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Why Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism Are Untenable

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Why Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism Are Untenable Why Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism Are Untenable Markus E. Schlosser University College Dublin Forthcoming in the Journal of Mind and Behavior This is the author’s copy (which may differ from the final print version in minor details) It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from functionalism mainly in its commitment to anti-representationalism, and I will offer two new objections to anti-representationalism. The first will be based on considerations concerning the contents of desires and intentions. The second objection concerns inner speech and mental imagery. We will see that the objections are of relevance to contemporary debates, as they apply with equal force to the currently popular anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive cognition. Keywords: behaviorism, Ramsey sentences, anti-representationalism The philosophy of mind literature distinguishes between two main types of traditional behaviorism: philosophical and psychological behaviorism (also known as analytical and methodological behaviorism).1 Both views are usually presented as relics of the past, and the implicit message is often that they are still being taught only so that we can learn from their failure (Graham, 2019; Heil, 2012; Kim, 2010). It is certainly true that psychological behaviorism is widely considered to be hopeless as a general theory of mind, but there are some remnants of this view to be found in many areas of empirical psychology. Most importantly, it is still often held or implicitly assumed that phenomena that can be explained in behavioristic terms should be explained in this way—in particular, they should be I would like to thank Dr. Russ (Editor) and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to Dr. Markus Schlosser, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Newman Building, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. Email: [email protected]. 1 Philosophical behaviorism is most closely associated with the work of Gilbert Ryle (especially Ryle, 1949; see also Hempel, 1949). Sympathizers included Rudolf Carnap, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W. V. O. Quine. The most important psychological behaviorists were Ivan Pavlov, John Watson, and B. F. Skinner. 1 explained, if possible, without the ascription of representational mental states. Likewise, it is widely agreed that traditional philosophical behaviorism is an untenable theory of mind. But the more recent past has seen the emergence of various views that are in line with philosophical behaviorism in the sense that they propose accounts of embodied and enactive cognition that do not require the ascription of mental representations (Chemero, 2009; Hutto and Myin, 2013; Thompson, 2007; van Gelder, 1995; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991). My focus here is primarily philosophical behaviorism and its anti-representationalist dimension. I will return to psychological behaviorism briefly in the conclusion. Philosophical behaviorism faces many objections and challenges. One of these objections is commonly singled out as the most devastating problem for the view. This is the problem of circularity. I will argue that this problem admits of a relatively straightforward solution if we make use of some of the insights that have emerged from the more recent debate on the nature of dispositions. If we refer to the causal bases of behavioral dispositions, we can solve, as I will argue, the circularity problem in the same way as functionalism does. This will force us to get clearer about the difference between behaviorism and functionalism, and it will lead us to the second part, in which I present two new objections to philosophical behaviorism. The first objection will be based on considerations concerning the contents of desires and intentions. In the second objection I argue that behaviorism cannot explain inner speech and mental imagery. It will become clear that those objections apply with equal force to the currently popular anti-representationalist versions of embodied and enactive cognition, and I will suggest that they point to clear limits for neo-behavioristic aspirations in psychology and cognitive science. Before we turn to philosophical behaviorism, let me add a note on the overall dialectic, which may seem rather odd, at first. In the first part I defend behaviorism against the circularity objection, and in the second part I reject the view. As indicated, there is reason in 2 this apparent incoherence. The reply to the circularity objection will bring into focus the key difference between behaviorism and functionalism. This will take us to my objections, which are objections that apply to all forms of anti-representationalism. Philosophical Behaviorism And the Circularity Problem Let me begin with an outline of traditional philosophical (or analytical) behaviorism (henceforth behaviorism, for short). This outline is based on the received view, as it is presented in standard textbooks (Graham, 2019; Heil, 2012; Kim, 2010). There are two main components of the view. The first is an analytical component that concerns the meaning of mental terms. It says, roughly, that statements about mental phenomena can be analyzed in terms of (or reduced to) statements about behavior and behavioral dispositions. The second component is ontological. It concerns the nature of mental states. It says, again roughly, that having certain mental states consists in the possession of behavioral dispositions and their manifestations in overt behavior. The analytical component is supposed to yield the ontological component: when mental terms are analyzed in behavioristic terms we can see that the possession of mental states can be reduced to the possession and manifestation of behavioral dispositions. To illustrate, let us consider two stock examples. It seems, for instance, that being in pain is typically accompanied by certain types of expressions, such as wincing, moaning, and by actions that lead to a cessation or alleviation of the pain (avoidance behavior). Behaviorism suggests that “being in pain” can be analyzed entirely in terms of such behaviors and behavioral dispositions, and that we have therefore no reason to think that the mental state of being in pain involves anything else than that. Or, it seems plausible to assume that what people believe is strongly correlated with what they are disposed to assert. Behaviorism suggests that the mental state type “belief that p” can be analyzed in terms of assertions and 3 dispositions to assert, and that mental states of belief are nothing over and above such behaviors and behavioral dispositions. At the time when behaviorism was developed and defended, it was commonly thought that dispositional properties, including behavioral dispositions, could be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. Behaviorism is still usually presented in this way, even though the conditional analysis is now widely rejected (more on this below). Assuming this analysis for now, a first approximation to an analysis of belief may take the following form: S believes that p if and only if S would assert that p if S were asked about p. There are, of course, obvious problems with that. What if the agent does not want to say or is afraid to say what is believed? What if the agent intends to express the belief without being asked? What if there is some misunderstanding or miscommunication? And so on. Note, first, that one cannot avoid those issues by rejecting the conditional analysis. Nowadays, the conditional analysis of dispositions is widely rejected, mainly due to various counterexamples. Consider, for instance, a sorcerer who would change the intrinsic properties of a fragile glass if it were to be struck, so that it would not break when struck. Or suppose that the sorcerer would cover the fragile glass with protective coating if it were to be struck, so that it would not break when struck. The former is an example of a “finkish” disposition (Lewis, 1997), the latter is an example of a “masked disposition” (Johnston, 1992). Such examples show that the truth of the relevant counterfactual is not necessary. Reverse cases, sometimes called “mimics,” show the opposite. Assume, for instance, that the sorcerer would turn a paper cup into a fragile cup whenever it was about to be struck. This appears to be a counterexample to the claim that the truth of the relevant counterfactual is sufficient (for more on this see Fara, 2005; Manley and Wasserman, 2008). 4 Various lessons can be drawn from this. One may suggest that this shows that dispositions cannot be explained reductively, and that it simply has to be accepted as a brute fact that dispositions may be finkish or masked in various ways. In light of this, one may suggest that behaviorism can appeal to dispositions without analyzing them as conditionals, and that there is, therefore, no need to specify all the possible defeating conditions. Given this, the proposal may be rendered as follows: S believes that p if and only if S is disposed to assert that p when S is asked about p. On this suggestion, the mentioned complications are not counterexamples. No claims are being made about what the agent would do, but only about what the agent is disposed to do. Suppose that, under certain circumstances, the agent does not and would not say what is believed. It may nevertheless be true that the agent is disposed to say what is believed (even in those circumstances). This strategy may help to avoid apparent counterexamples, but it does not get to the bottom of the issue. The mentioned complications are not merely potential counterexamples to behavioral analyses.
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