CHAPTER ONE

PLATO’S AND ’S DE INTERPRETATIONE: SETTING THE SCENE

1. Introduction

A study into the reception of the Cratylus in Antiquity has almost inevi- tably got to start with a discussion of the Cratylus itself. Once relatively neglected, the dialogue has received its fair share of attention in recent years. In most of these studies the Cratylus is presented either as a work about the philosophy of language, a category which as such did not yet exist in Antiquity, or about linguistics, especially because of the many etymologies.1 Only few publications discuss the Cratylus as primarily a dialogue concerning Platonic dialectic. Most ancient interpreters, on the contrast, taking their clue from the fact that presents names as the instruments of a dialectician, assume that the Cratylus deals with the dialectical function of names. Below I shall explore a reading of the Cratylus from this dialectical perspective. On the one hand, within the context of the present study, such a discussion will provide a useful foil for the study of the ancient interpretations. On the other hand, as regards the interpretation of the Cratylus itself, such an approach will appear to contribute to a better understanding of the dialogue. That is not to say that I adopt the ancient interpretations of the Cratylus, nor do I advice that we adopt uncritically ancient readings of in general. There is no reason to assume that these are in principle any better than modern approaches, since they tend to be determined by all kinds of assumptions about Plato and his work that we may nd impos- sible to share. The appreciation of the etymologies from the Cratylus as a source of knowledge among later Platonists is a case in point. Plato in the Cratylus explicitly warns against using etymology in philosophy. Yet, as we shall see in the next chapter, under the in uence of the Stoa

1 As Dalimier 1998: 14 aptly puts it: “il y a le Cratyle des philosophes et le Cratyle des philologues”. 2 chapter one later Platonists had taken a different attitude towards etymology and thus failed to notice this obvious warning. The second part of this chapter will focus on Aristotle’s view on lan- guage as we nd it in De Interpretatione. There are two reasons for doing so. On the one hand, the remarks about language at the beginning of De Interpretatione are often interpreted as Aristotle’s reaction against the Cratylus. If so, they constitute the rst phase in the reception of the Cra- tylus. On the other hand, it is impossible to tell the story of the reception of the Cratylus in Antiquity without reference to De Interpretatione. The two are often compared to each other and at the end of this chapter I shall undertake such a comparison myself in order to bring out the tension between the two accounts.

2. The Cratylus: an outline

2.1 The discussion with Hermogenes: the natural correctness of names (Crat. 383a–391b3) The Cratylus is usually divided into three parts. The rst consists in a discussion of Socrates with Hermogenes, the second in a lengthy series of etymologies offered by Socrates, whereas the third consists in an exchange between Socrates and Cratylus. Of these three sec- tions, ancient discussions center especially on the rst two. There is good reason for this. The last section undermines the belief so dear to almost the entire later tradition that names are trustworthy sources of information about the nature of things so that they may have felt inclined to omit it, be it perhaps unconsciously. The Cratylus begins with the successful attempt by Hermogenes, whose eagerness for learning excels his philosophical skills by far, to involve Socrates into a discussion about the correctness of “names” (μ), i.e. whether they have a natural correctness or that their correctness depends on convention only. Before Socrates arrived at the scene, Cratylus—a Heracleitian who according to Aristotle was one of Plato’s teachers—had claimed the former, yet had refused to explain to Hermogenes his reasons for holding this view while teasing him by adding that, according to this natural correctness ‘Hermogenes’ is not Hermogenes’ name. Hermogenes now asks Socrates to shed some light on the matter. Socrates rst makes Hermogenes elaborate on his posi- tion that “no name belongs to a particular thing by nature, but only