The Parliament (No. 2) Bill: Victim of the Labour
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THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL The Parliament (No. 2) Bill: Victim of the Labour Party's Constitutional Conservatism? being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of Hull by Lavi David Green B.A. (Hons), M.A. September 2019 That a major bill to remove hereditary peers, and to reconstitute the basis of membership for the upper House, should have received all-party endorsement, been introduced as a Government bill, received a comfortable majority at second reading, then been abandoned in committee, was remarkable. Donald Shell1 The idea of reducing its powers was, in a vague kind of way, official Labour policy. What I was primarily concerned with, however, was to place its composition on a rational footing. Such a project, one might think, would commend itself to all Liberals and Socialists, if it involved eliminating or at least much reducing the hereditary element … In fact, the position was, from the beginning and throughout, much more complex. Lord Longford2 1 D. Shell (2006) ‘Parliamentary Reform’ in P. Dorey (ed.) The Labour Governments 1964–1970, Lon- don: Routledge, p.168 2 F. Longford (1974) The Grain of Wheat, London: Collins, pp.33-4 ABSTRACT This thesis assesses the failure of the UK House of Commons to pass an item of legislation: the Parliament (No. 2) Bill 1968. The Bill was an attempt by the Labour Government 1964- 70 at wholesale reform of the House of Lords. Government bills would normally pass without difficulty, but this Bill had to be withdrawn by the Government at the Committee Stage in the Commons. While the Bill’s failure is often attributed to a backbench filibuster, this was a necessary but not sufficient cause for the failure. The filibustering would have been overcome if the Bill was supported enthusiastically by a larger number of the Labour backbenchers. The Labour Party had an attachment to the Westminster Model of British Government. Within this constitutional conservatism, there was a conservative standpoint on the House of Lords which consisted of three tenets: firstly, the Lords’ existing anachronistic/irrational composition was considered as preferable to a rationalised composition, since this protected the supremacy of the House of Commons; secondly, it was thought that a Labour Government should be focussing on economic and social reform, rather than on Lords reform; thirdly, there was a distinct lack of theory, or theorising, on the Second Chamber qua Second Chamber, which was based on the Labour Party’s empirical, atheoretical, and pragmatic approach in general. The Parliament (No. 2) Bill was intended to appeal to the Labour Party on the basis of a range of selling-points: 1) abolishing the Lords’ hereditary basis, 2) abolishing the Lords’ capacity to impede the Commons, 3) strengthening the Commons’ scrutinising functions, 4) technocratic reform of the governance institutions, and 5) modernising Parliament as part of a wider institutional modernisation. The thesis concludes that these selling-points were insufficient to overcome the Labour Party’s conservatism on Lords reform, grounded as it was in a broader constitutional conservatism, and that this overall conservatism was the principal cause for the Bill’s failure. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS There is a long and varied list of people who made some form of a contribution to the success of this PhD. Starting with the two largest contributors. Firstly, my supervisor Lord Norton of Louth. What an honour it was to receive the tutelage of someone who is indisputably at the forefront of the field. Not only that, but he showed me a forbearance and diligence without which I am certain this PhD would not have been completed. Secondly, my dear mother, without whose support (financial, moral, and I suppose biological) this PhD would never have even been started. How does she put up with me? Other family members also helped by Skyping/e-mailing me with advice and reassurance, or by accommodating me while I accessed archives. A special mention to my cousin, Dr. Ilan Kelman, who showed a genuine concern over a long period of time. Several academics (non-familial!) also assisted with general support or by answering my awkward questions – I wonder where they found the time? A special mention to Dr. Kevin Hickson with whom I spent hours discussing the sometimes-inscrutable ideology of the Labour Party. My two examiners, Dr. Matt Beech (internal) and Prof. Pete Dorey (external), deserve to be acknowledged: I can only imagine how much time it must take to forensically read through a PhD and draw-up a list of questions on it. There are also the countless librarians and archivists who helped with obtaining obscure and long- forgotten-about items. Their work is often overlooked but is crucial. The Labour MPs and Civil Servants from the time who agreed to be interviewed were indeed able to show an impressive power of memory (there were also those who tried to recollect but were understandably unable). I am grateful to all those listed here, and my apologies to all those who I have omitted. CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2: Historical Context.......................................................................................... 40 The Labour Party’s standpoint on Lords reform 1945-1964 Chapter 3: Labour Party Ideology (1) ............................................................................. 62 Linear ideological spectrum: Revisionist Right, Labour Left, & Centre Philosophical strands: Fabianism & Labourism Annual Conference Chapter 4: Labour Party Ideology (2) ............................................................................. 91 Party Leadership – Technocratic Collectivism Chapter 5: Developing the Bill (1) ................................................................................ 121 Ministerial Committee Chapter 6: Developing the Bill (2) ................................................................................ 153 Inter-Party Conference Southern Rhodesia Order incident Reconstituted Ministerial Committee Chapter 7: The Cabinet’s standpoint on the Bill ........................................................... 186 Chapter 8: The PLP’s standpoint on the Bill/The Parliamentary Passage of the Bill ... 224 Chapter 9: Conclusion ................................................................................................... 263 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 288 Appendices ......................................................................................................................... I 1 CHAPTER 1: Introduction Introduction After the 1966 general election, the Labour Party was returned to Office on the basis of a campaign whose focus was on radical reform e.g. “modernising obsolete procedures and institutions”.1 At the time, the House of Lords was composed overwhelmingly of hereditary peers – “at total variance with the socialist ideals of equality”2 – and contained a large majority for the Conservative Party. The Lords also held a one-year delaying power over principal legislation and a power of rejection over subordinate legislation. Dorey notes: For many Labour politicians, the most objectionable aspect of the House of Lords’ ability to delay legislation for one year has been the unelected and unaccountable character of the (hereditary) peers imbued with this power.3 Overall, it is explicable that the Labour Government 1966-70 would make an attempt at reforming the House of Lords, and indeed this attempt was embodied in the Parliament (No. 2) Bill. The provisions of the Bill included: reducing the delaying power over principal legislation, establishing a compositional majority for the Government of the day (and as such eliminating the Conservative Party’s in-built majority), and eliminating both the hereditary principle and the power of rejection over subordinate legislation. It is reasonable to expect that this Bill would be supported by the majority of the Labour backbenchers, and therefore that the Bill would proceed reasonably straightforwardly to Royal Assent.4 Indeed, the Bill received a Second Reading in the 1 The 1966 Labour Party manifesto – http://www.politicsresources.net/ (accessed 31st May 2016) 2 J. Silkin (1987) Changing Battlefields: The Challenge to the Labour Party, London: Hamilton, p.113 3 P. Dorey (2008a) The Labour Party and Constitutional Reform: A History of Constitutional Conservatism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.138 4 Additionally, the Labour Government was elected in 1966 with a comfortable majority of nearly 100 seats. 2 Commons by a large majority of 150. However, during the Bill’s Committee Stage, a minority of backbenchers were able to filibuster the debates in order to obstruct the Bill’s progress, while the majority of the Labour backbenchers were not sufficiently enthusiastic to support the Bill in order to drive it forward. As a result, the Bill’s progress was extremely slow – it got bogged down – and the Government was forced to withdraw it. While the filibustering has entered into political folklore (it was led by the so-called ‘unholy alliance’ of Michael Foot and Enoch Powell), this thesis will demonstrate that the filibustering was a necessary but not sufficient cause for the Bill’s failure. As such, the pressing question to ask is: what can explain the lack of enthusiastic support from the majority of the Labour backbenchers? A thesis