Commercial Diving (A Clients Point of View) Phil Keating BSc (Hons) in one area had become so well organized that a payment scale for salvage work was established by law, acknowledging the fact that effort and risk increased with in one area had become so well organized that a payment scale for salvage work was established by law, acknowledging the fact that effort and risk increased with 1-2.1 Breathing Tubes. capabilities was providing an air supply that would permit him to stay underwater. Hollow reeds or tubes extending to the surface allowed a diver to remain submerged for an extended period, but he could accomplish little in the way of useful work. 1-2.1 Breathing Tubes. capabilities was providing an air supply that would permit him to stay underwater. approach to an enemy stronghold (). Hollow reeds or tubes extending to the surface allowed a diver to remain submerged for an extended period, but he could accomplish little in the way of useful work. approach to an enemy stronghold (). however, that any of these devices were actually constructed or tested. The result however, that any of these devices were actually constructed or tested. The result important factors in diving. Successful diving operations require that the pressure be overcome or eliminated. Throughout history, imaginative devices were designed important factors in diving. Successful diving operations require that the pressure the problem of pressurebe overcome underwater or eliminated. was Throughoutnot fully understood history, imaginative and the devicesdesigns were were designed impractical. the problem of pressure underwater was not fully understood and the designs were impractical. 1-2.4.4 Salvage of the HMS Royal George. eral types of diving dress were being used in actual remains of the sunken warship, HMS Royal George. William operation was an ideal opportunity to formally test and evaluate the various types of apparatus. Wary of the Deane apparatus because of the possibility of Siebe dress be adopted for future operations. government historian noted that “of the seasoned divers, not a man escaped the repeated attacks Figure 1-1. Early Impractical Breathing Device. Figure 1-2. Assyrian Frieze (900 B.C.). Figure 1-3. Engraving of Halley’s Figure 1-2. Assyrian Frieze (900 B.C.). of rheumatism and cold.” The divers had Figurebeen 1-4. Lethbridge’s Diving Suit. This 1511 design showsFigure the 1-1. diver’s Early headImpractical encased Breathing Device. Diving Bell. Figure 1-5. Siebe’s First This 1511 design shows the diver’s head encased Enclosed Diving Dress and in a leather bag with a breathing tube extending to in a leather bag with a breathing tube extending to Helmet. the surface. the surface. not realize the implications of the observation. What appeared to be rheumatismminutes. was instead a symptom of a far more serious physiological problem that, within a few years, was to become of great importance 1-2 1-2 U.S. Navy DivingU.S. Navy Manual—Volume Diving Manual—Volume 1 1 to the diving profession. all had the same basic limitation as the diving bell—the diver had little freedom 1-2.5 Caissons. inventors were working to improve the diving bell by increasing its size and operated pump capable of delivering air under pressure was developed. of chambers 1-2large.4. 2enough Deane’s to permit Patented several Diving men toDress. engage Several in dry men work produced on the a successful apparatus at footings or constructing tunnel sections where long periods of work were required. These dry chambers were known as caissons, a French word meaning “big boxes” (). Dress, consisting of a heavy suit for protection from the cold, a helmet with viewing Exhausted or surplus air passed out from under the edge of the helmet and posed Figure 1-6. French Caisson. 1-2.4.3 Siebe’s Improved Divingover Dress. the work site and dress has been given to lowered to the bottom by system ( Figure 1-8. MK 12 and MK V. Modern day sat divers Figure 1-3. Engraving of Halley’s Figure 1-4. Lethbridge’s Diving Suit. CHAPTER 1—History of Diving 1-4 U.S. Navy1-5 Diving Manual—Volume 1 Diving Bell. minutes. all had the same basic limitation as the diving bell—the diver had little freedom operated pump capable of delivering air under pressure was developed. types: 1-2.4.2 Deane’s Patented Diving Dress. Several men produced a successful apparatus at water), Dress, consisting of a heavy suit for protection from the cold, a helmet with viewing Exhausted or surplus air passed out fromcircuit under types). the edge of the helmet and posed 1-3.1 Open-Circuit SCUBA. cylinder and the exhaust is vented directly to the surrounding water. 1-2.4.3 Siebe’s Improved Diving Dress. dress has been given to1 -3.1.1 Rouquayrol’s Demand Regulator. system ( cylinders strong enough to contain air at high pressure could not be built at the time, 1-4 U.S. Navy Diving Manual—Volume 1 1-3.1.2 LePrieur’s Open-Circuit SCUBA Design. to the constant manual control of his air supply. The lack of a demand regulator, CHAPTER 1—History of Diving 1-9 Commercial Diving • Saturation diving depth records • The diving depth record for off shore diving was achieved in 1988 by a team of professional divers of the Comex S.A. industrial deep-sea diving company performing pipe line connection exercises at a depth of 534 meters (1752 ft) of sea water (MSW) in the Mediterranean Sea during a record scientific dive. • In 1992 Comex diver Theo Mavrostomos, achieved a record of 701 MSW (2300 ft) in an on shore hyperbaric chamber. He took 43 days to complete the scientific record dive, where a hydrogen-helium-oxygen gas mixture was used as breathing gas New Depth Record Record Working Dive 2300ft 1752ft OFFSHORE INJURY, ILL HEALTH AND INCIDENT STATISTICS 2009/2010 HID STATISTICS REPORT HSR 2010 - 1 Date of Issue: December 2010 Health and Safety Executive TABLE 8 – SEVERITY OF INJURY AND AGE OF INJURED PERSON – 2009/10 AGE OF INJURED SEVERITY OF INJURY ALL INJURIES PERSON FATAL MAJOR OVER-3-DAY Less than 20 0 0 0 20 – 24 4 6 10 25 – 29 4 19 23 30 – 34 5 7 12 35 – 39 6 24 30 40 – 44 9 14 23 45 – 49 8 13 21 50 – 54 4 10 14 55 – 59 5 8 13 60 – 64 4 4 8 65 – 69 0 2 2 Not recorded 1 3 4 TOTAL 0 50 110 160 TABLE 9 – SEVERITY OF INJURY AND WORK PROCESS ENVIRONMENT – 2009/10 SEVERITY OF IN JURY WORK PROCESS ENVIRONMENT ALL INJURIES FATAL MAJOR OVER-3-DAY DECK OPERATIONS 13 31 44 DRILLING 8 11 19 MANAGEMENT 6 15 21 PRODUCTION 7 13 20 MAINTENANCE / CONSTRUCTION 15 38 53 OFFSHORE DIVING* 1 2 3 TOTAL 0 50 110 160 * HSE Offshore Division retains responsibility for all aspects of offshore diving and inshore diving. Statistics stated are for offshore diving and diving support activities only. TABLE 11 – ILL HEALTH INCIDENTS APRIL 1998 – 17MARCH 2010 DESCRIPTION 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 TOTAL Decompression 3 2 1 5 4 1 2 8 2 1 29 illness Barotrauma 1 1 1 3 Cramp 1 1 2 repetitive Beat knee 1 1 1 3 Inflamation of 1 1 1 2 1 6 tendons Hand-arm 1 2 4 3 10 vibration Occupational 4 2 5 2 1 3 17 dermatitis Chickenpox 6 7 10 6 13 6 8 6 9 4 7 4 86 Food poisoning 1* 1 3 2** 1 8 Malaria 1 1 Meningitis 1 1 1 3 Rubella 1 1 2 Mumps 1 1 6 1 1 10 Scarlet fever 1 1 Measles 1 1 Legionellosis 1 1 TOTAL 16 15 20 131 19 13 11 18 21 6 21 10 183 * This incident resulted in twelve people being affected ** One incident involved 21 workers, the other incident affected 16 workers 19 TABLE 12 – DANGEROUS OCCURRENCES BY TYPE 2009/10 TYPE DESCRIPTION NUMBER 01 Failure of lifting machinery etc. 38 02 Failure of pressure systems. 1 05 Electrical short circuit or overload. 13 08 Radiation. 5 09 Malfunction of breathing apparatus. 4 10 Diving operations. 15 11 Collapse of scaffolding. 0 13 Well operations. (See Table 12(a)) 24* 14 Pipelines and pipeline works. 0 73 Release of hydrocarbon. 187 74 Fire or explosion other than hydrocarbon. 28 75 Release or escape of a dangerous substance other than 9 hydrocarbon. 76 Collapses. 0 77 Failure of equipment required to maintain a floating installation on station. Objects dropped on an installation, attendant vessel or 102 into water. Weather damage. 78 Collision between a vessel or aircraft and an installation. 5 79 Possible collision offshore. 0 80 Subsidence or collapse of seabed. 1 81 Loss of stability or buoyancy. 1 82 Evacuation of an installation. 1 83 Falls into water. 0 TOTAL 434 * Excludes one well incident that occurred in the Falkland Islands. HSE currently acts on behalf of the Falkland Islands Government in the regulation of offshore activities in island waters. Table 12(a) - WELL RELATED DANGEROUS OCCURRENCES 2009/10 TYPE DESCRIPTION NUMBER 13(a) Blowout (Uncontrolled flow from a well) 0 13(b) BOP / Diverter operation to control flow 17 13(c) Unanticipated H2S released 3 13(d) Precautionary measures following failure to maintain 0 minimum separation between wells 13(e) Mechanical failure of a Safety Critical Element (SCE) 4(7)** of a well Total 24(27) ** Figure in brackets comprises events under 13(e) plus additional events that relate to failure of a SCE of a well that resulted in a hydrocarbon release.