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This journal is for YOU! *Order today for more FREE book options Perfect for students or anyone on the go! The Independent Review is available on mobile devices or tablets: iOS devices, Amazon Kindle Fire, or Android through Magzter. INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, 100 SWAN WAY, OAKLAND, CA 94621 • 800-927-8733 • [email protected] PROMO CODE IRA1703 A Matter of Small Consequence U.S. Foreign Policy and the Tragedy of East Timor —————— ✦ —————— JERRY K. SWEENEY hen East Timor resurfaced as a journalistic destination, most Americans were hard put to find it on a map. Later, when the Clinton administration W took official notice, some were wont to label the U.S. interest yet another example of a meritorious intervention, similar to the one in Kosovo. Others, familiar with East Timor and its problems, suspected the new U.S. involvement was the prod- uct of a guilty conscience. I myself recalled an observation from the film Bull Durham. Annie Savoy (played by Susan Sarandon) opines to the audience in the opening credits: “A guy will listen to anything if he thinks it’s foreplay.” The United States was never, in any wise, interested in the well-being of the East Timorese. The United States was not inclined to listen to what they had to say, especially if their grievances were justified. East Timor was and will be nothing more to the United States than a means to ephemeral ends involving a third party. The Portuguese Connection Our tale begins in 1942, when the successes of German submarine warfare led the Allied High Command to realize that a successful campaign against the U-boats would require an airbase in the Portuguese Azores. This realization placed Washing- Jerry K. Sweeney is a professor in and the head of the Department of History at South Dakota State Uni- versity, Brookings, South Dakota. The Independent Review, v.VII, n.1, Summer 2002, ISSN 1086-1653, Copyright © 2002, pp. 91– 102. 91 92 ✦ J ERRY K. SWEENEY ton in a good news/bad news situation. The bad news was that Portugal was a neu- tral nation in 1942. The good news was that Lisbon was party to an ancient alliance with the British, a U.S. ally. Britain and Portugal had avowed their friendship in 1373, and they concluded a formal treaty of alliance in 1386. Thus, in the fullness of time, U.S. aircraft based in the Azores put paid to the efforts of the German navy. Despite the success of the antisubmarine campaign, how- ever, the Department of War was disconsolate. In the first instance, the U.S. presence in the Azores was under the auspices of the Royal Air Force. Not surprisingly, the War Department preferred a wholly owned U.S. subsidiary. In addition, the existing facil- ity at Lajes could not be expanded to handle an increase in air traffic incident to the invasion of Europe or Japan. Finally, there was no doubt that a second airfield would be beneficial during bad weather. In consequence, at the end of 1943, Washington was committed to the establishment of a base independent of British control. Enter from stage left the Portuguese colony of East Timor, which the Japanese had occupied in the early months of 1942 as part of their drive on Australia. Despite regular protests by Lisbon, the Japanese remained obdurate. The Portuguese govern- ment believed that if it did not liberate the colony before the end of the Pacific War, Portugal might lose control of it in a general postwar settlement. This situation cre- ated what seemed a match made in heaven. The United States would provide the logistical support necessary to liberate East Timor, and Lisbon would authorize a U.S. base in the Azores. Of course, when sovereign states negotiate, there’s many a slip betwixt the cup and the lip. The Portuguese were not inclined to risk the ignominy that had resulted from their resort to arms during World War I. Portugal had left that conflict as a discarded and useless country. By 1943, however, Portuguese neutrality was proving quite prof- itable. If Lisbon managed to liberate East Timor, Portugal not only would survive the war unscathed, but would recover a lost colony in the bargain. In the minds of most Portuguese, the empire was vital to the nation’s existence as a sovereign state. With- out the empire, Portugal was perceived as little more than a hodgepodge of ethnic remnants strung along a coastal plain. In fact, more than one outside observer noted that the Portuguese were almost pathologically suspicious concerning the empire, and national dismay set in when even a rumor of foreign annexation was afoot. In addi- tion, it was widely believed that the loss of the colonies would presage the end of the authoritarian state created by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1933 (Guimaraes 1993–94; Sweeney 1997). However, any firm commitment to the liberation of East Timor most assuredly would affect operations designed to defeat the Japanese. There- fore, the Americans sought to fashion an agreement that would allow a facility in the Azores with a minimal obligation to support the Portuguese liberation of Timor. Both sides played their cards carefully, notwithstanding the fact that the United States was the five-thousand-pound gorilla at the table. A bargain was struck and the necessary documents exchanged on November 28, 1944. Once construction of an airfield on the island of Santa Maria was under way, U.S. officials, not unreasonably, THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW A MATTER OF S MALL C ONSEQUENCE ✦ 93 believed the Luso-American connection was on solid ground. They were dismayed, therefore, when East Timor emerged as an item in the negotiations over a postwar aviation agreement. Fortunately for the United States, Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, rendered the matter moot. Admittedly, a slight contretemps developed over who should accept the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. The British and the Australian governments insisted that Lisbon could not accept the surrender of Japanese troops because Portugal was a neutral state. London dismissed the resulting Portuguese protests as perfunctory. Wash- ington, for its part, repeatedly requested that London find a way to satisfy Portugal’s nationalistic sentiments, clearly seeking to convince Lisbon that it accepted all the obli- gations implicit in the Santa Maria agreements. The United States reaped an enormous harvest from a series of otherwise innocuous diplomatic notes. The deadlock over the aviation agreement was broken within a month, when the Portuguese reversed their for- mer position on several key points. Unfortunately for the American taxpayer, the newly created base in the Azores was a casualty of the aviation negotiation: Portugal paid $859,000 for a facility and equipment worth an estimated $2,200,000. In the decades following the war, the Luso-American connection focused on the U.S. facility in the Azores. So long as the ability of military aircraft to cross the Atlantic remained limited, the airbase was crucial to the defense of the United States. An alternative route by way of Newfoundland and England was considered less desir- able because of erratic weather patterns. Additional proof of the value of the Azores base came forth in October 1973. In view of the enormous equipment losses suffered by the Israeli Defense Force during the Yom Kippur War, Washington initiated an emergency resupply operation. Unfortunately, that effort could succeed only if the planes refueled in the Azores. Not surprisingly, the Portuguese government demurred, but the U.S. secretary of state read them the riot act. The U.S. planes landed in the Azores, and Portugal became subject to the retaliatory oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on October 21, 1973. The Azores were valuable, but Lisbon learned that Washington’s forbear- ance had limits. Portugal profited considerably from the Luso-American connection, so much so that, unlike its neighbor to the east, it became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When the issue of the dictatorial nature of the Portuguese government was raised in an executive session of the U.S. Senate, a State Department representative responded that “if it is a dictatorship, it is because the people freely voted for it” (Kaplan 1984, 109–10). As for East Timor, the State Department deemed the colony of so little consequence that it did not even achieve the status of unnoticed. Sumner Welles spoke for countless future U.S. diplomats when he avowed that the territory should be independent but that the process would take a thousand years (Louis 1978, 237). Of course, over time some Americans ques- tioned the need to concern themselves with Portugal or its colonial empire when the whole of Western civilization was presumably at stake.