PLATO, EUTHYPHRO & MENO READING LIST & ESSAY QUESTIONS I’ll be your tutor for this paper, Plato’s Euthyphro and Meno. The best email address for you to contact me on is [email protected]. Below is the current plan for topics and suggested reading with suggested essay titles. Please aim to read the preliminary reading and then read selectively (but carefully) from the suggested further reading. (It’s much better that you carefully read and respond to two papers rather than skimming through many.) Don’t feel constrained to only these texts – but it is helpful if everyone has a common starting point for discussion. These texts will be available either in your college library or online. There are far more topics than we’d actually have time to cover in tutorials. Hopefully, however, what we cover will be a useful springboard for your further study. The faculty reading list provides even more suggestions for reading, as will the relevant Stanford Encyclopaedia entry and, of course, the texts you read will inevitably lead you on to other texts. Obviously lectures are especially useful at giving you a thorough foundation for further study. If you do go further in your reading—great! However there’s always the chance that I or your partner have not read the specific text you address. So for all your reading it is important that you carefully lay out the author’s arguments and you reference accurately in your essays. The Harvard inline referencing style is easiest to follow (and most common in philosophy). I do really recommend you go beyond the set reading, especially as you revise the material. Since you will be expected to write commentaries in your FHS paper, each topic has suggested commentaries. (You will find some advice at the end of this reading list for tackling commentaries.) Over the eight weeks, you are expected to produce: • At least four essays (2,000 words), and • No more than either four translations and commentaries or four commentaries if you are doing Course IIA (1,000 words in total, including translation) We will agree either before or at the end of the first tutorial which weeks will be essay weeks. I expect some form of written work for every tutorial. The expectation is that you will email me and your tutorial partner your essay by 9pm two days prior to your tutorial. At the start of the tutorial you will be expected to introduce and comment upon your partner’s essay. (This of course entails your reading your partner’s essay beforehand.) Obviously if it is your turn to defend your essay then you cannot submit a commentary for that week. Set Texts R. W. Sharples, Meno, (Aris & Phillips, 1985) OCT Plato, Vol I, E. A. Duke, ed., (Clarendon Press, 1995) OCT Plato, Vol III, J. Burnet, ed., (Clarendon Press, 1903) (1) Socrates’ arguments against Euthyphro’s definitions of piety Preliminary Reading Euthyphro (esp 7a–11b) Secondary Reading S.Cohen,‘Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A–11B’ Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971) 1–13 P. Geach, ‘Plato’s Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary’, Monist 50 (1966), 369–82 M. Evans, ‘Lessons of Euthyphro 10 A–11 B’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 42 (2012), 1–38 Translation & Commentary Euth 7c10–e4 Euth 10d12–11b1 Essay Questions Choose a premiss from Socrates’ argument at Euthyphro 9d–11b that you find questionable, interesting, or puzzling. What objections could be made against it? How might Socrates defend the argument against these objections? What is wrong with defining the holy as ‘that of which the gods approve’? Can any of the definitions of piety offered in the Euthyphro be salvaged? If so, how? (2) Socrates’ piety Preliminary Reading Euthyphro (esp 11e–end) Secondary Reading S. W. Calef, ‘Piety and the Unity of Virtue in Euthyphro 11E–14C’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 13 (1995), 1–26 Ø. Rabbås, ‘Piety As a Virtue in the Euthyphro’, Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005), 291–318 Translation & Commentary Euth 12e9–13b6 Euth 14a11–c3 Essay Questions Does Euthyphro present Socrates as having a positive conception of piety? Can we extract a Socratic definition of piety from the Euthyphro? (3) Socratic definition Preliminary Reading Euthyphro 2a–6e Meno 70a–80e, 86d–e Secondary Reading T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, §12–18, 88–91 I. M. Crombie, ‘Socratic Definition’ in J. Day, Plato’s Meno in Focus, pp. 172–207 G. Fine, ‘Inquiry in the Meno’ (esp. section I) in Kraut (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge 1992); also in Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays (Clarendon Press 2003) D. Wolfsdorf, ‘Thee Socratic Fallacy and the Epistemological Priority of Definitional Knowledge’ Apeiron 31 (2011) 35–68 Translation & Commentary Men 71b1–c6 Men 72c1–d7 Men 73e7–b4 Men 75b8–d4 Men 75c8–e5 Men 80c6–d8 Essay Questions (1) If one does not know what F is, one cannot know for any x whether x is an instance of F and (2) If one does not know what F is, then one cannot know whether F has a property P. Is Socrates really committed to (1) and (2)? If he is, do they really commit him to a fallacy? What requirements does Socrates make of a definition in the Meno? Are they defensible? (4) Desire and the Good Preliminary Reading Meno 77b–79e Gorgias 466a–472e Protagoras 352a–358e Secondary Reading C. Bobonich ‘Socrates and Eudaimonia’ in The Cambridge Companion to Socrates, 293–332 D. Scott, Plato’s Meno (CUP: Cambridge, 2006), ch 4 T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, §97–98 H, Segvic, ‘No One Errs Willingling’ in S. Ahbel-Rappe and R. Kamtekar A Companion to Socrates (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) Translation & Commentary Men 78b3–d1 Men 79b4–c9 Essay Questions Outline Socrates’ argument for the claim that no one desires bad things (77c– 78b). Does this argument conclude that it is psychologically impossible to desire something that we believe to be bad? What could Socrates say to the heavy drinker who says: ‘Of course I know it’s bad for me, but I’m going to have another one anyway’? Is Socrates right to argue that one can desire bad things only if one believes them to be good? (5) Meno’s Paradox Preliminary Reading Meno 79e–86c, 97d–98a Phaedo, esp. 72e–84b Phaedrus 245c–249d Secondary Reading D. Scott, Plato’s Meno (CUP: Cambridge, 2006), ch 6–7 T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, §92–95 A. Nehamas, ‘Meno’s Paradox and Socrates as a Teacher’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 3 (1985), 1–30; reprinted in J. Day, Plato’s Meno in Focus D. Scott, ‘Platonic Recollection’, in G. Fine (ed.), Plato (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press 2000), vol. 1 G. Vlastos, ‘Anamnesis in the Meno’ in Dialogue 4 (1965), 143–67; reprinted in J. Day, Plato’s Meno in Focus Translation & Commentary Men 79e7–80b4 Men 81c5–e2 Men 84a3–c2 Men 86a6–c2 Men 86b5–d2 Essay Questions What is Socrates’ response to Meno’s paradox? Does it succeed? How is Meno’s paradox best answered? Is Socrates’ theory of recollection necessarily committed to the pre-existence of the soul? (6) Arete and Episteme Preliminary Reading Meno 86c–96d Laches 194c–201c Gorgias 466a–479d Protagoras, esp. 352a–362a Secondary Readining T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, §96–103 D. Scott, Plato’s Meno (CUP: Cambridge, 2006), ch 12–13 K. Wilkes ‘Conclusions in the Meno’ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61(1979)143–153; reprinted in J. Day, Plato’s Meno in Focus I. M. Crombie, ‘Socratic Definition’ in J. Day, Plato’s Meno in Focus, pp. 172–207 Translation & Commentary Men 88a6–c4 Men 92b9–d5 Men 93a2–b6 Essay Questions What conclusion, if any, does Socrates reach about virtue in the Meno? Does he reject the thesis that virtue is knowledge? Should he reject it? Why does Socrates set such high standards for understanding a term like ‘excellence’ (aretē)? Is he right to do so? Is Socrates right to look for a unified definition of virtue? ‘If virtue is a gift from the gods, then inquiry into the nature of individual virtue is futile.’ Is this a sensible reaction to the conclusion of the Meno? Does the Meno give good reason for thinking that knowledge is not necessary for virtue? (7) Episteme and doxa Preliminary Reading Meno 85b–86c, 96d–end Secondary Reading D. Scott, Plato’s Meno (CUP: Cambridge, 2006), ch 14 T. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics, §96–103 G.Fine, ‘Knowledge and True Belief in the Meno’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27 (Winter 2004) 41–81 Translation & Commentary Men 97a9–c2 Men 97e2–98b5 Men 99e4–100b6 Essay Questions ‘True belief plus a working-out of the explanation (aitias logismos).’ Is this a good account of knowledge? What might be meant by the Socratic notion of ‘tying down opinion with an account of the reason’? Does this offer a plausible account of knowledge? (8) Philosophical Method in the Meno Preliminary Reading Meno 86c–96d Secondary Reading D. Scott, Plato’s Meno (CUP: Cambridge, 2006), ch 11 R. Robinson Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, chs 7 & 8 J.T. Bedu-Addo ‘Recollection and the Argument “from a Hypothesis” in Plato’s Meno’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 104 (1984), 1–14 K.V. Wilkes ‘Conclusions in the Meno’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (1979), 143–53; reprinted in Day (ed.), Plato’s Meno in Focus (Routledge 1994) Translation & Commentary Men 89d1–e9 Essay Questions Does Socrates mislead Meno by appealing to analogies between mathematical and ethical enquiry? Explain the method of hypothesis and assess its usefulness for the argument of the Meno.