Troubled Leviathan: the Contemporary U.S
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Troubled Leviathan: The Contemporary U.S. versus Brian Berry’s U.S. Barney Warf Florida State University rian Berry’s (1970) summary of the geog- geographers today would insist that economic Braphy of the United States in the year 2000 trends—the heart of Berry’s subject—cannot is testimony to his forward-looking and insight- be divorced from ‘‘noneconomic’’ ones, parti- ful ability to summarize trends and project them cularly those concerned with power, ideology, through time and space. Berry has long been and social reproduction, a reflection of what one of the discipline’s most gifted and prolific is commonly called the ‘‘cultural turn’’ in the authors, and his article reflected a willingness social sciences (Thrift and Olds 1996). In brief, to map the future in a manner few would have the present moment differs markedly from that dared then or now. Prognostications are always portrayed in Berry’s essay because capitalism difficult, and the fact that an article written more has changed ontologically—it has become more than three decades ago imprecisely sketched flexible and globalized—and because our way the reality of the present is forgivable. The world of understanding it has changed as social science has changed enormously since Berry’s analysis has become epistemologically more self- appeared: the end of the post-WWII boom, conscious. Indeed, the omissions in Berry’s arti- accelerated globalization, the microelectronics cle do not simply reflect how much the world has revolution, the rise of services and telecommu- changed; they indicate that his worldview—the nications, the end of the Cold War—all have archetype of 1960s positivism—foregrounds dramatically reshaped the nation’s society, eco- some phenomena and backgrounds others. nomy, and spaces. Ironically, given the emphasis At the commencement du sie`cle, it is patently on prediction that Berry placed in his article, the obvious to observers around the world that the mismatch between the outcomes he foretold United States stands as the world’s only super- and the reality of the present is testimony to power, a political, economic, and cultural entity the complexity and contingency of social life, is- of unprecedented wealth and strength. It is rare sues important to poststructuralist geographers for the world-system to exhibit such a highly who do not hold the same regard for predic- monopolar structure, for typically hegemons tive capacity. are balanced by one or more competing powers Retrospective perspectives always enjoy the (Shannon 1996; Chase-Dunn 1998). Even luxury of hindsight, and like the world it exa- British rule during the Pax Britannica does mines, the discipline of geography has changed not come close to matching the dominance of mightily since Berry’s article appeared. Two fea- the U.S. today. Despite these assets, however, tures of his work are particularly interesting: grounds exist for arguing that the U.S. is a its silence about the global context and relations highly troubled superpower, one that suffers of the United States; and its lack of attention from a ‘‘hollow core’’ of multiple domestic to matters social, cultural, and political, which problems, including a large underclass, massive gives it an uncritical, empiricist flavor. These inequality, and—for many—inadequate public voids are not surprising, for geography has services. The central contention of this essay is matured along these fronts since 1970. It is that the external strengths of the U.S. and its increasingly impossible to separate the domes- internal weaknesses are simultaneously deter- tic from the international, given the widespread minant: that is, the former forms the basis for prevalence of globalization. Moreover, most the purchase of the latter. The Professional Geographer, 56(1) 2004, pages 85–90 r Copyright 2004 by Association of American Geographers. Initial submission, October 2002; revised submission, March 2003; final acceptance, May 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, U.K. 86 Volume 56, Number 1, February 2004 Unrepentant Hegemon farmers are twice as productive as their Eur- opean counterparts and ten times more so One important feature that distinguishes con- than those in Russia (Ballet et al. 2002). In temporary perspectives in geography from that manufacturing, which has shrunk to 14 percent which Berry offered in 1970 is the issue of global- of the labor force, the American automobile ization. Few geographers today would attempt industry has reestablished itself as the world’s analyses of domestic issues without at least a leader, while the country continues to dominate cursory reference to the manner in which they markets such as aerospace, electronics, and are embedded in the world system. Accordingly, pharmaceuticals. In services—fully 85 percent a few brief comments on this issue are necessary of GNP and jobs—the U.S. is a powerhouse to shed light on how the U.S. has been changed in commercial banking, securities, advertising, since 1970 by its global position, particularly engineering, legal services, construction, and over the last decade. computer software. International service ex- By now, it is established wisdom that the ports, which comprise one-quarter of the world collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economy, now generate one-third of American end of the Cold War ushered in a period of foreign revenues (Yarbrough and Yarbrough unprecedented American hegemony interna- 1997). The Internet, icon of the ‘‘space of flows’’ tionally (Hirst and Thompson 1999). Indeed, (Castells 1996), remains primarily an American never in world history has one power exerted as innovation, to which more than one-half of much relative and absolute economic, political, the public is connected (Warf 2001). American military, and diplomatic leverage as does the multinational corporations still form the largest United States. By constituting itself at the core pool of foreign direct investment (FDI) funds of a planetary division of labor that central- in the world (Dicken 1998). The country con- izes high-wage, high-value-added functions and tinues to enjoy virtually unchallenged domina- decentralizes low-wage, low-value-added ones, tion over the western hemisphere, where the the American economy has generated one of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF- the highest standards of living in the world. TA) is gradually being expanded from Prudhoe Its annual gross national product (GNP) of Bay to Tierra del Fuego, and maintains a string U.S.$10 trillion—roughly one-quarter of the of alliances throughout Asia, the Middle East, entire planet’s output—dwarfs that of Japan and Europe. Many of the benefits of these ($6 trillion), the world’s second largest. The activities are concentrated in global cities such U.S. GNP per capita—roughly $30,000 per as New York and Los Angeles (Sassen 1991), year—is not the world’s highest, but it is within swollen with immigrants from the developing the top ten. More than one-quarter of the U.S. world, although a secondary tier of cities such as GNP consists of im-ports and exports—twice as Seattle, Atlanta, Miami, Houston, and Boston high a proportion as during the period when are also important in their own right. The global Berry wrote his piece (Gilpin and Gilpin 2001). dimensions of American cities are evident in Buoyed by productivity gains from the micro- Berry’s article mostly by their absence. electronics revolution and deregulation, the U.S. Energy, the lifeblood of the U.S. economy, economy since 1980 climbed out of the abyss of is also its Achilles heel. With 4 percent of Fordism and has witnessed new levels of formid- the world’s population, the U.S. consumes ability, contrary to the dreary pessimism of 25 percent of its energy, a large share of which Marxists about its imminent demise (Porter feeds its voracious appetite for automobiles 1990). These comments should not be taken as (World Resources Institute 2001). Indeed, the an uncritical celebration of the U.S., but as a very structure of American urban form—spraw- realistic portrait of its ability to retain and ling, low-density suburbia—is deeply rooted enhance its competitive position internationally, in cheap gasoline, which is taxed at rates well a view that has gotten remarkably little attention below those of most countries. Petroleum im- from geographers. ports comprise one-half of total oil consumed In agriculture, for example, the U.S. stands in in the U.S. Nonetheless, the American economy a category by itself. Long a major producer of is far more energy-efficient per capita—and per grains, the U.S. exports one-third of all traded unit of GNP—than it was in 1970, largely due agricultural products in the world. American to the shift to services and the off-shoring of Contemporary U.S. versus Brian Berry’s U.S. 87 manufacturing. Further, the country has secured traditions, many rooted in reli-gion (Barber additional domestic and foreign supplies—in- 1996). As the tragedy of September 11, 2001, cluding, when necessary, by war. reveals, the U.S. is not immune from the global Politically, because the U.S. is the world’ssole reach of its culture and foreign policies. Yet hegemon, its military and diplomatic powers despite the contempt that many may have for are also unchallenged. With an annual defense American culture, for its crass commercialism budget of roughly $400 billion, the U.S. spends and boorishness and anti-intellectualism, for more on the military than the rest of the world billions of people throughout the world it combined, and five times more than its major constitutes an ardently sought-after ideal. potential rivals combined (Brauer and Gissy 1997). The nation is by far the world’s leading A Hollow Core? exporter of weapons.