A Note on Chronology
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A Note on Chronology We have been working within the generally accepted tripartite framework based on stylometric and linguistic considerations. Some dialogues are of disputed relative date (Sym., Crat., Phdr., Tim.). The order of the relevant dialogues that makes most sense, as far as con tent (relating to the three topics discussed) and method are concerned, seems to be the following: Early dialogues; Gorgias, Meno, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic; Parmenides, Cratylus, Theaitetus, Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Laws, Epinomis, Seventh Letter. We have not been able to decide what is the relative dating of the early dialogues. But it seems that the Protagoras, the Hippias Major (if genuine) and the Lysis in choice and treatment of their topics belong to the end of that period (cf. Part One). The Gorgias has been grouped as "early" in its treatment of Forms and Matter, but as "middle" in its psychology. There seems to be nothing odd in this if, as assumed, the dialogue is a transitional work. As far as the Cratylus is concerned, it seems transitional in method: there is a discussion of hypothesis (436cd) that may reveal disappoint ment. At any rate Plato appears concerned about the starting point to a degree that fits badly with the carelessness of the Meno (86e ff.) and the Phaedo (lOIde) or the optimism of the Republic (511bc). It is much more in line with the Parmenides (135d ff.). If we add to this the explicit mention and use of division (424b7-d4), it seems natural to place the Cratylus after the Parmenides. One might also mention the semantic interest which would group it with the Sophist. But in view'of the uncertainty that seems reflected in the encounter with the flux doctrine (cf. end of dialogue) and a view of soul (403b-404a) reminis cent of the Phaedo, we may tentatively suggest a date at the beginning of the late period .. The Phaedrus authorizes division as the new method to be adopted. This places it among the late dialogues. Its self-mover soul would seem 281 to place it after the Cratylus but before the Sophist, the Timaeus and the Politicus, where reason seems to be given a special ontological status. The relation to the Theaitetus is almost impossible to make out since that dialogue is close both to the Cratylus (flux) and to the Sophist and the Timaeus (discovery of "common notions") so that the Phaedrus is bound to separate dialogues close in content. Perhaps the Phaedrus' excitement over division puts it after the Thaeitetus. We do not regard the doctrine of Forms as a safe clue on this question (d. Part One). G.E.L. Owen has argued inter alia on stylistic grounds that the Timaeus is middle. But L. Brandwood's recent statistic work does not, as T.M. Robinson (1) 59 n. 1 thinks, support Owen, although it places the Timaeus before the Sophist. Stylometrics is a slippery ground, not least in the case of the Timaeus which is unique. Owen had to explain away hiatus-avoidance, and Cherniss and Rist have done much to undermine his philosophical argument. More positively, the Timaeus is late because of its implicit method of division, its cosmic soul, its implied self-mover soul, its view of thinking as an activity, its new concept of Space and the upgrading of the physical (patterns in flux), its mathematical bias and in Socrates not being the speaker. It may seem close to the Phaedrus with its paradigmatic Forms, but it is probably after that dialogue in its interest in natural kinds, in a less Orphic psychology (the soul is meant for bodies Tim. 41b, 69c) and in its view of soul as generated by reason. Also, it seems later than the flux dialogues (Crat., Tht.) in its balanced view of the physical (recur ring patterns do exist) and in epistemology (the sensible is perceived, as the Theaitetus demonstrated at some length, not with the senses, but with the mind, and empirical knowledge includes judgement about impressions) . It is perhaps later than the Sophist in that the reality of reason and matter seems proved first in the Sophist. The Timaeus, the Politicus, the Phi/ebus and the Laws all assume the existence of a cosmic reason and the Timaeus apparently takes the reality of matter for granted (in itself this is inconclusive: the proof may follow the assumption). The mathematical flavour of the dialogue places it near the Philebus (after it, if we do not want to separate the closely related Politicus and Phi/ebus). The Symposium has been placed in a non-controversial place, as leading up to the Republic (with its unhypothetical principle). But we have felt a strong inclination to redate this dialogue to a position after 282 the Phaedrus so that its sophistication as compared with that dialogue can be explained. John Moore has argued that it contains examples of division (e.g. 206b-208b). Also, it seems that the intermediate dynamic daemonic Eros (202de), with its cosmological significance in regulating the warring opposites or Necessity (cf. the relevant parts of Parts Two and Three), is very reminiscent of the world-soul of the Timaeus and rather awkward in the overall picture we have drawn of the middle period. Perhaps there is a further similarity with the Timaeus in the reservations on the topic of immortality (cf. 206c-208b and 212a5-7 with Tim. 90a-d). The lesson to be learnt from these chronological considerations is a warning against dividing the Corpus into three, so to speak, water tight boxes. One must allow not only for overlaps, but also for long term retention of old beliefs (perhaps not always consistent with new ones) and prevision of new ideas at an early stage (where they may not strictly fit in). 283 Abbreviations AGPh Archiv fUr Geschichte der Philosophie AJ P American Journal of Philology APQ American Philosophical Quarterly APhF Acta Philosophica Fennica Arch Philos Archives de Philosophie BICS Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the Uni versity of London Bonn Jbb Bonner Jahrbucher Class Med Classica et Mediaevalia CP Classical Philology CQ Classical Quarterly CR Classical Review DK Diels-Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Zurich 1966 Hibb Jour Hibbert Journal HSCP Harvard Studies in Classical Philology HTR Harvard Theological Review JHS Journal of Hellenic Studies JP Journal of Philology Kant Stud Kant Studien LSJ Liddell and Scott/Jones, Greek-English Lexicon, Ox ford 19589 Mus Tusc Museum Tusculanum PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PAPS Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society PBA Proceedings of the British Academy PCPS Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society Philos Philosophy Phron Phronesis PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review 285 REA Revue des etudes anciennes REG Revue des etudes grecques REL Revue des etudes latines Rev Met Review of Metaphysics RhM Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie Symb Osl Symbolae Osloenses TAPA Transactions of the American Philological Association YCI S Yale Classical Studies WS Wiener Studien 286 Notes General Introduction 1. Most conspicuously in the Phaedrus 245 f., the Politicus 269 ff., the Philebus 29 ff., the Timaeus and the Laws 891-99. The Phaedo and Republic X may be added as examples of earlier discussions. 2. E.g. J. B. Skemp (4) 87, T. M. Robinson (1) 154, Guthrie (3) V 316, Vlastos (1) 399 and indeed Aristotle, De An. 407b 12-19. 3. Laws 897b7; cf. the reference to soul-in-general 896e8-897b5. 4. E.g. Apol. 3Oab, cf. 36c; Crit. 47de; Charm. 156e f., Prot. 313a-c; Gorg. 477 ff., 523 ff.; Phd.; Sym. 201-12, Rep. IV, X; The Laws provides late specimens of this point of view, e.g. 959ab and, implicitly, 863d. 5. It will be argued in Part One that Plato may be said to have held a (developing) doctrine of Forms during the whole of his career. See also note 3 on Part One. 6. The reason why we do not restrict ourselves to a phase-by-phase approach within the three Parts - thus giving the systematic side a greater emphasis - is that there are serious chronological questions in the relative dating of certain dialogues and these should be considered in advance, not to beg any questions as to the doctrines held in the various phases (e.g. the position of the Timaeus is of vital importance to any interpretation of the final phase). It is thus an integral part of the programme of the present study to contribute to the understanding of the relative dating of the dialogues by a consideration of their stand on one or more of the three strands in Plato's metaphysics to be examined presently. We shall be particularly concerned with establishing the relative date of the Symposium, the Cratylus, the Phaedrus and the Timaeus. Cf. also appended Note on Chronology. 7. An arrangement based on the linguistic and stylometric studies started by Camp bell and Lutoslawski and refined in recent years by L. Brandwood and D.R. Cox. However, the relative date of the early dialogues is so much a matter of dispute that our order of dealing with these dialogues should not be taken as implying anything on that issue. 8. It should be noted, however, that we shall not be concerned with the historical Socrates in the sequel. We regard Socrates-in-the-dialogues as Plato's mouthpiece and shall consequently be referring to the views put forward by him as Plato's. This position is connected with the general impression that the dialogues for all their display of detachment, irony and play (paidia) have an underlying serious point and a hero as a proponent of that point whether it be Socrates, Diotima, Par menides, the Eleatic or the Athenian Stranger or Timaeus.