THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN MORALE VOLUME I Morale Division May 1947 THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY THE EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBING ON GERMAN MORALE VOLUME I Morale Division Dates Of Survey: March-July, 1945 Date of Publication: May 1947 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D. C. - Price 00 cents This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bomb- ing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered' as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpreta• tion in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey. FOREWORD The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was' established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944. pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt. The officers of the Survey were: Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. Henry C. Alexander, Vice-Chairman. George W. Ball,* Harry L. Bowman. John Iv. Galbraith, Rensis Likert, Frank A. McNamee. Jr., Paul H. Nitze, Robert P. Russell, Fred Searls, Jr., Theodore P. Wright, Directors. ChaiOes C. Cabot, Secretary. The Table of Organization provided for 300 civilians, 350 officei-s and 500 enlisted men. The Survey operated from headquarters in London and estab• lished forward headquarters and regional headquarters in Germany imme• diately follow the advance of the Allied armies. It made a close examination and inspection of several hundred German plants, cities and areas, amassed volumes of statistical and documentary mate• rial, including top German government documents; and conducted interviews and interrogations of thousands of Germans, including virtually all of the surviving political and military leaders. Germany was scoured for its war records which were found sometimes, hut rarely, in places where they ought to have been; sometimes in safe-deposit vaults, often in private houses, in barns, in caves; on one occasion, in alien house and, on two occasions ,in coffins. Targets in Russian-held territory were not available to the Survey. Some two hundred detailed reports were made. During the coui-se of its work, the Survey rendered interim reports and submitted studies and sugges• tions in connection with the air operations against Japan. "While the European War was going on. it was necessary, in many cases, to follow closely behind the front; otherwise, vital records might have been irre• trievably lost. Survey personnel suffered several casualties, including four killed The Survey studied the effects of the air attack on Japan and further reports have been submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. iii PREFACE The morale division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey had as its objective, "To detennine the direct and indirect effects of bombing upon the attitudes, behavior and health of the civilian population, with par• ticular reference to its effect upon the willingness and capacity of the bombed population to give effective and continued support to the German war effort." Volume 1 contains two parts. Part I reports conclusions on German morale based for the most part on interviews with 3,711 German civilians. Part II covers evidence derived principally from official German morale doc• uments and from selected interrogations with officials and civilian leaders. In certain cases supporting evidence from interviews with the civilian popu• lation is also introduced here. Volume II includes a miscellaneous collection of special reports which provide supporting data on morale from supplementary studies. The findings of the medical branch of the morale division, appraising the effect of bombing on the physical and mental health of German civilians and on the medical resources of Germany, are presented separately. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I ['H ye Summitry : The morale effects of air raids 1 Part T. Estimates of morale based on interviews with German civilians 5 Chapter 1. Background of German civilian morale 7 Chapter 2. The will to resist 12 Chapter 3. Morale effects produced by different bombing conditions 22 Chapter 4. Social and psychological factors affecting morale 33 Part II. Morale as reflected in official German documents and selected interrogations 41 Chapter 1. The couise of decline in morale 42 "Chapter 2. Morale and behavior of industrial workers 53 Chapter 3. Protection and relief-from bombing f>6 Chapter 4. Attempts to maintain morale by propaganda 73 Chapter 5. Attempts to rally youth ' SO Chapter (>. The relation of bombing to disruptive behavior ...- 87 Chapter 7. The control of subversion and opposition •. .. 04 Appendix A. The cross section interview study '. 109 Appendix B. Attitude toward ihe occupation.... -. • 130 * v SAMPLE CITIES INCLUDED IN MORALE DIVISION STUDY L ubflck •Bremen 1; ? Ritti* O o Honovtr • Munster ttrop Dortmund Eutn#* A Witten oMUnden • oLudenschsld •Kassfll Glodboch Bonn •Wetzlor • Frankfurt 8 nErlangtn • Nurnberg Sp«y«r • Kar sruhe •Stuttgart O Tubingen • Ulm • Freiburg •Munich • Bombed o Unbombed • Kempten ED USSR Zone of Occupation Chart I. VI SUMMARY: THE MORALE EFFECTS OF AIR RAIDS 1. Strategic bombing was the major means by those with a high proportion of home destruc• which tiie Allies were'able to strike a direct blow tion. This was apparently due in part to the at the morale of German civilians. Almost one- fact that the apathy resulting from the heaviest third of the Germans were subjected to it and bombing made people more susceptible to the all lived in the shadow of its threat. One-half of controls of the regime, and partly to the fact one percent were killed by bombing, and 1 per• that those with poorer morale tended to leave the cent injured. One-fifth of all civilians were de• more heavily bombed cities after the early raids. prived of water, gas, or electricity, many of them 5. These observations of the diminishing re• for long periods. One of every 15 civilians was turns from heavy bombing point to the practical evacuated to another area. Every German, whether conclusion that the maximum morale effects-of or not he experienced these direct effects of bomb• dropping a given tonnage of bombs on Germany ing, suffered such indirect results as shortage of would have been attained by lighter raids as food and supplies, and the disruption of transpor• widely distributed as possible, rather than by con• tation. There was no German civilian who did centrated heavy bombing in limited areas. not experience hardship or suffering as a result 6. Civilians who suffered personal injuries or of bombing. casualties in the family and/or property damage 2. Bombing seriously depressed the morale of had much lower morale than those who expe• German civilians. Its main psychological effects rienced bombing but were not involved imme• were defeatism, fear, hopelessness, fatalism, and diately and personally. Disruption of public utili• apathy. "War weariness, willingness to surrender, ties and especially of local transportation serv• loss of hope for German victory, distrust of lead• ices by bombing played an important role in de• ers, feelings of disunity and demoralizing fear pressing the German people. were all more common among bombed than un• 7. Lowered civilian morale expressed itself in born bed people. By the beginning of 1944, three- somewhat diminished industrial productivity. fourths of all Germans regarded the war as lost. German controls were fairly successful in keep• Air warfare was less important than other mili• ing traditionally obedient and industrious work• tary developments in producing defeatism, but ers at a routine level of performance, but they bombing aided greatly in convicing civilians of could not overcome increasing apathy induced by Allied superiority, both through the severity of bombing. the raids and through the unchecked passage over• 8. "Black" radio listening and disbelief in of• head of fleets of Allied aircraft. ficial propaganda, increased steadily during the 3. Bombing did not stiffen morale. The hate last 2 yeai-s of the war. Even belief in the ef• and anger it aroused tended to.be directed against fectiveness of the much-advertised V-weapons the Nazi regime which was blamed for beginning was limited, for a quarter of the German civil• air warfare and for being unable to ward off Al• ians thought the whole propaganda campaign a lied air attacks. There is some evidence that swindle. Bombing had much to do with the final under heavy bombing the hate and anger was discrediting of propaganda and of the Nazis be• dulled by apathy. cause it brought home to millions the tangible 4. Continuous heavy bombing of the same com• proof of almost unopposed Allied air power, in• munities did not produce decreases in morale pro• disputable proof completely at variance with the portional to the amount of bombing. The biggest familiar Nazi propaganda. The morale effects of drop in morale was apparent in a comparison bombing may thus prove to have had even more between unbombed towns and the only lightly importance for the denazification of Germany bombed. The morale in towns subjected to the than for hastening military defeat. heaviest bombing was no worse than that in towns 9. German controls, particularly terror and of the same size receiving much lighter bomb propaganda, helped to prevent depressed morale loads. Morale was just as poor in towns with a from being translated into subvei-sive activity se• moderate proportion of homes destroyed as in riously detrimental to the war effort. However, 1 the increasingly severe terror tactics which were they took. Neither did the Allied Command at• used to hold civilians in line, did not stamp out tempt to secure such data or to use the preliminary opposition to the regime.