Cognition in eco & cognition in vitro Can cognitive mechanisms explain ecological behaviour ?

Avel Guenin–Carlut avelguenin.github.io May 12, 2021

Kairos Research kairos-research.org Behaviorism Behaviour is determined by law-like regularities in the association of stimuli and response, as can be observed in experimental settings

(Post-)Cognitivism Behaviour derive from mental activity determined by the physical architecture which enable structured information processing

What are cognitive sciences ?

1 (Post-)Cognitivism Behaviour derive from mental activity determined by the physical architecture which enable structured information processing

What are cognitive sciences ?

Behaviorism Behaviour is determined by law-like regularities in the association of stimuli and response, as can be observed in experimental settings

1 What are cognitive sciences ?

Behaviorism Behaviour is determined by law-like regularities in the association of stimuli and response, as can be observed in experimental settings

(Post-)Cognitivism Behaviour derive from mental activity determined by the physical architecture which enable structured information processing

1 What are cognitive sciences ?

Behaviorism Behaviour is determined by law-like regularities in the association of stimuli and response, as can be observed in experimental settings

(Post-)Cognitivism Behaviour derive from mental activity determined by the physical architecture which enable structured information processing

1 From computer analogy to cognitive mechanisms [61]

Dynamical post-cognitivism Symbolic cognitivism (from [20]) (from [61]

What are cognitive sciences ?

2 Dynamical post-cognitivism Symbolic cognitivism (from [20]) (from [61]

What are cognitive sciences ?

From computer analogy to cognitive mechanisms [61]

2 Dynamical post-cognitivism (from [20])

What are cognitive sciences ?

From computer analogy to cognitive mechanisms [61]

Symbolic cognitivism (from [61]

2 What are cognitive sciences ?

From computer analogy to cognitive mechanisms [61]

Dynamical post-cognitivism Symbolic cognitivism (from [20]) (from [61]

2 Table of Contents

Cognition in vitro : studying cognitive architecture

Scaling cognition from the lab to the wild

Cognition in eco : studying human activity

Conclusion

3 Cognition in vitro : studying cognitive architecture Stimulus-response paradigm in experimental psychology A subject is exposed to a specific stimuli, and the experimenter measures some relevant aspect of their answer. The functioning of specific cognitive mechanisms is inferred from the observed regularities.

Behaviour is typically observed in controlled and individual settings where it exhibits law-like regularities. Cognitive mechanisms intervene so as to explain these regularities [61].

How does cognitive psychology work ?

4 Behaviour is typically observed in controlled and individual settings where it exhibits law-like regularities. Cognitive mechanisms intervene so as to explain these regularities [61].

How does cognitive psychology work ?

Stimulus-response paradigm in experimental psychology A subject is exposed to a specific stimuli, and the experimenter measures some relevant aspect of their answer. The functioning of specific cognitive mechanisms is inferred from the observed regularities.

4 Behaviour is typically observed in controlled and individual settings where it exhibits law-like regularities. Cognitive mechanisms intervene so as to explain these regularities [61].

How does cognitive psychology work ?

Stimulus-response paradigm in experimental psychology A subject is exposed to a specific stimuli, and the experimenter measures some relevant aspect of their answer. The functioning of specific cognitive mechanisms is inferred from the observed regularities.

4 How does cognitive psychology work ?

Stimulus-response paradigm in experimental psychology A subject is exposed to a specific stimuli, and the experimenter measures some relevant aspect of their answer. The functioning of specific cognitive mechanisms is inferred from the observed regularities.

Behaviour is typically observed in controlled and individual settings where it exhibits law-like regularities. Cognitive mechanisms intervene so as to explain these regularities [61].

4 Massive modularism [4, 17] Cognitive mechanisms are domain-specific adaptations to specific environmental problems encountered by humans in ancestral environment, and are consequently individuated by their function as defined by activation condition and stimulus-response law.

Illustration of module domains [56]

Individuating cognitive mechanisms by their function

5 Illustration of module domains [56]

Individuating cognitive mechanisms by their function

Massive modularism [4, 17] Cognitive mechanisms are domain-specific adaptations to specific environmental problems encountered by humans in ancestral environment, and are consequently individuated by their function as defined by activation condition and stimulus-response law.

5 Individuating cognitive mechanisms by their function

Massive modularism [4, 17] Cognitive mechanisms are domain-specific adaptations to specific environmental problems encountered by humans in ancestral environment, and are consequently individuated by their function as defined by activation condition and stimulus-response law.

5 Illustration of module domains [56] Evolutionary function [8, 55] Biological traits are not typically individuated by ancestral challenges they were selected to solve, since they emerge from developmental processes that are not shaped by single adaptive problems.

Ecological function [6, 13] Documented cognitive mecanisms are not typically individuated by the range of behaviour they cause, because they have an active role in the emergence of complex autonomous dynamics.

Can we match cognitive mechanisms to their function ?

6 Ecological function [6, 13] Documented cognitive mecanisms are not typically individuated by the range of behaviour they cause, because they have an active role in the emergence of complex autonomous dynamics.

Can we match cognitive mechanisms to their function ?

Evolutionary function [8, 55] Biological traits are not typically individuated by ancestral challenges they were selected to solve, since they emerge from developmental processes that are not shaped by single adaptive problems.

6 Can we match cognitive mechanisms to their function ?

Evolutionary function [8, 55] Biological traits are not typically individuated by ancestral challenges they were selected to solve, since they emerge from developmental processes that are not shaped by single adaptive problems.

Ecological function [6, 13] Documented cognitive mecanisms are not typically individuated by the range of behaviour they cause, because they have an active role in the emergence of complex autonomous dynamics.

6 Cognitive mechanisms are studied with three convergent methods : Decomposition : Cognitive mechanisms are methodologically desintegrated into component parts, whose behaviour is characterised in isolation. Recomposition : These components are conceptually integrated as functional parts of a broader system, which aggregate properties are modelled mechanistically. Situation : The mechanistic model is injected into specific ecological settings, and their coupling is used to predict and explain behaviour.

Looking down, looking around, and looking up [5, 7]

7 Decomposition : Cognitive mechanisms are methodologically desintegrated into component parts, whose behaviour is characterised in isolation. Recomposition : These components are conceptually integrated as functional parts of a broader system, which aggregate properties are modelled mechanistically. Situation : The mechanistic model is injected into specific ecological settings, and their coupling is used to predict and explain behaviour.

Looking down, looking around, and looking up [5, 7]

Cognitive mechanisms are studied with three convergent methods :

7 Recomposition : These components are conceptually integrated as functional parts of a broader system, which aggregate properties are modelled mechanistically. Situation : The mechanistic model is injected into specific ecological settings, and their coupling is used to predict and explain behaviour.

Looking down, looking around, and looking up [5, 7]

Cognitive mechanisms are studied with three convergent methods : Decomposition : Cognitive mechanisms are methodologically desintegrated into component parts, whose behaviour is characterised in isolation.

7 Situation : The mechanistic model is injected into specific ecological settings, and their coupling is used to predict and explain behaviour.

Looking down, looking around, and looking up [5, 7]

Cognitive mechanisms are studied with three convergent methods : Decomposition : Cognitive mechanisms are methodologically desintegrated into component parts, whose behaviour is characterised in isolation. Recomposition : These components are conceptually integrated as functional parts of a broader system, which aggregate properties are modelled mechanistically.

7 Looking down, looking around, and looking up [5, 7]

Cognitive mechanisms are studied with three convergent methods : Decomposition : Cognitive mechanisms are methodologically desintegrated into component parts, whose behaviour is characterised in isolation. Recomposition : These components are conceptually integrated as functional parts of a broader system, which aggregate properties are modelled mechanistically. Situation : The mechanistic model is injected into specific ecological settings, and their coupling is used to predict and explain behaviour.

7 Scaling cognition from the lab to the wild Cognitive systems endogenously maintains scale-invariant dynamical architecture [35, 30, 44]. Its resonance embody complex dynamics grounding both multiscale information integration and wild fluctuations [62, 2, 11, 12, 1].

The scale invariant architecture of cognition

Structural and functional brain networks (from [11])

8 The scale invariant architecture of cognition

Cognitive systems endogenously maintains scale-invariant dynamical architecture [35, 30, 44]. Its resonance embody complex dynamics grounding both multiscale information

Structural and functional integration and wild fluctuations brain networks (from [62, 2, 11, 12, 1]. [11])

8 Bioresonance Bioresonance allow living systems to amplify thermal or quantum noise across scales, creating symmetry breaking structures which they integrate within their own structural identity [36, 31]. They continuously create their own structure away from physical order, a property known as self-generation or autopo¨ıesis [38].

Cognition as creative evolution

Dissipative systems routinely self-organise in symmetry breaking stable states, ie emerging structures which deviate from the physical regularities imposed onto the system. Benard-Rayleigh convection cells

9 Cognition as creative evolution

Dissipative systems routinely self-organise in symmetry breaking stable states, ie emerging structures which deviate from the physical regularities imposed onto the system. Benard-Rayleigh convection cells

Bioresonance Bioresonance allow living systems to amplify thermal or quantum noise across scales, creating symmetry breaking structures which they integrate within their own structural identity [36, 31]. They continuously create their own structure away from physical order, a property known as self-generation or autopo¨ıesis [38].

9 Yes. They do.

Innovation in the collective brain [42] Human societies self-organise into scale-invariant structures [26, 48, 32, 50, 39], which enable the creative evolution of complex cultural traits [19, 48, 50, 39].

This distributed process of cultural adaptation is critical in shaping individual behaviour through the construction of the collective socio-cultural niche which directs the developement of human cognition [33, 9, 42, 28, 16, 59, 49, 43].

Do social systems display bioresonance ?

10 Innovation in the collective brain [42] Human societies self-organise into scale-invariant structures [26, 48, 32, 50, 39], which enable the creative evolution of complex cultural traits [19, 48, 50, 39].

This distributed process of cultural adaptation is critical in shaping individual behaviour through the construction of the collective socio-cultural niche which directs the developement of human cognition [33, 9, 42, 28, 16, 59, 49, 43].

Do social systems display bioresonance ?

Yes. They do.

10 This distributed process of cultural adaptation is critical in shaping individual behaviour through the construction of the collective socio-cultural niche which directs the developement of human cognition [33, 9, 42, 28, 16, 59, 49, 43].

Do social systems display bioresonance ?

Yes. They do.

Innovation in the collective brain [42] Human societies self-organise into scale-invariant structures [26, 48, 32, 50, 39], which enable the creative evolution of complex cultural traits [19, 48, 50, 39].

10 Do social systems display bioresonance ?

Yes. They do.

Innovation in the collective brain [42] Human societies self-organise into scale-invariant structures [26, 48, 32, 50, 39], which enable the creative evolution of complex cultural traits [19, 48, 50, 39].

This distributed process of cultural adaptation is critical in shaping individual behaviour through the construction of the collective socio-cultural niche which directs the developement of human cognition [33, 9, 42, 28, 16, 59, 49, 43].

10 Both individual humans and societies display the same scale invariant structure, wild dynamics, and ability for creative evolution. This invalidates naive strategies of inference. From past to future behaviour : Creative evolution implies that systems do not revisit the same states regularly, so their properties cannot be inferred from the observation of any time window. From the lab to the wild : Wild dynamics implies that human behaviour is critically dependant of endogenous dynamics and context, and cannot be mapped by stimulus-response paradigm. From individual to collective cognition : Scale invariant structure implies that individual properties do not determine collective dynamics, therefore models of cognition do not scale.

Inferring in eco cognition from in vitro behaviour

11 From past to future behaviour : Creative evolution implies that systems do not revisit the same states regularly, so their properties cannot be inferred from the observation of any time window. From the lab to the wild : Wild dynamics implies that human behaviour is critically dependant of endogenous dynamics and context, and cannot be mapped by stimulus-response paradigm. From individual to collective cognition : Scale invariant structure implies that individual properties do not determine collective dynamics, therefore models of cognition do not scale.

Inferring in eco cognition from in vitro behaviour

Both individual humans and societies display the same scale invariant structure, wild dynamics, and ability for creative evolution. This invalidates naive strategies of inference.

11 From the lab to the wild : Wild dynamics implies that human behaviour is critically dependant of endogenous dynamics and context, and cannot be mapped by stimulus-response paradigm. From individual to collective cognition : Scale invariant structure implies that individual properties do not determine collective dynamics, therefore models of cognition do not scale.

Inferring in eco cognition from in vitro behaviour

Both individual humans and societies display the same scale invariant structure, wild dynamics, and ability for creative evolution. This invalidates naive strategies of inference. From past to future behaviour : Creative evolution implies that systems do not revisit the same states regularly, so their properties cannot be inferred from the observation of any time window.

11 From individual to collective cognition : Scale invariant structure implies that individual properties do not determine collective dynamics, therefore models of cognition do not scale.

Inferring in eco cognition from in vitro behaviour

Both individual humans and societies display the same scale invariant structure, wild dynamics, and ability for creative evolution. This invalidates naive strategies of inference. From past to future behaviour : Creative evolution implies that systems do not revisit the same states regularly, so their properties cannot be inferred from the observation of any time window. From the lab to the wild : Wild dynamics implies that human behaviour is critically dependant of endogenous dynamics and context, and cannot be mapped by stimulus-response paradigm.

11 Inferring in eco cognition from in vitro behaviour

Both individual humans and societies display the same scale invariant structure, wild dynamics, and ability for creative evolution. This invalidates naive strategies of inference. From past to future behaviour : Creative evolution implies that systems do not revisit the same states regularly, so their properties cannot be inferred from the observation of any time window. From the lab to the wild : Wild dynamics implies that human behaviour is critically dependant of endogenous dynamics and context, and cannot be mapped by stimulus-response paradigm. From individual to collective cognition : Scale invariant structure implies that individual properties do not determine collective dynamics, therefore models of cognition do not scale.

11 Cognition in eco : studying human activity Integrative pluralism The natural sciences attempt to explain observable phenomenons by appeal to causal relations in the natural world, which typically implies piecewise integration of contextually relevant models [40] rather than reduction to lower levels [18].

Complexity beyond networks

Living systems are typically organised in complex structures across scales, in a way that extends beyond bottom-up ”emergence” [51, 37, 41, 22].

12 Complexity beyond networks

Living systems are typically organised in complex structures across scales, in a way that extends beyond bottom-up ”emergence” [51, 37, 41, 22].

Integrative pluralism The natural sciences attempt to explain observable phenomenons by appeal to causal relations in the natural world, which typically implies piecewise integration of contextually relevant models [40] rather than reduction to lower levels [18].

12 Niche construction as embodied cognition Organisms systematically alterate their environments so as to fit their ecological needs, a process known as niche construction [34]. By shaping the landscape of affordances in which the agent evolves, this process embodies cognitive attitudes in its material niche [10, 15].

Adaptive coupling in cognition (from [59])

Organisation and collective cognition

Human societies display organisation across scales, in the form of social structure, material infrastructure, or institutions [54],.

13 Adaptive coupling in cognition (from [59])

Organisation and collective cognition

Human societies display organisation across scales, in the form of social structure, material infrastructure, or institutions [54],. Niche construction as embodied cognition Organisms systematically alterate their environments so as to fit their ecological needs, a process known as niche construction [34]. By shaping the landscape of affordances in which the agent evolves, this process embodies cognitive attitudes in its material niche [10, 15].

13 Organisation and collective cognition

Human societies display organisation across scales, in the form of social structure, material infrastructure, or institutions [54],. Niche construction as embodied cognition Organisms systematically alterate their environments so as to fit their ecological needs, a process known as niche construction [34]. By shaping the landscape of affordances in which the agent evolves, this process embodies cognitive attitudes in its material niche [10, 15].

Adaptive coupling in cognition (from [59])

13 Evolutionary inheritance and collective agency The coevolution of ingroup cooperation and new evolutionary inheritance systems (such as genes or social learning) enable the progressive functional specialisation of individuals, and their integration into supra-individual agency. This process is known as evolutionary transition [29, 60, 57].

The emergence of City-States, dense settlement of highly specialised populations [58] which depend on writing to enact centralised administrative control [25] and maintain their structure [52, 53], is a clear case of evolutionary transition Unknown source [27].

Enacting collective agency

14 The emergence of City-States, dense settlement of highly specialised populations [58] which depend on writing to enact centralised administrative control [25] and maintain their structure [52, 53], is a clear case of evolutionary transition Unknown source [27].

Enacting collective agency

Evolutionary inheritance and collective agency The coevolution of ingroup cooperation and new evolutionary inheritance systems (such as genes or social learning) enable the progressive functional specialisation of individuals, and their integration into supra-individual agency. This process is known as evolutionary transition [29, 60, 57].

14 Enacting collective agency

Evolutionary inheritance and collective agency The coevolution of ingroup cooperation and new evolutionary inheritance systems (such as genes or social learning) enable the progressive functional specialisation of individuals, and their integration into supra-individual agency. This process is known as evolutionary transition [29, 60, 57].

The emergence of City-States, dense settlement of highly specialised populations [58] which depend on writing to enact centralised administrative control [25] and maintain their structure [52, 53], is a clear case of evolutionary transition Unknown source [27]. 14 Enactive variational inference [14, 24, 47] Dynamical systems, given sufficiently regular boundary conditions, spontaneously self-organise so as to minimise their variational free-energy, ie maximise evidence for the world-model they embody.

Variational free-energy minimisation entails the continuous recreation of one’s structural identity so as to preserve it from environmental fluctuations. This inferential process occurs across scale in living systems, and grounds their nested organisation [46, 45, 3, 21]. from [46]

Cognition across scales

15 Variational free-energy minimisation entails the continuous recreation of one’s structural identity so as to preserve it from environmental fluctuations. This inferential process occurs across scale in living systems, and grounds their nested organisation [46, 45, 3, 21]. from [46]

Cognition across scales

Enactive variational inference [14, 24, 47] Dynamical systems, given sufficiently regular boundary conditions, spontaneously self-organise so as to minimise their variational free-energy, ie maximise evidence for the world-model they embody.

15 Cognition across scales

Enactive variational inference [14, 24, 47] Dynamical systems, given sufficiently regular boundary conditions, spontaneously self-organise so as to minimise their variational free-energy, ie maximise evidence for the world-model they embody.

Variational free-energy minimisation entails the continuous recreation of one’s structural identity so as to preserve it from environmental fluctuations. This inferential process occurs across scale in living systems, and grounds their nested organisation [46, 45, 3, 21]. from [46] 15 Conclusion Cognitive dynamics in social network

Human cognition emerges from complex social interaction, whose properties cannot be reduced to individual behaviour.

16 Cognitive dynamics in social network

Human cognition emerges from complex social interaction, whose properties cannot be reduced to individual behaviour.

16 Augmented reality (from Black Mirror)

Cognition as creative evolution

Cognition is the process through which living systems actively build meaning by their own agency [38], continuously creating their own structural identity in a open-ended manner.

17 Cognition as creative evolution

Cognition is the process through which living systems actively build meaning by their own agency [38], continuously creating their own structural identity in a open-ended manner.

Augmented reality (from Black Mirror)

17 Academic research is coupled to wider socio-cognitive dynamics by drawing from folk knowledge and building pragmatic understanding. This process depends on the construction of stylised, contextually useful models [23] which characterises the naturalist demarch.

Enactive loop

Epistemology, enactivised

18 Enactive loop

Epistemology, enactivised

Academic research is coupled to wider socio-cognitive dynamics by drawing from folk knowledge and building pragmatic understanding. This process depends on the construction of stylised, contextually useful models [23] which characterises the naturalist demarch.

18 Epistemology, enactivised

Academic research is coupled to wider socio-cognitive dynamics by drawing from folk knowledge and building pragmatic understanding. This process depends on the construction of stylised, contextually useful models [23] which characterises the naturalist demarch.

Enactive loop

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