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1985 The Diplomacy of William Jennings Bryan Patricia Sue Chism Eastern Illinois University This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program.

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Date Author

m THE DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

(TITLE)

BY

Patricia Sue Ch ism

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

Ma ster of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1985 YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING

THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

DATE THE DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

William Jennings Bryan (1860-1925) was Secretary of

State for the first two years of the administration of

Woodrow Wi lson, from 1913 to 1915 . During that time he

sought to implement his views of diplomacy which were

based upon his political and religious beliefs . His

emergence on the national political scene in 1896 had

been based upon his commitment to the welfare of common

man wh ich was inherent in his espousal of Popul ist prin­

ciples . As Secretary of State he promoted pol icies ,

especially in Latin America , designed to advance the

democratic form of government, wh ich he bel ieved best

served the interests of common man . His commitment to

Christianity was always a factor in his life , but it wa s

especially important after 1900 , when he merged morality

and his advocacy of various political issues , including

world peace . He believed international peace was attain­

able if men would attempt to solve differences in the

spirit of goodwill and brotherhood . Wh en a potential

conflict with Japan devel oped in 1913 , he applied his

ideas regard ing the practicability of attaining peace

through goodwi ll by his personal diplomacy with that

nation's ambassador to the Un ited States. He considered

his most important work as Secretary of State to be his

effort to make international peace attainable by estab-

1 ishing peace treaties wh ich would deve lop a process of

conciliation between the Un ited States and the other -2- signatory nations .

Bryan , after the outbreak of the First World War in

August 1914, continually sought opportunities to end the conflict . He hoped to help restore peace and prevent the

Un ited States from becoming involved in the conflict . To attain the latter objective , he wanted American citi zens traveling on belligerent ships in the war zone to be warned to do so at their own risk, but Wi l son absolutely refused to do this . After the British liner Lus itania was sunk in May 1915 with the loss of more than one hundred American lives , Bryan worked hard to gain ac­ ceptance of pol icies he felt necessary to prevent the nation from becoming invo lved in the war . Wh en it became obvious his views would not be accepted , he resigned in

June 1915 rather than sign the second Lusitania note , wh ich he was convinced would lead to involvement in the war . Afterward he continued to work to prevent the nation from becoming involved in the war , but when Congress declared war in April 1917 , Bryan immed iately gave it his support .

Following the war Bryan supported America's entry

into the League of Nations believing that organization provided a way to prevent future wars . In the 1920's he actively opposed the teaching of Darwin 's theory of evolution in schools supported by state funds because he - 3 - fe lt th is led to a questioning of religious truth s wh ich in turn wa s destructive of morality, political reform and ultima tely would threaten civilization itself . Bryan , who above all desired to be regarded as a Christian statesman , sough t to bring Chr istian morality into the international arena , bu t in the end , as Secretary of State he essentially continued the policies of his predecessors . To Orrison and Geraldine Chism TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ...... iii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

I. EARLY POLITICAL LIFE ...... 3

II . ADVOCATE OF POLITICAL AND MORAL REFORMS . .. 10

III. SECRETARY OF STATE ...... 17

IV . RESIGNATION AND LAST TEN YEARS ...... 38

FOOTNOTES ...... 4 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 54

ii ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Thanks to Dr . Raymond Koch for guidance in researching ma terial for th is work .

iii -1-

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of th is paper is to describe Wi lliam

Jennings Bryan 's approach to diplomacy as Secretary of State from 1913 to 1915 . He was offered the po­ sition because he was a leader of the Democratic

Party and had contributed his support to the election of Woodrow Wi l son in 1912. As a product of the values and ideals of Nineteenth Century America he sought , wh ile directing foreign policy , to impl ement his be­ lief that the nation had a mission in the world to provide an illuminating example of Christian morality and democratic government. However , his idealistic principles conflicted with the practical problems with wh ich he had to deal , wh ich forced him to compromise some of his ideas . Nevertheless , he refused to com­ promise his concern for the welfare of the people, and resigned in June 1915 rather than sign the second

Lus itan ia note because he believed it would lead to

American invol vement in the First World War . All of his pol itical life he sought to express the cause of the people , from 1896 wh en he captured the Democratic president ial nomination , to the Scopes trial in 1925

in Dayton , Tennessee . In dealing with Bryan both pri­ mary and secondary material has been utilized , including

some of his articles , speeches and memoirs , as well as biographies , journal articles and volumes analyzing -2- events with wh ich he was connected . In dealing with his record as Secretary of State , primary and secondary ma terial regarding the Wi l son Administration has been used ,

including Wilson's Papers , Foreign Relations Documents ,

several Wi l son biographies and journal articles analyzing the administration 's policies . THE DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

Wi lliam Jennings Bryan (1860-1925), emerged from an agrarian background , a fact wh ich affected his personal and pol itical belie fs . Born in Salem, Illinois , he re­ ceived his education includ ing law school , in that state . After beginning his practice of the law in 1883 in Jacksonvi lle , Illinois , he moved to Lincoln , Nebraska , believing it might offer a better opportunity to advance in that profession. There he also began rising rather rapidly in politics and successfully ran for Un ited

States House of Representatives in 1892 and 1894 as a

Democrat . Unsuccessful in his attempt to become a United

States Senator from that state , he returned to the prac­ tice of law, but increasingly devoted his energy toward pol itics .

Bryan emerged on the national political scene with his unexpected nomination by the Democratic party for the presidency in 1896 . The catalyst for his prominence was the silver cause wh ich was deeply rooted in Western frontier religion and politics . Christianity on the frontier presented the world as a struggle between abso-

1 ute good and evi l with the inevi table triumph of good ­ nes s. The Populist party , founded in 1891 to seek polit­ ical redress for agricultural gri evances, perceived the exis tence of an evil conspiracy by the Eas tern money power against the virtuous common man . Bryan , who had politically cooperated with the Populists throughout his -4-

Nebraska career , attempted to repeat th is on the nation­ al leve l in 1896 as he received their nomination for the presidency . Bryan 's view of the world was more Populist than Democratic and the ma in issues of his campa ign came from that party. He urged basic economic reforms , par­ ticularly free silver , wh ich was presented as the key to alleviate financia l dif ficulties and to restore the idyl­ lic past. Political reforms were urged to enable the common man to gain control of the government.I

In 1898 , nationa l attention focused on foreign prob­ lems as the Spanish-American Wa r began on Apr il 25 with a Congressional declaration of war . Bryan , like other men from the We s t, vo lunteered for duty on the same day , perceiving the war as a way to liberate the Cuban people from the Spanish . The military action in Cuba was short and the United States , having previously renounced any intention of anne xing the island , eventua lly gave it min­ ima l independence . During the war Amer ica began to take control of Spain's other colonial possessions . In the

Car ibbe an , an area wh ere the Uni ted States had already deve loped an in f luence , it established outright military contro l of Puerto Rico. In the Pacific , William McKin­ ley's Administration favored the annexat ion of the

Hawa iian Islands and in July, Congress , citing the war as justification , passed a joint resolution annexing that -5- island . Bryan was one of the few Democrats to oppose th is action , claiming it would be the precursor of a period of imperialism.

The Treaty of Paris , between Spain and the Un ited

States , was signed on December 10 , 1898 . According to its terms , America agreed to pay twenty million dollars for the Philippine Islands , wh ich prompted the Filipine insurgents to resist American annexation . Congress de­ bated the treaty early in 1899 and ratified it on Feb­ ruary 6, 1899 . The treaty officially ended the war and

America acquired Guam , Puerto Rico and the Philippine

Islands .

It was the conquest of the Philippines , wh ich gave the Spanish-American War its imperialistic character , and immed iately an anti-imperialist movement arose to challenge this deve l opment . Th is movement began dur ing the summer of 1898 with ind ividual protests against the course of the war . The intention of the McK inley Ad­ ministration to annex the Ph ilippines led to the organ­ ization in November , 1898 , of the New England Anti­

Imperialist League . The intiators of the League included some of the most noted men in Massachusetts , including Charles Eliot Norton , a Harvard professor and the first to speak out against the war , Gamiel Brad ford , initiator of the movement, George Sewall Boutwell , and

Erving Winslow , pres ident and secretary of the League -6- respective ly, as we ll as Edward Atkinson and Moor field

Storey , both opponents of American action in the Ph il­ ippines . The core of its leadership came from some of the upper middle-class families of Boston's established mercantile wealth , including Thomas Wentworth Higginson and Charles Francis Adams . 2

The anti-imperialist movement gained its strength from the fact that there was nation-wide opposition to imperialism. Th is was the case because it touched fac­ ets of the American experience . It arose from the sense that imperialism was inconsistent with America 's demo­ cratic past . The impetus for the movement could be found in the social discontent surround ing the advancing industrial order . Industry was beginning to dominate the nation and industrialists found in imperialism a foreign policy that worked to their economic advantage .

Conversely, the anti-imperialist opposition idealized the older mercantile-agrarian society wh ich the new order threatened . The An ti-Imperialist League reached out to various groups to increase its strength and re­ ce ived support from those wh o felt th ey saw in the Phil­ ippine insurrection mu ch of the reason for their own sense of estrangement from the social conditions . Men from the silver crusade , Popul ists , as well as Irish­

Americans , who tended to view imperialism as being essentially English , joined the cause, as did blacks , -7- some labor un ion leaders and some un ions. Various reformers from the clergy and intellectuals joined , also leaders of such diverse reforms as the feminist and pacifist movements , along with leaders of the new movement for urban reform. Socialists also joined in this opposition.3

The fact that the anti-imperialist movement was a diverse political movement made it difficult to agree on a common strategy . Particularly diff icult to accept was Bryan 's idea of accepting the treaty with Spain and then attempting to limit the imperialism it contained.

Bryan had , at least in part , favored the treaty simp ly to bring the war officially to an end. Nevertheless , he quickly separated himself from most of his anti­ imperialist allies by working for the treaty 's ratifi­ cation . In the East the most prominent political opponent of imperialism and the ratification of the treaty was Republican Senator George F. Hoar , of Ma ssachusetts .

Wh ile anti-imperialist strategy was to delay, Hoar was one of the men respons ible for allowing the vote to be taken when it wa s . Nevertheless , he held Bryan as the man , next to McKinley , most respons ible for passage of the treaty. Wh ile Bryan may have influenced a few votes, his role in the treaty 's passage has been overestimated . 4

The second part of Bryan 's plan was thwarted by the nar­ row defeat of the Bacon resolution which promised ulti­ mate independence to the Philippines . He had strongly -8- advocated granting independence to the Philippines , arguing that America had fought the war to liberate the

Cubans and it was wrong to subjugate the Filipinos.

For him, the defeat of the Bacon resolut ion was the beginn ing of a new and important political struggle.5

Bryan was one of the first public men in America to oppose imperialism, although he did not oppose expansion or taking territory wh ich could be converted into states of the un ion. He rejected imperialism on moral , philo­ sophical , social and economic grounds. Ph ilosophically he rejected it because he bel ieved that government de­ rived its power from the consent of the governed and because of his commitment to Jef fersonian principles .

He felt the Ameri can form of government would be threat­ ened , since carrying out this pol icy would require a large standing army and the acquisiti on of subjects, wh ich could only be accomplished by force. In addition,

America would lose her prestige and influence around the world by abandon ing her role as champion of self­ government, liberty , human rights and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.6

Bryan received the Democratic nomination for President in 1900 on the first ballot. His campaign emphasized three key issues wh ich he felt characterized the battle between democracy and plutocracy. He felt imperialism, the trusts , and the gold standard , repres ented closely '!'

-9-

1 inked interrelated issues wh ich he opposed ind ivid­

ua lly and collectively, and wh ich he believed would

provide the essential key to his success . He devoted

his acceptance speech to imperialism, wh ich he declared

the paramount issue . After this speech in Indi anapolis ,

Indiana , he received aid from the anti-imperialist move­

ment as it declared him its choice for President . Be­

cause both rejected the idea of control of the nation by

the plutocracy , they could agree on imperialism and the

trusts . The un ion between Bryan , as the Democratic

candidate and a man of Populist sympathies , and the New

England Anti-Imperialist League in opposing imperialism,

represented the peak of the alliance of men with their

vision of an older Ameri can society . Nevertheless ,

there were problems as some of the anti-imperialists

rejected Bryan because of his position on bime tallism,

and even on the issue of imper ialism their vote was

deeply divided . Wh ile there was some natural opposition

to imperialism, it did not provoke undue concern among

the electorate . Instead , the decisive factor in the

election was the state of the economy . Amer ica was ex­

periencing a prosperity brought on , in part , by the war .

The Republican strategy , wh ich proved successful , had

been to impart fear that Bryan would destroy that pros­

perity by putting into effect his dangerous economic

ideas . In the end , McKinley was re-elected with only a -10- one per cent increase in the popular vote over the previous pres idential election . 7

Af ter 1900 , Bryan became increasingly concerned with religion and with earning a good living , both of wh ich affected his political efforts . His merging of pol iti­ cal and moral issues was ref lected in his advocacy of socia l justice , popular government , peace and interna­ tiona l arbitration as a method of ach ieving th is. Both the Chautauqua lectures and his weekly newspaper Th e

Commoner served the political objective s of keeping the

Democratic party on a reform course . Moreover , on the

Chautauqua circuit he made a direct appeal to the people essentia l to ach ieve the enduring transformation of soci­ ety wh ich he sought . He be lieved a transformation toward a humanitarian society with human righ ts as we ll as inter­ na tiona l peace could only be achieved after there had first been a change in the heart of each person . The traveling Chautauqua 's provided an ideal setting for th is because of its programs of lectures and enterta inment wh ich were designed to promo te education and individua l

improvement . In addition , bo th the Chautauqua circuit and his newspaper provided lucrative sources of income .

In 1900 and after , he wa s criticized as one who used politics to become one of the ve ry plutocrats he fervently -11- denounced . By 1908 , he claimed his wealth was between

$125 ,000 and $150, 000 and by 1909 he was earning about

$100 , 000 annually from lectures . 8

Throughout the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, beginning in 1901 , Bryan criticized its foreign pol icies .

He objected to his militarism, particularly in regard to establi shing the Panama Canal . Rooseve lt originally sough t a diplomatic settlement with Colombia to gain ac­ cess for an interoceanic canal linking the Atlantic and

Pacific, principally for use by the American Navy . He believed nava l power was the key to America's position in the wor ld , wh ich was his ch ief concern . Unable to gain the settlement he desired , he aided the Panamanian revolt by send ing ve ssels to prevent Colombia from putting down the rebellion. In November 1903 , America quickly recognized the new nation , and its leaders soon agreed to terms favorable to American construction of the canal . In the Far East , Roosevelt sought to protect

American interests by ma intaining a balance of power be­ tween Russia and Japan . To th is end , he successfully arbi trated a conclusion to the Russo-Japanese war in 1905 .

Bryan praised his efforts at ending the war and later urged him to make arbitration treaties with other nations the next step in his foreign policy , wh ich Roosevelt re­ fused to do . Wh ile some bilateral arbitration treaties were negotiated during his administration, Roosevelt, -12- un l ike Bryan , believed in a limited number of issues to be adjudicated , and beli eved treaties viable only if power existed to back them up . 9

Bryan received the democratic nomination for pres­ ident for a third time in 1908 . His opponent , William

Howard Taft, Roosevelt's Secretary of War , had played a sign i ficant role in the foreign pol icy of that admin­ istration and was expected to continue its direction .

The Republ ican policies of expansionism and a navy with an offensive capability were threatened by the Demo­ cratic party with its anti-imperialist tradition.

Bryan played a central role in the construction of the

Democratic platform , wh ich called for eventual Philip­ pine independence and pledged a navy merely sufficient for national defense . Wh ile domestic political and economic issues predominated in the campaign , the over­ riding issue was wh ich man would best continue Roose­ ve lt 's pol icies . In the end , Taft won because many believed he would continue those pol icies and that prosperity would return more quickly with him since he had the support of the business commun ity . Bryan suffered his worst presidential defeat in the election . IO

The Taft Administration continued many of Roosevelt's foreign pol icies , but its ma in emphasis shifted to eco­ nomic solutions for various problems and to achieving world peace . In Latin America , Taft sought both American -13- commercial success and the economic improvement of the region to gain the prosperity , pol itical stability and peace he desired . Critics began to label his approach to problems as dollar diplomacy . Bryan , who toured

Latin America for a few months in 1909 and 1910 , was one of those who objected to his emphasis on economic solutions to the problems of the area , preferring moral persuasion to settle disputes . Bryan , who over the years had come to support the cause of peace , sug­ ges ted to Taft the idea of establi shing arbitration treaties as a method of ach i eving world peace . Taft, wh o also desired world peace , acted upon the idea and

in the summer of 1911 un limited arbitration treaties with both Britain and France were signed . Wh ile Taft had hoped the treaties would be the high point of his administration , the Senate excluded certain questions from arbitration , prompting him to refuse to send them

to the nations for ratification.11

Bryan , following his th ird pres idential defeat, worked very hard to ensure that progressives would con­ trol the Democratic National Convention and thus nomi ­ nate the presidential candidate . Wh ile he did not ex­

clude himself from consideration , other men were rising

as possible presidential contenders . He opposed the

conservative -backed cand idacies of Judson Harmon and

Oscar Underwood , wh ile describing James Beuchamp Clark , -14-

Speaker of the House of Representatives , and Woodrow

Wi l son , Governor of New Jersey, to be equally progres­ sive . In the months preceeding the Democratic National

Convention, Bryan increasingly began to favor Wilson, who had by 1910 converted from conservatism to a sup­ porter of progressive reforms . By January 1912, Wi lson's presidential campaign was under attack , including the publication of a letter he had wr itten in 1907 con ­ taining an unfavorable reference to Bryan . Bryan chose to ignore the remark , accepting his conversion to pro­ gressivism and unwi lling to aid the conservatives by

creating division within the progressive ranks . At

the Democratic Convention in June , Bryan was a delegate at large instructed for Clark . He sought from the be­ ginning to establ ish a progressive dominated convention

and to that end opposed the conservative backed Alton B.

Parker as temporary chairman . Wh ile the move was unsuc­

cessful , it high l ighted the nature of the struggle at

the convention and a progressive was ultimately named

permanent chai rman . On June 27 , Bryan introduced a

resolut ion , wh ich subsequently was passed , declaring

that the party would not nominate a man under the inf lu­

ence of or in obligation to John Pierpont Morgan , Thomas

Fortune Ryan , or August Belmont , major American finan­

ciers . During the presidential balloting , Bryan voted

for Clark , the leading candidate at the beginning of the -15- convention . His cand idacy received a large boost when

New York cast its ninety votes for him on the tenth ballot since th is gave him a majority of the delegates .

Bryan assumed at first that New York would soon abandon him, but eventually began to worry that the Clark forces had made a deal with that state . On the fourteenth bal­ lot Senator Gilbert Hitchcock , believing that sentiments about Clark had changed , demanded a pol l of the Nebraska delegates , and Bryan , along with most of the rest of them switched to Wi l son . Bryan explained that he re­ fused to vote for any cand idate wh ich the New York del­ egates with their connections to the cons ervative financial and business elite were also voting . Wh ile his change of vote caused some loss of momentum for

Clark , Wi lson's subsequent nomination on the forty-sixth ballot came from securing the necessary addit ional votes , particularly those of the Underwood delegates . 12

Bryan was pleased that the Democratic Party had named a progressive presidential candidate in opposition to the conservative Taft, the Republican nominee , and Roosevelt, who had bolted that party to become the nominee of the

National Progressive Party on August 6. The following day , Wi l son formally accepted the nomination by the Demo­ cratic Party . In his subsequent campaign he advocated reforms , pr incipally regarding tariff and trusts to insure a "New Freedom" for America in wh ich the nation would -16- regain its economic and pol itical liberty . In empha­ sizing the value of democracy and economic opportunity for the common man , wh ich were being threatened by the control of a few men of great wealth , he was continuing the popul ist and Bryan tradition. Bryan enthusiastic­ ally worked for Wi lson's victory , vigorously campaigning for seven weeks, delivering as many as ten speeches a day . Bryan ultimately brought his large following to back Wilson wh ich was critical since a coalition of support in the South and We st was needed for victory .

In November , Wil son won the election with a plurality of the popular vote , although he swept the electoral vote . With his election came the problem of what to do with Bryan . Wh ile Wi l son had come to respect and admire him, he held little confidence in his judgment . However ,

Bryan 's position as titular head of the party and his help during the campaign , along with Wi lson's desire to have his help in obtaining domestic legislation and to prevent him from criticizing the administration from the outside , left him little choice but to bring him inside his government. Unsuccessful in his attempt to interest him in an unobtrusive foreign position , Wil son finally offered him the position of Secretary of State in

December 1912 . Bryan , who had been interested in pro­ moting international peace for some time , accepted the position since Wi l son approved of his plan to negotiate -17- a series of peace treaties with other nations and to ma ke them an integral part of th e administration 's foreign po licy. 13

Bryan took the oath of off ice as Secretary of State on March 5, 19 13 , th e day following Wilson' s inaugura­ tion as President . He brought to th e position certain be liefs and attitudes stemming from his deep commitment to Christian morality wh ich affected his approach to fore ign affairs , his perception of internationa l rela­

tions and the po licies he sought to pursue . He perce ived internationa l relations in terms of simple good and evil, be lieving that th e same standards wh ich appl ied to indi­ viduals were also applicable to nations . His moralism

led to his pursuit of certa in ideals inc luding th e via­ bility of moral persuasion and the cultivation of good­ wi ll and fr iendship to settle disputes between na tions .

His pr inc iple diplomatic goa l invo lved his concern for mankind , particularly th at for the welfare of common man who se interests were served by the establishment of dem­ oc ratic government and interna tiona l peace. He believe d

that th e spread of democracy would result in governments

increas ingly reflecting the people' s welfare wh ich wa s

advanced by peace. He felt peace could be achieved by mediation of po tentia l internationa l conf lict, and that

his hoped- for social transformation would be ma de -18- meaningful by the establi shment of a lasting peace between nations . Believing that war was only "evidence of man's surrender to his passions1114 he felt that "if peace is to come in th is world it will come because people more and more clearly recognize the indissoluble tie that binds each human being to every other . If we are to build permanent peace it must be on the foundation of the brotherhood of men . . 1 1 15 To him "one of the tests of civilization is man's willingness to submit his controversies to the arbitration of reason rather than of force .11 16 In 1910 he proposed that the

Un ited States take the lead in promoting peace by

"telling the world that it did not believe in war , that it had no disputes . it was not willing to submit to the judgment of the wor ld . If this nation did that it not only would not be attacked ...but it would become the supreme power in the world .11 17

The beginning of the new administration coincided with a number of impend ing foreign policy crises wh ich

Wilson and Bryan approached based on their similar ideas . The first foreign problem they faced was the question of whether to grant full diplomatic recogni­ tion to the new Mexican government of General Victoriano

Huerta who had overthrown the elec ted president Francisco

I. Madero on February 18 , 1913 . Madero was arrested and after "resigning" the presidency was killed under -19- suspicious circumstances. Nevertheless , the Taft Admin­ istration granted de facto recognition to Huerta . President­ elect Wil son was shocked by the incident wh ich was pre­ sented by the press with an implication that Huerta wa s responsible . Th is moral view affected Wilson's decision regarding the question of recognizing the new Mexican government. Wi l son sought to promote peace and stabi lity in the region of the Panama Canal and to help improve conditions within Mexico by reestablishing constitutional government. His stress on idealism and moralism was shown by his announcement, on March 11, 1912 , emphasizing

America's desire for a spirit of friendship and helpful- ness to exist with Latin America , but he stressed that this needed to be based upon constitutional government in the area . He later stated that "the purpose of the

Un ited States is solely and simply to secure peace and order in Central America in see ing to it that the pro- cesses of self-government there are not interrupted or set aside . Usurpations ..ren der the devel opment of ordered self-government impossible . . It is the purpose of the Un ited States , therefore , to discredit and defeat such usurpations whenever they occur ." There­ fore , the administration urged a mediation plan in wh ich it would make available its good offices to conduct an election . However , the authorities in Mexico City ob­ jec ted to this American interference in Mexico 's internal -20- affairs and the Constitutionalists refused to partici­ pate in the election . 18

The administration , in spite of the rejection of its offer , believed Huerta had agreed to its condition that he not be a cand idate , and looked forward to the sched­ uled election of October 26 , 1913. Just before the election , Huerta , in an attempt to control the Chamber of Deputies , arres ted several opposition members , dis­ solved the Mexican Congress , and thereafter ruled as a mi litary dictator . Because of these events the Wi l son

Administration announced it would not recognize the re­ sult even before Huerta was "elected." From that time forward Wil son intended to eliminate Huerta from power .

He first sought to cooperate with the First Chief of the Constitutionalist opposition forces , Venustiano

Carranza, believing their victory would move the nation toward consti tutional government, however , no accommo­ dation could be reached because they refused to accept any American interference in the nation's internal af­ fairs . However , by January 1914 Wil son believed they were the on ly alternative to an American intervention to eliminate Huerta . To that end , on February 3, 1914 , he lifted the American embargo on arms to Mexico . In spite of th i s, Huerta was able to maintain himself in power over the next few months . By April 1914 Wil son beleived the Constitutionalists intended to secure -2 1- ser ious economic and social reforms as well as estab- lish constitutiona l government and found a way to inter­ vene to advance these reforms . He stated that "I ho ld th is to be a wonderful oppor tunity . . . to prove to th e wor ld that th e United States of America is not only human but humane ; that we are actuated by no other mo tives than the betterment of th e conditions of our unfortunate ne igh­ bors , and by th e sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. 1119

The administration found in an inc ident at Tampico th e pretext it needed to intervene to eliminate Huerta . On

Apr il 9 a Huertista officer arrested several American sailors who had landed to load supplies in a mi litarily restricted area without permi ssion. Wh ile the men were quickly released , accompanied by express ions of regret , th e squadron comma nder at Tampico , Admiral Henry T. Mayo , viewing the Mexican action as unjust, presented several demands to th em , including the firing of a twenty-one gun salute . Although th e Mexicans were willing to negotiate a face- saving compromise , the administration insisted that Mayo' s demands be me t without condition . Wil son appeared before Congress on April 21 , and cited the insult to th e flag and lesser inc idents as the basis for his re­ quest to obtain permission to use the nation' s mi litary forces to enforce the dignity and respect due th e United

States from Mexico. The author ization was granted on the -22- twenty-second but Wi l son , who had actually intended to use the military to weaken the Huerta regime by pre­ venting foreign mil itary supplies from reach ing him along the eastern ports , had already acted . To prevent the landing of a German ship loaded with military sup­ plies wh ich would aid Huerta in maintaining power , Wil son decided to prevent th is land ing by occupying key points within Veracruz . However , Mexican resistance to the

Marine occupation was so strong that the entire city had to be occupied . The Constitutionalists , although the intended beneficiaries of the action , denounced th is interference in Mexico 's internal affairs and announced that they would mi litarily oppose any further Ameri can advance . 20

Bryan , wh ile having strongly supported Wi lson's ob­ jectives and policy in Mexico from the beginning , opposed any further intervention in Mexico . He was relieved to be able to accept the offer of mediation of this crisis made by Argentina , Brazil and Ch i le. Since Huerta also accepted the offer , the danger of further American inter­ vention was relieved . However , the mediation conference wh ich was attended by representatives of the Un ited States ,

Mexico and the A. B. C. Powers , as they were called, met from May to July 1914 but ended with little substance .

Nevertheless , the Un ited States control of the custom­ house at Veracruz bankrupted the authorities at Mexico -23-

Ci ty , wh ile the Constitutionalist forces continued to advance militarily , prompting Huerta to "resign" on

July 15. The following month Carranza assumed execu-

tive authority in accordance with the previous agree- ment between the revolutionary leaders . Carranza com­ pletely rejected American efforts to play a role in the nation's internal affairs . The administration then began to hope General Francisco Villa , who had quickly

rebelled against the new government, would succeed since

he seemed to accept the political and social reforms the

administration sought . Th is hope was abandoned when

Villa suffered ser ious mil itary losses in the spring of

1915 . On June 2, Wil son issued a statement to the leaders

of the factions in Mexico urging them to un ite and estab­

lish a constitutional government and warning that the

Un ited States might be forced to employ the means to ac­

complish th is in the event they did not do so. Bryan

approved his course , but urged the way be left open to

recognize Carranza , should his influence warrant such a

move . By the fall of 1915 Carranza 's military strength

was such that the administration extended de facto re­

cognition. Bryan , who had resigned several months before ,

applauded this as an indication of the success of the

Ameri can objectives of oust ing Huerta and open ing the way

for constitutional government in Mexico . Two years later

in March 1917 , the administration granted full diplomatic -24- recognition to the Constitutionalists . 21

Bryan directed policy toward the rest of Latin America subject to Wilson's final approval , although , he had from the beginn ing gotten the administration to place a high priority on cult ivating friendship in the area . His concern for th is was shown by his desire to deal with

Colombia's gri evance about the support America had given the Panamanian drive for independence in 1903 . In

July 1913, Bryan discussed this question with the Colom­ bian minister to the Un ited States , John Bel ancourt , and in noting that American "honor [was] at stake in all matters wh ich involve fair dealing with other nations ," proposed their differences be adjusted by direct negotiation . 22

Later in the year he sent a draft treaty to the American minister to Colombia , Thaddeus A. Thomson , wh ich provided the basis for the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty signed on

April 6, 1914. It was ratified two months later in Co­ lombia, and Wil son quickly submitted it to the United

States Senate . However , there was considerable opposition to the American expression of "sincere regret that any­ thing should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of . . friendship . between the two nations" since this was viewed as an apology . 23 There was also opposition to the Un ited States agreeing to pay an indemnity of $25 ,000 ,000 . Bryan attempted to gain -25-

Senate approval , but had not been able to do so by the time he left office . Nevertheless , his efforts had helped to restore America 's moral prestige in Latin

America higher than it had been since 1903 . It was another six years before an amended version of the treaty , omi tting any regret , was approved by the United

States and ratification in Colombia quickly followed . 24

In Central America and the Caribbean , Bryan tried

to promote friendship and democratic government wh ile impl ementing policies to protect American interests by advancing peace and stability in the area . Secur ity

for the Panama Canal , completed in 1914 , was of partic­ ular importance and Ameri can policy toward Nicaragua ,

strategically located near the canal and containing an alternate interoceanic route , reflected this concern .

The Taft Administration had sent Marines to ma intain order during disturbances in 1912 with the result that

the Conservative Party of Al fonso Diaz was able to re­

tain power . Bryan continued to support that regime

believing the alternative was insurrection and chaos .

However , the revolution had left the nation with seri­

ous economic prob l ems and , in the fall of 1913, Bryan

agreed to a loan from American bankers in Nicaragua

wh ich would provide funds to enable the government to

continue operating . Bryan believed that the root of

the problem was the presence of foreign investors and -26- attempted to supplant their influence by proposing that the Un ited States government provide a loan to Nicaragua .

He was seeking to extend the Monroe Doctrine to include

American opposition to foreign investors in Latin Amer­ ica , however , he was forced to abandon the loan scheme because Wi l son opposed it. He was able to provide finan­ cial help for Nicaragua by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty signed on August 5, 1914 in wh ich the Un ited States agreed to pay $3 ,000 , 000 for , among other items , an ex­ clusive right to an interoceanic canal route . Particu­ larly concerned about possible German efforts to acquire this he was able to secure for America a permanent op­ tion on the alternate canal route to prevent any foreign power from acquiring it . Bryan had left office by the time both nations ratified the treaty in 1916 , however ,

Latin America rema ined concerned that it would provide an excuse for more American intervention in the area . 25

Bryan based American pol icies toward the Caribbean nations of the Dominican Republic and Haiti , occupying the Island of Hispaniola, upon concern for American security by promoting stability along the entrance to the Panama Canal and in helping to advance democratic government in the area . In both nations financial mis­ management and constant revolutions had contributed to serious economic problems , wh ich led the Un ited States to assume by treaty in 1907 , a financial protectorate -27- over the Dominican Republic to prevent foreign inter- vention . Later , Bryan 's concern about foreign involve- ment in Haiti led him to attempt , without success, to gain its agreement to some financial control . His effort to promote constitutional government led him to

; support the Dominican Provisional President Jose Bordas

I Valdes , who was threatened by rebellion in the fall of

1913. He gave rebe l leaders an American guarantee that

the upcoming constitutional election would be free .

However , difficulty arose when Bordas , who was to call

for a pres idential election in Apr il 1914 , apparently

intended to remain in power by controlling the voting .

His opponents by late May un ited under the leadership

/ of General Horacio Vasques and continued to advance militarily unt il the United States threatened naval

bombardment if fighting continued . In August , the

Wi l son Adm inistration presented a plan to reestablish

governmental authority by means of a pres idential elec-

tion. Mo st of the leaders agreed to this and Juan

Isidora Jim�nez became Pres ident in December 1914.

Wh ile Bryan was prepared to use American military force

to support the government, he increasingly urged the

Dominicans to accept more Ameri can control over both

its finances and a constabulary . However , his efforts

to reduce the nation's sovereignty alienated the people

. / from Jimenez , thus reducing his ability to remain in -28- power . Bryan resigned in June 1915 , but his policies quic kly led to mi litary in tervention during di sturb­ an ces in Haiti , which by treaty finally gran ted sub­ stantia l control over its dome stic affair s to America .

Later , during di sturbances in the Dominican Republic ,

America landed troops and in November 1915 , placed it under mi litary rule . Both nations remained protector­ ates of the United States for several years. 26

Bryan had a major in fluence in formula ting policy toward the Far East and was immedia tely confronted wi th the problem of maintaining cordia l relations with Japan .

That nation con sidered pending legislation in Califor - nia to be directed toward its subjects in that state and viewed this as offensive and in vio lation of a 1911 treaty be tween the two nations . Bryan went to California hoping to gain sufficient moderation in the language of the legis lation to prevent in jury to Japan 's sensibilities and to indicate the government 's good in tentions in the matter . On Ma y 9 legislation was passed prohibiting ownership of land to aliens ine ligible for citizenship and rumors of possible war between the United States and Japan followed . Because of this American mi litary leaders urged ships be sent to help protect the Philip­ pines and Hawaii from attack , but Bryan along wi th

Wi lson rejected this , believing it would merely -29- increase the chance of war . Bryan , applying his idea of dispell ing crises by personal diplomacy and goodwill , talked on May 18 with Japan's Ambassador to the United

States Viscount Sutemi Ch inda . He expressed American friendship, but was unable to give assurances of any remedial action to be taken regarding the California law. This prompted Chinda to ask if the position was final , to wh ich he responded that "there is nothing final between friends '' and that the Un ited States would consider any proposition the Japanese offered . 27 The

American response to the first Japanese protest was presented to Ambassador Chinda the following day . In the note Bryan expressed assurances of American friend ­ ship by stating it would cooperate "in every possible way to maintain . . . the understanding wh ich bind the two nations together in honor and in interest," but did not concede any of the main points Japan had raised . 28

In the fall of 1913, the Japanese proposed to resolve

the issue by negotiating a treaty , but little progress had been made by April 1914 when a new Japanese govern­ ment came to power urging a more aggressive foreign

pol icy . The Japanese note of November 25 , 1914 , wh ich

stated it had received ''little that appears to answer in

a fundamental manner the main compl aints ," indicated the

failure to arrive at any solution . 29 The lingering hos­

tility clouded relations and made agreement over problems -30- wh ich arose in Wor ld War I more difficult .

Bryan 's belief that America should do more to advance world peace than any other nation led him to propose a plan giving expression to his idea that Christian moral­ ity was applicable to the world . On April 24 , 1913, he presented to diplomats of thirty-six nations with repre­ sentatives in the Un ited States a plan officially enti­ tled, "Treaties for the Advancement of General Peace ," wh ich he believed would be the basis for an enduring peace . The Un ited States and any nation signing these treaties agreed that any dispute including ones of vi- tal interests and national honor arising between them , not settled by diplomacy and without recourse to arbi­ tration , would be presented for investigation to a five ­ member international comm i ssion. The one-year period the commi ssion would normally take to make its report provided time for cooling-off and reflection before resorting to hostilities or war . Bryan hoped that during the time of investigation reason would replace emotion enabling men to reach a solution and that in the year publ ic opinion might form and express itself to reduce the likelihood of war . Wh ile there was no provis ion for enforcement and no obligation on the parties to accept the decision, he believed at the end of the time war would on ly be "a remote possib ility .11 30 He wanted the parties to include in the treaties a prohibit ion -31- aga inst mi litary bu ild-up , but th is was to be determined in each agreement . By late 1914 thirty-six nat ions had adopted his peace plan in pr inciple , representing over three-fourth s of the world 's population . Germany ac­ cepted the plan in principle ; however , it refused to sign because its great mi litary advantage would be reduced by a cool ing-off period , wh ich would allow other nat ions to mobilize their forces and reduce its barga in­ ing power . Of the th irty treaties wh ich were negotia ted , twenty were ultima tely ratified by the United States

Senate , including those with Great Britain , France ,

Spain , Ch ina and Rus sia . 31

The outbreak of the First World Wa r in early August

1914 led Bryan to continually seek an opportunity to offer American mediat ion as a way to restore peace .

Bryan had urged Wi l son before the war to offer mediation

as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28 ,

but ins tead Wi l son consul ted the British as to whether

an American proposal of its good offices would serve any

useful purpose . On August 4, with war existing betwe en

Austria-Hungary along with Germany against France and

Rus sia , the United States issued a proclamation of neu­

trality. The same day , Bryan instructed the American

ambassadors to deliver to the leaders of Austr ia-Hungary ,

Germany and Russia an offer of mediation . On August 5 -32-

Br itain declared war on Germany and similar instructions were sent to that nation as well as France . However , all five nations rejected America 's first formal offer of good off ices prompting Bryan to note that "each one de­ clares he is opposed to war and anxious to avoid it and then lays the blame upon someone else .••32 He hoped more opportunities for mediation might arise and upon learning on September 6 that Germany might accept an American offer of mediation , immediately expressed to that nation the desire of the Un ited States to bring "the parties into conference with a view to the adjustment by them of their differences .11 33 He conveyed to England and France through the respective American ambassadors the desir­ ability of mediation , since he believed it would be bene­ ficial if "the dif ferent nations would be able to explain

. . . the reasons for continuing the war . . . and the terms upon wh ich peace is possible . Th is would locate responsibility for the continuation of the war and help to mold public opinion . 1134 The United States on

September 16 received Germany 's negative reply, thus ending the effort, as Wil son would on ly offer mediation if assured of its acceptance . Bryan bel ieving nei ther side would win the overwhelming victory necessary to dictate terms urged Wil son to make an open appeal to the belligerents asking for immediate peace talks to be held in the Un ited States with all neutral and belligerent -33- nations attend ing . Wil son rejected th i s, but Bryan continued to urge an appeal for peace believing the

Un ited States as the leading exponent of Christianity and the foremost advocate of world peace had a respon­ sibility to do everything possible to end the war . 35

Bryan 's greatest contribution to peace during the war lay in the effort he exerted to maintain American neutrality as a way to retain the nation's influence

for reconciling the belligerents and to avoid its in­ vol vement in the war . Immediately after the war began ,

the administration was confronted with the possibility

of American bankers extend ing loans to the belligerent governments . Wh ile such loans were not contrary to the precedents of international law, Bryan believed that

"money [was] the worst of all contrabands because it com­ mands everyth ing else.1136 He urged Wil son to oppose

the granting of loans because it would lead to division

within the nation as those who had lent money would fa-

vor one belligerent against another and this would make

it more difficult to maintain neutrality . On August 15,

he announced that the administration , although unable to

prevent such loans , regarded them as ''inconsistent with

the true spirit of neutrality.11 37 As the war continued ,

the administration sought to prevent divi s ion within the

nation by closely adhering to a policy of strict neutrality

between the belligerents . Th is was reflected by Bryan 's -34-

changed attitude regarding loans , since in October he was willing to condone bankers extend ing short-term

credit to the belligerent governments , wh ich would en­

able them to purchase war materials in the Un ited States .

On October 15, he reaffirmed the administration 's posi­

tion that individual Ameri cans had a right to sell mili­

tary supplies to the warring nations . The administration believed the British proclamation of October 29 wh ich

increased the articles considered absolute contrabands and

liable to seizure if destined for an enemy , was based

upon international law, and did not send a formal protest

although it infringed upon America 's neutral trading

rights . For the same reason , the administration did not

formally protest the British proclamation of November 3

designating the North Sea a war zone in wh ich neutral

ve ssels could travel safely on ly by following certain

routes . 38

As the war continued the administration sough t to

protect America's neutral rights wh ich were increasingly

adversely affected by the escalating reprisals between

the belligerents . Its previous decisions regard ing neu­

trality had enabled Great Britain, given its naval supe­

riority over the Central Powers and its efforts to re­

strict German shipping , to secure from the United States

the supplies necessary to continue its war effort . Th is

situation led Germany on February 4, 1915 to take -35- countermeasures by declar ing the waters surrounding the

British Isles , including the English Channel, to be a war zone in wh ich , after the eighteenth , all enemy mer­

chant vessels would be subject to attack by submarines without warning . It further noted that neutral ships would be in danger of destruction since submarines would not be able to adhere to visit and search before com­ mencing an attack because of British misuse of neutral

flags and its ramming techniques . The administration

responded to Germany in a note of February 10 declaring

that the loss of Ameri can lives or ves sels by submarine

attack without warning would be regarded as "an inde­

fensible violation of neutral rights" for wh ich it would

be held "to a strict accountability . 1 1 39 Bryan believed

the German reply offered some hope of obtaining an agree­

ment between the belligerents relating to their respec­

tive maritime rules and on February 20 sent notes to

both nations . He urged them to consider , among other

items , that Britain allow food to be imported for German

civilians under American supervision, in return for that

nation agreeing to adhere to visit and search regarding

merchant ve ssels, but no agreement was reached . The

British Order in Council of March 11 declaring its inten­

tion to detain all ships presumed to be trading with Ger­

many , prompted the administration 's reply that it was

expected "to make full reparation for every act , wh ich - 36 - under the rules of international law constitutes a violation of neutral rights .1140 Nevertheless , by the spring of 1915 relations wi th Germany had deteriorated as it believed America was unneutral , at least in spirit , because of its failure to oppose British measures whi le continuing to sell it mi litary supplies . 41

The Wi lson Administration was predominately concerned during the spring of 1915 wi th Germany 's use of the sub­ marine in enforcing its blockade of Britain . By early

May Wi lson had decided that while clearly opposing Ger­ many 's submarine warfare , he would be wil ling to post­ pone final settlement of the several incidents involving

America until after the war . However , this was dras­ tically altered when the British liner Lusitania was sunk wi thout warning by a German submarine on May 7 resul ting in the deaths of 124 Americans . Bryan , two days later , pointed out to Wi lson that the ship had carried a cargo of ammunition and noted that "Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect [it] from attack .1142 He urged

Wi lson to maintain strict neutrality by sending a note to Germany regarding the Lusitania incident and one to

Great Britain protesting its interference wi th American neutral rights . He believed this would show the United

States intended to defend "our rights from aggression -37- from both sides .1143 He signed the first Lusitania note of May 13 wh ich declared Germany would be held to "strict accountability" for infringing America 's rights regarding travel and commerce as well as noting that the use of submarines against merchant vessels resulted in ''an inev­ itable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity.1144

Bryan believed a protest would be sent simultaneously to Britain , but Wilson refused to do this when a more ser ious controversy exis ted with Germany . As Wi l son would later note , the "violation of neutral righ ts is different from ...violatio n of the rights of humanity.1145

Bryan , as he had done before , urged the administration to take action to warn Americans to avoid traveling on bel­ ligerent ships in the war zone , but Wil son rejected this, believing it would weaken the importance of the note and would appear as weakness before the threat to the right of Americans to travel the seas . To prevent a crisis from developing after the note was sent , Bryan urged a sta tement be issued at the same time indicating that

"strict accountability" did not mean an immediate settle­ ment . He believed since Germany had accepted a peace treaty in principle with the Un ited States , agreement could be reached for a one-year investigation of the

Lus itania incident with the final settlement postponed un til after the war . Wil son ultimately refused to issue -38- a sta tement believing it would weaken the protest and that there wa s no need to engage in a prolonged di scus­ sion regarding some very simple facts . On May 31 the administration received Germany 's reply and began to prepare a second note . Bryan believed "this may be our last chance to speak for peace , for it wi ll be much harder to propose investigation after some un friendly act than now," and again urged Wi l son to approve the suggestions he had made believing without them the note being prepared would likely produce a break in diplo­ ma tic relations wh ich might rush the nat ion into war . 46

Bryan refused to sign the second Lusitania note ins tead submitting a letter of resignation to Wi l son dated June 8, 1915 . In the letter he noted that his resignat ion wa s to take effect when the note wa s sent ,

since he believed war could not be avoided if he wa ited un t il a harsh reply wa s received from Germany . Wh ile

he realized his resigna tion might end his political

career , he believed he had an obligation to the people who had put so much trust in him and could not join in

action wh ich they opposed and wh ich might cause them so much suffering and loss of life . He hoped from outside

the administration to contribute to the cause of peace

by helping to br ing the sentiments of the people against

the war to the surface . 47 - 39-

There were a number of other reasons Bryan resigned in addition to the note . He had proposed , in dealing with Mexico and Nicaragua , the Uni ted State s government extend loans to Latin American nations as a way to pro­ tect the Monroe Doctrine and to advance democracy in the area , but Wi l son in early 1914 had rejected this idea . On a personal and diplomatic level , he was upset because he felt the influence of Walter Hines Page , the

American Ambassador to Great Britain , and especially that of Edward M. House , the President 's personal ad­ viser , was greater than his own . Immediately before he resigned , he told Wil son that "Colonel House ...has been Secretary of State , not I, and I, have never had your full confidence . 1148 On many occasions Wil son had commun icated directly with House and Page as well as other personal agents , thus bypassing Bryan , leaving him at times un informed regard ing the status of certa in matters and causing foreign governments to disregard his comments . Finally, Wi l son had continually rejected

Bryan 's advice regarding Ameri can neutrality during

World War I, wh ile accepting that of Robert Lansing , the Counselor of the State Department . 49

After his resignation Bryan worked to prevent the

Un ited States from becoming invo lved in the First World

War . He argued that the nation should not become in­ vol ved as a resul t of incidents not directed at the - 40 -

Un i ted States , and urged the people to let the Pres ident and members of Congress know of their support for warning

Americans against traveling on belligerent ships . In early 1916 Bryan 's influence helped to produce resolu­ tions by Senator Thomas P. Gore and Representative

Jefferson Mc Lemore , wh ich were intended to prevent

Americans from traveling on belligerent ships ; however ,

Wi lson's strong opposition prevented their passage . In the fall of 1915, Bryan proposed a popular referendum be held before the nation declared war . He continued to oppose the nation undertaking a program of mil itary pre­ paredness . He argued that "if preparation prevents war , there would have been no war in Europe . They spent twenty years prepar ing for it" and continued to insist that mediation was the way to end the conflict . S O How­ ever , Wil son had begun to favor preparedne ss after the

Lus itania incident and urged the Congress to accept an increase in the nation's military defense , wh ich was finally granted in June 1916 . Even though Bryan was displeased with some of Wi lson's actions , he dec ided to support his re-election as president in 1916 believing he seriously desired peace . During the fall , Bryan vigorously campaigned for Wilson , who won a narrow vic­ tory over his Republican opponent, Charles Evans Hughes .

On December 18 , 1916 Wil son sent identical notes to the belligerents asking that they state their war aims and - 41- terms of peace , a course Bryan had urged from the be­ ginn ing of the war . Germany accepted Wilson's invita­ tion to a conference of belligerents without stating any terms , wh ile the Allies demanded terms Germany could not accept . In January 1917 Germany announced its intention to resume submarine attacks against mer­ chant vessels and Wil son , as he had earlier threatened to do , responded by severing diplomatic relations .

Bryan , who had resigned believing this action would lead to war , traveled to Washington , D.C. to consul t with Congressional leaders to find a way to avoid th is occurring . In mid-March , three American ships were sunk and Wilson advanced the special session of the meeting of Congress to April 2. He went before Congress and asked for a declaration of war , wh ich was granted on April 6, 1917 . 51

Bryan , believing laws enacted by majority rule should be obeyed , immediately began to support the war , although his offer of military service was declined . The fighting

continued for more than a year before an armistice was

signed on November 11 , 1918 and Wi l son soon traveled to

Paris, France to attend the Peace Conference wh ich began

early in 1919 . On June 28 the leaders of the Allied na­

tions signed the Treaty of Versailles , wh ich included the

Covenant of the League of Nations . This organization was designed to join the member nations together to prevent -42- future wars . Bryan strongly suppor ted the ratification of the treaty and America's entry into the League , recog­ nizing that Article XII of the Covenant wh ich provided for a period of investigation and attemp ted conciliation before resorting to war , wa s based upon the principle of his peace treaties. Nevertheless, he suggested several changes, in particular advocating that each nat ion be able to decide whether it would suppor t th e decisions of the Security Council , since he did not want the Un ited

States to go to war against its will or be forced to support an economic boycott against an agressor as th is was likely to deve lop into a war . In early 1920 he urged Democ ratic Senators to accept changes in the treaty to ga in its ratification . However , Wi lson refused to compromise and a treaty with the reservations of Senator

Henry Cabot Lodge wa s rejected on March 20 , 1920 . Bryan had urged the Democratic Party to reject Wi lson's demand that the 1920 presidential election be a refe rendum on the League and , for the first time , did not campaign for th e Party 's presidential candidate . In November the Dem­ ocratic nominee , Jame s C. Cox , wa s overwhelmingly defeated by his Republican opponent , Warren G. Harding . 52

During th e ear ly Twenties Bryan increasingly turned his attention to religious ma tters , although he continued to advocate a program of political and social reform . -43-

However , the political conservatism and materialism of postwar America was not conducive to this spirit. Having

always believed Christianity the basis for social and

political change he came to view the apathy and indif­

ference of the people as the result of increasing doubts

about religion which arose from the theory of evolution .

In his lecture "The Menace of Darwinism" he held that

belief in God was weakened because the theory put "the

creative act so far away that reverence for a creator

is likely to be lost .11 53 By 1921 he had become con ­

vinced that teach ing evolution as fact in schools

caused youth to lose faith in the Bible and ultimately

in Christianity . By 1922 he moved to Miami , Florida

and began to address a succession of state legislatures ,

mostly in the South , in wh ich he urged the passage of

legislation to prohibit teaching evolution in tax­

supported schools . He argued the majority of the people

objected to this being taught . 54

In early 1925 the Tennessee legislature passed the

Butler Act , wh ich was the first law explicitly proh ib­

iting the teach ing , in a school supported by state

funds , that man had descended from a lower order of

animals . Bryan hailed this as the first step toward

preventing the teaching of evolution as a fact in

schools across the nation . Wh ile the state did not

make an effort to enforce the legislation , opponents -44- of this act sought a test case . Because of this situa­ tion a biology teacher at Rhea County High Schoo l in

Dayton , Tennessee , John Thomas Scopes , was arrested on

May 7 after admi tting he could not teach the subject without discuss ing evolution . Within days Bryan agreed to become part of the prosecution , wh ich eleva ted the case to national attention .

Immediately before the trial began on July 10 , 1925 ,

Bryan declared that "the contest between evolution and

Christianity is a duel to the death ....If evolu- tion wins in Dayton Christianity goes ...for the two cannot stand together .11 55 After Judge John Tate Rauls ton instructed the jury to decide if Scopes had violated the law, the prosecution presented four student witnesses who testified he had based his biology lectures on

Darwin 's theory . The defense wanted to base its case entirely upon the testimony of several scientists and theologians to prove the theory of evolution was valid and did not conflict with the Bible . However , the chief counsel of the prosecution , District Attorney­

General Arthur Thomas Stewart, objected to the admi s­ sibility of such evidence and Bryan , in his only major address to the court, agreed that scientific testimony should not be admitted . He stated that any objections to the legislation should have been addressed at the time the bill was pend ing . He further contended that -45- not only was evolut ion wrong scientifically, but it had given rise to philosophers like Friedrich Wilhelm

Nietzsche and recalled that Clarence Darrow , in defending two clients charged with murder , had argued that profes­ sors who had taught these doctrines were partly respon­ sible for the crime . On July 17 the Judge excluded the scientific testimony and on the following Monday , the defense called Bryan as a witness and he consented to testify . During questioning by Darrow , Bryan revealed he did not always accept a literal interpretation of the

Bible , to the consternation of his Fundamentalist sup­ porters . On the following day , the Judge ruled his testimony be stricken from the record and stated the issue was whether Scopes had violated the law, not whether man had been created in an evolutionary manner .

Darrow asked the court to instruct the jury to find the defendant gui lty and as the defense did not address the jury , Bryan was prevented from delivering his closing speech for the prosecution , wh ich was to have been "the mountain peak of his life's effort .11 56 The jury quickly returned a guilty verdict wh ich Bryan hailed as a vic­ tory for Christianity . On Sunday , July 26 , five days after the trial ended , Bryan died , probably as the re­ sult of his steadily worsening diabetic condition. He lay in state through Wednesday in the New York Avenue

Presbyterian Church in Washington , D. C. , with two -46-

Spanish -American War ve terans standing guard and was buried , as he had requested , in Ar l ington National

Cemetery. 57 r "

-47-

FOOTNOTES

l Bryan 's connection with Popul ists is in Louis W. Koenig, Br an : A Political Bio ra h of William Jenn in s Bryan (New York : G. Putnam s Sons , 1 71 , pp . 86 , 163, 176-177, 245-246 ; Paolo E. Coletta , William Jenn ings Bryan , vol . 1: Political Evangelist, 1860-1903 ( Lincoln : Un iversity of Nebraska Pres s, 1964) , pp . 39 -43 , 113-114 , 1 58 , 207-211; and Paul W. Glad , McKinley , Bryan , and the People (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company , 1964) , pp . 153-161 , 181-182 , 208-209 .

2The beginn ing of the anti-imperialist movement is in Daniel B. Schirmer , Republic or Em ire : American Resistance to the Philippine War (Camt ridge , Massachusetts : Schenkman Publi shing Company , Inc. , 1972) , pp . 93-94 ; Robert L. Bei sner , Twelve Against Empire : The Ant i­ Imperialists , 1898-1900 (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company , 1968) , pp . 78-99 , 114-115, 193-197 ; and Christopher Lasch , "The Ant i-Imperialists , The Philippines and the Inequality of Man," The Journal of Southern His­ tory 24 (August 1958) : 319-333.

3Groups wh ich agreed with the anti-imperialist move­ ment are in Schirmer , Republic or Empi re , pp . 8-21 , 58-73 ; and Bei sner , Twelve Against Empire , pp . x-xi .

4coletta , Political Evangelist, pp . 235-236 .

5 Bryan 's support for the Treaty of Paris is in Koenig, Bryan , pp . 288-293 ; Schirmer , Republ ic or Emp i re , pp . 108-110, 121-122 ; and Coletta , Political Evangelist, pp . 233-237 .

6For Bryan 's views regarding imperialism see Ray Ginger , ed ., William Jennings Bryan : Selections (Merrill Company , Inc. , 1967 ) , pp . 59-67 ; and Merle Eugene Curti , Bryan and World Peace (New York : Octagon Books, 1969) , pp . 119 - 1 20 .

7 Bryan 's 1900 presidential campaign is in Koenig , Bryan , pp . 294-302 , 312-313 , 316-317 , 321-345; Schirmer , Republic or Empire , pp . 198-303 , 205-208 , 220-223 ; Coletta, Political Evangelist, pp . 267-285 ; Curti , Wor ld Peace , pp . 1 24-135 ; as well as Thoma s A. Bailey , "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 24 (June 1937) : 43-52; and E. Berkeley Tompk ins , "Scylla and Charybd is, The An ti-Imperialist Dilemma in the Election of 1900," Pacific Historical Review 36 (February 1967) : 143-161 . -48-

8Bryan 's political and religious activities after 1900 are in Koenig, Bryan , pp . 345-368 , 419 ; Coletta , Political Evangelist , pp . 289 , 293-296 , 442-444 ; Paola E. Coletta , William Jennings Bryan , vol . 2: Progressive Politician and Moral State sman , 1909-1915 (Lincoln: Un iversity of Nebraska Pres s, 1 969) , pp . 1-4; and David D. Anderson , William Jennings Bryan (Boston : Twayne Publi shers , 1981) , pp . 121-134 , 159-16 1.

9Roosevelt 's foreign policies are in Howard K. Beale , Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Pres s, 1956) , pp . 254-255 , 268-314, 349-350 ; John Morton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge : Harvard Un iversity Press , 1967) , pp . 125-141 ; David H. Burton , Theodore Roosevelt : Confident Im erialist (Philadelph ia: University of Pennsyl vania Pres s, 1 �68) , pp . 101-104 , 120-130 , 172- 176; Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography (New York : Harcourt Brace & World , Inc. , 1931) , pp . 216- 231 , 261-272; and Howard C. Hill , Roosevelt and the Caribbean (Chicago : The University of Ch i cago Press, 1927) , pp . 30-31 , 52-68 ; and for Bryan 's views of these policies see Koenig, Bryan , pp . 350 , 388-414; and Coletta , Political Evangelist, pp . 299-304 .

lOThe reasons for Bryan 's 1908 presidential defeat are in Koenig , Bryan , pp . 454-456 ; and Coletta , Political Evangelist, pp . 430-444 .

llThe foreign policies of the Taft Administration are in Wa lter V. Scholes and Mar ie V. Scholes , The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration (Columbia : University of Mi s sour i Press , 1970) , pp . 35 -44 , 59-67 , 105-106 ; Donald F. Anderson , Wi lliam Howard Taft : A Conservative 's Conception of the Presidency ( Ithaca : Cornel l University Press , 1973) , pp . 236 -238 , 258-263, 275-283; Paolo E. Coletta , The Presidenc of William Howard Taft (Lawrence : The Un iversity Press o Kansas , 1 73 , pp . 170-173 , 184- 191 ; and John P. Campbell, "Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911 ," The Journal of American History 53 (September 1966) : 279-298 ; and for Bryan 's views of those policies see Curt i, World Peace , pp . 148- 149 ; and Koenig, Bryan , p. 463 . -49-

12Bryan 's role in Wilson's nomination during the 1912 Democratic Convention is in Ar thur S. Link , Wi l son : The Road to the Wh ite House (Princeton : Princeton Un iversity Press , 1947) , pp . 455-456 , 463-465; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 491- 493 , 496 ; Ray Stannard Baker , Woodrow Wil son : Life and Letters , vo l . 3: Governor , 1910-1913 (Garden City , New York : Doubleday , Doran & Company , Inc. , 1931) , pp . 354-360 ; and Coletta , Progressive Politician, pp . 76-78 .

13Bryan 's role in Wi lson's presidential campaign is in Koenig, Bryan , pp . 496-500 ; Link , Road to the Wh ite House , pp . 512-513; Baker , Governor , pp . 395-396 ; Coletta , Progressive Politician, pp . 7 9-85 ; and Anderson , Bryan , pp . 169-170.

14Richard L. Me tcalfe , comp ., Th e Real Bryan (Des Mo ines , Iowa : Personal Help Publish ing Company , 1908) , p. 37 .

15Ibid. , p. 145 .

16Ibid. ' p. 37 .

17Bryan 's beliefs wh ich affected his view of foreign affairs are in Koenig, Br an , pp . 502-503 , 509-510; Coletta , Political Evan e list, pp . 287-289 , 318, 387-388 ; Coletta , Progressive Po yitician, pp . 2-4, 92-94 ; Arthus S. Link , Wil son : The New Freedom (Pr inceton : Princeton Un iversity Press , 1 956) , pp . 277-280 ; Norman A. Graebner , ed ., An Uncertain Tradition: Ameri can Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York : McGraw Hill Book Company , Inc. , 1961 ) , pp . 79-100 ; and Curti, World Peace , pp . 114-116 , 134-139 , 143-147 .

18The approach of the Wil son Administration toward Mexico in 1913 is in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 328-331 , 350 ; John Morton Blum, Woodrow Wil son and the Politics of Morality (Boston : Little , Brown and Company, 1 956) , pp . 84-89 ; Coletta , Progress ive Politician, pp . 147-156 , 179- 181 ; Harley Notter , The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wi l son (Balitmore : The Johns Hopkins Press , 1937) , pp . 221-231 ; P. Edward Haley , Revolut ion and Intervention : The Di lomac of Taft and Wi l son with Mexico, 1 9 10-1917 Cam ri ge , Massachusetts : The Massac usetts Institute of Technology , 1970) , pp . 83-85, 101-108 ; Ray Stannard Baker , Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters , vol . 4: President , 1913- 1914 (Garden City , New York : Doubleday , Doran & Company , Inc. , 1931) , pp . 242-256; and Koenig, Bryan , pp . 517-519. -50-

19Link , The New Freedom, p. 394 . The approach of the Wil son Administration toward Mexico in late 1913 and early 1914 is in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 365-369 , 377 , 392- 394 ; Haley , Revolution , pp . 112-113, 122-129; Baker , President , pp . 283-286 , 306 , 312; Coletta , Progressive Politician, pp . 156-161 ; and Koenig, Bryan , pp . 519-521 .

20The Wil son Administration 's handling of the Tampico incident is in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 394-402 ; Haley, Revolution, pp . 131-135; Baker , President , pp . 315-334 ; Coletta , Pro ressive Politician, pp . 160-167 ; and Koenig, Bryan , p. 52y .

21Bryan 's approach toward Mexico after the spring of 1914 is in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 396 , 407-409 ; Coletta , Proressive Pol itician, pp . 167-179; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 521 -522 ; Arthur S. Link , Wi l son : The Strugg le for Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton : Princeton Un iversity Press , 1 960) , pp . 238-23 9 , 257-260 , 467-469, 475-476 ; Haley, Revolution , pp . 162-163 ; and Ar thur S. Link , ed ., The Pa ers of Woodrow Wilson, A ril 17 , 1915-Jul 21 , 1915 Princeton : Princeton University Press , 80 , pp . 2 5, 304-306 .

22Paolo E. Coletta , "Wi lliam Jennings Bryan and the Un ited States-Colombia Impasse , 1903-1921 ," The Hispanic Ameri can Historical Review 47 (November 1967) :490 .

23pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the Un ited States , 1 14- Washington , D.C. : Government Printing Office , 1 922) : 164.

24Bryan 's actions toward Colombia are in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 320-324 ; Coletta, Progressive Politician, pp . 182-183, 185-188 ; and Coletta , "Un ited States-Colombia Impasse," pp . 486-501 .

25Bryan 's policies toward Nicaragua are in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 331-340 ; Dana G. Munro , Intervention and Dollar Di lomac in the Caribbean , 1900-1921 (Princeton : Princeton Un iversity Press , , pp . - 01 ; as we ll as Selig Ad ler , "Bryan and Wil sonian Caribbean Penetration ," The Hispanic American Historical Review 20 (May 1940) : 198- 226 ; Anna I. Powell , "Relations between the Un ited States and Nicaragua , 1898-1916," The Hispanic American Historical Review 8 (February 1928) :43-64; and Thoma s A. Ba iley, " Interest in a Nicaragua Canal , 190 3-1931 ," The Hispanic American Historical Review 16 (February 1936 ):2- 28 . -51-

26Bryan 's policies toward the Dominican Republic and Haiti are in Link , The Struggle for Neutality, pp . 498- 534 , 548-550; Munro, Intervention and Dol lar Diplomacy, pp . 277-302, 333-335 , 342-350; Sumner Wel les , Naboth ' s Vine ard : The Dominican Re ublic , 1844-1924 , 2 vo l s. Mamaroneck , New York : Paul P. Appel Pu lisher , 1966) 2: 713-755; Coletta , Progress ive Politician, pp . 182-183 , 194-210; and Ad ler , "Caribbean Penetration ," pp . 198-226 .

27Paola E. Coletta , "'The Most Thankless Task ': Bryan and the California Alien Land Legislation," Pacific Historical Review 36 (May 1967) :177. Bryan 's approach to Japan is in Link , The New Freedom , pp . 293-300 , 304 ; and Coletta , "'Most Thankless Task ,-rrr pp . 163-187 .

28pa ers Relatin to the Forei n Relations of the Un ited States , 1 13 Washington , D.C. : Government Print ing Office , 1920) :632.

29Foreign Relations , 1914 , p. 433 .

30Foreign Relations , 1913, pp . 974-975.

31Bryan 's approach toward his peace treaties are in Koenig , Bryan , pp . 510-511 ; Coletta , Progre ssive Politician, pp . 239-249 ; and Link , The New Freedom , pp . 280-283 .

32Link , The Strugg le for Neutrality, p. 192 .

33papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the Un ited States , 1914 , Su lement to the World War Washington , D.C. : Un ited States Government Printing Office , 1928) , p. 98 .

34Ibid. , p. 99 .

35Bryan 's efforts to end the First World War are in Link , The Strugg le for Neutrality, pp . 44-45 , 191-207 ; Coletta , Progressive Pol itician , pp . 249-259; Ray Stannard Baker , Woodrow Wil son : Life and Letters . vol . 5: Neutrality , 1914- 1915 (Garden City, New York : Doub leday , Doran & Company , Inc. , 1935) , pp . 1-68 , 276-321 ; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 530-534; and Curti , World Peace , pp . 187-191 .

36Link , The Struggle for Neutrality, p. 63 .

37coletta , Progressive Politician, p. 264 . -52-

38Bryan 's efforts to maintain American neutrality after the outbreak of the First World War are in Link , The Struggle for Neutrality, pp . 44-45 , 62-65, 132-136 , 169 ; Coletta , Progressive Politician , pp . 263-265 , 268 , 272; and Ernest R. May, The World War and Ameri can Iso­ lation , 1914-1917 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press , 1 959) , pp . 45-46 , 50-51, 63 .

39Link , The Struggle for Neutrality , p. 323 .

40papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the Un ited States , 1 915, Su lement to the World War Washington , D.C. : Un ite States Government Printing Office , 1928) , p. 156 .

41Bryan 's efforts to ma intain American neutrality in early 1915 are in Link , The Struggle for Neutrality, pp . 322-326 , 344-347 ; Coletta , Progressive Politician , pp . 276 , 286 , 291-300 ; and May , American Isolation , pp . 138 , 142-146 .

42coletta , Progressive Politician, p. 313.

43Ibid. , p. 317 .

44Foreign Relations , 1915, Supplement, pp . 394-395 . Bryan 's efforts to reduce conflict with Germany regarding the first Lusitania note are in Link , The Struggle for Nuetrality, pp . 381 , 385-387 ; Coletta , Progressive Poli­ tician, pp . 311 , 313-318 ; and Baker , Neutrality, pp . 332- 333 , 338-339 .

45coletta , Progressive Pol itician, p. 332 .

46Bryan 's efforts to reduce conflict with Germany before the second Lusitan ia note was sent are in Link , The Strugg le for Neutrality, pp . 389-391 , 414, 417 ; Coletta , Progressive Politician , pp . 319-321 , 332-335 ; and Baker , Neutral ity, pp . 341 -344 , 354-356 .

47Bryan 's resignation because of the second Lus itania note are in Coletta , Progressive Politician , pp . 335 , 340 ; Link , The Struggle for Neutral ity, pp . 419-420 ; and Koenig, Bryan , p. 549 .

48Link , The Strugg le for Neutrality, p. 422 .

49various reasons for Bryan 's resignation are in Coletta , Progressive Politician, pp . 356-359; Link , The Struggle for Neutral ity, pp . 420-422 ; Koenig, Bryan , " pp . 548-549 ; and Ad ler , "Caribbean Penetration , pp . 208-213. -53-

50paolo E. Coletta , Wi lliam Jennings Bryan , vo l . 3: Political Puritan , 1915-1925 (Lincoln : Un iversity of Nebraska Press , 1969) , p. 14 .

51Bryan 's efforts to prevent the nation 's invo lvement in the war are in Coletta , Pol itical Puritan , pp . 3-15, 25-35 , 47-55; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 5 51-557 , 567-569 ; and Curti , World Peace , pp . 223 -225 , 236-243 .

52Bryan 's support for the League of Nations is in Coletta , Political Puritan, pp . 88-100; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 577-580; and Curti , World Peace , pp . 162-163 , 248-250.

52Lawrence W. Levine , Defender of the Faith : William Jenn in s Br an , The Last Decade, 1915-1925 (New York : Ox ord Un iversity Press , Inc. , 5 , p. 265 .

54Bryan 's opposition to the teaching of evolution is in Coletta , Political Puritan , pp . 228-232; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 606-609 , 630-63 1; and Levine , Defender of the Faith , pp . 261-289 .

55Koenig, Bryan , p. 239 .

56coletta , Pol itial Puritan , p. 271 .

57Bryan 's effort during the Scopes Trial is in Coletta , Political Puritan , pp . 251-252, 258-268 ; Koenig, Bryan , pp . 644-654; and Levine , Defender of the Faith , pp . 342-344 , 348-352 . BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Lowenthal, Abraham F. The Dominican Intervention . Cambr idge : Harvard Un iversity Press , 1972 .

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Articles

Ad ler , Selig. "Bryan and Wi l sonian Caribbean Pene­ tration." The Hispanic American Historical Review 20 (May 1940) :198-226 .

Bailey, Thomas A. "Interest in a Nicaragua Canal , 1903- 1931 ." The Hispanic Ameri can Historical Review 16 (February 1936) :2-28 .

"Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 24 (June 1937) :43-52 .

Beard , Charles A. "New Light on Bryan and War Policies ." The New Republic , June 1936 , pp . 177-178.

Bryan , Wi lliam J. "The Issue in the Presidential Campaign ." The North Ameri can Review , June 1900 , pp . 753-771 .

"A Menace to Government and Civilization." The Independent, May 1902 , pp . 1068-1069.

"The World Missionary Movement ." The Outlook , August 1910, pp . 823-826 .

Campbell , John P. "Taft, Roosevelt, and the Arbitration Treaties of 1911 ." The Journal of Ameri can History 53 (September 1966) : 279-298 .

"Circular with Reference to Neutrality and Trade in Contraband ." Supplement to the Ameri can Journal of International Law 9 (January 1 915) :124-126 .

Coletta , Paolo E. "'The Mo st Thankless Task ': Bryan and the California Alien Land Legislation ." Pacific Historical Review 36 (May 1967) : 163-187 .

"Wi lliam Jennings Bryan and the United States­ Colombia Impasse , 1903-1921 ." The Hispanic American Historical Review 47 (November 1967 ) :486-501 .

Hackett , Charles W. "A Review of Our Policy in Nicara­ gua ." Current His tory , November 1928 , pp . 285-288 .

Lasch , Christopher . "The An ti-Imperialists , the Ph ilippines , and the Inequality of Man ." The Journal of Southern History 24 (August 1958) :319-333 . -61-

Mencken , Henry Loui s. Ed itorial . The American Mercury , October 1925 , pp . 158-160 .

"Mr . Bryan 's Address on Imperialism." The Outlook , August 1900 , pp . 938-940 .

Munro, Dana G. "Dollar Diplomacy in Nicaragua , 1909- 1913." The Hispanic Ameri can Historical Review 38 (May 1958) :209-234 .

"Neutrality Proclamations ." The American Journal of International Law , Supplement 9 (January 1915) : 110-114 .

Penrose, Eldon . "Grape Juice Diplomacy and a Bit of Political Buncombe ." Pacific Historical Review 37 (May 1968) :159-162 .

Powell , Anna I. "Relat ions Between the United States and Nicaragua , 1898-1916 ." The Hispanic American Historical Review 8 (February 1928) :43-64.

Smith , Daniel M. "Robert Lansing and the Formulation of American Neutrality Policies , 1914-1915 ." The Mississipp i Valley Historical Review 43 (June 1956 ): 59-81.

Sutton , Walter A. "Bryan , Lafollette , Norris : Three Mid-Western Politicians ." Journal of the We st 8 (Ocotber 1969) : 613-630 .

Tompk ins , E. Berkeley . "Scylla and Charybdis : The An ti-Imperialist Dilemma in the Election of 1900 ." Pacific Historical Review 36 (February 1967) :143-161 .

Wr ight , Theodore P. , Jr . "Free Elections in the Latin American Policy of the Un ited States ." Political Science Quarterly 74 (March 1959) :89-112.

"The United States and Latin American Dictatorship : The Case of the Dominican Republ ic ." Journal of International Affairs 14 (no . 2 1960) : 152-157 .

Ed itorials

"The Bryan Peace Treaties ." The American Journal of International Law 7 (October 1913) :823-829 .

"The Effect of Mr . Bryan 's Peace Treaties upon the Re la­ tions of the Un ited States with the Nations at War ." The Ameri can Journal of International Law 9 (Apr il 1915) :494-496 . -62-

"Mr . Bryan 's Proposed Comm i ssions of Inquiry." The - American Journal of International Law 7 (July 1913) : 566-570 .

"President Wil son and Latin America." The Ameri can Journal of International Law 7 (April 1913) :329 -333 .

"Secretary Bryan 's Peace Plan." The American Journal of International Law 8 (July 1914) :56 5-571 .

"William Jennings Bryan , Secretary of State ." The Amerian Journal of International Law 7 (April 1913) : 333-335 .

"The Anti-Imperialist Resolutions ." The Outlook , August 1900 , pp . 943-944 .

"The Arbitration Treaties ." The Outlook , August 1911 , pp . 801-802.

"Mr . Bryan 's Acceptance ." The Outlook , August 1900 , pp . 903-904 .

"Mr . Bryan 's Letter of Acceptance : Imperialism." The Outlook , September 1900 , p. 241 .