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A Note on Chronology

We have been working within the generally accepted tripartite framework based on stylometric and linguistic considerations. Some are of disputed relative date (Sym., Crat., Phdr., Tim.). The order of the relevant dialogues that makes most sense, as far as con• tent (relating to the three topics discussed) and method are concerned, seems to be the following: Early dialogues; , , , , ; , , Theaitetus, , , Politicus, , , , , Seventh Letter. We have not been able to decide what is the relative dating of the early dialogues. But it seems that the , the Major (if genuine) and the in choice and treatment of their topics belong to the end of that period (cf. Part One). The Gorgias has been grouped as "early" in its treatment of Forms and Matter, but as "middle" in its psychology. There seems to be nothing odd in this if, as assumed, the dialogue is a transitional work. As far as the Cratylus is concerned, it seems transitional in method: there is a discussion of hypothesis (436cd) that may reveal disappoint• ment. At any rate appears concerned about the starting point to a degree that fits badly with the carelessness of the Meno (86e ff.) and the Phaedo (lOIde) or the optimism of the Republic (511bc). It is much more in line with the Parmenides (135d ff.). If we add to this the explicit mention and use of division (424b7-d4), it seems natural to place the Cratylus after the Parmenides. One might also mention the semantic interest which would group it with the Sophist. But in view'of the uncertainty that seems reflected in the encounter with the flux doctrine (cf. end of dialogue) and a view of soul (403b-404a) reminis• cent of the Phaedo, we may tentatively suggest a date at the beginning of the late period .. The Phaedrus authorizes division as the new method to be adopted. This places it among the late dialogues. Its self-mover soul would seem

281 to place it after the Cratylus but before the Sophist, the Timaeus and the Politicus, where reason seems to be given a special ontological status. The relation to the Theaitetus is almost impossible to make out since that dialogue is close both to the Cratylus (flux) and to the Sophist and the Timaeus (discovery of "common notions") so that the Phaedrus is bound to separate dialogues close in content. Perhaps the Phaedrus' excitement over division puts it after the Thaeitetus. We do not regard the doctrine of Forms as a safe clue on this question (d. Part One). G.E.L. Owen has argued inter alia on stylistic grounds that the Timaeus is middle. But L. Brandwood's recent statistic work does not, as T.M. Robinson (1) 59 n. 1 thinks, support Owen, although it places the Timaeus before the Sophist. Stylometrics is a slippery ground, not least in the case of the Timaeus which is unique. Owen had to explain away hiatus-avoidance, and Cherniss and Rist have done much to undermine his philosophical argument. More positively, the Timaeus is late because of its implicit method of division, its cosmic soul, its implied self-mover soul, its view of thinking as an activity, its new of Space and the upgrading of the physical (patterns in flux), its mathematical bias and in not being the speaker. It may seem close to the Phaedrus with its paradigmatic Forms, but it is probably after that dialogue in its interest in natural kinds, in a less Orphic psychology (the soul is meant for bodies Tim. 41b, 69c) and in its view of soul as generated by reason. Also, it seems later than the flux dialogues (Crat., Tht.) in its balanced view of the physical (recur• ring patterns do exist) and in epistemology (the sensible is perceived, as the Theaitetus demonstrated at some length, not with the senses, but with the mind, and empirical knowledge includes judgement about impressions) . It is perhaps later than the Sophist in that the reality of reason and matter seems proved first in the Sophist. The Timaeus, the Politicus, the Phi/ebus and the Laws all assume the existence of a cosmic reason and the Timaeus apparently takes the reality of matter for granted (in itself this is inconclusive: the proof may follow the assumption). The mathematical flavour of the dialogue places it near the Philebus (after it, if we do not want to separate the closely related Politicus and Phi/ebus). The Symposium has been placed in a non-controversial place, as leading up to the Republic (with its unhypothetical principle). But we have felt a strong inclination to redate this dialogue to a position after

282 the Phaedrus so that its sophistication as compared with that dialogue can be explained. John Moore has argued that it contains examples of division (e.g. 206b-208b). Also, it seems that the intermediate dynamic daemonic Eros (202de), with its cosmological significance in regulating the warring opposites or Necessity (cf. the relevant parts of Parts Two and Three), is very reminiscent of the world-soul of the Timaeus and rather awkward in the overall picture we have drawn of the middle period. Perhaps there is a further similarity with the Timaeus in the reservations on the topic of immortality (cf. 206c-208b and 212a5-7 with Tim. 90a-d). The lesson to be learnt from these chronological considerations is a warning against dividing the Corpus into three, so to speak, water• tight boxes. One must allow not only for overlaps, but also for long• term retention of old beliefs (perhaps not always consistent with new ones) and prevision of new ideas at an early stage (where they may not strictly fit in).

283 Abbreviations

AGPh Archiv fUr Geschichte der Philosophie AJ P American Journal of Philology APQ American Philosophical Quarterly APhF Acta Philosophica Fennica Arch Philos Archives de Philosophie BICS Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the Uni• versity of London Bonn Jbb Bonner Jahrbucher Med Classica et Mediaevalia CP Classical Philology CQ Classical Quarterly CR Classical Review DK Diels-Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Zurich 1966 Hibb Jour Hibbert Journal HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology HTR Harvard Theological Review JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies JP Journal of Philology Kant Stud Kant Studien LSJ Liddell and Scott/Jones, Greek-English Lexicon, Ox• ford 19589 Mus Tusc Museum Tusculanum PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PAPS Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society PBA Proceedings of the British Academy PCPS Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society Philos Philosophy Phron Phronesis PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review

285 REA Revue des etudes anciennes REG Revue des etudes grecques REL Revue des etudes latines Rev Met Review of RhM Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie Symb Osl Symbolae Osloenses TAPA Transactions of the American Philological Association YCI S Yale Classical Studies WS Wiener Studien

286 Notes

General Introduction 1. Most conspicuously in the Phaedrus 245 f., the Politicus 269 ff., the Philebus 29 ff., the Timaeus and the Laws 891-99. The Phaedo and Republic X may be added as examples of earlier discussions. 2. E.g. J. B. Skemp (4) 87, T. M. Robinson (1) 154, Guthrie (3) V 316, Vlastos (1) 399 and indeed , De An. 407b 12-19. 3. Laws 897b7; cf. the reference to soul-in-general 896e8-897b5. 4. E.g. Apol. 3Oab, cf. 36c; Crit. 47de; Charm. 156e f., Prot. 313a-c; Gorg. 477 ff., 523 ff.; Phd.; Sym. 201-12, Rep. IV, X; The Laws provides late specimens of this point of view, e.g. 959ab and, implicitly, 863d. 5. It will be argued in Part One that Plato may be said to have held a (developing) doctrine of Forms during the whole of his career. See also note 3 on Part One. 6. The reason why we do not restrict ourselves to a phase-by-phase approach within the three Parts - thus giving the systematic side a greater emphasis - is that there are serious chronological questions in the relative dating of certain dialogues and these should be considered in advance, not to beg any questions as to the doctrines held in the various phases (e.g. the position of the Timaeus is of vital importance to any interpretation of the final phase). It is thus an integral part of the programme of the present study to contribute to the understanding of the relative dating of the dialogues by a consideration of their stand on one or more of the three strands in Plato's metaphysics to be examined presently. We shall be particularly concerned with establishing the relative date of the Symposium, the Cratylus, the Phaedrus and the Timaeus. Cf. also appended Note on Chronology. 7. An arrangement based on the linguistic and stylometric studies started by Camp• bell and Lutoslawski and refined in recent years by L. Brandwood and D.R. Cox. However, the relative date of the early dialogues is so much a matter of dispute that our order of dealing with these dialogues should not be taken as implying anything on that issue. 8. It should be noted, however, that we shall not be concerned with the historical Socrates in the sequel. We regard Socrates-in-the-dialogues as Plato's mouthpiece and shall consequently be referring to the views put forward by him as Plato's. This position is connected with the general impression that the dialogues for all their display of detachment, and play (paidia) have an underlying serious point and a hero as a proponent of that point whether it be Socrates, Diotima, Par• menides, the Eleatic or the Athenian Stranger or Timaeus. Cf. Methodological Considerations below. 9. The religious teaching of the Orphics and is almost identical (see Guth• rie, and Greek Religion, pp. 129 f., 216-21) or at least inseparable on the available evidence. Cf. also Dodds (2) 149. 10. We do not claim that the description "Eleatic" does not apply to the later dialo• gues. But we cannot agree with Ross (2) 83 that they exhibit an interest in Eleati-

287 cism that is abscent in the middle period. This is misleading. The later dialogues display a negative interest in and recognition of the limitation of Eleaticism (cf. Soph. 244b-245e, 241d) and a corresponding positive interest in Pythagorean ideas (d. Philebus and Timaeus passim). II. Of course not all "answers" are controversial or indeed new. Very little in Platonic scholarship can claim to be new. But our aim is the less spectacular one of finding some order, although developing order, in the wealth of data provided by recent scholarship. Again it should be emphasized that the three headings Socratic, Elea• tic and Pythagorean must not be taken too rigorously.

Part One 1. The modern debate was set off by Vlastos (2). 2. Aristotle (e.g. Met. 99lbt-3), for instance, complains that Forms play the impos• sible double role of being both universals and particulars (substances) and he cannot conceive of universals existing apart. 3. We adopt the practice of writing Form or Kind with capital initial letter whenever Plato's use of the terms eidos or genos appears to have technical ontological significance. We furthermore decide to let the phrase "" cover not only the middle dialogue doctrine of transcendent Forms but also the later theory of Kinds and the doctrine found in the early dialogues. The reason for this is that the three doctrines are obviously one developing realist theory of universals. But it is of course always open to debate when an object, or theory, has changed too much to deserve the same name or description. 4. By "transcendence" is meant "outside (not in) the world" This sense involves, but is not involved by another sense, i.e. "being inaccessible to the senses". The Sophist seems to require a non-extensional interpretation, i.e. another level of being than ordinary particulars. The Seventh Epistle, if we are right, involves a non-classical transcendence of Forms (see below). 5. "Explicative" (as opposed to "lexical", "stipulative", etc.) means that the defini• tion gives an analysis of a thing or a concept, in this case of a thing. As we are not dealing with words except as referring to things the notion of definition is perhaps unfortunate. 6. To take just a few, the following scholars seem to hold that Socrates is concerned with either or abstract properties: Nress 97 ff., Cohen (I) 171 f., Allen (5) 99 f., Santas (I) 200 ff., Nakhnikian (2) 142. An abstract entity is here: an entity that cannot be sensed and cannot be significantly located in space and time (Pap 349). The of "concrete common quality" will appear from the sequel. Cf. esp. note 10 below. 6a. Cf. Pap 485 and 451. 7. Cf. Penner (2) 60-62. 8. Theoretical entities are microbes, viruses, molecules, atoms, gravitational forces, etc., unobservable in different degrees, but posited by science as explanatory entities. For terminology and ideas I am indebted to Penner (2) 41 and his general attack on the meaning and tendency view of the Socratic virtues. 9. "Self-predication" implies that the adjective corresponding to the name of a Form is predicated of that Form (Sellars 414). Cf. also Vlastos (13) 258. However, in so far as the problem of self-predication involves a clear distinction between substan• ce and quality it seems irrelevant and probably anachronistic exegesis (see below). 10. Cf. Aaron's chapter on common qualities esp. 162 ff. Cf. by contrast Crombie (1) II who talks of abstracting the common quality from its instances (267) and who seems to identify it with the universal (268) and the (304-5). Henry

288 Laycock (4ff.) usefully discusses the meaning of the terms 'concrete' and 'par• ticular'. 11. Cf. Webster 23 ff. 12. We should not be deterred by cases like loving (cf. ' philotes) or "seeing" (cf. the causal theory of perception attributed to Empedocles in the Meno 76cd). 13. See Geach 376f. Cf. below for similar arguments used in the Hip. Maj. 14. Cf. Vlastos' biconditionality- interpretation and his objection to de facto identity «13) 232 f.). 15. Cf. our remarks on the nature of a common quality in connection with our analysis of the . 16. This has been seen by Penner (2). This article attempts a radical reinterpretation of the unity question which we have found it worthwhile to develop further. 17. Cf. the analysis given above. Raeder and Ritter among others advocate an early date for the . 18. The genuineness of the dialogue is disputed (cf. e.g. Tarrant and Thesleff). But it contains as W.O. Ross notes (12) 4 a development in the doctrine of Forms that bears the mark of Plato's hand: a distinction between ordinary Forms and Forms of number (300d-302b). If genuine this places it late among the early dialogues. A vaguer but perhaps convincing consideration in favour of authencity may be its sparkling irony and intellectual liveliness. Cf. also Guthrie (3) IV 175-6. 19. Or in a more formal mode: (1) sortal universal, (2) feature universal, (3) concrete characterizing universal, (4) abstract characterizing universal. Cf. Strawson (2) 168,202. 20. It is fair to note that 294b3 replaces hyperechonti by hyperche. But 294b2 may still be said to reveal the true sense of 294b3. 21. Cf. the comments above on the Euthyphro and n. 9. 22. It is here assumed that the context is extensional. This assumption may be based on the general impression one gets of the dialogue (and the early dialogues) and therefore not question-begging. Cf. the holy-godloved argument in the Euthyphro and arguments referred to above in the Protagoras. 23. We are not saying that Plato actually intended these generalizations here, but that they could be and were eventually made, in the Timaeus and the Phaedo respec• tively. 24. For convenience we regard this transitional dialogue as "early" on Forms and Matter, but "middle" on Mind. For discussion of its relative chronology see Dodds (3). 25. Cf. comments above on the Prolagoras (ad fin.). 26. Virtue seems here conceived of as a function with different values for different arguments, a translation of the problem into modern terms suggested to me by Mr. Crombie. 27. Compare Tht. 146d4 with Meno 72b2, 72c6-7. The Theailelus does not distinguish between values and kinds. 28. Cf. 76<18 ff. 29. We do not want to argue that Plato takes that step clearly in the M'!no. We have only tried to make explicit some implications of what is said in that dialogue. 30. For this (traditional) interpretation of the Oxford text (to men ... , t6 de) speak: a) the parallels in Hip. Maj. 291dl-3, 9, Sym. 211a5. b) that it avoids the awkwardnesses of the alternative interpretation. Against speaks: doubt as to whether the argument for the transcendence of Forms (74a-c) can be regarded as valid on this interpretation. Is it sufficient for numerical distinctness that one item only seems to have a property not had by another item?

289 For the alternative interpretation, originally advanced by Murphy (2) p. 111 note ("equal to one thing, not to another" speak: a) it fits in with what seems to be parallel passages and arguments, e.g. Phd. l02b-e; Rep. 479a-c, 523 f., Parm. 129. b) it seemingly avoids the philosophical doubt raised against the traditional view. Against speak: a) eniote (b8), paralleled by estin hote (c1), becomes pointless b) soi (c1) loses a parallel in t6 and becomes pointless c) Forms are relative too, cf. Vlastos (6). On balance it seems that the objections to the alternative reading are weightier than the question of the applicability of Leibniz' : appearing in a certain way may count as a distinguishing property. 31. It is not, be it noted, implied that the sticks are not fully equal. They appear sometimes equal, sometimes not equal. Contrast e.g. Bluck (3) p. 178 f. and Vlastos (13), p. 378. The latter even claims that the "no two physical things have any metrically identical dimensions" if true would be "a significant about the physical universe". I must confess that I fail to understand this. It seems to fly into the face of commonsense and the evidence of the Phaedo does not require such a position. On the contrary, it seems to require the very opposite (cf. also 102d7-8). 32. There seems to be a reality-appearance distinction at work (onta-phainetai 74b8, d. 102d7-8). There is a similar distinction in the earlier dialogues, e.g. Prot. 356d and Hip. Maj. 294. 33. The latter has to be inferred. Compare 102b8 ff. with e.g. Hip. Maj. 290d5-6, 291dl-3 and Sym. 211a3-4. Context-dependence may be taken in a sense wide enough to cover observer-dependence. 34. Cf. the discussion of the Phaedo in Part Two for a fuller anaiysis of this passage. 35. E.g. Crombie (1) 267, 270 and passim. R.E. Allen (2) 52, Ross (2) 225, Brentlinger (2) 143, 150. 36. What is not growing, decaying, waxing etc. is not necessarily timeless or eternal. 37. Common qualities are not everlasting nor uniform since they are in space and appear mixed with other qualities, i.e. since they are not separate. 38. It reappears in the Phdr. 247d f., the Tim. 52a3 and Ep. VII, 342c. This seems to be a major obstacle to Crombie's interesting thesis that Forms of the classical period were rather like abstract designs (1) II 274 ff. 39. We have argued (n. 9) that self-predication may be explained away in the early dialogues. As long as the Form is conceived of as a part of a "material" (if this anachronism is pardoned) object there is no problem in saying, e.g. that the green in the apple is green, indeed just green (unlike the apple that is both green and red and full of worms or what not). When the Form is separated it may be the case that the conception of the Forms as a kind of "stuff" is preserved and justifies so-called self-predication: it is just that "stuff' and nothing else. 40. Hence we cannot agree with Santas (3) 44 that we have a "general" possibility that the two criteria (object and product/function) are independent. It is at most a theoretical possibility without textual foundation. Cf. also the closely similar argu• ment in Timaeus discussed below. It is also difficult to accept his analysis of the rest of the argument (his premisses (9) ff.) for the simple reason that he struggles to get, by implication, analogy and even from Hintikka (1) what can be got from the text itself (his corollary (11) is stated explicitly 478a3-5). Hintikka (2) 7-8 and 10 (step 3) seems to confuse the two criteria with the quite unPlatonic consequence that e.g. Forms become somehow the product of knowledge (cf. p. 13). Hintikka (p. 15) bases his case on Crombie (see next note). With similar consequences.

290 Gosling (1) 132 claims that 477 d contains only one criterion, "what it performs", supporting his case by a mistranslation of 478a6. 41. Crombie (1) II 57 holds that the argument is flawed by the possibility (not noticed by Plato) of two powers having the same object and yet being different, e.g. sight sees apples and smell smells them. But surely Plato did not mean this, but he thought that sight sees size and colour (523e f., 477c7; cf. also Charm. 167cd) and that these are external objects (507d ff.), not internal as Crombie suggests. Cf. on this topic Don Locke: Perception and our Knowledge of the External World, 1967, p. 73 f. Internal objects here would wreck Plato's beliefs in objective Forms. Cf. also Santas (3) note 5. 42. Cf. Part Two notes 39 and 13. Cf. Kahn (3) on the complexity of einai. 43. It is commonly said that Plato is obviously wrong here: we do have belief and knowledge about the same object (Cross and Woozley, p. 151, Flew (2) p. 362-3, Santas (3) p. 34, etc.). But it ought to be emphasized that it is empirical under• standing of incomplete predicates (see below n. 46) that is impossible. This is not an obviously absurd point of view. 524a-c is helpful in this connection. 44. If one sees nomima (479d4) in the light of 479a3 (476c2) and takes seriously the concluding ara (479d3), one might perhaps translate not "beliefs" but "belief• correlates". In 484dl-2 we seem to have a reference to objective extra-mental standards. Cf. the fuller discussion of this point in Part Two. 45. Relative predicates (e.g. "taller", "larger") require singular terms as their comple• ting substantives, whereas attributive predicates (e.g. "good", "one", "large", "hard") require general terms. 46. An incomplete predicate may be defined as a predicate that does not make a complete statement when it is joined to a subject term unless a completing substan• tive is understood from the context. Cf. Brentlinger (1) p. 70 who uses the term as covering the two types of predicate mentioned in n. 45. 47. Cf. e.g. Raven (p. 156 f.) who rests his case on Plato's ("the square itself'). The question is whether the philosophical structure of the Line does not decide the matter even if a linguistic expression may seem unhappy. 48. Cf. Grube p. 159 and Ross (2) pp. 78 f. 49. Cf. premise (2) of the proof above and the comment on it. 50. In so far as "theios" and "theos" are much vaguer than our "divine" and "god" there is nothing upsetting about this identification. See Part Three n. 74 and Part Three on the Phaedo. 51. E.g. Tht. 174b, Phil. 15a, Tim. 30e, 3ge, 51bc. Cf. also the very theme of Soph. and Pol. 52. Therefore, and because so-called self-predication does not seem to be given up, we need not take this argument, and the first part of the Parmenides, as an attack on self-predication. It seems more likely that it is participation, involving Forms and material objects, that is the target, and that Plato does not as yet quite see where the fault lies. Participation is clearly focused upon in the last two objections (2b and 3). Incidentally, it may be asked whether we are better off than Plato in our understanding of properties? We do not have a clear criterion of identity of pro• perties. Another corollary seems to be that the argument is somehow a self-criticism. If Plato is still worried about the problem in the Philebus it must be his problem, not that of some mistaken Platonists. 53. The very separation of Forms from common qualities engenders the two-world metaphysics with all its problems. That the divine creator made only one Bed (Rep. 597cd) cannot, therefore, be taken as answering this objection, which on the contrary assumes uniqueness.

291 54. If two particulars, x and y, are alike in being green, this is because they are like the Form Greenness l (F1). But the latter likeness is in turn due to x, y, and FI being like a Form Greenness2 (F2). Etc. 55. Again "self-predication" is assumed. As God, or the divine in general, is assimi• lated to, in the middle dialogues perhaps even identified with, the Forms (here with Knowledge) (cf. Part Three n. 74), it is not obvious that "Knowledge knows" is felt as problematic. Rather the two-world conception is under suspicion. It is revealing for the conception of being that it is coupled with degrees of perfec• tion. Cf. n. 42. Behind the problem felt here of the perfect having traffic with the imperfect seems to lie the ancient thought that like comes to/knows like. 56. Surprisingly some leading commentators think that Zeno's method should be extended to the Forms (Cornford (5) p. 104-5, Runciman (1) p. 161). Ross (2) p. 91 is faithful to the text which is explicit in its disparagement of particulars. 57. It should be noted that Plato explicitly blames the exclusivity of Forms (Parm. 133a8-9; cf. c3-4) and that this characteristic is left out in the negated hypothesis (135b5-c2). 58. It may be useful to keep this in mind when considering the import of the end of the dialogue (see below, note 65). 59. Cf. e.g. Soph. 218c and Tht. 184c. Kinship (syngeneia, koinonia, oikeiotes, homoiotes) plays an important role in division, cf. e.g. Soph. 253el, Pol. 285bl, 5- 6. Division is discussed and recommended (424b7-d4). Plato may have found linguistic analysis, i.e. hypothesis as practised in the middle dialogues, disappoin• ting (436cd). Correct naming must be based on classification of named object (394de). Both procedures, in that order, came very much to the front in the later dialogues. In view of this it seems natural to interpret the kinship referred to here as the logical relations denoted by "mixing"I"blending" in the Sophist (rather than, as Guthrie (3), V, p. 15 note 1, find an allusion to the Meno's: all reality is akin (81c). Cf. the discussion of that dictum in Part Three). 60. Cf. Calvert p. 33 and Guthrie follows him (3) V, p. 20, 6-7. 61. Guthrie (3) V, p. 22. 62. Cf. e.g. Arist. Met. 1070a18. See Guthrie's sensible remarks (3) IV, p. 549, note 2. 63. It must be had by particulars (389blO), i.e. they must conform to it. There is no talk of approximation (pace Guthrie (3) V, p. 22). See also Luce (3). 64. This sounds admittedly paradoxical. But as the following lines seem to show the meaning of the question is: whether each single X itself is real (when X is a neuter adjective or any other general term we know and use). Cf. n. 42. 65. Cornford (3) p. 99 (cf. p. 101) and Cherniss (1) p. 10 think that the Craty/us here implies the existence of Forms (presumably the well-known middle dialogues ver• sion). But R. Robinson (1) p. 48 is clearly right in claiming that the argument shows no more than that there must be something stable somewhere. The absence of middle dialogue Forms is one reason for placing the Cratylus among the "criti• cal" dialogues (cf. Note on Chronology). 66. Cf. the discussion of the Theaitetus in Part Two. 67. Admittedly the language of the Digression sounds familiar, but this in itself does not prove that Plato is talking of the same thing. On the specific powers of doing• /suffering cf. Phdr. 270d ff., Crat. 394 bl. For their relevance as criterion of reality cf. Soph. 247e. On seeing-as-a-whole cf. Phdr. 270c. 68. In particular, sensibles are not striving in vain to be like common notions. On the other hand, whereas in the middle dialogues one could see literally at least a mirror image (or the like) of Forms, common notions are in principle inaccessible to the senses. 69. Both in the sense that they are outside the world and in the sense that they are inaccessible to the senses.

292 70. It is much more like the inductive process described in the Symposium. Note however that the guide is missing. The Symposium is also in other respects close in content to late dialogues. Cf. Note on Chronology. 71. We stick to our convention of writing Form with capital f to indicate that the reference is to an entity of technical ontological significance. 72. Collection of particulars seems implied in a number of passages in the later dialo• gues: Tht. 147c4, d7; Phdr. 270a-272a, Pol. 262d3, Phil. 18b6, 8-9. Hence Corn• ford (3) p. 185-6, 267 cannot be right in confining collection to "the world of Forms". This makes an interestint contrast to the hypothetical method recom• mended in the Parm. 135e (cf. n. 56) and perhaps also to Socratic induction. 73. Soul is no more a transcendent (non-immanent) Form than body is, and both are studied with a view to finding their causal properties (270b, and in general 270a- 271b). There seems to be no reason why we should regard-types of soul as species of a genus soul. It might just as well be argued that types of body are species. It is on the whole debatable whether the genus-species terminology is quite adequate when applied to the subject-matter of the later dialogues. 74. It will be argued in Part Three that the transcendence (the being outside the world) is at least of a peculiar brand. The cosmological sight-seeing of the Timaeus (41d- 42d) where the soul from a star is shown the nature of the universe has some resemblance to Phdr. 246d-249b, and we shall argue that the soul is not bodiless during its touring on the top of heaven. Plato does, in fact, disclaim too much fuss about anything in the preceding - it was play (paidia 265c) - except for the mention of procedure (2). 75. G.E.L. Owen (3) has subjected inter alia this passage to an adinirable examination and has argued, to my mind convincingly (against the common view), that there is no question of the existential sense of "is not" being ruled out. There is a "prospect of joint illumination" of being and not-being when they have been found equally puzzling (250e5-51al). Plato goes on to analyse the incomplete use of the verb "be" in its negative construction (A is not, sc. B) and Owen adduces evidence and argument that this is the case also in its positive construction. "The non-negatable use of to be is nowhere in view". It is not non-existence but nothing (237e2) that cannot be dealt with without contradiction. 76. Owen (3) p. 261 sees the paradox about being (242b6-250e4) as "an exercise in the logic of identity and predication, not of existence." There is some truth in this, but in view of n. 75 it is perhaps an overstatement. "Being", though not confined to existence (Owen is right here), cannot refer to being exclusively in the copulative or identity sense but must stand for being in a sufficiently broad sense that includes existence. 77. Literally: naturally united entity (symphyes gegonos 247d3). This is also referred to as a mark (horos): "I propose as a mark to distinguish real things that it is nothing but power" (247e3-4). Plato is saying not that real things are nothing but power, but that they have power (cf. 247d3, 8, 248c4-5). Moreover, in the later dialogues at any rate, it seems that a power is typically had by something (Phdr. 270d4, Tht. 156a6-7, cf. 174b4-5). Cf. Part Three n. 136. 78. In the Theaitetus (184cd) Plato is very careful in stating that we perceive with the soul through the sense-organs. The middle dialogues too may lend some support of the same view (Phd. 65b, 79c; Rep. 523b-524e). It seems at any rate impossible to find a statement in the Corpus to the effect that we perceive with the body as opposed to the soul. 79. paschein is taken to involve kineisthai. By whom? Vlastos (13) p. 309-17 makes heavy weather of this and tries to exonerate Plato (the ES) from adherence to a thesis which according to Vlastos is false and involves a contradiction with the immutability of Forms. The Forms, we are told, satisfy the "mark" by serving as

293 objects of knowledge (which is a form of paschein). Vlastos puts the blame on the Friends of the Forms. But he cannot explain why they, as opposed to Plato, should have good reason for granting that paschein involves kineisthai. The reason is, of course, that Plato must hold this thesis himself: it is analytic if paschein means "being acted upon" (Vlastos' snowflake example is oddly out of place in this logical context), and this is required by the dynamis mark that seems to involve action• Ipassion in a stronger sense than that implied in "serving as object of knowledge" which would render it useless as a criterion of reality. Cf. Phdr. 270d ff. 80. This analysis of the argument owes something to a valuable article by D. Keyt (p. 2). But I cannot accept his analysis in detail, especially because of the unpalatable conclusion he must draw from it, i.e. that Forms are changed. 81. This premise figures in Keyt's analysis and Vlastos thinks this is the only possible alternative (p. 312). 82. Vlastos argues that knowing (gignoskein) cannot be a passion (pathos) on gram• matical grounds (p. 312). But this is a very dubious line of argument. If the grounds are morphological we would have to say that seeing (horan) and hearing (akouein) are actions; smelling (osphrainesthai) , tasting (geuesthai) , touching (haptesthai) , sensing (aisthanesthai) in general and thinking (dianoeisthai) would presumably have to be taken as actions provided we pay attention to the syntacti• cal aspect. But we know that all sensations at least involve passion (cf., e.g., Phd. 65c5-7, Tht. 186c2, Tim. 65b). Hearing is described very much as a passion (Tim. 67b) and vision is at least to a large extent passion (Tht. 182a, Tim. 45c2-d3, esp. c7-d3). We cannot rely on grammatical grounds. Plato is not a Greek lohn Austin paying austere service to ordinary usage. He puts his own theory-loaded interpre• tation on these crucial terms. 83. Cf. Part Two on the Theaitetus and the evidence cited there. Tim. 45b-46b and 37a• c seem in substantial agreement with Tht. Cf. also Phil. 33d-34a and perhaps Rep. 508b. 84. The common view is defended by e.g. Cherniss (5) p. 353, Corn ford (3) p. 246f. and Guthrie (3), V p. 144 ff. But "empsychon" means "having life in it", "being alive", "having soul in it". And what has soul in it if not the bodily (in this context it belongs to "the perfectly real" (248e7f.»? Not the Forms according to Guthrie (ibid. p. 144, note 1) and in this we have already seen reason to concur: we need the immutable Forms (and there is no reason to think that the noeton zoon of Tim. 3gel is alive). Plato does not of course imply that the perfectly real (pantelos on) is mortal, as Guthrie suggests (ibid. p. 146), but it is implied that the bodily motions of mortal animals and hence the bodily in general is real (249b2-3) and present to the perfectly real (248e7 f.). Cf. also Part Three n. 141. 85. E.g. Lysis 217c ff., Hip. Maj. 289d4, 292dl; Phd. l00d5-6, 103b6. If there is a reference in Soph. 247a to the Forms, it would be natural to take it that middle dialogue Forms are meant. But there is of course a possibility that a new concep• tion of Forms is referred to, one of which some hints may have been dropped in the preceding dialogues. 86. Cf. n. 78. 87. If this is so, Forms are in the same category as particulars. 88. It should perhaps be noted that in the Republic God's activity does not give rise to qualms (379 ff., compare 380 with 381c). 89. The proof (250a8-c7) is by substitution. It may be interpreted thus: (1) change and rest are most opposite (2) both and each are (real) (250all-12; d. 249d3-4) (3) it is not the case that both and each change (by 1) (4) it is not the case that both [and each?) rest (by 1)

294 Therefore, it is not the case that being is identical with (a) both change and rest, (b) each of them (by 2, 3 and 4). This seems to be the contradictory of what was the outcome of the Battle (249d3-4) or its implications (249a9 ff.). But in fact what is denied now is the identity of being ("its own nature") with change and rest, and this is not incompatible with the assertion that being is changing and resting (cf. 249a9 ff.). But it requires a sorting out of the identity and copular sense of einai. It seems a reasonable assumption that Plato does exactly this later on (255e-257a). 90. It is tempting to translate Plato's problem (stated neutrally in terms of examples of x and x itself) into the modern distinction of extension- (cf. 250b7). This is convenient and common in the literature of philosophical scholarship. But care should be taken that this device does not prejudge the issue, namely, whether Plato is developing other kinds of meaning than reference. Possible cases of "self• predication" (258a-c) tell against an innovation. That is to say, we must be pre• pared to understand by "intension" a property that characterizes itself and that is not categorically different from particulars. More positively, ontologically being has a habit of popping up alongside (para) the two isolated entities, e.g. hot and cold, or change and rest. This is reminiscent of the refutation of the Dream in the Tht. (202d-205e) where the second horn of a dilemma is that a complex is "some one kind of thing (idea) that has come into being when they (sc. the elements) are put together" (203c5-6; cf. e3-5; 204al-2, 8-9). The terminology used there is in turn very close to what we find in a passage in the Parm. (157c4-e2) that implies that a whole is more than the sum of its parts (d. esp. 157d7-e2). Now it certainly looks as if the problem of the nature of a whole is relevant to the present problem, and if the dialogues men• tioned antecede the Sophist, as is generally assumed, we may reasonably expect Plato to apply his insight in this case: change and rest together constitute a whole, i.e. a new single entity which we call "being". We shall see presently that the notion of whole is indeed involved. 91. E.g. Crombie (I) II, p. 406, Vlastos (13) p. 278 ff. 92. The Forms of the Sophist cannot be interpreted extensionally. Cf. n. 99. 93. Is Plato saying "the Form (in the minimal sense of Parm. 135b6) of change is resting" is false (supposing our understanding of 249b8-c5 is correct and disregard• ing here our, not Plato's, speculations whether the "activity" of the Form in cognition involves any changes)? This is commonly denied because the statement is taken as a predication of the Form qua Form. But surely it is on the specific Form-contents and their relations that Plato concentrates here (as almost always). So he is saying that change has nothing to do with rest, i.e. what we mean (e.g. 250b5) by "change" is in no way what we mean by "rest". Similarly, what we mean by "being" is not what we mean by "change-and-rest" (250a-d). On the other hand, part of the meaning of "rest" or "change" is being, self-identity and differ• ence. (This seems to follow. One might feel inclined to protest that this is a meaning shared by everything and therefore not a meaning in any understandable sense. We would want to say rather that being, self-identity and are characteristics of meaning as such. But Plato does not appear to take that step). Richard Ketchum has made a useful distinction between "Form-predications" and "first-order sentences" justified by appeal to participation (p. 42). But he goes on identifying the latter as "kind-predications" with the result that he gets implausible interpretations like the falsity "change is a kind of thing that rests" (p. 50). Surely we cannot believe that Plato took it that it is true that change is a kind of thing that changes? What he meant must have had something to do with the meaning carried by e.g. "change". 94. II; other words, the alternatives: ordinary predication - Form predication are not

295 exhaustive and cannot be made the basis of inferences of the type: if not OP, then necessarily FP. 95. Cf. the later Pol. 285a5-7; cf. also Pol. 276el-4, 260dll ff., 278b6-c1, 280b7. 96. The substantive to be understood is probably eidous. Only Forms are considered in the context (esp. d7 and d1, e1), cf. Rep. 511c1-2 and Parm. 135e. See however n. 72. 97. I.e. Being and Not-being are the most important Forms and the theme of the Sophist. The Theaitetus (185 f.) suggests other candidates for vowel terms. 98. The relations of each of the five greatest Kinds of identity to themselves and difference from the other four are all argued to be property relations by Vlastos (13) pp. 305 ff. 99. E.g. the argument that Change is not Identity (256all-b4) cannot be interpreted extensionally (cf. Crombie (1) vol. II, p. 407). Also the difference of Being from Change and Rest together is obviously non-extensional and so is its difference from Change and Rest separately (25Oc6-7). Cf. n. 89. 100. Moravcsik (6) has suggested that we take this approach. 101. S.M. Cohen (2) is an advocate of this view. 102. Cf. our interpretation of Pol. 262-3. In general it is bad exegesis to make inferences based on later dialogues. But it seems unnecessarily restrictive not to compare two dialogues so close in time and content. 103. b9 refers back to b2-3 that refers back to a2-4. 104. This would mean inter alia that the Kind is in the class (289b5, cf. Soph. 226c5-6 and Phil, 16c-e) or stretches through the class (Soph. 219c6). 105. "Analogies" would not cover the children case (277e ff.). 106. The Greek is ton panton (278dl) glossed a few lines later by ton pragmaton (d4-5). 107. G.E.L. Owen (4) has produced a very thorough analysis of this passage rightly stressing the importance of the immediate context. One can only concur with his conclusion (p. 358) that weaving is what can be depicted and that statesmanship cannot. The connection with the earlier methodological passage (277cff) would then amount to this: an example (weaving) can be depicted, whereas the exem• plified (political science) cannot (cf. 279a7-b5). Unfortunately, Owen's arguments (p. 356 ff.) against the traditional linking Pol. 285d9-286a7 with Phdr. 250b ff. are not convincing. If we understand him correctly he argues 1) that it is simpler not to introduce Forms if not necessary, 2) that we should not credit Plato with a philosophical myth concerning the teaching of the majority of words by ostensive definition. These grounds are certainly too vague and general to counterbalance the obvious parallels between Phdr. 250b1-el and Pol. 285d9-286a7. Owen's understanding of the syntax and meaning of pephykasin (Pol. 285e1) is unaccept• able. Cf. p. 354-5 where he struggles to free it from any connection with "nature" and p. 350 where it is claimed to be obvious that it does not govern the infinitive (katamathein). But it seems that this policy involves Owen in syntactic implausibilities (p. 350 note 3). If the mss reading radios katamathein is retained, it is surely more natural to let it depend on pephykasin (cf. LSJ B II 2) than to resort to very rare noun dependencies. There is also no textual or contextual indication that we should avoid reference to nature. 277c is not so parallel to 286 a that it can be inferred that "the image clearly made for men" is man-made (cf. 277c) rather than a divine artefact (cf. Phdr. 250b ff., esp. 250d5). However, from another point of view Owen may conceivably be right: epistemological images tend to be man-made in the late works (see Epist. VII, 342b2, cl-2, cf. Pol. 277d). Perhaps it may also be argued that the perfect tenses of pephykasi (on Owen's rendering = eisin, hyparchousin) and eirgasmenon support an interpretation involving nature rather than man. In sum: 1) we do not think it proven that Plato is here referring to classical transcendent Forms by the expression "incorporal entities", 2) Owen

296 does not seem to have demonstrated convincingly that Plato does not refer to the Forms of the Phaedrus type. But if these are mythical, as suggested above, then there is no need to cut the links with that dialogue. lOS. The rendering "everything produced" would not be equivalent to "all that comes to be". 109. Cf. Phil. 58c3. 110. Cf. Phil. 66a. Such an interpretation may perhaps contain a clue to the idea of the Republic, i.e. that the Good is related to (Rep. 534e). 111. Plato himself lumps together what is different (colour is not a genus as figure may be said to be). 112. We can only find two questions. Delete question mark of Oxford text at 15b4. 113. CL the restatement and link-up at lSeS-19a2. 114. Or less anachronistically: the last Form before the character of Unlimitedness is applied, i.e. where no more general traits (Limits) are to be found, or strictly, are found worth noting. 115. Cf. Phil. 17e3 and the context. 116. Perhaps this is a more tractable question than the question how one Form can be present in many particulars. Ratios at any rate are categorially different from particulars. This cannot be said about the "classical" middle dialogue Form. 117. Cf. the analysis above of Soph. 24Se-249d. 11S. This is perhaps a controversial point tied up with the nest of difficulties surround• ing the question of Plato's theology. Suffice it to say here that, whereas in the middle dialogues the divine largely coincides with the Forms, there is a pro• nounced tendency in the later dialogues toward separating Forms from god, or the gods. This does not mean, of course, that the Forms (Kinds) are not god-like (Phil. 62aS, Soph. 254bl). On the contrary, the gods get their divinity from nearness to the Forms (Phdr. 249c5-6). Cf. note 74 on Part Three. 119. Cf. Phil. 54c for the idea that genesis is a process or means for an end, ousia. 120. This is not circular. We have independent grounds for preferring the given interpretation of the Heavenly Tradition (lowe this convenient term from Mr. Crombie's stimulating treatment of this section of the dialogue in Crombie (1) II, pp. 422 ff.). 121. One may perhaps find modern, admittedly far-fetched, parallels in contemporary quantum . 122. Cf. e.g. Phd. 9Sb-99c, Tht. 173e-175a, Phdr. 270-1, Tim. 47 and that dialogue in its general scope, Laws 903bc and Laws X passim. 123. Hence it is difficult to agree with inter alios Gosling (2) pp. 222-3. 124. Compare Phil. 56d-57e with Rep. 524d-526b. We have a distinction here between a non-philosophic and philosophic arithmetic dealing with exactly equal entities (Phil. 56e, Rep. 526a). But, whereas we have found general grounds for doubting that the latter are Forms in the Republic (in spite of auto to hen 525dS f.), it seems as if the Philebus, while making a distinction here (d. the transition from mathematics to dialectic 57de), soon forgets it. Note that the divine circle and sphere itself (62a7-S) (Forms, as indicated by the context) are contrasted with the carpenter's circles etc. There is silence about philosophical arithmetic (c( Epist. VII). This does not of course prove anything in itself. 125. We have already dealt at length with the interdependence of "art" and subject• matter in connection with the Philebus. It plays an important role also.in the Republic in the proof at the end of Book V of which we have given a detailed analysis above. We there suggested that Plato relies on a more fundamental princi• ple of relative things (Rep. 43S). 126. One notes that the world is most like (1) God and (2) the perfect Living Being (2SbS f., 3Od). Does this mean that God is identical with the Living Being (see

297 5Od3, 37al, 92c7 if noeton is to be completed with teou)? There is a further question whether the Living Being or God is identical with the whole world of Forms or part of it. Cf. note 118. 127. God, if distinct from the Forms, would need contemplation of the natural Kinds (30e, 3ge f., 51bc) to guide his creation of the natural kinds. Cf. note 118. 128. J. Whittaker has (rightly) seen this passage as indicating a new conception of the Forms. 129. 51d-52a set out above. 130. Cf. also Aristotle, Met. 1039a3-14. 131. In the Epinomis mathematics replaces dialectic as the supreme . This is difficult to reconcile with the general high estimate of dialectic in the later dialo• gues. Hence it is tempting to accept Guthrie's trust in the statement found in Laertius (3, 37) that is the author (cf. Guthrie (3) vol. V, p. 385 f.). On the other hand, it could be interpreted as evidence that dialectic, i.e. knowledge of the Forms, had developed into a sort of mathematics. This would not be surprising in view of the mathematical character of the doctrine in the later dialogues. As for Diogenes' statement it need mean no more than that Philip copied the Epinomis as well as the Laws. There is however the claim (983d2-3) that ta onta einai soul and body. If this means that the world contains only two kinds of thing, soul and body, then the Epinomis seems irreconcilable with the doctrine of the later dialogues. Taran (2) argues at length that the dialogue is spurious. 132. The authencity has been, and still is, hotly disputed (for references see Guthrie (3) vol. V, pp. 399-402). A subjective impression (who else could have written, e.g., the Digression?) does not settle the matter, but the puzzle looks insoluble. Apart from this it perhaps does not really matter for us who wrote these lines. The author certainly knows his later Plato and works within a clearly Platonic framework. See however now Taran (2). 133. The letter is addressed to the friends of Dion after the death of the latter in 354 (cf. Guthrie ibid. p.402-3). 134. These descriptions of the Digression seem inconsistent (cf. lim. 26e4-5). But perhaps Plato has been influenced by his own expressed distrust in the written word. 135. It appears that what is meant is inter alia drawn circles (342c1-2, 243a5-7) and visual and other perceptions (344b5). Plato in the passage under consideration shifts between object and correlated mode of apprehension. Hence "drawn cir• cles" are equivalent to "visual circles". Plato seems to be talking about the per• ceivedworld consisting of perceived objects. These he calls images (eidola) of true reality that is intuited (gnoston). Cf. the requirement of paradeigmata noted in Pol. 277d. We shall argue below that it is on general grounds preferable to see the images of our letter against the background of the doctrine of images of the Timaeus (48e-52c) rather than that of the Republic (e.g. 510, 598b, 600e5). E.N. Lee has drawn a useful distinction (1) p. 353 between "substantial images" and "insubstantial images". The two classes vary inter alia in their dependence on the original (I am less sure whether Lee is right in his analysis of the medium depen• dence, p. 354). The point is that images in the Republic seem to have "some independent physical identity of their own", while the images of the Timaeus, and Epist. VII if we are right, are wholly derivative. 136. "Each of the things that are" (ton onton hekasto 342a7, cf. e3-343a1, c4, 344b7) seems to be a Form (cf. Crat. 440b6, 439c8 f.; Parm. 135dl, 133bl-2). 137. Cf. Guthrie (3) vol. V, p. 408, note 2. 138. Crat. 438c; Tht. 175c2-3, 6, 174b3-5; Phdr. 270de, 271dl-3; Soph. 218c, 221b; Pol. 267a5; Leges 895d-896a.

298 139. We assume that Aristotle is talking of transcendent Forms and therefore disregard the Cratylus shuttle which is not clearly transcendent according to our analysis (see above and n. 4). 140. Represented by, e.g. Guthrie (3) vol. V, p. 407.

Part Two 1. The reader should be warned that body (and soma) are ambiguous between organic and inorganic (physical) body. When we speak of "body-related" we mean "of relevance for the understanding of the mind-body-problem", i.e. "related to an organic body". But matter or physical bodies in general are crucially relevant to a discussion of organic bodies. Cf. Part Three n. 143. 2. We draw on a later dialogue only because it mentions what looks like the same principle held by the same . 3. Cf. Simplicius Phys. 27,11; DK 59a41 on . 4. We should perhaps also note the idea of the body-tomb (Gorg. 493a3) and the doctrine that all good and bad for the body derive from the soul (Charm. 156e). 5. The Oxford text of Gorg. 465a3-5, esp. a4, is obscure. But the sense seems given 501a3-6. 5a. Cf. e.g. the unlimited nature of pleasure Phil. 31a. 6. The term is strictly speaking incorrect in so far as a clear distinction between the material and immaterial has not yet been drawn. Hence the shudder-quotes. Cf. Ch.2. 7. This view may get some support from the middle dialogues where the point of separating "qualities" is that their earthly manifestations are mixed with others into composite things (syntheta). On the Presocratic lack of distinction between substance and attribute Bluck (3) p. 175-6 with references may be consulted. Baldry has provided a useful survey of the uses of eidos and idea before Plato. A.L. Peck in his Loeb edition of Arist. Gen. An. gives a concise account of the central concept of dynamis (p. XLIX ff.). Recently A. Mourelatos has turned our attention to ", Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Things" (in Exegesis and Argument). However, in the light of our analysis of Plato's Sophist in Part I it is difficult to agree with him when he claims (p. 16) that the communion of Forms is "the great moment of revolution", i.e. away from things into "the world as logos-textured". Something surely happens, but less than a break with thing-like qualities. 8. Cf. DK 59B4; Aristotle Phys. 187a20-b6; John Brentlinger (1) has proved helpful here. 9. Cf. the fuller discussion of the Cosmological Proofin Part Three. 10. Not, however, the "material" qualities of the early dialogues. See below for a discussion of that part of the dialogue and cf. n. 29. 11. Jf we are right in holding that Plato did not (at any rate at this stage) see cle;;trly the substance-quality distinction, then it is also not to be wondered that qualitative and quantitative change are lumped together. 12. 74d4-5. 13. Cf. 75d2. Cf. also 77a2, 78d3-4, 65d13 f., 92d9 and passim. Being belongs emi• nently to the Forms. The soul must trust only what it considers independently of the senses, and what it views through them "as other in other things" it should count as nothing "real" (alethes 83b3). It is clear from the context (81b4, 83c7, d6) that bodily affections dispose the soul to regard their sources as real or even the only thing that matters; only the bodily exists to such a soul. Hence the (exagger• ated) warning not to regard the bodily as real, i.e. existing.

299 Both Allen (2) 51 and Vlastos (2) 248, 252-3 take copying or imitation in Plato as in itself involving degrees of reality. But Vlastos (13) 43-75 argues that this has nothing to do with degrees of existence (e.g. 49) which makes "no sense whatever" (65), and then tries to reduce the whole matter to degrees of cognitive reliability (49, 63) and degrees of value (50 ff., 63 f.); i.e. the supreme being of Forms consists in that they only are fully F and, secondly, they only are most satisfyingly F. If this is a fair account of Vlastos' view, it will be obvious that we cannot agree as far as the Phaedo is concerned for the reasons given above. But Vlastos also (47) accepts Owen's view that even the Sophist does not succeed in isolating the "is" of existence from that of predication. How then can he be so sure that Plato in the Republic "would have had to fight his native language" to get degrees of existence - not pure, to be sure, but included in a sense of einai that embraces both the existential and the predicative sense? Incidentally, the "rank absurdity" (65) or "monstrosity" (49) of intermediate degrees of existence is allegedly a feature of ordinary contemporary English. How would Vlastos deal with shadows or mirror• images? Is it absurd to hold that shadows exist less fully than what cast them? Is it only that they are not fully what cast them? The answer seems No. Cf. also Brentlinger (2) 149 ff. Conversely, when Vlastos (13) 378, with B1uck (3) 178 f., goes on to argue that physical objects are not and cannot fully be F (two sticks can never be exactly equal) this is surely rank absurdity (cf. Part One, n. 31) and contrary to the textual evidence (Phd. l02d7-8). Two sticks may even appear equal (74b8), as equal as one could possibly wish. But they may in other situations appear unequal, and this lack of self-consistency is what inter alia makes visible equality deficient. Objective physical "qualities", on the other hand, like tallness in Simmias are self-consistent but still transient, fluctuating, context-dependent, local and therefore also defi• cient (cf. Bluck (6) 123). The worry about the look of the sticks indicates that perhaps it is wrong to make a too sharp separation of appearance and reality in the case of physical objects in the Phaedo. There is not much evidence for the distinc• tion here (cf. below on the Republic). However, this deficiency ought not to be construed as a category distinction (as e.g. Allen (2) 52 and Brentlinger (2) 152 do). What could it mean that one catego• ry falls short of or is deficient in relation to another? Vlastos must be right in so far as he assumes that the Form belongs to the same type as particulars, is a perfect particular. Allen's analysis, however, is very interesting and possibly on the right track as an interpretation of the relation between Form and images-in-space in the later dialogues (Timaeus) for which see below. 14. In general it is bad practice to elucidate earlier dialogues by later ones, if one works on the, as it seems, plausible assumption that Plato develops. But such a principle should not be applied too mechanically. It may be helpful to make a distinction between theory-loaded terms, in fact our main interest, such as psyche, soma, eidos, etc. on the one hand, and instrumental or neutral terms or phrases like auto kath' hauto, monoeides, etc. on the other. There seems to be no reason why one should not avail oneself of later evidence in the case of the latter category of terms. They constitute so to speak the elements of Platonic thought at any time. Of course it may always be open to dispute what terms are rightly classified as instrumental. Also, we must be prepared to acknowledge that certain instrumental terms are ambiguous (polyeides as applied to sensibles and to later Forms may be a case). But this is not a problem confined to instrumental terms. 15. Prauss takes inter alia this as an indication that Plato sees no distinction between quality and part of thing or between quality and substance in the early and middle dialogues (pp. 110-11). I hope it is clear that I am very much in sympathy with these assumptions. It seems that some of the frightful questions (self-predication

300 for one) that have plagued modern scholarship are generated by approaching Plato from Aristotle rather than from the Presocratics, and it does seem that the latter approach can avoid a good deal of anachronistic exegesis. As for Prauss I think he perhaps rather overstates his case when he claims that there is to be found no expression (Ausdruck) for matter/material in the Phaedo, and that Plato has not at all given thought to the subject. To this it may be objected that Plato has the word somatoeides (81bS, c4, eI, 83d5, 86a2) , and that the distinction polyeides/ monoeides may be meant as an analysis of a non-philosophical distinction somatoeides/asomaton (see e.g. Simmias' characterization of the lyre and its har• mony 85e5 ff. This passage actually brings together, at any rate in the text if not logically, somatoeides and syntheton (one of the crucial krms in the Forms/particu• lars dichotomy discussed above». 16. The Form instances that are "never constant in any way" are e.g. beautiful people, beautiful horses, equal sticks, etc. But there is a question here whether the refe• rence is to the beauty of beautiful people, horses, etc, and the equality of the equal sticks or to the people, horses and sticks. In the modern idiom: is Plato referring to inherent qualities or to their possessors? The many F's that are contrasted with the F itself are changing and therefore composite (and multiform) and thus dissoluble. It may be suggested that Plato is not concerned with particulars such as horses, garments, etc. but rather, as the wording indicates (78dlO), with these under a certain aspect, i.e. their sensible properties. This was the issue above (74d4) and there is even a mention of the same property of equality in the present passage. The many beautifuls, for instance, would then be, not peoples, garments, etc. as such, but what makes us call them "beautiful", e.g. their shape and colour. If we tie the meaning of beauty to concrete shapes and colours, we soon get confused as to what beauty really is, because shapes and colours are never constant, neither in themselves nor in relation to one another. Also concrete shapes and colours may with some justification be said to be composite. If all this is possible, as it seems, we ought to choose this interpretation of the many F's for the sake of consistency with Phd. 74 and with passages to be examined in the sym. (211ab) and Rep. (479a• d and 523c ff.). But there is also, as we have seen, small but positive hints in the text that this possibility should be taken seriously. 17. Brentlinger (2) claims, supporting his case by the Cratylus, that particulars are indefinite and in total flux in the middle dialogues (pp. 134, 137 f.). He certainly has not proved this thesis: (1) the Craty[us, the date of which is disputed, cannot be used as main evidence for middle dialogue views. (2) We should not rely too much on isolated phrases (oudamos kata tauta, Phd. 78e). They cannot bear the burden of the whole Heracleitean flux doctrine found in the Theaitetus. An overall analysis of the Phaedo shows that Plato tends to exaggerate the evils of this world at unguarded moments. (3) Brentlinger seems less than careful in his remarks (p. 134) about reminiscence which is not, as he thinks, a causal relation and not from unlike objects when Forms are involved - the doctrine being modelled on the Simmias' picture - Simmias relation (compare also 74a5-7 with 74d4-e4 and cf. Ackrill's penetrating article (5». 18. The question dia ti is typically answered by a noun in the instrumental dative (96b4, el, 98c4, 99bl, 10Ie2-3, etc.). 19. See e.g. Hackforth (6) 122. Interestingly, he has a footnote revealing, perhaps, uneasiness. See also Bluck (3) 106 and Gallop 47. 20. Hackforth commenting on Aristotle's critique of this passage claims (6) 145 n. 1 that phtheiresthai cannot mean "to lose an attribute". But Plato does not in fact use that verb here but, as we have seen, apollysthai which may be used at any rate of the attribute itself, i.e. its perishing (Phd. 102e2, cf. Parm. 156b3-4). Later (l06a• c), however, this verb, and cognate terms, are used to denote the perishing of

301 particulars like lumps of snow, fires, etc. But even this does not involve total annihilation: snow melts and fires are quenched, i.e. water and logs lose attributes. It may be suggested that this is what is meant in our passage by apollytai (96al0, 97b5-7). Four arguments in favour of this may be advanced: (1) The one that becomes two (96e8 ff.) must surely lose the property of being one. (2) It is striking how little perishing is actually discussed. The only place it is referred to (96b9) it is unclear what exactly perishes. Probably it is the senses, memory, knowledge, etc., i.e. not exactly substances but rather attributes (this classification is of course very rough), (3) "Becoming or perishing" are in a couple of places replaced by some• thing like "doing or undergoing something" (97dI, 98a6). It is unclear how exactly the two phrases are related (becoming may conceivably be undergoing as well as doing whereas perishing presumably is undergoing. But this is guesswork. But however we take the substituted phrase it suggests an incomplete use of becoming and perishing (the latter must then be equivalent to losing). We should remember the context. Plato is advancing a new theory of inter alia perishing. (4) It may be recalled that the argument from opposites did not involve substantial generation. The present passage may be taken in a way that conforms with the earlier. This is not in itself conclusive, but in connection with the other arguments adduced it has perhaps some weight. 21. It is not claimed that existence is not involved, only that the copulative sense of esti is what is at issue here. 22. The Forms are called in as explanation of all questions (lOOc ff.). "Cause" is the traditional, but misleading rendering of "aitia". In fact, giving the aitia is answering the very vague question "dia ti" (see 96a9), i.e. giving an explanation. It would perhaps not be fair to say that Plato confused physical questions and logical ques• tions. Rather he saw logical difficulties in physical answers to a variety of questions (96d-97b). 23. One feels that Plato has been so carried away by the discovery of apriori know• ledge that he now recognizes only apriori knowledge as knowledge. Knowledge of the ultimate Good would presumably enable Plato to deduce (cf. 97e2) an explana• tion of all possible questions. In the ante-Meno period we find another, less sophi• sticated and less conscious, extreme of taking all knowledge as empirical. 24. 99c8 ff. has been much discussed. Bluck (3) 110 f. seems to have a correct transla• tion: "but since I have been denied this [such a cause], and have not been able to find out about it for myself or learn it from anyone else, would you like me to demonstrate, , how I have busied myself with the second line of approach towards the search for the cause". Cf. his note 1 at p. 111 and end of Suppl. Note 11 p. 200 on the expression "deuteros pious" which should be taken as implying a second (perhaps inferior) approach at the same goal. Cf. two other occurrences in Plato: Pol. 300c and Phil. 19c, and Hackforth's comment (6) 137. What Socrates has been denied is a teleological explanation of the physical world. It does seem as if Socrates believed that this would involve a direct confrontation with reality (99d-e6, implied esp. e5-6) even if not by means of the senses (9ge2-4). Therefore an indirect, and thus second-best, approach in terms of logoi (9ge5) or more exactly hypotheses (100a3-4) is substituted (cf. Meno 86e ff.). One such hypothesis is that Forms exist. From this it is hoped that an explanation of the physical world can be given (99c-l00c). This explanation turns out to be participa• tion (100c5, d5-6) in a Form, and it may be suggested that this is a different kind of explanation from teleological explanation (cf. l00b4 looks back to 99dl). Hence there seems to be a shift both in method and in subject matter. It may then be asked, what exactly is "the second-best approach"? The hypotheti• cal method or Forms of both? To answer this one has to have an idea of the relation between the method and the Forms. Now, in so far as the doctrine of

302 Forms is presented here simply as a hypothesis (100b5-7) it may be submitted that it is the doctrine of Forms itself that is a second-best approach. If it be objected that Plato could not conceivably have regarded this doctrine as in any way second• best, it may be retorted that as long as it is hypothetical it is inferior to the certainty derived from a direct intuition (grasping) of the unhypothesized principle (Rep. 5lOb7, 511b6-7). The doctrine of Forms, so long as it is a hypothesis, is an indirect way of looking at reality. The goal is still the same, i.e. that of providing an account of the physical world. Richard Robinson (2) 143 wonders "why Socrates adopted the method only when he had abandoned the Good. Surely he did not think at this time that the Good could only be found through the senses". This seems to be a misleading question and one to which no answer can be given - as Robinson himself realizes. It would be wrong to say bluntly that the Good had been abandoned. Everybody knows it hadn't. But he felt that for the time being he had to make an indirect, hypothetical approach to what he could not see or grasp directly. Plato in the middle phase at any rate seems to have thought that true cognition is got by something analogous to sensing rather than by discursive thinking (cf. e.g. Phd. 67b, Sym. 212a, Rep. 490b, 532ab, c5-6, 533d2). Socrates, then, has been denied the full and final insight into the end of the cosmos. This does not, as e.g. Vlastos too appears to think (8) 297 f., mean that final causation has been dropped. Vlastos argues that Forms, being absolutely immutable, cannot have teleological function which pertains exclusively to mind or soul in the Phaedo and the Timaeus (8) 303. One wonders what he makes of Phd. 74d9 ff. 75bl-2, 7-8; On the contrary, it may be suggested that Plato in the Phaedo is on his way to the of the Republic, a perfectly acceptable, and immutable, final cause of everything good and right (Rep. 517c2); compare also Phd. 99c1-6 with the description of the Good e.g. Rep. 509b6-10. We have been using the name of Socrates in accordance with our proclaimed practice, as a name of a dramatic character. Cf. the General Introduction. 25. The tripartite ontology implied here is controversial. See e.g. Bluck (3) 17-18, 118- 9 and 191-2, (9), Hackforth (6) 147-157, Cornford (6) 78-80, Vlastos (8) 299 f. and Hartman 215 ff. versus Verdenius (2), Shorey n. 283, D. O'Brien 1967 p. 201 f., Gallop 195 f., Stough 22 ff. and Guthrie (3) IV 353 ff. Now, even the opponent must admit that a distinction is made between tallness itself and tallness in us (102d6-7). It is perhaps interesting to notice that when the distinction recurs it is phrased slightly differently: the opposite itself never becomes its own opposite, whether it be in us or in nature (103b4-5). Guthrie has not seen this (see p. 354) and this makes his note 1 at p. 356 beside the point. But he could have used 103b4-5 in his defence against the tripartists: the F itself whether in us or in nature - is it not one and the same thing? As Guthrie correctly says "the Phaedo says it is by its presence in particulars that the Form can act as a cause" (p. 355). But he does not say that Plato is very indifferent, to the point of carelessness, as to how to express this "presence" (100d5-6). He notes though that Aristotle was right in seeing a poetic metaphor here (p. 355). And why is Aristotle right? Because, and this is emphasized throughout the dialogues from now on, the Forms are separate and do not enter the world (Phd. 83bl-2, Sym. 211a8 f., Parm. 133cb, Phdr. 247d7 fL, Tim. 52a3). This is no metaphor but a fundamental tenet. Guthrie is also wrong when he claims that tripartition does not recur. Parmenides 130b cannot be so easily brushed aside. The likeness itself and the likeness we have is not simply "the familiar distinction between Forms and particulars" as a glance at Parm. 133c8-d5 shows (a passage that is remarkably similar to Phd. 100d5-6 in its indifference to the exact relation between Forms and instances). 26. This formalization and certain elements in the subsequent analysis owe a great deal

303 to prof. Vlastos (8). For the sake of consistency the "why" ought perhaps to be understood as "how". 27. Cf. Burge. 28. It is a search for the explanation of generation and corruption and being (96a9-1O, 95e9f.). 29. We cannot agree with Hartman (216-7) who thinks that characters are viewed as "small bits of stuff', a view standing in sophistication somewhere between Anaxa• goras and the Timaeus. With the latter one could agree, but then why adopt the small bits? This seems too Anaxagorean (and indeed early Platonic) and also contrary to the evidence. It is hard to believe that Plato thought that the fact that Simmias is shorter than Phaedo depends on a bit of stuff in Simmias or that the idea of three (l04d5-6) is a bit of stuff in a given trio. But while a thing cannot be defined as a con junction of bits of stuff it is not either a meeting-place of universals (cf. Part One n. 10 and n. 37). Hence we are left with the intermediate view of a thing as a compound of particular (as it happens: sensible) instances of various Forms. It has often been assumed that the final proof involves a shift in the conception of soul from character to thing (cf. e.g. Hackforth (6) 165, Keyt (1) 169, Crombie (1) II, (317). Hartman (223) is sympathetic, but at the same time oddly believes that Schiller has proved that the soul is a thing (see Part Three with note 80 for a discussion of Schiller). But it is clearly anachronistic to presuppose a character• thing distinction here (the Form of beauty is beautiful, and just as threeness is uneven, so fever, we may assume, is sick and soul is alive). Cf. n. 15. It might be thought that a distinction should be made between opposites proper and those entities that "bring on" opposites. The latter seem to have an active nature in contrast to opposites proper and they seem to share with e.g. Simmias the possibility of containing or having opposites that are in them. Moreover, though this is a weaker point, things are not said to participate in them as they do in opposites. Yet both categories are said to be in a body or number (105b9, c3, 4), both are involved in the retreat - perishing alternative and both advance (105a, l06b) on other characters. We must conclude that there is no good linguistic reason for attributing different ontological status to the two categories discussed. Cf. also below. 30. l03c ff. 31. Tredennick (in Hamilton and Cairns p. 86) translates: "they are the things which are compelled by some form which takes possession of them to assume not only its own form but invariably also that of some other form which is an opposite" (my emphasis). But this fits badly in with the parallel description (105a3-5) which refers to "active" entities (ideai in the preceding, 104de) in contrast to the "passive" receiving things. 32. For the soul-life relation cf. the analysis in Part Three of the first proof of immor• tality in the Phaedo. 33. The Meno and the prominence of mathematical Forms in the Phaedo provide the basis of this suggestion. 34. Cf., e.g. 106c and further n. 13 (third para.). Phenomena are also mixed, impure and multiform (66a, 83bl-3, 80b4). See note 13 (third para.) and note 16. 35. Apart from what looks like obvious parallels in later dialogues (Pol., Phil., Tim.) our justification for drawing on Eryximachus' speech is the general consideration that the speeches in the Symposium contribute to the final result and the still more general exegetic assumption that we must take the views advanced by opponents (cf. e.g. Protagoras in the Protagoras) serious, especially if they are developed with some care and recur in later dialogues. I.e. we should to some extent read the

304 dialogues dialectically - as Plato's discussion with himself. Cf. Methodological Considerations in the General Introduction. 36. Two points should be noted here: 1) it is not clear in what sense the qualities are the Forms. Later (in the Line and Cave) it becomes clear that they are identical only in the limited sense that copy and original are identical. 2) there is no obvious distinction drawn between physical and sensible qualities. On the contrary, this passage seems to identify the qualities of things with what we see (i.e. colours, shapes, sounds). 37. "The many beautifuls" (or "heavy's" or "large's"), one would expect, are types of sensible qualities (colours, shapes, sounds). "Double" and "haIr' belong to a different stable, they need to be completed by a singular term (though one doubts whether Plato was aware of this). But it seems unlikely that Plato has anything but particulars in mind (cf. the repeated ti 479a6, b3, 6 and hekaston b8-9). The question then is what kind of particular is meant. "Double" and "haIr' suggest ordinary particulars such as chairs and tables. Cf. the finger example 523 cd. But it seems that colours, shapes and sounds are what is in Plato's mind here (476bc). 38. This term may perhaps be taken most naturally in connection with 479a3, as equivalent to "the many rs people believe in". Cf. Part One n. 44. 39. We cannot accept Vlastos' onslaught on the usual understanding of this passage (13) 48-9. He argues that sensibles "are and are not" is equivalent to sensibles "are and are not F". We have already discussed this move in note 13 in connection with the Phaedo. Suffice it here to note that Vlastos focuses perhaps too much on 479b9-10 and neglects 479c7 which seems very difficult if not impossible to account for as a predicative use of einai. 40. Contrast Crombie (1) II, 58. 41. Cf. 533bc. If either l-and-2 and 3-and-4, or 1 and 2 are numerically different, then 3 and 4 would have to be different also according to the analogy. 42. Nettleship 239 ff. appears to get caught in the metaphor of image/shadow the importance of which he rightly stresses. He thinks that we are looking at the original when we gaze at the image/shadow. But surely in a straightforward sense we are not. Unfortunately many scholars have followed Nettleship. 43. For the qualified being of manufactured objects see 597a4 ff. 44. We are not suggesting anything more drastic than that a person may be in a state such that he does not know whether a stick is bent or not because it seems either way - depending, of course, on submersion in water. Strictly the stick does not seem to have contrary attributes at the same time to the same person though Plato seems to have thought so. The expression "genuinely contrary properties" is designed to cover only such contradictions as can be solved by e.g. measurement in contrast to contradictions involving relative terms (Simmias' tallness and small• ness). 45. Rep. 508bI2-13, 507a3, 506e3-4. 46. Cf. Part One on Republic (ad fin.) and n. 50. cr. also Tim. 2ge3 (God = Good?). 47. The flux here is not limited to Heracleitean flux. 48. These claims are substantiated, it is hoped, in Part Three. For the "Cartesian" picture cf. General Introduction. 49. 585dl-3. Cf. 585c7-13. 50. Cf. Phd. 115c-e. But contrast Rep. 586b. 51. lowe this observation to Mr. C.C.W. Taylor. 52. Cf. our analysis of Sym. in Part Three. 53. Cf. 469de. 54. The body is a prison (Phd. and the Cave) or a grave (Gorg.). It gets a new, more positive function in the Timaeus.

305 55. Whatever the exact meaning of Laws 894al-5 may be, it does seem to derive genesis from locomotion. (3b) is in the Timaeus dealt with in terms of (3a). It does not figure in the classification of changes in the Laws X. Cf. also Cornford (6) 198 n.3. Admittedly, we allow ourselves to draw on later dialogues. But this "sin" is com• mitted within the confines of the late dialogues. 56. For this analysis I am indebted to Calvert, Phronesis 1971. 57. See Dodds (3) ad loco 58. This is argued below and in more detail in the discussion of the Timaeus. 59. These "axioms" are strictly speaking said to fight among themselves (155b4-5). 60. It does seem as if Plato is here confusing a logical and an ontological issue. This impression seems confirmed by the intended "solution" to the puzzles. 61. We date the Timaeus after the Theaitetus and it is not, in principle, acceptable to rely on a later dialogue when interpreting an earlier. Still, we do not rest our argument on this parallel, and both dialogues seem at any rate to belong to the same period. 62. This is argued in the analysis of the Politicus and the Timaeus below. 63. Cf. the "symmetrical" particles (156d3-4). 64. Nothing in the context or indeed elsewhere in Plato warrants a translation to the effect that real things are nothing but power. Therefore Ast's excision of horizein (247e3) followed by Burnet is not justified. 65. We find in general that it is confirmed by the new attitude to matter in the subse• quent dialogues, espec. the Timaeus. Something can now be real without being intelligible. 66. Cf. Part Three n. 136. Interesting in this connection is the fact that in the late dialogues soul is regarded as a "dynamis" (erat. 400b1, Phdr. 246a6-7, Epin. 986a8). For a discussion of the implications of this see Part Three. 67. The passive sense of the present middle voice (Soph. 249 b2) is testified by Phdr. 245e3, c6, e5. The pedect middle (Soph. 249d3) has usually a passive sense (Phdr. 245b4). 68. For details of the points of this paragraph see Part One ad loc. 69. In the Republic it is at most the heavenly bodies that are described as divine (530a). 70. When the Timaeus refers to the world as an unreal image (29bl-2) it seems to be in the special sense of an insubstantial image (52c2) requiring a real substrate. 71. Cornford (3) 321 f. and Vlastos (I) 389 f. claim rightly that Plato did not solve the metaphysical problem in the Sophist. The Timaeus can be seen as a kind of answer to that question. 72. Cf. Tim. 52e2 ff.; Phil. 25el; Sym. 186d ff., 188ab. 73. The Myth may of course be a joke (268de), but Plato is often saying something of importance whilst joking (cf. Tim. 59d). The thread is a suggestion made by M.P.M. Schuhl in his book La Fabulation Platonicienne, Paris 1947, p. 93 f. 74. Cf. (in Tim., III, 273) and Simplicius (in Phys., 1122, 3). 75. Skemp (2) 89 is unnecessarily worried about the intelligibility of this because he demands a literal understanding of the myth. Skemp (2) 102 ff. also holds that Plato did not want to give a mechanical account of the backwinding. The motive power is the world-soul and the relation of God to the world is to be seen as that of one soul acting on another. Guthrie (3) V 181 follows him. A.E. Taylor (5) 214 even argues or contends, that the inborn desire is a desire for immortality. But this cannot be so. The logic of the myth, as we hope to have shown, requires another reading. It will not do in Platonic exegesis to just paraphrase/repeat the actual words (e.g. 269dl) as evidence (in casu: that the world is alive and intelligent - per se). Especially in a myth such literalness is bound to mislead. 76. Empedocles, as Plato understood him, held that the universe is alternately one,

306 ~nd at peace, under the sway of Aphrodite, and again many and at war with itself in virtue of some sort of strife (Soph. 242e5 ff.; d. frg. 17). Pace Guthrie (3) V 195 this is a theory which might well have suggested the odd cosmic backwinding (do we have two different dinai in Empedocles frg. 35,1. 4 (d. perhaps frg. 17,1. 25) and [Plut.) Strom. DK 31A30?). Even if this is unclear, two contrary revolutions in Empedocles could easily be inferred by Plato from the reversal of human life and the connection assumed at least by Plato (Pol. 274a) between man and universe. 77. O. again Tim. 52e f. This would not be the universal death envisaged in Phd. 72bc (d. Gorg. 465d), i.e. the Anaxagorean coming together of everything. Anaxagoras took reason to be a separating force, whereas Empedocles and Plato, perhaps already in the Sym., conceive it as combining unlikes. Only Plato does not have a second force like Strife to separate unlikes (d. however Phil. 23d9 ff.). He lets like join like on their own. Cf. below on Timaeus. 78. believed in creation in time (de an. 1016cd) and hence a pre-cosmic period with disorderly motion attributable to an irrational soul (ibid. 1014de). Skemp (2) 106 thinks that 273b and 269d "clearly suggest" a pre-cosmic chaos (though see Skemp (4) 149 where he seems less sure). 79. Necessity (ananke) is tied closely to backwinding in the Myth (269d3, d. perhaps also 274a3) and so is the allied notion of fate (heimarmeni) (272e6). For the connection of Necessity-Fate d. also Rep. 566a, Leges 918e, Tim. 41e f. SO. Cf. Phil. 27bl. 81. Our justification for bringing in the Timaeus in the interpretation of the Philebus is that we regard the two dialogues as so close in content (and date) that we cannot decide which is the earlier. We have put the Philebus first not to separate it from the Politicus with which it has some affinity (the doctrine of the mean). 82. Cf. note 35 above and our discussion of the Symposium. 83. For details see Part One on the Politicus. 84. It may seem surprising to find the doctrine of degrees of being after the reality of matter has been proved (Soph. 249) and in view of the reality of Space that is going to be argued (Tim. 52). But it may be argued that at the start of the dialogue Plato deals with matter in terms of the "generated visible copy" (48e f.) which may still be said to have a very precarious existence (52c). It is only at 49 ff. that Space is introduced. 85. "Creation" cannot be taken literally. See below on Precosmic Motion. Cf. also Part Three on Timaeus. 86. 30b appears to contradict all attempts to impute a pre-cosmic soul to the Timaeus. 87. 31b4 refers back (d. de) to 28b7-c2 where we find the same three attributes co• ordinated. Visibility and tangibility are obviously not necessary conditions for being "what has come to be". The geometrical solids (53c4) and soul (46d6) are neither visible nor tangible but still "what has come to be". Also, being bodily cannot be a necessary condition of "what has come to be"? This would have un• Platonic consequences for the soul. Therefore A.E. Taylor's translation (1) 93 - though unplausible on syntactical grounds - must be accepted. 88. Guthrie (3) V 278 queries the consistency of this passage with the later chaos passage (52d ff.). God would have to accept as data four elements and their relative quantities. But this overlooks that it is only said that Chaos contains - presumably inter alia - traces of the present elements, i.e. something sufficiently indeterminate for God to have a real choice (d. 69b). 89. This rotation, it will be argued in Part Three, is actually the motion of reason, just as the geometrical proportion mentioned above is part of the nature of the world• soul. 90. We are not convinced (by Vlastos) that some pre-cosmic analogue of time (dura• tion) can conceivably have been connected with pre-cosmic genesis (d. Part Three n. 151). 307 91. Therefore it is presumably an on (52c4) in spite of a curious kind of intelligibility (52b2,51a7f.). 92. This has not always been understood. A translation that is at once straightforward and logical may run as follows: "as not even that on (epi) which it has come to be belongs to itself and it is carried forever as a semblance of something else, there• fore it is proper for an image that it comes to be in something else, clinging somehow to being or else be nothing at all" (52c2-5). Cornford (4) 370 and 192 translates: "not even the very principle on which it has come into being belongs to the image itselr'. But this seems far-fetched and makes a truism of what is an argument. Taylor (1) 348 offers this rendering: "an image is not even the thing• which-it-really-is of itselr', i.e. is not an image of itself. This is also what Kiihner• Gerth I 334 (Hannover 1955) gets out of 52c2-3. But it is an implausible transla• tion. Cornford (4) 370 is right in feeling this a too cautious phrase for what could find a much simpler expression. Also Taylor's suggestion is wrong, not for the reason advanced by Cornford (an image being an image of itself - nearly nonsense according to C. - would also require a medium), but for the more intelligible reason that it too does not constitute a ground for the image's being in something else. If our translation is correct, it follows that an image derives its content or qualities from the Forms and its being from the medium. (After this was written I have noticed that Schleiermacher (Platons Werke, Berlin 1856) and Eva Sachs (201 n.9) take the same view of 52c2-3 as that argued for above.) Cherniss, although he follows Cornford closely in his translation (5) 376, had this implication right, cf. his article "A Much misread Passage in the Timaeus" AJP 1954 p. 130. It is odd, therefore, to find Allen (2) 57 saying that particulars "derive their whole character and existence from Forms (cf. Zeller II, 1, 746), and inex• plicable how Lee (1) 365 n. 55 can support his claim that they (images) owe their existence both to the Forms and to their medium by a referrence to Cherniss. The view that phenomena (images) owe their being to space has consequences for the way we must conceive of space itself. There seems to be a case for saying that space is prime matter (in contrast to Cornford (4) 181, Taylor (1) 347 and others), cf. the ekmageion 50c2, the gold-analogy (50ab), the perfume base (50e), Aristo• tle's explicit statement (Phys. 209bll) that Plato in the Timaeus identified matter and space and the considerations advanced in our own analysis below. 93. E.g. the mimema is introduced as "visible" (48e6 f.), but is later (5Oc4 ff.) said to pass in and out of the Matrix (as a soma (50b6». But it is of course possible that mimema is used of the cosmic bodies here. For terminology (cosmic matter) see introd. to Part Two. 93a. Strictly speaking "room" is more correct (cf. 52b4). But Plato is offering his solution to what comes to be known as the problem of space. The meaning of chora is anyway vague and has to be elucidated by means of "receptacle" and "matrix". 94. Strictly "the Nurse of Becoming" (52d4-5), but this is a stand-in for Receptacle (49a6). 95. Schulz claims that Structurkonstanz is a Grundphiinomen (121) and that there is no explanation in Plato of the Formkonstanz of sensible bodies, no mechanical inter• locking (120). But this is incorrect. Mechanical interlocking takes place in human bodies at any rate (Tim. 43a). Moreover, Formkonstanz may be displayed at various levels: the entire cosmos, sensible bodies, groups of atoms and single atoms. If we are to believe the Timaeus it is Reason that is responsible for form and proportion at every level (cf. Tim. 3Oa, 31bff., 56c, 69bc). Cf. n. 109. 96. Cornford (4) 202 is therefore wrong in claiming that the like to like principle is unanalysed.

308 97. There are, however, interstices left (d. e.g. 58b3) between the microscopic corpus• cles. The coupling of a corpuscular theory with no void is found again in Descartes who also identified space and stuff. 98. E.g. Zeller II, 1 p. 733-6, 740; Burnet (2) 344; Taylor (1) 312; Cornford (4) 200, 181, though he thinks the receptacle has its own nature 183, 188. Schulz has dealt with the receptacle-space in an interesting dissertation, arguing against a qualita• tive physics and finding parallels in modern physics. But to a non-physicist at any rate it seems unclear whether it is correct to equate Plato's dynamic receptacle with empty space (contrast 106 with 103, 110) and why space as substrate cannot be regarded as prime matter (108). 99. One may object that it is a vacuous concept. However, it seems required by the phenomena. 100. Cornford (4) 200 ff. (and 182 ft.) struggles unconvincingly to free the Chaos pas• sage (52d-53b) of its obvious atomistic elements (d. Diog. IX, 31 ff.). Schulz 96-7 deals adequately with Cornford at this point. 1ooa. It is important to be clear about the significance of this claim. The context, e.g. 28c1-3, implies that what has a cause is all change (locomotion, alteration and generation, although Plato seems now to acount for all change in terms of locomo• tion, i.e. combination and separation of "atoms"). 101. Just to cite some central occurrences: ananke (47e5, 48a2 et passim), kinesis (pas• sim), genesis (52d3, 49a6, c7), dynamis (52e2, 56c4), tyche (d. 56d and, preceding our passage, 46e5). 102. Cf. Laws 894c for translation and understanding of Tim. 46d8-e2. It is hard to see how Skemp (4) 77 can be so sure that there are irrational psychic causes here. Of course the passage does not by itself exclude (psychic) self-motion of the "secon• dary" causes, but neither does it prove it. The corresponding dichotomy of Laws X (see below) makes our interpretation preferable. 103. Cf. Phdr. 245c-e, Pol. Myth, Laws 894bc. 104. When things are sorted out entirely in concentric layers motion would stop. Mate• rial things need a psychic cause cf. our interpretation of Tim. 28a4-5, Phil. 26e3-8, Laws X, and in general Ostenfeld (1). 105. Glenn Morrow (1) 432 f. seems to look too far afield (Aristotle's Physics) for an elucidation of Plato's notion of tyche. Hence he gets an understanding of it as a conjunction of two events, each the result of its own independent cause (433). But this is speculation as far as Plato is concerned. The little evidence we have in Plato (Tim. 46e, d. Laws 889bc) suggests simply that a causal sequence exhibiting chance is devoid of purpose. We would say mechanical. Hence a single causal sequence, e.g. a tile falling from a roof and hitting a man, is "by chance". It would even seem as if the solitary motion of the tile through the air could be said to be "by chance" (cf. Tim. 43bl-2, Legg. 889b5). Morrow strives (433) to separate tyche from ananke, letting the latter refer to the causal sequence and the former to conjunctions of such sequences. Guthrie (3) V 273 sees necessity as internal to one thing and chance as requiring the proximity of two things. This strange situation is explained by the speculative character of both these views and springs possibly from an understandable uneasiness at facing the fact squarely, i.e. that tyche is a characterization of ananke in chaos. Morrow, in his thoughtful article, is surely right that what faces God has a dependable nature such that given A, then B (427 f.), but he cannot be right in claiming "that specific effects follow regularly from specific causes" (428) (my emphasis) nor in thinking that a determinate and reli• able character making prediction possible is required (432). This flies into the face of the evidence of the Chaos passage (esp. 52a8 ff.). We must assume, first, contrary to Morrow (434 f.), that the Chaos is strictly determined (ruled by Neces• sity). There could be no room for independent lines of causation in what looks like

309 a realm of Democritean necessity, which is of course not equivalent to saying that the world is deducible in all its parts from a portion of itself and therefore not incompatible with a Platonic assumption of "strict necessity as a relation, not between things but between ideas" (Morrow 435). Secondly, we must assume that Chaos is characterized by a maximum of chance. It is the latter only that is to be reduced by the intervention of God. 106. Ailt. 11,7, 11. Guthrie (3) II 35. 107. For hypothetical necessity see e.g. Arist. Phys. 199b35-200aI4. But 198bI0-32 would cover Plato's Necessity more adequately. It is clearly not merely a means to an end. Therefore Cornford (4) 174 ff. and others seem wrong in finding the notion of hypothetical necessity in Phd. 99b3-4 and in the auxiliary causes of Tim. 46c (68e, 76d). Guthrie (3) V 273-4 oddly claims both that "necessity is internal to one thing" and that Plato's necessity is close to the Democritean conception of neces• sity as movements and blows of matter. 108. appears to have called the whirl necessity (Diog. IX, 45) and to have meant by necessity the resistance and movement and blows of matter (Ailt. 1,26, 2). In the often quoted saying of : "nothing occurs at random, but everything ek logou and by necessity" (Aet. 1,25,4), the transliterated words must mean "from a ground" to fit the sense which is precisely not teleological. The usual rendering "for a reason" (Kirk & Raven 413, Guthrie (3) II 415) tends to give quite wrong associations. Glen Morrow (ibid. 427 f.) clearly sees the non-internal character of Necessity, but his argument (428 top) for this point of view seems unfortunately both to go counter to the evidence (cf. note 105) and to be a non sequitur. All that God would need is dependable natures in the sense if A, then B. 109. Schulz (120 f.) overlooks, it seems, this (mimesis) aspect when he accuses Plato's thought of a gap here. The Cosmos owes its structure (natural kinds) to the fact that it is an organism (3Ocd), cf. also the geometrical proportion and the rivets of 43a or the cohesion of 8Ib ff. His own suggestion i.e. that structural constancy is "axiomatisch postuliert" seems without foundation. Cf. n. 95. 110. We do not find a contradiction between such a view and the view of the Phaedrus and the Laws that aU motion stems from the soul. Vlastos (1) 396 n. 4 thinks otherwise but unfortunately does not tell us why. 111. The natural contrast to the dissoluble (mechanical) binding seems to be the only other cohesion that has been mentioned, i.e. the geometrical proportion of e.g. the world-body (31b-32c). Something analogous may have been employed in the crea• tion of the heavenly bodies (40a-d, compare 3Ic3-4 with 4Ia8-b6). 112. We refer here to the Parts of the dialogue (Part Two: 47e-69a). Tim. 47ef.; 71a7, d5, e3, 72d6, e5, 73b8, 74a7, c6, d6, 75b8, 75dl, 7, 76c6, el, 77a3, 78b2, 9IaI, 92a3, b3. 113. On this complex question more is said in Part Three. 114. Food, short-cuts, means (!) of transport, certain activities, etc. are means rather than instruments. It may be objected that e.g. productive means are causally connected to the end. A machine for making ice-cream is causally related to the ice. It is an instrument. But it is designed too for making ice, it is an ice-machine and therefore also logically related to its end. We may strengthen the relation by adding another category of means in the sense of material out of which an end is produced. For example, a stick of wood is the means of a flute. Here the matter is no longer causally related to the end but is part and parcel of the end, i.e. only logically related to the end. Which category of means includes the human body will be discussed in Part Three. 115. A fuller justification of this claim must be postponed till Part Three (on the . Timaeus).

310 116. We take the expression "divine seed" to be a metaphor for "divine soul" (promp• ted by the metaphorical context of "ploughland"). Cornford (4) 295 n. 1 seems both to be inconsistent in simply identifying it with the semen (cf. his note on 91bl) and also wrong. In fact, the "divine seed" is an allusion to the sowing done by the (41c, 42d4, 6) of the divine circles later to be confined in the head by the lower gods (44d, 43a). 117. The sense of the Greek (73c1-5) is not clear, in particular what is the subject of schesein (c4)? We have a choice between gene, eide or myelos, but the easiest and most natural seems to be eide. 118. E.g. by Cornford (4) 294. 119. Cornford (4) 293 n. 4. 120. We cannot here go further into the question of how we conceive the immortal soul as a kind of structure of the brain. For this we may refer to Part Three on the Timaeus. Only it should be pointed out that we are not viewing the structured marrow as a sort of pineal gland (cf. Descartes, Passions of the Soul). It is rather the manifestation of the activity of divine soul in matter (73bc) and not the locus of mechanical interaction of two entities. Cf. Part Three n. 18. 121. There has been an unnecessary controversy over Tim. 86b ff. because of Taylor's claim (1) 612 that the passage involves a determinism which contradicts the doc• trine of moral responsibility expoused even in the very same dialogue (Tim. 42e). This unplausible view was rightly controverted by Cornford (4) 343 ff. but for the wrong reasons. He denies, firstly, Taylor's contention (1) 615 that the soul has no illnesses of its own and, secondly, that folly covers the whole field of mental illnesses (4) 346. But he does not succeed, it seems, in demonstrating what specific mental illness he has in mind (88ab is referred to, but an overdeveloped mind is not an ill mind). Moreover, folly (anoia), according to Cornford's own understanding (ibid.), covers by definition all cases where the immortal soul () is out of control, and as no cases of mental illness apart from folly are cited one doubts whether Cornford's view stands up. As a matter of fact Taylor seems much more in accordance with the evidence on the above-mentioned two points. But he seems wrong in attributing a determinism inconsistent with responsibility to Plato. In the Republic X the body cannot directly produce disease in the soul (cf. Taylor 615). This doctrine has, most significantly for our purposes, been substituted by a much more realistic feeling of the importance of physiological inheritance and environ• ment for mental life. These are now so fundamental that they are "more to blame" (87b4-6) than the culprit himself. All the same, he should make an effort, i.e. try to do the right thing on the basis of study and right tuition (87b6-9). This freedom, which seems inconsistent with determinism, is entirely in line with the passage cited by Taylor 613: "except in so far as it shall be the cause of evil to itself' (Tim. 42e3-4). The "it" refers to the living being, the compound of soul and body, and it is made quite clear in the subsequent account of incarnation (43-4) that whatever evil (kakia alien to God, cf. 42d3-4) the living being occasions derives from its body (cf. also 42b2). The divine circles as such have only one "aim": to revolve forever in imitation of heaven. Hence Taylor is wrong in seeing an inconsistency in the Timaeus itself. It needs further argument to show that he is wrong too in thinking 86b ff. inconsistent with the Republic and the Laws X (Taylor (1) 413). As far as the Republic is concerned we have noted a shift of emphasis only. It will have to be discussed below whether the Laws X is inconsistent with Timaeus or rather combines a belief that soul is the cause of motion with the belief that moral evil, in some sense, has its source in matter. Cf. the Politicus 273b-d for a clear exposition af this view. 122. Significantly the soul's motion is here phora, a term standing for locomotion and thus involving spatiality. This topic is discussed extensively in Part Three.

311 123. The marrow was moulded in due proportion (73cl). The proportionate comes second after right measure in the scale ofvalues (Phil. 66b). Hence God makes the world as proportionate as possible (Tim. 69b, 31b ff.). 124. We must refer to what was said of "combination" in the Phileb.us above. Moreover, it should be pointed out, whatever the significance may be, that here the body is said to carry the soul (Tim. 87d5, cf. 69c7) whereas elsewhere (erat. 4OOa) we are told that the soul carries the body. The two statements are not necessarily incom• patible if different types of carrying are intended (cf. Tim. 38e5, 36e3). 125. The long "alarmingly complex " 896e8-897b4 has been misunderstood by Guthrie (3) V 367. Agei panta (896e8) is resumed by agousi panta (897a5-6), the subject now being not soul, but psychic primary motions. The object is now not "all in heaven" etc., but secondary bodily motion. That this is the right under• standing seems confirmed by the return to soul as subject (897bl). England, in his note on 897bl, correctly says that pasin bl sums up all secondary (mechanical) processes. It is inexplicable how Guthrie can come to the conclusion that the primary motions are physical (not-mental). 126. This classification, including generation below, follows the text (893c-894a) closely and seems to accord with the six changes mentioned 894blO-ll - rotation and locomotion may be said to belong to a different level and therefore left out here. One misses also qualitative change in the sense of assimilation and dissimilation (cf. Parm. 155e-156b). But this is now understood as a secondary phenomenon dependent on quantitative changes. Skemp points out (4) 97 the relevance of the Timaeus for this passage which he thinks is a convenient recapitulation of doctrines advanced in the Timaeus. No doubt the Timaeus is bound to be relevant and Skemp's investigation is convincing in many respects and useful. Still we may remain doubtful about the implicit claim that Plato has specific cosmological rather than logical purposes in mind. We have already dealt with a neat classification of changes in the Parmenides (155e-156b). Such a scheme is all that is needed for Plato's immediate purpose: proof of the priority of one motion over the rest. It should be noted that it is after we have been introduced to the classification that identification of soul with the tenth motion takes place (cf. also 898b2). Moreover, Skemp (4) 99 claims that the ninth motion is the genus of which the first eight are species, and that the tenth is declared to be different in kind from the nine, it alone is non-physical. This is misleading and unwarranted by the evidence. The ninth too is different in kind from the eight preceding motions, and it seems together with the tenth to be at a level different from the eight. Both are up-graded (894d5-e2) and it is for the sake of both the list was drawn up (894b3-4). There is thus reason to think that they may both enter into or be relevant for the eight preceding motions. There is nothing to suggest that the tenth is non-physical in contrast with the rest. They are all kineseis. Self-motion may be a mystery, but it is not made less mysterious by being attributed to a non-physical, substantival soul (for which there seems to be no clear basis in this text). 127. In the Republic the right order of studies is said (526c, 528ab, de) to be arithmetic, geometry (second auxe), stereometry (third auxe), astronomy (the three-dimen• sional in motion). On auxesis (cf. Rep. 546c2) see J. Adam, The Republic of Platd vol. II, 267 ff. esp. 272 where he concludes that it means multiplication. In the Epinomis (990c5 ff.) we have a similar curriculum: arithmetic, so-called geometry and thirdly, stereometry dealing with numbers raised to the third power, analo• gous (1) to three-dimensional things. It is not clear whether a distinction is made here because it seems as if 23 is viewed as stereon te kai hapton (991a3). But the passage is extremely difficult and technical (cf. A.R. Lacey, "The Mathematical Passage in the Epinomis", Phron. 1956), and it would be wrong to be dogmatic about it. Interestingly, Aristotle too in De An. 404b22 ff. attributes to Plato the

312 view that sensation is correlated with the geometrical solid (cf. Ross (2) 214-5). The difficult passage (Laws 894a) clearly owes something to Pythagorean thought (see e.g. Kirk and Raven, op. cit., texts nos. 317 and 322), in particular perhaps the confusion of a geometrical solid with a physical body. Skemp (4) 105 suggests a further step to overcome this. But he himself admits it accords badly with Aristotle (see above). More importantly, it seems unwarranted by the Greek (894a4-5) that most naturally is rendered: "having come as far as (mechri) the third stage it becomes perceptible to perceivers". No fourth stage can be got out of this. The curriculum of Laws 817e leaves no room either for such a step: arithmetic, metrical science (dealing with three dimensions) and astronomy. 128. It is surprising that Skemp (ibid) comes to the conclusion that "all the motions but the tenth are physical" without even mentioning 896b. It is not until we have had the argument for the identity of soul with self-motion that it may safely be con• cluded that the tenth motion is psychic and that soulless matter moves according to the ninth motion. It is, however, strictly still an open question whether psychic motion is correctly described as non-physical, i.e. spiritual. This is a big question that must be dealt with in Part Three. 129. Strictly, the Timaeus tells us that a (i.e. the divine circles) is given by God. Presumably the heavenly soul of the Laws is equivalent to the daimon. 130. Cf. Part Three ad loc. for a parallel in the conception of soul. Psycholo• gically there is nothing unusual in this. 131. Surprising in view of e.g. Pol. 273b-d and Tim. 86d7ff., but not in the relevant, closer context of Laws 896bl, d8. 132. Guthrie has some useful remarks on this topic (3) I 267-73, V 284-5,386. He points out the difference between the function of aether in Plato and Aristotle (3) I 271. It is more difficult to know whether to agree with his belief that the Epinomis (which he rightly finds close to the Timaeus on exactly this point) cannot be attributed to Plato (3) V 386. See Part One n. 131. 133. Cf. n.29. 134. Rep. 493cd, 566a.

Part Three 1. I am borrowing the terminology of P.F. Strawson, Individuals 167-8, 202. In an earlier article, "Particular and General" (in PAS 1954), we find an only slightly different vocabulary: material-names, substance-names and quality or property• names. 2. Franz Brentano, as is well-known, claimed that mental phenomena are typically intentional, e.g. about something which need not exist. 3. Cf. Aristotle, De An. 405bll ff., 409b19 ff., 410b15 ff. 4. The power of knowing is perhaps most emphasized in the middle dialogues (Phd., Rep.), while the power of initiating motion is stressed in the later dialogues (from Phdr. onwards). 5. Cf. the General Introduction. launched a devastating attack in his now classical book The Concept of Mind. 6. If three ontological levels are assumed: matter, life and mind, then it is today felt that the gap between matter and life is easier to bridge (both involve material or physical things, biology may, perhaps, one day be reduced, in some sense, to physics and chemistry, etc.) than the gap between life and mind. 7. It should be remembered that the distinction empsychon-apsychon relates to the problem of life rather than consciousness (res cogitans). Thus Aristotle's interest is

313 in different forms of life and not in the phenomenon of consciouness (cf. e.g. D. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima, Oxford 1958 introd. XIII or H. Regnell, Ancient Views on the Nature of Life, Lund 1967, p. 145). 8. "Nous" is the teleological term par excellence. 8a. Cf. Armstrong's ch. 3, and Broad 609,625-630 (cf. 22 ff.). 9. This does not mean that soul cannot be sufficient for life or even itself be alive in some non-human (disembodied) sense of life. 10. This would seem to follow from Apol. 3Ob3-4. Cf. Charm. 156e. lOa. a. Laws for similar sayings. There death is said to be good for the soul (958al, cf. 862e). However, nothing can safely be inferred from this late work as to the content of the early dialogues. II. But the agnosticism is coupled with a seemingly firm belief in divine planning. This makes one somewhat agnostic about Socrates' agnosticism. 12. "Substance" is here used in a non-technical, "innocent" sense of (ordinary) thing. 13. In a sense man is what he does and has done. A somewhat similar line of thought is found in the Protagoras: the soul is to some extent, at any rate, what it has learnt (314bl-4). See below on the Protagoras. 14. This is the view of T.M. Robinson (1) 5-7 who takes the analogy so seriously that he concludes that body and soul entail each other (6). But he himself admits that the eye-head relationship is not a good instance of co-implication, and he seems inconsistent, therefore, when he refers to this relation as evidence that the over• flow from soul to body (156e8) is logical. The view that soul is "the whole" (man) is, it is true, suggested by the analogues, but it is not compatible with the theory of health/illness (156e6 ff.) and indeed, according to Robinson (7-8), unique in Greek thOUght so far. "The whole" (156e4) is therefore body plus soul, and ekeino (157al) refers back, not to tou holou (as one might think) but to psyches (156e6), as the context shows (psychen 157a3). Perhaps this is a warning that we can only too easily be mislead by modern fashionable views of man (Strawson's person theory?) into attributing views to Plato that only seem to be there, but which are not in fact warranted by the text. 15. Plato is not unaware of this distinction (Prot. 329d, Parm. 142d-43a, 157a, Tht. 204a, 205a) and he exploits the notion of functional whole in several connections (Rep. 420b, Phdr: 264c, 27Oc, Leg. 902d ff.). 16. If we disregard the possibility of a material soul and an immaterial body as unlikely, there are three possibilities. 17. We are not saying that Plato conceived of soul and body as material nor that he simply took for granted that they are material. All we are claiming is that he is committed to the view that soul and body are both ordinary things (what we may call material objects). Plato had probably not yet given thought to this topic, and he had certainly not isolated specific mental laws however much he may be demon• strating them in practice. 18. For a discussion of this theory see Keith Campbell, Body and Mind, ch. 5. 19. a. Campbell, p. 81. 20. It may be said that the fourth definition is refuted (15a). But so are the other three. What is important is form of definition and the tendency displayed. 21. I.e. more than mere know-how (14de). Cf. Laches 199d8ff. 22. Cf. the qualification below. For the thought see also Phd. 107d2-4. 23. Cf. perhaps Phd. 96d1-5. 24. 352e5-358al Protagoras and Socrates explicitly join forces against the plebs. 25. For the idea that virtue is taught (including the sense of indoctrinated) from the early years see Prot. 325c-326e and Rep. III, 398-416 on education. Note in par• ticular 4OIcd, 411e.

314 26. Cf. the Methodological Considerations advanced in the General Introduction. 27. The context is, of course, ironical, but what has been stated here seems genuinely Socratic. Cf. references to psychological possibility in the face of evils (358e3, d2, 4). 28. This determination is perhaps describable as causation (reasons being causes in this case), cf. the remark (358c7 ff.) that it is not in human nature to want to go toward what is believed to be bad in preference to what is good. 29. This premiss involves the further claim that people pursue the good. This is a fundamental tenet of Plato's thought (cf. also Gorg. 468b, Meno 77c, Sym. 204e, Rep. 413a, 438a, 505d). 30. Strictly 354c5-6 by itself may mean only that pleasure is a good. But the context (e.g. the following lines until e2 and again 355a3-5) supports identification. Cf. also 351e5-6 which reveals Protagoras' expectation. This would appear to dispose of Vlastos' attempt in his edition of the dialogue (introd. XLI) to rescue Socrates from an outright identification of pleasure with goodness. 358b6-7 may of course mean that pleasure is a good, but as a summary of the earlier discussion (354c-e) it is unlikely that this is what it means here. 31. It is perhaps not quite clear what is the substantial difference between the two conclusions. Apparently the first deals with acts, the second adds wish, and choice; moreover, the first is concerned with good, the second with evil. It seems that the first conclusion amounts to a denial of incontinence, while the second is giving, in many words, the well-known dictum: "no one does evil willingly", or the thesis: "everyone wants the good", a fundamental tenet in Plato (cf. Gorg. 468b, Meno 77c, Symp: 204e, Rep. 413a, 438a, 505d). Both follow and are clearly meant to follow (cf. particles cited) from the identification of pleasure with good. The impossibility of incontinence has been shown already (355), but the second thesis, i.e. that all want the good, is in need of elucidation and substantiation. On the basis of the pleasure - good equivalence, it may be suggested, Plato thinks it is proved true: It is simply not in man's nature to go against his own good (pleasure). 32. 358d-6Oe. Cf. Phil. 32c, Laws 644cd. Contrast Laches 191de. 33. Cf. note 17. 34. Terry Penner, "The Unity of Virtue", PR, Jan. 1973. 35. Now generally regarded as authentic. Cf. Guthrie (3) IV 191. 36. Cf. in particular Ale. I 130a; but cf. also Phd. 79c3, Tim. implicitly 44d ff., Leg. 897b1. This shows that the Alcibiades I, if genuine, is difficult to date relatively to other dialogues. In B. Jowett, introd. note to the dialogue, it is thought near in psychology to Philebus and Timaeus, and Guthrie (3) III 477 seems to sympathize with a late dating because of its doctrine of "the divinity of the human reason". But elsewhere Guthrie (3) IV 169 n. 2, following Burnet (Ess. and Add. 139), finds the dialogue a reliable source for Socratic teaching. It is difficult to find agreement here, and the present author tends to subscribe to the verdict of A.E. Taylor (2) 13 that Ale. I looks too much of a "textbook", a genre that Plato detested. The dialogue also holds a view apparently found nowhere else in the Corpus, that man is soul (13Oc5-6). However, Apol. 29a and Rep. 589a7f. may imply such a view. 37. Cf. the similar contrast of mental and bodily jobs in Charm. It will no doubt be objected that flute-playing by a disembodied soul is absurd (impossible). But we have reasons for believing that the Socratic soul is not an immaterial "Cartesian" substance. So some sort of ghostly playing is not at all logically inconceivable. Contra T.M. Robinson (1) 10. 38. On the early dialogues in general I have found Burnyeat, "Virtues in Action" particularly helpful.

315 39. Cf. Part One n. 24. 40. For the idea that arts are relative in nature to their subject-matter cf. Rep. 438. For the idea that effects must be like their causes cf. Phd. 101a6 ff. 41. Descartes, for instance, thought that the differentiating attributes (to borrow a phrase from C.D. Broad) of mind and matter were so basically different that they were incompatible with each other and thus belonged to different substances. Spinoza, on the other hand, was unconvinced by this argument and posited just one substance, God, as the bearer of all attributes. To avoid misunderstanding: Descartes' view can be characterized as attributive dualism (two kinds of thing). This is not to be confused with dualism of attributes which is compatible with attributive monism (one kind of thing) and substantival monism (one thing). 42. The passage 492e8-493c3 is no doubt relevant for Plato's view on the soul. But we are surely not supposed to take everything in it literally (cf. the concluding admis• sion that what preceded, though paedagogic, was rather absurd 493c3-4). The absurdity concerns the mythologia (493a5 ff.), and even that contains some truth (493c). The preceding lines can be taken more seriously (Socrates wouldn't be surprised if Euripides were right, etc.). 43. A reminder may be in place that we are referring to the Platonic figure. 44. The body-tomb view is Pythagorean according to Dodds (3) ad lac. 45. See e.g. Vlastos (5). 46. E.g. by Ryle, "Plato", The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (P. Edwards, ed.). 47. Cf. also our discussion of the Meno in Part One. 48. That is, the physical, drawn diagram. 49. The soul is in time cf. premise 11 above. It is less clear whether it is in space. But it seems to have innate ideas that involve some kind of space. As for embodiment or not the Gorgias (close in date) conceives of denuded souls (524d). 50. To get an idea of what is meant Plato fortunately gives examples: the virtues, quickness of mind, memory, nobility of character (88a7-8), learning and training (b7-8). 51. Complete assimilation of the soul to Forms would presumably imply that it would be immaterial (asomaton). Cf. Part Two n. 15. It should be noted that the immate• riality of the Forms is only implied in the Phaedo where the emphasis is rather upon incompositeness, intelligibility, etc. (80b). Cf. the two series of conjunctions of predicates (85e5 ff.) advanced by Simmias perhaps as a parody of 80c2-d1O (cf. Gallop 147), but as commonly accepted background knowledge (premises) for his own controversial view. Cf. also Vlastos (2) 247 n. 3. But we should also note Plato's reservation about complete assimilation to Forms (80blO, cf. perhaps a hint 79b8-10). Therefore Gallop (137) is mistaken, if we are right, in asserting that the affinity argument involves a soul that is essentially immaterial. 52. Cf. also 66c4, dl, 8f., e2-4. Perhaps one should be warned that in a perfectly natural and non-technical sense Plato can imply that the self is rather the whole anthr6pos e.g. when he says that the philosopher uses pure thought (soul) (66a2). But the real self (soul) is clearly different from man (cf. Meno 86a3-4, Phd. 76c11- 12, 92b5-6). 53. E.g. Guthrie (1) 234, (3) IV 347, Dodds (4) 213, Hackforth (6) 117 n. 7. 54. Cf. the discussion below of Socrates' reply to Simmias (92a-95a). 55. The qualities mentioned are evaluative and quantitative. Significantly many of them reappear later in the dialogue as Forms. 56. There is nothing surprising in the ontological vacillation esp. in a context that is expressed in terms of the traditional "opposites". 57. It is anachronistic to draw a distinction between synthetic and analytic know-

316 ledge/. But the claim that when something becomes smaller it comes from being larger is analytic. 58. lowe this observation to prof. David Hamlyn. 59. Cf. C.J.F. Williams 221. A remarkable and penetrating analysis of the argument. I accept his understanding of "existence" discussed 222-228. Cf. n. 75 on Part One: it is not non-existence but absolute nonentity (Soph. 237b7-8) or the contrary of being (ibid. 258e) that cannot be dealt with. I take it that Plato treats existence and non-existence as contradictory predicates in the Sophist (cf. Part One) and indeed assumes this in the Phaedo. 60. It would then also have to make sense to say that "soul partakes in death". This sounds odd if read with the final proof in mind. But "death" means not annihila• tion but rather "off duty" here. The recapitulation (77c9-d4) too envisages dead souls. 61. For some differences in the treatment of recollection in the Meno and the Phaedo see Gallop 115. It may be added that Plato seems now clear that it is knowledge that is innate (contrast Meno 85c7, 86a7). The diagram is inessential in the Phaedo. It only provides the most striking cases. 62. Cf. Part One with notes 30-2 on this passage. 63. It seems as if Plato infers that, if we notice failure (cf. 10), then we remember from likes, and therefore know (cf. 1). 64. Ackrill (5). 65. It can be claimed that the condition contained in (3) is fulfilled in the argument for (23). 66. The Meno seems to envisage unconscious beliefs (86a7-8). But there is the same neglecting of categorially different kinds of knowledge (85d9-1O). 67. This means that there is some myth or metaphor also in the Phaedo. But Ackrill (5) 177 is correct in pointing out that the pre-existence is not a metaphor. 68. What might read as implying a non-human body (77b7, cf. 92b5-6) is cleared up elsewhere (114c, 66d ff., 80e f.). There are passages in other middle dialogues (and transition dialogues) where a disembodied state seems referred to or implied: e.g. Gorg. 524d5, Rep. 611cd, erato 404a (403b) , and possibly Phdr. 248e5-249a5, 25Oc5 (but see 246c3). It should be noted, however, that disembodiment need mean no more than a discarnate state, a shedding of the human body (cf. 81c-e). 69. Cf. above and n. 67. Gallop 133-4 follows Ross (2) 25 in thinking that disembodied learning would settle the problem of embodied learning. 70. This is an idea that is pronounced in the middle dialogues (and the transitional dialogues): e.g. Phd. 79b16, d3, 80bl-3, 84b2; Sym. 205e5 ff., 211dl-3, 212a; Rep. 490b; Phdr. 247cd. In the later dialogues the soul is typically akin not to Forms, but to the gods (god), the divine: Tht. 176a8 ff.; Phdr. 248a, 252c ff., and the horse-metaphor of the soul; Tim. 47b6 ff., 9Oa5, c7 ff.; Laws 899d7, 9OOa7 etc. and the idea of "the best soul" (= God cf. 899b6-7); Epin. 977b, 975b, 978c. 71. Descartes was concerned with mind being non-extended. 72. But it should not be forgotten that the like to like principle was deeply ingrained in ancient (and Platonic) thought. Cf. C.W. Muller, Gleiches zu Gleichem. It may indeed be found explicitly in this argument at 79d3. 73. It seems drawn in Tim. 37c-38b. Cf. Part One n. 128. 74. Wilamowitz, Platon I (589 ff.) identified the Forms with Gods. Similarly Gallop (143, 141). Grube (152) is adverse to this because "it only covers one aspect of what we designate by the word" (presumably "God", cf. 151). But he is willing to see the gods as "the mythical representation of the ideas" (177). This seems unsatisfactory (unclear whose notion of God is meant, inconsistency between p.

317 152 and p. 177). On the whole Grube's thesis that "our word God is a synthesis of two concepts which the Greeks kept distinct and which are clearly differentiated in Plato" (151) cannot, it seems, be unheld. On the contrary, as he says himself (151), we have an anthropo-psychic conception whereas Plato, as can be gathered from the Phaedo, obscures the matter by using a word, that had been given anthropomorphic connotations by artists and poets, for his ultimate impersonal reality. Cornford (I) 245 ff., thinks that in the course of the arguments it becomes clear "that souls and Ideas are things of the same kind" (246) and points, rightly, to the similar ways in which souls and Forms are described in the middle dialogues (252). He concludes that "the process of differentiating concepts from souls has not yet gone very far in Plato's mind" (252). Substituting "concept-correlates" for "con• cepts" we can sympathize with this. It is an assumption that makes an understand• ing of the texts (e.g. the third and fourth proofs) much easier and it has a fairly good textual support (Phd. 80a, d, 81a, 82blO (cf. 66d ff., 79d); Sym. 202d ff. (cf. 21le3-4), 212a; Rep. 380c, 617e, 530a (cf. 517c), 381c (cf. 585c), 597cd). This need not involve an acceptance of Cornford's notion of Ideas as Soul-substances or Daemons. Plato is too much a philosopher for that. Rather we incline to the view that in the middle dialogues the gods are the mythical representation of the Forms. Grube seems correct in noting that typically gods and Forms are not on the scene simultaneously (158). 75. Cf. n. 53. 76. Dia with the genetive may be used in a spatial sense (e. g. Phd. 65a7, dll; cf. Rep. 584c4, Tim. 43c4, Tht. 184c6) and an instrumental sense (e.g. Phd. 79c3-5, 83b2). But the body is in both cases the means of perception. Guthrie (3) IV 346-7 seems to share a wide-spread view that sense-perception is "assigned to the body". To the present writer it is hard to see what can be meant by this, and it does not seem that the evidence compels us to impute such a view to Plato. 77. Gorg. 507d f.; Sym. 186 ff., 207d f.; erato 4OOa; Pol. 273e; Phil. 30b, 32ab; Tim. 38e; Leg. 896e ff. 78. After this was written I have noted that Gallop (151) entertains a similar view of Cebes'doctrine. 79. See Guthrie (3) IV 357 and Bluck (3) 193 respectively for these interpretations. Guthrie ibid. in n. 4 (end) argues that, if the soul is athanatos - immortal, not admitting death -, then it must always exist. To this it may be objected, first, that athanatos can mean either of two things, "non-mortal" or "immortal". In the crucial occurrence at 105e6 it must mean "non-mortal". This is all that follows from the preceding. But it can be argued (and this is probably what Guthrie has in mind) that at 106d3 the sense "immortal" is assumed, as appears from the explana• tory participial construction aidion on. If these two words are genuine and not a gloss on athanaton, then we are faced with a dilemma: either Plato begs the question by simply assuming that athanaton means "everlasting", i.e. "indestructi• ble" (but what is then the purpose of d2-9?) or "everlasting" does not imply "indestructible" (which is false). As the argument gets less non-sensical without aidion on and as it has an appearance of a gloss and as the MSS reveal some (not much) uncertainty, we might be tempted to regard the words as spurious. The matter is perhaps impossible to settle definitively. Second, if it were all a matter of logic, as both Guthrie and Bluck appears to assume, then it becomes hard to see the point of 106d2-9 which, apart from the questionable aidion on, contains no analysis of the meaning of athanatos but rather an attempt to convince us on extraneous grounds by appeal to God, Forms, etc. It might be said that Plato here moves from essence to existence and not, be it noted, in a strictly deductive fashion. This would all be to Plato's credit (contra Gallop 217-221). It should be

318 noted that Plato expected his deductive proof to show that the soul is athanaton (l00b9), not anolethron. 80. For arguments for substantival Forms see the treatment of this passage in Part Two with n. 31. Cf. also Part Two n. 29 (end). Jerome Schiller has written an article to the effect that Plato in the final argument never treats the soul as an immanent form, but as a particular thing. As this contradicts our position and has been acclaimed as convincing by, e.g. Guthrie (3) IV 360 and Hartman 223 n. 11, it seems necessary to air some reasons for disagree• ment with Schiller. He develops his view in opposition to Hackforth (6) and as an approval of Archer-Hind, The Phaedo of Plato, London 1894 ad hoc. He cites an odd argument of the latter, apparently with approval: "The soul does not occupy the body in the sense in which trias occupies tria: the triad is the cause why three are three, the soul is not the cause why body is body, but the cause why it is alive". And further, "the triad is the idea of three; the soul [ I is not the idea of soul, but a particular soul, etc." This is a misapprehension. The triad is the cause why a trio (I04d5-e4, cf. the analogues, snow and fire l06a) is three (it is speculation to import a category of number into this passage as Schiller (57) does), and the soul is the cause why the body is ensouled (a possibility that Schiller (55 n. 13) later mentions in another connection. Of his own three arguments in support of Archer• Hind's thing-reading the first two seem to fail and the third looks inconclusive: (1) if katasche is used in the same sense at 104d6 and at 105d3, then it would follow that the body is immortal (Schiller 53). This absurdity follows only because 104 d9- 10 is misunderstood. The meaning seems to be quite trivial: "to such a thing (i.e. what threeness occupies, sc. a group of anything you like) the character contrary to the character that brings this (sc. unevenness) about can never come". Briefly, what threeness occupies can never be even. This could of course mean that a given group of three could never become a group of two. Schiller seems to take it that way and feels compelled to introduce numbers. Quite unnecessarily. The quoted lines need mean only that as long as a given group is a trio, it cannot ever be even. This seems in fact to be the sense since it is inferred (ara 104e5) that threeness is (always) uneven. (2) the shift in the use of katasche from 100d to 105d can be shown to be natural by three considerations (Schiller 53 bottom). But if there is no shift and no need of one, as we have just seen, there is no need either of a tortuous argument to convince us that it is expected. (3) Plato displays a studied indifferen• ce to the locutions by which he refers to numbers, e.g. I04a7 ff., 104c1-5, 104e3-5 (Schiller 57). But it has already been pointed out that 104e3-5 is an inference most naturally from the nature of three things to the nature of threeness (indicating a change in reference). Therefore it is tempting to see the first two examples of indifference as indifference indeed, but not necessarily warranting the Schillerean conclusion that tria and trias refer to the same thing. Plato unfortunately was in the habit (cf. the later dialogues) of shifting from (what we might call) talk about classes to talk about properties. At any rate, it does not seem to us that Schiller has established his point. 81. Arist. Cat. la 23-25, 3a 29-32. 82. We have argued in Part One n. 39 and Part Two n. 13 (end) and n. 29 that Plato's two-world view in the middle dialogues reveals a lack of understanding of the categorial difference between thing and property. 83. The difficult notion of a subsisting Form-instance involved perhaps an idea of the manifestation of god/the divine (cf. n. 74). Cf. Part One on the Republic (the Cave) for the view that Forms "do" something ("cast shadows", under the "gui• dance" of the Good), i.e. are causes (aitiai) and thus responsible. For the unaffec• tedness of the Form-in-us see Phd. 102d7-8. 84. Cf. the Orphic-Pythagorean idea of contamination (81bl) and purification (69bc, 67ab). 319 84a. The eschatological story (107dS-114c6) is called a myth (1l4d7). It is, however, interrupted by (1) cosmological information (lOScS-llOb1), some of which Plato believes is true, and (2) a myth about the true earth and the' rivers of the under• world (1l0b-113c), which is "worth listening to". The eschatological myth is not something that Plato would claim to be true as it stands. But, in view of the proved immortality of the soul, it is proper to affirm something like it (1l4d). The myth supports the old Socratic insight that goodness and wisdom are all-important. 85. Memory presupposes someone to do the remembering. It presupposes a self, someone possessing past experience. Also, bodily identity does not seem to be a necessary condition for personal identity in so far as it is not obviously self-con• tradictory to assert survival of bodily death. 86. Cf. Phd. 76e1-2, 92d8-9; Phdr. 249bS-6, e4-5 (but contrast 250a2, 248a7), Tim. 41dff. 87. It has been assumed that psyche = eros (Robin (1) 110-124, Landmann, Zeitsch. f ph. Forsch. 19S4, Guthrie (3) IV 425 n. 2, idem in Vlastos (12) 241 where he also talks of possession of eros). This would have the unfortunate consequence that the god-like soul (of Phd. and Rep.) would here have to be conceived of as constitu• tionally intermediate between gods and man, i.e. as a daimon. But Plato says nothing that necessitates such identification. The trouble may have been caused by the personification of eros (cf. the myth). Thus it seems that Skovgaard Jensen's discussion of this passage (80-86) is taking the comparison of eros and daimon too literally. Though I agree with his claim that the human soul does not here mediate as a daimon (87) and indeed with his interpretation of Plato's metaphysics as relative dualism (at this stage), I fail to see the point of making such heavy weather about eros not being a real daimon unless it is assumed that soul = eros (cf. 84). Skovgaard Jensen is right, I think, in his rejection of a Platonic demonology, perhaps with the exception of the doubtful Epinomis. 88. Hackforth (4), Luce (1), Chemiss CR 19S3, 131 and Hackforth (6) 21. 89. Cf. Comford (7) 77: "man becomes immortal in the divine sense". As the Phaedo is well aware this does not occur on earth. 90. Immortality for Plato presumably involves uncreatedness (d. Phd. 72cd, Rep. 611a, Phdr. 24S). 91. Cf. also Gorg. 503e ff. on the job of craftsmen (including physicians) of imposing order (taxis) on their material, Cebes' weaver-soul (ct. n. 77), Politicus and Philebus on creation of due measure and above all Timaeus on demiurgic activity and production of health (8Se-e). Cf. Part Two n. 35 for the use of Eryximachus. 92. Cf. Part Two n. 77 and in general the discussion in Part Two of matter in the later dialogues. 93. Cf. Hip. Maj. 29Sde for the relation of chreia to beauty and for a chreia-dynamis relation analogous to the ergon-dynamis relation discussed below. 94. Cf. Part One with notes 40, 41, 43 on Republic. 95. See LSJ s.v. epi B, III, 1 and 2. 96. This seems to follow from the above analysis of dynamis to which ergon is related as actualization to disposition. Hintikka (2) 12 sees ergon as product (see Part One n.40). 97. One should recall that heat, dryness and virtues are lumped together with organ• isms in having an ergon. 98. So Hackforth (5) 7S. 99. For a probable reference of "patM" and "eide" see Rep. 435c1. Thomas Szlezak (3S-42) seems to have given a fair interpretation of the difficult passage in Book X (611bl-612a6). On this basis we translate eide as parts. Szlezak (47 ff.) argues, convincingly, that the mention of the four virtues (609bll f.) does not imply that the tripartite soul is immortal.

320 100. Crombie (1) I 350 ff. finds it hard to believe that Plato took seriously his own axiom of non-contradiction ("principle of potential conflict"). It would generate parts within the parts it creates: I am angry with a man whom I respect, and anger and respect, being typical spirited compulses, would then split up the spirited element. Hence the whole theory of soul is threatened. But to this it may be objected that respect appears to originate in reason (571c9, 56Oc), and that the respect in which I am angry with a man whom I respect is (Plato would say "necessarily", and I think rightly) not identical with the respect in which I respect him: I may, for example, respect John for his professional skill and be angry with him for his conduct or vice versa, but hardly both respect and be angry with, say, his conduct. The axiom works well enough in this case and does not seem destructive to Plato's model of mind. However, Crombie also critizises the axiom as a confusion between a logical truism (it cannot be the case that a man has a pro-attitude to a given thing and also that it is not the case that he has a pro-attitude to that thing) and a falsehood (that a man cannot have both a pro-attitude and an anti-attitude to the same thing). It is evidently true, says Crombie, that a man can be both for and against the same thing (356). Plato would of course agree that "a man" can both odisse et amare, who would not? But he would deny, what Crombie seems to imply (he does not say so explicitly), that the man does this with the same part of his soul. How could he defend this denial? By means of the axiom (436b, e) which, though not as it stands a logical principle, may still be said to involve one: if one has an anti-attitude, say, to the smell of cheese, then it may be inferred that it is not the case that one has a pro-attitude to the smell of cheese, or, if one has, then it must be with another part of oneself. The pro- and anti-attitudes are incompatibles that cannot be had by the same thing in the sense that white and black cannot characterize the same area. Therefore it would be breaking the rules of logic to say that one and the same thing has both a pro-attitude and an anti-attitude to the same thing in the same respect at the same time. That Plato does consider the axiom of some importance is con• firmed by the fact that he returns to it twice in Book X (602e, 604b). It's applica• tion does not necessarily involve a host of soul-parts. Plato has demonstrated the existence of three, but hints that there may be more (443d7). Another part of Crombie's analysis should be commented on here. In the Appen• dix on Rep. 436-7 (365 ff.) he raises a problem of why the example of the spinning• top is introduced. It is suggested that the top may threaten an interpretation of the parts of soul as genuinely distinct things. Crombie is inclined to view the top as merely sophistical. This is very nearly what Plato says, but it ought to be kept in mind that Plato, later at any rate, found circle-movement puzzling (cf. Laws 893cd) and that he works out this example with great care. But Crombie's concern about the top stems, it seems, from an assumption that it is introduced with the purpose of revealing something about the sense in which the soul is divided. Now this cannot be its purpose in the context. It stands firmly between the two state• ments of the axiom and its purpose is as certain as one could wish: to show that the axiom works in practice, even in difficult cases. But it does not prejudge the question what is meant by a part of soul. At most the introduction of the top has an implication that "part" in "part of soul" might have another sense than the usual, e.g. "soul in one sense". But the latter is ruled out, as Crombie rightly observes, by a disanalogy between soul and top. But this does not, I think, warrant the infer• ence that the parts of soul are distinct in the sense that parts of a physical thing are distinct. Plato is understandably vague on this topic. I have ventured to put for• ward some different points of view, hopefully without too much distortion of Crombie's highly original discussion of the tripartite soul, to which I must acknow• ledge a great debt. 101. Dia {xl paragignetai (439dl-2) seems to justify this interpretation. But this state-

321 ment (and similar ones below) are not meant as prejudging the issue whether it is not rather the soul that takes, or feels compelled to take, an interest in the body (cf. beginning of discussion of Phaedo above). 102. We have certain necessary desires that are either unavoidable or useful. Our nature must follow these desires for, e.g. food, drink and sex (558 ff.). 103. Terry Penner (1) is of the opinion that Plato really thought that there were only two parts of the soul (pp. 111-13). To support this view he points to "the extreme paucity and weakness of Plato's arguments for thumos as a separate part" and two places (431a ff. and 602e, 603d) where Plato "acts as if he really did think there were only two parts". As for the first claim (implying that "Plato shrank from confronting thumos with his criterion for parthood") it is difficult to agree when one considers the clear conflicts outlined in the Leontios case and Odysseus' anger (441b4 ff.). Penner seems to take both cases as involving rather a reason-appetite conflict, the former assimilating anger to reason, the latter assimilating it to appe• tite. He pins his argument on the fact that anger always sides with reason when there is a conflict with appetite (cf. 440b4 ff.). But one wonders how we could possibly have assimilation to either reason or appetite when we have Odysseus rebuking his own anger (which, according to Penner, has got carried away in its defence of reason against appetite)? The fact is of course that the human soul has a set of emotions (of which anger has been selected out as the most prominent) that are typically semi-rational or sometimes rational, sometimes not. The rational anger and the irrational ditto are both anger and this is the fact of psychology to which Plato rightly calls attention. Penner asks why Odysseus' anger cannot join sexual desire, hunger and grief. But grief is not on a par with sexual desire and hunger. The two latter are or involve bodily or physiological states in a way that grief does not. Grief is treated by Plato as connected with the element of soul that ought to be courageous (cf. 486bl-4, 387de). Anger may therefore join grief, but these two may join sexual desire and hunger only when the two lower parts are considered as a whole (as Plato does, e.g. 604d ff. or 606d). But we also find the two higher parts treated as a whole (442ab) if it suits Plato's purpose. It seems therefore unwarranted to construct a two-part doctrine on the basis of such pas• sages. 104. Cross and Woozley (129 f.) think that the tripartite soul is incompatible with personal responsibility: there is no "I", nothing to do the choosing. The problem, if we are right, is spurious. Once the derivative nature of the lower parts is under• stood both queries vanish. 105. Among the fitst group of scholars (with whom we cannot agree) are Stallbaum (ref. in Adam below) followed by Murphy (2) 239. J. Adam is an exponent of the latter view (II, 408 and Appendix II, 466 ff.). Murphy's claim that "from the first Plato has clearly included sensible apprehension under [ 1the cognitive part" (i.e. our calculative part) seems unwarranted. The fact is that there is very little on sense• perception in the Republic and the little there is (e.g. 523 f.) does not support Murphy: the intellect is only called in in certain cases. 106. Murphy (2) 241 ff. believes that the original axiom in Book IV concerned "contrary movements and tendencies" and that Plato is wrong in applying it to opinions. (604b) seems an essential feature of the axiom, we are told. But this is hardly correct. The second formulation of the axiom includes, besides suffering and doing, being opposites, etc. (436e9 ff.). Again, the external arguments adduced by Murphy against the Platonic claim that a man cannot contradict him• self with the same part of himself misfire: It is clearly assumed (602d ff.) that one is aware of the contradiction. Therefore latent or unaware knowledge is irrelevant to the case. Likewise tendencies to believe in different or opposite conclusions deriv• ing from different bits of evidence are ruled out by the axiom itself. Finally one is

322 bound to wonder why a study of logical opposition cannot lead to psychological necessities? No one, not even Plato, for a moment believes that logical studies by themselves lead to psychological necessities. But can one seriously believe that psychology is exempted from the rules of logic? 107. Murphy (2) 240 is right for the reasons he offers in objecting to the view that the distinction is between pure intellect and sheer sensibility. Grube (137) thinks that the division is the Platonic antithesis into perception and intellect and refers us to 523e ff. and 478. But, as he explains himself, belief and knowledge (478) have different objects and here we have two parts of soul dealing with the same object. Therefore it cannot be that important distinction which is in Plato's mind. The reference to 523 ff. seems also mistaken. The contrast there is between what the soul learns via the senses and what it comes to know by itself (e.g. 524e5). Grube points (137 n. 1) to the fact that both parts are said to be of dianoia (603b10). But this is only what we should expect. This term is used, e.g. in the Phaedo (66a2, 67c3) of the immortal soul, and it is this which also in the Republic is split into several parts. Cf. Grube's own remarks (141). The distinction of 602 f. is rather that between eikasia and pistis (cf. the Line and 602-3). 108. This is an assumption shared by early and middle dialogues (notably the Phaedo) up to the Republic, and there is clear evidence that it is still upheld here (cf. 469d6- 9). 109. See e.g. Hamlyn (4) 14 who, referring to Tht. 184c, says that "perceiving through the senses, but with the mind" is a step forward from the Republic where the senses themselves perceive. But the Tht. says that we see through the sense-organs and not with them, and it is doubtful whether Plato ever believed anything else (cf. n. 76). 110. This is certainly a most natural reading, but it is disturbed by the Sun itself where the analysis of sight is put to work: when one turns the eyes to dark objects they see dimly, etc. Likewise with the soul, etc. (508cd). On the face of it this seems to suggest that sight has nothing to do with the soul, that is, that it is a purely physiological phenomenon. But this cannot be Plato's view (cf. 523 ff., 602 f.), and we seem forced to explain the apparent contradiction by a use of "soul" in the sense of "reason" (cf. 519ab, 611b ff. et passim). 111. Cf. 609a9-b2 and Book I 352d ff. analysed above: typically things have one ergon, one excellence and one defect. 112. Grube (138-9) rightly protests here. 113. Cf. the final pages of the discussion of the Republic in Part Two for a consideration of the fundamental ontological asymmetry between soul and body. 114. At 341e5 the body is "evil" in the sense of "deficient". But this is not the sense required here. 115. We know from the Phd. (81b-e, 114c) that to be discarnate does not necessarily mean to be disembodied. Cf. n. 68. 116. Descartes, Passions of the Soul I, 5 and 6. 117. Cf. Phd. SOc. It is fair to say that the Timaeus (81d) claims that the soul is set free when the body is worn out. This may be a later development. 118. Plato's usage is seldom strict and he seems quite happy with using "soul" and "reason" for (different aspects of) the same thing. In the middle dialogues the immortal reason (dianoia) is often referred to as soul (psyche) cf. n. 107. In the later dialogues reason (nous) assumes importance as an ultimate ontological real• ity, equivalent to intelligent soul (cf. below on the ontological status of the world• soul in the Timaeus). 119. Cf. esp. the Politicus Myth (with and ). 120. Zeus was the brother of (both were sons of Cronus), and Zeus Kata-

323 chthonios or Zeus Chthonios are other names for Hades (cf. , 11. 9.457). Similarly we find expressions such as "the hospitable Zeus of the departed" (Aesch. Supp. 156) or "another Zeus" (ibid. 231). 121. Cf. n. 68. 122. Crat. 4OObc. Cf. Part Two on the Crat. At least two of the three body- are of significance for Plato's thought (cf. ego Gorg. 493a, Phd. 82e f.). 123. For fuller discussion of this point see Note on Chronology. 124. Cf. Part One with n. 68 on Tht. 125. Cf. n. 107. See, however, Part One with n. 67 on Tht. 126. T.M. Robinson's weightiest argument (1) 111-112 against the Ox. Pap. reading seems to be that autokinetos is not found elsewhere in Plato. 127. Cf. Hackforth (5) 64 n. 3. It seems unimportant for the meaning that the presence and position of the article in 246b6 is uncertain (cf. Frutiger 130-4). There is a tendency toward treatment of "soul" as a feature-term (cf. n. 1) in the later dialogues, esp. the Laws X. 128. Cf. the discussion of the Phaedrus in Part One. Cf. also Bluck (8) and (10) and McGibbon. 129. This myth is of course not to be taken literally in all details. But when we find ideas that are integrated in Platonic doctrine to be found elsewhere in non-mythical contexts, then we may assume that Plato is not just joking. Frutiger classifies this myth as parascientific (180). 130. This is important to note as it is often claimed that Plato here contradicts what is said e.g. in the Timaeus or Laws X, i.e. that the soul is generated. See below on Politicus. 131. Guthrie (3) IV 424 n. 2 thinks that Plato thinks low of our imagining gods as compounded of soul and body. The soul of a god is the god himself according to Guthrie (ibid. 424). He may be right in the first claim, but there seems to be no foundation whatever for asserting that gods are not such compounds but rather pure souls. The star-gods of the later dialogues provide ample evidence to the contrary. Cornford (4) 138 f., Dodds (220) and Hackforth (5) 70 n. 1 take the passage as directed against mythological gods, presumably because of 246c6-7 which they take as scathing remarks (one could refer to Tim. 40el-2) and perhaps (they do not tell us) because of the implied invisibility of the gods involved. Stars are visible gods (cf. Tim. 4Od4). But this is not conclusive. The crucial point is that we can neither see nor conceive immortal living beings, compounds of soul and body (cf. Tim. 36e6). The question recurs explicitly in Laws 898d9-899b9 (note 899b7-8). The topic there is star-gods. Cf. n. 205. 132. Rep. 439c9 ff., 485d, 580d ff. and the discussion above of the tripartite soul in the Republic. T.M. Robinson (1) 117 contests the common assumption that the tripar• tition in the Phaedrus is basically that of the Republic (cf. e.g. Hackforth (5) 72). According to Robinson only lip-service is paid to that doctrine because (a) the good horse cannot be distinguished from the charioteer, their desires and aim being the same, (b) desires of bad horse are invariably evil. But surely the picture of the tripartite soul in the Phaedrus is basically identical with that of the Republic: (1) we have three parts, reason (247c), desire for glory and renown and blind desire for bodily satisfaction (253d-254e), (2) their nature is the same even if Plato stresses the good aspect of the aggressive element and the bad aspect of bodily desire. It is true that there is a difference, but it is a difference of emphasis not of kind (cf. Rep. 441a). The good horse is different from the charioteer in having the specific aim of glory and renown and in being characterized by a lack of rationality (driven by command (253d7-8) and dominated by shame and modesty (254a2, c4». The bad horse is evil and must be repressed, but the Republic knows of evil desires too that much be eliminated or reduced (Rep. 571b). Crombie (1) I 358 claims that the tripartite doctrine in the Phaedrus is different 324 from that of the Republic in that we now have rather a division into three functions - all desires ought to be represented by the bad horse. But it must be admitted that each part still has its proper desire. They have each their proper food (247dI-2, e5- 6). The charioteer feels desire (253e5 ff.), the good horse is a lover of glory (253d6), the bad of lust (254a6-7). It should be noted at this stage that we do see a difference between the Republic IV and the Phaedrus in so far as the latter deals with what the Timlleus regards as the immortal element of soul. That is, we want to argue that tripartition in the Phaed• rus has to do with the psychogony of the Timlleus. See below for discussion. 133. It is strictly speaking not quite certain that the gbds are mentally tripartite. Cf. Hackforth (5) 69 n. 3. But it seems a fair inference from our likeness to the gods whoever they may be (cf. e.g. 252e and the procession of souls (246e ff.». If, as we have argued, the gods are embodied, then they necessarily have some bodily interests. 134. The Phaedrus constitutes a challenge to all theorizing about Plato's psychology. Thus Hackforth (5) 75 f. agrees with Wilamowitz (Platon I, 475) that "Plato never attained to a full reconciliation of the various views expressed in the dialogues". He does not even believe in a "development ending in something firm and pre• cise", but thinks that we must accept that Plato wavers to the end between a religious, Orphic-Pythagorean, conception of a divine soul and a scientific concep• tion of soul as a source of motion. Archer-Hind (1) 121, on the contrary, believes that the dialogues "compose an artistic and coherent whole in which we may trace development, but not contradiction". Guthrie (1) 242 holds that after the Socratic phase Plato is fundamentally consistent. Another point of view is represented by Groag (1) 351 f. who finds development in Plato involving irreconcilable views. We cannot accept Groag's chronology but subscribe to his way of dealing with the problem. 135. Guthrie (1) 237 claims that the composite nature of soul is bound up with its involvement in the wheel of rebirth. Out of the wheel it is completely pure. But this will not do: how do we then explain the difference between divine soul and human soul (246ab)? How is the fall explained? Guthrie (3) IV 425 admits himself that a flaw appears, but why and how, if not in the way (or some analogous way) that Plato cares to tell us? How do we account for divided divine souls? Guthrie (1) 228 has no answer: "for the gods the allegory of the chariot implies no plurality of nature". Szlezak (56) has a further argument: the soul is tripartite already on its way to the heavenly tour (248a-c), i.e. before being caught by the Wheel. We must conclude that this attempt to bring the Phaedrus into line does not succeed. 136. A dynamis is typically "had" by something and seems to constitute the causal properties of an object as opposed to its internal nature (cf. e.g. Phdr. 237c8, 27Od4; cf. also Lach. 192bl; Charm. 168b, 169a; Prot. 33Oa4 ft;, 349b4-5; Sym. 199c5; Crat. 394bl; Tht. 156a6-7; Soph. 248(:; Phil. 29b8; Tim. 28a8. The soul is regarded as a dynamis in several late dialogues (Crat. 4OObl, Phil. 28d7, Epin. 986a8). 137. Contra Cherniss (2) 404-5. A consequence of not taking self-motion thus, but rather as identical with satisfiable philosophic desire is that the motion of God becomes utterly mysterious. Cf. Guthrie (1) 241-2. But there is not even room for mystery here. Plato is quite explicit that God rotates (cf. below on Pol., Tim. Laws X). 138. Non-physical motion is assumed by e.g. Cherniss (2) 395, 405, Skemp (4) 86, T.M. Robinson (2) 458 and Lee (5). Against it are inter alia Tim. 34b, 36e (33bl ff.): Arist. de an. 406b27 ff., 407a2 ff., ' view of soul as idea tou pante diastatou, Robin (4) 284, Rivaud (1) 335-6. The point is discussed below in detail and at length. 139. Cf. comments above on 246e ff. Cf. also Hackforth (5) 72-4. 325 140. Cf. Note on Chronology. I am indebted to Mr. Crombie in the analysis of star• souls. 141. Cf. Part One on the Sophist. We assume that kinoumenon (249b2) has the same reference as soma or genesis pheromene (246c). Moreover, it should be noted that 249b8-9 and 249d3-4 declare that reality or the sum of things is both at once, all that is unchanged and all that is in change. It is misleading to use the notion of entailment (as we have done), if it suggests that there is an analytic tie between the terms mentioned. This would be entirely anachronistic. Still, Plato argues here, he does not carry out laboratory investigations (cf. symbainei 249b5). 142. That there could be no motion without intelligence appeared from the analyses of Politicus, Timaeus (Precosmic Motion with note 104), Leges X, Epinomis in Part Two. See also the discussion in Part Three of the same dialogues. 143. Soma in Plato appears to have at least the following senses: (a) living, organic body (Phd. 64e; Sym. 207e; Rep. 341e, 585d; Phdr. 250e, 271a; Tim. 34b2 and passim). (b) artefact (Pol. 258e2, 288d). (c) element, basic body or aggregates of such bodies (Tim. 56el, 34b2, 35a2 and passim; Soph. 246b9; Pol. 269d6, el; Epin. 988c; Leges 892. Common to all senses is some notion of organisation or application of art. Somatoeides is vaguer, tending to the amorphous (e.g. Phd. 81bS, c4, el, 83d3, 86a2, Rep. 532c7, Pol. 273b4, Tim. 31b5, 36d9). On one occasion hyle (Phil. 54c) is used. 144. Cf. Part Two on Politicus. 145. So Crombie (1) I 379. 146. Cf. Cornford (4) 208-10. 147. Cf. also Tim. 30b. Hackforth (3) 56 n. 1 argues rightly against Zeller, 715 n. 1 that we have only one Reason here. But we cannot accept his claim that reason at 30e6 is transcendent. There is evidence against this (30bl, cf. 23c4). Therefore the idea that immanent reason is a self-projection of transcendent reason is entirely gratuit• ous. Tim. 30b is taken in a forced, restricted sense, dating back to Proclus, in Tim. 1402 (Diehl), but not warranted by the quite general doctrine of Phil. 30e9-1O. Earlier Hackforth (2) 445 made a distinction between what has nous and what is nous to circumvent textual evidence (Phil. 30e, Tim. 30b, Soph. 249a) that nous must be in a soul. But there is no warrant for that distinction. We are told in plain words that of what exists only soul can have nous or be intelligent (Tim. 46d5-6, cf. Epin. 981b7-c4). Cf. also Cherniss' argument (2) 606-7 and our discussion of the Politicus above. 147a. I.e. the real Aphrodite (simple, not of many forms as Philebus' goddess, whom he calls hedone). In the myth she is mother of Harmony (Hes. Theo. 937,975). See Dies (Platon, Philebe, Paris 1941) ad Phil. 26b. Compare Eryximachus' Good Love, harmonizing the warring opposites (Sym. 186-7). 148. Vlastos, who is an ardent creationist, has usefully collected the arsenal of his opponents in two articles (1) and (4). Recently Taran (1) has discussed the value of the same arguments and come to the opposite conclusion. I largely agree with the latter but owe a debt to both as will appear from the notes below. 149. The last point is made by Taran 391. 150. So A.E. Taylor (1) 69. Vlastos (1) 383-4 seems to underrate the adherence to the mythological interpretation in Plato's immediate successors and to over-estimate the truth of Aristotle's exposition. Cf. Taran 388-9 with notes. 151. Vlastos (4) 410-1 draws a distinction between uniform and measurable time-flow, time (u), and irreversible temporal succession, time (s), and he claims that Plato did not deny that time (s) is instantiable in the absence of time. However, 37e4-5 (that past and future come into existence when time is made) does perhaps not imply but is still most naturally taken as saying that only when time is made do we get past and future. Against this Vlastos has two, as it appears, argumenta e silentio

326 (412) and he cannot find in the Corpus that Plato was aware of the distinction between time (u) and time (s). Vlastos thinks (413-4) that Plato had a "metaphysi• cal block", the idea of a disorderly state before creation, that prevented him from seeing the distinction. But there is no need for diagnosis. There is no illness here at all. Plato has no idea and no need of time (s) because his chaos is characterized by the six irrational motions, i.e., it cannot have irreversible temporal succession. Cf. also Taran's argument (n. 59). In his earlier article (1) 389 f. Vlastos claims that the trouble is the idea of genesis: Plato tries to conceive of utterly formless change, but on Platonic standards this would be devoid of being, nothing at all. This is a metaphysical problem never cleared up according to Vlastos. We cannot accept this at all. The whole point of Space, as argued in Part Two, is to lend some being to the formless chaos (52c2-5). 152. We have argued this in some detail in Part Two (inter alia when discussing Precos• mic Motion in Tim.). See also below on the world-soul and plant-souls. Cf. moreover Taran 384-8 and Ostenfeld (1). We assume, on independent grounds (cf. Note on Chronology), the traditional order of Phaedrus, Timaeus, Laws. Oddly enough Vlastos (1) 396 (in 1939) had stated what appears to be the right view: [god) "never has to think of starting motion but only to keep it going" , but he unfortunately couples this with the inconsistent idea that chaos is for purely mechanical reasons in constant motion (my emphasis). This prevents him from seeing that the Timaeus can be reconciled rather easily with the Phaedrus and the Laws on the topic of motion. 153. The argument derives from Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy, London 1888, 365. It is very effective, it seems, and Vlastos' counter-attack (4) 404 fails: precos• mic matter is visible in a "problematic sense", "we do not know" whether it is visible. 154. The last point has been observed by Taran (375). That the intermediacy of soul has to do with its being the structure of the body (in some sense) will appear from the discussion of the world-soul. 155. This was seen already by Proclus, In Tim. vol. I 288, 14-27 (Diehl) and argued effectively by Taran who bases his reasoning on Rep. 381b8-clO. 156. The soul is by definition a self-mover in the Phdr. (245e7 f.) and in the Laws (896a3-4). If we are right in placing the Timaeus between these dialogues we would expect to find the same doctrine here. But even leaving the dating out we have hints in the Timaeus itself that the soul is a self-mover (36e, 37b, 46de, 77c, 89a). If this is granted we have a contradiction in the idea of the Demiurge generating self• generating motion (36c-e). Taran (377) is of course right in reminding Vlastos (4) 416 that the soul is (not has) self-motion. Again it is puzzling to note how Vlastos has the insight (1) 393 n. 2 but apparently forgets it. 157. Cf. Cornford (4) 26. Vlastos (4) 407 argues that aei might as well mean a duration which has a beginning but goes on for ever after. In theory, yes, but in context, no. We have aei in the parallel phrase to on aei (27d6) without the specific meaning Vlastos wants for the next occurrence of the word. Again, we have aei in a passage later in the dialogue that sums up and therefore refers back to our passage: pephoremenon aei (52a6), cf. 49d4, 6-7, e5 with e6 dia pantos ("at all times"). Here it occurs in connection with Space which is aei. Here again there is no warning that the sense shifts within a few lines. This passage, incidentally may be used to counter a recent attempt to question the MSS reading of or to show the importance of deleting aei (28a1). Cf. T.M. Robinson (3), who in n. 2 ignores this passage. 158. Cf. Cherniss (2) n. 350. I have nothing to add to Taran's n. 60. 159. Cf. Grube, CP 1932, 80-82 (following Proclus) and Comford (4) 59-61. 160. Cf. Cornford ibid. 66-72. 161. a. Cornford ibid. 72-93.

327 162. Cf. Part One on Tht. and end of Soph. 163. Cf. Owen (1) 328. 164. Compare tes [scil. ousiasJ peri ta somata gignomenes meristes (3Sa2-3) with ousian skedasten (37aS), the latter being contrasted with ameriston (37a6). In the later dialogues Form (or Kind) instances or versions are often referred to as Forms (or Kinds) qua scattered, chopped up or drawn apart (Phdr. 26Sd, Soph. 2S8e, 260b, Phil. ISb5-6 (cf. Parm. 13la-c), 23e, 25a). The indiscriminate use of such termino• logy of both Forms and very wide Kinds may be another that Plato did not take them to be different in type. Crombie (1) II 203 usefully points to a passage in the Republic (476a5 ff.) as an illustration of the point made here. However, it is misleading when he claims (ibid.) that it is not being and becoming but two kinds of being that are blended. As appears from the quotation it is "being that comes to be" and the candidate for this title in the cosmology of the Timaeus is obviously the copies that come to be in Space and thus cling to being (S2c4-S). The point is important because a conse• quence of Crombie's view would be that soul is viewed as consisting of the being of universals whereas, if we are right, it consists of the being of universals and Space. 165. Cf. the compound power soul of the Phaedrus (246a6). The fact that the blend is tripartite in both cases led (Sth cent. A.D.) to combine the two accounts (heteron = bad horse, tauton = good horse, ousia = driver; cf. In Phaedrum 123, 14 ff. ed. Couvrer). But apart from being three in number and heteron being dysmeikton (35a8) there is no plausibility in this equation. Heteron, for instance, has nothing bad about it, and one suspects a confusion of the element with the circle of the same name. Robin unfortunately made things worse: not only did he follow the lead of Hermias, but he altered the equation (heteron = the two horses, tauton = driver; cf. (2) CXXII f.). Apart from the fact that the correspondence in number of elements has now been skipped, we are here left with an entirely unacceptable notion of heteron as "nature rebelle" and tauton as "1'Uniforme" (Robin has here the circle in mind). The conclusion of all this seems to be that it is fruitless to explain the Phaedrus Myth in terms of the Timaeus psychogony. 166. John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning, London 1%1, p. 44. 167. Cf. Part Two on Cosmic Matter in Timaeus. 168. Cf. analysis of Politicus above. 169. The message of the Myth, if not demythologized, may seem to involve the claim that there is a reason that is independent of space and time. 170. Cf. Hackforth (2). 170a. Cf. Part Two n. 112. 171. Cf. Cornford (4) 197, 361, 208. But it is impossible to follow Cornford in his identification of Necessity with the circle of the Different which he takes to be an irrational element in the world-soul. This is decidedly wrong. The circle~ are made of the same stuff and both move uniformly in the same place (36c). Moreover, the world-soul is rational (36e). There is therefore no basis for attributing irrationality to the world-soul. Howeve::, it must be admitted that the Same is viewed as single, uniform, most intelligent and sovereign (36c7 f., 39b7 ff.). Moreover, the world• soul has to cope with (persuade) Necessity, i.e. physical motion. This may account for the constitution of the circle of the Different, which is governed by the circle of the Same (cf. also 4Oa5 and perhaps 42c4-5), is split up and goes to the left. The infant divine soul has similarly one circle governing the other and their reaction to incarnation seems different (43d-44a). Cf. (C) below. 172. Cf. Cornford (4) 68 with n. 1 and 49 n. 2. 173. For a fuller discussion see Part Two on The Tissues in Timaeus. 174. This translation feels easier than and perhaps preferable to that produced by Cornford. Soph. (259c9-d7) seems presupposed pace Owen (1) 328.

328 175. The Soph. (and a fortiori the Tht.) seem earlier than Tim. on this point. Tim. refers briefly to an apparently well-known doctrine that is set out as new (it seems) in the Theaitetus. 176. Cf. Cornford (4) 95 n. 2. He argues that the passive (kinoumeno) is more appropri• ate to the animal which is moved (cf. kinethen 37c6) and points to autou ten psychen (b7) as confirmation. Taran (n. 33) disagrees, thinking with Cherniss (4) 26 n. 24 that en to kinoumeno hyph' hautou (b5) can be glossed by the assertion below that knowledge and belief occur in the soul (c3-5). But this will not do. It does not answer Cornford's second point, and it is anyway fallacious to argue or imply that if knowledge, etc. occur only in the soul, then the discourse leading to knowledge, etc. must also occur in the soul. Pheromenos (b5) (cf. diangeile, men• yse) is perhaps another indication that bodily motion is meant. 177. The Timaeus passages referred to are dealt with in Part Two on the Tissues in Timaeus. Spiritual motions are mentioned, e.g. in Rep. 583e; Tht. 153b9-10, Phdr. 245e7 f., Soph. 249b2, Pol. 26ge5-6, Phil. 33d4-6, 34b7, 35d and Laws 896e9 are dealt with in connection with their respective dialogues. It appears from the discussions there that we cannot agree with the traditional view represented by e.g. Cherniss (2) 402-14. 178. 77c is discussed below. 89a: self-motion is most akin to the motion of thought and of the universe. 9Oc8f: the motions akin to the divine part in us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. Cf. 47. 179. This seems to be implied also in the structural likeness between spatial and spiritual rotation, described in Laws 898a8 ff. Cause and effect need not, indeed must not, be like each other (cf. Tim. 57e). It is interesting to note Cherniss' remark (2) 405: "the two could not have been identified in the Timaeus by the thinker who in the Republic (529cd) had so sharply distinguished the movements of the visible heavens from the "true" intelligible motions. Aristotle is consequently mistaken", etc. To be fair, Cherniss had other considerations for his view, but it should be pointed out that the "could not" needs explication. 180. This is probably a reductio ad absurdum of the substance view of soul (cf. Tim. 52c6 ff. and our comment on that passage in Part One). The soul would have to be embodied (cf. Aristotle's soul). It should be noted however that the Stoics were not deterred from total blending of substances (cf. the krasis of soul and body). It should also be noted that Proclus III, 254 13 regards soul as an intermediate sub• stance. 181. Cause introduces Limits that put an end to "the war of opposites" (Phil. 25e). Cf. also Cebes' weaver. 182. We may perhaps here refer to the discussion of causation in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus in Part Two. Causes must not either be too like the affected (Tim. 57e). 183. In classifying the view as dualism of attributes (or forces) there is a risk of giving the obviously wrong impression that the attributes are on a par, while the fact is that the one is ontologically dependent in the long run on the other. However, it is the least misleading label we have been able to think of. 184. Vlastos (1) 393 asks how an immaterial soul can be affected by material things in sensation and 1 (399) how "the immaterial soul acts and 'masters' the discordant motions of the body. How does one pattern of motion act upon another pattern of motion, though one is the motion of material particles and the other not?" But as we have repeatedly tried to demonstrate, the motion of soul is not immaterial. Vlastos may be referred to his own quotation (1) 394 n. 2 from Tim. 87a on the blending of phelgms and humours with the motion of the soul. cr. also hearing (67b). 185. Plato's conception of evil is far from clear. But it seems as if in the later dialogues

329 (cf. Pol. 273cd, Laws 896e, 897b3, 904b) soul is by nature both evil and good, probably because it is now akin to both space and Forms (cf. Tht. 176a, Phdr. 25Oc, Pol. 273b). For the human soul cf. the bad horse-of the Phaedrus myth and the terrible and necessary feelings, added to the immortal divine soul (Tim. 69c8 f.), but prepared for, it seems, by the less pure constitution of the human divine soul (Phdr. 248b, Tim. 41d). 185a. The Demiurge sowed, however, the several souls into the planets that were "meet" for them (41e). This is reminiscent of the idea of the Phaedrus that we each have our special God, whom we try to imitate (252cff.). One wonders whether this is an acknowledgement of innate temperament or capability (252e f.). In the Ti• maeus there seem to be no differences in moral and cosmological knowledge. 186. Note that the number of souls equals the number of stars (41d8). This and the animation-problem are probably more than side-effects of mythical imagination. Cf. n. 205. 187. T.M. Robinson (1) 106-7 seems therefore wrong in concluding from e.g. 45dl-3 that we have an internal substance. He himself admits that there is an implication in the Timaeus that the soul occupies the same spatial volume as all the parts of the body that are "alive". 187a. Cf. above on Laws of Destiny. We agree with Hackforth (5) 88ff., against Taylor (1) 64Off., that transmigration in the Timaeus is "serious mythical belief'. But this being so, one has still less ground for accepting Taylor's argument from silence in Laws X that "such a migration was alien to Plato's own imagination" (641). 188. For the purpose of relative dating it should be noted that according to the Timaeus (44a, cf. 37 ab) we make judgements in perception, and that both the capacity for making apriori and the capacity for making aposteriori judgements are parts of intelligence. Even the sheer having a sense-impression seems to involve intelli• gence (64b5). This doctrine appears to be in line with the Theaitetus (184-6) but is incompatible with the more unsophisticated view that the senses (including soul, but excluding intelligence) may judge for themselves (Rep. 523 f.). 189. This is in fact the final answer to the question raised in the Phaedo 95e. 190. Soul is the first genesis and kinesis (896a7); cf. first kinesis (895a8) and first genesis (899c7). It seems not to matter much which term is used. If so, it is not necessary to take "genesis" in the technical sense it has at 894a. On the contrary, it is arguable that it should be taken in the sense of "process". 191. Temporal priority is here, for once, clearly referred to (cf. perhaps also 896c1-2). But it should be noted that the context is a refutation of the atheists who hold the temporal priority of matter. Plato may have felt the need of arguing on their premises. His argument does not depend on this concession. 192. Hence we cannot agree with Vlastos (4) 414 who finds that the creation of soul in the Timaeus is in flat contradiction with the Phaedrus doctrine that the soul is uncreated and also with the Phaedrusl Laws idea that soul is the first cause of all motion. Cf. also his belief (1) 396 n. 4 that primordial motion in the Timaeus is irreconcilable with Phdr. 245c-e/Laws 896ab. As Vlastos apparently believes that the order of these dialogues is the traditional (4) 416 n. 3 it is a most unfortunate conclusion. But it is quite unnecessary (cf. for primordial motion n. 152). 193. Cf. note 190. Vlastos (4) 414 n. 1 argues that the Laws in the same terms as the Timaeus develops the same view, i.e. that soul was created first. But surely the sense of Tim. 34c4-5 is not as clear as Vlastos thinks. If we have been right it cannot support creationism. The sense of "genesis" in the Laws is still more in question. 194. Premise (9) might, at first glance, seem to contradict the Politicus 273b-d that takes a material view of evil. But there is no inconsistence here. Psychic evil stems from

330 the soul's blending with matter (Pol. 273b), but indirectly soul is responsible for all motion and thus for all evil. 195. We have two possible candidates in mind when speaking of "weak sense" of image. First, Plato advances some of his most important insight in terms of images: the Cave, the Aviary and the Waxen Tablet, the image of soul in the Phaedrus, the image of the soul in Republic (588). Today one would probably speak of models (theories intended to explain given realms of phenomena or pictures intended to explain such theories) or, with due respect for Plato's poetic mind, metaphors. But the relation of models to the modelled or of the metaphorical predicate to the subject is anything but clear. We may for contrast compare the relation of a photograph with original. Here is a definite ontological distinction that seems to lack in the cases mentioned above. Second, it should be noted that Plato in the Laws 959b speaks of the body as a semblance (indallomenon) or image (eidolon) of the soul. Cf. erato 400c3-4. This seems to indicate a fairly radical change in the conception of body from what is found inter alia in the Phaedo (body-prison) or the Gorgias (body-grave). It does not of course by itself show that Plato was a Wittgensteinean (cf. n. 209). But it lends just a little more support to an overall interpretation of the late dialogues that makes sense of both Plato's own words and Aristotle's attack (de An. 407a2- bU). On general grounds we cannot, and, if the considerations juSt adduced have any weight, then we need not accept the traditional understanding of Laws 897d-898c represented by inter alios Cherniss (2) 404-5 with n. 331 and 332. Nor can we accept the recent, interesting analysis of Lee (5) of how Plato's image is an image of nous. Lee attacks what he calls a "psychologistic" and an "expressionistic" reading of the model for viewing the model in relation to subjective features of noetic acts. Rotation, he claims, is the model not of the act of thought, but rather of those qualities of thought in virtue of which, when it occurs, it qualifies as noetic (80). It is the model for a kind of relation o/the subject to an object, not for some inner condition of a subject (83). It would require an artiele of its own to counter this penetrating analysis. Here we must say that Lee's thesis seems apriori implaus• ible in so far as it goes contrary not only to Aristotle's rather detailed account, but also to relevant Platonic evidence. Aristotle, according to Lee, is mistaking the model for an empirical hypothesis (cf. the accomplishment sense of motion 85): Lee claims that a spinning globe involves a motion that does not move toward any goal, but is complete at every moment (78). This may be right, but Lee supports the claim that Plato thought similarly of the motion of nous by a reference to the vision of Absolute Beauty at Sym. 211ab, and this will not do. The obvious place to look for information on the motion of nous in the Laws is rather Tim. 37a-c. The whole point of that typically late passage is exactly the opposite of the Symposium passage cited by Lee: nous does not see its object as such, but typically in relation to other objects (37a7-b3). Whether this is circling in the "accomplishment" sense or the "activity" sense (cf. Lee 78) is debatable, but it can be taken in the first sense and therefore also be taken as involving spatial extension (in this connection it may be pointed out that when rotation is first introduced in Laws X (893c f.) we get an example that contains reference to speed (d4-5). It is hard to see how this notion can be applied in the context of the "activity" sense of motion, which involves that motion is complete in every phase and moment of its duration). But even with circling in the "activity" sense, could we still not have a quasi-empirical theory of the "psychic mechanics" underlying the processes or experiences of thinking? If thinking is contemplation rather than syllogizing, then one could imagine a cerebral analogue to Lee's group of children dancing around the may

331 pole. The Timaeus anyway shows that there is good reason to think that the motion of nous is "some inner condition of a subject" (cf. Tht. 18ge f., Soph. 263e). 196. 904c, 904e; cf. 715e ff.; cf. also Tim. 41e ff. Adrasteia (Phdr. 248c, Rep. 451a) and Ananke in some uses (e.g. Phd. 108c2, Rep. 617e) are other designations of these laws. 197. Cf. Part Two n. 125. 198. Cf. Part Two n. 126. 199. Skemp's (4) 98 rendering of enarmottousan (904c5). Cf. Tim. 36e1. 200. Contra Hackforth (2) 442, Cherniss (2) 402-3. 201. Cf. Hackforth (2) 443. 202. It seems misleading to say as T.M. Robinson (1) 154 that the body-soul relation• ship was never clearly formulated. The Phaedo alone refutes that claim. What one misses, and perhaps this is what Robinson intends to say, is evidence that Plato feels that there is a problem here. It is for Plato rather a relationship that is taken for granted and this perhaps conceals for him that he, if we are right, has changed his mind on this topic. 203. For the idea of the body as a vehicle cf. Tim. 44e, 69c, 87d; Phdr. 246e5, 247b2. The seemingly opposite notion of soul as carrier is found at Crat. 400ab. But the context does not allow a definite interpretation. Perhaps Plato intends to say what is said somewhat more explicitly at Tim. 38e, i.e. that the body is bound by psychic bonds. 204. Peripephykenai at 898e2 means basically "to be all round" or less vaguely "to have come to grow round about". England II 479 reminds of the use of the same term of the body (Rep. 612), but he draws a wrong corrollary, i.e. that Plato's usage is loose. Rather Plato has changed his view. The senses just listed fit in with perikaly• ptein of Tim. 34b. Skemp (4) 87 n. 3 thinks the sense is "to survive" (i.e. "evade") sc. attempts to perceive it. But this use is not recorded by LSI or Ast. Notice that the Timaeus too regards the body as a vehicle (n. 203). 205. Hence England II, 480 cannot be right in holding that "Plato's own hypothesis was clearly the first of the three". As far as star-gods including planets are concerned he is an agnostic. It should be noticed that the scepticism recurs in the Epin. 983b6- c5, esp. c2; e5 ff. This does seem to clash with the evidence of e.g. the Timaeus (40ab, 38c-39d) where we are told not only that stars get certain motions, but also that both fixed stars and planets are living beings (40b5, 38e5). This contrasts with the expressed scepticism of Laws 899b7-8. It may be added that the relation of the world-soul to its body is made clear in the Timaeus (34b, 36de), and that here the soul is twice said to envelop (perikalyptein) the body from outside (34b4, 36e3). The term is regularly used of a garment, an association that is felt here, as dia• plakeisa (36e2) shows. We may note in passing that, whereas in the Phaedo (87de) the body was viewed by Cebes (and perhaps, as argued above, by Plato) as analo• gous to a garment of the soul, it is now the soul that may be taken as a "garment" of the body. Cf. n. 204. However, the question is whether all this is more than metaphor. That the soul is inwoven and wrapped around its body in the Timaeus may be a flowerish way of expressing the fact that the circle motion of at least the sidereal equator affects the whole cosmos, from the circumference to the centre. But it could hardly be argued that this description is non-committal as to whether the world-soul is in or out of its body. In the Laws (896d1O ff.) soul is regarded as residing in whatever is moved. No specific individual soul is meant, just soul in general. There is a notable lack of interest in individual souls and a corresponding great interest in type of soul in these pages. Hence 896e-898c may be said to concentrate on what type of soul is in charge of the universe, i.e. what in the Timaeus was called world-soul. Plato does not seem puzzled about that soul's

332 relation to its body. We cannot but take it that it resides in the cosmos. A problem arises, however, when the single stars are considered (898 ff.). Why are stars (astra including planets) problematic? Presumably because they collectively constitute the body of the world-soul. This was perhaps not realized fully in the Timaeus where both world-soul and the everlasting gods "inhabit" the cosmos (cf. 37c6-7). Plato does not seem to realize that, if the stars are inhabited by individual souls, then there is strictly not much body left for the world-soul, unless one chooses to say, as Vlastos (14) 35, that the everlasting gods (37c6) are the world-soul. But there is no evidence for this nor does Vlastos adduce any. On the contrary, the planets are themselves "living beings with their bodies bound by the ties of soul" (38e5) and the fixed stars are "living beings, divine and everla• sting" (40b5-6). Vlastos (14) 109 is rightly engaged' in attacking the "third force" postulated by Cornford, but his own conception of the self-motion of stars cannot be right: according to Vlastos the self-motion of the planets would cover whatever motions they happen to have; there is no reason, he says, to assume with Cornford that the self-motions of the stars have to be motions other than those imparted to them by the Same and the Different. He adds, as an afterthought, "except of course for axial rotation as well, which is not in controversy". Now Vlastos' attack on Cornford's implausible "third force" has obviously led himself into a difficulty about the self-motion of stars. Corn ford is quite right in regarding the Same and the Different as imparted motions and restricting self-motion to axial rotation. The consequence of not doing so is obliterating the world-soul or identifying it with the star-souls, and there seems, as we have seen, to be no basis for this in the Timaeus. However, Plato may have come to see a problem here in the Laws. This is evident in these words: "if soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually" (898d3-4)? We have already noticed the lack of interest in, probably revealing real lack of individuality of, the particular soul• manifestations (cf. 899b5-6). Plato seems to conceive of "soul" as a mass-term like "wood", "water", etc. Now if soul in this sense cares for the whole cosmos, what of the single heavenly bodies? Is soul split up in individual indwelling souls or not? This seems to be the problem stated here (898e8 ff.) and still unsolved in Epinomis (983b6-c5, esp. c2, e5 ff.). It is important to emphasize that Plato is puzzled only about stars .and planets. He is certain that the notion of living being (zoon) involves a body with a soul in it, and he is also sure that men, animals and plants are living beings. Moreover, he is sure in the Timaeus and to all appearance in the Laws as well that the cosmos is a living being. The sense in which soul is "inside" the body is not, as Skemp (4) 87 seems to think, a naive one. If we have been right in the lengthy examination above, then it is a very "scientific" one indeed, and the only question that is left as a mystery seems to be the relation of star-souls to their bodies; or, in other words, the relation of star-souls to the world-soul. 206. Cf. perhaps Cornford (4) 108, who seems to have glimpsed the perspective of the third solution, although he is wrong in the details (cf. Vlastos (14) 109) and at an important point discussed below. Skemp (4) 86 ff. seems right in emphasizing the active guidance of God (cf. Pol. 269c5, 270a3) in connection with the third possi• bility, but perhaps mistaken in thinking that it is implied that there is no physical action whatever of soul on body. It is safer to say that the case envisaged is one excluding "mere material impulsion" (to use Skemp's rendering). Cherniss (2) 591 is right in rejecting the suggestion of Jaeger that the theory of the transcendent unmoved mover is hinted at in the third possibility: it lies closer at hand to see whether "the motion that is capable of moving itself" is not the intended candidate. An important point in Cornford's exposition may be queried here. He assumes

333 (81) that the circles only mark the orbits and symbolize the motions of the planets. "Plato had not the notions of force or of mass", says Cornford and refers us to the astronomy of the Republic (528e). Vlastos (14) 65 follows Corn ford in thinking that Plato in the Timaeus advances a purely kinematical model. But what are we to think of the eight heavenly "powers" of the Epinomis (986ab) which must surely be identical with the eight revolutions of the Timaeus (39b3-4)? It seems misleading to regard these motions as "assumed". The doctrine of the motion that is capable of moving itself (Laws 896al-2) which, we have argued, is implied in the Timaeus too, is an attempt at explaining motion. Further, it is explained not in primitive hylozoistic terms, but by a physical theory, if we are right, of self-motion. If a force is a cause of motion, then the soul is certainly such a force. It is the most powerful necessitation that comes from a soul endowed with intelligence (Epin. 982b5-6). But there is other necessitation at work (cf. Part Two on Precosmic Motion in Timaeus). Therefore Cornford seems to be mistaken in claiming that Plato had no notion of force. He had dynamis and he used it in an irreducible way about the soul. We should not forget that the soul of the later dialogues is regarded as a dynamis (erat. 400bl, Phdr. 246a7, Phil. 28d7, Epin. 986a8, d. Laws 896al-2). Hence we should' avoid taking the circles of the Timaeus kinematically. Therefore a reference to the "middle" astronomy of the Republic is inadequate. 207. "The gods that are according to law" (904a9 f.) are taken by England II 494, followed by Vlastos (4) 408, as referring to the gods of established religion, and we are given references to Tim. 41b and 43a2. But this must be a confusion. For the gods that were held together with indissoluble bonds are not explicitly the tradi• tional gods whose generation is by-passed (40de), but the visible star-gods (41b). Plato focusses on the latter. Similarly in the Laws "the legal gods" are probably the visible star gods whose existence is laid down by the lawgiver (887al, 888dl, 89Oc2) and the law (890b7). Cf. perhaps also Epin. 981e7, 984d, 987a. These created gods are indestructible, but not eternal (d. Tim. 37d3-4), mentally as well as bodily, exactly as the human soul and (potential) body are for the reason given. Certainty on what type of god is involved is not obtainable and probably does not matter for the conception of human soul. It is hard, however, to see how we can possibly be supposed to get the sense that Vlastos recommends out of the Greek: "that (human) body and soul are (each of them: d. bl-2), when generated, indestruct• ible, but not (as a composite unity) everlasting, as are the legal gods". This tortu• ous rendering is otiose if we have been right in seeing no difference between god and man in respect of being indestructible, but not eternal (which seems in fact to be an adequate characterization of the gods addressed at Tim. 41b and of the human soul (Tim. 43d6-7). It seems odd, if not impossible, to predicate "inde• structible" and "everlasting" of different subjects and similarly implausible to let the comparative clause refer solely to the last predicate from which it is separated by three words (making us feel the two predicates as one complex predicate). In fact, bl-2 confirms that the common subject is "each of them". 208. In 903d it may perhaps be questioned that aei goes with syntetagmene rather than metaballei. But the word-order seems definitely, in spite late Platonic stylistic oddities, against attaching aei exclusively to metaballei. At most we would have to concede that it goes with both participle and finite verb, and then our point still holds, i.e. that the soul is always in a body. Tote men I J tote de, being a gloss on aei, confirms the participial connection. 209. Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part II, p. 178 (transl. by G.E.M. Anscombe): "The human body is the best picture of the human soul". 210. The dialogue may not be genuine. After Taran (2) the arguments put forward by Harward 27-58 and Raeder (2) no longer carry conviction (d. Part One n. 131).

334 Skovgaard-Jensen (ch. VI) adduces arguments against it relevant for our purposes in Part Three. 211. For this problem see the discussion (with references) above of the relation of nous to psyche in the Timaeus. 212. Cr. the hesitation regarding star-survival (982a2-3). 213. Cf. Leg. 899a7-8; England II 481 iii his note on that passage rightly rejects an interpretation of the vehicle as distinct from the body. The implied reference back to possibility One 898e8-10 is too clear. But Epin. 986b5 must be taken so and does not appear to be a case of possibility One (the indwelling soul). Rather possibility Three perhaps (indwelling body = body guided by marvellous powers) seems here to be contrasted with possibility Two (involving two bodies, one of which is said to be fashioned by the soul itself). 214. It is probably advisable to keep distinct the god of the fixed stars (who might be called "Cosmos" 987b) and the supreme, best kind of god whom we have discussed here (who may be called "Cosmos", "Olympos" or "Ouranos"). The latter is the father who teaches us to count and fashions, e.g., the moon (978cd). Confusion is likely to arise inter alia because the former may be, and perhaps has been (Tim. 36c7f.), thought to be a leader of the inner circles (987b8 without the ouk of Burnet; cf. Cornford (4) 91 n. 1. and Raeder (2) 52f.). But the outermost sphere of fixed stars is clearly only a part of the cosmos and can be called "cosmos" only with some qualification (987b7). It is, moreover, on a par with the other seven powers spread over the whole of heaven.

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