THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN MORALE

VOLUME I

Morale Division

May 1947 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN MORALE

VOLUME I

Morale Division Dates Of Survey: March-July, 1945 Date of Publication: May 1947

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. - Price 00 cents This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bomb- ing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered' as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpreta• tion in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey. FOREWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was' established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944. pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt. The officers of the Survey were: Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman. George W. Ball,* Harry L. Bowman. John Iv. Galbraith, Rensis Likert, Frank A. McNamee. Jr., Paul H. Nitze, Robert P. Russell, Fred Searls, Jr., Theodore P. Wright, Directors. ChaiOes C. Cabot, Secretary. The Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350 officei-s and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters in London and estab• lished forward headquarters and regional headquarters in Germany imme• diately follow the advance of the Allied armies. It made a close examination and inspection of several hundred German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and documentary mate• rial, including top German government documents; and conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans, including virtually all of the surviving political and military leaders. Germany was scoured for its war records which were found sometimes, hut rarely, in places where they ought to have been; sometimes in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns, in caves; on one occasion, in alien house and, on two occasions ,in coffins. Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the Survey.

Some two hundred detailed reports were made. During the coui-se of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and sugges• tions in connection with the air operations against Japan. "While the European War was going on. it was necessary, in many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records might have been irre• trievably lost. Survey personnel suffered several casualties, including four killed

The Survey studied the effects of the air attack on Japan and further reports have been submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.

iii PREFACE

The morale division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey had as its objective, "To detennine the direct and indirect effects of bombing upon the attitudes, behavior and health of the civilian population, with par• ticular reference to its effect upon the willingness and capacity of the bombed population to give effective and continued support to the German war effort."

Volume 1 contains two parts. Part I reports conclusions on German morale based for the most part on interviews with 3,711 German civilians. Part II covers evidence derived principally from official German morale doc• uments and from selected interrogations with officials and civilian leaders. In certain cases supporting evidence from interviews with the civilian popu• lation is also introduced here.

Volume II includes a miscellaneous collection of special reports which provide supporting data on morale from supplementary studies.

The findings of the medical branch of the morale division, appraising the effect of bombing on the physical and mental health of German civilians and on the medical resources of Germany, are presented separately.

IV TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME I

['H ye Summitry : The morale effects of air raids 1

Part T. Estimates of morale based on interviews with German civilians 5

Chapter 1. Background of German civilian morale 7

Chapter 2. The will to resist 12

Chapter 3. Morale effects produced by different bombing conditions 22

Chapter 4. Social and psychological factors affecting morale 33

Part II. Morale as reflected in official German documents and selected interrogations 41

Chapter 1. The couise of decline in morale 42

"Chapter 2. Morale and behavior of industrial workers 53

Chapter 3. Protection and relief-from bombing f>6

Chapter 4. Attempts to maintain morale by propaganda 73

Chapter 5. Attempts to rally youth ' SO

Chapter (>. The relation of bombing to disruptive behavior ...- 87

Chapter 7. The control of subversion and opposition •. .. . 04

Appendix A. The cross section interview study '. 109

Appendix B. Attitude toward ihe occupation.... -. • 130

*

v SAMPLE CITIES INCLUDED IN MORALE DIVISION STUDY

L ubflck

•Bremen 1;

?

Ritti* O o Honovtr

• Munster

ttrop Dortmund

Eutn#* A Witten oMUnden • oLudenschsld •Kassfll

Glodboch

Bonn

•Wetzlor

• Frankfurt 8

nErlangtn

• Nurnberg Sp«y«r

• Kar sruhe

•Stuttgart O Tubingen • Ulm

• Freiburg •Munich • Bombed o Unbombed • Kempten ED USSR Zone of Occupation

Chart I.

VI SUMMARY: THE MORALE EFFECTS OF AIR RAIDS

1. Strategic bombing was the major means by those with a high proportion of home destruc• which tiie Allies were'able to strike a direct blow tion. This was apparently due in part to the at the morale of German civilians. Almost one- fact that the apathy resulting from the heaviest third of the Germans were subjected to it and bombing made people more susceptible to the all lived in the shadow of its threat. One-half of controls of the regime, and partly to the fact one percent were killed by bombing, and 1 per• that those with poorer morale tended to leave the cent injured. One-fifth of all civilians were de• more heavily bombed cities after the early raids. prived of water, gas, or electricity, many of them 5. These observations of the diminishing re• for long periods. One of every 15 civilians was turns from heavy bombing point to the practical evacuated to another area. Every German, whether conclusion that the maximum morale effects-of or not he experienced these direct effects of bomb• dropping a given tonnage of bombs on Germany ing, suffered such indirect results as shortage of would have been attained by lighter raids as food and supplies, and the disruption of transpor• widely distributed as possible, rather than by con• tation. There was no German civilian who did centrated heavy bombing in limited areas. not experience hardship or suffering as a result 6. Civilians who suffered personal injuries or of bombing. casualties in the family and/or property damage 2. Bombing seriously depressed the morale of had much lower morale than those who expe• German civilians. Its main psychological effects rienced bombing but were not involved imme• were defeatism, fear, hopelessness, fatalism, and diately and personally. Disruption of public utili• apathy. "War weariness, willingness to surrender, ties and especially of local transportation serv• loss of hope for German victory, distrust of lead• ices by bombing played an important role in de• ers, feelings of disunity and demoralizing fear pressing the German people. were all more common among bombed than un• 7. Lowered civilian morale expressed itself in born bed people. By the beginning of 1944, three- somewhat diminished industrial productivity. fourths of all Germans regarded the war as lost. German controls were fairly successful in keep• Air warfare was less important than other mili• ing traditionally obedient and industrious work• tary developments in producing defeatism, but ers at a routine level of performance, but they bombing aided greatly in convicing civilians of could not overcome increasing apathy induced by Allied superiority, both through the severity of bombing. the raids and through the unchecked passage over• 8. "Black" radio listening and disbelief in of• head of fleets of Allied aircraft. ficial propaganda, increased steadily during the 3. Bombing did not stiffen morale. The hate last 2 yeai-s of the war. Even belief in the ef• and anger it aroused tended to.be directed against fectiveness of the much-advertised V-weapons the Nazi regime which was blamed for beginning was limited, for a quarter of the German civil• air warfare and for being unable to ward off Al• ians thought the whole propaganda campaign a lied air attacks. There is some evidence that swindle. Bombing had much to do with the final under heavy bombing the hate and anger was discrediting of propaganda and of the Nazis be• dulled by apathy. cause it brought home to millions the tangible 4. Continuous heavy bombing of the same com• proof of almost unopposed Allied air power, in• munities did not produce decreases in morale pro• disputable proof completely at variance with the portional to the amount of bombing. The biggest familiar Nazi propaganda. The morale effects of drop in morale was apparent in a comparison bombing may thus prove to have had even more between unbombed towns and the only lightly importance for the denazification of Germany bombed. The morale in towns subjected to the than for hastening military defeat. heaviest bombing was no worse than that in towns 9. German controls, particularly terror and of the same size receiving much lighter bomb propaganda, helped to prevent depressed morale loads. Morale was just as poor in towns with a from being translated into subvei-sive activity se• moderate proportion of homes destroyed as in riously detrimental to the war effort. However,

1 the increasingly severe terror tactics which were they took. Neither did the Allied Command at• used to hold civilians in line, did not stamp out tempt to secure such data or to use the preliminary opposition to the regime. Death sentences (most information that was available. Results from of them for political offenses) increased sharply pilot studies of foreign labor, captured letters, during each wartime year. In 1944, Germany's and prisoner of war demonstrate that quanti• . fifth full year of war, approximately one of every tative data regarding the effects of various kinds 1.200 German adults was arrested by the Gestapo of bombing on German morale could have been for a political or religious offense. Organized obtained during the period of the war through opposition groups were found in most German scientific research techniques. Had these tech• cities. Bombing served both to aid and to hinder niques Iwcn used and had results, such as those such groups, but our informants reported unani• mentioned in item five above, been applied in mously that air raids rendered people more sus• guiding bombing strategy and in directing the ceptible to their message. use of propaganda in an integrated offensive with 10. There is evidence in the Survey, which bombing, the adverse effect on German morale confirms previous suggestions, that the Catholic could have been appreciably greater, perhaps even Church, the Confessional Protestant Church and crucial. certain other small religious groups constituted an important source of resistance to certain poli• Methods and Procedures cies and actions of the Nazi regime. This was The morale division had as a major objective reflected in utterances and activities of the clergy the determination of the effect of bombing upon and in the generally lower war morale (from the willingness and capacity of German civilians the German point of view) among the laity. to give full support to the war effort. Specifically, 11. Up to the very end of the war. membere this includes an appraisal of the conditions under of the Nazi Party, those accepting Nazi ideology, which bombing produces the most advei'se effect and those -who had a vested interest in German upon morale, an evaluation of the success of the victory had higher morale than did others. As measures taken by the Nazis to minimize the might have been suspected, these factors had more morale effects of raids, and an analysis of the to do with the determination to hold out than problems of dislocation in German civilian life did any others.. Confirmed Nazis were frightened resulting from bombing, such as evacuation and by bombing, hut this fear did not necessarily migration. , produce a willingness to give up. Nevertheless To achieve these objectives, the morale division even the Nazis were affected by bombing and on obtained information from a number of inde• some measures their morale suffered as great or pendent sources, in order that major conclusions a greater drop than did that of others. The de• might be based upon more than one body of data. cline, however, was never large enough to reduce Two main sources were exhaustively utilized in the Nazi level to that of the general population. this investigation of Genu an wartime morale: 12. The evacuation program, in* general, pro• 1. The most accurate and dependable body of duced widespread dissatisfaction and confusion. data was obtained through interviewing at length Of all parts of this program the evacuation of a cross section of the German population in the children, particularly if'they were sent long dis• American, French, and British zones of occupa• tances from their families, had the most advei'se tion.1 These interviews were conducted by a pro• effect on morale. It not only imposed the burden fessionally competent field force. In all, 3,711 in• of fiunily separation, but in addition made it terviews were conducted with German civilians • necessary to relinquish -to the Nazi party the in 34 communities during the months of June and moral and educational guidance of the children. July 1945. (See Chart I for location of sample Tn spite of the inadequacies of this program, cities.) These 34 cities and towns varied in the however, morale probably would have been more degree of exposure to bombing, ranging from un• seriously affected by bombing if there had been bonded (owns to cities which had received a total no planned evacuation. of almost 50,000 tons of bombs. Objective com• 13. The Germans had no accurate, quantitative parisons could thus be made between morale and data on the effect, of bombing on the morale of the degree of bombing experience. their civilian population or on the relative ef• 1 Kfc appendix A for H full *tnK'mi'nl on niciuodu urwil in uliliilu- fectiveness of the' various control steps which injf hiterrlmvH. 2 2. Official German documents and records were war, from which a sample of 2,200 letters was sought and examined. Special attention was paid analyzed in detail. to morale reports, officially known as Stimmung- 4. Written questionnaires filled out by displaced sberichle or Lageberielite, which' were prepared foreign workers in Germany who had experienced for the Nazi officials and for the Propaganda bombing there. Ministry by local intelligence agents. 5. The questioning of French escapees in No• In addition, data were obtained from the fol• vember and December of 1944. lowing sources: (i. The interrogation of key informants, espe• 3. German civilian mail captured during the cially community leadei"S. PART I

ESTIMATES OF MORALE BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH GERMAN CIVILIANS •9

mm .VI eel

r

\

(a

4s

BELIEF! "

J 5^ CHAPTER I. THE BACKGROUND OF GERMAN CIVILIAN MORALE "In the coming war we shall fight not only on land, on the sea, and in the air. There will be a fourth theater of operations, the Inner Front. That front will decide the continued existence or the irrevocable death of the German nation." —Himmlei\ September 1937.

The Target bombing, although its structure was seriously damaged. But during the closing months of the Civilian morale was a vital weapon in the Ger• war, the cumulative effects of strategic bombing man arsenal. The people's will to support the delinitely began to outweigh the powerful Nazi war was essential to German victory. German forces which above all else had held the German civilian morale, therefore, was an important target people to the war-industry grindstone during the for the Allies. 2 preceding years. Poor morale did ultimately A major factor in the final break-down of Ger-. break out into widespread popular behavior im• man civilian morale was strategic bombing. It periling the German war effort. But the actual was not the only factor adversely affecting mo• outbreak was the result of several momentous and rale, but it did much to produce a mood of de• coinciding German catastrophes, the. approaching featism in the civilian population. By the end of 1944, strategic bombing had depressed a sub• loss of the war, the loss of German land to the stantial percentage of the bombed population enemy j the cumulative devastation and disruption into apathy. of the German home front by bombing, the mili• tary, political, and economic chaos which pre• The reason that poor German civilian morale vailed in the wake of disastrous setbacks. It was did not translate itself into action seriously en• in this combination of circumstances that strategic dangering the German war effort until the lat• bombing was able to achieve its maximum morale ter months of 1944 and the early months of 1945 effect. (See chart II.) was largely due to the terroristic control of the population, by the Nazis and, in part, to the The Objective Consequences of Bombing cultural patterns of the German people. The psychological effects of bombing are not The Nazi Party strove in every way to sustain limited to the ordeal of the air raid. The level morale. Whenever morale faltered or failed, of morale under bombing is determined by the every resource of Nazi control, propaganda or terror of the attack and of its immediate objec• police, was employed to minimize the danger to tive consequences in terms of civilians killed and the war effort. maimed, homes destroyed, families broken up by Then, too, the stern disciplinary standards of evacuation, and utility services destroyed, or dis• the German people, their subservience to author• rupted. It is in this context of the total disloca• ity and their unquestioning acceptance of the tion of civilian life that the morale effects of commands of their superiors helped the Nazis bombing must be understood. On the basis of data in their task of maintaining at least the out• from the cross section survey, it has been esti• ward manifestations of good morale. Coupled mated that the physical effects of strategic bomb• with these were the deeply ingrained habits of ing were as follows: work of the German people; their habitual de• TABLE 1.—Physical effects of bombing i sire to accomplish any task assigned; their will Killed 305,000 to work for work's sake. A third contributing Wounded 780,000 cultural factor was the intense emotional nation• Homes destroyed 1,865,000 alism of a people long obsessed with the specter Persona evacuated 4,885,000 of encirclement, led for generations to believe in Persons deprived of utilities 20,000,000 the righteousness of German wars, and convinced Chart III summarizes these results. that defeat would be calamitous. ' All estimates include ItusRinn-uccupicd Germany. The casualty Morale was not an easy target to knock out. estimates are haaed on Interviews with civilians and do not include police officials, member* of armed forces, displaced persons, people - It was never completely destroyed by strategic In concentration camps. 7 BOMSIke ATTACKS mi camur (OJ) KICH)

B|U||H|—- 944

Hamburg .300

Cologne

Bottrop

tvetimvnstar Bremen Munster 27,300 Munchan- Glodbach Li/beck 7. ,700 tmund 27,300 Hanover 24,700 '1,700. Wupportal 7,000 Kassel Wetztor 19,100 300 Frankfort // 29,300 /r

O 300

Isruhe Stuttgart "Wl.500 27.200

Nurnberg Freiburg 22,200 S 2,200 6.600

Kempt en Munich 28,300

PHYSICAL EFFECTS ON POPULATION (Old Reich.total: 69,800,000) Subjected Civilians Civilians Homes Deprived to Attack . Killed Wounded Evacuated Destroyed of Utilities ,22,000,000 305,000 780.000 5,000,000 1,800,000 20,000,000 Casualties TABLE 2.—Bomb damage to homes (dwelling-units) in Germany Approximately 22,000,000 German civilians, or

Percent of all roughly one-third'of Germany's pre-1939 national Number of Percent of hotnw In population of 69,800,000, are estimated to have homes tut homes htt Germany 1 been subjected to strategic bombing. Deal roved or damaged beyond re- On the basis of 3,711 interviews providing a 1.805,000 20 3 Damagod and rendered temporarily representative cross section of German civilians nninhiibltablo.. 1,365,000 20 7 in the American, British, and French zones of Darn mod but not rendered unin• habitable .2,318,000 45 13 occupation, the morale division has arrived at the following estimates of German civilian cas• Total fi, 137,000 100 28 ualties as a result of Allied air attack upon Ger• 1 The total number of homes in Germany in 1042 wan 18,443,000. many: dead, 305,000; wounded, 780,000. These figures arc in substantial agreement with other The Over-all Effects Division, on the basis of estimates made by the Survey. data obtained from the German Government For the purpose of the morale division inquiry Bureau of Statistics has estimated that 490,000 into the morale effects of strategic bombing, the residential buildings were totally destroyed; or, final and exact casualty statistics are not essen• applying the accepted conversion factor of four- tial. In analyzing the significant morale effects dwelling units per building, that 1,960,0002 dwell• of strategic bombing it is necessary to make fre• ing units were totally destroyed. quent reference to this approximate total of The cross-sectional interview data indicate that 900,000 to 1,000.000 casualties (of wliich 300,000 personal property losses affected more than 50 to 325,000 are dead). Unprecendented as is this percent of the 22,000,000 bombed civilians. civilian casualty total in terms of European air war, it is far removed from the generally anti• TABLE 3.—Personal property losses cipated total of several millions, which created Per sous an exaggerated expectation of * the effects of Severe personal property loss 8,004,000 strategic bombing upon the German civilian pop• Moderate personal property loss 6,072,000 ulation during the last 2 years of the war. Of approximately 22,000,000 "civilians' subjected to Total 14,070,000 bombing, roughly 5 percent suffered injury or death. Disruption of Utilities and Essential Services A related element in the background of Ger• The cross-sectional interviews have furnished man civilian morale was the rumor and panic in the data for estimates of the disruption of utili• both bombed and unbombed areas of Germany ties and essential services in terms of civilian itself, which pei-sistently expanded civilian cas• deprivation of electricity, gas, water, food, and 8 ualty totals far out of proportion to actual fact: transportation to work. These estimates further fill in the backdrop of the objective physical con• "Evacuees from Hamburg have found ditions with which the German civilian popula• places to stay in this area (Wuerzburg) and tion had to contend. recount their experiences. Eye witnesses tell Such deprivations were in many instances tem• of a half million dead." (Morale Report porary, but they indicate the type of civilian of Regierungs-Praesident, Wuerzburg, 11 fox-hole existence which the urban German popu• August 1943). lation was forced to endure as a result of Allied air attack for periods varying from hours to Home arid Personal Property Damage months. In the bombed German cities approximately

5,500,000 homes are estimated to have been dam• *Tliere Is no available basts of comparison with Over all Effects aged or destroyed, on the basis of the cross-sec• Division estimates of oLlier categories of home damage, different terms of damage measurements having been used. tional survey data. 1 All extrapolated to include Russian area. XAIILE 4.—Deprivation of utilities and serciccs to have reached 10,500,000. The total is broken Electricity deprivation : ' remim*. affected down as follows (omitting an obscure miscel• Severe 5,766,000 laneous category) : Moderate 34.520,000 In the East, owing to land occupation by the enemy 8,350,000 Total 20,286,000 In the West; owing to land occupation Gas deprivation : hy the enemy 1,421,000 Severe 12,402.000 Owing to "Air Terror" 4,884,000 Moderate 6,018,000 The sudden mass population flights in the clos• Total 38,420.000 ing months of the war as a result of the threat• ened and actual occupation of German land ex• Water deprivation: Severe 7,692,000 ceeded about twofold the total "air terror" evacu• .Moderate 30,254,000 ations. But in order that its full importance may be Total 17,940,000 grasped, the "air terror" movement of 4,884,000 Loss of food : must, in great part, be related not to the entire Severe 2,808,000 duration of the war, but exclusively to the last Moderate 9,108,000 21-months, between June 1943 and March 1945. Prior to June 1943, both precautionary and post- Total 11,916,000 raid evacuations had not exceeded 1,000,000. Loss of transportation The disruptive effects of such mass movement to work: and migration of almost 5,000,0000 civilians are Severe 3.S04.000 Moderate " 2,994,000 impossible of statistical calculation by the very nature of the chaos that accompanied them. The Total 6,798,000 evacuations produced economic and administra• tive disruption of German civilian life, which The repercussions of such deprivations botli may be classified under three broad headings: in terms of physical discomfort and in terms of 1. The physical and eccmomic burden.— morale influence could not be localized or isolated Civilian services and the civilian economy were in the bombed communities. They made them• widely affected by the problems entailed in the selves felt throughout Germany, above all through evacuation of 5,000,000 adults and children. the evacuations. (a) Strain on transportation.—In addition to the overwhelming problems of evacuation from Evacuations the bombed and threatened areas, concessions had The vast civilian evacuations affected every to be made to the widespread transportation de• facet of German morale. Evacuations began as mands arising from the evacuees themselves: a precautionary measure shortly after the out• civilians insisted on revisiting their children di• break of the war. Evacuations from the bombed spersed in distant reception areas;-workers in• and threatened areas proceeded in a more or less sisted on visiting their evacuated families; in orderly manner until late 1043. During 1044 they some cases evacuees wilfully returned to .their became chaotic. homes and had to be re-evacuated. The evacuations had morale consequences of a (b) Insufficiency of available housing in physical, social and economic nature not only many areas. for the evacuees but for their hosts, for the fam• (c) The impingement of evacuations upon ilies that were left behind and .for the general necessary recreational facilities. morale level of botli the bombed and unbombed (d) Evacuation-wrought problems of food areas. These extensive effects will be referred to distribution and rationing. Evacuation upset the in greater detail in a subsequent chapter. Here, balance of food, and food crises were created in reference is made solely to the over-all dislocation previously immune areas. and disruption caused by evacuation. (e) Strain on medical and community Total civilian movement in the Reich is esti• 4 services in both bombed and unbombed areas. mated in a Reichlevel directive of 6 March 1945 2. The want complex of disruption resulting

* Captured document, photostated MIHS, London, No. PH-133. from regional^ cultural, and/or economic differ- 10 ences between- evacuees and their hosts.—These ***** introduced new elements of friction into the ma• These are the broad outlines of the disloca• chinery of communities. tion and disruption which strategic bombing 3. Strain on governpxental coherence and or• produced in the crucial aspects of German civilian ganization, and on, the Nasi Party, in maintaining life in casualty tolls, in house damage, in depriva• Chilian order.—The administrative problems of tion of essential needs and in all phases of civil• the mass evacuations were not met by the Party ian evacuation. It is against this background with one consistent, clearly defined policy. This that the morale effects of bombing must be con• led to an intensification of bureaucratic confu• sidered. sion, and to turmoil in German civilian life.

II CHAPTER 2. THE WILL TO RESIST No matter what aspect or. measure of morale Each of these facets of the morale of German is considered, the major finding is that bombing civilians will be reported and, in addition, es• definitely depresses morale. The will to resist, timates of general morale will be based on the as reflected in such attitudes as loss of confidence combined information from all these sources. in leaders, willingness to surrender, and a weak• These combined measures have been arrived at ened desire to continue the war, shows these ef• by two methods: (1) In a sample of 500 cases fects. The behavior of German civilians also each interview was read as a whole and all the yields evidence that bombing depresses morale. relevant comment taken into account as a basis The main psychological effects are defeatism, de- for over-all codes, including a judgment of mo• presssion, despair, fear, helplessness, fatalism, rale. (2) Certain responses coded in the separate and apatlry.1 The popular notion that bombing morale measures were selected as indicative of stiffens the resistance of a people finds little con• high and low morale and credit assigned where firmation in the facts of German experience. It such responses appeared. These credits were creates some anger and hatred and at times a added to obtain a morale index for each of the temporary increase of determination, but the ag• respondents interviewed. gressive emotions of rage and anger have no The effects of bombing on morale are investi- • ready outlet against the enemy. They tend to be gated by two methods. The first involves an directed against the Nazi leaders or to be dis• analysis of what people said about the effects sipated and replaced by dejection and apathy. of bombing, and the second makes objective com• parison of how morale differed among the peo• Methods of Studying Morale ple who suffered various degrees of bombing. In The will to resist, i. e., psychological morale, general, these different procedures yield con• has many dimensions and can be measured at clusions that are consistent even though the actual various levels. One of the measures of great prac• figures obtained by different methods may not be tical importance is the estimate of the individ• identical. It is important to keep in mind, how• ual's willingness to surrender. Of critical signifi• ever, that the morale differences between the cance is belief in the probability of victory or bombed and the unbombed tend to understate the defeat. Intellectual conviction about the cause total effects of bombing. This is due to the fact for which the individual struggles and emotional that the news of bombing and its consequences identification with the cause are of prime im• reached the whole population and led many to portance. Confidence in leadership is also essen• fear that they would be involved sooner or later. tial for good group morale. Group unity, the Moreover, the inconveniences of evacuation and feeling that all elements in the population are of housing evacuees were experienced by both bearing their share of the burden, is another the bombed and the unbombed. Evidence of such measure of morale. Finally,, the psychological indirect effects comes from a number of the di• health or demoralization of the individual must rect questions on bombing. be taken into account. In interpreting the -remits of this and subse• There are several ways in which an individual's quent chapters, certain facts about the interview attitudes and feelings manifest themselves in be• materia] must be kept in mind. In the first place, havior and thus yield evidence of his behavioral it is to be noted that two different sets of ques• morale. It is possible to study absenteeism rec• tions (listed in full in appendix A) were used ords, to secure estimates of the incidence of sui• in the civilian interviews. Schedule A consisted cides, to observe the amount of crime and black of direct questions about bombing and was used market activity, as well as subversive and oppo• only with those who had had bombing experience. sitional activity aimed directly against the gov• Schedule B was composed chiefly of general ques• ernment. • tions about the war and problems which arose during that time with a few direct questions on 1 Though In general the effect of bombing la to lower morale, the bombing inserted at the end of the interview. degree to which it Is lowered and the exact nature of the de- pressnnt effect vary la relation to the amount and pattern of Persons asked the questions in schedule B came bombing. These more detailed considerations arc treated in Inter from both bombed and unbombed areas. No Chapters. 12 respondent was interviewed on more than one were encouraged Lo Lalk about their present prob• schedule. As a consequence of the difference in lems, their expectations, their hopes and fears approach of these two questionaires, the percent• during the war, the events and faetois which ages of people answering in a certain way may first led them to believe the war was lost. Ques• he different even when the questions appear to tions about bombing a p pea ret 1 only toward the he similar. So where differences appear in the re• end of the interview. sults of schedules A and B. it must always be re: These over-all judgments give the following called that the answers in schedule A were given picture of German morale at the beginning and in ii context emphasizing raids. In all cases, there• end of (he war. fore, the absolute level of the percentages obtained • must be interpreted in the light of the questions TABI.K —Qi;4r-all j inly men I n of Cenmiit morale asked and the total interview situation. This Pwwnt of German population means that; more reliance can be placed on the rela• tive comparisons between the proportion of per• Beginning of war End of war sons who give certain responses than in the actual percentage levels. For example, there is less am• 1'netnt I'tret at Hi&h morale. 32 a biguity attached to the finding that bombing 51 16 ranked ubove food shortage in frequency of men• 17 78 tion as a-wartime hardship than lo the fact that Total.. 100 tno 9J percent of people mentioned bombing as the greatest hardship. Similarly, the actual percent• age of persons reporting that they were willing to Thus, at the start of the war, only 17 percent surrender would doubtless vary with form of of the Germans regarded the war as ,a mistake question and context. But a fairly straightfor• or as a hopeless cause. One-third had high mo• ward comparison may be made between percent• rale and one-half had fair morale. As the war ages willing to surrender among the bombed and progressed, morale declined. The high morale unbombed. when the same question is asked both group dropped to 0 percent, and the moderate groups. morale group lost almost, all of its original num• bers. The great change in the morale of the Ger• Over-all Evaluation of German Morale man nation is an indication of the completeness Under Bombing of the German defeat in World War IT. The causes of this fall in morale are complex, An evaluation of German morale under bomb• but the relative weight of factors of primary ing must take into account the complexities of importance follows: the total war situation, the initial level of Ger• man morale at the start of the war. the effects TABI.K G.—M

The application of one method of over-all Bombing 3(i

evaluation was made by securing judgments of Personal losses 33 psychologists and social scientists on 500 inter• Internal events (dissension, bomb nlot, etc.).. 7 views with German respondents.2 These inter• Total 300 views were selected from the cross-sectional study of German civilians in the British, French and •The Infoi'iniulon In this table was obtained by over-all ending American zones of occupation and were chosen of the 500 interviews used for table Kncb interview was read to determine factors which ap|>ciired to have caused a decline in to be representative of this population. The. in• morale. terviewing was not conducted in a context of interrogation about bombing. Respondents did One out of three Germans gave indications that not know the real purpose of the interview and his morale wns more affected by bombing than by any other single factor. Bombing was second : Schedule It interviews were used .as 11 IMIKIS of these over-all only to military factors as a primary morale judgments. See appendix A for n description of schedules A and B anil of tho basic plan employed. depressant. For 45 percent it was adjudged the 13 secondary contributory cause of reduced morale ple did it reach the point of wanting to accept in 70 percent of the cases. unconditional surrender? It is worthy of note that no instances were Official German intelligenpe reports on morale, found in which bombing permanently raised mo• prepared for the Propaganda Ministry and other rale and in only 2 percent of the cases was there Nazi officials are revealing. A March 1944 secu• a temporary rise. If information had been ob^ rity service report from the Munich region states: tained at the time and if time changes could be Morale has reached a new low such as has assessed in greater detail, more temporary in• not been observed since the outbreak of the creases might be registered. But in spite of the . * * * Among the masses, sayings are belief in the efficiency of bombing for raising w;u common such as: "The wagon has gotten off morale, it is difficult to demonstrate this effect the track. It got stuck in the dirt." "One in even a small fraction of cases. ought to make an end, for it cannot become The German people themselves gave an over• worse than it is now" * * *. The air ter• all evaluation of bombing. In the cross-sectional ror continues to be the crux in the holding study they were asked: "What was it that was of morale * * *. With people who suf• hardest for the German civilians during the war?" fered total loss of property, the feeling pre• Their answers appear in the following table: vails that their losses can never be replaced, TABLE 7.—Wartime hardships even if Germany should win the war * * *. I'vivcntaf. German population The heavy destruction in Augsburg had a Bombing 01 particularly severe effect on morale. Food shortages 10 Deiilhs of family members In Army "> The growing desire of the German people for Shortages '(other than food) 3 an end of the war and of the bombing terror Family sepa rut I on 2 became a constant concern of German intelligence, Loss of freedom 2 to judge from the frequent references to it in the Nazi Injustices ' 2 morale reports.

Total H15 That the Nazi officials had good reason to worry about the state .of German morale is clear from 1 ['urvcntuffL'H add to more Minn 100 percenl localise some people the findings of the cross-sectional study in which gave multiple answer*. Based upon 8.711. interview!. a representative sample of civilians was inter• The most onerous burden for German civilians viewed. The German people were asked: during the war was bombing. That many Ger• mans who had personally experienced its terrors Did you at any time during the war ever should feel this way is to be expected, but bomb• come to a point where you simply did not ing came to mind nine times as often as any want to go on with the war? other problem. People gave their answers, more• Their answers follow: over, in' an interviewing situation in which no previous reference had been made to bombing. TABLE 8.—Breaking point of morale Percf.it t ol Germans in unbombed and lightly bombed Oarman population towns, as well as in heavily bombed towns, agree Never wanted war In the first place 13 that the heaviest trials on the domestic front were Yes, did not want to go on: 58 the air raids. People in the heavily bombed areas Point reached before January 1942 4 approach unanimity in this judgment (94 per• Point reached between January 1042 cent). Even in the unbombed areas 88 percent and January 1944 15 Point reached l>etween January 1944 were of this belief. The psychological shock of and July 1044 ...; 4 the raids thus exceeded their physical reach. Point reached between July 1044 and January 1945 5 Specific Morale Measures Point reached between January 1945 and end 4 War Weariness and Willingness to Surrender Point reached, no time specified 26 Never readied point of want to give up 24 War weariness was common in Germany long Point reached, but recovered desire to go on 5 before the Rhine crossing. How much of it can be attributed to bombing? And in how many peo• Total 100 14 Thus the majority of Germans had readied the TABLE 10.—War weariness and air raids point where they did not want to go on with the Pttrccnt of (Joi tJioH population war before the end of the conflict. One-third War-weary from bombing 00 definitely did not want to go on before the in• General 23 vasions of the Continent. Twenty-six percent After casualties from raids among reached the point of not wanting to go on, but friends and relatives 2 did not specify the approximate time of their After repeated raids and increased tempo of attacks .,13 decision. On the other hand. 29 percent either After loss of pruiwrty 3 never thought of giving up or recovered from After first raid 3 such un-Nazi like ideas. Because of difficulties of living How much of this defeatism can be traced to under ah- raid conditions 1 air raids? In communities that suffered air raids But nothing we could do about it 15 Yes, but got over it 2 the most important single factor in producing Never wanted war in lirst place 16 war weariness was bombing. Though two different No. not war-weary 22 methods were used in the survey to assess the effects of bombing, the findings are the same. The Total 100 one procedure is indirect, involving the objective comparison of people in bombed and unbombed death or injury of friends or relatives in raids, towns on the question of not wanting to go on the destruction or damage to their property and with the war. The other procedure is the direct the increased tempo of the raids. Another group, questioning of bombed people about the effect 16 percent, were war-weary but they did not of bombing upon their morale. ascribe their low morale to the air raids. About The objective comparison from the indirect ap• one-fifth contended that they had never reached proach shows that the more heavily bombed the the point of wanting to quit. area, the more people there are who wanted the The two methods of ascertaining German mo• war to end. The question, "Did you at any time rale under bombing strongly corroborate one an• during the war come to a point where you did other. The dominant reason for civilian war not want to go on with the war?" was answered weariness, as ascertained by both the indirect and in the affirmative by the following percentages direct approaches, is bombing. of people in each group. An additional supporting bit of evidence is found in the B schedule. In this schedule, people TABLE 9.— War weariness and amount of bombing were asked about war weariness without reference Percent to bombing, but those who admitted war weari• UnlHJiiilied towns 50 ness were then asked what brought them to the Lightly bombed towns 56 Moderately bombed towns 50 point .of wanting peace. They gave the reasons Heavily bomlwd towns 00 appearing in table 11.

The second procedure in which a separate cross- TABLE 11.—Reasons for loar weariness section of bombed people was asked directly about Percent of Percent of their experiences confirms these results. In bombed people In un• people In towns, the sample answering the A schedule was bombed towns bombed towns given the same question about war weariness, Bombing ^ 32 M save that they were asked to relate it to the air Personal (loss of family member at (rant, personal hardship, cruel treatment by raids. The answers fall into several categories. Naila, etc) 24 16 These direct statements by Germans on the ef• All other (general hopelessness, lack of con- 44 36 fect of bombing upon their war morale are strik• ingly like the results obtained from the indirect Total 100 100 approach. When individuals were asked to re• port on their own subjective experiences, 60 per• It is possible for people to reach a point of cent said they did not want to go on with the not wanting to go on with war and yet be un- war because of bombing. A considerable number willing to accept unconditional surrender. In in this group gave specific reasons such as the Germany, however, war weariness was at such 15 a level that more than half of the civilian popu• Belief in German Victory lation was ready to accept unconditional sur• By the beginning of 1944, three-fourths of the render before the end. The effect of bombing, is German people regarded the war as lost. Only objectively demonstrated by comparing the reac• 8 percent were "bitter-enders" who still felt in tions of German people in bombed and unboml>ed the spring of" 1945 that Germany would win. An• areas. Six percent more people in bombed than other small group (16 percent) thought the Ger• in unbombed towns were willing to surrender. man cause hopeless from the start. The military However, when compared with other data ob• events of late 1942 culminating in Stalingrad, the tained in the interviews, it is clear that this rela• North African reverses, and the mounting air of• tively small difference understates the effective• ness of bombing. fensive of 1948 convinced the Germans that the This is true principally because bombing de• tide had turned irrevocably. pressed morale in unbombed towns, as well as in places actually bombed, and this fact does not TAIII.K i:-t.— When did Germans regard the tcur as lost? appear in comparisons of towns suffering different Percent of Cumulated German amounts of bombing. All of the unbombed com• percentages munities had repeated- alerts and many expected population that sooner or Inter they would be the target. 16 10 Moreover these people had heard much about the 22 3S Between January 1042 and January 1044... 39- devastating consequences of raids from the evacu• Between January 1044 and July 1944 s " BS ees in their midst. These indirect'effects are re• Between Julv 1B44 and January 104S 02 Between January NMfi and May IWfi _ 6 88 flected in the fact, already reported, that SS 100 percent of the respondents in unbombed towns HH) said that bombing was the hardest thing civilians hud to bear. Only 4 percent more (92 percent) in bombed communities made this statement, German civilians, when asked in an interview (Schedule B) in which bombing had not yet

TABLE 12.—Willingness to accept unconditional Hiirrnndor been mentioned, said that they came to the con• clusion the war was lost for the following groups Percent oi Percent of l>eonlo In un• people in of reasons: bombed towns bombed towns

Willing 51 1 57 TAIII.K 14.—/teasons for thinking war losf. Unwilling 13 It Percent of No personal admission of willingness but ft of ui an population 20 is Military reverses 48 Indifferent, never heard or thought about III 10 Allioil superiority 24 Air raids In Total 101) too War shortages 2 Miscellaneous 11 1 Six pert-ent mure people lu bombed than In unbombed towns wen; willing to surrender. Thin relatively small difference under- mates the effectIvenesfi of tximhliiK, Total 100

These • findings agree with the reports of dis• Air raids in themselves were mentioned less placed foreign workere who had been imported frequently than military rcveises and Allied su• into Germany for forced labor. Schedules rilled periority, but in talking of military reverses, out by over 2.200 such displaced Russians. Ital• reference was sometimes made to German air ians, and French give independent accounts of weakness. The differences between the peoples German morale.3 The great majority of Russians of bombed and unbombed areas in their reasons (S4 percent), of Italians (75 percent), and of for believing the war lost came in the categories Trench (71 percent) say that the Germans they of military reverses and Allied superiority. The knew came to believe, as a result of bombing, bombed people spoke less oF military reverses and thnt they couldn't continue with the war. more of Allied superiority. In fact, bombing aided greatly in producing conviction of Allied »See vol. II. <:h. 3 for detail* of this study. superiority. Botli the severity of the raids and with reactions to bombings. Hence, the answers the passage overhead of fleets of Allied planes shown in table 15 were given in a context which impressed the German people with the huge ar• made the respondent emphasize raids and their senal they were opposing. Official German mo• effects. The results should not be taken to mean, rale reports repeatedly call attention to the in• therefore, that 43 percent lost hope only because of ferences the German people were drawing from raids; although that proportion volunteered noth• witnessing planes flying overhead, unmolested, ing in addition to the reference made to raids in during the day. A captured German letter re• the question itself. It can only be said that 43 peats a German saying to the effect that the percent, when questioned directly, believed that German people are now forbidden to look up raids played a major part in their loss of hope. into the skies since they have become exclusive Actually, it is clear that "losing hope" is not an Allied property. easily defined concept and that it may be accurate The question about the effect of bombing on psychologically to report that hope for victory was the outcome of the war was raised directly by "lost" by January 1944 and that it was also "lost" asking the respondents, "Did your opinions of the after that because air raids didn't stop. war change when the air raids didn't stop?" This is partly because of the fluctuating char• The answers fell into the following groups: acter of belief and hope and partly because it is actually true that people may experience what TAHLE 35.—Effect of civ raids on opinion about seems to them absolute despair or loss of hope outcome of war at one time to find later, in a more devastating Porcont of German population experience, that they did not know the nature of No, still believed in German victory 15 real despair. "Lost hope" then cannot be-taken No, already knew Germany couldn't win.. 33 as an absolute zero point. Yu-Si lost hojie In Geriuuu victory. 43 Yes, raids plus other events led to loss of Confidence in Leadership hope in German victory S Opinion fluctuated 1 Confidence in leadership is necessary for good group morale, whether the group is democratic or Total 100 authoritarian in nature. The representative sam^ pie of Germans was asked: Though a small group still believed in German victory and others gave qualified answers, the "Was your leadershii> as good as you had largest single group (43 percent) said they lost expected? * * *. Is that your opinion for both hope in German victory when the air raids didn't the political and military leadership? * * *. stop. How did you think about this shortly after Certain apparent inconsistencies between tables the beginning of the war? 13 and 15 need comment. In the former it appears thut by January 1944, 77 percent of German About one-third of the German civilians did not civilians believed the war was lost. In table 15, distinguish between the competence of their politi• 43 percent said their opinions on the war changed cal and their military leadership. Of this undis- and that they lost hope in victory when the air criminating group, CO percent now definitely say raids didn't stop. Since the bulk of the raids that their leadership was incompetent. Of the came after January 1944, it may seem that more larger group who distinguish between political people lost hope as a result of raids than had hope and military leaders, 9 out of 10 condemn the before the intense raids occurred. The first point political leadership as incompetent, but only to be made is that many heavy raids did occur 1 out of 3 is willing to pass equally harsh judg• and could have been involved in the loss of belief ment on his military leaders. in victory before January 1944. The large measure of confidence enjoyed by Furthermore, the question on raids (table 15) the TVehrmacht boomeranged in its morale effect was asked on schedule A, while the question when it became known that the group in which about timing of the loss of belief in victory (table there was less confidence, the Nazi hierarchy, was 13) was asked on schedule B. No reference to making military decisions. bombing was made on tins schedule until the very The lack of confidence in Nazi leadership is end. Schedule A, on the other hand, dealt largely further evidenced by the division of the German 17 people on the question of whether the leaders ing that Berliners are said to Have shown wanted what was best for the people. Somewhat little understanding thus far for the suffering over one-third were emphatic in denying that of the population in the Rhineland. There their leaders bad the interest of the people at was veritable indignation that after this one heart. Only one-third were firmly convinced of light attack on Berlin retaliation attacks were the sincerity of their leaders. Thirteen percent immediately launched against England, while volunteered the information that they trusted after raids that destroyed at least parts of their leaders in the beginning of the war but not such cities here as-Cologne, Duisburg, Dussel- at the end. Three percent were still so loyal to dorf, and Mainz allegedly no plane was made Hitler that they spontaneously differentiated be• free from the eastern front for such a retalia• tween him and other German leaders. tion attack. It is hardly possible to reproduce Bombing had a decided effect upon the trust the number of statements of this sort. Fre• quently it could be heard said that it would people placed in their leaders. In unbombed be fine if the British flew more frequently to towns there was less questioning of the motives Berlin so that the inhabitants there would get of the leaders. a taste of how we in the west are feeling.

TABLE 10.—Confitlctwe in leaders People are very curious as to whether the population of greater Berlin will get extra, Percent of coffee rations for this trifling attack. One Percent of people In people in un• heavily bombed often hears it said that the whole thing bombed towns towns proves unequivocally that we in the west are

Leaders had best interests of people at regarded as second class people and that the 02 •18 whole Rhineland has already been written off. Leaders did not have interests of people at 31 42 Qualified opinion or don't know 7 1G A majority of Germans felt that their own Total . 100 100 group was harder hit by the war than other groups, and this feeling is more in evidence in Some Germans in speaking about their air raid bombed than unbombed communities. The ques• experiences told of their resentment of their tion asked was: leaders during a raid. In 12 percent of the cases, How did people of your circumstances get such comments as these were volunteered: "I felt along in comparison with other groups of we have only the Nazi to thank for this," and German people? "In the bunker, people cursed the Fuehrer." German civilians replied as follows: Equality of Sacrifice Group morale is predicated upon group soli• TAHI.K 17.—feeling that people in his oirr.uinstances got darity. When people begin to feel that others along icorse are bearing a lighter part of the burden, their Percent of Percent of morale is affected. German civilians in heavily people in un• people In bombed communities resented the good fortune of bombed towns bombed towns their countrymen- who had not been bombed. Our group got along worsoi 49 57 Many people in the Rhineland, for example, were Got along better or same 51 43 pleased when the bombs began to fall upon Ber• Total 100 100 lin. The reaction in Krefeld, a Rhineland town which had been bombed early in the war, was summarized by the security police intelligence The two main reasons which people gave for report on 24 January 1943, as follows: faring worse than othei's were: as nonparty members they were discriminated against and, as The news of the bombing of the capital has workers or poor people, they had a harder time been the talk of all parts of the population. than the well-to-do. Without exception especially great satisfac• tion that the loud-mouthed Berliners have at Psychological Impact and Demoralization last got it again, could be noted in all conver• The multiple morale effects of bombing have sation. The satisfaction derives from the feel• thus been established objectively by comparing 18 bombed and unbombed ureas. The direct impact cent women and children were killed by the of air raids needs also to be considered, for obvi• thousands. ously bombing presents all the traumatic condi• tions of front-line warfare, a warfare which Another woman told of the death of her husband: strikes at the whole population. It was in March 1944, the first large raid In the cross-sectional study in which people on Ulm. My husband was at his job at the were asked directly about their experiences during auto wor.ks and had raid duty when a phos• raids, most of them talked freely about the psy• phorus bomb fell directly on him. He burned chological elfect of the raids. More than one re• like a torch. His nerves were burned all spondent, however, broke down and wept and along his back. It was terrible pain that he could not go on with the interview when recalling had to suffer before he died. the experiences under bombing. An interviewer notes the reaction of one woman: So frightful was the ordeal of air raids that when Germans wei-e asked in June 1945 how they Twice during the interview some sort of were faring under the occupation, many expressed explosive went off in the vicinity and the little reaction to their defeat and occupation, but respondent jumped out of the chair both talked mostly of their relief that the war was over times with extreme fear in her expression. Even though the war was over now for almost and the bombings had stopped. a month and the last raid was 3 montlvs be• The harrowing fear and strain that bombing fore, she winced when she heard an airplane produces in people is also illustrated in the study motor outside. * of captured German mail.4 These letteis written by German civilians to their friends and relatives The reactions of bombed people fall into the in the Wehrmaeht are authentic and spontaneous following major categories in terms of fear and expressions of the feeling about air raids. If any• upset: thing, they are minimal expressions because the writers may have feared German censorship or TABLE IS.—Dcprw, of fair and- upaet may not have wanted to worry members of their I'arcen faj/tf of (h;> IIIIIII ptijiu In linn families at the front. Moreover, they were written Severe upset, Intense fear nervous collapse ("My at the time of air raids and are not as retrospective nerves were gone," -'Can't even talk about it," as the interviews. These letters corroborate the "After that always afraid.") SS findings of the cross-sectional interview study at Temporary or l«j:-s severe fright or upset 31 Little or no fear or upset 22 many points. They show particularly a lowered Description of fearful events il morale among people in bombed areas which takes the form of anxiety, nervous upset and the general Total ' 100 tension and insecurity. Instances of these effects appear in the following excerpts from captured More than one-third of the people going letters. through a big raid stiller relatively permanent psychological elFects. that is, the terror transcends A woman from Dresden wrote in October 1944: the immediate raid to such an extent that it is reinstated by the next alert. Many examples can If only the planes would leave us alone. be cited to show t.he emotional shock of the raids. We have alarms very often mostly during the One woman gave this account of her experiences day. Believe me we are trembling. The in her first big raid: fright from the last time is still in our sys• tem. From sheer fright we do not often dare I saw people killed by falling bricks and to go to town. heard the screams of others dying in the fire. I dragged my best friend from a burning A letter written in September 1944. from Oldeu- building anil she died in my arms. I saw dorf: others who went stark mad. The shock to No human being can imagine the things my nerves and to the soul, one can never that happened at the railway station of erase. I can never forgive the Allies for bomb•

ing the purely residential section where inno• 4 .See vol. II. eh. 1' for [he report of this study. Cologne * * *. I could just go crazy. I feel I got rather used to those raids. After all that we will never see each other again. I could not do any more than die. I became accustomed to them because they A letter from Herten in October 1944: came so frequently, but with eacli attack We had an alarm at noon today again. For there was the same terrible fear. the last ten days, I have been tremendously Frequency of raids was of much less impor• frightened. As a result of all of it, I'm very tance in its effect upon subsequent reaction to tense and nervous and suffer tonight again bombing than the experience of the first raid. Of from my nerves. those badly frightened by the first raid, 4S percent A woman war worker in Hamburg in July 1944: showed continued fear. Of those frightened a little, 29 percent showed continued fenr. Simi• So far I'm all right, momentarily we have larly, the number of raids experienced by dis• a terrible attack behind us. Kiel was the placed pei-sons made only a slight difference in target. You may well imagine the fright I the proportions of those who became habituated experienced. For days and nights we are on to bombing. duty and soon I shall not be able to stand it any longer. I believe that in time I shall TABLE 20.—Habituation and frequency of raids

collapse. Percent of •thplacnl peruana reporting linliit nut ion Adaptation to Air Raids Frequency of raids: 5 raids (average) GG Soldiers learn to live in fox holes and some 20 raids, (average) 73 people manage to adapt to air raids. But the 73 raids (average) 73 majority do not become adapted to bombing. It will be -noted that while only one-third of TABLE 10.—Adaptation to further raids the German civilians adapted to bombing, a con• Percent >if siderable majority of displaced foreign workers German population became habituated to air raids. This difference Became adapted 3(1 can be accounted for by the different outlook of Did not adapt f>2 No change (always frightened).. 24 foreign workers. For them increased bombing Feared them more and more 2S meant liberation; for the Germans it meant de• No change (never had any fear) 0 feat. Depended (on circumstances and raid)... 0 Blame for the Allies Total 100 A great deal has been said about the hate en• People who did not become habituated spoke gendered by- the raids.- When Germans were asked, "Did you blame the Allies for air raids?" in such terms as: approximately one-third of them said definitely How could we get accustomed to them? "yes" and about half said "no" without any * * *. We feared them so much we only qualifications. wanted the end of the war. .Of those who indicated that they did not blame „ One can't get used to the raids. I wished the Allies, between one-quarter (B) and a third for an end. We all got nerves.' We did not (A) expressed the opinion that, "This is war and get enough sleep and were very tense. People such things are to bo expected." About three- fainted when they heard the first bomb fifths of this group not blaming the Allies, said drop. I never became accustomed to the raids TABF£ 21.—Percent of persons blaming-Allies and bombing. I don't think anybody did. I was always afraid and shaking and Schedule B Schedule A'

nervous. Ptrctnt Percent No Blamo 43 68 Some of the people who adapted gave these Blama; 38 32 comments: 14 10 Total 100 too I got used to them and then they didn't

bother me. but I did always seek shelter. 3 See appendix A for description of schedules A and n. 20 that bombing was to be expected because the weight. In fact the percentage of persons ex• Germans had done the same thing. Of the groups pressing resentment is practically the same for the blaming the Allies, 11 (B) to 13 percent (A) unbombed as for those most heavily bombed, were abusive and expressed deep hate and anger. when the sample is taken as a whole. Only the It will be shown in chapter 3 that the attitude Nazis show a consistent increase in blame as bomb• of blame bears no consistent relation to bomb ing increases.

21 CHAPTER 3. MORALE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY DIFFERENT BOMBING CONDITIONS The depressant effects of bombing upon morale people who had suffered severe-consequences are so marked that they can be observed in almost of raids and who had low morale. The ab• all phases of civilian ,willingness to wage war. sence of such pei"Sons in heavily bombed _The .critical .question,^however, is the problem of cities would improve the general morale level what conditions of bombing are productive of the and ret'ard the appearance of a further morale greatest advei'se morale effects. In this chapter, drop in these cities. the following aspects of bombing are examined There is some evidence for the notion that in relation to morale changes: (1) the total ton• severe raids increased apathy among the nage of bombs dropped, (2) degree of city destruc• population. Under these conditions, resents tion. (3) personal involvement or exposure to ment against leaders, which was stimulated -raids, (4) deprivations caused by bombing, and by light bombing, might give way under (5) day versus night bombing. heavy raids'to preoccupation with personal Since chapter 2 has already presented the evi• matters, apathy and reduced interest in politi• dence that bombing affected the morale of people cal affairs. In a police state with totalitarian who did not actually experience any raids, this controls, such apathy may be considered good matter is not considered in the present chapter. morale, since people in this state of mind are When comparisons are made between morale of more easily manipulated and controlled. Such the bombed and unbombed, however, it must be a situation would result in arresting the de• remembered that the differences in these groups cline in morale at high levels of bombing. do not reveal the full effects of bombing upon The suggestion has been made that in• morale, because the unbombed were themselves creased bombing stiffens resistance by creat• affected. This comparison only serves to show the ing bitterness and anger against, the Allies. relation between morale level and the amount of The evidence does not support this explana• bombing suffered. tion of the diminishing effects of heavy bomb• ing. Summary The question is asked whether increased bomb• Bomb Weight.-—In general, morale declines as ing breaks down morale because more people bomb weight increases, hut this effect is not pro• suffer direct personal experiences, such as losing portional to the total tonnage delivered on a city. their homes or family, interference with health, The greatest rate of decline in morale tends to or disruption of public services, or whether there occur between unbombed towns and those sub• is also a morale effect on those who are not per• jected to total average bombing of about 500 sonally involved in any serious way. The answer tons. There is some further decline, when bomb• is that, even when the influence of personal in• ing is stepped up to (1,000 tons. There is very volvement or deprivation is ruled out, stepped up little change or, in some cases, slight improvement raids tend in general to depress morale. Under in morale as a result of increasing bombing up these conditions, the group which escapes pei-sonal to 30.000 tons. disaster shows the grentest loss in morale when These observations point to the conclusion that lightly bombed or unbombed towns are compared the maximum effect on morale of dropping a given with moderately bombed, but the people who weight of bombs would be attained by widespread have suffered directly are relatively less affected bombing rather than by concentrating on a lim• by an increase from light to moderate bombing. ited number of areas. Severe pei-sonal losses, even in a lightly raided This diminishing effect of increased bombing town, depress morale so greatly that the added probably resulted from a combination of the fol• effects of moderate raids are relatively less lowing factors: marked. The cities undergoing great raids lost a Personal Involvement.—When pei-sonal in- considerable part of their population through •volvement. in terms of casualties in the imme• evacuation, and these evacuees were probably diate family or property loss, is taken as a 22 VARIATIONS IN MORALE FACTORS AND INTENSITY OF BOMBING

UNBOMBED LIGHT BOMBING MEDIUM BOMBING HEAVsY BOMBIN G 1

lt% EXPRESSING ANXIETT

S3 Hi* , SHOWING INCREASCO FEAR

3H0WIH9 WAR WEARINESS CO

123 LI3TENIHO TO ALLIED BROADCAST

CHANGING OPINION THAT GERMANY OOULD WIN BE3

IHOWIHO WEAKENED DESIRE TO CONTINUE THE WAR

SHOWING APATHY C FATIOUE

WILLINO TO SURRENDER

BELIEVIHO LEADENS HAVE • EST INTERESTS AT HEART Jit INDEX OF HIGH MORALE

REPORTING LITTLE OR NO FEAR

•X- No miesure *os moda on this variobl* in unbombtd c it its

23 measure of the severity of raids, there is a marked bombing experiences will be compared. Chart IV decline in morale as the degree of involvement summarizes the results. increases. There is little evidence of diminishing returns and no tendency for morale to improve Fear and Fright at the level of greatest personal involvement. Individuals in the first three groups were asked Personal involvement is clearly the most sensitive about their experiences and feelings at the time measure of the severity of raids for the individual, of the first big raid on their town. No differences and is more closely related to changes in morale are found in the amount of intense fear.reported than the other measures reported. by respondents, but there is a marked tendency Deprivation.—If severity of raids is estimated for the percentage of persons showing little or no in terms of deprivation of food,, utilities and fear to be highest in the cities of group III, where services, again morale declines as the raids become the bombing was lightest. Groups I and H, with more severe. Here the drop in morale slows*down heavy bombing, show essentially the same inci• or actually improves when deprivation is high. dence of fear. In other words, diminishing effects appear just as they do when tonnage is the measure of the TABLE*23.—Percent of personsshowing little- or no /cai (schedule A) severity of raids. Group I: Heavy bombing i 22% 2 (525) Oity Damage.—Cities were classified on the Group II: Medium bombing 20 (297) basis of estimates of the percentages of liomes and Group III: Light bombing 31 • (93) buildings destroyed. Morale is shown to decrease •The percentages in the tables of this chapter do not add to as the proportion of destruction increases, and 100 percent because the base of the percentages is different lu again diminishing effects appear when the raids each bomb group. So, in the first row of table 28, 22 percent of those who experienced the heaviest bombing (group 1) reported are most severe. that they experienced little or no fear. Twenty percent of those Night Versus Day Raids.—Night raids are re• suffer! up medium bombing showed little or no fear, etc. - Figures in parentheses, in this mid all other tnbles in this garded as worse than day raids. chapter refer to numbers1 of re." pond cuts.

Weight of Bombs Dropped A similar finding appears in the evidence on specific anxieties about future raids and about The cities in the sample were divided into four the well-being of friends and relatives. Again, groups on the basis of the total average tonnage there is an increase in anxiety from lightly 1 of bombs dropped during the war. bombed to the moderately bombed towns and no further change in the percentage of those ex• TABLE 22.—City groups by bomb tonnage pressing anxiety in the most heavily bombed cities (group I). Range of Average tons tonnage for per city cities In group TABLE 24.—-Percent of persons expressing anxiety (schedule A) 80.000 19.100-17,200 0.100 1.700-13,100 Group I: Heavy bombing 12 (634) Group m ; 600 300- BOO Group II: Medium bombing 32 (307) Qr0Up IV. O Group III: Light bombing 9 (123)

- Onlrambecl. These relations are further reinforced by answei-s to the questions: For schedule A, the interview form used only "Were you more and more afraid as the for bombed people, comparisons must necessarily raids continued, or did you get used to be limited to the first three groups. For schedule them?" and "Did these repeated raids have B, given to respondents in both bombed and un• any other effects on your state of mind?" bombed cities, comparisons include all four groups. The morale of these groups with different The percentage of individuals who report that they experienced more and more fear increases 1 It has not been considered necessary to analyse separately . the effect of frequency of rnlds on each measure of morale, in• from the lightly bombed to the moderately asmuch, as analysis snows that there ia a very close relationship bombed, while very little difference appears be• between tonnage and frequency. As a check, the two morale Indices of schedules A and B and tHe evidence on adaptation to tween the medium and heavily bombed groups. continued roids were analyzed In relationship to frequency of This small difference is in the direction of im• raids. In all cases the effect of friMn'cnc.v on morale parallels the evidence on bomb tonnage. proved morale under heavier bombing. TABLE 25.—Percent of persons vhvwiny increased fear would lose the war later than any of the other (schedule A) groups. The most heavily attacked group main• Group I. Heavy bombing H3 (027) tained its morale longer than group H and ar• Group II: Medium bombing MO (H55) Group III: Light bombing '. IS (.104) rived at a belief that Germany would lose about the same time as group III. War Weariness and. Opinion on Outcome of War TABLE 27.—Median date for first belief that Germany Answers to four questions on schedule A were would lose (schedule H) examined to obtain ratings on war weariness as Group I: Heavy bombing 1 Aug. 1942 (701) a result of bombing: Group II: Medium bombing 1 Apr. 1042 (403) Group III: Light bombing 1 Aug. 1042 ( 220) "Did your opinion on the .war change when Group IV: Unbombed 15 Oct. 1042 (410) the air raids didn't stop?" "Did you ever come to a point because of the air raids where Willingness to Surrender you simply didn't want to go on with the On both schedules A and B the question is war?" ""What did you think at that time of asked: 'unconditional surrender'?" and "AVhat in your opinion was the chief cause of the war?" What did you think at that time (at the time when you did not want to go on with The story of diminishing returns in morale the war) of unconditional surrender? effects with increased bomb tonnage repeats itself. A significant increase in war weariness from the On schedule A the question was asked in the lightly bombed group to the moderately bombed context of a series of other questions which had appeal's but again there is no further depression specifically to do with air raids, so that there is in morale in the most heavily bombed cities. The an emphasis on willingness to surrender because percentage of war-weaty is almost the same for of air raids. group I (heavily bombed) as for group 17. An examination of the replies to this question on schedule B reveals an increasing number of TABLE 20.—Percent of persons showing war weariness persons willing to give up in towns subjected to (schedule A ) light attacks as compared with those in towns not Group I: Heavy bombing 02 (415) raided at all. Also more were willing to give up Group TT: Medium bombing .'. 62 (299) under medium bombing than under light bomb- Group III: Light bombing 4S (101) ing. The percentage of such individuals (willing to give up) under heavy attacks and under The following question was asked on sched• medium bombing is identical. The evidence is that ule B: an increase in bomb tonnage from the 6,000 tons What fii-st brought you to the belief that in group 77 to the 30,000 tons in group 7 has pro• Germany would lose the war? duced no further decline in morale among those exposed to it. From the answers given to this question, it was possible to determine the time at which indi• The results from schedule A are similar, with viduals first came to believe that Germany would increasing numbers willing to surrender in group lose. It is interesting to note that the effects of 17 as compared to LT7. In this case, moreover, bombing recapitulate the familiar pattern of de• there is apparently n slight recovery in morale pressed morale under light and medium bombing in the heavily bombed group. This difference is with a slight upswing under heavy bombing. The not statistically reliable, however. unbombed people came to the conclusion that Germany would lose at a median point of 15 TABLE 2S.—Percent of persons willing to surrender October 1942. The slightly bombed group (771) reached the point at the median of 1 August 10-12. Schedule A Schedule B Group 77 (under medium bombing) shows a Group I: Heavy Bombing SB (436) 59 (881) median at April 1942; and group I (under heavy Group II: Medium Bombing. 72 (200) 69 (648) bombing) 1 August 1942. The unbombed cities Oroup ITT: Light Bombing 65 (104) 64 (25S) Oroup IV: Unbombed 61 (47(1) arrived at a point of believing that Germany

25 A question closely re]utcd to wi 11 ingness to weights constituted the indices, which were then surrender was phrased as follows: grouped into six categories from "very low" to "very high morale." The items going into these Did the news of air-raid damage in other measures are, for.the most part, the dimensions cities strengthen or weaken your will to see already discussed, such as fear and terror reac• the war through? tions, war "weariness, willingness to surrender, con• The percentage of people expressing a weak• fidence in leadership, etc. ened desire to see the war through increases from The index obtained from schedule A shows a the unbombed level of group IV to group III marked decrease in morale from towns lightly (lightly bombed). There is no further increase raided to towns under medium bombing. As with with bomb tonnage in group II (medium bomb• so many of the-individual items, the index sug• ing), and in the most heavily bombed cities gests a slight increase in morale under the heaviest, (group I) there is a marked (and statistically bombing conditions. The curve representing the significant) falling off in the proportion of people level of morale drops as bombing increases until who did not wish to go on with the war. the highest bomb tonnage is reached, where there TABLE 29.—Percent with weakened desire to continue the is a reversal. This same relationship between the war severity of bombing and the level of morale is Group T: Heavy bombing 72 • (SS7) found in the index based on schedule B. Group II: Medium bombing 79 (570) Group HI: Light bombing 79 (250) Group IV: Unbombed 71 (504) TABLE 31Percent of people showing high morale

Attitude toward Leadership Bohedule A Schedule B

Attitude toward leadership is reflected in Group I: lluavy bombing _ 44 (487) 44 (822) answer to a number of questions in the cross- Group II: Medium bombing 41 (370) 42 (S72) Group III: Light bombing 50 (12fl) 51 (278) sectional survey. On schedule B the question was 56 (818) asked: During the war did you believe that your Behavioral Morale: Absenteeism and leaders wanted what was best for you? Illegal Radio Listening The extent of belief that leaders did have the Schedules-A and B contain the question: best interests of the people at heart was appre• How many work days were you absent ciably less in bombed towns. But the people of from your work in 1944? the most heavily bombed communities show greater faith in the leaders than those in towns For schedule A, given only to people in bombed suffering lighter raids, a repetition of the finding communities, there is a very slight increase in the that heavier bombing does not have a propor• number of pei-sons admitting that they took time tionally greater effect on morale. off in the more heavily raided communities. For

TABUS HO.—Percent believing leaders had the best inter• schedule B, however, there is a statistically signifi• ests of people at heart (schedule H) cant difference (a) between bombed and un• Group I: Heavy bombing 48 (035) bombed communities in time taken off, and (&)• Group II: Medium bombing 44 (500) between the cities in the heavy tonnage group and Group HI: Light Immhlng 52 (272) cities under medium bombing. These resuks on Group IV: Unh-nnihcri 02 (502) absenteeism do not repeat the pattern of an up• Morale Index ward shift, in the morale curve for most heavily A morale index was constructed for both sched• bombed cities. This is undoubtedly due in part to ule A and schedule B to give a composite measure the fact that extra time off must result from more for the various aspects of morale. intense bombing apart from morale effects. On schedule B, Si) items and on schedule A, 40 At the very end of schedule B respondents were items were selected as reflecting important aspects asked about their illegal radio listening: of morale. AVhen any one of these answers ap• pealed on a schedule a certain weight was as• Did you ever listen to Allied broadcasts? signed in the morale index. The sum of these AVhen did you first begin listening? TABLE 82.—Awn-aye time taken off from work, 1944 tional sample. Cities were grouped into five cate- .gories on the basis of percentage of buildings and Schedule A Schedule B homes destroyed as shown in tnbles 34 and 35.

Group 1; Heavy bombing 23 days (310) 24 days (024) A comparison of these groups of cities on the Group II: Medium bombing 211 days (174) 21 days (306) various measures of morale gives results similar Group 111: Light bombing 22 days (02) 22 days (131) 17 days (21«) to those obtained when bomb tonnage was the measure. There is always a rapid rise apparent

in(the proportion of people showing low morale The difference in.illegal listening between cities when undamaged cities and those with 1-10 per• lightly bombed and cities not bombed at all is cent destruction are compared. Eight of 11 significant. Increased levels of bombing bring no measures show further depression when destruc• corresponding rise in black listening. tion reaches the 20-39 percent level. From this TAIILB 33.—Percent listening to Allied broadcasts i point on the change in morale is slight and in• (schedule B) consistent, sometimes dropping, sometimes re• Group I: Heavy bombing 36 (845) maining the same, or even improving, as the-per• Group II: Medium bombing; 35 (593) centage of damage grows larger. Group III: Ugbt bombing '..38 . (278) Group IV :'No bombing 27 " (538) TABLE 34.—Percent showing high morale i I. Cities GO-SO percent destruction 40 (371) ' I'rc-lORl) listeners are not included in thin table, because it v Ifi nwumed that their listening habits could not hAv* IK-CO due II. Cities 40-59 percent destruction 44 ( 361) lo bombing. III. Cities 20-39 percent destruction 41 (614) IV. Cities 1-10 percent destruction 44 (435) Other Measures of Severity of Raids ' V. Cities 0 destruction ".. 59 (519')

Though total bomb tonnage is the most obvious 1 All reaiKinses reported in tables 34-40, inclusive, aro from objective measure of the severity of airraids, it is schedule O. Responses from schedule A show similar trends. only a gross index of the exposure of .the indi• TABLE 35.—Percent trilling to surrender vidual to bombing. It fails to take account of the I. Cities 60-80 percent destruction 07 ( 305) amount of destruction produced in a city relative II. Cities 40-59 percent destruction 54 ( 342)' to tonnage and to the size and concentration of III. Cities 20-39 percent destruction 55 (737) population. It also does not provide for the fact TV. Cities 1-19 percent destruction 60 (350) that not all people in the same city are equally V. Cities 0 destruction 51. (413) affected by air attacks. One person may suffer Morale and Personal Involvement severe experiences; another may escape with a minimum of damage. Both of these shortcomings The most sensitive measure of the physical im• of tonnage as a precise measure of exposure must pact of bombing upon civjlians is the extent to be taken into account before accepting the con• which they were personally involved. People clusion that the heaviest, bombing does not depress' were grouped into the following four classes: morale as much as relatively lighter -bombing. • I. 'Very high involvement—personal in• Three more precise measures of bombing ex• jury or casualty in immediate family, prop• posure must, therefore, be considered: erty damage and/or sleep and health dis• turbed. (1) percent of. actual houses and buildings H. High involvement—property damage destroyed in a given city. and health or sleep disturbed. (2) degree of personal involvement in III. Some involvement—property damage, terms of casualties suffered in the immediate only. family, own home or business destroyed, or IV. No involvement—self or family not health affected. affected in these specific ways. (3) the extent to which the individual has been deprived of seryices and utilities. In all 12 measures of morale described,1 morale is lower for the people with very high involve• Chart V summarizes these results. ment who suffered injuries, or casualties in the family (level I) than for those with high involve• City Damage and Morale ment (level II). Estimates of bomb damage were obtained from 'See section, "Weight of bombs dropped" In Ihjs chapter for former German officials of cities in the cross-sec• description of morale measures. In 11 out of 12 measures morale improves where in other words, there is evidence here, as in the only property damage is involved (level IH as material on weight of bombs dropped, that beyond compared to level U). a certain point further increase in deprivation In 7 out of 12 measures the persons who have has very: little additional effect- in depressing suffered none of these particular effects^of bomb• morale. ing (level IV) show higher morale than those •The following tables show these tendencies. with property damage only (HI). From these results it is clear that .casualties and TABLE 30.—Percent showing high morale injuries are most serious in their; effects on morale Highest deprivation : 36 (447) and that property damage is relatively much, less High deprivation . 30 (334) important. When measured in these terms, the Moderate deprivation ." 46 (444) greatest amount of involvement produces the • Low deprivation 53 ( 486) Little or no deprivation -.... 57 (517) lowest morale. See chart V. TABLE 40-—Percent willing to surrender The following tables illustrate, these trends. Highest deprivation .-:7r.-.-. -63 " (445) High deprivation , 63 (328) TABLE 30.—Percent showing high morale Modernte deprivation 52 (497) Very high personal involvement 35. (178) Low deprivation -.' 50 (428) High personal involvement 43 (974) Little or no deprivation •. 48 (487) Some personal Involvement 53 (288) No personal involvement . 59 ( 305) ; Day Versus Night Bombing TABLE 37.—Percent willing to surrender Respondents1 were asked on schedule A, "Which Very high personal involvement 01 (163) were more terrible, day or night raids?" Eighty- High personal Involvement 60 ( 333) two percent indicated that the night raids were Some personal involvement 55 (272) worse. There is a question whether this great No personal involvement 49 (281) dread of night raids results "from the greater

TABLE 38.—Pei-cent indicating leadei's had best interest severity of these raids. In order to check on this at heart point, two small groups of three cities each were Very high Involvement 45 (176) selected which had been hit with an average of High personal involvement 49 (1006) 25.000 tons of bombs. One of these groups experi• Some personal Involvement 51 (282) enced predominantly day raiding and the other Xo personal involvement 57 (307) predominantly night raiding. Another pair of groups was set up with nverage raids equal to 9 Deprivation and Morale tons and, again, one was predominantly" day People were classified into five groups on the raided and the other night raided. basis of the amount of deprivation they suffered A comparison of the percentages of the heavily in terms of: Quantity and quality of' food and bombed who feared night raids more shows the other commodities, transportation,to work or for same results reported for the whole sample. ,At personal purposes, mail, telephone, gas, water, this level it is still clear that raids at night are electricity, heat supplyi and sanitary facilities. A more feared, evenswithttomiage constant and'the composite score was derived-from the information number of night raids varying. The same com• about these various services and supplies.' parison at the second, much lower tonnage level, In general it may be said that morale declines again shows little difference in the percentage of as the amount of deprivation increases, but the those who consider night raids the worse. In this changes seen in the various measures of morale case, however, there is a slight increase in the are not as consistent with increase in deprivation number fearing day. raids when the city has ex• as was the case with personal involvements More• perienced predominantly day raids, and this dif• over, on almost half of the measures thefe is a ference comes close to statistical reliability. This tendency for morale to remain at the same level finding would indicate that when bombing is light or to improve "where deprivation is the greatest. there is some increase in the number of people who fear the kinds of raids that they have experi• aThe importance of Interference wltli various types of utility services Is discussed ln ch. 1, vol. 11. The iwckground Information enced most often, but 76 percent of these respond• on clttea in the sample reported there confirms the results dis• ents still consider it worse to be raided at night. cussed here• VARIATIONS IH MORALE FACTORS RELATED TO EFFECT OF BOMBIHG

DEGREE OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT LOSS OF HOME. RELATIVES, ETC.

- KON£ 30«£ HI8H VERY HIQ H

56% "ILLINONESS TO SURRENDER

MORALE INDEX 41% s»%

DEGREE OF DEPRIVATION OF UTILITIES TRANSPORTATION; GAS, ELECTRICITY, WATER *•

NONE LOW MODERATE HIOM HIGHEST

60% Wl LLINGNESS TO SURRENDER

INDEX 4S%

PERCENT OF DESTRUCTION OF CITY

NONE I TO 10% 20 TO 39% «0 TO 3t% SO T0 80%

VTILLIH QN ESS TO 3URREN0ER

MORALE * INDEX

* Percent shaw'ma hiah morale

29 TABLK 41.-—Peroent w,ho judged night raids worse Table 42, supports the notion that morale .changes resulting from a given weight of bombs s 25,000 tons tt ton* are produced principally by the amount of per•

Predominantly;night raids 88 (16!) 84 ' (138) sonal involvement incident to the bombing. The' Predominantly day raids. 84 (108) 7fl (118) table indicates that in the present study the amount of serious personal involvement does not increase in proportion to tlie weight of bombs It is impossible, unfortunately, to find cities dropped. The percentage of people suffering such which- are equated for the amount of area bomb• consequences increases with tonnage, but the ing and which vary with respect to proportion of change is very small where bombing is severe. day and night raiding. Only a comparison be• Only 5 percent more people were involved where tween such groups (equated for area bombing) 30,000 tons of bombs had been used than with would answer finally the question about the rela• 6,000 tons. This pattern of diminishing increase tive importance of night bombing versus day in personal involvement as bomb weight mounts bombing. parallels closely the pattern of change in morale Tliis is consistent with the results of the study with increasing bomb tonnage. It is possible, of captured mail reported'in chapter 2, volume IT therefore, that the diminishing morale effects are which finds that-night raiding produces much explained by whatever is responsible for such a more severe emotional reactions. It is shown leveling off in pei-sonal involvement produced by there, however, that night raids are no more eff'ec- • heavy bombing. five than day raids-in changing morale attitudes such as willingness to surrender, etc. TABLK 42.—Percent suffering r-erg high and high personal The same result is reported in the. foreign involvement (schedule I!) worker study, chapter 3, volume II. Heavy bombing 72 (851) Medium bombing ]: G7 (592) -Discussion and Interpretation of Results Light bombing • S3 (278) Unbmnbed 04 (478) The principal conclusion of this chapter has been stated as follows: The explanation for the small increase in per• Morale decreases as the weight, of bombs in• centage of pei-sonal involvement in cities most creases but the change is not proportional to ton• heavily bombed probably lies in the fact that a nage, the maximal effect appearing where tonnage number of evacuees from these cities did not fall is stepped up from no bombing to 500 tons. It is in the sample. The omission of this group would important for practical reasons to consider reduce the number of seriously involved persons whether these diminishing effects of increased and persons with low morale in these communities, bombing are significant and meaningful and to and the level of morale of such cities would conse• determine what lies behind them for, as the re• quently be increased. There can be little doubt sults stand, it appeal's that the maximum morale that this is one factor- holding up the level of effect of dropping a given weight of bombs would morale but the question remains whether the re- be attained by widely scattered bombing rather sults are completely accounted for by the personal than by concentrating available tonnage on a few involvement factor. Does the tonnage of bombs areas. dropped have morale effects over and above the fact that more bombing directly involves more • Is Bomb Tonnage an Important Factor people in casualties, property damage, and inter• In Morale Change? ference with utilities and services? The demonstration that morale is liighly sensi• tive to the degree of pei-sonal involvement has Comparison I: Equal Personal Involvement, raised the question whether the morale of a city is Different Degrees of Bombing determined principally by the number of persons The effects of personaL involvement may be suffering direct personal consequences of raids. ruled out by examining differences in the morale In this case the change in morale with bomb of people who have suffered the same amount of weight might be due wholly to a change in the pei-sonal involvement but have experienced dif• amount of personal involvement produced by- ferent degrees of bombing. When this is done, bombing. the depressing effects of increased bombing show

30 up ut every level of personal involvement, but it Respondents reported on their state of mind is not always true that the maximum changes arc under continuing raids. Apathy and fatigue were produced at the level of light bombing.' This is two of the effects reported. Since apathy and still true in (>0 percent of*the morale measures at fatigue are similar psychologically, the categories the highest levels of involvement, and in 85 percent were combined. The interesting finding is that as of the measures where involvement is slight, ln bombing increases there is an increased apathetic other words, when the individual impact of bomb• reaction, and there is no diminution of this re• ing is greatest, at least 10 percent of the-morale action in the cities undergoing the most severe measures show either no consistent change with attacks. bomb weight, or as great a drop when bombing is Stepped up from medium to heavy as when it TABLK 43.—Percent of persons reporting apathy and changes from light to medium. fatigue (schedule A) Croup I: Heavy limbing 12 (031) It may be concluded : Oroup II: Medium bombing 0 (304) tiroup HI: Light- Iwjmbiiig 0 (10T) (1) The tonnage of bombs dropped does make These results suggest that heavy bombing may a difference in morale over and above its effect in raise morale, not by making people active and causing more people to suffer serious pei-sonal in• enthusiastic in their support of the war. but by volvement. Both the victims of such involvement making them apathetic and hence less active in and others in the community suffer changes con• their criticism of and opposition to the war nected with bomb weight. effort. Under conditions of 'severe raids their (2) Where there is little or no such direct in• thoughts centered on the immediate personal volvement, morale falls fastest when light bomb• problems of fox-hole existence. They did not ing is administered. Diminishing returns of in• think about nor \ concern themselves with the creased bombing are-thus confirmed. larger political problems of war aims, of the con• (3) At high levels of involvement diminishing duct of the war by their leaders, of whether sur• effects appear but with less consistency. On some render should he conditional or unconditional. morale measures the maximum effect of increased Unfortunately there nre not enough- measures tonnage shows up at the level of most severe of apathy in the cross-sectional study to-establish bombing. tills interpretation conclusively. However. Ger• man official intelligence reports and- the back• Comparison II: Equal Deprivation, Different ground reports from the sample cities suggest that Degrees of Bombing heavy bombing produced passivity making for a A further check on the reliability of the obser• malleable people. vation of diminishing effects may be made by examining morale changes when the effects of Background report from Munich:. deprivation are ruled out and only the bomb ton• The raids caused such physical destruction nage varies. that for the majority the whole of their People AVIIO have suffered little or no depriva• energy was necessarily taken up in coping tion show the same maximum fall in morale'in with the elementary physical problems of lightly bombed as compared to unbombed cities existence. on 90 percent of the morale measures. As in the personal involvement mnterial, however, the tend• Background report from Freiburg on under• ency to diminishing returns nppears less con• ground activity: sistently where deprivation is great. In considering this matter, it must be re• membered that the great attack of 27 Novem• Other Factors Causing Diminishing Effects of ber 194i took all the fighting spirit out of Bombing on Morale the city. Since the leveling off of morale changes with Background report from Hannover on under• severe bombing cannot be wholly explained by ground activity: changes in' the amount of pei-sonal involvement and deprivation, other sources of this effect must The bombing attacks.made it more difficult be sought. to carry on our activities. People had to con-

31 1

cerri themselves with the problems of their Official German morale report from Frankfurt, own families so that they did not have the September 1944: time or the energy to engage in preparation The difference in the formation of opinion for revolution. splits between optimists * * * and j>essi- ' The bombing attacks definitely handi• mists * * *. Between them stands' the wide capped our activity for several reasons. In voice of those who take" absolutely no' posi• the first place people were too busy taking tion and in a sort of fatalism await what will care of their own families during the raids happen. These latter avoid for instance and their attention was necessarily focused listening to the Wehrmacht Communique and upon the problems of surviving the raids. looking at the map because they don't wish to see the German reverses. Background report on behavior in shelters: There remains the possibility that the apparent Two reports indicate that actual bombard• leveling off of the morale curve under conditions ment reduced or eliminated quarreling and of heaviest bombing is due to the anger and ag• petty criticism. In Karlsruhe it was reported gression directed at the Allies as a result of the that quarreling ceased "when a'bombardment raids. The responses to the question, "Did you began. In Dortmund it was reported that blame the Allies for air raids?" do not support quarreling and criticism took place only in this explanation. Bather, they fall into the same instances when there were alarms without configuration as the other aspects of morale. attacks. Apparently the effect of immediate There is increased resentment against the Allies danger was that of reducing petty quarrel• in the cities that have been widely bombed as com• ing. pared to unbombed communities. But increased bomb weight does not bring a corresponding in• Official German morale report to Luneberg. crease of resentment. August 1944: \ TABLE 44,—Percent of persons who bl-amed Allies Many find themselves in a condition of ab• solute fatalism. One cannot change what's Sahedute A . Schedula B going on, therefore there is no point in Group I: Heavy bombing ' 83 (Ml) 36

32 CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS AFFECTING MORALE Not nil Germans subjected to bombing were and, on the other hand, some doubtless failed to willing to give up. A thorough-going analysis of admit their membership. Hence a second index the effectiveness of bombing must explore therea- • was obtained. The interviewers rated each re• sons why this is so. Who were these .people who spondent for degree of Nazi identification on the were willing to keep going to the very end? What - basis of all the information gained during the sort of opinions and ideas did they have? Were interview, particularly on the types of Nazi be• they altogether immune to the effects of bomb• liefs expressed. For example, a respondent might ing? disclaim adherence to Nazi ideas but would go on Among the factors which made the morale of to remark that it was nice to have a good Aryan some individuals higher than that of others, per• people like.the Americans as an occupying force. sonal identification with the Nazi cause was by Twenty percent of the sample admitted that all odds the most important. Other psychological they were -members of some Nazi organization, characteristics which were related to high morale exclusive of the Hitler Youth groups. Ten per• were continuing belief in the adequacy of defense cent were identified* as ideological Nazis. 57 per• measures, a sense of vested interest in German vic• cent as non-Nazisj and 33 percent as falling bc-_ tory, belief in V-weapons, and a tendency not to tween. • be apprehensive of the future. These results do Tables 45-48 furnish examples of the consist• not mean that the morale of persons with such ently higher Nazi morale on a few of the morale characteristics was invulnerable to bombing. measures. All other measures tell essentially the Nazis, for example, actually showed depressed same story, with the minor .qualification already morale as a result of bombing more frequently noted that the differences in the percentage ot than others; but their initial morale was so much Nazis and non-Nazis expressing fear under bomb• higher that bombing was insufficient to bring it ing arc on the whole unreliable, even though these down to the level of the non-Nazis. It was found, differences show the same trend as those on other however, that fear and terror in the presence of measures.of morale. bombing bore no relation to the practically more important' aspects of morale, such as willingness TABLE 45.—Median morale index I! i

to surrender. The persons who became extremely* Heavy Medium •' Lifiht Un• - frightened were no more willing to give up than .bombing bombing bombing bombed

were those who remained calm. Naxi party members 32.5 29.5 dl.5 31.5 29.0 27. B 38.7 30.7 Nonmombera - - 3.5 i.7 2.8 0.8 Nazi Identification Difference -. 30.5 35.0 .16.2 38-8 Level of ^Morale Ideological Nails • 26.5 26.8 28.4 29.0 Xon-Nslis

Belief in Nazi ideas and the Nazi cause had DMTerenco 10.0 8.2 7.8 9.8 more influence than any other factor on the morale 1 of the German civilian. It was, in fact, more im• 1 High scores mean high morale on morale index It. • portant than m direct bombing experience, for TABLE 40.—Percent mllinu to surrender! *" ardent Nazis subjected to heavy bombing retained Heavy Medium Light Un• better-morale, as a group, than did non-Nazis who bombing bombing bombing bombed were not bombed at all. This was true for all aspects of morale with the possible exception of Xnd party members '.. 43 49 36 ~ 37 60 57 50 53 the purely emotional reactions of fear and terror Xonmembers 17 8 12 J6 brought on by the raids; Nazis seenrto have been Difference.

frightened almost as much as other Germans. 20 30 12 14 Ideological Xsiis 65 53 57 95 Two indices of Nazi identification were used. Xon-Xaits The first was simply an admission of membership Difference .... 45 33 46 51 in the Nazi Party organization, which was sub• •In tbe tables of this chapter the baue-of the percentages ia ject to possible error on two counts. Some mem• the number of people rolling in each cell. For example, in table bers had joined for bread-and-butter reasons 46, 43 percent,of Uazi Party members who were heavily bombed said they were willing to surrender. Sixty percent of non- rather than because of beljef in Nazi doctrines mamliern heavily bombed were willing to surrender, etc. 33 TABLE 47.—Percent reporting war weariness were inadequate had .lower morale than the civil• ians who thought these measures adequate; Heavy Medium Light bombing bombing bombing Again, bombing served to bring the satisfied and dissatisfied groups closer together by lowering Nail party members.'. . 73 76 53 the morale of those who considered defensive 73 73 63 measures adequate. "Increased bombing lowered Difference 1 0' (3) 10 morale more among individuals who felt every•

• 42 42 37 thing possible was being done than among those 7B 79 M dissatisfied with defensive measures. Perhaps

Difference M 37 28 people satisfied with the steps taken to protect them found the situation all the more hopeless 1 Difference In parenthesis Is in direction opposite from cx- under heavy air attack. Since, in their eyes, peclntlon. everything possible was being done, the psycho• logical impact of the raids was all the greater. TABLE 48.—Percent expressing intense fear of bombing

Beavy Medium Lteht TAIILK 4(\.—llelief in adequacy of defensive measures and bombing bombing bom bin* morale

32 38 29 42 40 35 Median morale index.(A)1

Difference ID 2 6 neavy Medium Light bombing bombing bombing

It is evident from .these tables that the classifi• AHI' unsatisfactory 31. ] 32.7 30..6 20.0 28.7 22.5 cation of Nazis on the basis of ideology brings out Everything possible was done.. 2. 1 4.0 8. 1 greater morale differences than classification by Difference party membership. This is consistently true. 30.3 31.6 29.5 Dissatisfied with shelters 30.0 29.5 • 27.8

Satisfied with shelters The Effects of Bombing on Nazis 0.3 2. 1 1.7.

Difference As already indicated, the consistently higher 31. 1 31.5 29.5 20.0 27. n morale of Nazis should not be interpreted as Ack-ack inadequate •a. 4 Ack-ack adequate meaning that they were invulnerable to the effects Difference 2. 1 3. 1 2.5 of bombing. Tables 45—48 bear out the statement Post-raid services unsatisfactory 30.6 30.9 31.0 that bombing had its effects on Nazi morale. Each Post-raid services good '. 29.7 30.0 27.8 of these measures shows a falling off, with the Difference 0. 0 • 0.0 3.2 possible exception of the party member category in table 45, when unbombed are compared with 1 Illvrli scores indk-iite low morale i>u Index A. heavily bombed. There are 27 morale measures on which it'is possible to compare the drop in The question inevitably arises whether this ap-" morale for Nazis and non-Nazis. In 16 of the 27 parent relation of morale to belief in adequacy measures the differences between bombed and un• "of defense is real or whether it occurs been use bombed Nazis were greater than similar differ• Nazis, who have the highest morale, are disposed ences for non-Nazis. to avoid criticism of defensive measures pro• The morale measures on which Nazis showed vided by the government. The relation turns out a greater morale drop than non-Nazis include, to have meaning, for the differences demonstrated among others, willingness to surrender (schedule. •persist when the results are analyzed separately B), time lost from work, fear and'depression, for those with Nazi ideology and those with other apathy and fatigue, a feeling that the respondent views. suffered more personally than others, interference with work routine because of loss of sleep. Vested Interest in German Victory ^ German morale was influenced not only by Nazi Belief in Adequacy of Defensive Measures conviction and by belief in the adequacy of On the whole, people who felt that the air-raid counter-measures, but also by a sense of vested shelters, anti-aircraft, and post-raid measures interest in German victory. The Nazi Propaganda 34 Ministry did its best to exaggerate the community Belief in V-weapons of interest and the common fate of the German Great hopes were pinned on the development of people. Some Germans, however, realized they V-weapons by certain parts of the German popu• had much more to gain from victory than others, lation. This was commented on by various official and there were those who felt they would be reports such as that from the security police in benefited by an Allied victory. This feeling of Braunschweig in 1944: vested interest was ascertained by asking people The hopes of further secret weapons are how they would have fared if the Germans had after all the only factor having a positive won the war, and how they expected to get along effect on morale. Everything which propa• under Allied occupation. ganda sets forth concerning the new weapon Those' who felt they would have fared better is received and discussed with burning, in• under a German victory than under Allied occu• terest. pation were classified as having a vested interest The analysis of interview material reveals that in German victory. Those who felt they would persons who accepted the propaganda on this sub• have fared worse under German victory than ject were on the whole a high morale group. under Allied occupation were classified as having a vested interest in Allied victory. Civilians.show• TABLK 52.—Median score on morale index B i ing the greatest vested interest in German victory maintained their morale in many cases until the Heavy Medium Light Un• bombing bombing bombing bombed end of the war (tables 50 and 51). Bombing, how• 1 ever, did produce some war weariness and de• Great belief ln V-weapons 32. : 33.1 33.8 3a 0 featism, even in this highly motivated group. The Complete rejection 29.3 29.2 27.2 27.9 effect of bombing upoir the opposite group (those Difference. 5.9 6.9 6.6 8.4 who thought they would be better off if the Allies

1 won) was less clear-cut. It led to war weariness nigh scores Indicate high morale. earlier in the war. but it did not increase the pro• TABLE 53.—Percent willing to surrender portion of people wanting unconditional. sur• render. Heavy Medium Light Un• bombing bombing bombing bombed Again, it. has been found that the fact of having a vested interest in German victory is not the same Great belief in V-weapons 40 39 32 30' Complete rejection 70 64 64 70 as Nazi identification, for its relation to morale persists when Nazis are excluded. Difference 33 28 22 40

TABLE 50.—Percent willing to surrender unconditionally It is doubtless true that belief in V-weapons de• pended to some extent on acceptance of Nazi Heavy Medium Light Un- bombing bombing bombing bombed claims hi general or on some more general factor of morale. It was not, therefore, altogether a Vested Interest In German vie- cause of high morale but was in part a result of it. 31 31 25- 13 Vested Interest in A Hied victory. 62 65 65 68 There is evidence, however, that the acceptance of this belief did operate to affect morale attitudes as Difference 31 34 40 55 long as the belief persisted, for 5 percent of the sample mentioned spontaneously that failure of / the V-weapons to materialize made tliein believe TABLE 51.—Median time al which individuals no longer Germany would lose, and of those respondents wanted to go on with the war who never reached the point of wanting to give

Ucavy Medium Light Un• up, 4 percent gave as their reasons tlie hope for • bombing bombing bombing bombed the new weapons. ,,

Vested Interest in Oerman vic• tory Oct. 19+4 May 1946 Sept. 1944 May 1945 Fear and Sensitivity Vested interest in Allied victory. Mar. 1943 June 1943 Feb. 1943 Jan. 194i

Difference (in months) 19 23 19 4 Some of'the individual differences in morale which relate to beliefs, attitudes, and motives are 35 in part a reflection of deep-lying personality When, however, subjective fear or sensitivity characteristics. No completely adequate measures was studied indirectly through queries about peo• of personality were possible in the cross-sectional ple's apprehensions, a relation was found between study but there were inquiries yielding informa• morale and timidity. German civilians were tion on objectively produced fear and sensitivity- asked about the expectation that their lives would on the one hand, and about subjective fear on be upset by the war. The apprehensive people, the other. who felt the war would seriously affect their lives, had poorer morale than their stolid country• Objectively produced fear can be distinguished men who had not anticipated the trials of war and from sensitivity, or subjective fear, in that it air attacks. Anticipation, instead of helping to grows directly out of terrifying situations and is cushion, the shock, proved to be a symptom, like common to most people, whereas sensitivity re• worry, related to poor morale. lates to subjective processes, to apprehensions and expectations which differ markedly between indi• On the other hand, the apprehensive are not consistently more susceptible to the effects of viduals. The latter is, therefore, more.truly a per• bombing than are more stolid persons. On some sonality trait.. measures, as in the first portion of table 56, they In general, when people were questioned about show even less consistent decline in morale as a their emotional experiences during raids, they re• result of bombing than do the less apprehensive.. ported more in terms of objectively produced fear than in terms of subjectively induced fright. The fear experienced during air attacks was not corre• TABLE 55.—Percent willing to surrender lated with willingness to surrender or with most Heavy Medium Light Un• of the other aspects of morale. Thirty-six statis• bombing bombing bombing bombed tical comparisons were made between measures of Expected life to be upset 02 66 47 60 emotional reaction to bombing and morale atti• Did not so expect 61 32 46 44 tudes. Only 3 of the 36 indicated any relation• 11 4 2 6 ship, between fear and the various dimensions of morale. Thus, for example, the frightened in this sense are no more willing to give up than are TABLE 50.—Percent believing leaders did not liaue . those reporting no fear.' As already suggested, people's interests at heart this was also true of Nazis. No matter how strong Heavy Medium Light Un• the identification with Nazi ideas, the sheer ob• - bombing bombing bombing bombed jective terror of an air raid produced fear in the Expected life to be upset 46 48 39 30 individual experiencing it. The immediate effect Did not so expect 33 37 32 22 of the experience was very much the same for all, Difference 13 11 7 17 regardless of other aspects of morale. Table 54 illustrates the absence of a relationship between Thought a great deal about war. 43 47 34 31 Did not think much about war.. 31 36 46 25 degree of fear and willingness to surrender. Difference 12 11 01) 6

TABLE 54.—Percent Killing to surrender Table 56 also shows that the passive or stolid - Heavy Medium • Light individuals who thought little about the war had bombing bombing bombing higher morale than their more imaginative col• Intense (ear 21 82 08 leagues. Bombing lowered the morale of both 65 58 48 groups, but in this case those who thought a great deal about the war were slightly more affected, The same phenomenon has been observed in when the unbombed are compared.to the heavily, battle, where men with good behavioral morale bombed. will experience fear under terrifying circum• stances almost as much as men who run away. Socioeconomic Status It is not so much whether people become fright• Socioeconomic status was determined from the ened as what they do about it that affects the information regarding education and occupation outcome. of the respondent. 36 The most striking result of the analysis of Catholics. On this one measure (morale index B) morale by socioeconomic status is the consistently there was ho difference.. lower morale revealed by the people with- low status: This is true of all morale measures an• TAIILE 5S.—Percent willing to surrender alyzed and at all levels of bombing. Since this group starts with such low morale even when un• Ueary Medium Light Un• bombing bombing bombing bombed bombed; the drop with increased bombing is rela• tively slight. In the other higher status groups 66 63 73 67 there is a marked drop in morale with increased ^64 • SI 4B 52 bombing.

TABLE 57.—Percent willing to surrender Other Individual Differences

Heavy Medium Light Un• A number of other variables were examined bombing bombing bombing bombed and found without effect on morale. Notable nigh jiattia 55 SB 38 33 among those which showed no consistent effects .Middle status 58 53 51 48 were age, sex;-, and marital status. Region is Low status 63 62 61 61 shown to be an important factor in morale in chapter 1 of volume II. • ' ' However, these differences do not persist when

legree-of Nazi identification is controlled. Nazi 1 See further reference to the role of the church in ch. 7, pt. II, identification and high socioeconomic status vol. 1, and to rellRlous activity in ch. 1, vol. II. tended-to be identified to such an extent that the * In ch. 2, vol. II it la reported that women showed greater apparent effects of the latter were wholly due.to loss in morale than men. The Index used there 1B based chicly on emoUonal components of morale. In the civilian interview the higher morale of the Nazis. material women showed about the B&me loss as men on measures of willingness to surrender. The markedly grea.ter loss in the study of captured mall Is probably due to the fact that the Religious Affiliation \ ~ morale measure there U based on emotional components; that, in other words, women's emotional reactions were more affected On all but one measure of morale analyzed, by bombing than those of men, but not their attitudes toward Protestants showed slightly higher morale than surrender.

37

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I. Damaged buildings in (Jim. 2. Ruined dwellings in Krefeld. mm i

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3. Clearing the rubble in Nuremberg.

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1. German Civiliaos clean up debris and search for dead in Cologne-Bruhl.

10 I

( PART II

MORALE AS REFLECTED IN OFFICIAL GERMAN DOCUMENTS AND SELECTED INTERROGATIONS CHAPTER I.—THE COURSE OF DECLINE IN MORALE Official Intelligence Reports (Mainfranken) district to the Bavarian Ministry German authorities, concerned with the state of the Interior. Copies were also sent to other of popular morale, maintained an extensive intel• State and Party officials. This material is sup• ligence service on the home front, both for their plemented by Party and Propaganda reports general information and as a specific guide to covering the Schweinfurt area (located in Main their propaganda,efforts. Many officials within Franconia) for 1043 and the first half of 1044. the hierarchy of the civil and Party administra• Additional material includes a series of reports tion were regularly engaged in writing morale from the Wuppertal security service branch office reports. The Security Service, the Propaganda to the security service regional headquarters at Ministry and other governmental departments all Dusseldorf, covering the period from the end of had their agents throughout the population fur• September 1044 to 23 March 1045; and nine siim nishing material for these intelligence reports. ilar reports from the area around Braunschweig, covering the months of September and October The morale reports give a picture of German 1044; and several miscellaneous morale reports. morale as seen by German officials during the war. They are of great value as a secondary source of Dominant Features of the Official • information, both for their accounts of morale Morale Reports and for the insight they furnish into German The particular series of morale reports de• official thjnking. The reports are limited, how• scribed in this chapter has much in common with ever, in that the Germans did not avail them• other sets of similar reports. The following char• selves of modern scientific techniques for the study acteristics are conspicuous in all of them. of popular thought and feeling. Quantitative controls, sampling methods and research design The German Distinction Between Psychological were completely lacking in the collection and in• and Behavioral Morale terpretation of the -material for those reports. Hence the German intelligence reports cannot be German intelligence reports invariably distin• used to obtain estimates of the degree and extent guished between Sti/mmmg which was the way of weak or strong points in morale with any pre• the people felt, and HoUimg. which was the way cision. They show the problems of maintaining they behaved. The Nazi authorities themselves war morale in a totalitarian state and they give frequently admitted that the people were de• illustrations of the qualitative aspects of these pressed or even demoralized, critical of the Party, problems, but they do not indicate in any quanti• the leaders, the propaganda and the war. but tative manner the relative extent or depth of the almost always such' evidence of demoralization various elements of morale. In addition to the was compensated for by the continued claim that defects in the collection of data, the morale re• TJaltung in any case was all that might be ex• ports suffer from two possible sources of sub• pected. Frequently, also, admissions of poor jective bias: morale were expressed by the formula that only a "part of the population" held the defeatist, point 1. The tendency for the reporting official to of view, doubted the official propaganda, or par• give his superiors the type of material they ticipated in whatever manifestation was referred wanted; to while the "majority" still had complete faith in 2. The tendency for the reporter to exaggerate the Party, or in victory. the importance of the attitudes and beliefs The interaction between Stinvmung and Halt- of his own social group. •m\g was important; so long as Haltung remained satisfactory, the authorities could afford to,ignore The following analysis of morale reports is a certain lowering of popular morale. As stated based principally on a series of 33 monthly re• in one report: ports covering the period February 1042-October 1044 and addressed by the 'administrative head In spite of all their worries and many dis• (Regierungspraesident) of the Main Franconia satisfactions, the Ilaltxmg of the people is good—and this is what really matters, not • were going badly in one area, the official propa• the Stimmung, which is subject to outside ganda could help to redirect attention to a more influences. favorable aspect or, if things were going badly everywhere, it could distract the people by But the official .concern was based on the recog• promising a future success. The obvious danger nition that Stim/nmng had its effect on Flatting. in this sort of manipulation lay in arousing ex• A report written in September. 1944 makes the pectation which demanded fulfillment. Successes admission : of nonmilitary nature were also manipulated in In general the Stimmung is extremely un• the same way. stable, and in accordance with the develop• The present series of 33 German intelligence ment of events can take either a negative or reports mention morale factors in the following a positive turn, which would then have an order of frequency: Eastern front, air war,1 effect on HdLtung. U-boat warfare, military and political events con• cerning Germany's allies, agricultural problems, The question of how behavior could remain events on the West front, rations, African cam• satisfactory when morale became consistently paign, heavy casualties. poorer is one which other parts of this report at• tempt to answer. An obvious assumption woidd The Air War and Morale be that habits of discipline, on the one hand, and fear and. coercion, on the other, might be respon• To the German civilian, the air war was one of sible for this situation.- An interesting admission the most important of military events, ranking on the part of the Security Service to this effect" ' second only to the lighting on the Eastern front. is found in a report to. Berlin of March 1044: In the 33-month period covered by the Main Franconian reports, enemy air raids are men• The TJaltimg of the population can be tioned as a primary factor affecting morale in called unobjectionable, the reason being 20 reports. (During this period there were live partly the comparatively widespread fear of raids on Schweinfurt. located in this district.) defeat, and partly kind-heartedness, which Air raids are mentioned four times in 1942, in shows itself in the readiness with which the- April, July, August, and September.'each time inhabitants of the western part of the region in connection with attacks on specific cities or received evacuees from Augsburg. Princi• regions. In 1943 the raids are mentioned as one pally, however,.the outwardly good conduct of the primary'factors influencing morale during can be attributed to the authoritative pres• every, month from May on. In 1044 the bombing sure which leaves no room for any extended was mentioned in every month from January negative activity. It is the fear of punish• through May; it was displaced by the invasion in ment which precludes especially severe ex• the June and August reports, but reappeared in pressions against, the stute leadership. July and again in September and October.-' With the increasing frequency and intensity The Effect of Military Events on Morale of raids all over Germany, the air war gradually During the war the most important single fac• displaced the Eastern front as the most important tor affecting morale was the course of the actual factor affecting morale. Following the invasion, fighting, including the air war; SUmmmig varied the air raids were displaced by the lighting on with the ups and downs of the over-all military the Western front, according to these reports. situation. But the widespread nature of the war It appears that the raids did not have to be meant that a number of campaigns were being directed against a particular area in order to waged simultaneously. In estimating morale, the, affect adversely the morale of the population in authorities were faced with both positive and that area. The news of the raids hi other places negative military events, and they discovered that was effective in depressing morale because it in• the depressing effect of a defeat in one sector was tensified both fears of losing the war and feelings frequently offset by a victory elsewhere. To a certain extent this compensation could also be 'It in interesting to note thut bombing is also placed second manipulated by propaganda. Thus, when things in rank as a cause of morale decline by German civilians. See ch. 2, pt. I, Vol. I. 43 of helplessness, and also created anxiety about- have lost all hope of whining the war. Their mood future raids against the local area. was one of complete demoralization bordering on panic. The inability of the V-l.and V-2 rockets Retaliation Weapons as a Morale Stimulant- to halt the air raids or to interfere with the Allied The interaction of favorable "and unfavorable advances in the West removed their last hope. factors determined the level of popular .morale. The question which naturally arises is how and As the war continued, the negative factors in• why they kept working. The morale reports do creased and there were fewer positive influences not attempt to answer that question, except for to offset them. As stated in a morale report from occasional suggestions that propaganda was in• Braunschweig in August 1944, fluential.

Dangers winch at the moment one can see Fluctuations in German Morale as the no possibility of overcoming appear in every War Progressed: A Chronology quarter. If one seems to be somewhat re• A chronological summary of German official • lieved, a new one develops somewhere else. reports during the war gives some insight into This situation .called for the application of some morale fluctuations and official concern with the sort of morale-booster by the authorities to pre• growing defeatism. vent Stinvnwng from sinking too low. Morale is Good in the First Half of 1942' One of the great stimulants to morale applied by the Nazi leaders was the promise of retaliation In February 1942 the. military picture ap- and secret weapons. The purpose, partially^ real• -peared bright. In view of Rommel's victories in ized, was to strengthen the people's will to hold Africa, a successful defense on the Eastern front, out and to convince them of the possibibty of a and U-boat activity off the American coast, to say final German victory. There is evidence that as nothing of the favorable progress of the Japanese the air raids, grew heavier in 1944, faith in the ally, the popular Stimrmmg was characterized as eventual application of the new weapons was the good. But the hard fighting in the East continued main sustaining hope of many Germans. Until in March and April, with no victories being an• the invasion, the desire for retaliation was closely nounced, and the heavy casualties of this cam• tied up with the air war, while after June 1944 it paign, added to reductions in food rations and was associated also with the hope of defeating the agricultural worries, began to depress the morale, enemy attack in the West. which was now characterized as "serious." Air The cry for retaliation appears first in 'June raids on Bonn, Kiel, Cologne, Rostock, and 1943 in the Main Franconia series of reports. The Luebeck also caused worry. In May 1942 there V-l rocket was not put into action until June was an upswing, due to military successes and 1944, so that for a year the patience of the people good weather. was under the greatest strain while the frequently heralded and greatly desired wonder-weapon did -The great victories on the East front, with not appear. It is not surprising that all sorts of their high figures of prisoner and booty at runioi-s of coming miracles circulated. There is Kerch and Kharkov, the successes of the evidence that under such strain the people began U-boat weapon, and the victorious battles of to doubt tho existence of the weapon and began the Japanese have increased the confidence to lose faith in the Party and its leadership as in a successful outcome to the war and the •well. When the V-l was finally launched, its hope that the Russian war can still be ended daily use was closely followed, and the absence of this year. any mention of it in the communique for a-day At the same time, the end of the-dry spell re• or two again aroused the greatest anxiety." Fur• lieved the anxiety concerning the harvest and the thermore, the air raids caused great fear that the next year's food prospects (an important factor factories producing the V-weapons might be hit in this agricultural area). This confident mood and their production either rendered impossible continued through June as'the German arms con• or so delayed,as to render them ineffectual. tinued to be victorious in Africa, in the East, and Late in 1944 and in 1945 the people seem to at sea; Iii July of 1942 a number of reductions in had been increased, but housewives continued to rations and new food shortages preoccupied the complain that they would have preferred an in• people, and .the air war had a depressing effect. crease in the fat ration. The frictions with evacuees from'Duesseldorf continued, and there The heavy air raids on cities in north• were increasing difficulties connected with sup• western Germany and, more recently,, on plying them with the necessities of life. Again Saarbruecken and the. Palatinate, have a complaint was made that their tales of destruc• raised doubts in wide circles of the popula• tion had an unfavorable effect on the general tion. morale. Rumors about the bomb damage were contradic• In October, the harvest season, people were tory, but again focusing their attention on 'food. The speech of the Fuehrer, and Goering's famous In general it may be said that the bombed- speech promising that the Germans would eat no out evacuees would serve the public interest matter who in Europe starved,. helped to raise better if they were more discreet concerning the confident mood, while the increase An rations the results of the raids. invited favorable comparison with the first World Contributing to an improvement of morale were War in which rations were seriously cut in the the German victories on the southern sector of fourth war year. Evidence of war weariness is to the "East front and further U-boat exploits. be seen in ,the widely circulated rumors of an The favorable progress on the Eastern Front imminent armistice between Germany and Russia. and the successful smashing of the "invasion at• Since the wish is father to the thought, the tempt" at Dieppe were convincing enough to raise population is very receptive to such rumors the Stimmvng again to "good" in August, but the and hopes for a surprising end to the war, at big raids on the cities of the Main.estuary and the least with Russia * * *. Such rumors are a later attack on Nuremburg considerably strength• great danger for the popular Stimmung since ened the feai*s of the population that Main Fran- they bring "about disappointments as soon as conian cities would soon be attacked. These fears their lack of foundation becomes evident. were great enough to find expression in overt behavior. The inhabitants of the larger cities By the end of December 1942 the unfavorable were removing their valuables to the country, and impression made by the Anglo-American occupa• some of the large textile companies of Wuerz• tion of North Africa is said to have gradually burg were also transporting the major portion of disappeared. The leadership was credited with their stocks to safety. taking effective measures to achieve this result. The problem of caring for evacuees from other However, the Eastern Front was again becoming regions, -which from now on was to be one of the a. source of depression, and rumors concerning constant irritations for the local population, is Stalingrad were rife. Nevertheless, the claim was mentioned in August for the first time. With1 made: better supplies, worries over the food situation re• By and large the Stimmung can still be treated again to the background. considered firm and confident. People clearly The Eastern Front and the Air War Are understand what a lost war would mean for Sources of Worry in the Fail of 1942 Germany and understand that the war must be waged to a successful conclusion, whatever The Eastern Front presented heavy fighting it may cost and however long it may take. again in September of 1942, and the intensified air raids helped to "bring home to the popula• The confidence was said to be further bolstered by tion the seriousness of the war." People were be• the Fuehrer's New Tear's speech. ginning to realize that the war in the East would Stalingrad the Main Factor during ' not be over as soon as had been hoped and that more sacrifices would be necessary before'Ger• the Early Months'of 1943 many won. The city population was still nervous At the beginning of the year, the Stalingrad over the possibility of raids and continued to battle was the focus of attention. It was followed evacuate property. People were happier about the with particular interest by the Main Fran con i an food situation since the bread and meat rations population, since many men from the area be- 45 longed to the Sixth Army. Although "over/timid were to be fully razed by the Fuehrer's birthday souls'3 are said to have become doubtfid of final (20 April). People who had relatives at Stalin• victory, the predominant part of the population grad tuned in on the Russian radio stations, hop• is reported to have maintained its will to hold out, ing for news of the soldiers. which was strengthened by the speeches of the Fuehrer and other leaders on 30 January, the Air Raids Begin to be a Central Problem tenth anniversary of the accession to power. It is Haltung continues to be characterized, as good admitted, however, that the Party was holding in May 1943, but the Stimmung is said to be de• waves of meetings to "keep people in line." pressed, because of the defeat in Africa, the The'actual surrender at'Stalingrad proved a great drop in U-boat claims, and the uncertainty great shock to the population. The February re• regarding military developments in the East. port reasoned: Further, the terror attacks by the Amer• The German people had been spoiled by ican and English airtforces against the Ger• their military successes up to now and were man and Italian cities and especially against not' prepared for a defeat. According to the the German dams, which are gaining in num• disposition and the political attitude of the ber and intensity, are discussed with con• individual, one can hear the most diverse cern. opinions. One part of the population accepts By June 1943 the people were even more de• the situation with quiet confidence. But the pressed, principally because of the.air raids on faith in final victory of another part of the the Ruhr cities, which caused great worry. The population has begun to falter. Here the report of the local Party leader in Schweinfurt waves of party meetings take hold and carry to the regional Party leader in Wuerzburg in• the fafterers along. The large numbers being geniously explains that since there are no great drafted, worry over the accomplishment of battles occurring at this time, the people's atten• agricultural tasks, the imminent closing down tion is focused on the Rhineland. In other words, of business, the labor service for men and there was no counter-stimulus to overcome the women, all these are additional burdens for effect of the raids. The reports by refugees in• the popular morale. tensified tho crushing effect of the raids, and fan• tastic rumors concerning casualties circulated.- Helping to overcome the low point in morale were The lack of news of more U-boat successes was "the Wehrmacht communiques of the last weeks considered especially painful. There was much with their firm and confident tone, and the three talk of the retaliation promised by Goebbels in special announcements of U-boat successes." his Sportsplatz speech on 5 June, which was The March reports of 1943 still evaluate morale • awaited with "burning impatience." People were in terms of Stalingrad. Morale is characterized asking, "How much longer is it to go on like as composed and confident again, if it could not this?" and- newspaper articles commented that, yet be called optimistic. The stabilization of the "Retaliation was naturally promised by- the Eastern. Front, together with news of territorial leadei'S, otherwise we would fail of victory. But gains in the East and U-boat achievements, suc• when will it come?" ceeded in overcoming the low morale which fol• A comment by the Party chief in'Schweinfurt lowed the Stalingrad defeat and. the subsequent demonstrates that resentment is turning against great territorial losses. the Party: " * IJaUung is said to\>e good in April, but the • Stinvnmng was divided according to whether or Also the malevolent turn of phrase is fre• not the individual saw the situation in the East quently heard that the present time reminds with confidence or anxiety. Periods of military one very much of 1918. The people in ques• inactivity arc noted to be especially favorable for tion are also hard to convince. When one tries the formation of rumors. High casualty figures •to enlighten them, they say, "Oh yes, you be- had a detrimental effect on Stimmung. In the • long to the Party, you have to talk that way." Schweinfurt area there were many rumors re• ferring to bombing. One states that many of the Further evidence of this turning against the cities which had already been attacked by air Party is the complaint in the Propaganda Minis-

46 try Intelligence Report that the use of the German raids based on England to a halt and other• greeting "Heil Hitler", had markedly fallen off in wise have a decisive effect on the course of the Schweinfurt area, although it was formerly the war, will soon be put into effect. more employed there than in other regions. The local propaganda leader comments: The problems concerning refugees were increas• ing, and the number present in the area- had risen Is that not a cause for reflection? It turns to 53,000 with another 25,000 in prospect. out again and again that one's way of greet• At the local level, satisfactory behavioral ing is a symbol of one's attitude. morale is reported by the mayor of Schweinfurt, although reports show that following the raid Late 1943: Political Events, Air Raids there was great nervousness and anxiety. The re• and Eastern Front port covering the local area declares:

The' Italian political events and the air raids The belief in final victory of a not incon• sei-ved to depress morale in July 1943, although siderable part of the population has doubtless the "collective behavior" of the population is de• been strongly shaken, and already one hears scribed as not bad. One rumor in circulation was voices demanding peace at any price, since that. "With Italy's collapse the war is over, for the war is already as good as lost. At the we cannot occupy the Balkans alone." There was same time all sorts of rumors are circulating; a general demand for retaliation, which "would be e.g., to the effect that * * * our enemies de• the decisive means for strengthening the popular manded that we cease hostilities by the 15th morale." There was temporarily less concern, over of August or else 40 German cities would be the outcome of the eastern fighting, "no doubt razed to the ground', etc. The present Stwrnmi- partly due to the positive and confident attitude" ung or more specifically Raltwng of a not in• of the soldiers home on leave. considerable part of the population is there• The 46,000 evacuees who were quartered in the fore critical. Only a quick and important Mai hf ran ken province caused difficulties. They military success can bolster up again the be• were frequently dissatisfied with the conditions lief in final victory. and many of them returned home. Toward the End of 1943 the Italian Situation Many-of the bombed-outs are negativistic. and Military Events Depress Morale Through their somewhat exaggerated reports In September 1943 the Stimmung was still seri• they cause false notions and strengthen the ous for much the same reasons, the Italian situa• fear that the enemy fliers, after destroying tion, the German retreats on the East front, and the cities on the western border of the Reich, the air raids. The military implications of the will gradually also smash the cities of central Italian events caused such worry that, according . Germany. to the Schweinfurt party reports, they even put The bombed-outs are a very unfavorable in• the raid on Schweinfurt somewhat in the back• fluence at the prescribed air raid drills in the ground of attention. The promised retaliation country. They "know it all" and persuade was the subject of various- rumors: the population to slacken in their ARP preparations. The statement is remarkable that on the island of Usedom factories for the production The generally unfavorable military picture in of .new secret weapons have been destroyed August caused a noticeable deterioration in the - by enemy air iraids and therefore retaliation popular morale. The primary reasons given are will again be delayed. Others claim that the the confused Italian situation, the loss of Sicily, / new weapon is now being tried out in Nor- the evacuation of Orel, Kharkov and other Rus• *- way. sian cities, and especially the air raids. The Fuehrer's speech of 10 September to the effect In particular the attack on Schweinfurt has that Germany had the technical and organiza• badly shaken the sense of security of the Main tional means not only to break the air war but to Franconian population. It is generally hoped retaliate effectively, was an attempt to bolster con• that the frequently announced retaliation fidence and silence the growing doubts. against England, which will bring the air The work effort of the population at the harvest time earned a rating of good HaZtung in October Morale fluctuates in Relation to Raids 1943, but the. SHmmtrng was still serious. The (January-June L9H) general military picture and more specifically, the In 1944, the Stirrvmung was consistently de• war in the east with its high casualty rates and pressed by the raids, the Russian advances, and the air raids, still caused worry. The people are the breaking away of Germany's eastern allies. said to be awaiting the retaliation with great The invasion surprisingly brought a relief, for longing. people thought that now a decisive defeat could At the local level, the Schweinfurt evacuees are be inflicted on the enemy, and the use of V-l said to have good Halinmg, and the population ended the suspense of the long wait for the re• generally behaved more calmly during the second taliation. raid on the city (14 October) than in August. In January the news of the German air raids However, the local Party leader reports that there against south England was received with great was great nervousness following the raid. At satisfaction. There was still a cry for retaliation: eveiy new alert people rushed out into the coun• tryside. They had partly lost their nerve. The It was noticed that the Fuehrer in his raid had put the fighting fronts somewhat into speech of 31 January 1944 made -no- mention ; the background. of retaliation. This omission is frequently • In November 1943 the Stimarmng was still seri• interpreted as meaning that the retaliation ous. The interaction of various mo rale-determin• will perhaps come all the sooner. ing factors is evident in the report by the presi• dent of the Mam Franconia district: The heavy raid on Schweinfurt hi February 1944-resulted in further depression, to which the All in all, the general Stimmjimg.is serious, Eastern front and the heavy casualties contrib• in keeping with the military and political uted : situation. The counter-attacks which we have People ask themselves what, the future de• • been launching for some time on the East velopment will be if one munitions plant front doubtless have contributed to a more after another is heavily damaged or de• confident'judgment of our military pros• stroyed, and they fear that in time also the pects. On the other hand, it is considered^ medium-sized cities will become "the target of more and more a sign of weakness that we enemy attacks. have to take one terror raid after another without being able even to reply in kind. The People were concerned as to whether or not the Fuehrer's speech'of 8 November and the raids on England constituted the longed-for re• wave of Party meetings have recently taliation. strengthened the power of resistance of the broad mass of the population. The reflection, While some consider these attacks to be the however, that the destructive blows against opening blow of retaliation, others explain the home front also frustrate the prepara• •that they represent no real reprisal for what tions for retaliation, will not be stilled. Re• the English and Americans have inflicted on taliation is therefore anticipated with great us. The belief in a decisive retaliation which longing. will change the military situation in our favor is therefore no longer so general as The air raids and.the retaliation were the-prin- was the case earlier. cipnl factors affecting morale in pecember of 1943. The people were depressed and were ex• The flood of evacuees in the area continued to pressing'doubts of the retaliation measures, £fit- have a more and more depressing effect, and the ler's New Year proclamation and the speeches of air raids together with the Eastern front kept the other leaders at the holiday season are said to have SHmnmng depressed. The March report gives a strengthened the popular will to resist, but the picture approaching demoralization. propaganda was evidently o'f a negative nature, The mayor of the city of Schweinfurt for it is said that "People are thoroughly con• points out in his report that the hourly re• vinced of what Germany would have to expect if ports oh the air raid situation over the radio our enemies succeeded in defeating ns." have a particularly unfortunate effect. There tire many fellow Germans who keep their lief that the use of the retaliatory weapon is radios turned on from morning to night, only an answer to the technical superiority of OUJ in order to hear what is said about approach• enemies. ing planes. As soon as enemy planes are an• nounced anywhere over Reich territory, it's The 20 July attack on Hitler's life naturally all over with peace and quiet. became the focus of attention. The hard defensive righting, on all fronts and the air terror at home The nervousness of the population is also revealed led to a serious mood. People were longing foi in another incident: the end of the war but realized; in accordance with German propaganda lines, that only victory The setting-up of flak installations in sev• could guarantee "the continued existence of the. eral boundary points around Wuerzburg has Reich and the freedom of the people." Some dis• been received by the population with mixed appointment with the V-l evidently continued tc ' feelings.. Since the city of Wuerzburg has so be expressed, and people were waiting for more far been spared enemy attacks, they see in this secret weapons. fact less a protection for the city of Wuerz• burg and its environs than a point' of attrac• Even if there were individuals who ex• tion for enemy fliers. pected a decisive effect for the war, or at least The Haltung of the civilian population is char• an immediate cessation of enemy air attacks, acterized as "somewhat intimidated" and is con• and these exaggerated hopes were not ful- trasted with the unshakable confidence of the >filled, nonetheless people are convinced of the front soldiers that the Soviet advance will be favorable effects of the uninterrupted V-l halted. attacks.

All faintheartedness, however, will disap• In August the invasion front took precedence. pear if the retaliation * * * is set into, action It is understandable that the surprisingly and succeeds. quick movements of the Allies in France, the In April and May of 1944 the Sivnvnvmig con• surrender of Paris, and the fighting which is tinued to be depressed by the raids, and the diffi• already taking place on the battlefields of culties between the rural population and the the first World War depress the Stimmung evacuees from the bombed cities continued to be of the population and strengthen the depres• a focus of disaffection. The May report, written sion of many fellow Germans, who in addi• immediately following D-day, states that people tion to this are uneasy because of this lack of were expecting hard and decisive fighting on all news from their relatives in the field. fronts and anticipated great military events. The In the face of the development on the West• retaliation was now expected momentarily.. ern land front which is arousing such con• cern, the successes achieved by the Navy There is, however, a not inconsiderable brought only a momentary lift to morale. number of fellow Germans who no longer be• "If such blows were continually repeated," lieve in the enemy invasion and the German then people would have a reason to count ori counterblow. "Wiry an invasion after all?" a successful interference with the enemy's many ask. (They say) That is no longer bringing up of reserves. But a single success, necessary, for the continued air attacks on however remarkable, is not effective * * *. Germany will accomplish the same goal. The hopes of further secret weapons remain The Invasion and the Normandy Campaign the single morale-boosting factor * * *. It is interesting with regard to the formation of Lead to Demands for the New Weapons morale that a definitely serious political In June the popular morale was dominated by event, such as the defection of Turkey, did the invasion and the German retaliation: not result in any essential and additional The news of the invasion front and of the strain on people's spirits. "One more enemy application of the German weapon against now doesn't matter any more. We are lost England have found a passionate echo arid anyway if we don't soon come forward with have strengthened the population in its be• pur new weapon * * *." Pessimism Gives Way to Defeatism ' This minority, however, is not very con• Toward the End of 1944 siderable. Their views are listened to by those having a skeptical attitude with a pitying The parallel with the first. World War con• smile. tinued to arouse defeatist associations. In Sep• tember it is reported that: The general pessimism had led to great skep• ticism concerning the official news services and Comparisons with the development of the propaganda. Even so-called strong characters World War are made constantly. Everything were being infected with the general demoraliza• is happening today as it did then, only this tion. But, at least according to this series of re• time we held out a year longer. The miracle ports, faith in Hitler still remained. of Stalingrad is comparable to the miracle of the Marne. In 1918 it was the home front It is particularly depressing for those whose which stabbed the front in the back. This Flaltvng has been above criticism and who time it;s the other way around. u have kept their heads high to find that they are generally considered to be "not quite all The enemy air superiority was in the foreground there", if they express out loud their confi• of all discussions. dence in the future. They find a sympathetic ear most easily among their fellowmeu if they People see it at the front as well as over refer to the personality of the Fuehrer as the the Keith itself with helpless fury. The criti• only consolation and as a support above all cism is becoming more and more sharp and temptation. "It would be contrary to all rea• merciless, even against leaders and specific son, if one were to believe that this man could programs. deceive us now when it is a matter of the life Certain individuals were said to be concerned or death of all Germans, and would persuade with the problem of what they should do if the us to hold out still longer if there were abso• Anglo-Americans were to invade northwest Ger• lutely no prospects for victory. The Fuehrer many. The Party ordered them to carry out a alone knows whether or not we can manage it, scorched-earth policy and Hee. and he would not demand further sacrifices from us if further resistance were really In discussions on this topic a large part of meaningless!" ' , those concerned expressed the decision to stay in Hamburg, been use they trusted to human• The workers in armament industries were more ity of the English. than ever convinced that the raids were so de• structive to the war industry that by October all However, others, impressed by German propa• production facilities would be destroyed, so that ganda, nwaited eventual occupation with great even the most wonderful inventions would be of no fearbecause of what they heard of the administra• 'use. The Western front was now considered the tion of Anglo-American occupied territory in decisive one. France and Italy. The only popular hope for a In connection with the continuing raids, the change in the course of the war lay in the new alarm announcements were no longer taken very weapons which-hnd' been promised, and the next seriously. ^ several weeks were expected to decide the outcome of the war. "Attention, attention. Over enemy terri• tory there is not a single German airplane. The progressive destruction of the arma• End of the German Air Force." This illus• ment industry is increasingly disturbing. trates the impression of very many people of Stories telling of the destruction of big arma• the present value of our air force. ment factories in all regions of the Reich are calculated to impair seriously the hopes of the A report of the same period mentions the great completion of our new weapons. number of rumore in circulation concerning peace negotiations. Interestingly enough, these are di• A certain minority was said really to believe that rected at the western powers. However, the report a change in the air war would soon be achieved by continues to the effect that the question of the the new weapons about which fantastic rumors necessity of the war with Russia was again being were circulating. discussed.

50 The writer of the Security Service report criti• the beginning of November, in which he affirmed cizes the official atrocity propaganda of "strength his belief in a German victory, met with an un• through fear" as leading not to increased perform• favorable response. ance but rather to a- condition of apathy. People An increase in listening to foreign broadcasts were expressing thoughts of suicide in case things was noted. There was special interest in pro• should get too bad, but at the same time they were grams which gave the names of prisoners held in coming more to the opinion that "the enemy is not Allied'countries. quite so bad" as depicted by the German propa• In December 1944 and January 1945 the stead• ganda. The propaganda line of the horrors' of de• ily increasing raids were having increasing de• feat is credited in the report with keeping up the moralizing effect on the population. Haltung of the Main Franconian population, in The people are beginning to suffer from spite of an almost catastrophic Stimmung. what is called Bunkerfever and inability to Air raids and their consequences were the prin• work. Newspaper articles, in which the peo• cipal morale-determining factor. By October the ple are told that the days of the air terror number of persons from outside of tho region who are numbered, have exactly the opposite effect had been evacuated to it, totaled 145,382. of what they had been intended for. If, sub• There was no faith in a German victory, accord• sequently, another air raid occurs the depres• ing to an October report from Wuppertal, but sion of the people is all the worse. The faith general hope for an early end of the war, possibly in our leading men, including the Fuehrer, through a compromise with the enemy. It was is rapidly disappearing. They are thoroughly being said that too much had been asked of the fed up with Goebbels' articles and speeches, people and that everything humanly possible had and say that he too often has lied to the Ger• been done. The only further possibility was total man people and talked too big. The attitude collapse. The people were saying thej* would 'pre• towards National- Socialism is characterized fer "the end with terror rather than terror with- by the following saying: "If we have not yet out end." a phrase very often encountered in collapsed it is not because of National Social• morale reports from many regions. ism but m spite of National Socialism." The air superiority of the enemy was declared the decisive factor for the end of the war. No pos• The Rundstedtoffensive and a simultaneous, tem• sibility was seen for overcoming this superiority, porary decrease in raids improved things slightly although the use of V-l provided some bolstering toward the end of December, but a new heavy raid of morale. At the same time, dissatisfaction was on^l January and the stalling of the Ardennes expressed that fighter plane production was sub• offensive, soon led to a further relapse in Stimm• ordinated to V-l. ung. At the same time the local population was incensed over the fact tliflt the heavy raid on A general turning against the Party was also Wuppertal was not mentioned in the communique. reported. People were skeptical of the propaganda The Russian drive on Silesia in January com• on new -weapons and sought to find the person re• pletely removed any lingering hope of a German sponsible for delaying the program. The "Heil victory. People said that if Silesia and its indus• Hitler" greeting was dropped out of- use. The try were out'of the running, the war was lost. speeches by Goebbels, Ley, and other leaders were openly criticized. . The Defeatist Mood Approaches Panic in 194") In February and March the defeatist mood ap• It was-also said that one might still trust proached panic. The Russian advance, and the air the Fuehrer but certainly none of the others, raids were the focus iof all attention. Women because it was apparent that within the ranks were seen weeping publicly at the stories of the of the leaders treason and sabotage were rife. sufferings in the area of the Russian invasion. f However, another report declares that it was com• Nobody believes any longer in retaliation mon talk that the masses had lostN faith in Hitler, or in new weapons. There is no trust in any- too. 1 The Volkssturm, a type of home guard for last ditch defense, Hitler's announcement of the inauguration of was inaugurated by Hitler In October 1944. Since people had the Volhsaturm2 is reported to have met with al• been given to understand that It was to be used only for .local defense, they began to object'strenuously when the men were most 100 percent disapproval, and his speech at shipped to the various fronts. \

51 tiling that the government announces. It is dogs, it is Goering's fault. Although he had said that we shall never have a tolerable peace command of all the resources of Europe, no as long as the Party is in the saddle. new type of airplane had been issued since 1938. Also, the defense had been so neglected Rumors were rife concerning peace negotiations, that today the enemy air force ravages all von Pa pen usually being named as the envoy. Germany without a shot being fired. Other rumors told of the collapse of military re• sistance on both the Eastern and Western fronts. The civilian shortages provided the last straw. The only consolation of the people was the It is ^interesting to note, after reading of the thought that they would be invaded by the Anglo- utterly hopeless feeling of the population that it Aniericans and not the Russians. was the food shortages which led to the first Feeling was even turning against Hitler. expression of revolt to appear in these reports.

Hie women make the accusation that the There is a tremendous shortage of coal, German population has been doomed to death flour, salt, victuals, and potatoes. In the ranks by the terror raids. There are no defense of the workers, it is said_that if on top of measures. Nobody can answer for this any everything else they were expected to go longer, not even Hitler. hungry, they would rise and refuse to work.

But Goering was made the chief target. At the end of March it is said that even in oflicial circles it was generally believed that the war was Goering is called the greatest criminal of lostJ A passage from "Mem Kampf" was being all, since it is he who is responsible for increasingly cited: the cruel air terror. By the air terror alone the resistance of our soldiers has been If a nation is led to ruin, its people have broken * * *. If Germany is going tp the not only the right but also the.duty to revolt.

52 CHAPTER 2—MORALE AND BEHAVIOR^ OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

The crucial spot in which to examine the effects duction was a full 30 percent. A certain amount of.lowered morale upon the German war effort of this loss, although by no means the major part, lies in war production. Did depression in general, resulted from- the cumulative effects of loss of and defeatism and disaffection from the Nazi morale. regime in particular, show themselves in lowered War production, good as it was until mid-1944, industrial production? might have continued to rise if morale had not The testimony of industrial informants and been depressed. The percentage increases in Ger• plant representatives throughout western and man war production were not large in relation to southern Germany indicates that war production the possible .productivity in a rationalized, na• was in some instances critically reduced by de• tionally coordinated war economy. They were pressed morale, particularly during the final slight when compared to our own percentage in• months of the war. Official German statistics'do creases in the production of war materials.- not reflect this condition because such effects are There are three major ways in which lowered usually concealed or falsified in the original re• morale may be expected to affect war production: ports and because available data do not include absenteeism and lower productivity, both of which the hist months of the war, when cumulative had significant effects upon German war produc• effects of lowered morale were becoming most tion, and sabotage, which did not. A more de• serious. tailed analysis of these three kinds of effects The" majority of the industrial population was follows. obviously not immune to the morale-depressing influences which affected civilians in general. Absenteeism Discouraged workers, however, are not necessarily unproductive workers, and German war produc• The Problem tion kept up amazingly. In" fact, according to Demoralized workers may be expected to find official German figures, Germany's domestically ways and means of staying away from work more produced gross national product showed an an• readily and more frequently than workers whose nual increase during each war year. The 1944 morale is high. In wartime Germany the limits gain was 3 percent, one of the largest. Armament within which absenteeism was possible were rather production, which made up an ever larger share narrow. The codes specified by the Labor Office of the total product, increased at a much faster were very specific. Controls were rigid and penal• pace. According to the official reports. 1944's gain ties could be severe. Strong motivations of a vol• over 1943 was no less than 25 percent. The total untary nature, moreover, tended to keep Germans increase was accomplished, moreover, with little at work. As a people, they were accustomed from or no increase in the total labor force after 1940, the cradle to habits of industriousness and obedi• and notwithstanding the substitution of women, ence. Their livelihood depended upon their labor. adolescents, and foreigners for many skilled Considerations of patriotism were significant. workers. Even in the armaments industries, the 'With sons and husbands at the front, the people total labor force increased by only 3 percent be• knew that their services were indispensable if tween 1943 and 1944. victory was to be achieved. For a time, then, German war production held • Bombing did much to weaken the effectiveness its own and even gained, in spite of declining of the controls. When, in the latter months of the morale. But in August 1944 the arms production war, the need for them became greatest, it became • program began to decline, in spite of the fact that increasingly difficult to enforce them. Spontan• nearly everything else had been sacrificed to it. eous desire to continue at work also declined. and dropped every month thereafter at .an in• Money was less needed because there was little creasing rate. Between July 1944 and the follow• to buy and because so many people received al• ing January, when very little German territory lowances for bomb damage. The problem of had been lost to the Allies, the drop in arms pro• getting to the place of work became an increas-

53 ingly difficult one. With the conviction that the they testify that worker's were given time off after war was hopelessly lost in any case, considerations air raids when they could not or would not have of patriotism became , less potent. And so, as worked anyway. This was obviously reported as bombing created new kinds of excuses for remain• "authorized" absence. "Phoney" leaves for sick• ing away from work, an increasing number of ness and for repairing bomb' damage were fre• Germans took advantage of them. quently granted and hence became authorized. Absent workers were reported as present, lest they The effects of increasing absenteeism were not be arrested and their services permanently lost. immediately apparent. Throughout the arma• ments sector of the economy, in particular, various Typical statements of these industrial repre• types of standardization, concentration in larger sentatives follow: plants, decrease in number of types produced and Shop superintendent-, Ivloeckner-Humboldt- other kinds of industrial rationalization intro• Dietz Co., manufacturers of trucks, fire- duced efficiencies more than adequate to cancel fighting equipment, etc., TJlm: out the effects of lowered morale, at least until late 1944. Moreover, the best workers were, kept We were generous in the granting of free in the arms industries. The growing absenteeism time to-those who applied for it, either for rates more or less coincided (unfortunately for " purposes of rest or for cleaning up. purposes of this analysis) with other forms of Labor office representative, Bamberg: war loss, particularly as a result of the bombing of industry and transportation. Hence the exact A large number of reports from Army effects of absenteeism upon productivity cannot be plants included the names of some individuals computed. The following paragraphs provide reported as working, who, I discovered, had evidence for our conclusion that these effects were not appeared to work for months. actually significant and, in some instances, serious. Labor trustee for Bavaria^ Munich (secret Types of Absenteeism report, 19 Feb. 1941) : '

The only legitimate reasons for authorized ab• The cases of breach of labor contract, un• senteeism were earned vacations, sickness and authorized absenteeism and particularly post-air raid needs, such as repairing damage at "blaumachen" (taking a day off) which come home, reestablishing one's domicile, or searching to the attention of the authorities are only the for relatives. Both internal and external evidence, smaller part of those which actually occur. however, indicates that the distinction between authorized and unauthorized absences was an ex• In short, managers often came to authorize the ceedingly flexible one in German statistics. Ac• inevitable. Hence it is necessary to do a^ great cording to figures in table 59, prepared by the man• deal of reading between the lines of those indus• agement of the Ford Works at Cologne-Neihl, a trial statistics. plant only slightly damaged, the percentage of The major unauthorized ways in which workers absenteeism due to sickness doubled between 1939 absented themselves during scheduled houra were and 1944. Absenteeism conveniently labeled as follows: "other," which included vacations and absence for dubious reasons, increased from 1.8 percent Faiung to appeal' for one or more days, to 12.2 percent in the same years. Losses due to the practice of taking a "blue Monday" was air attacks increased between 1942 and 1944, But commonly justified by workei-s as due to ill• remained much smaller than the other two cate• ness, or the* need to look after property or gories. ' relatives, following an air raid. Women fre• quently took unauthorized leave to visit hus• The conclusive-evidence for this practice of mis• bands in the Army, to do housework, to shop, labeling absences comes from interviews with to care for children, etc. managers, personnel officers and other industrial Tardiness, often inevitable because of dis- representatives who were interrogated. Many of rupted transportation, was more frequent these informants were frank in stating that records than necessary, according to several of our of absenteeism could not be trusted. Repeatedly informants.

54 Remaining away following air-raid alerts the long absences which jail sentences would during work hours was a practice particu• cause. This position.of the firms * * * has larly difficult to control or to clieck, because brought about a frightening deterioration of of general confusion and disruption. labor discipline (Meinmingen. 18 Sept. 1942). Extension of authorized leaves, for sick• ness, for earned vacation, or for post-air raid The last of these quotations is paralleled by sev• needs, beyond the allotted time was not un• eral others showing that while reported absences common. declined in 1942, the decline represented simply the general discovery by plant managers that it Changing jobs, theoretically impossible did not pay to report them. without approval, and constituting a serious "breach of contract," usually resulted from Absenteeism thus appears as a wartime phe• offers of better wages or from transportation nomenon, quite apart from bombing, and it is difficulties due to bombing. Often the em• most common among women. "Women, moreover, ployer had no means of knowing, for days made up 40 percent of the total labor force as or weeks, whether a prolonged absence meant early as 1941, and nearly half of it in 1944. By a change of jobs or merely "blatimachen." the latter year native women workei"S exceeded Quitting work entirely, also a breach of native men workers, so that the problem of female labor contract, was fairly frequent on the part labor morale was exceedingly important. of women and very young workei-s. The absenteeism problem was aggravated' by bombing in Bavaria, but was already serious be• The Effects of Various Degrees of Bombing fore any bombing occurred. An Area Almost Untouched by- Bombs.—The An Unbombed Plant in a Heavily Bombed files of the Reich's labor trustee for the economic Area—The Ford plant in . Cologne, though region of Bavaria, available from 1941-15, pro• slightly damaged, never suffered any serious In• vide evidence concerning this region which was terruption because of plant injury. Cologne it• scarcely bombed at all until 1943. The important self, however, suffered very heavily, beginning branch of Siemens-Schuckert in Munich reported, with the big attacks at the end of May 1942. As as early as March 1941, that 15 percent of its shown in table 59, total absenteeism increased workers were absent at all times. Comparable year by year with accumulated bomb damage to statistics are not available for other firms, but the the city. Most of the absenteeism labeled "air evidence, suggests that their absenteeism rates attacks" is presumably due to alerts and to re• must have been almost equally high. The follow• pairing air-raid damage outside the plant, rather ing reports to the labor trustee are representative: than to the plant itself. Total absenteeism during the 3 years of heavy bombing increased from 17.6 The increasing amount of sickness among percent to 28 percent, figures significantly higher female workers is startling; however, it seems than the pre-bombing rates, either in the same obvious that.the sick calls are only a form of plant or in the Munich plant mentioned above. taking the day off (Kempten. 18 Oct. 1941). Reports of breach of labor contract by It may be assumed that the normal absenteeism female workei-s increase to a terrifying ex• rate for this plant, apart from sickness, was not tent. The decline in the labor morale of above 2 percent, since the category "other" re• women cannot be mistaken any more (Nurem• mained a't the constant figure of 1.8 percent from berg, 19 Dec. I94i). 1939 to 1941. By 1944 this rate had been multi• plied by seven, and the increase coincides exactly Breaches of labor contract have again risen with the years of bombing. The sickness rate by 50 percent as compared with previous doubled between 1939 and 1944. Since there is no .months and have continued to rise for the evidence of unusual epidemics in Cologne during ' past 8 months (Bayreuth, 21 Jul. 1941). this period, this increase must be attributed to war This decline in the number of breaches of weariness in general and to fatigue and nervous• labor contract (during the previous report ness resulting from air raids. period) does not represent an actual decline. The majority of plant managers, particularly Absenteeism thus increased sharply .in this in the larger plants, are reluctant to makb heavily bombed city, even in a plant only slightly such reports, feeling it preferable to avoid affected itself.

55 TABLE 59.—Honrs worked and lost, Ford plant, Cologne Cologne.—Factories sustained no physical damage in the attack of 31 May 1942 but Percentage of planned manihours lost work in factories was impossible because of Year Hours workod (ia 11 lions) absenteeism- as a result of evacuations. After Sickness Air attacks Other Total heavy attacks following 2 February 1943 ojity

[930 .10.0 S.4 1-3 7.2 about 30 percent would show up for work. 1940... 8.0 7.3 1.8 0.1 After attacks on -28, 29, and 30 October 1944, 1041 8.3 7.3 1.8 • B. 1 1942 9.2 8.1 2.3 9.2 17. G workers left in chaos. Production completely 1943 10.9 8.8 4.8 10.3 23.9 ceased after 14 October 1944 due both to de• 1044.. 16.8 10.'2 fi.0 12.2 28.0 struction and absenteeism of workei-s. Re• spondent is absolutely certain that air raids shortened the war through their .effects on Five Heavily Bombed Cities.—In the absence the economy and administration. Absentee• of strictly comparable'plant, records,' interroga• ism was widespread right into the highest tions wore held in several German cities. The in• places. terrogations were comparable in the sense that the same questions were asked of all informants. They Hamburg.—After the July 1943 raid 1 were not comparable in the sense that some in• women made frequent and often "phoney' formants had access to their own records while excuses about illness, need to care for chil• some did not, and also in that they did not hold dren, etc. Gontrol over tlris was not very the same kinds of position's in the firms which strict. Also, after alarms that occurred to• they ,represented." Some were general managers, ward the end of the day, workers did not othei-s personnel managers, still others workers' return to their jobs. Sickness rates jumped representatives, etc. Ail, however, were in a posi• from 9.3 percent in January 1945 to 15 per• tion to have special knowledge of industrial prob• cent in April. Much was due to nervousness,' lems, and only those whose testimony was be• anxiety, and fatigue. lieved to be essentially reliable are quoted. Breaking of labor contracts was most fre• There were live heavily bombed cities, in which quent among sailors, women and youth. In 8 or more individuals were thus interrogated. general, discipline was good, but after the Out of 58 interrogations, serious absentee prob• July 1943 raids, 50-60,000 left Hamburg and lems are mentioned in 43, or 74 percent. There did not return, though they were under obli• are a total of 70 references to the existence of ab• gation to do so and could have returned. sentee problems in one or'several forms, and only Throughout the war, there was some slight 15 statements that soine specific kind of absentee• increase in the number punished for viola• ism did not exist. (See table 60.) tion of labor contracts. • Mvmich.—Some absenteeism occurred after- The problem took different forms "in different raids because of bonib damage. "After July cities. In Cologne, Munich, Bremen, and Hannover 1944, there was a production loss of 30-40 • a majority of the firms reported greatly increased percent because of absenteeism. The average illness and malingering rates as a result of raids, illness rate was 10 percent; during the win• while in Hamburg the flight of workers from their jobs after big raids was reported in 10 of 17 ter it rose as high as 30 percent. Attempts eases. The increases in sickness rates were as• at malingering were controlled through the tounding. Rates-running up to 15, 20 and even 30 plant physicians. percent of planned hours were not uncommon Tardiness was caused mostly by interrupted after big raids. This clearly was one "safe" way means of transportation, which could not be in which workers, whose attitudes were reported considered an excuse. Workers always re• as being predominantly anti-Nazi in all five cities, turned after raids unless their own district could engage in passive resistance. was hit. A sample of excerpts of the interrogations in Bremen.—Workers stayed away up to 2 these five cities gives.some indication of the rela• weeks because of bomb damage, even when tion between absenteeism and poor morale induced it was not all necessary. The armament pro• by bombing. Each excerpt is from a different in• gram was considerably affected. formant: The peace time illness rate, approximately

56 • 3 percent, went up to 5 to 6 percent during the tion of labor contracts. The impression given is war; malingering increased and, after the that malingering increased sharply as a result of great raids in 1944-5, all types of absenteeism the late raids, coming on top of a previous de• increased. terioration of morale due to the general wnr situa•

- Baivn-over.—In January 1945, after the big tion and the indirect effects of air warfare through raid, the total loss in man hours was 39 per• alarms, etc. ^ cent (illness, 19 percent; allowed vacations, In Luebeck, the March 1942 raids had some two-tenths of 1 percent; leave without pay effect, which wore off in time as no further raids ,to repair homes, 16 percent; unauthorized, occurred, but' reappeared gradually in late 1943 3.7 percent). Before the big raid the total and 1944 with the increasing alarms and worsen• loss "in man horn's was 14 percent (illness, ing war situation. There were four statements on S.C percent; leave without pay, 5 percent; absentee problems in nine plants covered, but the unauthorized, five-tenths of -1 percent). increase in illness rates is moderate, up to levels -of 4.6 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent. This • Illness rates were too high, in areas under compares with frequent references to rates of 20, danger of air attacks, and especially high 25, and 30 percent in the heavily bombed cities among locomotive drivers and train con• and in Freiburg after the heavy raids. It is sig• ductors. The rate in the fall and winter of nificant that in Luebeck there were no instances i944 was 10-12 percent. Foreigners usually noted of flight from the job nnd only two com• showed higher average sick rates. ments on a small amount of other unauthorized absenteeism, ' Tiuo Lightly Bombed Cities.—For obvious rea• sons, it was impossible to find cities, comparable The references to absentee effects are sum• in size to the five considered above, 'which re• marized in table 60, with the comparable figures ceived few or no bombs. The nearest possible ap• for botli heavily and lightly bombed cities. proach, for purposes of comparison with heavily bombed cities, were Freiburg, bombed heavily TABLE 60.—Number of references to varwut types of only in late 1944 for a short period,, and Luebeck, absenteeism bombed heavily once in March 1942 and hit by a 5 heavily bombed cities 2 lightly bom bed'cities few scattered raids of the precision type in 1944. Type of absenteeism (58 Informant*) [(17 inform acts) However,-there were frequent alarms in both of Ytt> No > Yet' No those towns so that they do not offer apicture of Increased sickness rates cities completely unaffected by air warfare. Par• and malingering 32 8 8 A Gndua time for Home ticularly notable is the indirect effect of air war• damage and repair 2 o' 1' 0 fare on morale, even in lightly or unbombed cities. Increase In unanlborited absence 11 4 4 0 The knowledge that the rest of the country is Increased tardiness 10 "2 5 0 being destroyed may add to general defeatism Flight from jobs..: 15 1 2 0 induced by an unfavorable military situation, and . Total _: 70 Ift 20 4 so lower the will to keep working. This seems to have been reinforced in the case of "Luebeck by the 'The heading "YeB" signifies a statement of .presence in sig• interruptions in raw material supply in 1944, nificant degree of this type of absenteeism ; "No" Bigniflca a specific which made production difficult and gave tangible denial that such absenteeism existed. evidence of the disruptive effect of the bombings Sample1 excerpts follow (each from a different elsewhere. informant).: In Freiburg, which was bombed four times more Freiburg.—After the raids "of November heavily than Luebeck (2,200 tons against 500), 1944, many of the women workers stayed serious absentee problems developed in connection away longer than necessary or didn't come with the late 1944 raids, according to four of the back at all. Old workers returned promptly; eight interrogations held. These reports indicate the illness rate went up to 25 percent in 1944- very high illness rates connected with malinger• 45. There was some sham illness on the part ing, ranging from 9 percent to 25 percent. There of women workers. were also four complaints'of increased tardiness General lethargy and lowered morale were and two cases of mass flight from the job, in-viola- the basis for tardiness and'slowdowns, even

57 in plants where prompt return to work was TARLB fil.—Percent of hours lost due to sickness, leave, still possible. etc (entire Reich, all armaments firms) , .

Luebeck.—There was a steady increase in Total bomb Hours Break-down i for Peroent 1944 lost tons (In September 1944 absenteeism, from 8 percent in 1940 to 12 thousands) percent in 1944. Three-fourths of the in- Percent crease was due to general dissatisfaction of March 10.8 27 6.4 (A Leave ' 1. ... 16 the workers and abuse of the sick leave pro• April 11.4 May. . 11.7 28 Tardihew. unexoueed visions; June 12.2 21 1.3 July 1.10 48 Operational causes .7 There was some increase in absenteeism due August 12.4 43 1 '•* ' to malingering after the big raid of 1942, but September. II. I 50 October ' 10.8 100 Total 11.1 this declined after about 3 months. In 1944 November . 11. 6 99 morale deteriorated, and there" was increased •"gold-bricking" in connection with damage Table 62 gives a break-down of various types of - to homes from raids. Time lost through ill—* time loss due to air raids, for armaments plants v ness in 1945 was 10 percent (no estimate for and for all industries. Since there is little varia• previous years). tion among the different months, the figures are given for September 1944 only, a month in which The Over-all Extent)?} Absenteeism time loss was somewhat higher than average, but Official SiathtUstt.—Regardless of' local differ-' not the highest for this period. ences in degree of bombing, how 'extensive was absenteeism of all kinds? Two sets of Reich-wide TABLE G'Z.—^Man hours lost from all causes, entire Reich, statistics are available, each covering a few September as percent of planned hours months of 1944. They tell a rensonably consistent Armaments All plants story, though certain reservations are necessary, plants as .noted below. • Due to air raidg: Percent Percent The fii-st source is the records of the Govern• 2.3 2.0 ment Bureau of Statistics, from which a study i.a 1.4 Damage to plant itself.- - .2 .2 has been made of total man hours lost from all Other raid effects... .4 .3 causes by various regions and for the whole Reich. Total air-raid loss 4.5 3.8 The study indicates that losses of -hours due di• 11. 1 11.4 rectly to air attacks average approximately 4 Total 16.6 15,3 percent of total.hours worked for all industry for the entire Reich. (See table 61.) The data cover only the months from March to November 1944 In view of two known facts,, total losses during for some series, and April to September 1944 for the final months of the war must be considered others, so that they do not offer grounds for com-- somewhat greater than the 15 percent indicated in parison with periods in which air attacks were table 62. Absentee effects of bombing were in• less important. creasing up' to i944, and presumably increased further in 1945, and official statistics tend to mini• Losses of hours due to illness, leave and vaca• tions, tardiness and other causes averaged 11 per• mize the actual extent of time lost ; e. g., workers cent for the period. Such losses were relatively were often considered to-.be on the job when they constant and show only a slight relation to the in• were in fact idle, or even absent. creased intensity of air attacks for the "economy A second Reich-wide source is a "strictly con• as a whole. fidential" repoit entitled "Industrial Damage

The rise from 10.8 percent in March to 13'per• through Bombings," % published in Berlin on 28 cent in July may be partially due to the intensive September 1944, which provides the material for bombings. More probably, however, it reflects a tables 63 and 64. Data are included only-for the summer peak in leave and vacations, since there is armaments industry, totaling some 11,000 fac- no correlation between total hours lost and total .tories, excluding oil and hydrogenation plants. bomb tonnage dropped by all air forces on all of Only the months of April, May, and June 1944 are Germany for this 9-month period. available. Breakdowns are given both by region

58 (table G3) and by industry (table 64). Since there TABLK 65.—Man hours lost by enemy action, as pei-cent are no significant variations during this 3-month of hours planned Repair and cleau-up work 1.3 period, data are presented for sample months Air alurms 1.0 only. Bomb damage to plant _ 0.2 Other bombing-related reasons 0.3

TABLE G3.—Man hours lost from all causes, June 19M> by Total 2.8 region as percent of total scheduled hours These figures indicate clearly that only ab• Per- Per• cent cent senteeism which is directly and immediately re• lated to bombing is so labeled. All absenteeism Berlin _: 22.2 Carinthia ias Hamburg 19.8 Munich-Upper Bavaria 15.3 which could be attributed to morale factors' is Lower Danulwi 19.4 M agd e burg-A nha It 15.3 either listed as "vacations and sickness." or not Vienna 18-7 Weser-Ems . 14.9 Cologne-Aachen 18.2 Westmark 14. S listed at all. Pomcrouta 17.5 Wartheland 14.3 Essen 17.2 Moseiland 12." British and American Absenteeism Rates.— 16." Upper "Danube _ Average, All Reich 14.7 These figures compare very unfavorably "with data from Britain and the United States. In 11 British It is clear, from table 63, that the most heavily war plants during one of the blitz periods (April, bombed regions are those with heaviest absentee• May, and June 1941) absenteeism from all causes ism rates. Two further considerations indicate ranged between 3.6 percent and 11 percent, the that the effects of bombing upon absenteeism are average being 7.4 percent. This-figure breaks even greater than would appear from this table. down into 3.2 percent for sickness, 0.5 percent for Figures for the heavily bombed oil and hydrogena- injury, and 3.7 percent unauthorized. In 5,000 American war plants, average monthly rates tion industries are not included and,'secondly, ranged between 6.1 percent and 6.8 percent in totally destroyed plants, like the dead, do not 1944 for absenteeism due to all causes except speak. Their 100 percent absenteeism is not in• strikes and vacations. Even including these addi• cluded in these figures. tional causes, the average rates would remain close to 7 percent. • i- ^ TABLE 04.—.lion hours worked, as percent of hours Individual Estimates.—Officials of several Ger: planned, May 19^5. by industries man firms were specifically interrogated, during Hours lost through- June and July 1945, as to unauthorised absences. Industry noura worked Of those who gave comparable figures for more Enemy act km Vacations, . sickness than 1 year, the replies in some cases were esti•

Percent Percent' Percent mates. In others they were based upon records. 83.0 3.2 11.8 Percentages are based upon total scheduled hours: Metal 80.9 2.4 10.7 Steel and iron construction.. 84.8 3.4 11.8 Machine . 84.9 ' 3.3 11.8 Motor car 83.3 3.5 13.2 TABLE 60.—Planned work lost through unauthorized 86.1 4.2 10.0 absence 82.8 2.8 14.4 Shipbuilding 84.1 3.9 12.0 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total, all industries... 85.5 2.8 11.7 Ford Go., Cologne (percent) : 1.5 as 4.5 Elefctroacustlc Neumuensier (percent)... 3.0 0.0 18.0 Deutsche Sohiflwerk, Bremen (percent).. 1.5 2.0 4.6 . For the month of April, the range of total ab• 2.0 M.A.N\ Nuremberg (man hours) 95,000 99,000 107,000 senteeism among the several industries- is from 13.1 percent to 17.2 percent. Only about one- Seven other firms provided estimates of unauthor• fourth of all loss is attributed to "enemy action." ized absence (without date), ranging up to 20 A more detailed break-down of the category percent. , "lost by enemy action" in May 1944 is as follows Some plants, on'the other hand, reported little (all industries) : or no deliberate absenteeism. The Adder Werke

59 (Frankfort-), E. H. Huock (Lndenscheid), the the existence of various types of absenteeism, but Grille TVerke (Hallein), Helmuth Sachae (Kemp- the estimates 'of the amount of absenteeism are. ten), the Light Metal Works (Bonn) and Krupps substantially grenter in the heavily Ixmibed cities. '(Essen) all reported unauthorized absenteeism of Total absenteeism rates during the last war year 2 percent or less right up to the bitter end. more than doubled the wartime rates in Britain Self-Reports of Absenteeism.—Our cross section arid the United States, as well as prewar German sample of respondents was queried as to absence rates, approaching 20 percent of all scheduled from work. The replies of all those gainfully em• hours during the last months of the war. A large ployed, not- just the industrial employees, are proportion of increased absenteeism was volun• summarized in table (17. tary on the part of workers and was attributable to bombing more than to any other single fflctor.

T-AHI.K (57.—Peroent of gainfully employed reportint/ obsenee from- work. Worker Productivity

Heavily Moderately Lightly German statistics do not exist from which total bomhed bomlwd bomhed Unlwimhed cities' cities" cities production figures may be related to comparable figures for hours worked-. Both kinds of data, Some time taken even if they existed, would be subject to ques• oft In 1944 »87 75 00 D7 Time off hecauseof tion. It, is known: that workei's were often re• air raids _ » 54 40 2U ported as present and working when they were in Time off -by sub• terfuge ' 14 . "13 23 (i fact absent, or when' they were present and as• signed, to post-raid clean-up work, or waiting .for : These, percentn do nor. add to IO0 percent because a person may supplies to arrive. Hence it. becomes necessary to fall into, more than one of the categories. rely on information obtained from plant Officials These figures show a consistent and statistically after the German surrender. In some cases our significant difference between unbombed and heav• informants were able to refer to their own records. ily bombed, areas, as- well as a slight difference In others they had only impressions to report. In between those lightly and heavily bombed. Fur• either case the figures cited are'to be'taken merely thermore, they confirm ' evidence from other as best available estimates. sources as to the wide prevalence of absenteeism. Heavily vs. Lightly Bombed Cities , Gestapo Arrests.—One of the categories in the available Gestapo arrest statistics (covering the Among the 58 informants queried in five heav• first 6 months of 1044 only) is labeled "refusal to ily bombed cities (see table 60), 35. or GO percent, work." The figures (for Germans only) range indicated a decline in work performance on the from 1,758 to 3,314 per month for the old Reich job, including sharp decreases in productivity, area. The estimated 1944 total arrests for this increase in loafing, poor labor discipline and de• cause are from'26,000 to 28,000. This equals about clining quality of work. There were r>3 references one-tenth of 1 percent of the 1944 native German to decreased work performance in one of these labor force, male and female, industrial and non- wnys on the pnrt of the workers, and 10 references industrial for this area. In view of the known to decreasing managerial efficiency. There were practice of trying to shield workers from arrest, 29 statements to the effect that there was no actual arrests of one worker out of each thousand change in work performance on certain specific for refusal to work in' 1944 is not an insignificant scores and six to the effect that managerial effi• figure. ciency wns not lowered. The break-down on spe• cific factors is shown in table 68. Summary The chief problems were: (1) a decline in en• Absenteeism was a serious problem in regions thusiasm for work, reflecting-itself in productivity of Germany, such as Bavaria, before they were decreases running as'high as 20, 25. and even 30 bombed. It was also serious in lightly• bombed percent and averaging perhaps 15 percent; and cities find in relatively undamaged plants in heav• (2) decreasing observance of rules regarding ily bombed cities. There are approximately equal alarms, return to work and staying on the job. proportions of industrial informants in heavily The following examples give a more concrete in• bombed and in lightly bombed cities who report dication of the nature of the productivity loss

60 caused by raids. Kach excerpt is from a different TABLK

Cologne.—After day attacks there was 6 heavily bom bod 2 tightly bombed Type of lowered productivity cities (38 Informants) citios (17 Informants) more loafing, frequent visiting the toilet, fre•

quent, questions of the foceman. more time Yet* .\'c I Yet Xo ' used to clean machines and select tools. Loafing and loss of enthusiasm... 30 7 7 1 r. • Cross-Section Sample of Cities Munich.—There was an estimated produc• Industrial representatives were asked to draw tivity loss of 20 percent after the introduction up memoranda in the cross-section sample cities. of the 00-hour week. All manner of loafing (See appendix A.) Reports were thus obtained and slowdowns existed. The production of on 39 major war plants in 17 cities. Informants prisoners dropped to 40-percent; of foreign were specifically asked to comment on produc• workers, to 50 percent; and of women, to 70- tivity, entirely apart from losses resulting from S0 percent. absenteeism. Faulty workmanship rose by 5 percent In only 4 of these 19 reports was it claimed since the summer'of 1944. that there was no noticeable decline in produc• The replies of the informants appear in table OS tivity. Two of these 4 reports came from lightly together with those of the informants in the two bombed cities -(Wetzlar, Hallein) ; one from an lightly boml>ed cities. Informants in the two-sets unbombed city (Lndenscheid); and one from of cities report decreasing productivity in approx• Frankfort-on-Main, heavily bombed. imately equal proportions, but estimates of the Reports on the other 15 plants all refer to some amount, of loss tend to be greater in the heavily degree of loss in productivity, commonly de• bombed cities. scribed as due to fatigue and nervousness. The estimates of loss of this kind range from 2 per• Summary cent to 50 percent. Sample excerpts from these Increasing losses in man hour productivity were reports follow: reported in lightly bombed as well as in heavily bombed areas. The over-all production loss due Ford plant, Cologne: ' to this factor was. probably not less than 10 per• A large increase in accidents, due to nerv• cent, the greater part of which is attributed by ousness and fatigue, further lowered produc-. our informants to morale factors. 'For this, bomb• tion by 10 to 15 percent. ing vvas largely responsible. ' - Elekt/roaoustic W&rke,. N'euvvuenster: Worker Opposition to the Nazi Regime. Production loss due to fatigue and nerv• Strong anti-Nazi attitudes were prevalent, ap-. ousness is estimated at 12 percent in 1913. 20 parently, among workers in all large German percent in 1911 and 39 percent in 1945. cities, particularly in the north, throughout the Tlmischel & Sohn. manufacturers of '•'•Tiger''' war. Outright sabotage, however, was rare. Among 5S 'interrogations of industrial representa• i tanks, Kasset: tives in five heavily bombed large cities, exactly It is estimated that o to 10 percent of man' half referred to more or less widespread worker hours were lost due to fatigue and nervous• antagonism to the regime, and only 3-denied-this. ness, 3 to o percent due to intentional loafing; Nine informants gave exactly the same picture of to this is to-be added an increase of 5 percent' Luebeck, which was only lightly bombed.-but only in unsatisfactory goods, during the last few 1 of 8 informants in Freiburg, a southwestern city months" of the war. (also lightly bombed), claimed to know of any ex • tensive anti-Nazi attitudes among workers. Knvpp Works, Essen: All this is consistent with the interpretation After insisting that his workers were loyal suggested from many other sources of informa• and had an excellent sense of duty, the per• tion; namely, that antagonism to the Nazis was sonnel manager added: After heavy night stronger in heavily bombed cities, not originally a ttacks, when the workers had .to labor under nor primarily because of bombing, but because the nervous strain, war weariness together with large cities, where worker sentiment against the poor diet Caused production to fall off con• Nazis was already strong, were those selected as siderably. targets for heavy bombing. Where there were al• Rithrstali Iworke, Witten: ready anti-Nazi feelings, bombings served to in• crease them. Where there were not, resentment on Fatigue and nervousness had some in• account of bombings was less likely to be directed fluence on production, probably less than 5 against the Nazis. percent. The nervousness on the part of It is quite clear that oppositional activities, women workers increased from December 12 which occurred more often in the heavily bombed until the end of the war. cities than in others, were the result of pre-exist• Kloeckncr-Ilumboldt-Diets, Uhn,: ing antagonism to the Nazis rather than of bomb• ing. Thus in the five heavily bombed cities, 13 of The separation of workers from their 58 informants specifically refer to active opposi• families had an adverse effect on their pro• tional groups, 4 of 13 adding that these groups ductivity. For the typical Swabian worker, carried on sabotage, during the war. Only 7 of life without his family (i. e., following these 58 informants assert that there were no ac• evacuation of family members) is simply tive opposition groups. In Luebeck and Freiburg intolerable. (lightly bombed) and in 9 other cities receiving Almost exactly the same conclusions are drawn various degrees of bombing (in each of which from data concerning 10 light industry (non- scattered interrogations were held) active opposi• anna merit) plants in seven cities, gathered in the tion-groups were rarely mentioned by informants. same way as those described above. Since both While this is not conclusive evidence for its ab• the findings and the comments closely resemble sence, it is doubtless an indication of the volume those reported above, they are not included here• of oppositional activity. with. As to outright sabotage, 4 of 58 informants in 62 the five large heavily bombed cities mentioned prevented direct sabotage or oppositional ac• specific instances oi which they knew, while 8 as• tivity. serted that there was none in "their cities. In the Opposition groups thus existed among workers two lightly bombed cities, only 1 of 17 informants throughout the war in most of the industrial cities knew of any sabotage, while 1 of them asserted of Germany. Their activities consisted mainly of that it had not existed. In the miscellaneous distributing leaflets, spreading "mouth propa• group of nine cities (in each .of which compara• ganda," etc. A few of them seized occasional tively few 'interrogations were held) 4 informants opportunities for outright sabotage. In the main, mentioned incidents of sabotage, while 8 of them however, their methods of hindering war produc• asserted that there was none in their cities. tion were those of using various pretexts to stay The nature of such oppositional activity as' away f rom work, arriving late, loafing on the job, etc.. Bombing provided the best opportunities for existed among workers is illustrated in" the fol• such pretexts. Such attitudes on the part of work• lowing excerpts from interrogations of industrial ers account very largely for the greater absentee• representatives. ism and lesser productivity in the heavily bombed Hamburg.—The oppositional group was cities. opposed to sabotage in its own plant, because it was a food factory. But "whenever the op• The Nature and Causes of Decline in portunity presented they sabotaged airplanes Industrial Morale and nearby airfields, punched holes in gas Many kinds of official documents, as Well as a tanks and threw sand in cylindeis." variety of informants, together present a picture Workers wasted, quantities of material, de• of the manner in which lowered war morale af- liberately cutting U-boat parts to wrong de• • fected industrial workers. Samples are herewith signs, removing parts of torpedoes, etc. This presented. sabotage was never traced. Leaflets were distributed, especially after Official Morale Reports air raids. The middle classes became vio• These secret reports, though not written with lently anti-Ally after raids and were driven the problem of industrial morale particularly in closer to the Nazis, because victorious war mind, nevertheless throw a good deal of light ' was their only hope of recovering what they upon it. The following selections, taken from had lost. Workers became more anti-Nazi; Ivrefeld reports, are representative of those from and in proletarian circles it was easier for other areas: Communists to work after raids. The war damage offices pay out too much Hanover.—Dissatisfaction with the Nazi money, "frequently causing lack of labor dis• regime among workers was noticeable in 1943. cipline. Absences of several days with" lame It became very open and outspoken in 1944 excuses are the result, particularly in "the case and 1945. ' . of female workers" (31 Aug. 1943). The fear propaganda does, not lead to in• Cologne.—In Cologne the workers became creased production, but rather makes people more anti-Nazi as the air attacks got heavier. phlegmatic and apathetic. "The population There was widespread "griping" but it did becomes more and more serious because of the not result in any tangible form of sabotage. constant air alarms * * *. This begins to Luebeck.—General morale deteriorated con• show more and more in the productivity and tinuously during 1944 with the feeling of de• efficiency of labor" (6 Mar. 1943). featism and bitterness against the Nazis for The bad morale begins to affect actual be• continuing the war. There was widespread havior moi'e and more * * *. People con• disappointment at the failure of the July 20 sider the war lost; measures of total war are coup. Women became increasingly outspoken too late; V-weapons are too late, or else and critical, and the workers laughed openly, thought to be mere bluff. It is clear that such among themselves after being harangued for attitudes have an effect upon the industrious- 2 hours by a Nazi speaker attempting to spur ness of the whole population. The willingness them to greater efforts. Terror of the Gestapo to work suffers considerably (28 Aug. 1944).

"63 Files of Regional Economic Counselor made up a, large proportion of those who The following conclusions are drawn from broke labor contracts and remained absent monthly economic reports- to the Party office in without authorization. Major reasons: they hike time off'to see their husbands home-on Munich. They deal principally with the then un• leave, or to visit husbands "at Army stations; bombed city of Wuerzburg and the already they don't need the moneys since family al• bombed city of Schweinfurt and cover the period lowances were often considered adequate. 1941^13. Women's labor .morale declined somewhat as 1. Women laborei-s cause'd trouble through ab• the war went on, but there is no evidence that senteeism., taking hours oh", increased sickness, this fact (reported ' before the region was sham or real. Sickness figures given in one in• bombed) is related lo bombing. stance fire up to 25 percent of all workei-s. Adolescent workers, next to women, caused 2. Adolescents cause trouble through absentee• the most labor 'trouble. Chief1 complaints ism, etc. One reason given is inadequate pay were taking days off. tardiness and slowness which does' not permit decent shelter and food. of work. Principal reasons: dissatisfaction But _ there is also evidence of "gold-bricking" and with wages, which were usually less than an unwillingness to enter professions which do those paid to adults for equivalent work; not promise easy money. sense of loss of freedom, due to stringent la• 3. The reports on foreign*labor are inconclusive bor laws and to the hick of free time; feeling in that the same group of laborers may be consid• that the work was too hard; and placement ered satisfactory or bad workers at different times. in suitable jobs. Various types of punishment, However, Russians are almost invariably de• such as "week-end arrest" and "youth arrest" scribed as inefficient because of insufficient food. were sometimes inflicted but in some instances 4. Foreign workers present the only cHSe which could not be carried out-beoause of lack of makes it possible to link up the aiv war with labor jail space. Penalties seemed only to increase morale. After the Schweinfurt raids prisoners absenteeism. There is no observable relation of war who had contracted for labor in Schwein- , between the labor morale of youth.and bomb• furt, refused to renew their contracts (which, un• ing. der the Geneva conventions, was legitimate), giv• Foreign workers were frequently guilty of ing us their reason thai, they feared for their lives absenteeism and tardiness. Reasons most com• if they stayed in.Schweinfurt. This-had a disrup• monly mentioned were: bad treatment by fac• tive effect on production. It may be surmised that tory managers and peasants (the Labor Trus• it also had a bad effect on German workei-s who tee complains that local police do not protect must have loved their lives as much but who could foreign workers adequately) ; broken prom• not quit. ises alwiit wages and living conditions in 5. Absenteeism was general in the Main- Germany; attempts to go home; and attempts F ran ken region, though it has very little to do (often successful) to change to a better job. with the air.war. Reasons given: work in the Russians became more difficult to handle fol• fields and no need for earning more money. lowing the German retreats in the East. There 6. Sometimes workers quit one job illegally to is no directly observable relationship to bomb• .take another, job. presumably better paid, thus ing- causing upsets in work plans. ' • 7. There was evidently no enthusiasm for regis• Labor Front Memoranda tering for total war and for the "total use of These memoranda, written between November labor." 1941 and January 1945, are from the leader of Files of Labor Trustee the labor front, district of Bayreuth, to plant inanagei-s. The earlier ones contain little more The following summary is drawn from a series than requests for cooperation, but the later ones of reports to the labor trustee for the economic sternly demand action and compliance with or- region of Bavaria, covering the period January dei-s. Beyond the usual references to poor labor 1941 to February 1945:* morale and concern over political influence of Warn en workers constituted the major foreign workei-s-upon Germans, these documents problem of" labor morale. Women always are of particular interest in revealing a jurisdic- 64 tional dispute between two labor agencies in deal• there was only one idea among the people: " ing with the problem of absenteeism. "it's no use; we can't stand it; we are being In late 1944 managers were urged to report in• ruined." dividuals guilty of absenteeism to the labor front, which "through education and'enlightenment can, Conclusion in by far the greater number of cases, make the At a minimum estimate absenteeism was in• German worker aware of his duty in wartime, creased by 15 percent of all scheduled hours, in without having him go to jail and thus be absent all industries, over and above normal absentee from work for a longer period" (October 1944). rates,-during the final 0 or 8 months of the war. Until this period, the. law had required that such Loss of hourly productivity on the part of work• offenders be" turned over to the state labor ofiice ers reporting for duty was almost certainly for punitive action, but the labor" front (a party, .greater than 10 percent, for' all. industries. Of not a state organization) won its fight in .January this minimum total of 25 percent loss in produc• 1945, evidently on the basis of its claim that '80 tivity, a. substantial but incalculable part was in• percent of the habitual absentees passing through directly due to morale factois, as distinct from its hands had returned to an exemplary life of unavoidable absenteeism or sheer incapacity to labor, without-actual punishment. The significant :producc- more efficiently.-.,: . fact is that'an elaborate system of propaganda, The effects of bombing-are;finextricably fused warnings and punishment failed to prevent a de• -with the effects of the steadily-deteriorating war gree of absenteeism which was considered serious, situation, in producing the lowered morale. But and hence another system was superimposed upon we feel safe'in concluding; again.-that a sizeable it. * share of the total loss was due to bombing, because of its immediate and palpable'effects. Interrogations of Industrial Informants The effects of bombing-lowered morale upon In addition to the factors noted above, indus- war production were not crueialfor'the German trial informants made it clear that bombing.lia'd war. effort. Nevertheless, depressed morale had a a more immediate effect upon the will to work real effect-upon war production. By the summer than did more general feelings of defeatism, be• of 1944 the over-all military situation had led cause bombing effects were immediate and direct, most Germans to abandon hopes of. victory, and demonstrating vividly the uselessness of perform• bombing rendered.a defeatist population increas• ing work that, was only doomed to'destruction. ingly apathetic. Traditionally obedient and in• Such excerpts as the following from the interroga-» dustrious, most Germans simply carried on in tions document the point: routine fashion; their very apathy made them more readily subject to official controls. Dortmund.—As the air war-went on, there Thus, during the final months-of war. a tread- was less and less desire to rebuild, as it *mill sort of war production was.maintained. But seemed to be without purpose or justification. the evidence is convincing that, during this period, Kiel—In late 1944 and 1945 the decline in there was little spontaneous, enthusiastic partici- morale due to air raids became serious. The •pafion in the war effort. Bombing had much to feeling became widespread that "there was no do with the fact that German war production for point in building things up. only to have a good many months had to depend upon routine them smashed again. and compulsory rather than active and whole- .

Wuppertal.—:After the heavy attacks of hearted performance in war production. The lat• May and June 194B, it was commonly-said, ter kind of effort, which might have been possible "The war is lost. There is no use in working without bombing, would not. in any case, have any more. The Nazis are.to blame, for the brought victory, but it would--have resulted in a war; let them fight it" From the fall of 1944 less rapid disintegration of the.German war effort.

65 CHAPTER 3— PROTECTION AND RELIEF FROM BOMBING How adequate were the German counter^ At the municipal level an ARP chief was in• measures against air raids? Certain steps had stalled, usually the police commissioner. Coor• been taken, in anticipation, by way of insurance dination between local, state, and federal agencies, against serious depression of morale by bombing. as well as between different horizontal agencies Other steps were taken after it became clear, such as chamber of commerce,,labor front, Na• from a steady stream of official reports, that tional Socialist Welfare League, Red Cross, rent morale was being seriously threatened as a result rationing office functioned more or less smoothly of air attacks. These measures helped to some through committee arrangements. At the height extent to sustain morale. Nevertheless, morale of our air attacks internal difficulties developed, continued to fall, and in some instances expressed however. Thus, in Munich, the police commis• itself in actions causing considerable alarm to sioner and the local Party leader threatened to officials. Toward the last, some of the control arrest the managing officials of the gas works be^ measures themselves were breaking .down. But cause of some disagreement on manner and prior• the over-all picture indicates that counter-meas• ity of repaiis. Not infrequently friction appears ures held up extremely well within the limits of to have arisen between -participating party, ad• what remained possible after the general disin• ministrative, and voluntary agencies" in this criti• tegration of transport and supply. " cal period.

Success in Terms of Popular Confidence Air-Raid Protection ARP in Germany was not only older than the At the outbreak of the war Germany had this air war; it was older than the war itself. The excellent ARP system. The people were well open preparation for war by the Nazis, the ruth• aware of it and the absence of air raids, coupled less advocation of the maxims of total war, and with the quick success in the east, made air-raid the cultivation of martial spirit in all the people protection seem superfluous. The state of the were the grounds on which ARP measures were Germans at this time can be best illustrated by a planted. The measures seemed adequate when quotation from a correspondence file from the Germany went to war. president of the police of Augsburg: They had to be supplemented when the Allies People were indifferent to the air raid. The went over to the offensive in the air. It was a majority did not believe that an air alarm long way from Goering's guarantee that no enemy would be sounded during the day, let alone plane would fly over a German city to the com• that an air attack would take place (21 Aug. plaints of delayed indemnification for claims oh 1941). the basis of the war damages law. Adequacy of the Measures History and Organization As long as bombing was restricted to a moderate The German Association for Air-Raid Protec• scale, the system of protection and relief proved tion was founded in 1933. Its purpose was to reasonably satisfactory in most-cities, but the familiarize the Germans with air war and train heavy weight of bombs which was to fall on Ger• them for defense. It was organized in state and man cities was never foreseen. "When the raids in• local groups, had schools, research institutes, li• creased to saturation proportions and were consist• braries and its own newspapers. ently recurring in every part of Germany, the bur• The Reich Institute for Air-Raid Protection den of the civilian-defense system, as originally put air-raid 'protection on a systematic, if not a set up, was too great for it to bear efficiently." scientific level. Separate organizations were cre• So concludes the report of the United States Stra• ated, as for instance an industrial ARP for the tegic Bombing Survey, Civilian-Defense Division. specific purpose of protecting production. The While the system was working with reasonable party was the main agency bearing responsibility adequacy, it unquestionably had a beneficial effect for the planning and execution of all relief func• upon popular morale. By the same token, when tions. its inadequacies became evident, a certain amount

66 of disillusionment occurred, with a consequent from the point of view of German officials, gath• lowering of morale. erings in public shekel's offered opportunities for As to the system in general, the following an• passing on rumoi-s and spreading disaffection swers were made by our cross-section sample to toward the Nazis when people were in the most the question: receptive, mood for listening. These and other consequences of shelter life concerned the Nazi In your opinion, how well was your home authorities not only because of their immediately town protected against air raids? upsetting effect, but also because common knowl• edge of them served to lower morale still further. TAIII.E 69.—Adequacy of air-raid protection Percent • Respondents in our cross-section sample, on be• Everything possible was done 24 ing asked to comment on the adequacy of air-raid Everything possible WHS done, within the limits of protection in their home towns, replied as follows the situation 15 concerning shekel's: Not adequate: more could have l>een done 29 Very unsatisfactory 82 TABLE 70.—Adequacy of shelters I'crcent Total 100 Satisfied with shelters and shelter system S5 ADEQUACY OF ACK-AUK Dissatisfied On Adequate 15 Adequate in beginning only .' 34 Total ]00 Inadequate f>L

Total 100 These replies, made in June and July 1945, are obviously a final judgment representing the later Thus; by considerable majorities, our respondents period in which shelters were least adequate. indicated their dissatisfaction with the system, It should be remembered, however, that al• particularly in the later stages of the war. though the German shelter system left much to be "Really safe public shelters were not available . desired from the point of view of absolute safety, to the vast majority of people." according to the German shekel's were superior to those of other above-mentioned Strategic Bombing Survey Re• countries. In relation to total weight of bombs port: Small and medium-sized towns had few dropped on German cities, German casualties shelters. In some cities, e. g.. Munich and Augs• were low, and comparatively lower than British burg,, shelter-building was "too little and too casualties. late." Occasionally bombs made direct penetra• tions of shelters, most notably in Cologne, where Post-raid Relief some.2,000 people were killed in'the shelter. Nazi officials were fully aware of the impor• Such incidents, together with the official policy tance of adequate post-raid relief for keeping up of not publishing casualty figures, or occasion• morale. In Cologne, for example, a "secret" re• ally publishing them only after a long interval, port by a local official recounts the granting of led to exaggerated rumors. First-hand observa• what was recognized as a preposterous claim for tions of inadequacies in the system brought dis• bomb damage. The official felt it wiser to spend illusionment to many. the money than to alienate the applicant. That And so there resulted, in varying degrees, in• the post-raid services were widely appreciated is fractions of established procedures, confusion, indicated by replies of our civilian sample to the and lowered morale. Thus some people refused question: . . to go to the shekel's to which they were assigned, How good were the special measures and or refused to go at all, because of rumoi-s concern• ing their relative safety. Nazi officials took over welfare services after the raids? Was every• the safest and most comfortable shelters in at thing possible done? , least one established instance (Muenster), setting More than half (5S,percent) expressed clear satis• up permanent office space inside; similar allega• faction, feeling that everything possible was done; tions were given wide credence elsewhere. Shel- only 17 percent replied unequivocally that the tei-s came to be centei-s of spreading infections services were unsatisfactory; and the remaining and were feared as such. Perhaps worst of all, 25 percent gave various kinds of qualified answers. Food Supplies suffering and agony to million's, very few of them judged the post-raid services inadequate for this According to informants in most cities, food reason. supplies were usually prompt in reaching the bombed-out people who needed them and were in There was apparently a fairly general sense of general adequate, until the problems of .transpor• adequacy regarding post-raid billeting. Those of tation became too great. . our respondents who were forced to move (i. e.. supplied new quarters in the same town) were General satisfaction with this aspect of post- ' specifically quizzed on this point. New quaitei-s raid services is indicated by our respondents in were reported as satisfactory by 56 percent, un• the reasons given for their satisfaction or dissatis• satisfactory by 4A .percent, ln view of the known faction with post-raid services. By far the most conditions of crowding, this must be interpreted frequent reason (52 percent) for a sense of ade• as a very tolerant response. This very tolerance quacy was that people were fed or given extra testifies to the widespread belief that all was being rations after air attacks. Only 11) percent, on the done that could he done. other hand, mentioned the insufficiency of food as a reason forjudging the services inadequate. Financial Compensation

Housing and Billeting An official policy for damaged and lost property This was a much more difficult problem than was introduced with the very beginning of bomb• food. Official morale reports very often mention ing. It was, in general, a generous policy, and we "shocking" conditions of crowding and exposure have almost no evidence of dissatisfaction on this due to shortage of housing space. Perhaps the score. In fact, complaints were much more com• most telling evidence as to this critical situation mon to the effect that payments were too generous. is to be found in the numbers of bombed-out. in• Km plovers, in particular, complained that some dividuals,who took up continued residence in the who had been reimbursed for bomb damage re• shelters. Among the 24 of our sample cities in fused to work .because they did not need the which evidence was secured on this point, only money. eight reported that JIO one lived in shelters and Respondents in the sample were queried as to only one of those was a large and heavily bombed the receipt of indemnity for lost or damaged city. Thus, according to our informants, in Essen property. The replies of those who had suffered "countless thousands" took refuge in shelters; in any such losses appear in table 71. Perhaps the Bottrop 00 percent of the population, did so, in most, significant finding in this table is that, large Kassel 21 peroent, and in Muenchen-Gladbach 20 numbers of people entered no-claim. Among*these pei-cent, while in Dortmund, Hannover, and Wit- who did make claims, over half received some in• ten "a few", or a "very few-3'' did so. In many cities demnity for damage to personal property (exclu• sive of homes) or to income producing property. the practice was forbidden, or permitted only to Among those who received some indemnity, in the aged, mothei-s with children, etc. Taking up most cases less than half of the claim was allowed. residence in a shelter was occasionally the result It'is not known whether it was a common practice of anxiety concerning future raids, hut the home• to enter swollen claims on the assumption that less made up the great majority of those residents. only partial allowances would be made. In most cities only the homeless, together with the aged and others especially helpless, were per• KTICIII mitted to live in sheltei-s. TAIILK 7J.— of indemnity received for bomb damage*. -Tn spite of the acute housing shortage, or per• haps because the shortage was so painfully obvi• Income U amv. Personal Producing ous, there was little dissatisfaction on this score projKirty property among our respondents. Twenty-three percent of those who considered post-raid services adequate Percent Percent Percent No indomnltv claimed ... 30 34 M mentioned the billeting and evacuation of bombed- Indemnity claimed: ' Not received 35 21 20 out people as a reason for such a judgment. Only Received lesstlian lialf 15 33 IS two percent mentioned poor housing as the reason Received more than hulf 11 12 3 for judging the services inadequate. In short, Total 100 100 100 while the experience of being bombedTout caused •'Responses of those suffering loss. 68' Only in the case of indemnity for casualties The Party believed that the manner in which ' (death-or injury) were respondents asked about evacuation problems were met would influence the the adequacy of the payments. Their answers were loyalty of the people. It hoped that such measures as follows: would intensify the feeling of dependency on the Nazi regime. TAHLK 72.—Allen tiuuy of indemnity for casual lies Percent The bombed out and evacuees must feel No indemnity ulaimed 71 that in addition to agencies in the region, Claimed, but not received 12 Party agencies on a Reich-wide basis are con• .Received, but inadequate ,. 7 cerned with them. The recent news of the Received and adequate 10. arrival of special deputies in various regions spread like wild-fire, and alleviated the feel-' Total :.: '..100 ing of being foi-saken which was developing Obviously, the number of Germans who felt here and there among evacuees, (circular dissatisfied about this aspect of indemnification letter from -the Propaganda Ministry to all regional party chiefs, 19 Aug. 1943). policy was not very great. "L

Medical Treatment The'Party lielieved that a uniform and con• sistent procedure was essential, and an elaborate" Another of the post-raid services offered was plan was set up to this end. From-April to Octo- • medical treatment to the injured. Those of our ber 1943, a long series of directives was sent from respondent's who had-received injuries from air Berlin, by the National Socialist Welfare Organi• raids expressed the following attitudes toward medical treatment: zation, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry " of Ti-anspoi t. and the Party Chancellory (signed TARI.R 7tt.—Adequacy of medical treatment by Bormann), in an attempt to standardize evacu• Percent ation procedure. Many of these directives ex• No treatment sought 29 plicitly called attention to the vital importance Treatment adequate ',. - 60 of evacuation problems, and to the necessity for Treatment inadequate - -• 1-1. an efficient, effective and not too bureaucratic

Total :.. 300 handling of the many difficulties which inevitably

(attended the movement of large numbers of peo• Assuming that the most common' reason for not ple. Many compromises were admitted in plans seeking treatment was that injuries were slight, and procedures from mid-1943 on, due to great, almost six-sevenths .of the injured who received concern over the .morale effects of evacuation. medical treatment considered it satisfactory. Coercive-measures were used very cautiously, j So great was this concern that the Party devel• Protection and Relief by Evacuation1 oped a definite morale p>ohcy on evacuation prob• Official Awareness of the Morale Problem lems. 'A .Party headquarters directive signed by' The Nnzi Party considered evacuation to be Bormann, 27 August 1943, states' that evacuees one of its most crucial problems, and to be of need constant care and • attention, particularly decisive importance in relation to the morale of • while en' route. A directive from Munich, 13 the civilian population. August 1943, states that all efforts must be.exerted " The care of lx>mbed-out persons and . to effect the tnmsportation of evacuees as calmly evacuees is one of the most important tasks ' as possible. Many of the directives deal with the of our time. When millions of people live morale aspects of proper housing facilities, proper together with strangeis, in closest quarters, rationing and distribution of food, and the neces• countless phychological problems arise which sity for constant attention to the. welfare and we .must master if they are not to become cultural needs of evacuees. the roots and sources of negative conduct. An intensive propaganda campaign, was initi• ' (circular letter from the 'Propaganda Min• ated during the summer of 1943, to prepare people istry ,to all regional party chiefs, 19 Aug. and thus to minimize frustrations and maintain 1943). morale in the face of the greatly-increased evacua•

1 See ch. 5, Pt. II for fur.ther Hscuaalon of evacuation. tion of this period. Notices were prepared both for evacuees and for hosts, carefully describing a depressing effect on the mood of the the behavior expected of them. But the Party evacuees, who are sent aimlessly about from' foresaw the gap which would inevitably develop pillar to post. Other regions must stop the between expected and actual behavior, and kept lax procedure of telling people "just go all its own officials, as well as Hitler Youth per• wherever there is a place." The Berlin, sonnel,.on the alert for friction, tension or refusal Dortmund, Hamburg, and Cologne-Aachen to cooperate with the program. regions are especially lax in this respect. Thus the Nazis used much time, effort and The fall of 1943 was the crucial turning point equipment in an attempt to solve evacuation prob• toward a serious, housing shortage, and an in• lems, and to prevent an advei'se effect on morale. adequate distribution of supplies to evacuees. By - The System—Its Extent and its Difficulties late 1944, what had begun as mere complaints, stemming from minor frustrations, had de• Evacuation was a crucial problem in that it veloped into a state of confusion and serious contained many sources of possible confusion and physical need for a part of the population. The loss of control. There was an attempt to set up an. period from late 1943 on was also characterized integrated and controlled-movement of popula• by the fact that many of the areas designated' tion by establishing a system of sending and re• as reception regions were themselves heavily ception regions, and by designating the types of bombed. persons to be.evacuated. Prom the first, however, people were also urged to make their own ar• During the last months of the war the con• rangements with friends and relatives wherever fusion was greatly intensified by the large num• possible. A fully "coordinated flexibility" was bers of refugees from the Eastern and Western desired, but never achieved. Sources of confusion fronts. The number who fled from the Russian included the problem of keeping families to• advance was greater than the number of evacuees gether, arrangements for making return journeys, from "air terror" during the entire coui-se of the attempt to insulate persons or places from the war. This evacuation was a planless chaos the effects of evacuation or to preserve class dis-' which made the "air terror" evacuation appear tinctions, setting up a system of payments to orderly by contrast. evacuees and hosts, and administrative conflicts In spite of accumulating confusion and final between agencies carrying out'the evacuation break-down of the evacuation program, it must program. • be emplmsized that had there been no program, At least 5 million persons, and probably more, as was the case in Freiburg, confusion and were evacuated during the course of the Avar. At demoralization of the civilian population would least four-fifths of "all evacuations occurred in have been much greater than they were. the period from June 1913 to the end. Confusion developed during the summer -of 1913, and it Morale Effects: Official German Reports became necessary to improvise on the original Evacuees were almost invariably described in plan. By the fall of 1943 a, major modification official morale reports as having a. depressed had been introduced. People were to be evac• mood. Complaints were the typical form of ex1 uated into nearby areas within their own region, pression of this mood. Evacuees constantly com• as far as possible, but this arrangement brought plained about the inadequacy of facilities fur• further difficulties. Much confusion existed nished them. Until the summer of 1943 the throughout 1944. As a typical example, the complaints were little more than a release for monthly report of the National Socialist Wel• general frustration caused by the disruption of fare chief of Sonthofen to regional headquarters normal routines and sentiments. Beginning in of the Schwaben region, May 1944, complains June 1943 the complaints became more serious, about lack of clear procedure on evacuation, as and actual shortages were sometimes acute. This a result of which many people arrived without situation was further complicated by the fact permits and without arrangements for quarters. that evacuees often received sizeable payments Many are sent away, and they can't un• for damages,-and then found there was nothing derstand why. Often they are in no condi• for which the money could be spent. Inflated tion to go further. The whole situation has expectations, were thereby disappointed. Throughout the entire period evacuees had like that, or one would be blown to bits, and difficulties of adjustment in their new locations. if one ventures out on the street, he runs Both rural-urban and regional differences were into the phosphorous bombs that come down involved. By the end of 1943 and the beginning like a rain of fire. They say our counter- of 1944, when the pattern of sending and re• measures are inadequate. Thus our people, ception regions was disrupted .and there were in this area, are being given the impression evacuees from within the reception regions them• that they are powerless against the Anglo- selves, the problem was aggravated because there American bombing attacks. were conflicts not only between evacuees and The same pattern continued and was inten• hosts, but also between evacuees of different sified in the rural areas of reception regions backgrounds. Old North-South conflicts fre• when cities in these areas were bombed. The quently flared up. anxiety thus generated created a strong desire : The morale of remaining members of evacuees for retaliation, which in turn was frustrated. families was a particularly serious problem for Thus, evacuation acted as a morale depressant. the party, and there is evidence that both mood Yet, again it must be stressed that, without and behavior were adversely affected in .this way. evacuation,- serious demoralization probably Desire of family members to be reunited was a would have occurred much sooner than it did. major factor in the iinauthorized return of evacuees. For example, in Dortmund, in Sep• Morale Effects: Eirst-Hand Testimony tember 1943, such returns were increasing at an Information supplied in, the cross-sectional alarming rate because of the desire to lead a study shows less dissatisfaction than is indicated normal family life. Workers claimed that their in the official intelligence reports. It is probable willingness to w.ork would be impaired unless members of their families were permitted to re- that the cross-sectional survey minimises the .turn. The Party considered such returns to be degree of discontent, since respondents inter• most undesirable and disruptive to the entire viewed in June and July of 1945 might be less ARP program. Yet, the counter-measure taken concerned over old problems than they were against them provoked a storm"- of resistance, during the war. The official German intelligence the effects of which were spread right to the reports may give an inflated picture of the ex• front lines. The problem of family separation tent of evacuation difficulties in that the writers thus created a serious dilema in the evacuation of these reports obtained their material from program. the articulate complaints. Most of the re• spondents felt, in June and July of 1945, that The m'ood of hosts often became bad and de• the advantages of evacuation had outweighed pressed with, the influx of evacuees into a recep• its disadvantages. tion area. The many social differences between Detailed questions were asked of all respond• evacuees and hosts created' friction and conflict. ents who had been evacuated, whose families had Evacuation made persons in reception areas been evacuated, or who had received evacuees. aware of the air war, and acted as a major cm'- Responses of the first two groups are sum• rier 'of anxiety. This process of transmitting marized in table 74. low morale became very pronounced in recep• These -replies show that, both evacuees and tion areas during the summer of 1943. A morale members of their families left behind -were, in report of the administrative head of the Main Francoiiian district (Wuerzburg, 11 Aug. 1943) the mam, satisfied with their billets. Most of them left because they wanted to .and felt that is typical: " t they adapted reasonably well to their new sur• Morale has been much influenced by roundings. The principal reasons given for lack evacuees from Hamburg, who have found of adaptation was that they were homesick, and places to stay in this area, and yrhO recount that family separation was difficult. The main their experiences. Eye witnesses tell of a reasons offered for having gotten along well half million dead. They also say that the were that townspeople or housemates were con• government is not doing enough for the se• genial, and' that it was reassuring to know that curity of the population. They say it is im• their children were safe or were not in a Nazi possible to stay in one's house during a raid camp. 71 TABLB 74.—Responses concerning evacuation TABLE 75.—Replies by hosts concerning evacuation

Percent of Percent of Percent of thoso whoso '.'bosta" evacuees families were evacuated Sfttlsfactorinesa of experience: 7r Billet eatiafactlon: IS Satisfactory.-. 81 11 Part tally satisfactory. 9 10 Unsatisfactory • Total.! '_ tort 100 Total : Attitude'toward uvacuees: 40 Reason fur evacuating: 13 Compulsory 12 Voluntary (home damaged or destroyed) 20 No attitude expressed 13 Voluntary (other reasons) 0 No relevant Inlorronilon ..- Total...". 100 Total IU0

Adequacy of adaptation: Adapted very well variety of reasons was offered by those who Adapted with difficulty Got alona badlyi. found the experience partially or totally unsat• Couldn't adapt; returned isfactory (most of whom, presumably, were en• i tertaining neither friends nor relatives nor short- Total * 100 time guests). Evacuees failed to do their share of work, were too critical or arrogant, aroused 1 Hosts replies concerning their, experiences old regional antagonisms ("Prussians" were with evacuees were thoroughly consistent with particularly disliked in most southern evacua• those reported above, as shown in table 75. Here tion areas), created food shortages and over• again we find evidence of considerable tolerance. crowded living conditions. A full third of the hosts report that they "only The frequency or replies that evacuees got tolerated" or "actively- disliked" the evacuees, along very well because they were friends or yet only one-ninth of them render an over-all relatives testifies to the wisdom of the official judgment that the experience worked out badly. policy of letting evacuees and hosts make their An analysis of reasons given for satisfaction own arrangements. All in. all, the evidence fronr or dissatisfaction with evacuation throws some the study of . civilian opinions confirms our light on how the system worked. Two sj>ecific earlier judgment that the evacuation plan was reasons were given by those who reported a necessary and helped morale more than it 'in• satisfactory experience: the_evacuees were friends jured it, despite the creaking and groaning of or rela.ti.ves; or they stayed so briefly that there the system while the Nazi regime was approach• .was no time for friction to develop. A wider ing its end.

72 CHAPTER 4.—ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN MORALE BY PROPAGANDA Propaganda, together with terror, kept an A generous and highly advertised program habitually obedient and industrious people of relief and compensation for bomb damage. 'treading the mill. But it was a propaganda Regardess of the medium used for propaganda, which depended upon two pillars, military suc• the content varied litt le. In addition to the stand• cess, and the elimination of conflicting sources ard prewar lines of Hitlers greatness and infalli• of information. Strategic bombing did much to bility, the Bolshevik menace, aud the .lews, the topple both of these pillars, first, by playing a following themes appeared almost continually prominent role in German military reversals and. throughout the war: second by-bringing home to millions of Germans Past and current successes were exploited, and the tangible proof of Allied might, indisputable future ones were promised. proof completely out of harmony with the familiar Nazi propaganda. Towards the end, The enemy was* vilified.'toward the end of Gennan civilians seem to have sorted out the arousing popular hatred. factual wheat from the propaganda chart" more A split, among the Allies was presented as adequately than did their presumably better- inevitable, if not inrminent. informed officials. The consequences of defeat were luridly painted. Nazi propaganda, so useful., so necessary and The sufferings and losses of the enemy were so effective for so long a time, boomeranged in maximized. the end. The implications of this fact for the future orientation of the German people may The heroism of Germans, both individually be enormous. and collectively, was glorified. The contributions of the Party to German Types of Propaganda welfare were kept in the fore-front of every German's attention.1 German officialdom, in its struggle to main• tain morale, faced a duel task: the negative one Such were the major themes of German war of preventing morale-depressing activities or ex• propaganda, and for every one of tliem a relation• pressions, and the much more difficult affirmative ship to some aspect of air warfare was developed. task" of providing actual stimulants to morale. An analysis of how these themes were manipu• Terror and censorship'were the chief instruments lated provides a clue to the principal morale wor• of the negative policy. ries of German officials. Evidence as to how the propaganda was received by the German populace The affirmative-policy rested upon action meas• provides a step-by-step account of how bombing ures, including the social welfare program of the finally served to_ undermine, much of what the Party and a wide variety of propaganda meth• Propaganda Ministry had built up. Throughout ods. The thorough control of: propaganda ex• the greater part of the war period, however, propa• tended to: . ganda accomplished its purpose with a clear, mar• Press and radio, carefully directed and gin of success. coordinated both by censorship and by a steady stream of directives. Official Worries •Films, including a large sprinkling of Soon after heavy air raids began, regional Party news-reels, documentaries and battle-action leaders in the aH'ected regions began-to report pictures. . • . that morale was being seriously affected by bomb• Public addresses, requoted in press, radio, ing. They recommended that official notice be and niovies. taken, of-air attacks, by including references to Rallies and parades, staged mainly under them-in the.High Command Communiques. The Party auspices. suggestion was accepted. Regional Party'head• ' . ' A network of "mouth propaganda" agents, quarters were instructed (10 July 1942) to send to whom directives were regularly issued con• reports to the Propaganda Ministry not later than cerning slogans to be circulated, rumOrs to be 1 This list of themes is banco upon a study of domestic press and combated, etc. ~~ radio niflterlnls throughout the poriod 10:10—fft.. 73 10 o'clock of the morning following each raid, in• Hans Fritzsche was one of the propagandists cluding information on the state of local morale. particularly assigned to this campaign. At a pub• The Propaganda Ministry forwarded these re• lic mass funeral in Schweinfurt (15 Oct. 1944) ports to the High Command so that they could be he referred to the victims: taken into consideration by the editors of the They too died so that the great German communique. The very necessity of developing community might live. this policy testifies to the degree of official con• In an earlier radio address he had extolled: cern over the effects of bombing upon morale. Those millions in the bombed areas, the Attempts to Combat Feelings of. Helplessness great heroes of this war who wear the in• and Fass'tveness^ visible oakleaf and before whom entire gen• erations of Europe will sometime bow (31 The earliest available directive concerning the July 1943). treatment of air raids is dated July 1011. The main concern is obviously that of countering the Hitler went even further. In an order of the day morale-damaging effects of air raids, and in par• (18 Apr. 1945) addressed to the soldiers of the ticular the general attitude on the part of civilians Eastern front, he held up civilians as models to that their role is merely a passive one. The points the troops whom must not be ashamed to face stressed in this directive to the press are: - "women and children who hold out in the bomb- terror of our cities." 1. Reports must emphasize the effectiveness of German anti-aircraft defense. Eventually, the propagandists ventured to con• tend that bombing stiffened morale. In December 2. Positive features, such as energetic ac• 1943 in the face of heavy air raids over Berlin- tivity of individuals in extinguishing incen• and other urban centers. Dr. Goebbels wrote in an diary bombs, are to be stressed, as contrasted article entitled. "The Soap Bubble"2: ' with negative impressions. 3. In such cases, the names of persons in• Whether the enemy believes it or not, it is volved are to be mentioned; this is to show evident that our people face the war and its that the suffering experienced from air raids cruel consequences with an equanimity and a is as great as that at the battle fronts, and stoutness of heart which deserves more than their efforts equally important. admiration * * *. As we have to move Twoyeai-s later (9 April 1943) a similar directive more closely together physically in the cities was issued by the Party Chancellory: under the enemy's aerial warfare, so also spiritually * * *. Out of the fires which Reports of air raids, particularly of heavy flame up after terror raids in the residential ones, are to stress not the damage and devas• quarters of raided cities there arises an un• tation inflicted but the brave demeanor of the conquerable national strength * * *. The people and auxiliary forces employed. Speak• hammer blows of fate hit us hard but they ers, too, must be instructed that when dealing meet only iron which is hardened, and not with the subject in public meetings they must softeijed, by blows. emphasize the positive aspect, i. e., the bear• ing of the people, In the same issue of his weekly a staff writer's account of shelter-life in Berlin concludes: "Positive features" were stressed primarily in the form of heroic resistance. Local propaganda offi• In these exhausted people you find not ces were requested to describe heroic incidents in much flaming hatred, as the growth of some• their air-raid reports, and special efforts were thing much more dangerous and vital. A life, made to record such accounts for later broadcast• which has been injured in its innermost core, ing. And so millions of Germans who thought of becomes hard and forever inflexible in such themselves as passive victims of bombing, past or hours. future, found themselves described as soldiers of the home front. Obituaries of air-raid victims Security service morale reports of this period were decorated with the Iron Cross, and some of suggest a good deal of popular skepticism con• those who survived were awarded the War Merit cerning such preachings. Cross. 5 Dan Reich, (12 Dec. 1043). This was Goclibf-le' official weekly. Sense of Shared Guilt for Air Raids the burning of Jewish synagogues in 193S by the Nazis^ On seeing endless caravans of bombecbout It is known, from several sources, that many evacuees, othei-s were reminded of the many Jews Germans felt that their own country bore its full they had seen in earlier years being herded along measure of responsibility for attacks upon civil• the roads to concentration camps. ians. A directive from the Party Chancellory (7 Religious opposition was never quelled under July 1042) reflects this concern: the Nazis because it could not be openly attacked, The concept of "terror raid" is intended to and • constituted a continuing problem for the reflect the criminal behavior of the enemy propagandists. * * * therefore a German attack must One of the major purposes of the terror theme never be called "terror raid." Counter-meas• in German air-war propaganda was to counteract ures of the German Air Force are to be desig• the too-prevalent assumption that, after all, Ger• nated as "retaliation measures." mans also had bombed civilians. The twin themes of barbarism (Anglo-American preference for de• The same directive goes on to insist that, "It is stroying cultural monuments) and- terrorism historically proved that the RAF was the tirst to (Anglo-American habits of attacking "almost ex• make raids on nonmilitary targets." A book en• clusively" civilians) together made up a very titled "England's Sole Guilt," published in July large part of air-war propaganda. During the 1943, gave the documentary "proof" for the alle• week of 20-20 June 1943, for example, no less than gation. Repeatedly, however, the propagandists In percent of all time devoted to news and com• had to answer the inevitable questions as to who mentary on the domestic radio was given to these bombed War-saw and Rotterdam. topics. In the same week, 13 percent of the entire German officials were convinced that the Cath- space in a representative sample of German news• obc clergy were particularly responsible for paper's was taken up by these same subjects; all spreading the notion of shared guilt. In an official • other aspects of the air war occupied only 2 per• morale report from Dortmund (27 Apr. 1942) a cent of the total space during this week. Catholic priest is reported to have said in a meet• Closely related to the terror propaganda was ing of clergymen that the German bombing of the hate theme. Local officials, in secret re• York was an outrage. He pointed out .that, like ports, occasionally reported that, understandably other British Baedeker cities, it was not only a enough, "unlimited rage" was expressed by the cultural monument belonging to the world, but victims of bombing. Nevertheless, tire propagan• was unfortified. On the other hand, everyone dists did not feel safe in relying on popular knew that cities like Hamburg, Luebeck, Rostock, hatred as a natural result of bombing, but took and Cologne had military importance which jus• care to stir it up again and again. Thus a letter tified their being bombed by the British. from the Regional Press Office, Cologne-Aachen, A more specific form of religious support for to the editor of the Koehiische Zeitung (3 Mar. the assumption of shared guilt was that bombing 1943) criticized a- drafted article because there represented divine retribution for the sins of the was "too httle emphasis on a. feeling of revenge, Nazi'regime. Several of our informants pointed or hatred, or even mere anger.". This hate cam• this out. For example, a Protestant Confessional paign culminated in an article by Goebbels him• Church official in Wuppertal said: • self in the Voelkisch&r Beobachter (20 May 1944) in which he claimed that captured pilots had to be With the members of our churches the re• protected by armed police Jest they be killed by ligious interpretation was foremost. Many the enraged people. This protection would no also realized that the German people, through longer be given, he then suggested, thus implicitly the National Socialist government and the inciting Germans to lynch captured Allied fliers. criminal deeds of the Elite Guards, had loaded upon themselves a tremendous col• Fear of German Impotence in the Air lective guilt. German officials had ample reason to be con• According to other local informants, many reli• cerned about popular discouragement as to Ger• gious people saw a connection between the burn• many's air strength. Regular reports of wide• ing of the Christian churches during air raids and spread disillusionment on this score reached them, based particularly on the absence of air resistance Command communiques regularly reported V-2 to the bombers. Their best propaganda weapons activity, sometimes with emphasis equal to that were directed against such deepening disillusion-^ given to either the Eastern or the Western fronts. ment. In particular, retaliation and V-weapons Another method of allaying popular suspicions' were stressed, together with losses of Allied air• of Germany's relative air weakness was that of craft, and untruthfulness of Allied propaganda. publicizing Allied air losses. Repjeatedly Germans Popular demand for retaliation was inevitable. heard and read that their defense forces were "Until October 1912. the explanation for its delay exacting a prohibitive toll; the day would come was that the German Air Force was busy in when air raids would have to be stopped. Goeb• Russia. Thus, Goebbels declared in Dm Reich bels christened the Flying Fortresses, "Flying (14: Aug. 1942) : Coffins" (3 Oct. 1943). Allied announcements of their own air losses were ridiculed. All Reich The decision in this war will be made on propaganda offices were'ordered to play up to the the eastern battlefield * * *. It would untruthfulness of American propaganda (9 Mar. 'naturally be quite possible to divert a few 1944): thousand planes from the front for such mas• sive reprisal raids on Britain that the RAF The fantastic American figures are to be would soon lose all desire to terrorize German played as new proof of the unreliability of towns in vicioiis night attacks *' * *. We American news reports * * *. Why do are beating England in the east. they report so much greater successes than the English? Have they better pilots or are In the same vein, the Frankfurter ZeiMmg com• they better liars? forted the harassed population of the Western An untold number of Germans, in short, had cities (17 Aug. 1942) : come to believe that air strength would be the • Once the bulk of the German Air Force is "deciding factor in the war. Disbelief in German no longer employed on the Eastern front, air strength had thus become equivalent to de• things beyond their wildest imagination will featism, which gradually became propaganda happen to the British. They will then learn problem number one. what the German Air Force really is. Their Discrediting of the Party whole island will become one vast conflagra• tion. The raids of 1940 will be child's play As confidence in German ability to ward off air- compared with the wrath to come. attacks waned, Nazi officials found themselves the victims of their own long-established policy of As the prospects for a quick victory in Russia van• presenting the Party as the guardian and guaran• ished, the line was changed, promises became both tor of community welfare. To the party went the vague and less frequent. Directives to all propa• particular responsibility of "taking care of the ganda offices (22 'Mar. 1944) ordered that when• victims,"' by establishing reception centers, pro• ever air raids against England were carried out, viding food, caring for the wounded and sick, and they should be heavily played. handling evacuation problems in general. Many Meanwhile "secret weapon" propaganda was party-affiliated organizations were involved, such beginning to increase. Rumors had been allowed as Hitler Youth, Women's League, Girls League, to spread since the summer of 1943. The official the Storm Troopers: and the National Socialist launching of the campaign on 8 .June 1944 met Welfare Agency, and the Party was careful to with great popular response. But by August of take credit for their activities. By the same token, that year the nonfulfillment of early hopes had blame was popularly assigned to the Party when caused such disappointment that Hinunler strictly services were'inadequate. It thus became a major forbade all propaganda concerning secret weap• propaganda task to meet these criticisms. ons, except V-l. From June to August, V-l As early as 18 October 1942, Goebbels found it propaganda made up a good half of all air war necessary, in a public speech, to castigate certain propaganda, declining gradually until in Novem• critics in Munich who were "always against the ber, V-2 propaganda displaced it, assuming about Party." In broadcast of 2 .July 1943, Goebbels the same proportions for some months thereafter. tried to meet the continuing grumbling and to de• During most of this period the German High fend the Party leaders: People have experienced during the nights, Answers to two other questions by the same re• of fire and sorrow what the Party means to spondents confirm this skepticism-with regard to them. The "Little Hitlers," often wrongly German news: criticized or ridiculed, have stood the test Did the newspapers and the radio correctly again. Without them one could simply not describe the general state of mind in the city do. after each raid? Martin Bormann, who as chief of the Party Chan• cellory had reason to be vitally concerned, reveals TAHIJ- 77.—Reliability of 0 firman information Percent. how critical the situation of the Party was in Oerman Information reliable 21.- January 1943: Sinnettitieii reliable, -joiuetime-j not - t(i Completely unreliable • JV4 * * * The Party has" the duty of lead• No answer obtained- 9 ing the broad masses with strongest activity and untii-ing readiness * * * of helping Total - 3 00 them .in every respect * * * and of marching ahead in .unshakable optimism What did you think of A'-weapons when *' * *. As prior to coming to power, we they were first used ? (ratings of initial belief are .waging a -most severe battle; our old ad• in effectiveness). versaries have reunited and old tricks are TABT.E lS.~Coiifldencc in Y-ioeapoux being played against us. The Fuehrer ex7 pects the Party to employ the spirit and the Piirwmt methods of our fighting period before 1933, Complete rejection (swindle, fake, etc.) -. 23 Limited belief In effectiveness ~. •• • 43 not to limit itself to administration and gov• Belief in effectiveness 30 ernment, but to lead. Didn't know they existed 1 No answer obtained .* 3 To most Germans, of coui-se. the Party was indis• tinguishable from the regime. Since war morale Total 100 necessarily depends upon confidence in the regime responsible for the conduct of the war, German' These replies indicate that a good half of Ger• officialdom had cause for serious concern over man civilians accepted propaganda with a great these popular criticisms. deal of skepticism even when proclaimed as noisily as were the-V-weapon claims. It must be repeated, "Black listening" (listening to Allied broad• howev.er, that this degree of suspicion did not casts) constitutes a pretty good index of dissatis• exist, throughout the entire war. These figures faction with official' German news sources! At must, in fact, be considered as representative only least half of all German adults listened, as indi• of the last few months. For many of our respon• cated in answers given by civilians to the ques• dents, disillusionment came only after surrender. tion, "Belogen and betrogen" (lied to and betrayed), Did you ever listen to Allied broadcasts? the phrase originally used by Hindenburg after If so, when did you begin to listen? discovering the deception practiced in high Ger• man circles in 1918, was a common phrase upon TAULK 76.—l-Jxtent of black Untmiuy their lips, as they came to realize belatedly how Percent they have been victimized by the Nazis. Began lu l'XMi or before 37 Began as the war pru;rret-se

a No radio, hence iir> Hstenijijr. 11 German officials at or near the Ministerial level .Dirt not listen (no reason given) 38 were not always realistic in their assessment of Tntnt • 100 Nazi propaganda. This was true in two'senses. To a considerable degree they were taken in by it The number of new listeners increased steadily themselves, and most of them exaggerated the as the war progressed, from 3 to 4 percent a year degree to which it was popularly accepted. in 1940 and 1941, to 8 jwrcent in 1944, and 1 per• Some of the top-level prisoners who were inter• cent a month in 1945. rogated we're quizzed at this point. A consider- 77 able number revealed their own gullibility. Some skepticism about the accuracy of propaganda. of them, no doubt, sought by such answers to Those who stayed On were largely believers. escape responsibility for their official acts, but Some high officials, who were interrogated, othei-s must have been equally anxious to demon• claimed to have seen through the propaganda. strate their own astuteness. Sample replies fol• Thus von Eberstein, "Elite Guard general of the low : police in Munich, stated that in spite of propa• ganda, people like himself had long seen that all Elite Guard General Petrie: was lost. Walter Hoffman of the Speer Ministry, stated that people "on the higher level of intelli• Propaganda'was everything. We had gence" (presumably including" officials like him• to depend on it, and we took it as fact self) never took Goebbels' propaganda seriously. when we saw it printed. Such claims, however, are relatively few. Franz JJofer., regional Party leader of the Regarding assumptions as to popular accept• Austrian Tyrol: - ance of propaganda, the top officials from whom we have statements seem to be even less realistic We believed in what the, propaganda For-example: told us. It worked on us rather than on. .you. Tou never believed it, though it Elite Guard General Petrie: was intended to let you know how strong People always said, "The Fuehrer has we were. 'Instead, we believed it. never lied to us." Lieutenant General Huebner: * Max Amann, one of the original founders of Our propaganda concerning victory . the Nasi Party, and Party press chief: was so positive right up to the very end * * *. Even we had to get our infor- - The people's faith in victory was un• , mation from them. We believed they shaken, due to propaganda and pei-sonal must have known something, else they faith in Hitler. wouldn't have made such statements. Emmanuel Schaeffer, chief coordinator of An official of the Propaganda Ministry: morale reports, Propaganda Minist^ry: The idea'that the new weapons might • I, as well as most of other officials at decide the war was faithfully accepted the Propaganda Ministry, firmly be• lieved in victory until, the Americans by the people, who held tight to this hope broke through beyond Frankfort * * *. until the last day of the war * * *. "We were under the impression that the Paul Schmidt, press chief. Foreign Ministry: armed forces had the necessary reserves to win the war. The effect of the propaganda exploi• tation of our V-weapons was the wide• According to these and other similar statements, spread feeling that what they can take propaganda officials believed that the Army' had - we can take, too; an ace up its- sleeve. Meanwhile, Army officials were assuming that, unknown to them, special and Dr. Gustam Adolf Scheel, Gauleiter of Sals-

important information of a top-secret naturetwas burg : being confided to the Propaganda Ministry. There The people believed in Goebbels' propa• is a good deal of corroborative evidence to'the ganda that some miracle weapon would effect that each' of the several military branches come. and Government offices was effectively sealed off from the others, as far as exchange of certain Other-officials made more guarded statements. kinds of information was concerned, and that Thus Schaeffer, of the Propaganda Ministry, said many top-side officials would listen only to .what that Goebbels constantly announced the penalties .they wanted to believe. In'•more than one case inflicted upon those convicted of listening to for• (e. g., Emmanuel Schaeffer, of the Propaganda eign radio stations, "but nobody paid any atten• Ministry) officials were dismissed for expressing tion." To this he added:

78 With the increasing aerial superiority of There is considerable evidence that the degree the Allies (early 1944) which stood in 'such of personal identification with the Nazi Party or gross contrast to the speeches of leading per• Nazi doctrines is highly correlated both with'per• sonalities, the task of the propagandist be• sonal belief in the claims of Nazi propaganda and came more-^and more difficult." with assumption of its widespread acceptance by Fitz-Randolph, of the Foreign Ministry, esti• others. Top officials, of course, were mainly se• mated that..after Stalingrad not more than half lected for Nazi "reliability," and the inevitable of the German people credited Nazi propaganda, price of this policy was that many of the officials and that only a few believed hi the wonder-weap• in positions requiring cool unbiased judgment ons. Such skepticism, however, appears to have were in fact least capable of such judgment. Thus been unusual at the top level. was Nazi propaganda ensnared in its own toils.

79 CHAPTER 5.—ATTEMPTS TO RALLY YOUTH The problem of youth morale in wartime Ger• Effects of Nazi Programs Upon Schooling many presents a kind of condensed and intensi• Even before the war, the Nazi youth program fied account of the over-all problem of civilian had come to have serious consequences for school• morale with which officials had to1 contend. The ing. The Nazis' open • contempt for intellectual Nazi movement had been, in a way, a youth move• •'education antagonized many parents and large ment in itself, and- its leadeis remained particu• numbers of teacher's. An acute shortage of teach• larly jealous.of the loyalty of their youthful fol• ers was developing by 1939. Official indifference lowing. Ironically, it was "because of this very to academic training also resulted in shortages of ovcrconcern that the Nazi regime came to face' textbook's and other-equipment, fuel and even one of its most critical war liidrale problems. One buildings for school .purposes. Instructional horn's youth measure, a program of evacuation to camps were cut, particularly in winter,'in order to con• ostensibly to assure safety from bombing, came serve fuel. In Westphalia, for example, weekly to be widely resented-by parents. In-spite of prom• class periods had been reduced by one-fourth in ises of only voluntary participation, compulsory 194L measures were .introduced; anti-religious teaching and Nazi indoctrination' were the obvious pur• Thus, even before the additional disturbances poses of the program. Probably no single measure caused by Allied bombing, there was a heavy en• introduced by the Nazis ever did more to spread croachment on school instruction. According to popular disaffection. In this instance bombing the careful tabulation of Dr. H., Schumacher,• served-to undermine the Nazis, not directly, but teacher at a 33remen school, the total loss of in• because of resentment thftfc officials were taking structional hours during the period from 1 April advantage of the bombing situation for their own 1941 to'31 March 1942 amounted to almost.one- purposes. third of the entire instruction time which was 10,000 hours, exclusive of an'estimated 6 percent loss caused.by air-raid alerts. Nazi Youth Measures Prior to Bombing The youth of Germany had been most radically TABLK 79.—Loss iu school time affected by the progressive Nazification of Ger• Houre Percent ol total many before and during the earlier pait of the Instruction lime war. Although officially no compulsion was im• Lots due to: posed, by 1937 almost 7 million boys and girls Lack of fuel ... 1,817 19.3 were coordinated in the Hitler Youth and its Lack at teachers 711 7.0 M iscellaueoua reasons 279 2.8 various subdivisions. This figure, after the intro• duction of the obligatory youth service on 25' Total loss 8,907 2U. i March 1939, rose to about 10 million juveniles between the ages of 10 and 18. In addition to the above losses, every Saturday The purpose of this huge organization was, as was freed for the benefit of the Hitler Youth, and von Schfrach. youth leader of the German Reich, an entire school year was eliminated in all secon• defined it in a pei-sOnal interview, "to educate Ger• dary schools. Furthermore, a veritable pande• man youth for the State." According to this same monium of "extra-curricular" activities was in• informant, political coordination and the soldierly troduced, ranging from the collecting of fees and way of life, which the former German Youth contributions to the gathering of junk and beech• movement had sadly neglected, were made the nuts. keynote of the Hitler Youth, with the result that The inevitable effect of so much Nazi domina• •from 1939 to 1945 German.children between 10 tion over the lives of^youth was, in a sense, partic• and 18 were exposed to the most systematic.Na• ularly on the part of teach el's, religious organiza• tional Socialist indoctrination and to'the most- tions and many parents, that their "prerogatives rigorous physical training program possible. were being encroached upon. Thus, before the

80 JJOMthing had begun, many among these groups conscription of school children between 10 and 17 hud. come to find themselves in conflict with the years, it was emphasized from the very beginning regime over the custody'of their charges. that,

The Fuehrer had consented to the employ• Morale Effects of Precautionary Air-Raid ment of school boys as air" force auxiliaries Measures only under the condition that their school in• Further Loss of School. Time struction would be continued at least 18 hours per week. Air raids made it' necessary to draw up elabo-- rate plans.f or the adjustment of school houis. As Although most of the boys evidently, were early as the fall of .1940 it was found'necessary pleased at their new semimilitary assignment and to issue specific directives to regulate instruction although, for a time, they were even willing to after night alerts or night attacks. For example, do justice to the scholastic side of their job, it if an,alert occurred before 10 p. m.,-instruction on became obvious only too soon that the school and the following day was to begin at 8 a. m.; if the the boys' education were the losers in this struggle: alert continued beyond 10 p. m., instruction on the For the first few weeks the air force aux• following day -was to begin at 8:45 a. m., and at iliary displayed a. very fine interest in the 9:45 a. m. if the alert lasted more than 2 hours school instruction-Starting on 10 March 1943. (directive for Keinpten schools,. 7 May 1942). We now notice such a serious decline of their Similar directives appear to have been prepared work and achievements that the success of the in all German cities. instruction of the air force auxiliaries seems -•Especially in the earlier phase of the war. addi• gravely endangered (report by special com• tional time was lost through frequent air-raid missioner for LWH of the.Reich Ministry of drills'which usually meant to the students a wel• Education, Kassel, 4 June 1943). come excuse from work, but actually constituted a serious disruption of the regular teacliing As early as March 1943, the Security Service schedule. As a matter of fact, instruction itself reports begin to record an endless series of com• was invaded by the requirement of enlightening plaints and criticisms of the air force auxiliaries. school children with regard to the various aspects It. is clear, from voluminous and intimate docu• and dan gel's of air war. Germany's exposed posi• mentation on this problem, that the principal fac• tion in the air was to be discussed in geography, tors in conflict over youth;were the school, the facts about poison gases in chemistry, questions armed forces, parents, and the Hitler Youth. of ballistics and' of the effects of explosives in physics, etc. Parental Protests

Air .Force Auxiliaries / Documentary sources tell repeatedly of the parental disappointment and indignation over Even more disturbing to school instruction was what were regarded as flagrant violations, of the the precautionary organization and training of a explicit stipulation of the Fuehrer. The follow• large number of air-raid protection personnel, ing are selected from many of similar tone: such as messengers, night-watchers, fiiti-fighters, fiist-aiders, food-carriers, etc. The indignation of the parents is great. Among these "precautionary" air-raid organi• In the decree of the Air Ministry of 1 Octo• zations tliere was one; which more than any other ber 1943, it was stated that, "the Fuehrer single factor affected the education and the mo• consented to the employment of school boys rale of youth, parents, and teachers alike: the as air force auxiliaries only under the condi• recruiting of the so-called air force auxiliaries tion that their school instruction be continued (LWH) from school youth of 16 and 17 years of at a rate of at least 18 hours per week." The age. In fact, the authorities must have been aware parents are well aware of this stipulation. In of'the morale implications of this step taken on 26 reality, several groups of auxiliaries have not January 1943. lii fear that parents and people in had any instruction for weeks or even months general would see in it nothing but a disguised ' (letter to the Reich* Ministry of Education by Dr. Wagner, special commissioner of air * * * However, .the roll call of the force auxiliaries, Muenster, 26 Dec. 1943). prospective air force auxiliaries this year * * * The attitude of the parents con• (1944), in contrast to the elevating celebra• cerning the instruction of the air force aux• tion in 1943, was not a dignified occasion by iliaries is extremely critical. -They doubt any means. Morale was no longer, as for• whether their children are actually learning merly, the expression of a genuine enthu• anything at all in the few hours of instruc• siasm, but rather the expression of complete tion, given and are therefore viewing the fu• indifference and inner apathy. As a matter ture with great anxiety (report by Kalten- of fact, in a great many cases open opposition brunner, chief of security police, to the Reich to this auxiliary service was quite noticeable. Ministry of Education, 23 Feb. 1944). Worst of all, every true National Socialist must have been disgusted to see in what soft Parents also feared that the religious instruc• and sloppy Baltung the majority of the pupils tion and religious services for air:force auxiliaries' walked up to the Kreisleiter, how carelessly would be neglected, "as was the case in all matters the Hitler salute was given, how rarely the coming and heing controlled from above," (morale Kreisleiter received-a firm, straight look'-from report, Dortmund, 8 Mar. 1943). any of the boys, how contemptuously the call Moreover, they were uneasy because their to the air force auxiliaries was accepted, how youngsters, in spite of all.promises to the con• positively insulting the haste with which the trary, were put on duty far away from home, boys stepped off and left the room, against ex• frequently-lacked proper care, food, clothing, and" plicit orders. Indeed, one of these roll calls billeting, were being exposed to the uncontrolled- must be termed a catastrophe. It revealed a influence of all sorts of seasoned soldiers, and in complete lack of morale of the Hitler Youth many instances, lost their interest in a future which in its lack of discipline has gone to the limit of what was considered possible in our civilian job, hoping for an easier life in a military secondary schools * * *. career. Beyond the parents' individual concern over I see in this failure a necessary result of the welfare and future of their children, their the manipulations through which the school morale in general was unfavorably affected by the in all questions of education has been more and more pushed into the background, if not consideration that, "Things must be in a mighty completely eliminated (signed Wilhelm Ille, bad shape if the Government has to resort to the dated 23 Mar. 1944).. employment of our half-grown youngsters," (re• ports from the Reich, 15 Mar. 1943). Direct Morale Effects of Bombing

• Morale of Youth .Children's Reactions to Raids The boys themselves were mostly full of enthu• Testimony from parents, teachers, doctors, and siasm. They were proud of this patriotic adven-, rjsychologists is all in substantia] agreement. ture, which, as the casualties indicate, was not During raids, in cellars and bunkers, the small without danger, and in general they proved quite children up to 10, 11, or 12, were afraid and "equal to their task. Only a few of them were panicky, clinging to their parents or teachers and aware and somewhat apprehensive of the loss of often crying hysterically. The older ones, no time and educational preparation, and most were doubt, were equally afraid but displayed more dis• unconcerned about the physical and nervous at• cipline and poise. Many of the older children also trition which troubled all responsible air force assumed a certain heroic pose or took the experi• auxiliary officers and army doctors. However, by ence of an air raid as an exciting adventure. But January 1944 the morale of air force auxiliaries as the bombing continued, the children began to in at least one district, Vienna, seems to have been take raids and alerts'with a crowing indifference so low, both in its attitudinal and behavioral as• and as a matter of routine. Children who had to' pects, that the responsible special commissioner, be rescued from wrecked houses often suffered a of the district feels obliged to report in detail long time from shock, and wept and cried in their on "the complete demoralization" of youth : sleep. 82 However, in spite of the intense excitement of The most fundamental morale problem arose, their emotional life, both the younger and the of course, from the separation of children and older children soon recovered their inner equilibri• parents wliich evacuation generally entailed. In um. As may be expected of. youth, again and Germany, this problem was aggravated by the again, the youngsters showed a remarkable-re• fact that the breaking up of the family life, which silience, far superior to that of the adults. In fact, had been proceeding ever since the Nazis' rise to when asked to tell or to write of their air-mid ' power and especially during the course of the experiences, the children spoke mostly without in• war, had made people rather sensitive on this hibitions, and often with enthusiasm, of their im• point. To quote only one illustration: pressions and adventures and even of the. mis• fortune and suffering of their families and ac• In the case of a Dortmund family the quaintances. father is employed and living in Dortmund. His wife is in Bad Salzumen' with the three In contrast to this resilience which kept up the youngest cluldren who are not yet attending morale of the youngsters, their physical and ner• school. Of the children going to school, a vous reactions tended to show strain as the Allied 12-year-old daughter is in a National Social• air raids continued and gained in intensity and ist Welfare camp in Bad Heilbrunn, near 'frequency. Informants agree that the constant Tolz, a daughter" of 14 is with the evacuated interruption of the children's sleep through air school in Freiburg, Breisgau, and one of 16 alerts and attacks resulted in increasing physical years attends the National Socialist Welfare and mental exhaustion of the children, in nervous• Camp Leader-School at Zell near Nuremberg. ness and lack of concentration. A son of 17 is with the Reich Labor Service Attitudinal Effects and a 19-year-old son is in the Army at Hohensalza. This is only one example of As to the political reactions of youth under the many others (morale report, Dortmund, 27 impact of the Allied bombing, there seems gen• Sept. 1943). eral agreement that the children had no strong feelings of their own. To be sure, with the mount-, Other general problems of child evacuation ing fierceness of the Allied air war, the young• were the questions of transportation on crowded sters were more and more frequently heard to trams, of care while em- route, of adequate.housing, express their hatred of the enemy raiders, wonder• feeding, cooking, and clothing, of hygienic con• ing "why they had to hit just, their section of ditions and medical care, of progress in school, of town which harbored little of miUtary signifi• unknown and unwelcome influences, and of a cance." With the impatience and bluntness of proper supervision of moral conduct and personal youth, they also questioned why the German Air development. There was also, the worry, quite Force was not doing anything about the raids, or frequently expressed, that the parents might die .when the promised retaliation raids on Great in the exposed areas, leaving the children alone. Britain would start. To a considerable extent, of The official German Intelligence Reports yield an course; such utterances must have reflected what endless stream of criticisms and complaints of the parents were talking about at home. this sort.

Morale Effects of Child Evacuation Programs1 The Emphasis Upon Voluntary Evacuation Von Schirach, when summoned to Berlin by the Official Concent Fuehrer in October 1940 to take over the organiz• The morale effects of the evacuation program ing of the "Child Evacuation Program to Rural were the most serious for youth of all consequences Areas," warned Hitler at once that: of bombing. Authorities fully realized the serious implications of child evacuation for morale. Offi• This would be possible only on a vol/it/ntary cial correspondence and directives, are full of ob• basis, and even then it would cause the great• vious indications of concern over the dilemma; est difficulties, involving as it does the sepa• viz., that parents must be impressed with the dire ration of cluldren from their parents (inter• necessity of evacuating children,-but at the same rogation of von Schirach). • time must not be alarmed by it. This emphasis on'voluntariness, this un-Nazilike

1 Sec i:h. 4, pt. II for further discussion of evacuation. refraining from force, revealed the concern wliich the leading-Nazis felt for the possible morale im• Controlled E

84 as in their regular schooling, because, ns lie follow suggestions for refusing permission to claimed, he had expressly asked the Fuehrer for children to enter schools at home, for making such.a provision, and Hitler agreed. In practice, it difficult for them to get ration cards, for however, every means was tried to reduce, if not demoting them in school. to eliminate, religious instruction in the camps. It was not permitted inside the camps. Moreover, The result" was disappointing. None of these the Hitler Youth leadei-s in many outside camps "indirect" or illegal measures could intimidate the did their utmost to prevent the children from public: In fact, they seriously disci-edited the attending Sunday services elsewhere by schedul• prestige of Government and Party, intensified at• ing all sorts of special Hitler Youth' duties, Iv. P.. titudes already hostile to the political leadei-ship, etc., at the same horn's. and produced serious behavioral effects, such as For these and perhaps other reasons, parents violent, protests, open demonstrations, disobedi• began to bring their children home from the ence, and sabotage. In spite of the steadily in• camps; nothing seemed to be able to prevent tensified Allied bombing, people preferred to have them from doing so. OF comse. not only children their chijdren with them in the threatened areas, from the Children's Rural Evacuation Agency rather than evacuate them and thus expose them camps but also other evacuated children were thus to an uncontrollable indoctrination with Nazi returned home. But documentary material sug• ideology. gests that the percentage from camps was the. The extent to which the situation had -gotten . highest. Especially in the fall of 1943. official in• out of hand hy the end of 1044 is evident from a telligence reports refer with increasing frequency directive of the AVuertteniberg Ministry of Edu• to the uncontrollable crowds of evacuated children cation (Stuttgart, (i Oct. 1044). which stated that who were returned to the home area. Of :i total the amount of traveling to and from Stuttgart of 40.450 children evacuated from Munich, 4,570' by school children from all types of schools has or more than 10 percent returned by 20 October become so great that it was impossible to deter• 1043, according to a letter by the head of the city mine how many there were, or to get any general school de.parf.mcut. of Munich to the district com• picture of the situation. A similar communication missioner, dated 12 November 1043. from the Department of Primary Schools (Tne- In view of the threatened failure of the entire bingen. 13 Dec 1944). concerns the problem of project, so-called indirect; measures of force were ascertaining the whereabouts of school children then applied. Meanwhile, the principle of volun• who have wandered from the-State of Hessen to tary evacuation, on which people based their right Wuerfteniberg. The federal governor in Hessen to return their children at will, was not revoked. cannot, determine where they are, and has called A letter by the Party, commissioner for the Chil• upon the Reich Education Minister for help in dren's Rural Evacuation Agency (Munich, 15 Oct. this matter. 19J3) gives some insight into, the troubles and G on trolled Evacuation of Entire Schools.—The the remedies proposed in this connection : discrediting of the EXV evacuation of children steadily increased the popularity of evacuating "The problems of child evacuation and the whole schools. A number of factors caused the craze of the parents to get their children back parents to place an ever-increasing confidence in home have been discussed at a meeting in the this type of evacuation. The schools were usually Party Chancellory, with the following re• moved int o neighboring areas. Most .of the regu• sults : lar teachers whom parents and children trusted (1) The Fuehrer continues to refuse the went along. The children left in the company of application of direct measures of force in their friends and classmates. The entire school, connection with the KEY evacuation of chil• or at least as many classes as possible, were evacu• dren. ated together, so that a wider range of subjects (2) However, in order to keep up the par• and a more specialized type could be taught. ents' willingness to evacuate their children There was no undesirable interference of the through IvLV, one need not have any scru• Party or the Hitler Youth, except for the regular ples about applying indirect measures of Hitler Youth duties with wliich every youngster force, such as the following * * . *." There had to comply anyway.

85 Opposition Youth Groups coordinated in 1939. the majority of the Edelweiss On 1 July 1943, Hinnnler issued a decree "con• membei-s. also cnWedEdekveiss-Piraten, belonged cerning the protection of youth," which in its first to some official Nazi youth organization. But-they part contained drastic regulations of such matters- were opposed to the program of the Hitler Youth, as a 9 o'clock curfew for juveniles between 16 and its ideology and military coercion, and were IS, attendance at movies and public dances, etc. bitterly disappointed by the exploitation of Ger• In the second part, special instructions were given man youth for the purpose of feeding the Nazi to the police, war machine. As a result, they indulged in sabotaging the Hitler Youth organization by To watch associations of juveniles in gangs, propaganda, by uoncooperation, and frequently as past experience has shown that these fre• by beating up loyal Hitler Youth leaders. They quently lead to crime and general slackness. were held together, negatively, by their common Attention is drawn to unregulated camping opposition to the existing Nazi Youth organiza• and hiking by juveniles outside the Hitler tions. But it is more than doubtful whether they Youth. had a definite program, political or ideological. The last sentence almost certainly refci-s to cer• Li fact, the opposition movement seems to have tain youth groups or organizations which were in involved very heterogeneous persons, since we opposition to the Hitler Youth. find that the most active of its members were either Catholics or Communists, and. from the The Edelweiss Movement viewpoint of social class, young students or fac• It is well-known from prisoner of war interro• tory workei"S. gations and other sources that there were opposi• The Role of Bombing tional youth groups in Germany during the war, although few details about them have come to To wiiat extent was the rise of these opposi• light. There are indications that the best-known tional youth groups affected by-Allied bombing? of these groups, the so-called Edelweiss, existed as The most heavily bombed cities, such as Cologne, early as the summer of 1941 (and probably be• Hamburg, Berlin, Leipzig, and Bremen, were, fore), when a prisoner of war claims to have at the same time, main centers of Edelweiss ac• joined it in Leipzig. Because of the name, it is tivity. But these cities are known to have been assumed that this particular organization origi• centei-s of adult opposition, too, before bombing nated in Bavaria, spread from there to Austria, began. Like adult groups, the Edelweiss took then to the Bhineland, arid thence to other parts advantage of the air war for its own purposes. of Germany. The largest estimates of member• This is illustrated in a two-page leaflet printed ship totals are given for Cologne (3,000 to 4,000), by the Edelweiss group in Osnabrueck. One page Hamburg (2,000 to 3,000), Berlin (2.200 to 2^300), of it shows the picture of a street in Osnabrueck Leipzig (90 percent of the entire Hitler Youth destroyed by an air raid, with the caption, "For there)-, and Bremen (800 to 1.000). No figures are this we thank our Fuehrer": the other page available for other cities in which the organiza• shows a picture of the ruins of a factory demol• tion is known to have existed. ished by an air raid, with. the caption, "That will be the end." Since all German youth organizations were

80 CHAPTER 6.—THE RELATION OF BOMBING TO DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR

The decline of morale was bound to be re• basis for estimating the magnitude and general flected in all kinds of social conduct subject to trend in tins type of behavior. At the same regulation and enforcement through the admin• time they are symptomatic of the growing ag• istrative-legal machinery of the Nazi State. Va• gressiveness of Nazi law enforcement activities. rious types of social and political disorganiza• Botli of these factors work in the same dilu• tion were the inevitable byproduct of demoraliza• tion, to increase the number of arrests and con• tion. victions. Thus the material reflects the progress In the following two chapters an attempt is of social disorganization* as well as, in some made to assess the measure of disruptive, sub• measure, the growing preoccupation of the Nazi versive, and oppositional activities which oc• .authorities with disruptive elements, a concern curred during the war and to relate their inci• which is apparent in many explicit statements. dence to the effects, of strategic bombing. While Gestapo arrests statistics for the first 6 months the term "subversion" is here used to denote un• of 1944 contain information on two types of of• organized acts inimical to the regime and of es• fense which are relevant to the present discus• sentially political significance, (whether or not sion: political and religious offenses, and labor they have a purely political motivation), the offenses. During this period, arrests of Germans term "disruptive" behavior denotes selected types in the old Reich for broadly political and reli• of olfehse, essentially non-political in character. gious causes totalled about 19,000. There was no Only organized anti-Nazi activities are to be consistent increase in the number from month to designated as "oppositional." month during the 6 months covered by available The general statistical evidence of criminal records. cases and Gestapo arrests, an analysis of'disrup• Arrests for labor violations amounted to 13,000 tion and the efforts to combat it are treated in for this period. In this case there is some increase this chapter. Subversion and opposition, seen in the second half of the period (7,306) as com• against the background of the totalitarian ma• pared to the first (5.697). These figures include chinery of control, will be the subject of chapter 7. only Germans. Comparable data on arrests of foreign workers for the same offense indicate Criminal Statistics that repression and discipline lay infinitely more Statistical data available in this field are'un• heavily on imported foreign labor than on the fortunately incomplete and somewhat incoherent, German worker. Two hundred and four thou• because of the widespread destruction of mate• sand of this group were arrested, over 15 times rials. The most significant relevant indices, which the number of Germans. are available, follow: Death sentences increased in number during 1. A tabulation of Gestapo arrests cover• the course of the war. The report by Dr. Thierack, ing the first 6 months of 1944. 'Minister of Justice (published in Die Lage, 23 2. A summary of "progress" report by the Aug. 1944) includes the following statement: Minister of Justice on the incidence of cap• ital sentences from 1939 to 1943. In accordance with the commission given 3. The reconstructed criminal statistics of to me by the Fuehrer to administer justice, a few major urban jurisdictions, drawn from to proceed in time of war by the severest court and prosecutors' records. The uniform, means against traitors, saboteurs and other centrally collected criminal statistics were, undesirable elements, those committing unavailable; crimes of violence and anti-social habitual criminals * * * the number of death sen- Although none of these data reflects the com• • -tences has increased continually since the plete picture of disruptive and subversive activi• outbreak of the war. The total figures for ties hi Germany, they provide a quantitative this period are stated below: TABLK SO.—Death 'sentences i TABLE SI.—Criminality in four ttrban jurisdictions 3039 ".. 90 1040 021J Averasu Average Looting and monthly monthly Annual .104] 1,391 total, all looting and . thefts as ,c\iy Ye*r percent of bomb cases and thefts tonnage 1042 -, . . . 2.060 (in (in of all cases 1043 ;. . .: 5.336 IhoUBantls) thousands)

•These figures Include both Germans and foreign workers and Hamburg 1941 7.6 1.7 22 there Is no way of separating out the numbers for each groan. (1940 pop. 998,400) 1042 7.0 2.0 20 1,000 194:) 0,0 2.0 33 5, 750 1944 5.2 1.5 31 14,100 There follows a breakdown by type of crime, 1945 4.0 1.4. 35' ' iooo for 1943. High treason and treason account for Bremen 1941 4.6 1.8 40 1,745 of the total cases, or 32 percent. There are (1940 pop. 4I0.3OO) 1942 4.3 2.2 • fil 2. 150 93S cases, or 17 percent which fall in a category 1943 3.9 2.2 56 5,350 1944 2.8 76 5.350 labeled "dangerous habitual criminals, (thieves, 1945 4.2 3.3 79 ' fi, 100 swindlers, profiteers from black=n.ut and war con• LolpiiR 1940 a 6* .5 B 50 ditions)." Another 182 cases, or three percent,' (1940 j»p. 702,2011) 19-11' 6.8 .0 9 30 relate to looting of bombed houses. Because of 1942 7.3 L2 16 50 1043 7.4 1.3 18 SOO this method of classification, it is not possible to 1944 7.7 - J.S 12 3.800 determine what percentage "of these death sen• LjUBlieclr 1941 .11 . 8 53 tences were directly related to bombing. From, (1040 l»|>. 149,900). 1942 1.0 .6 58 100 W4K .fi 50 00 the beginning of the war many crimes were 1944 .9 .5 59 240

prosecuted under "regulations relating to crimes 1946 1.1 • ' 05 20 1 against the community" (Verorclnung gegen 1 Volksschaedlinge, or WO)-. For example, a 3 montlia only. petty thief who profited by a black-out to com• 81 indicate a marked increase in looting and mit hh crime could come under WO, and re- thefts in all four cities, over the period of in• reive a more serious judgment.' creased-air activity. The percentage of looting Whatever the reasons for these death sentences, and theft in Leipzig, wliich was only lightly the significant thing is that they increased steadily bombed before 1944, is remarkably low, but since throughout the war. In the fourth full year of the figures-had to be reconstructed from various the war they were nearly six times as frequent records, one cannot be certain that the classifi• as in the first, in spite of the (iy^ years which cation of crimes in Leipzig parallels that in the the Nazi regime had before the war to clean other three cities. The prosecuting, attorney of out the "dangerous elements." Hamburg agrees with these data when he states • Criminal statistics for the war years are avail• the opinion that a close relation exists between able for four urban jurisdictions, as shown in air attacks and looting: , table 81.: The destruction of homes and stores and The average monthly total of cases indicates the emergency repaii-s made to normally an upward trend for Leipzig. For Hamburg the locked entrances undoubtedly influenced apparent trend is downward and there'is little criminal elements to greater activity. Also, change in the others. However, when the de• parts of the population, which under nor• creased population of these cities, especially of mal conditions would never, "appear before Hamburg, after 1943 is taken into consideration, a criminal court, were spurred to criminal these figures-are suggestive of an increase in activity as a result of aerial attack. This crime rate. Hamburg had a prewar population applies especially to people who made ex• of 098,400 whereas its population in 1944 was orbitant and untrue claims against-the Gov• probably not much more than 100,000. ernment for property losses incurred by the attacks. The unsatisfactory psychological Special Types of Disruptive Behavior effect of prosecution of such offenders on the rest of the nation was responsible for the Looting policy of bringing to trial only a few, the absolutely clear cases, of attempted exploita• Looting is a type of crime most likely to in• tion of the Government. crease following air raids. The statistics in table

SS But again it must lie stressed thul the slatis- especially in the larger cities. Recently they ticnl evidence is fur from adequate to support •are found in greatly increased numbers. this entire claim. It points out that these gangs were formed There is no doubt, however, that looting did outside the Hitler Jugend, and failed in their exist in connection .with air raidsj that the de• duty to the folk community, especially in their tective force was constantly on the alert for such lack of will to contribute to the war effort. Some . crime and employed special squads for the pur• of their members came from "bad families" and pose and that death sentences were imposed. "anti-social kinship groups" but an increasing: This is evidenced by numerous scattered reports, number were being recruited from "respectable" and by the Reich-wide statistics given above. As homes. indicated there, in the 1043 statistics of death On the basis of available figures, the increase sentences, 182 such sentences were imposed for in juvenile delinquency appeal's 'to-- have been looting. From Freiburg comes the report that, most marked in the early years of the war. A report of the Party Chancellory, signed by Bor- Looting was one of the chief problems of manni 29 August 1944, comments on statistics , the police. All kinds of people participated, including the "decent*"' people. More patrols furnished him by the Reich Minister of Justice and controls were instituted, but were in• (which we do not possess) and states that the effective. The death penalty was carried out number of convicted juveniles had doubled be• at least once * * * but looting'continued. tween 1937 and 1942. He nlso comments on the "truly serious nature of these statistics," which It is quite apparent that the Party was much presumably covered the period of August 1944. concerned about looting, and tried to .divert pub• A Hamburg informant .reports an increase of lic attention away from it. For example, a at least 300 percent. propaganda directive in 1042, concerning the The reports by the prosecuting attorneys of manner in which measures against looting should Hamburg and Bremen, referred to above, com• be presented to the people, states that the.im• ment at length on the seriousness of juveni 1 e pression must be built up that only foreigners delinquency in that area. A "letter from the se• are the offenders,and German nationals do not curity police to the detective forces in Munich loot. Sometimes, it was explained, Germans are and Augsburg. 27 December 1944. makes refer• "suspected" of looting, hut they .were only help• ence to the Kaltenbrunner directive on combating ing their neighbors to salvage goods. Should the juvenile gangs, and states that there was a "con• matter become more serious, notices should be siderable amount" of gang activity in .Munich, published urging people to return "salvaged" and that damage to public buildings was mak• goods to their rightful owners (propaganda di• ing it difficult to follow'the directive. A mem• rective to all Reich press offices. 24 July 1942). orandum from the State Youth Office in Kemp- ten claims that juvenile delinquency increased Juvenile Delinquency throughout the war in that area. A. similar claim Youthful crime, especially in the form of is made in a memorandum hy the Youth Office ' thefts, became a serious problem with the prog• at Frankfort-on-Main. ress of the war. probably the most widespread Thus juvenile delinquency generally increased of. all forms of crime. Again, statistical ma• during the course of the war in Germany, as it terial is far from adequate and it is not possible did in America, and became a problem of se• to give exact rates. The most important docu-. rious, concern to the Nazi regime. When one. raises the question of the factors which led to mentary evidence of the general extent of this the increase, the answer is less certain. The problem- is a printed circular sent by the SS memorandum' referred to above, plus a series of Reichsf uehrer and chief of German police 10 interrogations on welfare of youth in Munich, (Himmler) and written hy Dr. Kaltenbrunner, all attempt to explain the increase. The disrup• head of the Security Service (Berlin, 25 Oct. tion of normal family life, loss of parental con• 1944). on the'subject of combating juvenile gangs*: trol, and the "thirst for life" of youth'amidst Juvenile gangs have been developing for death and destruction, are invariably mentioned several years in all parts of-the Reich, but as the factors involved. The extent to which po- litical ferment was at work is less easy to ascer• Cologne, December 1943-February 1944, contain tain because it is rarely admitted in official state• the following report wliich is typical of many : ments. In the areas where air raids occurred, The situation in the district of Cologne they too are alleged to have increased juvenile has changed radically because of devastat• delinquency. It is stated that gangs engaged ing aerial attacks. It is apparent that psy• in looting after air raids. The black-outs, bomb- chologically as well as materially the condi• tions for a strict enforcement of price reg• damaged houses and air-raid shelters are al• ulations have deteriorated considerably. It leged to have fostered illicit sexual relations, must unfortunately be stated that money as which seem to have been prevalent in these gangs. a medium of exchange is limited to a smaller The situation in Ivempteu, which was bombed and smaller sector of the economy. Goods only lightly and quite late in the war, helps to " which can be spared and which previously throw some light on the relationship of these were sold for money are increasingly used for factors. There, too, juvenile delinquency in• barter only, particularly for food consump• creased, quite apart from any direct effect of tion articles. Money circulation is limited strategic bombing. However^ even there, an in• more and more to that sector of the economy direct effect may be seen. There were many which is public "and controlled by the commu• evacuees from northern industrial areas, whose nity. In the Cologne district, where the ap• ways of life were different and who, judged by pearance of enemy planes shows the popula• Kemp ten standards, were "looser" in morals, tion almost every .night the way of all flesh, an particularly in matters of sex. They exercised exact legal price determination does not play a considerable influence on the youth of Kempten.' the role it used to do. Also the black-outs, alarms and disruption of school life fostered gang attitudes and behavior The police departments attempted strict con• patterns. In fact, youth in Kempten were gen• trol over food and personal supplies such as erally pleased by air-raid alarms, because they clothing. Few police reports are willing to ad• meant no school and a general relaxation of adult mit, that the control ever broke down. Some discipline—were pleased, that is, until they had admitted difficulty in enforcement due to lack actually experienced a raid. of men. Others admitted "winking" at hoarding, especially by "little people." Many blamed both It is safe to conclude that bombing acted as black market and hoarding on Party officials. an indirect factor in the increase in juvenile Many officials blamed the -black market on the delinquency, an increase which takes place in foreign laborers. modern total war whether there is boinbing or Sometimes the fellow who delivered the goods not. Where bombing occurred, it served to pro• could be caught, but the "wholesaler" could not vide occasions and facilitate conditions for eansr be found. Trading and exchange of goods by activity; routines and sentiments of a "delin• regular merchants was widespread. In Suttgart, quent" type became so thoroughly integrated with the bombing situation that people were it was reported that a large black market was given the strong impression that bombing was a operating out of Cannstatt, with foreign laborers major factor in the delinquency itself. In those in charge. parts of Germany where bombing did not ac• Here the trade might go as follows: bread tually occur, black-outs and alarms "'operated in for cigarettes, cigarettes for shoes, shoes for the same way. pants, and pants for bread. In many cities con• trol collapsed with continued raids. However, Black Marketing Activity Kempten reported stricter control as time went on. Hamburg reports an enormous black market, Various types of inflationary activities con• with house-to-house delivery. A competent in• stituted a type of disruptive behavior which was formant believes that many of the wealthier peo• difficult to control, and is difficult to estimate in ple there spent 500 marks a month on black extent. That such activities existed on a scale market food. In Cologne, a Party member alarming to the Party and its control agencies is "requisitioned" 1,600 marks worth of cigars, proved by many documentary sources. For ex• while the public got none. In Bonn, people felt ample, the files of the price control agency in in October 1911 that the Government had writ- 90 (et. (.lie lihinetaud oh" as lost so (,Iicy began to .Bombing did much to facilitate black market lake everything they could get. A boat load of activities. Many commodities, which were salt was seized, and used by the city to baiter thought of as essential, were destroyed in the with other cities. Ration coupons were a favorite ' raids. People were given money payments in on the Bremen black market. In lickenfoerde,black compensation for bomb damage, a clearly in• market food came from Denmark, and "every• flationary pnictice. Also evacuees were some• thing." "everybody." "everywhere." hoarded. Po• times iiKa position to hoard goods obtainable in lice did not bother to check up. In AVetzlar rural areas, to send them back to their home (here was so much barter that, "it would have area and dispose of: them on the black market. taken one policeman for each resident., and one Bombing also facilitated and provided occasions policeman for each policeman,'to control it." In for black market transactions. For example, cel• Dortmund, as in several other cities, "dealers, lars in bombed out homes were a favorite place well-paid workers." and Party officials," were for such transactions to occur. thought to be the chief* offenders. Luebeck re• ports that it was hard to find offenders, for they The Role of Bombing in Disruptive Activities ate up the stuff immediately. German officials, directly concerned with crim• Such activities came under, the category of war inal prosecution during the war. expressed the crimes against the community, and hence an in• opinion during interrogations that air attacks in• crease"" in the numbers of cases of this type re• creased general criminality: flects, in part, increasing black market activities. The general over-all effect "of war is demor• TAHLE S2.— War r.rimcn againut tho, community. Hamburg alization of the people and carries in its wake a teudecy for increased criminality. Veflr Number of coses Nunilwr of raids Bomb to image The reasons for this demoralization are

1940 279 Mont* None manifold, but the most important reason lies 1941 2S4 None None in the psychological effect of the moral and 1942 406 11 1.000 1918 4911 21 5.760 material losses of the war created by bomb• im 724 W 14. 100 ing. (Dr. Bellinger, prosecuting attorney for Bremen.) In this case, the factors involved" in the 'in• The growing number of criminal acts was crease may be readily analyzed, as they follow caused to a very large degree by the air at• the usual course of economic behavior. Commodi• tacks. Air raids-of the type of the attacks ties for civilian use became very scarce under an in July 1043. causing total destruction of economy geared to war. A rigid system of ra• large parts of the city, change not only the tioning and price control was attempted. An structure of the city as a. whole but also elaborate propaganda was used to induce peo• the individual human being subjected to the ple to conform to the system. Put. even under catastrophe. Such ,a destruction not only a totalitarian regime, the strain toward real provides ample opportunity for criminal prices, reflecting actual conditions of supply and nets, but also lowers the moral code and demand, made itself felt. changes the social position of the victims In general, food was the chief commodity on of the- attack. One who experiences the loss tiie black market: such hoarding as the little of all and everything for wliich he has fellow did was overlooked. The big olfenders worked and slaved for many years, perhaps usually managed to escape the police. Barter all of his life, and sees bursting into flames and exchange was widespread. Those who could all his dreams of home and future, becomes, afford to patronized the black market. It was na• indifferent to the law and order-of govern• tional in scope, not.really controlled, practiced ment regulations. This is shown by the in• by Germans and foreign laborers alike, and must crease in criminality since 1043. If the statis• have affected the national economy to a consid• tics do not convey that at first glance it will erable degree. As a morale factor, it brought a have to be kept in mind that the population further cleavage between rich and poor, Part}' decreased considerably during the last war member and non-Party member, those who could years. (Dr. Sohuberth. prosecuting-attorney buy and those who could not. for Hamburg.)

91 Evidence collected from 33 German cities con• TABLE 84.—Rating of cities on disruptive behavior—' general rating (based- on all faotors)1 firms such interpretations. On the basis of in•

formation on disruptive behavior obtained from Bomb tonnage Bomb tonnage interrogations and memoranda prepared by local officials, it.was possible to arrange these cities 1. Hamburg- 41,300 18. Hannover 24.700 2. Kassil W,H» 18. F.cWernlocrrie— 0 in rank order, according to the degree and se• 3- Cologne - 47,200 20. Nuremberg 22,200 6. Ulm 6,600 21. Luedeiwoheld 0 riousness of disruptive behavior during the war. 5. Freiburg 2,200 23. Muenohen-G lad bach 7.700 This rating of cities took into consideration the 5. Weiilar - 800 23H- Frankfort-on-Main... 29.500 7. Dortmund 27,300 23^. Muenster 13,100 amount-of looting, delinquency, and other crimes, 8. Karlsruhe 11,500 E5. Speyer 300 B. Munich— 28,300 2G. Wuppertal 7, 00J the frequency of riots and' demonstrations and 10H- Luelwck 500 27. .Erlangen 0 the prevalence of black market hoarding. The 10M- Stuttgart 27/200 2S>£. Muenden 0 12. Bremen. 27,300 28M. Widen I. TOO ranks assigned appear in tables 83 and SI. 13. Esscn.J 41.500 30. Detmold 0 14. Bottrop 4,600 31. Kultwlg _ 0 16. Bonn 5,400 32. Bissendorf- 0 TABLE 83.—Rating of ciUct on disruptive behditior i Iff. Neumuenstor,- 2.100 33. Klefie 1 18. Korapten - 500 B1 auk-market hoarding Looting Crimes, delinquency 1 Hamburg reported most disruption, Karael next n»ost, etc., down to Kletxe, which reported least When 2 or more cities have 1. Elam burg 1. Freiburg 1. Hamhurg the same rank number, they were given exactly tho Bamc rating. 2. Cologne 2. liQLirop 2. NeumuenalBT 3. Stuttgart ' 3. Ulm 3. Freiburg TABLE 85.—Relation of severity of bombing and 4. Boon 4. Hamburg 4. Karlsruhe S. Kateel 5. KaRSoL 5. Dortmund disruptive beha-vior fl. Haiuioviw 6. Luebeck 6. Wetslar Most disruptive behavior: Averago tonnage 7. Bramou 7. Ulm 7. KrankforWoti-Mab) (Hamburg, Kassel, Cologne, Ulm, Freiburg. 8. Eckcrnloerde 8. Wetilar 8. Muertcben-Oladbach. 8. Munich 9. Dortmund 9.. Kempion Wetzlar, Dortmund, Karlsruhe, -Munich. 10. WeUlw 10. Cologne 10. Kckcrnfoordc Luebeck, Stuttgart) 19,300 11. Dortmund 11. Karlsruhe [1..E3S0U 12, Karlsruhe 12. Bremon 12. Luebeck In termed late in disruptive behavior:

13. Luebeck 13. Hannover 13. Nuremberg (Bremen, Essen, Bottrop, Bonn, Nouiniien-v 14. Ulm 14. Essen 14. Stuttgart ster, Kempten, Hannover, Eckernfoerde, 15. Luerteracheid lS.'Bonn 16. Bremen 16. Nuremberg Id. Stuttgart 10. Muenjter FJoenberg, Gudenscbeid, ,Mucii(;Iien-0lad- 17._BoUrop 17. Nuremberg 17. Kassel bach) 12.300 IS. Neutmrenster 18. Munich 18. Muenden l^ast disruptive behavior: 19. Muenster 10. Wuppertal Ifl. Speyor 20. Freiburg 20* Sjwyer 20. Bottrop (Frankfort-on-Main, Muenster, Speyer. Wup• 21. Muenoheii-G lad bach 21. Muenster 21. Bonn pertal, Erlangen, Muenden, Witten, Det• 22. Frankfort-on-Main 22. Neumuonscfcr Z2. Munich mold, Kettwig. Blssendorf, Rietze) 4.700 23. Erlangcn 23. Erlangen 23. Lucdonscheld 24. Kompmn 24. Witteu 34. Cologne None of the cities in the fii-st group was un• 25. Wuppertal 25. M uenchen-Clladhach 25. Hannover 2a. Essen • 28. Eokornfoordc 20. Wuppertal bombed; two of the intermediate group and six 27. Wilton 27. Dotmold 27. Frankfort-on-Maln of the last group received no bombs at all. The 23. Speyor 28. Kamplon 28. Erlnngon 49. Deimolil 2B. Luedensehcid 29. Which , least bombed towns show the least disruptive 30. Kelt wig 30. Cettwig 30. Kettwig 31. Muenden 31. Muenden III. Deunold behavior. 32. RLaseudorf 32. Bissondorf ;t2. Biaaendorf This same 'relationship between bombing and 33. Rietie 33. Rleue 33. Rlolie disruptive behavior is expressed in a rank corre•

1 1 The rating ol 1 indicates, In each case, the moat or the par• lation coefficient of O.H between the ranks of the ticular kind of behavior, and 33 the least. cities on disruption and bomb tonnage. This analysis is discussed in chapter 1 of volume II. Riots and Demonstrations The relationship between bombing and dis• ruptive behavior is, however, not clear. It must l. Munich '3. KcmpUm 3. Cologne 1. Luedcnschold 4. Eason 0. nnmhurg 1 If the correepondeuce between bombing conditions and disrup• tive activity had been alien that the city receiving moat bombs j. (No riots or demonstrations reported in other cities.) showed the most disruption, the city with the second heaviest tomb load, the second most disruption, etc., down to the least bombed city which was aleo the least disruptive, the correlation A further analysis was made by dividing cities would.be perfect and could be expressed BB 1.00. • On the other hand, where there Is no relatlou at all between 2 into three groups of 11 each, and computing the measures, the correlation la said to be zero. If, for example,.some average "bomb tonnage for each group. Table 85 cities receiving heavy bombing showed much disruption and others little and aome receiving light bombing showed much and ethers gives these results. little disruptive nctlvily. the correction would be close to *ero.

92 not be overlooked that it was the larger cities types of criminal disruption, such as looting, theft which received the heaviest bomb-loads, and and black market operations for which it created larger cities are invariably characterized-by a dis^ incentives and opportunities. proportionate share of disruptive acts, bombing 2. Similarly, it could be shown to have been a or no bombing. The larger cities, moreover, tended .substantial factor in enhancing wartime juvenile to be centers of Nazi disaffection, whereas many of the smaller centers were Nazi strongholds, with delinquency. almost no evidence at all of political opposition. 3. The relationship between bombing and .in• Some of the social disorganization must be attrib• creasing criminality is not clearly established be• uted to factors other than bombing. cause of the association of bombing with city size and of the latter with disruptive, activity. In Co?? elusions general, however, strategic bombing was appar• 1. It has been found that strategic bombing ently a contributing, if not a primary factor in was responsible for a marked increase in special the increase of criminality.

93 CHAPTER 7.—THE CONTROL OF SUBVERSION AND OPPOSITION

'The Nazi Apparatus of Control cipal buttress of power. "While the influence of the security service over the other two services ""The home front of the German Reich, the appears to have grown progressively, a real fusion "Inner Front" as Himmler called it. was clearly recognized as one of the major theaters of opera• or integration of Party and Government protec• tions. It was the Nazis1 original theater of opera• tive forces does not seem to have taken place (in• tions and could never he safely neglected. The terrogation of Ohlendorf, chief of division TIT, forces mobilized by them against domestic objec• RSI-LA). tives went- far beyond the conception of "the If one beai-s in mind considerable overlapping police" and legal apparatus as employed in demo• and the constant tendency of the Party service cratic countries. to expand its powei-s. and activities, the division of labor in the domestic phase of this'"State Pro• Police and Courts tective Corps" may lie described as follows: The Security service, through its local and ve- The German prtlice system went through the gional network, gathered and consolidated in• same stages of development as other agencies of creasingly elaborate intelligence reports on all the Nazi Government, with the establishment of phases of community life and activities, with a centralized responsibility and the continuous in• definite emphasis on general trends, attitudes and crease in Party ascendancy. By 103(i, after some morale in all "national spheres of life" (morale jockeying for power against Goering. Himmler, reports, Stiminungsberichte). It was not the only who was already head of the Elite Guards (SS), agency -which produced such reports. In fact, in . had emerged as chief of all German Police. In recent years,, there was hardly one which was not this capacity he rearranged all governmental po• required to do so. lice services (on the national, state and local levels) under- two major divisions, the regular Since the responsible security service personnel police (Orpo. Ordnungspolizei) and the security was recruited from the most zealous and reliable police. (Sipo. Sicherheitspolizei). The security membei'S of the Party, these morale reports could police comprised the established criminal police atford to be surprisingly frank. Although they or detective force (Ivripo, lvriminalpolizei) and were based essentially on the consolidated reports the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei, secret,"state of local informants and not on scientific sampling, police). As head of the Elite Guards. Himmler objectivity was the official policy. This was not also had at his disposal the separate security serv• true, as a rule, for the comparable reports of other ice of the Elite Guards (SD, Sicherheitsdienst agencies, least of all for those emanating from der SS). finally, in 193!), the government and the general Party organization itself. party police services were coordinated through The Gestapo, with its own comprehensive offi• a joint National Security Office (ESHA, Reichs- cial and undercover organization, was in charge sicherheitshauptamt) in Berlin under Himm'ler's of actual police operations of a broadly political general supervision as Minister of the Interior and character, with the accent on "measures to prevent chief of.German police. acts inimical to the state." In effect, it had sweep• ing authority for the arresting, detaining and Regional control over all police services in each "liquidating" of any and all whom it regarded army region was vested in Himmlers representa• as actual or potential enemies of the regime. This tives, the "Superior Elite Guard and Police Lead• authority was unrestrained by any of: the legal ers." whose operations became especially effective controls which were still operating in the latter lit the outbreak'of the war. years of National Socialism. The closest coopera• Within this large-scale organization it was tion and mutual assistance was the policy pre• .mainly the detective force (increasingly indoctri• scribed for Gestapo and security service. nated and expanding in scope), the Gestapo and The detective force, finally, was charged pri• the security service wliich, informally known as marily with the remaining police work Involving the State Protective Corps, constituted the prin- i criminal offenses. Its character had been gractu- ully transformed in accordance with the policy of issued late in 1043, which required all police or• the regime by the requirement of Party member• ganizations to put themselves directly at the dis• ship'and Elite Guard qualifications (1038) as posal of .Party leadei-s in their battle against prerequisites for recruitment, even though it still recalcitrant and subversive elements. contained a substantial quota of its older, trained This organization was not only elaborately personnel. It was required to work in close col• manned with full-time personnel; it also succeeded laboration with botli Gestapo and security service. in drawing upon a large number of unpaid or These police organizations constituted the bard partially remunerated volunteer informants, both core, of die regime's control mechanism. It was in the case of the Gestapo and of the security reinforced by further protective layers, with the service, not to mention the Party as such. Until Party's own machinery as an important control fairly late, it succeeded in using Party members device in its own right. and even average non-Party folk as "patriotic" The more traditional elements of legal control agents who might be convinced that they were had been similarly harnessed and, transformed. fulfilling some patriotic duty by offering their The ordinary criminal courts, essentially deprived services, or who might expect substantial advan• of genuine independence, were put under increas• tages in return. Besides, there were large numbers ing pressure. Procedural safeguards had been un• of professionals and professional organizations done and progressively severe sentences were de• whose specialized knowledge was tapped, espe• manded, especially during the war. by the Minis• cially by the security service, for all kinds of in• try of Justice. (See the Minister's report as formation. quoted in the preceding chapter.) Moreover, vir• tually all criminal cases, involving major or po• This elaborate machinery of control and com• litical offenses, were withdrawn from their juris• pulsion was surrounded' by a fringe of terror, diction and placed in the hands either of the spe• symbolized by Gestapo, Elite Guards and the cial courts (Sondergcrichte) which were composed concentration camp. Although, only very few of picked judges, or of the people's tribunal actually knew much about the conditions in con• (Volksgericht), essentially an instrumentality of centration camps, rumors and half-knowledge Party tenor, which handled the most important provided a powerful deterrent. offenses, such as treason in the flexible Nazi sense Those who did come out of concentration camps of the word. had their mouths most effectively sealed. They very rarely told of their experiences, partly be• In spite of this elaborate apparatus of repres• cause of the fear of retaliation against them• sion and control, opposition to the regime con• selves, partly because their own next-of-kin might tinued, and there is reason to believe1 that it actu• be penalized. In consequence, a stark fear of the ally increased during the period of intensified unknown or partly known, increased by the ob• terror. The rise in Gestapo arrests, reported in servable severity of official punishment ineted out chapter 0. part II, is one indication of growing to political offenders, enhanced and perhaps even official concern with oppositional activity. . exaggerated the demonstrable power of the con• trol groups, and tended to cover up real gaps in Factors Favorable to Successful Control their control. A number of conditions were responsible for the Those who had the strength of conviction, will• remarkable effectiveness of the control system. ingly to take upon themselves, and if need be In the first place, little was left tp chance. The control machinery ultimately became as compre• upon their families and friends, the potential con• hensive as the activities of the community itself, sequences of anti-Nazi activity, not only had to so that little could escape its network. The old face the risk of cruel punishment; they also had. theory of the police as an agency of safety and to assume that their sacrifice, which was to further prevention had been supei-seded by a' new one a cause they believed in, would remain unknown. which exalted-the police as the political shock- Moreover, it was no longer possible, as it had troops and advance-guard of an embattled nation. been in the early years of the regime, to expect Although this change had been initiated some any remedial or restraining action against these years before the outbreak of the war, it was em• agencies through legal procedures. Political police phasized by wartime regulations, such as the one operations had long been explicitly exempted from

95 court control, Court decisions favorable to po• and the new men, frequently less well-trained and litical suspects could be disregarded by the Ges• certainly differently indoctrinated. tapo. And the criminal courts themselves had Quietly working within the confines of the been increasinglyj although not completely, per• machine, there were elements opx?osing National vaded with the spirit of the regime. Socialism. As far as the police were concerned, There was a final buttress. The propaganda it is clear that the detective force contained to the machine managed to j>ersuade the man iri the end substantial numbers of the old supporters of street for a long time that, for better or for the Republic, who had mainly belonged to the worse,, he was "in for it," because the "world was Social Democratic Party. Such men might go as bent on destroying Germany and the Germans; far as to arrange escapes for intended victims of that, whether or not he liked the Nazis, he was the Gestapo by entering their names in the miss• like a man in a leaky boat in midstream who, if ing persons file, after having warned them of an he wanted to survive, had to row regardless of his impending arrest. It was known to "insiders" feelings about some of his fellow-passengers. that there were quite active "cells!5 of this nature Once the war was well under way, the Germans. in government agencies^ such as the Ministry of who enjoyed any advantage of position or eco• the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry nomic status had a vested interest in German vic• of Labor, and certain courts and prosecutors' tory.. It is quite evident that such considerations offices, not to mention local Government services. would deter a good many people from taking Such persons could, and sometimes did, effec• active steps against the Nazis, even among those tively sabotage Nazi law enforcement. who were willing to brave the consequences. The growth of disaffection in the masses of the population, which our evidence reveals, produced Factors Impairing Successful Control further obstacles. It lessened the numbers and There were, on the other hand, certain features enthusiasm of informers while, at the same time, of the system which tended to diminish its effec• it increased the task of policing and controlling tiveness in the course of the war. This immense which were, by 1943, beginning to suffer from the and complicated machinery had actually outgrown manpower shortage. the limits of efficiency. Anyone who has plowed Finally,- there were disruptions of the control his way through the paper remnants of this vast services caused by the air raids. Characteristic bureaucratic machine, will appreciate that it was of this was the evacuation from Berlin to the beginning to burst at the seams. As with any provinces of many divisions of the National Se• overgrown organization, this resulted in two curity Office itself, the interruptions of communi• major shortcomings: there was imperfect coordi• cations, the destruction of records, and even cases nation among its parts (the several police cadres, of personal corruption among key personnel which the Party, the courts, and other government agen• came to light under these circumstances. cies) ; and, especially towards the end, there was a manifest shortage of skilled personnel, con• Summary of Control Problem sidering the scope of the customary operations. . The effectiveness of the Nazis' machinery of We.have many statements from the security serv• control and repression remained impressive to the ice and Gestapo representatives about the grow• end. It continued to function, despite a good ing manpower shortage in their ranks. many internal flaws which were responsible for This, lack of coordination was enhanced by the the survival of a considerable number of enemies* fact that there was a good deal of rivalry and of the system.' Partly because of its reputation even conflict among various control services, be• for ruthless use of all the means at its disposal, it tween the security service and the Gestapo, in served as a formidable deterrent to every sort of particular, and also between both of these and the opposition to the regime. old-line detective force. Similar tensions existed, at least in some localities (e. g., Munich) between The Pattern of Subversion representatives of the administration of justice The most striking exhibition of subversive be• and the Party police agencies. Basically this was havior was the overt criticism, which ranged from due to a natural conflict between old-line career simple complaint to outspoken denunciation. It officials, trained to use some measure of objectivity, was expressed by word of mouth, as well as in 96 written form by the use of leaflets or anonymous V-weapons) but unfortunately they come letters. There were other forms of subvei-sive from the other side. It is frequently claimed behavior under the"dictatorship wliich may be that it is possible for the enemy to figure out described as indirect. They comprised such ac• when Germany's war production will cease tions its the spreading of political jokes, of gossip to menace him" * * *. One can hardly and rumors, and listening to enemy broadcasts. talk of reprisal without eliciting a pitying All of them betray attitudes of nonconformity smile * * *. However, at heart many and protest, and were outlawed by the Nazi Gov• still believe in it" * * * (They say) "If ernment. we didn't have this Government we would have had peace long ago * * *. With the Throughout its existence the Nazi dictatorship tenacity of our leadership an end of the war had to contend' with a good deal of this sort of can only be hoped for after Germany's com• behavior on the part of groups and individuals plete annihilation." Members of the intelli• among its citizenry. Such currents antedated the gentsia state that "it was a matter of course war. and anyone who can read between the lines to be a German, but not quite understandable may discover subversive thought in the literature that one could still be a National Socialist." published in the Third Reich during this period. The average man might direct scornful or angry words at tlfe regime or its leaders. Complaining The same report emphasizes that the air war is commonplace in all political climates, when• "proves as hitherto the crux in the molding of ever there are misfortunes or reverses, but it is morale" and ends significantly: most significant under a dictatorship. In 193Sj for instance, a part.of the German public was Comment on the oftemquoted_ poet's word: agitated about the open persecutions of the Jews. "Germany must live even if we have to die." After the beginning of the war, it was the reverses * The question is often .raised: who in this case . in the east and later the air war which engendered will represent the surviving Germany? Will popular resentment. .it be the people in the bomb-proof sheltei-s?

Written Criticism Vocal Criticisms Following Air Raids Much the same pattern Can be traced in the As air raids began to bear down- on the popu• written expressions of overt criticism. While lation, it was the discrepancy between observed chain letters, anonymous letters, inscriptions and fact and government propaganda which lent it• leaflets had been well known, the growing impact self to criticism.. In September 1943, for instance, of air raids began visibly to affect the minds of it was reported from Dortmund'that: the anonymous scribes, 'especially in the exposed, The official Army bulletin was long and urban centres. critically discussed when, after the daylight There are striking examples of such communi• raid on Bochum, it was stated that "enemy cations in the spring of 1943 wliich originated in air units flew in tinder cloud cover." There the Rhine and Ruhr industrial area. A leaflet was much comment, for the enemy raiders pasted under the mail box in the Krefeld Post were widely visible.' Arery few clouds could Office contained this appeal:

be noticed. t - ' People awake! The angry air-raid victims did not relish being Down with Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Ley, fooled, just because the Government still sought Rosenberg, Himmler, etc. to cover up the ineffectiveness of its fighter pro• These, swine who have plunged us into tection. In 1944 we hear reports from Munich .misery; every night these raids. (morale report, Munich, to Berlin, undated;, Do we need to stand for that? shortly after the 20 March 1944 attack on Augs• burg).: • . In April leaflets were found in Krefeld which read: . The increase of air raids leads to expres• sions like the following: "Now we finally get No more of these raids, unite, arise, reprisals (a reference to the much touted Dow n with the Hitler murderer's, No more of these raids! The people arise! 1 dropped you two!" (morale report, Dort• Down with the murderers, down with Hit• mund, 28 Sept. 1942). ler! hi 1043 a Eh'iiteland political wit proposed the (Gestapo Regional Headquarters, Duessel- desperate riddle: dorf, 30 April 1043) What is it? It is naked, stands on a meadow " It is worth noting that, at the same time, Ger• and carries a bank savings-book under the man authorities recorded with growing alarm arm? Answer: The German of 194G. that fewer people were disposed to give up Allied leaflets to the proper German control agencies, More and more those responsible for Germany's another' indication of the waning confidence in downfall were the butt of sarcastic comment. As the ruling powers. one official repoit had it. The most vulgar jokes are circulated which Political Jokes particularly assign to the leader, \u the most Indirect criticism of all .kinds thrives in a dicr indecent manner, sole responsibility for-the tatorial environment. Like anonymity, indirec• war (Party morale report, Gau Schwaben, 20 tion helps to conceal the originator. The most June 1043). widely used and perhaps the most effective form which subvei-sive conduct of this type assumed in The air-raid shelter had by this time become Germany was the political joke. The Nazi bosses the natural distribution centers for such manifes• and their devoied hangers-on could be ridiculed tations of the public mind. In effect the political ' with relative impunity; jokes could expose well- joke, always a fruitful medium, showed the im• pact of the air raids in several respects. It crys• known weaknesses, vices, blunders and foibles; tallized criticism of the Party and its bosses and and the procedures of tyranny' itself could be held fixed on them responsibility for the public suffer• up to public ridicule. Earlier In the war, some ing. It reflected disappointment at the failure of of these political jokes were still rather gcdeceptions as purveyed in Nazi news and propaganda. Rumoi-s are equally significant, as they reflect the dissatisfaction, incredulity, fears and hopes According to a Rhineland story, a man in of the people. Precisely because the rumors were Cologne brought his radio to confession in often sharply at odds with official news and con• the Cologne Cathedral because it had been tentions, the Nazi authorities regarded them more lying so much lately. and more as danger sighs, as the war went. on. Germany had become a great rumor factory. The As the effect of the raids made itself felt, older lack of news about tangible facts suggested to the • topics of political witticism were replaced by cur• adherents of the regime that things were going rent subjects. well, while the skeptics invariably began to think and believe the worst. In one of these anecdotes, it is related how Hitler and Goering fly over Bochum to sur• This split results in.a general readiness to vey bomb damage "from the air. Goering believe more and "more rumors as they arise, points out the ruins to Hitler and comments: and .to spread them. Especially tettei*s from "Wouldn't they be pleased, Adolph, if we the front, taken as news substitutes * * * droppeil tliem a sackful of meat and fat cou• form a source of absurd speculation * "* *. pons? The pilot, a Bochum native, on hear• It also seems that foreign radio news is be• ing this turns around and says: "You have no ing listened to increasingly (morale report, idea how happy the Bochnmers would lie if security service. Bielefeld, (> Aug. 1941).

o The lack of authentic news on the one hand, Bombing as a Cause of Subversive Behavior ' and. the foreign radio offerings on the other, pro• There still remains the question of the extent duced a nation of rutnor-mongerers. to which strategic bombing induced the growth If one considers the character of rumoi-s dur• of all these subversive activities. There are three ing the periods of strategic bombing, it is clear main sources of evidence: that this experience had become one of the domi- nanl facts in the life of the community. The ru• 1. Nazi control agencies, such as the security mors concerning air raids involved such matters service, the Gestapo and the Party itself, empha• as the circulating of exaggerated casualty fig• sized on various occasions that nir raids had tin ures after raids, alleged forecasts of new air at• important and visible effect on subversive beha• tacks (often based on Allied leaflets supposedly vior. found elsewhere) and, increasingly, reports about" conflict and defection among the political leader's. 2. Nazi control agencies not only displayed in• By 1944 one Party report summed it up by saying: creasing iilarm. but sought to sti(Ten their counter- measures in various ways, in order to stem the ris• When the air power of our enemies is ing title of subvei'Sion. In this connection we have broken (and this will be the case in the near explicit references to the air-raid problem. future), even the weakest German will regain 3. Since the principal types of subversive be• courage. Bumor-mongermg still * * * havior constituted criminal offenses under Nazi parnlixes the German people's will to resist law. an examination of relevant criminal statistics and must be fought * * *. T.he shelters are the main dissemination places (morale should be revealing. As indicated in chapter t> report, 12 Dec. 1944, Ludwigshafen). of this part of volume I. information is scanty because of the widespread destruction of such ma• terials. Moreover. Nazi legal authorities agreed Black Listening that there was growing reluctance on the part of Listening lo foreign broadcasts had l>een pro• the population to bring such offenders' to book. , hibited by special legislation in 1989 and, as the Figures'avaihible for such urban centers as Ham• war continued, enforcement was increasingly em• burg. Bremen, and Luebeck suggest that where phasized. Illicit listening, like rumoi'S, increased there was fertile political ground the frequency with the intensification of strategic, bombing.1 of subversive conduct increased during periods Any shocking or striking event induced Germans of heavy air raids. The available samples, how• to push open another window which would let*in ever, demonstrate no more than that strategic views and opinions of the outside world. In a bombing in the end was one major element in the small way, such incidents as the Hess flight, and deteriorating war situation wliich stimulated sub• then 'more urgently the eastern reverses and, versive behavior. The lack of a conclusive statis• finally, the air-raids, made people more susceptible . tical correlation between weight of bombs dropped to news and views of non-German origin. Despite and number of arrests is due to the existence of all earlier promises, the skies had been darkened, many unknown and unmeasured factors, among by enemy aircraft after 1942. Not only did ex• wliich the public's aid in law enforcement was planations become increasingly implausible, but possibly the most important. people were nlso anxious to learn what precisely hud happened in other parts of Germany. And 4. An analysis of data gathered from the back• again the discrepancies between official assertions ground studies'- of the sample cities reveals a re• and observable facts, coupled with the worry over lation between the amount of bombing and sub• friends and relatives, drove people' more and-more versive activity, as expressed by the rank correla• to black*listening. One competent .Nazi authority tion , of 0.59. As in the case of disruption, has stated that after D-day it was the rule rather no satisfactory conclusion can be derived from than the exception to listen to enemy broadcasts. ' such data alone because larger cities, the preferred and we have ninny indications that the air raids bombing targets, may be assumed to have been a contributed heavily to this inclination. more fertile ground for subvei'Sion than other areas, regardless of strategic bombing.

1 Soe vol. I, pt. It. ch. 4 for report on the extent of "Black" Listening. »S«: Catholic Church and, among I am going to get out of the Party. the far less homogeneous elements of Protestant• (Report of National Security Office, 21 ism, of the Confessional Church. This was true July 1911.) in spite of the fact that on both sides there had been in the beginning some temporizing with Na• . Rank and File Misgivings tional Socialism. Even before 1030 many Ger• man Christians had become convinced that no As the air war developed, the reactions of "the reconciliation was possible between Nazism and churches tended in two directions; there was sor• the .church. Hundreds of clergymen, both Cath• row and sometimes resentment at what was re• olic and Protestant, were already in prisons and garded as the unwarranted destruction by bomb• concentration camps. ing of religious and cultural objects; but much more strongly there was the glowingly articulate The Clerical Denunciation rejection of the unspeakable leadership which had by its- own misdeeds caused Germany's destruc• From church officials there issued a small but tion. Of course there-were, both among Catholics persistent stream of acts of defiance which kept and Protestants, large numbers of laymen who, the authorities on edge and made the population even if their loyalty to the Party was gone, still increasingly aware of the conflict between Nazi wanted Germany to win. On the other hand there state and church. These activities included "sub• were those, and doubtless their numbers ran into versive" religious instruction by clergy in public millions, who were painfully aware of the con-" schools, the illicit continuing of religious youth flict between their church and this regime. Some organizations officially dissolved, pastoral letters of fihem regarded the possibility of a German vic• boldly criticizing the regime and occasional out• tory with uneasiness, because they feared that spoken sermons. hard days would then begin for their church. A notable example was .the pastoral letter of Roman Catholic bishops (26 June 1941) wliich Religious Opposition, Facilitated by Bombing registered a sharp protest against the difficulties t which authorities put in the way of the work of There were, both among the clergy and the the church, especially with regard to its educa• laity of the churches, groups who worked with tional and charitable activities. They said that it varying degrees of determination and aggressive• was unbelievable that such difficulties were made ness against the established authorities. The air at a time when the full solidarity of the people raids, as the most devastating events in the life should be preserved and not be disturbed by a of the community, afforded them a striking oppor• violation of the religious feelings of a large part tunity to discredit the Nazi Party and all it stood of the population. This letter caused great agi• for, to deepen dissatisfaction, and to create and tation among the people, and such utterances as increase all manifestations of defeatism. these were reported from various parts of' the -t Reich: Thus rumors were spread through religious cir• cles which had the purpose of diminishing confi• At long last the church does not take every• dence in and respect for the Nazi leaders. It was thing dying down. said, for example, that the, regional Party chief of Minister had fled from the city while the Bishop J See,ch. 4, pt. I, vol. I and ch, 1, vol. II for evidence of the remained bravely on his post (security service relation between war-time morale and church memberahlp and religions activity. report, Bielefeld. 22 July 1941). 100 Another report, referring lo such rumors, closes This propaganda (of the Catholic Church) with the significant statement: created in many people a hostile attitude toward the state. It even went so far that in It must be pointed out that these state• Catholic circles the opinion was widespread ments by leading .Catholic laymen are handed that it would lie better if Germany- would lose on to other lay-workers and through them the war, because, then at least the church find their way into the population. The pur• would be saved. (Report of National Security pose of this whispering campaign is without Office, 5 June 1042.) doubt to undermine systematically the confi• dence of the German people in the political Such antagonism was deepened among Cath• leadership (security service report, 1 Feb. olics by the fact that those among them.who had 1043). belonged to the old Centrist Party often continued The documents leave no doubt that Nazi au• to harbor the old political loyalties. thorities were deeply concerned with the effects of air raids on the morale of church people. Yet Organized Political Groups repressive efforts were somewhat'hampered by the Organized political opposition groups repre• wartime truce between church and state.. The sented another primary source of difficulty for lower clergy would and often did suffer, but the the Nazis. Despite the heavy hand of Nazi re• most eminent spokesmen of the churches no Nazi pression and intimidation, organized oppositional dared to touch. cells existed throughout Germany. Hardly any German city was found by our field investigators • A much smaller number actually hoped and in which local inquiry failed ,to reveal evidence of prayed for a German defeat because they were the existence of one or more groups, varying of convinced that a German victory would mean the course in size; political tendency, courage and triumph of a new paganism. Such people might skill. This is all the more significant smce it was ask: the natural tendency of such groups to operate Who is worse, he who tears religion out of in the utmost secrecy and since, quite frequently, the hearts of children or he who only, de• repressive measures were carried on by the au• stroys churches made of stone? (Anonymous thorities without any publicity, so that few be• postcard ascribed to Catholic circles, security yond the circle of participants would learn about service report, Duesseldorf, 27 July 1943.) the-elimination of certain active "enemies of the state." Others expressed openly the fear that after the war the final liquidation of- the church would be • For this reason, our principal direct sources of attempted by the Nazis: information, the testimony of surviving opposi• tion members, the Nazis-' official intelligence- re• Quite generally the opinion is held that ports and our interrogations of Gestapo and Se• with the end of the war, the State will make curity Service, officials, are combined to form an an ultimate.assault upon the churches. Espe• estimate of these efforts which is conservative cially among the rural population this idea because of the effectiveness of the wall of silence is strongly held (National Security Office, on both sides. This is true despite'the fact that 5 June 1942). surviving opposition leaders have at times been This widespread feeling induced in many peo• tempted to exaggerate tlie scope of their own ple a growing complacency toward the German work. war effort: . Local Organization This propagandists activity of the Cath• olic Church has led to a certain indifference Organized oppositional activities were normally - of a large part of the Catholic population confined, by necessity, to a local scale, because with regard to the war * * * (National any attempt to establish wider contacts and Security Office report of 5 June 1942). group connections exposed members to prohibi• tive risks. The "cell" system was commonly used, Some people went so far as to express the open whereby " only one member of a group knew of wish that Germany might lose the war: the existence of another in a different group. The

101 activities of these organized groups were devoted in conjunction with cells of sympathizers through• to anti-Nazi propaganda, to sabotage of the war out the country, with other political leaders, such effort, to opposition to the last-ditch recruiting as the Social Democrat Wilhelm Lensohner. and efforts, such as the setting up of the home guard with the military group which was responsible in 1944, and even, as in the case of the Munich for direct action. Free Bavaria movement, to revolts timed to aid Also associated with them was an important the final Allied push. underground network of Social Democratic and trade union sympathizers, as well as the so-called Ketch-Wide Organizations Rreisau circle, in which Christian-Conservative Despite all handicaps, however, there were noblemen, businessmen, Young Socialists, and efforts oh a national scale. Certain groups of the representatives of the churches found a common Social Democratic Party and of the trade union ground in a program of peace and Christian movement had intermittently continued their ac• socialism. tivities underground after 1933. During the .war Among the military group men like Beck, .period Nazi connr.ermeasures made the survival of Brauchitsch, Canaris. and Witzleben Set the tone. underground groups on a national scale increas• They were Conservatives who had been supplied, ingly difficult, although they were somehow main• as early as 1938-39, with elaborate political pro• tained even then through' liaison agents in a grams by civilian collaborators. number of cities. Apparently it was largely due to disagreements On the Deft, the Communist Party was appar• on policy and to personal jealousies among the ently more successful in maintaining continuous , generals tlmt the cooperation of these men, despite national and international connections than the earlier plots, did not lead to a successful upris• adherents of the Social Democratic Party. Ac• ing at an earlier date. cording to our information, relations with Russia were maintained by German, Communists, both The Effect of Bombing on Organized Opposition through agents among Russian workers in Ger• What effect, if any, did the air campaign have many and through German Communist refugees on the development of these organized opposition sent iii as agents from Switzerland. Contacts with groups and on the attitudes of the population the active Communist groups in the seaport cities towards them? The answer is far from simple, of Hamburg and Bremen were established through but may be summarized as follows . Communist seamen employed on neutral ships. Ultimately, under the stimulus of the Moscow- 1. There is evidence to suggest, from both oppo• sponsored Free Germany Committee, a National sition representatives and the Gestapo, that there Free-Germany Committee (N3CFD) was formed was an increase of oppositional activity beginning in May 1944 which was mainly a combination of in 1943. Yet an actual rallying to political or• Socialist and Communist elements. Branches of ganizations, unlike the "self-expression" mani• the committee had been' established before occu• fested in nets of subversion, resulted from a more pation in a large number of German cities. The complex set of factors than bombing experience development of an over-all German Communist alone. There are definite indications that the organization is further suggested by the fact that increasing tempo of air raids in 1943 and 1944 had a National' Committee of the German Communists a direct bearing on the decisions by the "July 20" sought and briefly made contact with the con• group to take action. ' One of Goerdeler's asso• spirators of 20 July 1944. ciates observed that "some military commanders have probably been strengthened by. the air raids The most conspicuous single effort at national in their inclinations to renounce Hitler and bring organization was spearheaded by a group of about his fall" (interrogation of V. Dictze). One army officers. This was the organized movement of the labor union leaders reports that it was which culminated in the plot against Hitler of after the beginning of the heavy raids on Berlin 20 July 1944. While -it constituted a merging of (Nov. 1943-Jan. 1944) that planning and prep• middle-of-the-road. Social Democratic and labor arations of the inner circle were definitely speeded ' union groups with Army, right-wing and religious up (Memorandum submitted by W. Musohke on cells it was led by a Conservative, Dr. Carl Goer- the preparation for 20 July 1944.) deler, the former mayor of Leipzig. He worked

102 2. There is much evidence, especially from placed two major handicaps in the-path of opposi• Communist, and Social Democratic leaders, that tion activities: air raids made the public more susceptible to their (a) Opposition groups were hit, like every on, appeals. This increased responsiveness doubtless else, by the disruption and confusion of commu• was due to the same causes which bred suhvei-sive nication and transportation. There is evidence conduct in general. that this presented major problems in a good 3. In the wake of physical and administrative many delicate situations. disorders produced by the air raids, special oppor• (b) Though the efficiency of both the Gestapo tunities for action were opened up. The syste• iincl of the average man was seriously curtailed matic hiding of deserters among the ruins is a by the exhausting pressure of air raids, so also striking example. Industrial sabotage and tam• was that of opposition workers. There was. in pering with Gestapo files likewise were greatly fact, a point where numbness and weariness re-"" facilitated on such occasions. duced men to that stage where naked survival was 4-. Against these advantages, strategic bombing the only thing which mattered.

103 -

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5. Steel reinforced concrete hunker in Krefeld.

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(>". Mult ffi/(! story ;iir-r;M<) .sJjHJer JJJ iJocklinirliauscii. 101 7. Germans escape to limestone cave to avoid bombing in Auermacber.

Returning evacuees. 105 A

eriuahrel V. SOllAllSMUS aberiftdie SI Lehre ponder IN DEP. SCHIOCSALSSTUNDE hSrMen M UNSEKES VOLKES HAT PmOff' DIE HEIMATDIEGLEICHE . ERFQUUNG PAROLE WIE DIE FRONT: HAKTEUNDGLAUBE GtNIRALORfP'I DICTl

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SCHAFFEN das haltmifdie Dauerkein Qegnermis.

9. Wartime propaganda posters. LOG 10. Black market activities continue under the occupation.

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11. German civilians loot railroad cars in search of food, April, 1945. 107 12. Inscription on ruins of Berlin house. APPENDIX A.—THE CROSS-SECTION INTERVIEW STUDY Major emphasis was placed upon interviews procecltu-e had the advantage, moreover, of viti• conducted with 3,711 German civilians in 34 com• ating inaccuracies in the report of respondents. munities, so selected as t6 represent the bomb• The analysis is not concerned with the absolute ing experience of German towns in the American, level of morale" but with relative morale as it British, and French zones of occupation.. corresponds to degrees of bombing exposure. It The interviewing survey was carefully de• may be, for example, that the absolute morale signed to elicit a maximum amount of informa• level of people who now report war weariness is tion and a high degree of validity. The main too high since they would like Americans to be• techniques to accomplish these purposes follow. lieve that they were not highly identified with the war effort. But the important point is that there I. Interviewing Method are significant differences, between the bombed The indirect interviewing method was used. and unbombed areas, in the number of people This procedure represents the application of who soy they did not want to go on with the war. clinical methodology to problems of social psy• These relative differences in morale are thus a chology. The interviewer sits down with the function of bombing, since the respondents in respondent and encourages a free narrative story schedule B did not know why they were being within the framework of the prescribed questions. questioned. Instead of cross-examination methods with spe• cific questions limited to yes-no responses, the ///. The Interview Schedules respondent is asked a broader type of question The English translations of the two forms of which he can answer in his own terms. Through a the interview- schedules follow. Schedule A was succession of such questions he is led by degree given to every third respondent who had been into the specific subjects about wliich information bombed. It asks information about bombing more is desired. directly than does schedule B, wliich was given to This type of interviewing emphasizes rapport two out of three bombed respondents and to all between the respondent and his interrogator, and unbombed respondents. calls for well-trained and skillful interviewers. For this task the morale division recruited a field Schedule A force of professionally trained people, thorougldy 1. How is it going with you. now under the oc• familiar with the German language find culture, cupation ? most of whom were outstanding social scientists 2. Is is better or worse than you had expected ? or psychologists. In addition, selected G-2 in• 3. "What did you really expect? terrogators were used after an intensive training 4. How do you think you and your familywill session in a pilot study. fare in the next 3 or 4 years? 5. How do you think you and your family would II, Experimental Design of Study have fared in the next 3 or 4 years if Germany The experimental design of the study called for had in the end'won the war? two forms of interview schedule. Form A was t>. When was your city bombed for the very first given to every third respondent who had been time? bombed. Schedule B, given to all unboinbed 7. Did the first air raid surprise you, or had you •people and to two out of three bombed indi• expected it? viduals, did hot inquire into bombing experience 8. Did you believe at that time that there would until the very end of the interview. There was be more l-aids on your town after this first an opi^ortunity for spontaneous report about raid, or did you think that your town would bombing to appear early in the schedule. But the now be left alone? indirection was devised to compare morale of un• 9. (If further raids, expected) What did you bombed and bombed people when they themselves think then that the future raids loould be like? did not know the purpose of the interview. This 10. When did you first experienced a big raid?

109 11. ' How did you fare at that tune? What were 36. Was everything.possible done? " your experiences? 37. (If dissatisfaction expressed) Who was to 12. (If not covered) What did you do? blame for it? 13- What were your feelings then, and did you 38. How good were the special measures and wel• react to it? fare services after the raids? 14. How many big raids did you-experience? 39. Was everything possible done? 15. Altogether, how many air raids did you ex• 40. (If dissatisfaction expressed) Who was to perience ? blame for it? - 16. Were you more and more afraid as. the raids 41. Did you people here in help each continued, or, did you get used to them? other after the raids, or did they only help IT. Did these repeated raids have any other ef• themselves? fect on your state of mind? 42. Did your opinions on the war change when 18. Which of the following bombs did you find the air raids didn't stop? most terrible: Incendiaries, explosives, phos• 43. Did you ever come to a point because of the phorous, air mines? air raids where you simply didn't want to 19. Which were more.terrible, day or night raids ? go on with the war? 20. Did you blame the Allies for the air raids? 44. What did you think at that time of "uncondi• 21. In your opinion, what do you think the Allies tional surrender?" wanted to accomplish hy these raids? 45. What, in your opinion, was the chief cause 22. Do you think that this city was bombed more of the war? than was necessary for military purposes? Additional Questions: Evacuation 23. Do you think that the people here suffered more than those in other cities in Germany? If respondent falls into A, B, or C, ask the ap• 24. Did the newspapers and the radio correctly propriate questions :- describe the general state of mind in the city A. Respondent evacuated from one community to after each air raid? (If no. then) : Give me another because of bombing or the threat of it. an example. B. Respondent's family evacuated because of 25. In what way was your normal way of life bombing or the threat of it, but respondent most upset by the air raids? remained behind. 26. How were your family relationships affected C. Respondent and fainily did not evacuate, but- by the raids? lived in community to which evacuees came. 27. Was your work aifected in any way by the air raids? GROUP A 28. How many workdaj's were you absent from 51. Did you leave vol untarily, or your work in 1944? * were you forced to go away? Please explain 29. Why were you absent? further. 30. How much free time did you take on your 52. Were official arrangements'made for your own? trip and living facilities, or did you have to 31. Did you ever have to use any kind of sub• arrange them yourself? terfuge in order to get some free time? 53. Did your whole family that lived with you . 32. (If subterfuge used) How many free days go with you, or did some of your family stay did you get by such subterfuge? behind? 54. (If some stayed behind) Who? Why? // respondent took no time off either on Ms own 55. (If some stayed behind) Were you able to or through subterfuge ash SS and 34; keep in touch regularly with the members of 33. How does it happen that you didn't take more your family that were left behind? free time for yourself? • * 56. In the main, how were you housed in the 34. Did you ever want to? ' place to which you went? 35. In your opinion, how well was your home 57. Could you explain to me in a few words how town protected against air raids? you reacted to the evacuation?

110 GROUP B 13. How did you think about this shortly after the beginning of the war? 61. 'Did your family leave volun• 14. (If changed) Why did you change your tarily, or were they forced to go away ? Please opinion about it? explain further. 15. During the war, did you believe that your 62. Were official arrangements made for the trip war leaders wanted what was best for you and living facilities, or did you have to ar• , or not? range them yourself? 16. How well handled were the problems which 63. Were you able to keep in touch regularly with the war brought here at home? the members of your family? 17. Do you think that you, personally, got along 61. In the main, how were they housed in the worse during the war than other people? place to which they went? 18. How did people of your circumstances get 65. Could you explain to me in a few words how along in comparison with other people? your family reacted to the evacuation? 19. At the beginning of the war, did you expect that your life would be completely upset, or GROUP C did you think that you yourself would not 71. Were there many evacuees or only a few? be affected by the war? 72. Did you lodge any evacuated people? 20. What was it that was hardest for the German 73. (If yes to 72) Why did they live with you civilian population during the war? particularly? 21. During the last year did you reflect much on 74. (If yes to 72) How did it work out? the state of the war, or didn't you have time 75. In general, what kind of people came to this for that? community? 22. (If reflected) What did you think about? 76. How well did the newcomers fit into their 23. Did you at any time during the war come new surroundings? to a point where you simply did not want to go on with the war ? Schedule B 24. What brought you to this point? 1. How is it going with you now under the oc• 25. What did you think at that time of "un• cupation? conditional surrender?" 2. Is it better or worse than you had expected? 26. How many workdays were you absent from 3. What did you really expect? your work in-'l944? 4. How do you think you and your family will 27. Why were you absent ?_ fare in the next 3 or 4 years? 28. How much free time did you take on your 5. How do you think you and your family would own? 1 have fared in the next 3 or 4 years, if Ger• 29. Did you ever have to use any kind of sub• many bad in the end won the war? terfuge in order to get some free time? 30. (If subterfuge used) How many free days 6. What do you think will happen -to prices in did you get by such subterfuge? the next few years? 7. If Germany had won the war, what do you // respondent took no time off either on his own think would.have-happened to prices? or through subterfuge, ash 31 and SS: 8. What, in your opinion, is the chief .reason that 317 How does it happen that you didn't take more Germany lost the war? free time for yourself ? 9. What first brought you to the belief that 32. Did you ever want to? Germany would lose the war? 33. What were your experiences with air raids? 10. As the war continued, what other influences 34. During the war did you expect that you in strengthened your belief that Germany would this immediate vicinity would be exposed to lose the war? air raids, or did you think that you would be 11. Was your war leadership as good as you had spared ? expected? 35. Did the news of air-raid damage m other cities 12. Is that your opinion for both the political strengthen or weaken your will to see the war and the military leadership? through ?

\ 36; Did you blame the Allies for the air raids? I am very much surprised' that we have 37. In your opinion, what did the "Allies want to been so well handled. I thought that because accomplish with these raids? the Jews had been so badly treated we would 38. During the war were you uneasy that the have to pay doubly. It has however* gone German armament industry would be crit• very well. It is much better than before the ically damaged by the air raids or did you occupation. There are no more feai-s of think that the armament industry was safe? bombing attacks. Yesterday my sister and 39. What did you think of the V-weapons when I were out in the fields picking berries. Some they were first used? 4(1 Did you ever listen to Allied broadcasts? planes flew over and we remarked that it 41. When did you first begin to listen? was so nice not to have to fear that they 42. What programs did you listen to? would attack us.

Additional Questions: Evacuation Question 2. Is it better or worse than you had Same additional questions on evacuation as expected? under schedule A. Better. I had great anxiety when I saw the hist Americans who came in here. Although IV, 'Examples of Interviews neither I nor any of my family was ever The two following interviews are presented to a Nazi, I fied out of the city to a village. I show the nature of the material obtained in the did not think that'we who were not Nazis cross-sectional interviewing survey. They are not would be punished, but I was afraid never• selected as necessarily typical of any specific theless. I thought.that the Nazis would be groups in the German population. punished. I thought also that there would Interview No. $1521, Schedule A be great changes in relation to money, food This interview was conducted in Detmold, Ger• and so on. Things have gone on hi those many, on 27 July 1945 with a housewife, 25 years matters just the same, however. Some peo• of age. who had left her home in Duisburg on ple thought, that we would have plenty to eat 28 October 1944 because of the air raids. She and no more rationing when the Americans brought her infant son with her and left her came, but that was foolish. parents, with whom she and her married sister had been living, in Duisburg. Her husband, a Question S. What did you really expect? telegrapher by occupation, was in the Army. Be• Answered- in question 2. fore her baby came she.had worked in the kitchen at the Thyssen Steel Works until May 1944. She Question J,.. How do you think you and your is of Protestant faith and has had grammar •family"will fare in the next 3 or 4 years? school education. The air raids had damaged I hope that things will go better for us. the rented home of her parents, but there had I ain here in Detmold with my 11 months' been no casualties in her'immediate family. She old baby. My sister, who also has a young had suffered some loss of personal property, for child, is here, as well as my mother. My which she claimed but did not receive indemnity. husband was a prisoner of war but he has She and her parents had suffered through bomb• been released and now has his old job with ing severe deprivation of gas, water, and elec• the Telegraph Bauamt in Duisburg. He will tric services, of sanitary facilities, and of com• modities other than food. In addition, the air• be able to keep this work. I hope that soon raids and the alerts had in her own case caused we will be able to get a place to live in Duis• severe loss of sleep. This information was ob• burg. At present we have no place to live tained from the factual questions at the end of and no furniture. the interview. The interview itself follows. Question. 5. How do you think you and your Question J. How is it going with you now family would have fared in the next 3 or 4 years, under the occupation? . if Germany had in the .end won the war? It would not have been better if Germany carriage. I snatched him out and rushed to had won the war. We would have had to the cellar. The other people in the house work hard to build the cities again and there were also in.'the cellar and there was much would have been, no freedom. Every tiring crying and praying because almost imme• was done by force and that would have con• diately large bombs began to fall directly on tinued. our section of the city. The house shook so that the men had to hold the timbers that Question 6. When was your city bombed for propped up the walls and floor above to the very first time? keep them from falling. We opened holes I can't exactly say when Duisburg re• in the walls into the next cellars and called ceived the first bombs. The city is near the out to see if the people there were alive. border and was one of the first places to be People were crying and praying. They said bombed. I think it "was in May 1940. There that we had to thank our Fuehrer for this. were just a few bombs dropped in those The Party leaders had their safe bunkers and early days. We would not have noticed such most of them were in Berlin. We usually bombings later. went to bunkers, but this time the attack came too quickly. Question- 7. Did the first air raid surprise you, After the attack -was over, we came out. or had you expected it? The doors and windows in our house were I can't say. We were very curious and broken. There was much destruction around stood outside to look at the planes. I would us. particularly in the Thyssen Works just say tliat we were surprised. opposite us. A great many large bombs had been dropped. s Question. 8. Did you believe at that time that there would be more raids on your town after That night we took turns keeping watch,, this first raid, or did you think that your town listening for the alarms across. the Rhine. would now be left alone? The alarm canie about 2 p. m., but it was too late to go to the bunker. We went to We always thought that more would come. the cellar, where again there was a fearful scene of ^ crying and praying. After about Question 9. (If further raids expected) What 15 or 20 minutes of .bombing there was a did you think then that the* future raids would be like? pause. My sister and I put our babies into their carriages and with my father ran to The bombings were a new experience, and the bunker. Many phosphorous bombs were we did not know what to think about what dropped, and everywhere houses were in they would be like in the future. flames. We hurried until we were completely exhausted. All the while my father was Question 10. When did you first experience a shouting to us to hurry. Finally, I took big raid ? my baby out of the carriage and ran on That was in October 1944. There were at• with him in my arms. By the time we reached tacks throughout 2 days, the fourteenth and the bunker bombs were falling on all-sides. I the fifteenth. was completely exhausted and said I could never go through this again. We stayed all Question 11. How did you fare at that time? this night in the bunker. After we went What were your experiences? home there were still continual alarms. We On- the'fourteenth we had an early alarm did not have time to wash our children or about 6 a. m. but no planes came. I stayed eat. All that day we were running from the up and did my housework. At 9 a. m. a pre• house to the bunker and from the bunker liminary alarm came and then a full alarm to, the house. The night that followed we almost immediately thereafter. My baby, stayed all the night in the bunker and the who was only a few weeks old, was in his babies got some sleep. Father remained at

113 home and he brought us something to eat. Question 18. Wliich of the following bombs About 4 a. m. we went home. Our house was did you find most terrible: Incendiaries, ex• damaged and there was no water running, plosives, phosphorous, air mines? but we brought some from a pump and The high-explosive bombs. They destroyed washed ourselves and the children. Then we everything light down to the cellar. The got some soap from the N. S. "V. and for 8 air mines were bad, too. In fact, I found days thereafter we got food in this way. Our all of them terrible. flat was badly damaged but we could live there. Question 19. Which were more terrible, day or night raids?- Question. IS. (If not covered) What did you I think that the day and night bombings do' were about the same. Take the fourteenth See question 11. and fifteenth of October, for instance. I can't say that one was any worse than the Question 13. What were your feelings then, other. I think they were about the same: and how did you react to it? Question SO.-Did you blame the Allies for the We were sure every minute that we would be killed. Even after the attack was over, air raids? we still had the feeling that we would be Really no. I heard the English radio and killed in the next attack. knew that we had bombed cities. Goebbels made a great speech in which he challenged Question 14- How many big raids did you ex• the Allies, saying that the German people " perience ? were strong and could take the bombings. The The attack that I have described was the leaders were sitting safe in Berlin, but we biggest-that occurred in Duisburg. No other had no flak and poor bunkers. attack affected the whole city as this one' did. The other attacks affected only parts Question 81-. In your opinion, what do you of the city. think the Allies wanted to accomplish, by these raids? * Question 15. Altogether, how many air raids The Allies wanted to wear the people out did you experience? and make them rebel and in this way end There were probably from 150 to 200 at• the war. If they had not bombed the cities, tacks. The alarms came almost continuously. the war might have lasted much longer and more men w,ould have been killed at the Question 16. Were you more and more afraid front. as the raids continued, or did you get used to them? Question SS. Do you think that this city was bombed more than was necessary for military I became somewhat accustomed to them purposes? but was always afraid. When the smaller attacks came, it was not so bad, but the The attack of October 11-15, 1944, cer• large attacks produce always more fear. tainly destroyed much of the industry but many of the attacks were not at all con• Question 17. Did these repeated raids have any fined to industry. In that sense, more bomb• other effect on your state of mind? ing was done than was necessary for mili• I always thought I would surely be killed. tary objectives. I lost the desire to live. The smut and dirt Question SS. Do you think that the people here covered everything and it was impossible to suffered more than those in other cities in Ger• keep any tiling clean. There was always so many ? much work to do. Life was no longer beau• • i . tiful. . Many other cities such as Essen have had 114 as much to bear as Duisburg. They also were Question 29. Why were you absent? under continual attacks from the beginning. I had three weeks vacation. Another time Many other cities did not have any attacks I was sick for 3 weeks. Then I missed about at first and were bombed seriously only in 7 or 8 days altogether because I stayed at the last year of the war. In Duisburg the ' home after the bombing attacks. attacks were continual. We often said, why don't they go" somewhere else and leave us Question 80. How much free time did you take alone. on your own? None. Question 24- Did the newspapei-s and the radio correctly describe the general state of mind in Question 31. Did you ever have to use any the city after each air raid? . (If no, then): Give kind of subterfuge in order to get some free time? me an example. No. I had a good overseer who let me stay No. They said that the people were not away from work when it was necessary. much affected, as if we lived in Berlin, which Question 32. (If subterfuge used) How many wasn't attacked much at first. The people free days did you get by such subterfuge? couldn't say much about how they felt, but in the bunkers they cried out against the Not asked. Party leader's. Question S3. How does it happen that you didn't take more, free time for yourself? Question 25. In what way was your normal way of life most upset by the air raids? I am not accustomed to stay away from work. I tliink it is one's duty to work. Also I got no sleep or rest and had to wear it was forbidden, and furthermore I needed my clothes day and night. Half of the time the money. I spent in the cellar or bunker. Question 34. Did you ever.want to? Question 26. How were your family relation• ships affected by the raids? No. I took only the time that was nec• essary. My sister and I live with our parents. Our husbands are in the Army and each of us Question 35. In your opinion, how well was had small babies. We were very crowded and • your home town protected against air raids? sometimes we became much irritated with At the beginning, Duisburg was well pro• each other. My sister and I came to Detmold tected by flak but not at the last. Much of at the last of October in 1944. We have lived the flak was sent to the front. There were here in one room and it is very crowded. finally some good bunkers in Duisburg itself, but the bunkers in Alsum, the suburb in Question 27. Was your work affected in any which I lived, were not strongly built. We way by the air raids? went to the cellar of the Thyssen Works I had a small child. It was very difficult when we could. to keep it clean and to give it the proper food. The milk soured in the bunker and Question 36. Was everytliing possible done? my child was often sick. I don't know. I think that there was too great a lack of men and materials to do Question 28. How many work days were you more. At the last, the flak was manned by absent from your work in 1944? old men and boys. The younger- men were I worked in the kitchen at the Thyssen all at the front. ' Works until the last of May 1944. Then I stopped because I was going to have a baby. Question 37. (If dissatisfaction expressed) "Dp to that time I had missed about 6 weeks "Who was to blame for it? of work. I do not think anyone was to blame. It

115 was due to lack of men and material. didn't come to any such decision because it wasn't possible. Often enough I was tired - Question 38. How good were the special meas• out with the war. ures and welfare services after the raids? After the early attacks the measures un• Question 44- What did you think at that time of unconditional surrender? dertaken to aid those who were damaged or ' bombed out were very good. We received I did not know how peace could be made extra rations of meat, coffee, candy for the and did not hear about unconditional sur• children, cigarettes and whiskey for the men. render during the war. Later there was much less, and finally noth• ing at all. The NSV always provided food. Question 45. What, in your opinion, was the It was very good but there was not so much chief cause of the war? of it at the last. It was said that we needed colonies and more land. There was the question of the Question 39. Was everything possible done?, Polish corridor and the mistreatment of Ger• I don't know. We assumed that every tiling mans there. I haven't thought much about was done that could be done and that there the fundamental cause of the war. I suppose was not enough supplies to do more. Since that the big people such as Hitler wanted the end of the war we have found out there more power. were great supplies of whiskey and wine that have been plundered. "We now know that Question 51. Did you leave Duisburg volun• many people lived well while the people tarily or were you forced to go away? Please didn't have enough. explain further. I came to Detmold voluntarily because I Question 40. (If dissatisfaction expressed) coidd not keep my child longer in Duisburg. Who was to blame for it? I do not know whether people in Duisburg Those who let the war go on. Our Party - were forced to leave later or not. leadens. They should have brought the war to a close. The Party leadei's looked out for Question 52. Were official arrangements made themselves first of all. for your trip and living facilities, or did you have to arrange them yourself? Question Jfl. Bid the-people here in Detmold help each other after the raids, or did they help We could have obtained the money for our themselves? traveling expenses, but it was so much tro- ble to make the application that we came The people were very much depressed but with onr own funds. We came at first to they did help each other as much as they relatives here, but had to.find other quarters could. since it was .too crowded. My sister came with me and we both have small children. Question J$. Did your opinions on the war The NSV and the Wolmungsamt here would change when the air raids didn't stop? not help us because the people from Duis• Yes, I was sure that the war would be burg were supposed to go" elsewhere when lost. We could not hold out against the at• evacuated. The people who were assigned ' tacks. here are from Gelsenkirchen, Aachen, etc. Since we were officially supposed to be else• Question J^S. Did you ever come to a point be• where, we could not receive- help here al• cause of the air raids where you simply didn't though there were vacant rooms. Finally a want to go on with the war? good woman who had a vacant room took We had to go ahead whether we wanted us in. She wasn't allowed to put us in that to do so or not. We couldn't simply say room, however, but had to keep it vacant that we would not carry on any more. I and let us have another room. Question 53. Did your whole family that lived Good. I have had no trouble with the oc• with you, go with you. or did some of your cupation government or the troops. My family stay behind? bicycle is gone; it was stolen by Poles. I tried to enlist the help of some English sol• Our parents with whom we had been liv• diers and have the impression that they ing remained in Duisburg. My father had to work and also we had chickens and other would have helped me except for the inabil• things to be taken care of at home. ity to understand me. By the time I made it- clear to them what I wanted them to do, the Question 54. (If some stayed behind) Who? Poles were gone. Why? Question 2. Is it better or worse than you had See question 53. expected?

Question 55. (If some stayed behind) Were It is better. you .able to keep in touch regularly with the members of your family that were left behind? Question 3. What did you really expect?

Yes, through the mail. My mother came I and all of us could only believe what here in March 1945. we were told in the newspapers, etc. I be• lieved that all men up to the age of 65 would Question 56. In the main, how were you housed be taken away to work elsewhere. I believed in the place to which you went? that we who remained behind would have to do hard manual labor in a slave status, break• See question 52. Five people live in the ing up stones, removing rubble and so on. one room which we have. My mother, my I feared we would be moved about arbitrarily sister and I and our two babies. We cook froin one city to another. I feared we would in this room and would have to carry water. not get enough food to support life. I feared It is much- too crowded. rape and general violence and disorder. Also I feared severe limitations on civilian move• Question 57. Could you explain to me a few ments. I expected to be allowed out of doors' words how you reacted to the evacuation? only 2 or 3 hours a day. On the other hand, I expected freedom from air raids; that was The woman with whom we live has been a partial consolation. very kind to us but the people in Detmold generally are unfriendly. They are not like the people in the Rhineland, but are so re• Question 4- How do you think you and your served and mean. We would like to return family will fare in the next 3 or 4 years? to the Rhineland. If things stay as they are or rather if the ~ same tendencies go on, it will not he so bad. Interview No. 61260, Schedule B We are getting enough to eat; in fact, I am The respondent, a 21-year-old girl, was inter• surprised that there were still so many things viewed June 25, 1945, in Bremen, where she had on hand. Already I notice an improvement. lived during the war. She had worked as a If a thing is repaired -now, e. g. a bridge, stenographer in the Focke-Wulf Munitions you know it will stay repaired and not be Plant. She was a Protestant and claimed not to .wrecked again by an air raid, as one for• have been a Party member. There were no cas• merly expected. One sees nibble being ualties from raids in the immediate family, cleared, streetcars being run again, etc. though their home had been damaged by bombs. Bombing also resulted in severe deprivation of Question 5. How do you think you and your commodities other than food, of water, and of family would have fared in the next 3 or 4 years, heat. if Germany had in the end won the war?

Question 1. How is it going with you now It would have been better. I worked for under the occupation? the Focke-Wulf and so am out of work now,.

117 of course. My father would be back at work I did not concern myself with politics, ex• again also. Reconstruction would have cept that I had absolute confidence in the created jobs for all. Fuehrer and the whole political leadership. Only with regard to the military leadership Question 6. What do you think will happen to did I have misgivings. " prices in the next few years? I have heard from a friend in the police Question IS. How did you think about this force that the prices will be held steady and shortly after the beginning of the war? I believe that. I was then completely enthusiastic about the entire leadership. Question 7. If Germany had won the war, what do you'think would have happened to prices ? Question 14- (If changed) Why did you change I don't know but it was generally believed your opinion about it? that the rationing system would be kept up For the reason mentioned in (11). for a few years and controls relaxed only gradually when they were no longer nec• Question IS. During the war,,did you believe essary. that your war leaders wanted what was best for you or not? Question 8. What, in your opinion, is the Yes. For the simple reason that they were chief reason that Germany lost the war? men from the ranks of the common people. Because in Germany everything was wrecked by air raids, whereas in Britain and Question 16. How well handled were the prob• America the plants went steadily on, xn-oduc- lems wliicli the war caused here at home? ing weapons, etc. At last it was not so good. For instance, in the early part of the war, alarms came Question 9. What first, brought you to the be• well ahead of attacks; one had an hour or lief that Germany would lose the war? more to get to the shelter. But later oh the The fact that the enemy advanced farther alarms came at the same time as the fliers and farther in the West. About October 1944, themselves or only a couple of minutes I realized definitely "that we would lose. sooner. The air-raid shelters were too few and too small. The one which we used where Question 10. As the war continued, what other I live was intended for 800 people and was influences strengthened your belief that Germany actually used by 3,000 or 4,000. In there we would lose the war? were so crowded and hot that one after the other vomited and the air became all the The fact that we no longer had any de• worse on that account. We just took oil fense against air raids. Also the big of• clothes without shame because of the unbear• fensive against us on two fronts, West and able heat. Most of the time I did not use the East, in February. public shelter anyhow. In the confusion of of the last part of the war, new regulations Question 11. Was your war leadersliip as good kept coming out only to be supplanted by as you had expected? new ones in a few days. During the first part of the war, yes; then I and everyone else was completely en• Question 17. Do you think that you, personally, thusiastic for the war and our leaders. Later m got along worse during the war than other people ? I found it strange and disquieting that so many top-ranking officers who had per• I fared better. My house is still standing formed such excellent service were demoted , and I was able to remain in Bremen. The one after the other. Focke-Wulf company formed many new branches to decentralize the enterprise and Question IS. Is that your opinion for both the make it less liable to damage by air raids and military and the political leadersliip? for a time I feared that I, like many others,

118 would be moved to a branch elsewhere. How• on all fronts. I felt that any reasonable per• ever, I was able to avoid that. son must see that the situation was hopeless.

Questiqn 18. How did the people of your cir• Question 84. What brought you to this point? cumstances get along in comparison with other See question 23. people? The wealthy and those belonging actively Question 25. What did you think at that time to tho Nazi party were able to find new homes of unconditional surrender? more quickly and so on. They had a prefer• I thought, if the Fuehrer sees that it is ential position. hopeless then he will accept this demand and ' sign unconditional surrender. And then I Question 19. At the beginning of the war; did always reflected: Or does he have a new wea• you expect that your life would be completely up• pon which will turn the tide of the war? set or did you think that you yourself would not be affected byt the war? Question 26. How many work days were you absent from your work in 1944? , I thought that I would not be affected by the war, for at that time there were hot yet .Thirty days ill. Six days vacation. Five'days any air raids; all of the stores, etc., were allowed to take part in the repair of my open. I and the rest of us expected things house after air raids. to remain thus. Question 27. Why were you absent? Question SO. What was it that was hardest for See question 26. the German civilian population during the war? The air raids; all other hardships revolved Question 28. How much free time did you take on your own? around them. Also the many deaths in fami• lies caused by some sons, etc., falling at the I didn't dare. front. Question 89. Did you ever have to use any kind Question SI. During the last year did you re• of subterfuge in order to get some free time? flect much on the state of the war, or didn't you Yes. have time for that? Yes. I was worried by the approach of the Question SO. (If subterfuge used) How many Russians. The propaganda made the atroci• free days did you get by such subterfuge? ties of the Russians very vivid. Not whole days, just a few hours now and then. The only excuse that did any good was Question SS. (If reflected) What did you think that I wanted to see a doctor. about ? I had a long working day (sometimes 15 Question SI. How does it happen that you hours) and lost much sleep because of air didn't take more free time for yourself ? raids at night, so that I did not have a great Because such a strict control was exercised. deal of time to think about anything. But One time I stayed home from work because I my thoughts were about the war exclusively. was actually ill. The company sent a person I thought first and foremost about my own to check and they were not satisfied until family, only then about more general impli• they forced me to get up and go to a doctor cations of the war situation. to have my story verified.

Question S3. Did you at any time during the Question 32. Did you ever want to? war come to a point where you simply did not want to go on with the war ? Yes.

Yes, I was tired of the war around the Question S3. What were your experiences with beginning of 1941 in the face of the reverses air raids?

119 My experiences cn the 6th of October 1944, ing him to make another exception in my were a good example. An alarm came at favor.' Then I went back home with my moth• 7 p. m. I was at home. I stayed at home er, for wliom I had also brought additional usually because I did not want to be sitting wet cloths. When we got home a new wave of in the public shelter while my house was bombers passed overhead, but we went ahead possibly burning. My mother and sisters with our Hre fighting. My mother found and went to the shelter. I stayed upstairs because extinguished some incendiary bombs that I our house has no cellar. The first wave of had missed, or rather we both extinguished airplanes passed overhead and nothing hap^ them. ''•The.windows were blown open by the pened. My hope grew that this time nothing pressure from the demolition bombs wliich would happen. had struck earlier, and showei-s of sparks Then a second wave came. I knew by the from the surrounding flames had set fire to the curtains and rug. I tore down .the cur• sound that it dropped incendiary bombs, al• tains and threw them out the window. My though none landed in our neighborhood. I mother ran and fetched water from the bath• also knew that after incendiary bombs, demo• tub which we always kept handy and with lition bombs were dropped. Therefore I ran that she put out the fire in the rug. After we to join 1113' family in the air-raid shelter. All had things under control, my mother went the people scolded me and said that yf I back to the bunker and I stayed home as long again came so late they would not- let me as I could stand it, but the air was so hot from in at all. While I was in the shelter, a third all the flames everywhere that I got dizzy and wave of planes came over and by the noise got a headache, so that I went to the bunker I knew that there were nearby hits. Some where the air was better. And so I went, back fell on the shelter itself. A great deal of and forth between the bunker and niy house panic arose in the shelter when that hap• all night, long like a pendulum. In our street pened. Downstairs I could hear that our air• one house after the other burned. The fire raid fighters were called up, so I knew that fighters were not to be seen. Fire engines our neighborhood had been hit. I insisted were there from all cities around Bremen. on going out with them and finally succeeded They stood around idly for a long time, say• although I had an exchange of words with the ing they could not couple the hose to the official at the gate, who was unwilling to let hydrant without any order to that effect. In me leave, being a woman. Outside all was a time, however, they got such an order, no sea of Humes. The house next door to ours doubt because they helped put out the fire in was in flames. Your couldn't see that there in the house on the other side of mine. I, too, were any flames in our house because of the helped, of course, and also kept pouring water air-raid curtains. It was difficult to get to my on the walls of my house, which were very house because of the air raid and across the hot, so as to keep the flames from spreading. way a house had had a direct hit and was . I worked in this way all night at one thing blocking the entrance somewhat. I got in• or another. In the morning I worked to mop side and ran upstairs. As I got in, a wave of up the water damage to our house, when I smoke met me. Several incendiary bombs had was interrupted at 10 o'clock by an alarm. penetrated the attic. I threw sand on them There was no raid on this occasion, however. and extinguished them. Also a bed had caught fire. I threw it out of the window. I had to Question 34- During the war did you expect go downstail's then because it was difficult that you in this immediate vicinity would be to breathe up there. Downstairs I got a wet exposed to air raids, or did you think that you cloth to hold on my nose; luckily the water would be spared? was running. I ran back to the shelter to get No, we did not expect air raids because my mother because I could not handle the during the first months of the war no such whole situation alone. Again I had difficulty thing happened. We thought the Govern• with the official at the gate. He said, "Either ment was simply erring on the side of caution in or out!" Nevertheless, I succeeded in caus• in stressing air-raid precautions so nmch.

120 Question So. Did the news of air-raid damage Question 63. Were you able to keep in (ouch in other cities strengthen or weaken your will to regularly with the members oE your family? see the war through? Yes: By mail. Neither of the two. Question 64- In the main, how were they housed " Questw?i 36. Did you blame the Allies for the in the place to which they went? air raids? They were at the home of relatives, so that And how! they were well housed and looked after. They are t wo sisters, aged 7 and 9 at the time. This Question 37. In your opinion, what did the Al• whole thing lasted only half a year, then they lies want to accomplish with these raids? came back because they were homesick. They wanted to terrorize the people. Later it seemed they did more tactical (sic) bomb• Question 65. Could you explain to me in a few ing, but at first they always hit hi residential words how your family reacted to the evacuation? sections, never factories, etc. See question 04. Question, 38. During the war were you uneasy that the German armament industry would be V. Sampling Method and Procedure critically damaged by the air raids, or did you think that the armament industry was safe? Area Covered I was afraid that'the war industries would The cross-sectional study in Germany covered be critically hit, that part of the country lying to the west of the western boundttries of Mecklenburg. Provinz Question SO. What did you think of the V- Sachsen, and Thiiringen. The area corresponds weapons when they were first used? closely with that un'der occupation by the Ameri• • I did not think much of them. I was far can, British, and French troops. too weary of the war to see any ray of hope In 1939 the population of the areas was 40.4 in them. millions, as compared with the total German popu• lation of G9.8 millions. Accurate current esti• Question J/0. Did you ever listen to Allied mates of the population .of the sample areas are broadcasts? not available; An estimate made by the Combined Yes. Working Party as of January 1945, gave 34 mil• lions for the German civilian population in the Question 41- When did you first begin to listen? sample area. Most of the decrease from 40.4 Through 1944 and 1945. millions was accounted forTry men serving in the Wehrinacht, and by war casualties: hi addition,- Question 4%- What programs did -you listen to? a decrease of 2!2 millions was attributed to evacua• New York : Hier spricht New York! (with tion to more easterly areas. drum signal) From France, after Allies ar• Within the sample area, the sample was re• rived there: Soldatensender west. stricted to German civilians between the ages of 16 and 70. The lower limit was chosen because Question 01. Did your family leave Bremen preliminary interviews in Krefeld and Darmstadt' voluntarily, or were they forced (o go away? had shown that persons under 16 were usually not Please explain. sufficiently mature to provide informative answers My sisters had to leave compulsorily be• to the questions in the schedule. The exclusion of cause their school was moved out of Bremen. persons over 70 was made mainly for .practical reasons: in the large cities where transportation Question GS. Were official arrangements made facilities were seriously damaged by bombing, the for the trip and living facilities, or did you have respondents frequently had to walk considerable to arrange them yourself? distances to the place of interview. Men who We did it ourselves. had been in the Wehrmacht during the period of intensive bombing were excluded. The only addi• tive raids. Data on RAF raids previous to 1942 tional exclusion was that of" a group of Germans were incomplete: the omissions, however, are con• who were evacuated from eastern to western Ger• sidered unimportant because raids in that period many early in 1945 because of the advance of the were small by later standards. Russian armies. Since this group had obtained From these data certain attributes of the bomb• almost all of its bombing experience in eastern ing experience were summarized for each town in Germany, it was not considered comparable with the sample area. These included the total H. E. the rest of the civilian population in the sample and I. B. tonnages dropped on the town, the total area. tonnage dropped in day and night raids, and the total tonnages dropped in "area" and "precision" Analysis of Bombing Data raids. A night raid was defined as one occurring PfeUminary to the selection of the sample between 1900 hours and 0700 hours. An area raid towns, chronological data were assembled on stra• was.taken as one where the target was the town tegic raids by the Sth and 15th Air Forces and or the town center; raids with any other target the RAF, and on tactical raids by the 2nd, 9th, designation were considered precision raids. Some 12th, SHAEF and ADGE Air Forces. For each study was made of the time pattern of air attacks raid the data gives the target attacked, the number so as to classify the experience of the target and types of planes, the number and weight of towns as regards "early" versus "late" raids, and eacli type of high explosive or incendiary bomb, "continuous" versus "sporadic" raids. Finally, and the time at which the planes were over the' frequency distributions of the raids were made target. according to total tonnage dropped. From these distributions the towns could be classified as hav• The official records and reports were carefully ing received mainly heavy raids or having re• checked against one another to obtain accurate ceived mainly light raids. The classifications data for the sample towns. For example, for the described here were used subsequently in the selec• Sth AF the Statistical Summary of Operations tion of the sample towns and in the analysis of (Daily) was consulted for primary figures since the interviews. Data were also available on straf• this record gives detailed information on target, ing raids and on German flak and fighter opposi• number of planes and bomb tonnage. These fig• tion; lack of time did not permit summary of ures were then compared with the Mission Expen• such data. diture Report (Bombers), a daily record of type, weight and number of bombs expended. Finally, General Principles Used in the the figures were corrected by a study of the Selection of Sample Towns Monthly Summary of Operations, a consolidated report which is more accurate but less detailed The first step was to classify the towns in the than the daily records. The Monthly Summary sample area. Ideally, the aim is to place in the permitted the following types of corrections: (1) same group towns which had similar bombing deduction of tonnage clue to loss of planes before experience and which are similar to their eco• the target was reached and (2) allocation of ton• nomic, political and cultural characteristics. If the classification is highly successful, the effects nage to secondary targets. In a similar manner of bombing on the people in a specified town tonnage figures for the RAF were arrived at after should be-the same as the effects on the people in studying the following records: Bomber Com• the group. Thus, it would be necessary to inter• mand: Summary of Operations (Day and Night J: view people from only a single town in the group. War Room Monthly Summary of Bomber Com• This town, the "sample town," represents the mand Operations and t\\z interceptions/Tactics whole group. After the selection of a sample Report. town for each group, the next step is to allocate From the beginning of 1942 till VE day the the number of people in the group which the town data are complete and, it is hoped, free from represents. This allocation provides a truly rep• major errors, though absolute accuracy is difficult resentative sample, since each experience group is to achieve because of the different sources and represented in the sample to the same extent as different types of reporting, and because of abor• in the population. 122 In the application of this procedure to the clude soldiers. Strictly speaking, only people present case, there are several complicating fac• between the ages of 10 and 70 should have been tors. First, the questions in the schedules deal included. However, the use of totals for all ages with many different.aspects of bombing experi• was considered sufficient for the purpose. ence. With some questions the response may. depend on the relative amounts of day and night TABLE A.—Broad classification of German towns by total bombing which the respondent had undergone; tonnage with others, on the relative amounts of high ex• plosive and incendiary bombs, on the total weight Tonnage Number 1030 itna Provisional population population number of of bombs, or in the amount of destruction in the group of towns (millions) (millions) sample towns town. It was not possible to find different towns Over 20,000 16 0.0 4.0 10 which were similar in all aspects of their bombing 10,00O-20, 000 11 1,7 1.1 3 experience. Therefore, after examination of the 5,000-10,0000 IB XI 1.0 4 1,000-6,000 53 2.8 2.1 4, questions in the schedule, some choice had to be 100-1,000 54 1.5 1.4 3 made of the most important characteristics of the Subtotal. „ 162 17.1 11.0 24 bombing as a basis of classification. Secondly, at 23.4 23.0 10 the time when the sample was constructed, there QrsiKl total 40.5 34.0 34 were no accurate figures for the current popula• tions of the different groups. Consequently, rough estimates were used; insofar as these were in error, For example, 15 towns in the sample area each certain groups will be over-represented and others received more than 20,000 United States tons of under-represented. Finally, since only a small bombs in raids during the war. The total popu• number of people could be interviewed in a town, lation of this class in 1939 was nine millions and it was necessary to consider the problem of ob• was estimated crudely as five millions in June taining a representative sample of the people in 1945. The 1939 populations were obtained from each selected town. the German' population census (Statistic des It seemed clear that the, first criterion to be Deutchen Reiches, Band 500, Berlin 1941) of that used in classification should be some index of the year. For the 1945 figures, two sources were help• severity of the bombing. No single index appeared ful : the ReicJisgesundheitsblatt, which gives pop• wholly satisfactory. Total weight of bombs ulation for cities over 100,000 up to the fall of was inadequate in comparing large • and' small 1944; and estimates of German migration made towns wliile weight per unit area tended by the-Combined Working Party. to over-estimate the seventy of • bombing It will_ be noted from the subtotals that 152 on small compact towns. The destruction, as towns each received more than 100 tons, their measured by the' percentage of buildings de• total 1939 population being 17.1 millions, or 42 stroyed, might have been, the beat index, though percent of the total for the whole area. Due to it did not take account of effects which depend evacuation from bombed to unbombed areas, this on the number of raids. Further, the data ob• percentage was estimated to have declined to tainable from photo reconnaissance on the per• roughly 33 percent hi 1945, (i.e., 11 millions out centage of destruction applied mainly to 1944 and of 34 millions). were considered unreliable for the present purpose in view of the extremely heavy raids on many It was proposed to distribute the number of towns in 1945. After examination of these and interviews in the various tonnage classes in pro• other measures of severity, it was decided to clas• portion to their 1945 estimated populations. At sify first on the basis of total tonnage, and to this stage the number of sample towns was fixed avoid as far as possible placing large and small provisionally as 4 per team, giving 32 for the towns in the same group. whole German area. This decision, which allowed for an average of slightly over 100 interviews per The following classification of towns awording town, was made arbitrarily. The use of more to total tonnage was used in the early stages of towns would have given a more detailed coverage the selection of sample towns. The 1945 figures of the various types of bombing, but would have .refer to the civilian population; that is, they ex• increased the time spent in travel and administra- 123 t-ion, with a resultant decrease in the total number tions and of the fact that some teams would re• of interviews. The final number of towns was ac• turn more schedules than others, this restriction tually 34, 2 of the teams covering 5 towns each. was not applied rigorously. It has been pointed out in table A that at the In order of their 1939 populations, the 15 towns time of the interviews about two-thirds of the with the largest tomiages are as follows: Ham• people in the sample area were estimated to be burg, Munich, Cologne, Essen, Frankfort, Duessel- living in communities which had not been bombed dorf, Dortmund, Hannover, Stuttgart, Duisburg, or had received only a few bombs. Some coverage Nm*emberg, Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, Bremen, was required both as a control on the responses Gelsenkirchen, and Kiel. Since 10 sample towns of people in bombed towns and for the sampling of were to be chosen from this group, the towns had to evacuees from the bombed towns. Consequently, be arranged in 10 groups. Hamburg justified im- 10 of the 34 sample towns were selected from the mediate selection since its present population was .unbombed or very, lightly bombed towns. The known to be about one million, or more than twice remaining 24 towns were then allocated to the the size (460,000) required for a group. For this different tonnage classes'roughly in proportion to reason Hamburg was placed in a group by itself the estimated number of people in each group in and 20 interviewing days were assigned to its in• June 1945, as shown in the right hand column of stead of the usual 12. Munich, with a present population of 450,000, was also large enough to table A. Since 24 towns were allotted to cover 11 form a group by itself. These selections left 8 million people, the sampling rate was about one towns to be taken from the remaining 13, none of town per 400,000 people. Thus the 15 towns with which were estimated to have a 1945 population 'tonnages over 20,000, having a 1945 population of as large as 460,000. It was considered inadvisable 4.9 millions, should be represented by between 10 to sample both Bremen and Kiel, since both are and 11 towns; actually 10 were selected. Simi• northern port towns with almost the same total larly, three of the 11 towns with tonnages between tonnage and were raided at frequent intervals 10,000 and 20.000 were chosen, and so oh. - since early. 1942. Consequently, a group was formed from these two towns, Bremen, being Details of the Method of Classification chosen to-represent the group. Similarly-the-reae- The previous analysis provides a rough alloca• tions of the people in the five highly industrial Ruhr towns were expected to differ little, espe• tion of the 34 sample towns as between heavily cially since the towns are so close together that bombed, lightly bombed and unbombed towns. each experienced some features of raids on the The next stage was to prepare a more detailed others. Thus Essen and Duisberg were placed subdivision of the sample area into 34 groups, together in a group representing the most severely each group to be represented by one sample town, raided of the Ruhr towns, while Dortmund, Dues- which was to furnish a. number of interviews pro• seldorf and Gelsenkirchen with . smaller total portional to the estimated 1945 population of the weights comprised a second Ruhr group. Essen corresponding group. However, it was desirable and Dortmund respectively were chosen as the to have about the same number of interviews in sample towns. most of the sample towns," as one of the main pur• poses of the cross-sectional study was to investi• Five townsto'be selected from those remaining: gate the relation between the morale of the people Hannover, Cologne, Frankfort, Mannheim-Lud- in the sample towns and the bombing experiences wigsliafeu. Stuttgart, and Nuremberg. Of these of these towns. It is known from" statistical theory the two which could best be paired were Frankfort that analyses of this type can be carried out most and Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, both of which ex• efficiently and conveniently with an equal number perienced a steadily increasing severity of raids of interviews per town. It was necessary when from 1942 to early 1945 and both were located in classifying the towns to attempt to make the the same region. Frankfort-on-Main is-the sample groups of approximately the same total popula• town for the group. The four remaining towns, tion, so that the number of interviews from a Hannover, Cologne, Stuttgart and Nuremberg, group remained proportional to the number of were each placed in a sej>arate group. The group• people in the group, as specified above. In view of ings and the total bomb weights are shown in the roughness of the estimates of 1945 popula• table B. 124 The 11 towns with total tonnages between 10.- At the level o'f around 4,000 tons, three groups 000 and 20.000 are as follows: were formed. The first contained the larger towns west of the Rhine. Aachen. Krefeld, TABLE It Muenchen-Ghidbach (the sample town) and Toicn: . Tons NeusSj which were attacked mainly at night. To Kassel 311,000 these were added some of the smaller towns in Braunschweig 38,000 the same area, such as Cleve and Dueren, which Koblenz 14,000 had smaller tonnages but heavy destruction. A Muenster 33.000 second group consists of some smaller Ruhr Snnrbmecken _ 32,000 towns, mainly day raided and represented by Bot• Wiihelmsliuveii -. 12,000 trop. A more southerly group, rather widespread, Karlsruhe • 12,000 and subject to day raids late in the war, was rep• Mainz '•• 11,000 resented by Bonn. Only two further groups re• Hamin 13,000 Bochum ,- '• 11,000 ceived average weights exceeding 1,000 tons: one' Osnabrueck 30,000 contains mainly southern towns with n few late heavy raids and an average of 2,200 tons; the Tn this group Bochum is anamalous. Consider• other contains the remaining Ruhr towns. Frei• ably larger than the other towns and more highly burg and Witten were chosen as the correspond• industrialized. Bochum experienced almost all of ing sample towns. its attacks at night, whereas the other towns ex• With a few exceptions the rest of the bombed perienced mainly day raids. For these reasons towns are'small and were bombed late in the war. it. was decided to classify Bochum with a later One group was formed from the principal excep• group of Ruhr towns. Three groups were formed tions: Flensburg, Luebeck, Oldenburg, and Rem- from the remaining 10 towns. The first group scheid, all of which received their heaviest raids comprised Kassel and Braunschweig, which are early in the war. The other towns were divided the two largest towns and had the highest ton• into three groups on the basis of their geograpliic nages. The bombing experiences of the remaining locations. Neumuenster was selected to represent eight towns were generally similar. However, the the northern group, Wetzlar the central group, northern group, Muenster. Wilhelmshaven, Hamm and Kempten the southern group. and Osnabrueck, underwent a slightly longer period of bombing and more area-bombing than The unbombed and very lightly bombed towns the southern group. Consequently, one group was were classified by location and population. Very formed from the four northern towns and one few of these towns had populations over 50,000. from the more southerly towns. To the northern Heidelberg was the largest, having a population group the small poit of Emden was added, since of about 80,000. Five groups were formed from its temporal pattern of bombing was similar to the towns with more than 20,000. Hetmold was that of Wilhelmshaven, though on a smaller scale. chosen from the north, Ludenscheid for the cen• One town was then chosen at random from each tral area, Speyer for the south Rhine and Pala• group. Kassel. Muenster, and Karlsruhe, respec• tinate, Tuebingen for Baden, and Wuerttenberg tively, were drawn. and Erlangen for Bayern. A similar geographic coverage was planned for towns with populations Below 10.000 tons the towns are smaller, and below 20.000. It proved, however, impractical to larger numbel's of towns had to be used in con• coordinate this complete plan with the work structing a group. The most heavily raided towns schedules for the southern teams, with the result in this class fell fairly naturally into two groups. that the small towns in the south are not repre• The first was a group of Ruhr towns: Bochum, sented. North and central Germany are repre• Oberhausen-Sterkrade, Solingen, and Wuppertal. sented by Echernfoerde (a small port 20 miles They received an average of 7,000 tons delivered north of Kiel), Bissendorf nnd Rietze (two farm• almost entirely in sporadic heavy night raids ex• ing villages in the.Hannover region), Kettwig (a tending back to 1013. The second is a group of country town in the Ruhr) and Muenden (10 miles nine southern towns with an average of 6,000 from Kassel). tons (dropped mostly'by day late in the war). Wuppertal and TJhn, respectively, were chosen To summarize, bomb tonnage and to some ex• for these groups. tent population were used as the primary charac- teristics for classification. Secondary character• ever, to retain approximately correct proportions istics were the time pattern (i.e. early versus late as between heavily and lightly bombed towns. attacks), geographical location and day and night For instance, of "The large Ruhr-Rhine towns, bombing. Cologne has a population below the group aver• age of 460,000, the -Essen-Duisburg group is Witliin the groups the sample towns were se• slightly too large, while the Dortmund-Duessel- lected in most cases at random, with probabilities proportional to the estimated populations of the dorf-Gelsenkirchen group is much larger. For towns in each group. The reason for this assign• the six towns as a whole, however, a sample repre• ment of probabilities was to give every person sentation of three towns is about right. Similarly, 1 in the British, American, and French areas of the less heavily raided Ruhr towns (the Wupper Germany an equal chance of being interviewed. tal, Bottrop, and Witten groups) also merit three For instance, suppose that a group to be sampled sample towns, although the Wuppertal group is contains two towns, A with a population of 70,000 somewhat under-represented. In the more lightly and B with a population of 30,000, and that 100 bombed groups, part of the variations in size were interviews are to be taken in wliichever town is due to revisions, in the classification made because chosen. Since there are 100,000 people in the of bombing data received too late for the original group, the probability that any person in the classification. groups will be interviewed ought to be 100/100,000 or 1 in 1,000. Now the probability that a specified Selection of People wttbin Towns person in town A will be chosen is the probability that town A is chosen, multiplied by the proba• A host of factors could be named which might bility that any one person in A will be selected influence an individual's reaction to bombing. if that town is in the sample. The latter proba• Party membership, age, sex, economic status, and bility is 100/70,000 or 1 in 700, since 100 inter• religion were considered among the most impor• views are to be taken in the town A where there tant. It was desirable to make the sample of are 70,000 people. Hence the first probability, people to be interviewed as representative as i. e., that town A will be chosen, must be taken possible of these factors in the composition of a as 7/10 in order that the product, (7/10 x town. This can be accomplished in two ways. The 1/700), shall equal to 1 in 1,000. Similarly, most accurate is to obtain data on the number of the probability that .the smaller town is chosen people in the town having each of the possible must be taken as 3/10. It will be noted that the combinations of the selected factors. The sample two figures, 7/10 and 3/10, are proportional to can then be selected so that the number of people the populations of the two. towns. Had equal in the sample having a given combination is pro• probabilities been assigned, people in the smaller portional to the corresponding number in- the town would have had a better chance of coming whole town. If this method is not practicable, into the sample than people in the larger town. the best procedure is to draw the sample so that every person in the town has an equal chance of Substitutions were made for two original selec• inclusion. In this case the .sample proportions tions, Bamberg "and Friechrichsthal, because ex• of the various combinations will not be correct for cessive travel would ha ve been required to sample an individual town, owing to chance fluctuations, these towns. Three selections in the unbombed but for a group of towns the fluctuations tend to towns, Arnsberg, Ludwigsburg and Landau, were cancel and no consistent biases are introduced. also rejected because information which arrived In drawing the samples an attempt was made after the selection showed that these towns had to control the proportions on age and sex, as been bombed. Another town .in this group. described below. Control on Party membership Speyer, received 300 tons, but was retained be• was not feasible at the time when the samples cause the town was not heavily damaged. Thifc were drawn because few membership lists were type of difficulty was anticipated because of th<> available. Control on religion could not be used time-lag in the summarization of the bomb data. for similar reasons. Occupational data were avail• It will be noted in table C that there are sub• able by individuals which would have permitted stantial variations in the estimated 1945 popula• some control on economic status. However, insuf• tions of the groups. An attempt was made, how• ficient time was available to make estimates of the

126 XABLB C.—Classification of German toimis into bombing- experience groups i 1946 Bomb 1945 Bomb 1930 group ton- 1939 group ton• nago nage (000) 1946 Bomb 1945 Bomb (?00) $») 5fl0) (000) 1039 group ton• 1939 group ton• pop. nage pop. nage WO) (000) WO) (000) Clausthal- Rliuydt... 1.3 Zellorfold 0.3 Schwane. 0.0 CuxbavBn 0.5 Trolsdorf. Hamburg Aachen 184 7.3 0.7 711 1,000 41.3 Diepboli 0.0 Unna Clevc.— 22 3.6 0.4, Goeltingcn , 0.3 Vlcr»HL._ 0.6 Munich S23 450 28.3 Dulmen 10 2.2 Guelersloh 0.4 Wcri 0.3 Stuttgart 468 360 27.2 Dueren 46 1.7 lleide 0.8 WeUlar.. Hannover 471 280 24.7 Emmerich 18 2.4 Hlldesheim 1.6 o.s Cologne 772 150 47. Z\ Juelloh 11 2.5 Lebrte 0.3 400 Nuremberg 806 250 22.2 Krefold 171 8.4 Lingen 0.2 o.e Leverfcusen..- 60 3.7 (Fuertli) Lippstadt 1.2 Ansbach Mueneben- 0.3 Minden 1.7 Bad Kremnadh. 0.8 Bremen 27.3 Oladboch— 128 7.7 Neum uena t or_ . . 2.1 Bayreuth 0.8 Kiel Neuss 03 7.4 28.2' Nienburg 0.0 Fried borg 16 0.4 Rueaselaheim. 3 2 0.2 ( Stade Oerroershelin 0.2 897 20.8 Weael 24 5.8 vechta 0.7 Oiuuciiri 0.5 Zwischunahn 0.0 Kempten 0.6 F rank fort -ou- 720 460 4.4 Kitzlngen 1.0 Main 29.5 407 400 0.8 Landau 0.6 Mannheim 1 Bottrop 33 4.6 34. 8 Mcratuingen 0.0 Ludwigshafaii / Castrop-Hauxel. 86 19 Ahlcn 0.2 Neckanrulm.. o.s Hagen - 152 6.0 1 Amsborg 1.0 Netimarkc 0.4 32.0 Horn berg 23 8.0 1,063 650 Bilburg 0.8 Nountircben 1.6 Kamen 13 4.1 Betxdorf 0.5 OlTenburg 1.1 Duisburg. 33.£>, Muelheim 135 1.8 438 BoohoJt 0.5 Plrmasena.--. 0.6 Essen 887 41.5 Wanne-Eickel— 7.7 DUlenburg... 6. 5 Rastatt- 0.2 Eschwege 0.2 Reutllngen 0.4 850 37.2 400 4.8 1,108 Euskirchen... 1.8 RuedtsheUi).. 0.3 Oeldem 0. 1 Saarlauiera... 1.3 Dortmund 27.3l BluUtfeltl 129 4.4 542 Kyllburg 0.3 Scbwaeb. riall... 0.7 Dueaseldorf... 20. 6 Boon 100 5.4 ,659 LimbuTE 0.3 TnuinKein__. 0.3 QelMntlrchen... 23.8 G lesson ___ 47 4.4 3IS Marburg 0.2 Straublne Kjiserslemern. 70 ae 1:1 Marl-Huels... 1.2 Zwelbruecken... 1,419 800 23.9 Paderbora 42 3.8 Meschede 0.1 0.^6 Itheiiw 35 6.4 Neuwied 1.2 839 Braunschweig... 17.7 Siogon 37 4.2 190 Opladen 1.8 0.0 Kaawl 216 '19. 1 Soast 25 3.3

250 16.4 485 400 4.3 1 The figures at thB end of each group show (from left to right) the total 1939 population, the estimated total 1945 population and Emden : 35 0.3 Bingcn 22 2.7 the average bomb weight. Hamm 50 11.0 Bremerhaveu. 79 1.7 .Muenster...;... 144 13.1 Froiburg 110 2.2 Osnabrueck 11)7 10.4 Fulda - 32 2.0 proportions in the various economic groups. Thus, WiUieliiiabavan. M4 11.9 Hellbronn 78 2.9 Homburg 22 3.7 apart from the control on age-and sex, the samp• 488 300 10.5 Ingolstadt 34 2.7 ling method used was to give every eligible person Landahut 32 1.0 Karlsruhe 190 II. 5 Pforrhef m 79 2.3 in the town an equal chance of being in the sample. Eobienz 91 14.4 Rosenheim 22 2.0 In addition, data were recorded during the inter• Malnx 1.18 11. I Trior 83 2.7 Saarbrucken 133 12.2 Worm* 61 1.8 view on occupation, religion and Party member• Wueralwrg... 1.4 ship, so that differences due to those factors could 350 12.3 7-17 500 2.3 be investigated'later. Bocbum , 305 10.9 The first step in selecting the sample in a town 0 berhausen-Stork 102 6.0 Dattoln„ LS Sollngcn 140 4.0 Do retail 0.8 was to discover the most up-to-date and complete WupperlaL.. 402 7.0 Glad beck 1.1 list of the inhnbitants. Where a military govern• Heme 0.5 1,039 700 7.0 Langondreor 1.4 ment registration had been completed recently, Recklinghausen 1.2 tins was used. Since each person has a separate AKhaflenbuxg... 48 3.7 Rheinhauseu 0.4 Augsburg 188 0.3 Win an 1.7 card, these lists were very convenient. In the DarnuLadt... 115 a.e majority of the towns registration was not com• Friadrlcasba/eii. 25 6.2 421 360 FTanan 42 6.81 plete, and ration card lists from the Department/ •Regansboxs 96 8.9 Fleuaburg.. 0.5 of Nutrition were utilized. In most cases new Sobweinfurt. 49 6\7 Luobook 0.'6 Ulm -74 0.0 Oldenburg., 0.7 registrations for ration cards were held monthly Remscheld. 0.9 Wiesbaden.. 170 3.4 and it was to the obvious interest of the individual 803 W0 5.81 434 400 0.7. to register, so that these lists proved generally satisfactory in use. For drawing the sample they

127 "were less convenient because data were recorded were classified and a number of districts (from 6 by families and because in the large cities the lists to 18) were selected to represent the city accord• were distributed in numerous district offices in• ing to severity of damage and to economic type. stead of being in one central place. The Registry Ration cards were then obtained from the chosen Office lists were used in a few cases but tended to districts and the procedure applied as above. be out of date and were more troublesome. In• The sampling of evacuees presented a problem. quiry was always made initially as to the com• Evacuees who had gone to the Russian area of pleteness of the lists. In view of the great move• occupation could not be included in the sample. ments of population no list was 100 percent com• Evacuees who had gone to unbombed parts of the plete, but in nearly all towns they appeared to be sample area would be covered to some extent from more than 90 percent complete. the 10 sample towns which represent these parts. When the list to be used had been selected, a Unless special steps were taken, however, such preliminary sample was drawn to estimate the age evacuees would be sampled at a much smaller rate and sex distribution in the town. This sample than people who had not been evacuated, because averaged about 800 names in the large towns and of the deliberate under-sampling of the unbombed 400 names in the smaller towns. This sample was area. Some under-sampling of such evacuees was considered justifiable, because they could not sup• obtained by taking every nth card so as to give ply information on certain of the questions in the the desired number and to cover proportionally schedules and because many of them had experi• every portion of the card files. A card file ar• enced little bombing. However, in order to pro• ranged by streets was used when available since vide a sufficient number of schedules from these this gave a good geographic coverage of the town. evacuees for purposes of analysis, it was decided The names we're then classified separately for to interview an equal number of evacuees and per• men and women into the following age groups: manent residents in each unbombed town, rather over 45, between 20 and 45, and between 14 and than take the evacuees in the proportions in which 19. Thereafter the smaller sample of about 150 they happened to be present. This was accom• names was drawn from the.larger sample, keeping plished by drawing separate samples for evacuees the proportions in the six age-sex groups the same and residents in unbombed towns. No special in both samples. At this stage person's over 70 measures were taken for evacuees who had re• or under 16 were rejected. Finally, the names and turned to the bombed towns. They were, there• addresses were typed for use by the teams. fore, sampled in the proportion in which they The proportions hi the age-sex classes were were present. quite uniform from town to town. Average pro• portions over 2G towns are shown below: For the interviews, rooms were secured in a central building. Wherever possible a separate TABLE D —Percentage of people in various age (/roups small room was obtained for each interview. In the large towns where transportation facilities Men Women were poor the interviewers travelled to different parts of the town on successive days. Appoint• 22 20 12 30 ments for the interviews were made in advance by 4 S Germans placed at the disposal of the team leader. 38 62 For this job teachers, rationing officials or police• men were used. Most teams experienced some difficulty in one of their towns (usually.the first) Thus the average sex-ratio was. about 38 per• in maintaining the presence of the correct num• cent men; for the group between 20 .and 45 years bers of respondents for each set of interviews. In it fell to about 28 percent. some cases the difficulty was due to the fact that In Hamburg, Essen, Dortmund, Kassel,. and people had moved since the lists were made; in Munich, there were so many ration -card offices others, to inefficiency on the part of the German (40-150) that not all offices could be reached for official or to errors in the lists. Substitutions were drawing the sample. An experienced city official allowed in such cases from other names in the rated every ration district according to percent •lists. Some bias may have been introduced from of houses seriously damaged and to percent of such substitutions, but it is believed not to have unskilled workers. From these data the districts been serious. 128 VI. Obtained Characteristics of the Sample TABLE G.—Marital status of respondents

The German Sample Bchedule A Schedule B Total

In all, 3,711 German civilians were interviewed Ptrtcnt Percent Percent in the course of the study, 2,010 in June and 1,701 Single 21 20 20 70 73 72 in July 1945. Schedule A, using the direct inter• Widowed, divorced, separated.. 9 7, 8 viewing procedure, was followed in 34 percent of Total 100 100 100 the cases, and schedule B, the indirect procedure, in 66 percent. 1.243 2.463 3,711

. TABLE E.—Sex distribution of respondents

Schedule A Bchedule B Total

Percent Percent Percent Men 42 89 Woman 67 58 61

Total - 100 100 100

Number Interviewed 1.248 2,403 '8, 711 TABI-E 11.—Educational level

TABLE F.--Age distribution Schedule A Schedule B .Total

Age Schedule A Schedule B Total Percent Percent Percent Elementary school (Voifcscbulo) 64 58 , 60 Percent Percent Percent Trade school (Faehschulo) IS 13 17 16-19 6 6 6 High school (Oberschule) 16 IS 18 20-34 9 6 7 College (Rochschule) 4 e A 26-29 • 6 fi 6 No information 1 30-34 7 10 9 35-39 ' 11 11 U Total 100 100 100 40-M 12 12 12 44-19..: 13 ' 13 13 N'ombu Interviewed 1,243 2.463 3,711 50-64 12 13 13 65-68 10 9 e 60-70 IS 14 14 The respondent was placed in an educational 1 1 1 grouping regardless of whether he had completed Total 100 100 100 his training at that level. The high school group, 1.24S 2.463 3.711 for example, includes both high school graduates and those who had had some high school training.

129 APPENDIX B.—ATTITUDE TOWARD THE OCCUPATION

The morale division survey provided certain TABLE C.—Reasons for favorable reaction to occupation significant information on the reaction of Ger• {June) man civilians to the occupation. Percent Relief that bombing had stopped. : 24 The 3,711 Germans in the 31 sample cities -were Relief that war and fighting had stopped' 12 asked the following questions about the occupa• Have personal freedom 24 tion -. Have work ....' 11 • Like Americans 8 "How is it going with you under the occu• Miscellaneous reasons 6 pation ? "Is it better or worse than you expected ? Total with favorable attitude 85 "What did you really expect? "How do you think you and your family After this first feeling of relief had passed, an would have fared in the next 3 or 4 years, if appreciable shift in attitude occurred. In July Germany had won the war?" the proportion with a favorable attitude had Part of the sample was interviewed in June dropped to 58 percent compared with 85 percent and part in July. for June. Both relief that bombing had stopped The interviews showed that the initial stage and that the fighting was over dropped appreci• of the occupation was a great relief to the German ably as reasons for having a favorable attitude. people. First, bombing and the threat of bombing On the other hand, the two reasons for being dis• ceased. Second, although there were some cases satisfied with the occupation which showed an of rape, looting and similar incidents, the behav• appreciable increase from June to July are "short• ior of the troops was very much better than the age of food" and "cannot find employment." By Germans had dared to hope. July over half the people who were unfavorable in their attitude mentioned shortage of food. The findings based on interviews made in June show: The July results are: TABLE A.—Attitude toward the occupation (June) Percent TABLE D.—Attitude toward the occupation {July) Peroent Favorable attitude • 85 Undecided; or partly favorable and partly un• Favorable 58 favorable 9 Undecided; or partly favorable and partly unfavor• able 24 Unfavorable 8 Unfavorable 19 Total 100 Total : 100 In terms of expectations the results were as follows: Of the 58 percent with a favorable attitude to• ward the occupation, the main reason each gave TABLE B.—Expectations-and experience of occupation •for feeling favorable is'as follows: Percent Found the occupation better than they expected... 65 TABLE E.—Reasons for favorable reaction to occupation Found the occupation the same as they erpected... 18 Percent Found the occupation worse than they expected... 11 Relief that bombing had stopped 12 Were undecided 6 Relief that war and fighting had stopped 0 Have personal freedom •-. 17 Total : '....100 Have work • 13 Like Americans 4 Of the 85 percent with a favorable attitude to• Miscellaneous reasons 8 ward the occupation, the main reason each gave for feeling favorable is as follows: Total with favorable attitudes 58 180 A corresponding shift in attitude from June to On what does it depend? The Germans who July occurred in expectations for the future. expressed this attitude in July—47 percent of the When asked, "How do you think you and your total—emphasized the following factors: . family will fare in the next 3 or 4 years?", the answers were: TABLE G.—Factors on, which expectation depends Percenti On possibility of getting or keeping work 36 TABLK F.—Expectations regarding occupation On restoration of economy (industry and trans• portation) 9 June . July On what occupational*aathorities will do (severity, Justice, and success of their plans) 0 • Percent Percent It win be good 4B 38 On adequacy of food supply 10 In some wtys It will b« good. In other w»y» bed... 10 14 On return of relatives (p/w's, etc.) 9 30 47 It will be bad 11 11 1 Total exceeds 47ft ; multiple reasons permitted.

TotilT : : -. 100 100 Thus 25 percent of the German civilians or over half of those who expressed doubt about the fu• The striking percentage decrease in over-all ture, refer primarily to the problems of unemploy• optimism is almost entirely absorbed in the in• ment and restoration of the economy—'both inex• creased feeling that "it depends." The dominant tricably associated with occupation policy and feeling became'within 1 month "it depends." reconstruction.

131 UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS

The following is a blblography of reports resulting from 22 Metallgussgesellschaft G. m b H, Leipzig. Germany the Survey'B studies of the European- and Pacific wars. 23 Aluminiumwerk G in b H, Plant No. 2, Bltterfeld, Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be. pur• Germany chased from the Superintendent of Documents at the 24 Gebrueder Giulini G in h H, Ludwigshttfen, Germany Government Printing- Office, Washington, D. C. 25 Luftschiffbau Zeppelin G m b H, Friedrichshafen oh Bodensee, Germanv 26 Wleland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany European War 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Lelchmetallglesserelen, SoIIn- gen. Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 28 LIppewerke Verelnlgte Aluminium werke A G;, Lnnen, Germany *1 The United states Strategic Bombing Survey: Sum• 29 A7ereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hedderheim, Ger• mary Report (European War) . ' , many •2 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Over• 30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlln all Report (European AVar) & Waren, Germany *3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy AREA STUDIES DIVISION

AIRCRAFT DIVISION *31 Area Studies Division Report 32 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing (By Division and Branch) on Hamburg 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing *4 Aircraft Division Industry Report on Wuppertal . , .5 Inspection Visits to Various Targets.(Special Report) 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on linsseldorf Airframes Branch 35 ' A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomnmg on Soltngen 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 'Germany on Hemscheid 7 Erla Maschlnenwerke G.m b H, Helterbtick. Germany 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bomuing 8 A T Maschiiienbau, G m b Fl, Leipzig (Mncknu), Ci on Darmstadt Germany 3S A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrlk, A G, Gotha, Germany on Luheck _Focke Wuif Aircraft Plant. Bremen. Germany 10 3D A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Over-all Report Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hageu, Dort• 1,1 Pare A mund, Olwrhnusen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen Part B Appendices I. IT. in ! CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 12 Doruier Works, Frledrlchshafen & Munich, Germany 18 Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b-H, Kassel. Germany *40 Civilian Defense Division—Final Report 14 Wiener Neiistaedter r'lugzeugwerke, Wiener Neu- 41 Cologne Field Report stadt, Austria 42 Bonn Field Repert 43 Hanover Field Report 44 Hamburg Field Report—Vol I, Text; Vol II, Exhibit*" Aero Engines Branch 45 Bad Oldesioe Field Report 46 Augsburg Field Report 15 Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke G m h H,. Bruns• 47 Reception Areas In Bavaria, Germany wick, Germany 16 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G in b H,' Tnuclui, EQUIPMENT DIVISION Germany 17 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, Electrical Branch Germany *4S German Electrlcul Equipment Industry Report 18 Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Ger• many 40 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafer.tal, Germany 19 Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany - Optical and Precision Instrument Branch Light Metal Branch *50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report 20 Light Metals Industry J Part I, Aluminum Abrasives Branch of Germany \ Part II, Magnesium 21 Verelnlgte Deutsche Metallwerke, HUdesheim, Ger• *51 The German Abrasive Industry many 52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on Main, Germany 132 Anti-Friction Branch U4 Bh'liin and Vnss Shipyards. Hamburg. Germany 95 Deutscliewerke A G. Kiel, Germany *53 The German Anti-Friction Hearings Industry 96 Deutsche Schlff tmd MuscKinenhau, Bremen, Ger• many Machine Tools Branch 97 Friedricli Krupp Germanlawerft, Kiel. Germany 9S Howaldtswerke A G. Hamburg, Germany . *54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Eijuipmem *55 Machine Tool Industry in Germany 00 Submarine A"3se"mbiy Shelter, Farge, Germany 100 Bremer Vulkan. Vegesack, Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co, Cologne, Germany 57 Collet aud Engelhard, Offenbach, Germany 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany Ordnance Branch M01. Ordnance Industry Report MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION 102 Frledrlch Krupp GrusonwerkeA G, Magdeburg. Ger• 59 The Defeat of the German Air Force many 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign • 103 Bocbumer Verein fuer Gusstnhlfabrikntlon A G, Bo- 61 Air Force Rate of Operation cbuni, Germany 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bombardment Opera• 104. Herischel & Sohn, Kassel. Germany tions in the European Theatre 105 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 63 Bombing Accuracy, USAAF Heavy and Medium 106 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig. Hallendorf, Bombers in the ETO Germany 64 Description of RAF Bombing 107 Hiinnoveriscbe Maschinenbau. Hanover. Germany 04a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo• 10S Gusstahlfabrlk Frledrlch Krupp, Essen. Gerinuny gistics OIL DIVISION MORALE DIVISION *l()i> Oil Division, Final Report *64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale *110 Oil Division, Final Report, Appendix- (Vol I ft II) mi Powder, Explosives, Special Rockeis and Jer Pr<>- pellants. War Gases and Smoke Acid (Ministerial Medical Branch Report #1) 1.12 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater Ger• *65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care many in Gennany 113 The German Oil Industry. Ministerial Report Team 78 MUNITIONS DIVISION 114 Ministerial Report on Chemicals Heavy Industry Branch OU Branch *66 The Coking Industry Report mi Germany 67 Coking Plant Report No. I, Sections A, B, C, & T> 115 AmmoDiakwerke Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, Ger• 08 GutelioffiHiugshuette. Oberhauseu, Germany many—2 Appendices 69 Frletlrleh-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen. Germany 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen. Germany 70 Neunkircheu Eisenwtn-ke A G. Neunklrchen. Ger• Wintershall A G, Luetzkendorf. Germany many 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G Farbenlndustrie 71 Reichswerke Hermann Goering A G. Hallendorf, A G. Ludwigsbafen, Germany Germany 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenatlou Plant. Bottrop-Boy, Ger• 72 August Tliyssen Huette A G, Hamlwrn, Germany many, A*ol I, Vol II 73 Friedricli Krupp A Q, Borl)eck Plant. Essen. Ger- 119 Rhenania Osfjag Mlneraloelwerke A G. Harburg Re• many finery, Hamburg, GeVmany 74 Dortmund Hoertler Huettonverein,-A G, Dortmund, 120 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G, Grasbrook Germany Refinery, Hamburg, Germany 75 Hoesch A G, Dortmund, Germany 121 Rhenania Ossag Mineraloelwerke A G. Wilhelmsburg 78 Bochmrter Vereln fuer Gusstaiiffabrlkfltion. A G, Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Bochum, Germany 122 Gewerkschaft Victor, CastroprRauxel, Germany, Vol I & Vol II' • Motor Vehicles' and Tanks Branch 123 Europaeische Tanklager und Transport A G, Ham• burg, Germany *77 German Molor Vehicles Industry Report 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Harburg Refinery, Ham-" *7S Tank Industry Rejwrt burg. Germany 79 Daimler BenzA G. Unterturkheim, Germanv 125 Meerheck Rlieinpreussen Svhthetlc Oil Plant—Vol I 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant. Billnncourt, Paris & Vol II 81 Adam.Opel, Russelsheim, Germany 82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Cnggenau, Germany 88 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg. Nurnberg, Ger- Rubber Branch ninny -126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co., Manau. on Main. Ger• 84 Auto Union A G. Cheimiitrj and Zwickau..Germany many 85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel. Germany 127 Continental Gummiwerke. Hanover. Germany 86 Maybnch Motor Works, Friedrichshnfen, Germany 87 Volgtlander. Maschinenfabrik A G, Plauen. Germany 128 Huels Synthetic Rubber Plant 88 Volkswagenwerke, Fnllei-sleben, Germimy 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber Industry 89 Bussing NAG. Brunswick, Germany 90 Muehlenlmu Industrie A G (Miag) Brunswick*. Ger- Propellants Branch - many 91: Friedricli Krupp Grtisonwerke. Magdeburg, Germany 130 Elektrocbemlschewerke. Munich, Germany 131 Sehoenebeck Explosive Plant. Llgnose Sprengstoff Werke G m b H, Bad Salzemen, Germanv . - Submarine Branch 132 Plants of Dynainlt A G, Vormal. Alfred Nobel & Co. 92 German1 Submarine Industry Report Troisdorf, Clauathal, Di vimmel nhd Duneberg, Ger• 93 Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Xiirnberg A G. Augs• many burg, Germany 133 Deutsche Sprengchemle G m b H, Kralburg, Germany 133 OVER-ALL ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 197 Cliemische-wei-ke, Hueis, Germany 19S Gremberg Marslialllug Yard, Gremberg, Germany 134 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 191) Locomotive Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany Gross National Product ...... "1 Special papers Krlegseilheriehte I which together TRANSPORTATION DIVISION Hermann Goering Works ..,....[ compri se the Food and Agriculture ,....*..'. .J above report +200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Trans• 134a Industrial Sales Output and Productivity portation 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass • 202 Effects of Bombing on Hntlroad Installation in PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION Regensbtirg, Nurnl>erg and Munich Divisions 134b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War 135 Villacoublav Airdrome, Paris, France 204 German Military Railroad Traffic 136 Railroad Repair "Sards, Malines, Belgium 137 Railroad Repair Yards, l^ouvain, Belgium UTILITIES DIVISION 138 Railroad Repair Yards. Hasselt. Belgium •205 German Electric Utilities industry Report 139 Railroad Repair Yards, Namur, Belgium 206 1 to 10 In Vol I "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 140 Submarine Pens, Brest, France 207 11 to 20 in Arol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" 141 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France 208 21 Rhelnische^Westfalische Hlektrlzitaetswerk A G 142 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 143 Coking Plants, Montiguy & Liege. Belgium 144 FortSt. Blaise Vevdun Group, Metz. France Pacific War 145 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 146 Mlehelin Tire Factory. Clermont-Ferrand, France OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 147 Guome et Rhone Aero Engine Factory, Le Mans, France *1 Summary Report (Pacific War) 148 Kugelflscher Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Germany *2 Japan's Struggle to End the War 149 Louis Bregnet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France +3 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and 150 S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Tonlonse, France Nagasaki 151 A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France 352 V Weapons in Loudon CIVILIAN STUDIES 153 City Area of Krefeld 154 Public Air Raid Shelters'in Germany Civilian Defense Division 155 Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap• 4 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied sack, Germany 15C Brauweller Transformer & Switching Station, Bran- Subjects, Tokyo, Japan weiler, Germany 5 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 157 Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany Subjects, Nagasaki, Japan +6 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 158 Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Subjects, Kyoto, Japan 359 Railway Rridge, Etler,. Germany 7 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 160 GustlofE-Werke Weimar, Weimar, Germany 1G1 Heuschelt & Sohn G m b H,.Kasecl, Germany Subjects, Kobe, Japan 362 Area Survey at Plrmaseus, Germany S Field Report Covering Ah- Raid Protection and Allied 163 Hanomag, Hanover, Germany Subjects, Osaka, Japan 9 Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied 164 M A N Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1. 165 Friedrfch Krupp A G, Essen, Germany +10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and 160 Erla Musch incnwerke, G m b H, Hef terbllck, Gennany 167 A T G Masciiineubau GmbH, Mockau, Germany Allied Subjects in Japan *il Final Report .Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied ICS Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, Mockau, Germany 169 Bayerlsche Motoi-emverke. Durrerhof, Germany Subjects In Japan 170 Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, Germany Medical Division 171 Submarine Pens Devitsche-Werft, Hamburg, Germany 172. Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany +12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Serv• 173 Continental Gummlwerke. Hanover, Germany ices in Japau 174 Knsscl Marshalling Yards, Kuesel, Germany *13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical 175 Ammonia werke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany Services in Hiroshima and.Nagasaki 176 Brown Boverl et Cle. Mannheim, Kafertal, Germany 177 Adam Opel A G, Riisselshelm. Germany Morale Division 178 Daimler-Benz A G, TJnterturkhelm, Germany 179 Valentin Submarine Assembly, Farge, Germany +14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale ISO Volkswaggonwerke, Fallerslebeu, Germny 181 Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany ECONOMIC STUDIES 382 Shipyards Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany 183 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany Aircraft Division 184 Daimler-Benz A G, Mannheim, Germany " - 185 Synthetic Oil Plant, Meerbeck-Hamburg. Germany *15 The Japanese Aircraft Industry 1 • 186 Gewerkschaft A'ictor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany •16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 187 Klockner Humboldt Deutz, Ulm. Germany Corpornf ion Report Wo. I 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenatlorj Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germany (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) 18S Neuklrchen Elsenwerke-A G, Neukirchen, Germany' (Airframes & Engines) 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbecken, Germany *17 Nakajlma Aircraft Company, Ltd. 191 Railway Viaduct at Arnsburg, Germany Corporation Report A'o. II 192 Deuvag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany (Nakajima HIkokl KK) 19S Fire Raids on German Cities (Airframes & Engines) 194 I G Farbenlndustrle, Ludwlgshafen, Germany, A~ol I •18 Kawanlshi Aircraft Company & Vol II Corporation Report No. Ill 195 Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany (Kawanishf Kokukl Kabushiki Kalsha) 196 I G Farbenlndustrle, Leyerkusen, Gerniany (Airframes) 134 •19 Kawasaki Aircraft Industries Company, Inc. Electric Power Division Corporation Report No. IV (Kawasaki KokukI Kogyo Kabushiki Kai- +40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan sha) +41 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Plant lie- (Airframes & Engines) ports) 20 Alchi Aircraft Company Corporation Report No. V Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division (Aichi KokukI KK) (Airframes & Engines) +42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and +21 Sumitomo Metal Industries. Propeller Division Utilization of .Manpower Corporation Report No. VI (Sumitonin Kinzokti Kogyo KK, Puropera Seizosho) Military Supplies Division (Propellers) 22 Hitachi Aircraft Company +43 Japanese War Production Industries Corporation Report No. Til +44 Japanese Naval Ordnance (Hitachi Kokuki KK) 45 Japanese Army Ordnance (Airframes & Engines) *46 Japanese.Naval Shipbuilding 23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. •47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry Corporation- Report No. Till •4S Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding (Nippon Kukusai Koku Kogyo KK) (Airframes) 24 Japan Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company Oil and Chemical Division Corporation Report No. IX (Nippon Gnkki Seizo KK) 49 Chemicals In Japan's War 50 Chemicals in Jnpan's War—Appendix (Propellers) 51 Oil In Japan's Wnr 25 Tachlkawn Aircraft Company 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix Corporation Report No. X • (Tachikawa Hlkokl KK) (Airframes) Over-all Economic Effects Division 26 Fuji Airplane Company Cori>oration Report No. XT +53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War (Fuji Kikoki KK) Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Economic (Airframes) Intelligence on Japan-—Analysis and Comparison; 27 Showa Airplane Company Appendix B: Gross National Product on Japan Corporation Report No. XII and It s Components; Appendix C: Statistical (Showa MIkoki Kogyo KK) Sources). (Airframes) 28 Ishikawnjima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Transportation Division Corporation Report No. XIII (Ishiknwajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kai- +54 The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941— sha) 1945 (Engines) 29 Nippon Airplane Company Urban Areas Division Corporation Report No. XIV (Nippon Hikoki KK) *55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Economy (Airframes) (Summary Report) 30 Kyushu Airplane Company +56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo- Corporation Report No. XV Kawasnki-Yokohama (Kyushu Hikoki KK) +57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya (Airframes) +58 Effects of Air Attack ou Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto 31 Shoda Engineering Company • 59 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagasaki Corporation Report No. XVI 60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima (Shoda Seisnkujo) (Coinponenls) 32 Mltaka Aircraft Industries MILITARY STUDIES Corporation Report No. XTII (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kalsha) Military Analysis Division (Components) 33 Nissan Automobile Company 61 Air Forces Allied with the .United States in the War Corporation Roport No. XVIII Against Japan (Nissan Jldosha KK) ' 62 Japanese Air Power (Engines) 63 Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics 34 Army Air Arsenal & Nnvy Air Depots 04 The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Corporation Report- No. XIX LogisticB (Airframes & Engines) 65 Employment of Forces Under the Southwest Pacific 35 Japan Aircraft Underground Command Report No. XX 60 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom• bardment in the War Against Japan (Twentieth Air Force) Basic Materials Division 67 Air Operations in China, Burma, India—World War 36 Coal and Metals In Japan's War Economy II 68 The Air Transport Command in the War Against Japan Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division 69 The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan 37 The Japanese Construction Industry 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War 38 Japanese Electrical Equipment Against Japan 39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry 71 The Fifth Air Force In the War Against Japan Naval Analysis Division Physical Damage Division

+72 The Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols I.and 01 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound Bomb on , in Japanese Targets (a Report oh Nine Iucideuts) •73 Campaigns of the Pacific Wur 92 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan +74 The Reduction of Wake Island S3 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, Japan *75 The Allied Campaign Against Rabaul 94 Effects of tlie Four Thousand Pound Bomb on Japa• 7(i The American Campaign Against Wotje, Maloelap, nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) Mille. and Jalult (Vols I, II and III) 95 Effects of Two Thousand. One Thousand, and Five +77 The Reduction of Truk Hundred Pound Bomlis on Japanese Targets (a 7S The Offensive Mine Laying Campaign Against Japan Report on Eight Incidents) 79 Report of Ships .Bombardment Survey Party—Fore• 96 A Report on Physical Damage In Japan (Summary word. Introduction, Conclusions, and General Sum• Report) mary SO. Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En• Division closure AL Kamafshi Area 81 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En• closure B), I-Iamamatsu Area 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence 32 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-' 08 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa• closure C). Hitachi Area nese Homeland, Part I, Gompreiiensitie Report 83 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the .Tapa-' . closure-D), Hakodate Area nese Homeland-. Part IL Airfields 84 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En• 300 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Jnpn-' closure E), Muroran Area nese Homeland. Part III, Computed Bomb Plotting 85 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En• 101 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa• closure F). Shlmlzn Area nese Homeland, Part IV, Urban Area Analysis 86 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En-" 102 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa• closures G and-H). Sblonoml-Sakl and Nojlma- nese Homeland, Part V, Camoupaije Sakl Areas 103 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence In the Japa• 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party- (En• nese Homeland, Part VI, Shipping closure I). Comments and Data on Effectiveness 104 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence In the Japa• of Ammunition nese FTomeland. Part VII. Electronics 88 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En• 105 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa• closure J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence Firing •106 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa• SO Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En• nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery closure K). Effects of Surface Bombardments on M07 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa• Japanese War Potential nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and Railroads GO Effect of the Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a 108 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence In the Japa• Report on Eight Cities) nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis

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