Liberal Internationalism, the Peace Movement, and The
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DIVERGING WILSONIANISMS: LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM, THE PEACE MOVEMENT, AND THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF WOODROW WILSON by ERIC M. KENDALL Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy History Department CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY January, 2012 CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES We hereby approve the thesis/dissertation of ___________Eric M. Kendall________________________________ candidate for the ________Doctor of Philosophy________degree *. (signed)_____Dr. David C. Hammack_________________________ (chair of the committee) _____Dr. Kenneth Ledford___________________________ _____Dr. Alan Rocke_______________________________ _____Dr. Pete Moore_______________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ (date) ___November 1, 2011_____ *We also certify that written approval has been obtained for any proprietary material contained therein. 1 © 2012 Eric M. Kendall All rights reserved. 2 Table of Contents Abstract 4 Introduction: Wilson‘s Ghost 6 Chapter One: The First Wilsonian Era 39 Chapter Two: Reinventing Wilson—the Rooseveltian Formulation 106 Chapter Three: the Wilsonian Postwar Consensus 185 Chapter Four: Demise of the Wilsonian ―Big Tent‖ 268 Conclusion: Diverging Wilsonianisms 337 Bibliography 346 3 Diverging Wilsonianisms: Liberal Internationalism, the Peace Movement, and the Ambiguous Legacy of Woodrow Wilson Abstract by ERIC M. KENDALL Wilsonian liberal internationalism has provided a consistent, sustaining ideological basis for U.S. foreign policy since America‘s entry into the First World War. Since Woodrow Wilson‘s day, however, the credo he originated has undergone several substantial reformulations in response to changing circumstances—reformulations that necessarily involved successive reinterpretations of those precepts that comprise the credo: the imminent threat to international order; democratic self-determination, collective security, an integrated world economic system, and American exceptionalism. Through an historical study of liberal internationalists from the American peace movement, the organizations they created, and the political leaders they sought to influence, the origins, divergent evolution, and demise of alternative Wilsonian systems can be understood. Between 1917 and 1968, internationalists in the American peace movement significantly shaped an ongoing process of formulating and reformulating Wilsonian ideals, variously cooperating with dominant policy-making elites or promoting alternative Wilsonian foreign policy prescriptions as they did so. The overall picture, then, is one of 4 contending internationalist elites that can trace their intellectual roots back to Wilson, even as they clashed over the ultimate meaning of his legacy. Liberal internationalism originated as a response to World War I. In conjunction with internationalists from the peace movement, Wilson formulated and promoted the first iteration of Wilsonianism—and, in a number of ways, planted the seeds of future conflict over its interpretation. That conflict would arise only in the second half of the twentieth century, however, with the emergence of two subsequent reformulations of Wilson‘s ideals. The first of these was a progressive Rooseveltian interpretation that emerged in the years just before and during World War II. The second, a more conservative interpretation, came together in the late nineteen forties and fifties in response to the Cold War. Devotees of these two diverging Wilsonianisms clashed with one another, although the Cold War Consensus prevailed—at least until Vietnam. The war brought on the demise of the Consensus, but its unsuspected fragility in the nineteen sixties was itself, at least in part, a result of the continued influence of the Rooseveltian worldview. 5 Introduction Wilson’s Ghost ―The ghost of Woodrow Wilson walks again,‖ declared Lawrence F. Kaplan, senior editor of The New Republic, in the editorial pages of The Wall Street Journal in March of 2003. A new war between the United States and the regime of Saddam Hussein was then imminent, and President George W. Bush had, according to Kaplan, committed the country to exporting democracy—―remaking the world in America‘s image,‖ in fact—―beginning with Iraq.‖1 The following September, popular historian Thomas Fleming also glimpsed Wilson‘s restless, disembodied spirit in unfolding events in the Middle East. In an article for the online History News Network entitled ―What We‘re Grappling with in Iraq Is Woodrow Wilson‘s Legacy,‖ Fleming, who had just published a book highly critical of American participation in the First World War, had a somewhat more ambivalent perspective on Wilson‘s influence than that expressed earlier by Kaplan. Instead of highlighting the advance of democracy, Fleming referred back to the work of Lloyd C. Garner in associating Wilson‘s foreign policy with the origins of an American ―covenant with power‖—with all the opportunities, ambiguities, and pitfalls that ascendancy to great power status necessarily entailed.2 Interestingly, despite their very different perspectives on Woodrow Wilson otherwise, these two contemporary observers seemingly had no trouble discerning his impact on contemporary U.S. foreign affairs. They had arrived at the same general conclusion as to the power and pervasiveness of 1 Lawrence F. Kaplan, ―Democrats Against Democracy,‖ OpinionJournal, March 19, 2003, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110003218> (15 May, 2007). 2 Thomas Fleming, ―What We‘re Grappling with in Iraq Is Woodrow Wilson‘s Legacy,‖ History News Network, September 8, 2003, <http://hnn.us/articles/1668.html> (15 May, 2007). 6 Wilson‘s influence, although they obviously disagreed about what the nature of that influence was exactly. Neither Kaplan nor Fleming was mistaken regarding Wilson‘s centrality. Indeed, it was Woodrow Wilson who articulated and codified the earliest intellectual foundations of modern American liberal internationalism, a credo that decisively influenced the formulation of American foreign policy through much of the twentieth century and beyond. Even such a well-known practitioner and champion of foreign policy ―realism,‖ or realpolitik, as Henry Kissinger ultimately had to concede—perhaps grudgingly—that it has been to ―the drumbeat of Wilsonian idealism that American foreign policy has marched since his watershed presidency, and continues to march to this day.‖3 But that still leaves us with unresolved issues: what, precisely, is the nature of Wilson‘s influence? In other words, what, in the end, does Wilsonianism really mean? And how has the influence of Wilsonian ideas been perpetuated over the many decades that have elapsed since Wilson‘s two historic terms as president? At its heart, the following study is an attempt to resolve those questions. On a very basic level, it addresses the general subject of ideology and the creation of American foreign policy. Michael Hunt usefully defines ideology as ―an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.‖4 And since America‘s entry into the First World War, Wilsonian liberal internationalism has quite often served that purpose, providing a consistent, sustaining ideological basis for U.S. foreign policy. 3 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 30. 4 Michael H. Hunt, ―Ideology,‖ in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas Paterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 194. 7 There is more to it than that, however. The straightforward characterization offered above, as valid as it is as a broad generalization, masks a good deal more complexity than is often realized. The vision of a Wilsonian world order that emerged from the era of the First World War was itself ambiguous in a number of respects. That ambiguity, in turn, would allow for several substantial reformulations of Wilsonianism in the decades that followed—reformulations that necessarily involved successive reinterpretations of those precepts that comprise the credo: the imminent threat to international order; democratic self-determination, collective security, an integrated world economy, and American exceptionalism. The first such reformulation, Rooseveltian Wilsonianism, was developed in the years immediately before and during the Second World War. Yet another, competing Wilsonian system, the Cold War Consensus, quickly took shape after 1945, in the wake of the war. And these two decidedly disparate Wilsonian systems clashed repeatedly with one another in the policy debates that took place in the post-World War II era. What follows is, at least in part, an account of these competing Wilsonianisms—their origins, divergent evolution, and, eventual decline in the context of shifting political conditions. That the interrelated precepts that together comprise Wilsonianism are ambiguous and contingent—that they have been defined in different ways by different people over the course of decades, often in response to changing circumstances—is a point that is not well developed in the extant literature on the subject. And for that very reason, historians have not previously explored in any thorough and systematic way the distinct schools of thought into which Wilsonian internationalism may be subdivided. This line of analysis,