the social democrats. Determined ral that the new party should aim Those who leave the Labour to participate in national politics, to ‘take per cent of the Labour Party and go with David Steel the latter simply abandoned the vote,’ in the words of Bill Rodg- would not expect to win a Labour Party. Austin Mitchell, ers. Roy Jenkins, however, had majority in an election, but they who remained, reflected sadly ambitions for a grand centre alli- might win forty or fifty seats and that the Labour Party ‘was too ance with David Steel’s Liberals. they would then have a choice: Journal of Liberal History 45 Winter 2004–05 13 THE FLAWED STRATEGY OF THE SDP to put a Labour government developed from its Dimbleby The Alli- as an influence on the result in power – in which case why Lecture roots. Insufficient atten- since it established Thatcher as a had they resigned simply to put tion was paid to creating policy, ance’s considerable political figure. Labour in power again? – or to as Williams admitted during The Falklands factor is impor- put the Tories in power. So actu- the Crosby by-election. BBC strategy tant in explaining why the strat- ally the members who leave us Political editor John Cole went egy of the SDP failed to break the are on their way to becoming further, suggesting that since both failed to mould, but analysis of the strat- backbench Tory supporters, and Thatcherism and Benn repre- identify egy suggests there was more to it some of them maybe to becom- sented reaction against consensus, than that. The SDP’s strategy was ing Ministers in a right-wing ‘I doubted whether it was possible how it flawed. It was insufficiently robust coalition government. for the Alliance to establish a new to handle the upset of the Falk- politics on the basis of a reaction intended to lands war because the party failed An important question for the SDP against a reaction rather than on a to address the fundamental stra- was which party it would support clear programme of its own.’ Yet, break the tegic issue of which of its main in the event of the much antici- as each by-election illustrated, mould of competitors it planned substan- pated hung parliament. Shirley the section of the electorate most tially to replace. Williams claims it probably would supportive of the Alliance was not British poli- Of the one hundred and have been, reluctantly, the Con- Rodgers’ per cent of Labour ninety-one constituencies where servatives.