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Internacionals CIDOB 96 the CONSEQUENCES of SEPTEMBER AFGHANISTAN’S 2014 PRESIDENTIAL 2014 ELECTION IMPASSE

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Internacionals CIDOB 96 the CONSEQUENCES of SEPTEMBER AFGHANISTAN’S 2014 PRESIDENTIAL 2014 ELECTION IMPASSE CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona notesISSN: 2013-4428 internacionals CIDOB 96 THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEPTEMBER AFGHANISTAN’S 2014 PRESIDENTIAL 2014 ELECTION IMPASSE Malaiz Daud, Associate Senior Researcher, CIDOB s Afghanistan’s elec- The Afghan polity is in tatters, as fraudulent elections since 2004 3.1 percent in 2013 from 14.4 tion saga dragged have progressively polarized the leadership. This year’s presidential percent in 20121; the country is on, the international election could not have come at a worse time, with the security transi- expected to lose USD 5 billion tion taking place and foreign aid dwindling. Acommunity was desperate in revenue this year. The gov- to have the new president Internally, the past three months have been the bloodiest. Taliban ernment has run out of cash to in place in time to attend the have re-launched frontal wars in several provinces in the south and pay salaries of its employees. NATO summit in Wales on east, even north. The country is expected to lose USD 5 billion in Afghans are increasingly look- revenue this year. September 4th of this year. That ing to move out of the country did not happen. Because of Afghans are increasingly looking to move out of the country in search in search of better job oppor- the inconclusive presidential of better job opportunities as well as to avoid an uncertain securi- tunities as well as to avoid an election, there is uncertainty ty situation in the aftermath of the expected full withdrawal of the uncertain security situation in NATO forces. about the level of presence or the aftermath of the expected complete withdrawal of the A national unity government, if formed, will soon disintegrate as full withdrawal of the NATO international military forces the two camps and the apparent spoilers (e.g. Karzai’s network) will forces2. The brain-drain is and civilian aid from Afghani- be embroiled in an intense power struggle. If no unity government is straining Afghan government formed, the country will be more polarized than it has ever been since stan beyond December 2014. the Taliban were toppled, which would result in a de facto disintegra- capacity to address the im- The summit still committed tion of state sovereignty. pending challenges. to provide USD 5.1 billion an- nually to the Afghan security It remains to be seen whether Afghan elites manage to overcome the What is more, the Afghan gap in trust created through this election or whether the divisions forces in the foreseeable future will become even more profound, with an overtly ethnic dimension polity is in tatters, as fraudu- – one billion more than the to them, despite the fact that both camps include members of all ma- lent elections since 2004 have commitment made in the Chi- jor ethnicities of Afghanistan. progressively polarized the cago conference in 2012. On leadership. This year’s presi- The reality is that irrespective of the current political dispute, the the other hand, the US is eager future government will be weaker, less effective and more predatory dential election could not to conclude the Bilateral Secu- than the current one, largely because of a number of structural con- have come at a worse time, rity Agreement (BSA) with straints. with the security transition the new president following taking place and foreign aid refusal by President Hamid dwindling. The election also Karzai to sign the BSA despite internal and external pressures. showed that the longer the process is the more divisive it Internally, the past three months have been the bloodiest, according to the Afghan Defence Minister. Taliban have re- launched frontal wars in several provinces in the south and 1. The World Bank. “Afghanistan Economic Update”, The World Bank. October 2013. east, even north. The Afghan security agencies have constantly Available here: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/166 reported killing tens of Taliban everyday for the past year. The 56/820120WP0WB0Af0Box0379855B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1 2. CIDOB-STAP has an upcoming paper on capital outflow post-2014 election in the economy has seen a steep decline, with growth rate down to pipeline. notes internacionals CIDOB 96 . SEPTEMBER 2014 1 becomes. The runoff was particularly damaging as the con- Fissures within Leadership test became increasingly ethnic, with the Ashraf Ghani-led Pashtun-Uzbek alliance facing off with an Abdullah-led Tajik- One of major fallouts of the current election has been a break- Hazara one, or at least that is how it is portrayed by some down in an unannounced alliance amongst major political notable members of the two camps, neighboring countries, groupings and their leaders that had taken shape in the post- even parts of the international media. Taliban era. The leadership of the country had forged a rare consensus around a common overarching goal: preserving the After the runoff announcement of preliminary results put current Afghan state. Afghan elites saw the Taliban and their Ghani ahead of Abdullah, the frontrunner in the first round, main backer, the Pakistani security apparatus, as the main by a million votes, an unprecedented crisis ensued. The Af- threat to achieving this goal, thereby, setting aside all other ghan leadership’s inability to come to a consensus over how differences and accommodating each other in pursuit of a vi- to address the crisis prompted the international community able state. to step in. US Secretary of State, John Kerry, had to travel twice to Kabul to broker a deal between Ghani and Abdullah, It is important to note that the democratic space and the com- after President Barack Obama had pleaded with the two can- paratively pluralistic polity created as a result of the Bonn I didates not to take any unconstitutional steps or prematurely Conference (2001), Emergency Loya Jirga or grand assembly declare victory – even threatening that the US will cut all aid (2002), first presidential election (2004) and ratification of the in such an event. new Constitution (2004) gave an opportunity to leaders of opposing groups and parties, representatives of civil society Kerry broke the deadlock, or so is claimed, through a deal. and business elites to see each other in a different light other The deal envisions a national unity government headed by than only rivals, criminals and thugs, to an extent removing the winner of audited votes with the runner up taking the historical mistrusts. Scholarship on leadership/elites sug- gests that making similar ex- The brain-drain is straining Afghan government capacity periences, sharing a common culture or things as simple as to address the impending challenges. going to the same education- al institutions create a better newly-formed position of Chief Executive, a position not understanding and common ground for shared vision and foreseen by the country’s carta magna. All votes to be audited action among leaders. This was evident in Afghanistan until and those deemed fraudulent discarded in a UN-supervised this year’s election4. process. Despite reaching agreement, tensions are still run- ning high and the two camps keep using inflammatory lan- One of the outcomes of this process was that irrespective of guage against each other, with no headway being made in the numerous differences that existed among Afghanistan’s regards to the formation of the national unity government. leadership, individual leaders never equated each other with In fact, Abdullah once again pulled out altogether from par- the Taliban or other insurgents. However, this year’s elec- ticipation in the process as recently as August 27. As it is ob- tion has certainly reversed that trend. Prominent members of served, President Hamid Karzai’s administration has played both camps have been openly accusing each other of being the role of a spoiler for reasons not entirely known, giving worse than the insurgents. Whereas just last year, Amrullah rise to speculations and assumptions about his motives. Saleh, an Abdullah ally, credited Ghani for introducing the narrative of development to the country. Saleh, in return, en- This leads one to envision a scenario whereby divisions with- joyed respect of many of Ghani’s allies, such as Jelani Popal in leadership of the country will expand and may even pan and Haneef Atmar. This election has created a huge divide, out into ethnic rivalries as the leaders will attempt to mo- which will be hard to bridge. bilize support by stimulating ethnic sentiments. It is worth mentioning that scholarship on ethnic conflicts suggests that Atta Mohammad Noor, the powerful governor of the north- decisions and actions of leaders can be “proximate cause”3 ern Balkh province and the main financier of Abdullah camp, of violence. Subsequently, a national unity government, if lately called Ghani “mentally unstable” after Ghani laughed formed, will soon disintegrate as the two camps and the ap- off suggestions by Noor that Abdullah’s supporters would parent spoilers (e.g. Karzai’s network) will be embroiled in wage a civil disobedience campaign should the result of the an intense power struggle. If no unity government is formed, vote audit not be acceptable to them. The suggestion was in- the country will be more polarized than it has ever been since terpreted by observers as a veiled threat of military revolt or the Taliban were toppled, which would result in a de facto dis- coup. Even before the preliminary result of the runoff was an- integration of state sovereignty. The final hypothesis is that nounced, Saleh addressing a public rally warned they would under such a scenario, Karzai would attempt to create condi- be prepared to use “the fist”, implying violence, to respond to tions whereby he still remains the most powerful politician what Abdullah camp has called “industrial level fraud” by around.
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