Troubled Leviathan: The Contemporary U.S. versus Brian Berry’s U.S.

Barney Warf Florida State University

rian Berry’s (1970) summary of the geog- geographers today would insist that economic Braphy of the United States in the year 2000 trends—the heart of Berry’s subject—cannot is testimony to his forward-looking and insight- be divorced from ‘‘noneconomic’’ ones, parti- ful ability to summarize trends and project them cularly those concerned with power, ideology, through time and space. Berry has long been and social reproduction, a reflection of what one of the discipline’s most gifted and prolific is commonly called the ‘‘cultural turn’’ in the authors, and his article reflected a willingness social sciences (Thrift and Olds 1996). In brief, to map the future in a manner few would have the present moment differs markedly from that dared then or now. Prognostications are always portrayed in Berry’s essay because capitalism difficult, and the fact that an article written more has changed ontologically—it has become more than three decades ago imprecisely sketched flexible and globalized—and because our way the reality of the present is forgivable. The world of understanding it has changed as social science has changed enormously since Berry’s analysis has become epistemologically more self- appeared: the end of the post-WWII boom, conscious. Indeed, the omissions in Berry’s arti- accelerated globalization, the microelectronics cle do not simply reflect how much the world has revolution, the rise of services and telecommu- changed; they indicate that his worldview—the nications, the end of the Cold War—all have archetype of 1960s positivism—foregrounds dramatically reshaped the nation’s society, eco- some phenomena and backgrounds others. nomy, and spaces. Ironically, given the emphasis At the commencement du sie`cle, it is patently on prediction that Berry placed in his article, the obvious to observers around the world that the mismatch between the outcomes he foretold United States stands as the world’s only super- and the reality of the present is testimony to power, a political, economic, and cultural entity the complexity and contingency of social life, is- of unprecedented wealth and strength. It is rare sues important to poststructuralist geographers for the world-system to exhibit such a highly who do not hold the same regard for predic- monopolar structure, for typically hegemons tive capacity. are balanced by one or more competing powers Retrospective perspectives always enjoy the (Shannon 1996; Chase-Dunn 1998). Even luxury of hindsight, and like the world it exa- British rule during the Pax Britannica does mines, the discipline of geography has changed not come close to matching the dominance of mightily since Berry’s article appeared. Two fea- the U.S. today. Despite these assets, however, tures of his work are particularly interesting: grounds exist for arguing that the U.S. is a its silence about the global context and relations highly troubled superpower, one that suffers of the United States; and its lack of attention from a ‘‘hollow core’’ of multiple domestic to matters social, cultural, and political, which problems, including a large underclass, massive gives it an uncritical, empiricist flavor. These inequality, and—for many—inadequate public voids are not surprising, for geography has services. The central contention of this essay is matured along these fronts since 1970. It is that the external strengths of the U.S. and its increasingly impossible to separate the domes- internal weaknesses are simultaneously deter- tic from the international, given the widespread minant: that is, the former forms the basis for prevalence of globalization. Moreover, most the purchase of the latter.

The Professional Geographer, 56(1) 2004, pages 85–90 r Copyright 2004 by Association of American Geographers. Initial submission, October 2002; revised submission, March 2003; final acceptance, May 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, U.K. 86 Volume 56, Number 1, February 2004

Unrepentant Hegemon farmers are twice as productive as their Eur- opean counterparts and ten times more so One important feature that distinguishes con- than those in Russia (Ballet et al. 2002). In temporary perspectives in geography from that manufacturing, which has shrunk to 14 percent which Berry offered in 1970 is the issue of global- of the labor force, the American automobile ization. Few geographers today would attempt industry has reestablished itself as the world’s analyses of domestic issues without at least a leader, while the country continues to dominate cursory reference to the manner in which they markets such as aerospace, electronics, and are embedded in the world system. Accordingly, pharmaceuticals. In services—fully 85 percent a few brief comments on this issue are necessary of GNP and jobs—the U.S. is a powerhouse to shed light on how the U.S. has been changed in commercial banking, securities, advertising, since 1970 by its global position, particularly engineering, legal services, construction, and over the last decade. computer software. International service ex- By now, it is established wisdom that the ports, which comprise one-quarter of the world collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economy, now generate one-third of American end of the Cold War ushered in a period of foreign revenues (Yarbrough and Yarbrough unprecedented American hegemony interna- 1997). The Internet, icon of the ‘‘space of flows’’ tionally (Hirst and Thompson 1999). Indeed, (Castells 1996), remains primarily an American never in world history has one power exerted as innovation, to which more than one-half of much relative and absolute economic, political, the public is connected (Warf 2001). American military, and diplomatic leverage as does the multinational corporations still form the largest United States. By constituting itself at the core pool of foreign direct investment (FDI) funds of a planetary division of labor that central- in the world (Dicken 1998). The country con- izes high-wage, high-value-added functions and tinues to enjoy virtually unchallenged domina- decentralizes low-wage, low-value-added ones, tion over the western hemisphere, where the the American economy has generated one of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF- the highest standards of living in the world. TA) is gradually being expanded from Prudhoe Its annual gross national product (GNP) of Bay to Tierra del Fuego, and maintains a string U.S.$10 trillion—roughly one-quarter of the of alliances throughout Asia, the Middle East, entire planet’s output—dwarfs that of Japan and Europe. Many of the benefits of these ($6 trillion), the world’s second largest. The activities are concentrated in global cities such U.S. GNP per capita—roughly $30,000 per as New York and Los Angeles (Sassen 1991), year—is not the world’s highest, but it is within swollen with immigrants from the developing the top ten. More than one-quarter of the U.S. world, although a secondary tier of cities such as GNP consists of im-ports and exports—twice as Seattle, Atlanta, Miami, Houston, and Boston high a proportion as during the period when are also important in their own right. The global Berry wrote his piece (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001). dimensions of American cities are evident in Buoyed by productivity gains from the micro- Berry’s article mostly by their absence. electronics revolution and deregulation, the U.S. Energy, the lifeblood of the U.S. economy, economy since 1980 climbed out of the abyss of is also its Achilles heel. With 4 percent of Fordism and has witnessed new levels of formid- the world’s population, the U.S. consumes ability, contrary to the dreary pessimism of 25 percent of its energy, a large share of which Marxists about its imminent demise (Porter feeds its voracious appetite for automobiles 1990). These comments should not be taken as (World Resources Institute 2001). Indeed, the an uncritical celebration of the U.S., but as a very structure of American urban form—spraw- realistic portrait of its ability to retain and ling, low-density suburbia—is deeply rooted enhance its competitive position internationally, in cheap gasoline, which is taxed at rates well a view that has gotten remarkably little attention below those of most countries. Petroleum im- from geographers. ports comprise one-half of total oil consumed In agriculture, for example, the U.S. stands in in the U.S. Nonetheless, the American economy a category by itself. Long a major producer of is far more energy-efficient per capita—and per grains, the U.S. exports one-third of all traded unit of GNP—than it was in 1970, largely due agricultural products in the world. American to the shift to services and the off-shoring of Contemporary U.S. versus Brian Berry’s U.S. 87 manufacturing. Further, the country has secured traditions, many rooted in reli-gion (Barber additional domestic and foreign supplies—in- 1996). As the tragedy of September 11, 2001, cluding, when necessary, by war. reveals, the U.S. is not immune from the global Politically, because the U.S. is the world’ssole reach of its culture and foreign policies. Yet hegemon, its military and diplomatic powers despite the contempt that many may have for are also unchallenged. With an annual defense American culture, for its crass commercialism budget of roughly $400 billion, the U.S. spends and boorishness and anti-intellectualism, for more on the military than the rest of the world billions of people throughout the world it combined, and five times more than its major constitutes an ardently sought-after ideal. potential rivals combined (Brauer and Gissy 1997). The nation is by far the world’s leading A Hollow Core? exporter of weapons. Military technology has changed greatly since the quicksand of Vietnam: In addition to its focus on technological and as the Gulf Wars of 1990 and 2003 and the demographic change, another notable feature of Afghan War of 2002 demonstrate, the U.S. Berry’s article is its antiseptic quality: the degree possesses the power to decimate smaller coun- to which it uncritically overlooks the profound tries with minimal casualties to itself. The problems confronting the U.S. Its external American model of governance, neoliberalism, strengths notwithstanding, the United States which was just on the verge of coming into suffers domestically from grave difficulties and being when Berry penned his article, is char- obstacles, which stem from its relatively large acterized by deregulation and an uncritical faith degree of inequality and its inadequate, piece- in the rationality of markets, and was success- meal system of public services. While these fully exported under the Reagan Administra- issues may not have been as evident in 1970 as tion throughout the world, threatening the they are today, neither were they invisible, and welfare state even in its bastions, such as their omission reflects the particular ideological Scandinavia, and imposed on many developing view that shaped Berry’s article—a perspective countries through the International Monetary that represents itself as objective science. Fund and the World Bank (MacEwan 1999). Income inequality in the U.S. ranks the American culture—its attractions and repul- highest among Organisation for Economic Co- sions criticized and analyzed by writers ranging operation and Development (OECD) countries: from Toqueville to Adorno to Daniel Bell—re- one-fifth of the population owns 60 percent presents the epitome of the penetration of com- of total assets (Wilkinson 1997), a share cer- modification into consciousness, the triumph tain to rise with the increasingly regressive of the bourgeois spirit. Widespread prosperity federal tax cuts now being implemented. Within within the U.S., manifested in a technologi- labor markets, these inequalities are manifested cally sophisticated but intellectually infantilized in overpaid executives, media figures, and sports population (Fussell 1992), has entrenched this stars, and underpaid workers confined to the culture within the values of the enormous bottom rungs of the service economy (Ehren- middle class. In the late twentieth century, this reich 2001). Moreover, inequality has been form of culture has been exported worldwide: growing, in large part due to the increasing- for much of the world, globalization essential- ly regressive federal tax structure, the rise of ly equals American pop culture, imperialism unearned income (e.g., dividends, royalties), dressed in kitsch, the worldwide opiate of and the bipolar distribution of incomes asso- consumerism. As numerous observers have ciated with a service-based economy. Although pointed out, American icons ranging from blue the U.S. has a very large middle class com- jeans to McDonald’s to Nike to Hollywood fortably ensconced in the suburbs, it also movies and television shows to rock and sports has a significant underclass disproportionately stars command the love of billions worldwide populated by minorities (Wilson 1987). While (Appadurai 1996; Friedman 1999). Under- only 14 percent of the population lives be- standably, this ‘‘McWorld’’ has generated re- low the officially designated poverty level sentment on the part of many, particularly in the (roughly $20,000 annually for a family of four), Muslim world, who see it—legitimately—as a one-quarter of American children—includ- secular, nihilistic threat to long-established ing one-third of African-American children— 88 Volume 56, Number 1, February 2004 live in poverty (Huston 1994). Poverty is geog- ated for drug-related offenses. Not surprising- raphically concentrated, primarily in inner ly, the prison population is disproportionately cities, the rural South, and Native American African American: one out of ten black Amer- reservations (Kodras 1997). Roughly one mil- ican adults is in prison or on probation. lion Americans are homeless, most of them The fault for many of these dilemmas—or at minorities ( Jencks 1995). Thus, class and racial least the responsibility for their aggravation— inequality in the U.S. are inextricably fused. can be placed squarely on the shoulders of a This division is mirrored in gendered terms, in conservative electorate increasingly devoid of which women earn, on average, only 70 percent empathy for the poor and disenfranchised. In- of male incomes and comprise a large segment deed, the privatized culture of modern America of the increasingly feminized poor. The safety has largely confined the field of social respon- net for the socially disadvantaged, which has sibilities to the self. The extreme individualism been torn wide open by the onslaught of neo- and conservativism have fueled, and in turn liberalism over the last three decades, has made been fueled by, the most reactionary wings the U.S. an increasingly difficult place in which of the Republican party, often in league with to be poor. the religious right, which has led a class war These predicaments are evident with par- against the poor (Moore 2002; Brock 2002). At ticular poignancy in education, health care, the level of governance, the GOP has aggres- and the penal system. The American educa- sively launched an intertwined set of policies tional system, underfinanced for a century, has revolving around monetarism, military Keyne- produced a poorly informed, gullible public sianism, and regressive tax cuts designed to (Fussell 1992) as well as persistent shortages of starve the state of its capacity to provide scientific labor. In inner cities, school systems social services. The end of the Cold War beleaguered by inadequate funding, low teacher witnessed a new jihad against immigrants, salaries, and overcrowded classrooms have seen the impoverished, the sick and elderly, and the high-school dropout rates often in excess of 50 unskilled. Attempts to understand the geog- percent, a phenomenon that serves as a major raphy of the nation today should take these vehicle for the reproduction of the inner-city issues under consideration. underclass. Local control of schools thus repro- duces the very inequality that public education is ostensibly designed to overcome (Kozol 1991). Concluding Thoughts A democratized university system is threat- ened by a tidal wave of mediocrity, sustaining Berry’s (1970) article thoughtfully portrays the an anti-intellectualism with deep roots in the geography of the U.S. at a specific historical nation’s history (Merrow and Kozol 2001). moment: the postwar boom was starting to Among industrialized countries, only the U.S. draw to a close; the microelectronics revolution lacks a national health care system or even had yet to erupt; Fordism was at its peak; the socialized financing of health care. As a result, Keynesian state was still in operation; Bretton one-quarter of the population lacks health Woods had not yet collapsed; and the Cold War insurance and thus access to reliable medical was in full swing. Spatially, this set of circum- care, often flooding hospital emergency rooms stances was manifested in geographies domi- as a last resort. The inability or unwillingness of nated by manufacturing, relatively low degrees a country that boasts of being among the world’s of poverty and inequality, and a political com- richest to provide health care for its most mitment—however tentative—to the allevia- vulnerable segments stands as a lasting monu- tion of injustice (e.g., the War on Poverty). ment to the nation’s injustices. Finally, the Since the widespread sea change in capitalism United States has the highest incarceration rate that has occurred since then, the relations be- in the world, and in absolute terms, has more tween capital and space have changed markedly, people behind bars than the rest of the world the social contract between capital and labor has combined (Tonryand Petersilia 2000). Flooded been rewoven, and new geographies of exclu- by victims of a failed ‘‘war on drugs,’’ the prison sion and inclusion, centrality and marginality, population has tripled since 1980 to more than have been inscribed on the American landscape two million, two-thirds of whom are incarcer- (Dear and Flusty 1998). Contemporary U.S. versus Brian Berry’s U.S. 89

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