Naval War College Review Volume 54 Article 23 Number 3 Summer

2001 How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo, Phillip S. Meilinger

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Recommended Citation Meilinger, Phillip S. (2001) "How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo,," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 3 , Article 23. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/23

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blue-collar or decidedly middle-class amounts of energy and material are ex- background, mostly from farms or small pended, and notable gains are achieved. towns. Their story is an important one, At the same time, the path to success is and the first-person accounts of individ- not a straight line—there is much ineffi- ual sacrifice and aircrew heroism are a ciency, debate, and compromise. Sausage needed addition to the narrative of the is being made. Navy’s nearly forgotten war in the Mekong Gentile does not contest the findings of Delta. USSBS. Indeed, virtually no one has at-

WILLIAM M. CALHOUN tempted to do so in the five-plus decades Naval War College since they were released. The reason is simple: no one has the time, stamina, re- sources, or expertise to review the moun- tain of data collected and analyzed by the thousand individuals who conducted the Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? USSBS. Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. New Instead, Gentile seeks to discredit the York: New York Univ. Press, 2001. 273pp. $36 survey’s findings by revealing flaws and The issue of strategic bombing’s effec- inconsistencies in the survey itself. Pri- tiveness is vitally important to political marily, he argues that Army Air Forces and military leaders. U.S. Air Force doc- (AAF) leaders were so interested in form- trine has argued for decades that ing a separate air force after the war that airpower’s ability to operate directly and they induced bias into the USSBS. He is immediately at the strategic level of war unable to make this charge stick. The is its unique and defining characteris- survey was led by noted industrialists, tic—a characteristic that must be ex- bankers, economists, lawyers, and other ploited. Many disagree, so the debates professionals, most of whom had had lit- have been long and heated. tle or no direct involvement with avia- Gian Gentile, a serving Army officer, now tion prior to their work with the survey. adds to the literature on this important Gentile admits that General Henry “Hap” subject. Unfortunately, he never really Arnold, the AAF commander, stressed to comes to grips with the key issue of effec- these civilian leaders the need for objec- tiveness implied by the title of his book. tivity, impartiality, and truth in the sur- Rather, he has chosen to replow some old vey’s findings. Yet he treats such ground, looking anew at the U.S. Strate- admonitions as duplicitous, despite the gic Bombing Survey (USSBS), chartered statement by the USSBS head that “at no by President Franklin Roosevelt to exam- time has there been the slightest inclina- ine and report on the effects of strategic tion to interfere with us.” bombing in World War II. Measuring In truth, it is difficult to imagine that bombing’s effectiveness and examining men like John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul the workings of the USSBS that studied Nitze, and George Ball could have been bomb effects are two different things. manipulated and pressured to distort The story of USSBS has been told before. their findings. Common sense and logic In many ways it is a typical tale of war- tell us it is more likely that these time America. A need is identified, re- men—and their hundreds of colleagues sources and personnel are mobilized, vast on the survey— examined thousands of

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001 1 Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 23 BOOK REVIEWS 183

documents, interviewed hundreds of wit- as a foreign-policy tool, such measure- nesses, visited scores of bombed sites, ment is essential. This poorly reasoned and then concluded that strategic bomb- and highly parochial book will not help ing had indeed been a decisive factor in us find answers to that pressing need, nor the Allied victory, as they reported. will it foster understanding among the Alas, such a conclusion is unacceptable services.

to Gentile. He must find nefarious PHILLIP S. MEILINGER schemes and schemers, and so he repeat- Science Applications International Corporation McLean, Va. edly questions the motives and veracity of the participants. For example, when General Curtis LeMay testified before Congress that he did not believe airpower could “win the war” and that a balanced mix of land, sea, and air forces was neces- Jordan, Robert S. Norstad: Cold War NATO Su- preme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat. sary for victory, Gentile dismisses his New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 329pp. $49 statement as a “shrewd and bureaucrati- cally astute” tactic to manipulate his ci- Lauris Norstad was a major Air Force vilian superiors. leader during the defining years of the Cold War, and except for Dwight Eisen- The USSBS has been controversial ever hower, he was the most prominent of all since it was written. Small wonder—at- the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe tempting to measure the effects of strate- (SACEUR) since that position was estab- gic bombing in World War II was a lished in early 1951. Surprisingly, up to massive undertaking, conducted at a time now, nothing definitive had been written when the techniques of systems analysis on his role as SACEUR. Robert Jordan, a were in their infancy. Gentile finds it professor at the University of New Or- troubling that survey members were not leans and an authority on Nato, has filled in total agreement. This should hardly that gap. come as a surprise. If the unfolding of historical events were simple and uncon- Norstad grew up in a small town in Min- tested, our libraries would be far smaller. nesota and graduated from West Point in the class of 1930. Transferring to the Air His concluding chapter, dealing with the Corps in 1931, he was one of that rela- survey that analyzed the air campaign of tively small group of regular-officer avia- the Persian Gulf War, is less tendentious. tors who provided air force leadership Here again, however, the author presents during World War II. When the war be- little that is new, and, more importantly, gan, Major Norstad was serving on an air he does not attempt to address the book’s staff in Washington, D.C. He came to the ostensible focus—the efficacy of strategic attention of General Henry “Hap” Arnold, bombing. who headed what had become in June Measuring the effectiveness of strategic 1941 the Army Air Forces. In 1942 Arnold air attack is one of the greatest challenges established a select group of young offi- facing military planners today. It is an cers, the brightest he could find, to work enormously complex and difficult prob- in his immediate office. Norstad was one lem that defies easy solution. Yet as of them—he was on the way up. airpower becomes increasingly dominant

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