Erasing the Lines Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America
ast year, we published a report, “Blurring elected leaders who openly criticize U.S. policies, and the Lines,” which discussed the confusion of the growth of populist movements. Lmilitary and policing roles in Latin America amid weakening civilian oversight of U.S. military assistance programs. A year later, these trends are intensifying. 1. The Defense Department makes a play for The Defense Department continues to expand its control over foreign military training programs that greater control over foreign military programs were once the exclusive province of the Department A little-noticed but significant attempt to change U.S. of State, lessening congressional oversight and security policy occurred early in 2005 and resurfaced weakening the relation of military assistance to overall again at the end of the legislative session; though foreign policy goals. In Central America, the U.S. initially unsuccessful, it remains before Congress and government is encouraging military involvement in new warrants close monitoring. In March, the Pentagon internal missions—including policing functions—by requested broad new authority to train and equip accompanying a regional realignment of military roles in response to “emerging” threats. Training by Budget Source, 1999, 2001-2004 The year also saw human rights groups carrying out an intense effort to apply conditions in the law Defense budget programs Foreign aid and budget programs (sales excluded) governing military aid to Colombia, as well as a Bush Administration attempt to lift a fifteen-year- 25000 old ban on military aid to Guatemala. The most widespread challenge to the region’s military aid, however, came from conservative U.S. lawmakers. 20000 In their effort to punish countries that refuse to exempt U.S. soldiers from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, they have triggered 15000 partial military and economic aid cutoffs to twelve Latin American countries. 10000 The United States’ close partnership with Colombia deepened this year, the final year of 5000 “Plan Colombia,” as aid continued at the same high level. Meanwhile, policy and aid to the rest of the Andes is adrift, as U.S. security and civilian 0 officials failed to address the challenges posed by 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 shaky public confidence in democratic institutions,
Latin America A joint publication from the Center for Working Group International Policy, the Latin America DECEMBER 2005 Working Group Education Fund, and the Education Fund Washington Office on Latin America 2 Erasing the Lines
foreign military and police forces. The proposed budget, roughly 20 times larger than the language in the defense authorization bill foreign aid budget, and the members of these would have permitted the Defense Department committees—whose districts often benefit to support “building the capacity of partner heavily from defense spending—tend to take a nations’ military or security forces to disrupt or lighter hand at oversight than their counterparts destroy terrorist networks, close safe havens, on the foreign affairs committees. Third, unless or participate in or support United States, Congress specified otherwise, the lines between coalition, or international military or stability policing and military functions would be further operations.” It would have provided “equipment, blurred, as restrictions on Foreign Operations- supplies, services, training and funding.”1 The funded police training programs would not Defense Department requested $750 million in apply to defense-funded programs. Finally, forty contingency or “drawdown” funds to accompany years worth of human rights and democracy this new authority. As we went to press, final conditionality—the result of long debate and decisions on this new authority were pending. fine-tuning of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, ranging from prohibiting funding after This language would set up a new foreign military coups to narcotics certification to many security assistance program, paralleling the human rights provisions—would not apply to existing one managed by the State Department. DOD-funded programs. The existing program provides training and equipment to foreign militaries and by law While the Armed Services Committees rejected is administered by the State Department this proposal earlier in the year, it resurfaced as (with a few important exceptions, including a successful amendment to the Senate version Defense Department counterdrug programs, of the Defense Authorization and Appropriations the emerging Counterterrorism Fellowship bills in late 2005. The proposal was given Program discussed below, exercises and a few new impetus when the State Department others). Defense Department officials have reversed its previous objections and backed the long expressed frustration with State’s role. initiative. Secretary of State Rice, less cautious They criticize State’s management of security- than Secretary of State Colin Powell in ceding assistance programs as bureaucratic, slow on power from State to the Pentagon, co-signed delivery of aid, and hampered by congressional a letter with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld conditionality. Furthermore, because many requesting the authority.2 As of this writing, the members of Congress dislike foreign aid in new authority and contingency funds have not general, getting State-funded security assistance been finally granted. However, even if this new bills through the U.S. Congress is always more authority does not become law in 2005, it is controversial and difficult than legislation likely to resurface as the Defense Department funding the Defense Department’s budget. continues its calls for flexibility and agility in the “war on terror.” However, creating a similar program run by the Department of Defense (DOD) would have far-reaching implications. First, the State 2. A new counterterrorism program Department—which is charged with carrying increases the Defense Department’s out the totality of U.S. foreign policy, not just security policy—would lose control over an role in foreign military training important, and often risky and controversial, While this broad challenge to State’s role in foreign-policy tool. Second, congressional foreign military training may not prevail, a oversight would be radically decreased. These new program gives the Defense Department a programs would not be monitored by the much greater training role. In January 2002, congressional Foreign Operations and Foreign a few months after the September 11 attacks, Relations committees, but instead would be Congress appropriated $17.9 million in the under the jurisdiction of the Armed Services 2002 Defense Appropriations bill to allow and Defense Appropriations committees. the Pentagon to launch a Regional Defense These committees oversee the entire defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 3
which would “fund foreign military officers to and maintenance budget. The program is attend U.S. military educational institutions and overseen by the office of the Assistant Secretary selected regional centers for non-lethal training.” of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC). This initiative, begun at the urging of the regional military commands, particularly the While the Western Hemisphere lags behind other Pacific Command, has become one of the regions of the world, the CTFP went from training most significant sources of training funds 431 students from four Latin American and worldwide. In 2003 the CTFP became a Caribbean countries in 2003, to 1,107 students permanent program, when Congress included from 22 countries in 2004.3 This made the CTFP it in the 2004 National Defense Authorization the fourth-largest source of U.S. training funds for Act (Public Law 108-136). A new section of Latin American militaries in 2004. the U.S. Code (Title 10, section 2249c) gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to spend As a result, in 2004 the Defense budget up to $20 million each year on the program, funded 57 percent of all Latin Americans who using the military’s “defense-wide” operations received training at U.S. expense (8,908 out
Counterterrorism Fellowship Training Program Aid Table (all amounts in U.S. dollars) Trainees table 20037 20048 2005, est.9 2006, req.10 200311 200412 Regional discretionary 450,000 Argentina 12 Argentina 63,139 200,000 100,000 Bahamas Belize 8,477 Belize 1 Bolivia 17,100 Bolivia 3 Brazil 72,279 200,000 150,000 Brazil 6 Chile 39,990 100,000 Chile 9 Colombia 288,204 654,075 300,000 200,000 Colombia 358 542 Costa Rica 11,400 Costa Rica 3 Dominican Republic 20,043 Dominican Republic 3 Ecuador 187,454 200,000 100,000 Ecuador 14 El Salvador 21,090 100,000 El Salvador 5 Guatemala 17,490 Guatemala 4 Honduras 14,510 100,000 Honduras 3 Jamaica 127,171 Jamaica 3 Mexico 12,000 479,699 450,000 375,000 Mexico 1 236 Nicaragua 5,700 100,000 Nicaragua 1 Panama 50,412 50,000 Panama 3 Paraguay 338,029 242,458 200,000 100,000 Paraguay 17 94 Peru 209,810 362,413 200,000 150,000 Peru 55 119 Trinidad and Tobago 146,825 50,000 Trinidad and Tobago 5 Uruguay 158,916 Uruguay 39 Venezuela 8,810 Venezuela 2 Total 848,043 2,709,451 1,750,000 2,125,000 Total 431 1,107 4 Erasing the Lines
of 15,634 grant trainees).4 The percentage in A 2003 Defense Department policy guidance 2003 was slightly higher, but skewed by the explained that “all non-lethal education and unusual number of Colombians the U.S. trained training is to be considered available through for counterdrug purposes that year. The trend the CT fellowship.”6 This meant that IMET and remains the same. the CTFP could fund many of the same courses. In 2004, legislative changes turned the CTFP CTFP duplicates existing Military Training into a program that resembles IMET even more Programs. While the rationale for CTFP is closely. The 2004 authorization expanded the anti-terrorist training in the aftermath of 9/11, CTFP to allow lethal training, and permitted it the program is becoming less distinguishable to fund training activities, such as visits from from International Military Education and Mobile Education Teams to carry out training Training (IMET), the principal State Department- in other countries, that take place outside U.S. managed military training program in the annual defense educational institutions. Foreign Operations bill. Like other Defense-budget programs, the rise When the CTFP started, the idea was for a of the CTFP lessens the State Department’s largely academic program, somewhat similar involvement in training, reduces the relevance to the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of human rights and democracy conditionality (CHDS) and other regional defense centers.5 in the Foreign Assistance Act, and makes more The program’s curriculum focused on counter- training subject to the oversight of congressional terror doctrine and theory, taught mainly in armed-services and defense appropriations classrooms, workshops, and seminars. committees, which carry out far less scrutiny.
U.S. Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997-2006
1600
1400 Military and Police Aid Economic and Social Aid Economic and Social Aid without MCA and HIV-AIDS Initiative
1200
1000
800
600 MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS
400
200
0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005, est. 2006, req.
This chart indicates economic aid totals both including and excluding two programs, begun in 2004, which provide large amounts of aid to only very few countries: the Millennium Challenge Account, which so far has benefited only Honduras and Nicaragua, and the HIV-AIDS initiative, which benefits only Guyana and Haiti. The spike in 2005 economic aid owes to the approval of two five-year Millennium Challenge grants. Due to lack of available data, estimates of military aid for 2002-2005 are derived by duplicating 2001 levels of Defense Department "Section 1004" anti-drug assistance. Actual amounts may be significantly higher. SOURCE: All aid numbers used in this graph are official U.S. government figures. See sources at http://ciponline.org/facts/sources.htm Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 5
3. U.S. military aid still nearly equals to the region, but have not yet successfully challenged administration priorities. Rep. economic aid to the region; neither Robert Menendez (D-NJ), for example, has category has changed significantly tried to protect development aid to the region by creating a new Latin America fund, but that since 2003 has not yet become a reality. The Senate made In 2005 and 2006, the gap remains very a significant attempt in 2005 to re-balance narrow between total U.S. military aid and the Colombia aid package within the Andean economic aid to Latin America and the Counternarcotics Initiative by placing a cap on Caribbean. During FY06, the United States is military and police aid and raising the floor on slated to provide $1.03 billion in economic aid economic assistance; however, the final version and at least $908 million in military aid. Nearly of the bill provided only a $6.5 million increase half of the $95 million difference is HIV-AIDS in economic aid.13 House appropriators included funding to just two countries – Guyana and a successful provision in the FY06 Foreign Haiti. Remove that from the sum and expected Operations Appropriations bill to mandate that economic aid total falls to $958 million, barely aid levels to Central America not fall below exceeding the amount of expected military aid. previous-year levels.14 However, neither the Congress nor the administration sought any For 2006, the Bush Administration called additional funding for Central America to rebuild for reductions in two major economic and from the devastation wrought in October 2005 humanitarian aid programs, Development by Hurricane Stan. Assistance (DA) and Child Survival and Health (CSH), slating the Latin America portion of Some countries—in particular, all Andean nations these programs for cuts of 14% to 16%, with the exception of Colombia—may also see a respectively, from FY04 levels. The Congress modest decline in military and police assistance rejected the DA and CSH cuts and approved in 2006. Some of this decline owes to pressure amounts slightly above FY05 levels. Economic on the U.S. budget, though the American aid programs for the region have stagnated Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which has frozen over the past few years, though this has been non-drug military aid to many Latin American masked by sharp increases in aid to just four nations, is a strong factor as well. As a whole, countries. In addition to the funding for Guyana though, military-aid levels will not decline in and Haiti, large economic-aid grants were 2006. Bush Administration documents indicate recently awarded to Honduras and Nicaragua that reductions in military aid to Bolivia, Brazil, through the new Millennium Challenge program Ecuador, Mexico and Peru will be more than offset ($215 million and $175 million over five years, by increases to Colombia, El Salvador and Haiti. respectively). Beyond these four countries, however, the proportion of military to economic Moreover, if the American Servicemembers’ aid is nearly fifty-fifty. Protection Act provisions affecting Economic Support Funds are implemented (see section This is a significant shift, helped along by the 9), over $50 million in FY06 Economic Support advent of the mostly military “Plan Colombia” Funds to 12 countries could be withheld. If this in 2000, and it appears to be sustaining itself. happens, it will make a significant dent in U.S. As recently as the late 1990s, economic aid economic aid programs to Latin America. was more than double military aid to the region. During the Cold War, the ratio was even higher. A look at aid and training data reveals that Since 2003, region-wide aid amounts have a few other trends noted in past reports are stayed about the same, with economic and continuing. First, among all regions of the world, social aid efforts barely edging out weapons Latin America is still the largest recipient of U.S. transfers and military training programs. military training (U.S. statistics do not include training of Iraq’s new army), though Afghanistan Some lawmakers have become aware of the supplanted Colombia in 2004 as the number- problem of stagnating economic assistance one source of trainees. 6 Erasing the Lines
Between 2004 and 2006…
The following countries are likely to The following countries are likely see some decline in military/police aid: to see some decline in economic aid: Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Eastern Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Caribbean, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, Venezuela Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela
The following countries are likely to see The following countries are likely an increase in military/police aid: to see an increase in economic aid: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Haiti, Uruguay Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay
Second, the majority of Latin American trainees policing roles. These are in danger of being – 57 percent in 2004 – had their training paid erased. One of the dynamics leading to the for not by traditional foreign aid programs, but confusion of military and policing roles is the by the U.S. Defense Department’s budget. The Organization of American States’ new doctrine Pentagon’s programs, generally run without of “multi-dimensional security.” According to State Department supervision and with little the Declaration on Security in the Americas, oversight from Congress, have accounted for the adopted by the OAS in October 2003, majority of trainees since records first became “The security threats, concerns, and other available in the late 1990s. challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, A third and related trend that remains in and the traditional concept and approach place is the prevalence of the drug war as a must be expanded to encompass new and training mission. Fifty-three percent of trainees nontraditional threats, which include political, in 2004 had their courses funded by one of economic, social, health, and environmental two counternarcotics accounts in the foreign aspects.”15 Based on the concept of “human aid and defense budgets (the Pentagon’s security,”16 the new definition of security counternarcotics account and the State threat covers everything from terrorism to Department’s International Narcotics Control HIV/AIDS to migration. While broadening the program). Of course, much of this training concept of what makes states and individuals is given to Colombian personnel, who since secure is in theory a positive concept, in 2002 have had a special legal exception: all practice it could be used to justify military counterdrug aid to Colombia may be used in the responses to social ills. fight against guerrillas and paramilitaries. With the line between counternarcotics and counter- This “securitization” of social and political insurgency erased in Colombia, recent training problems has left open the question of which funded with counterdrug money may in fact state institutions are responsible for combating have had little to do with the “war on drugs” new security threats. Traditionally, threats and more to do with Colombia’s civil conflict. are dealt with by force, and there is a risk of a turn to security forces when threats are so 4. The “securitization” of social broadly defined. issues muddies the waters In numerous military forums, both in the After the end of the Southern Cone military United States and in the region, U.S. and Latin dictatorships and the Central American American militaries are spending considerable conflicts, many Latin American governments effort defining a list of current or “emerging” drew bold lines to distinguish military and threats such as gangs, drugs, organized crime, Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 7
illegal migration and natural disasters. While militaries is the U.S. government’s current all are serious problems in the region, none use of a very broad definition of potential are the kinds of threat that lend themselves to terrorist threat. Any kind of illicit cross-border military solutions. activity (organized crime) is now considered a “potential” terrorist threat because these Adding to the potential for this definition to be channels could be used for smuggling terrorists, used to justify expanded roles for the region’s money to terrorists or weapons.
Top Recipients of U.S. Training in Latin America (number of trainees)
1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Colombia 2,476 6,300 6,477 12,947 8,801 37,001 Bolivia 3,012 708 961 2,045 1,975 8,701 Ecuador 681 899 1,267 662 186 3,695 Mexico 622 857 600 520 892 3,491 Peru 983 427 507 680 402 2,999 El Salvador 355 1,082 607 488 415 2,947 Honduras 325 475 967 439 282 2,488 Venezuela 926 557 445 256 85 2,269 Argentina 450 302 368 430 679 2,229 Chile 336 590 268 345 369 1,908 Dominican Republic 421 308 340 412 186 1,667 Uruguay 620 259 300 226 66 1,471 Panama 75 40 25 914 217 1,271 Costa Rica 402 258 286 297 21 1,264 Paraguay 288 297 213 210 237 1,245 Jamaica 159 316 239 259 89 1,062 Trinidad and Tobago 257 390 109 186 106 1,048 Brazil 49 258 285 259 66 917 Belize 436 55 91 260 34 876 Guatemala 190 152 205 92 190 829 Nicaragua 71 85 97 250 111 614 Guyana 23 176 94 230 50 573 Antigua and Barbuda 158 67 22 72 98 417 Suriname 89 89 27 139 50 394 The Bahamas 42 40 135 46 79 342 Haiti 122 7 8 90 57 284 Barbados 47 64 14 20 2 147 Grenada 63 7 9 11 11 101 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 35 9 41 12 97 Dominica 28 5 9 11 40 93 St. Lucia 33 5 11 13 16 78 St. Kitts and Nevis 11 11 12 10 30 74 Total 13,785 15,095 15,039 22,831 15,842 82,592 8 Erasing the Lines
Instead of defining everything in terms of communities—disintegration of families, lack its threat potential, the U.S. government of opportunities for youth, prevalence of family should call problems by their real names and violence. Treating disaffected Central American combat them with the most appropriate tools youth as a threat worthy of a military response available. Organized crime for example is just both sends the wrong message and will be that—criminal activity—best dealt with by ineffective. The region and the international good investigative policing and international community need to invest in urban centers cooperation, not overwhelming force. with gang problems, improve policing and judicial systems, expand afterschool and sports programs, and address the unemployment that 5. The U.S. and Central American has produced an environment of hopelessness. militaries contemplate a role in U.S. civilian agencies have been slow to combating gang violence respond to the real public security problems Gang violence in Central America has become presented by gang violence in the region. If the a serious problem, particularly in Guatemala, State and Justice Departments do not step up El Salvador and Honduras, where estimates of to the plate and work with Central American gang membership vary from a low of 75,000 to governments to develop comprehensive multi- a high of 250,000. While long involved in petty sectoral anti-gang programs, the militaries are crime, gangs are responsible for more deadly likely to step into the gap. crime, the most dramatic example of which was the killing, allegedly by gang members, of 28 Central American Rapid Response Forces. In people on a Honduran bus in December 2004. late 2004-early 2005, the Central American The governments of Honduras, El Salvador governments began discussing the need to and Guatemala have responded with hard-line develop regional responses to the problem of polices, criminalizing gang membership, arresting gangs and other transnational threats. One young men for standing in groups on street proposal put forward by the Guatemalan corners and making it a crime to have a tattoo. government was to establish a regional Local police—poorly equipped, undertrained “rapid reaction force” (RRF). In spring 2005 and often corrupt— have been overwhelmed. the region’s governments agreed to greater Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have intelligence sharing and to the establishment of responded with a dramatic show of force, both national and regional-level RRFs to combat bringing the military into their capital cities to “emerging threats,” like gangs, drugs, organized perform joint patrols with the police. crime and illegal migration, issues that defense officials say exploit the “seams” between military Central American civilian leaders have asked and police missions. Each country, with the the U.S. Southern Command for help in dealing exception of Costa Rica, agreed to establish its with gang violence. During 2004 the Southern own RRF and efforts were to be made to develop Command led several U.S. government agencies regional coordination between the forces. While in discussions of gang violence in Central these forces are still in definition, some countries America. An inter-agency working group on already have joint police and military RRFs. gangs in Central America was formed. While initially the Southern Command led this group, Some U.S. officials contend that the regional it has since formally decided not to take a Rapid Reaction Force would be limited lead role. However, it has never defined an to peacekeeping and disaster response. appropriate role for itself or the Central American However, Central American defense officials militaries in response to gang violence. Gangs are envisioning multiple roles, including law continue to be a hot topic of conversation in U.S. enforcement. In October 2005, the Central military discussions with the region. American Defense Ministers met with Secretary Rumsfeld to discuss regional coordination The growth of gangs is rooted in the social ills issues. During the meeting Honduran Defense afflicting Central America and many U.S. urban Minister Breve spoke of “rapid response forces Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 9
to confront emerging threats, specifically drug The role of Central American militaries is trafficking, terrorism and illegal trafficking…” being redefined now. Rather than falling back while Salvadoran Defense Minister General on old patterns of relying on Latin American Romero spoke of “the effort we are doing as militaries to step in and solve problems where a Central American region to create a rapid civilian institutions, like the police, fail, the U.S. response force to combat the threat; there is no government should dedicate its resources to doubt that it takes into account the presence of helping civilian institutions succeed and send gangs as part of the problem.”17 Moreover, some unambiguous messages of support for a division individual countries’ Rapid Reaction Forces are between police and military functions. largely focused on police issues. For example, in the official minutes of the April 2005 meeting of the Regional Commission for the Rapid 6. Negotiations continue over Reaction Forces, the Guatemalan government described its joint army-police RRF as dealing International Law Enforcement Academy with “organized crime, drug trafficking and The U.S. government is once again in international terrorism.”18 negotiations for the establishment of an International Law Enforcement Academy To what extent the U.S. government will (ILEA) for the Americas, located in Central support the establishment of these RRFs is America. As officially described, the ILEA would unclear. Press reports indicated that the Central train “law enforcement officers in combating American defense ministers planned to request drug trafficking, alien smuggling, trafficking equipment for regional coordination during the in persons, and other forms of international October meeting with Rumsfeld. crime.”20 The United States manages similar regional academies in Hungary, Thailand, and The U.S. government is not sending a clear Botswana. Previous efforts to establish an ILEA message that there should be a division of in Costa Rica were not successful. This time, functions between police and military roles the talks are taking place with El Salvador. in Latin America, as the posse comitatus law divides police from military functions in the More effective, well-trained police forces that United States. To the contrary, DOD officials respect human rights and operate effectively to have been sending an indirect message not prevent and investigate crime are desperately only that they are open to the restructuring of needed in Central America. As citizens’ police and military roles in Central America, frustrations grow with the inability of the police but that they believe that it is necessary. In to combat common crime, so does support for October 2005, at the conference with Central bringing the military into civilian policing roles. America’s defense ministers, U.S. Secretary of If the role of the military is to be limited to Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “Differing threats matters of national defense, the performance of require differing instruments of national power, the police must improve. and each country needs to determine the role of the military and its security forces in its own Two of the issues that became sticking points way, according to its own history and distinctive for the U.S. government in the negotiation of constitutional principles. Yesterday’s convenient the ILEA in Costa Rica were local demands division of bureaucratic duties has been deemed for oversight of the facility and limiting the today to require some adjustment.”19 While student population to civilians. These are this may seem vague, Defense officials have important, reasonable requests that should been repeating this message regularly. In their be incorporated into the ILEA, wherever it is perspective, divisions between police and based. Serious consideration should be given military roles are viewed as old and bureaucratic, to the establishment of an independent “Board new divisions of labor should be devised and the of Visitors” to monitor the institution, make it United States will accept the decisions made by transparent and give the public confidence that the sovereign nations of Central America as to the training being given is civilian, appropriate how their forces should be restructured. and rights respecting. 10 Erasing the Lines
7. “Enduring Friendship” maritime Enduring Friendship appears likely to expand military roles into missions already covered program could blur lines at sea by civilian agencies. For example, the U.S. The Bush Administration continues to Coast Guard is bringing on line an Integrated promote a maritime cooperation effort called Deepwater System (IDS) to extend a “layered “Enduring Friendship” (EF). When first maritime defense from our ports and coastal conceived, EF was a proposal to coordinate areas hundreds of miles to sea.”24 Its mission maritime operations throughout the Western statement sounds similar to that of EF: “Protect Hemisphere, and indeed to become a America’s maritime borders from all intrusions “Maritime Force of the Americas,”21 led by the by: (a) halting the flow of illegal drugs, aliens, United States. For the time being, the idea and contraband into the United States through has been scaled back. The State Department’s maritime routes; (b) preventing illegal fishing; annual budget document now describes and (c) suppressing violations of federal law in EF as a “multinational, regional security the maritime arena.”25 initiative to develop a partnership of willing nations to work together to identify, monitor, Furthermore, drug interdiction is already and intercept transnational maritime threats coordinated by the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force under international and domestic laws.”22 The (JIATF) in Key West, which incorporates U.S. administration requested $5 million (of which military and policing agencies, as well as regional the Congress approved $4 million) in Foreign security forces. With fewer assets available to Military Financing to “enhance homeland it, because of other U.S. military commitments security in the Caribbean and improve around the world, the JIATF continues to regional capabilities to fight transnational increase drug seizures because of the focus of its criminal trafficking in aliens, narcotics, arms narrow mission. The broad mission of Enduring and other contraband.”23 Friendship duplicates programs more appropriate for civilian agencies. Moreover, the approval of In this budget request, the Dominican Republic initial funding could open the door to significant is the only country that would benefit from EF mission and program expansion. funding. However, DOD sees this as a “start small” approach, and once successful would likely expand it to include more nations. DOD 8. Human rights groups struggle to has also started calling existing exercises, like Panamax, a multinational Panama Canal apply human rights provisions defense exercise, part of Enduring Friendship. The executive branch generally dislikes the While it makes sense to coordinate responses idea of human rights conditionality in the to security threats in the Caribbean, EF has an law governing military assistance, since it extremely broad mission and appears to venture may disrupt the flow of military aid. Making beyond traditional military roles. It seeks to conditions apply, even minimally, requires address a complicated set of transnational concerted pressure from non-governmental problems including environmental crises, such human rights groups. This year saw a Bush as oil spills and hurricanes, and trafficking—in Administration effort to remove a ban on aliens, narcotics, arms, and other contraband. military aid to Guatemala, part of a general trend to eliminate such restrictions, as well as a None of these are traditional military roles for significant debate over the application of human the United States. Since 1990, the U.S. military rights conditionality to Colombia. has been involved in detecting and monitoring drugs coming into the United States, but many Guatemala. For the first time since military of the problems to be addressed by EF are in aid to Guatemala was suspended in 1990, the normal purview of the Coast Guard (which, $3.2 million in non-lethal military aid resumed in peacetime, is part of the Homeland Security flowing in March 2005. The administration Department, not the Defense Department) or released aid that had been frozen “in the other civilian agencies. pipeline” since 1990 over the Guatemalan Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 11
military’s involvement in human rights abuses, violates the Peace Accords’ restriction of including the murder of U.S. innkeeper Michael the military role to external defense; and Devine.26 The House of Representatives went cooperation by the military with civilian courts a step further, lifting the ban on regular IMET investigating and prosecuting human rights (training in combat, tactics, warfighting strategy, violations and common crimes is still weak.28 and technical skills), maintaining in place only Recent incidents of violence by joint military/ the ban on FMF (Foreign Military Financing, police patrols, directed against activists in which generally pays for weapons and protests, are also of concern. equipment). Guatemala and Indonesia had been the only two countries specifically restricted Colombia. Twelve and a half percent of the from receiving IMET; the House also loosened military aid provided for Colombia through the restrictions on Indonesia.27 However, the Senate FY04 Foreign Operations Appropriations law disagreed, and the final version of the bill was put on hold for the first seven months maintained the bans on regular IMET and FMF of 2005, as the State Department was not for Guatemala. prepared to certify that Colombia met that law’s Colombia-specific human rights conditions. Along with Guatemalan human rights groups These provisions require that the Colombian and Amnesty International, we have opposed government make progress in investigating and lifting the ban, given that the military reforms prosecuting security force members engaged in promised in the 1996 Peace Accords remain gross violations of human rights or collaboration unfulfilled. Guatemala’s intelligence institutions with paramilitary forces. While aid has been are not yet completely under civilian control; held up before, this was the longest delay since military involvement in law enforcement the conditions were established in 2000.
U.S.-Funded Trainees, by Region
60000 Former Soviet Union
Europe (non-NATO) 50000 Africa
South Asia (includes Afghanistan) 40000 East Asia/Pacific
Middle East 30000 Western Hemisphere
20000 Some data classified; Comparisons 10000 impossible.
40% 34% 40% 38% 37% 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
SOURCE: Department of State and Defense. Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2000-2005. 12 Erasing the Lines
Lack of progress in a number of cases allegedly by State on a handful of cases was positive, the involving direct violations by the Colombian decision to certify despite such limited progress Army made it difficult for the State Department was, we believe, a serious mistake. to certify. Among these cases was the massacre of two families in San José de Apartadó on The Leahy Law. Efforts to enforce the Leahy February 21, 2005. Community members Law in the past year were limited, and State allege that Colombian soldiers were responsible, moved forward slowly with mechanisms to but they are refusing to testify, claiming standardize its application. The Leahy Law bars harassment by the security forces and a foreign military units from receiving training if history of dozens of unsolved crimes, including there is “credible evidence that such unit has a massacre in 2000 in which community committed gross violations of human rights” members gave 115 testimonies to the Attorney and the government is not taking “effective General’s office without result.29 measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.” While the Colombian and international human rights State and Defense Departments assert that they groups, as well as citizens throughout the actively “vet” military units and individuals to United States, urged the State Department not enforce the Leahy Law, it is difficult to examine to certify. On July 1st, 22 senators called on this implementation.32 Units that have failed Secretary of State Rice “to refrain from certifying the vetting test might be mentioned publicly that the Colombian government meets the by State Department officials, but a full list human rights conditions… until further progress of banned brigades or battalions has to be is demonstrated.” The letter cited a variety of requested through the Freedom of Information cases, including San José de Apartadó; the Act (FOIA). Even when trainees are vetted quite dismissal of the case against Gen. Rito Alejo del thoroughly, this is not likely to be based upon Río for aiding paramilitary groups; the failure to adequate human rights information.33 One of investigate a possible cover-up of the killing of the difficulties of applying the Leahy Law is three trade unionists by members of the U.S.- the executive branch’s determination that “the funded 18th Brigade in Arauca in August 2004; unit trained is the unit vetted”—if individuals and the escape from a military brig of an army are being trained, individuals rather than larger major convicted of trying to kill union leader- units will be vetted. But only rarely are the turned congressman Wilson Borja.30 names of the individual perpetrators known—as opposed to their brigades or battalions.34 Under pressure from the U.S. Embassy, on June 30th, the Attorney General issued arrest The Leahy Law is utilized most where warrants for soldiers involved in the killing of there is the most public and congressional five family members, four of them minors, in pressure—such as the case of Colombia. Cajamarca, more than a year after the incident Even there, however, it is loosely applied. The took place. On July 12, the Attorney General State Department recently told the Colombian charged four soldiers and a civilian in the government that the United States “will not killings of the three trade unionists in Arauca. consider providing assistance to the 17th During that month, Under Secretary of State Brigade (in Urabá, northwestern Colombia) until Nicholas Burns discussed specific human rights all significant human rights allegations involving cases with President Uribe. the unit have been credibly addressed.”35 But the 18th Brigade in oil-rich Arauca, northeastern Despite strong pressure not to certify, the Colombia, the focus of numerous allegations, State Department determined on August 1, continues to receive major U.S. assistance.36 2005—three days before Colombian President Uribe joined President Bush at his Crawford, The State Department is launching a new Texas ranch—that Colombia met the human vetting database centralized in the Bureau of rights conditions for the FY04 aid as well as for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Human the first 12.5 percent tranche of FY05 aid.31 rights groups welcome attention to improving While the aid holdup and the pressure exerted vetting, but express concerns that the amount Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 13
of information required by the new database the unintended consequence of restricting our system will set the bar so high that many cases access to and interaction with many important will not be included. Technical fixes, including partner nations.38 Human rights objections adequate specific funding for vetting, and to this legislation—especially to its extension greater political will on the part of State, as well to economic assistance—is that just as the as more vigorous attempts to test the Leahy United States should be asking Latin American Law in Latin America on the part of U.S. and governments to respect international law and Latin American human rights groups, are all to prosecute security forces for human rights needed to make this tool more useful. violations, we are sending the message that our own soldiers should be protected from prosecution. The ICC is a popular cause in Latin 9. U.S. insistence that U.S. soldiers be America precisely because judicial systems have protected from International Criminal often failed to bring justice, particularly in cases involving security forces and the state, and Latin Court limits U.S. aid to region American civil society groups have thus turned Ironically, the most significant current limitation to the international system for relief. on U.S. military training to the Western Hemisphere stems not from human rights Of the 23 countries worldwide currently concerns but from U.S. conservatives interested prohibited from receiving assistance, twelve are in protecting U.S. soldiers from the International in Latin America and the Caribbean: Barbados, Criminal Court (ICC). In 2002, the Congress Bolivia,39 Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, passed the “American Servicemembers’ Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Protection Act” to ensure that no U.S. soldier or Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. government personnel could be tried by the ICC. (Of these, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru The law cuts off non-drug, Foreign Operations- are among the world’s top recipients of U.S. budget U.S. military aid (principally IMET and military aid—though most flows through FMF) to countries that are signatories to the counternarcotics programs unaffected by the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, unless the ASPA.) Mexico ratified the Rome Statute in country has signed a so-called “Article 98” October 2005, leading to the cutoff of an $11.5 agreement, pledging not to seek prosecution of million judicial strengthening program.40 U.S. U.S. citizens in the ICC.37 embassies throughout Latin America have spent much diplomatic capital over the past The FY05 and FY06 foreign operations bills two years urging governments to sign Article 98 extended the sanctions to include one category agreements, but with little success. of economic aid, Economic Support Funds (ESF). Only countries eligible for the Millennium According to officials and diplomats in seven Challenge aid program are automatically countries interviewed by the New York Times, excluded from such economic sanctions “the cuts are generating strong resentment at (currently Nicaragua and Honduras in the case what many see as heavy-handed diplomacy.”41 of Latin America). The President may waive this Ecuadorian President Alfredo Palacio, whose provision for a specific country if he determines country stands to lose one of the greatest it is in the national interest. ESF-funded amounts from sanctions—$15 million since programs affected by sanctions include efforts 2003 and perhaps another $7 million this to strengthen judicial systems, support free and year—told a Quito TV station he would not fair elections, fight corruption, promote local budge for the United States. “Absolutely no governance, and support civil-military dialogue. one is going to make me cower.”42 Costa Rican Foreign Minister Roberto Tovar called the The American Servicemembers’ Protection immunity proposals “offensive” and added: Act has been criticized, for different reasons, “One can be poor, but dignified.”43 by U.S. military officials and by human rights groups. Southern Command chief General Bantz The ASPA is doing great damage to U.S. foreign J. Craddock notes that the legislation “has policy goals in Latin America. Most importantly, 14 Erasing the Lines
it sends the wrong human rights message and most countries, are relatively new, weakened by undercuts efforts to address impunity. Moreover, years of “structural adjustment” and budget cuts, it reinforces the image of the United States as a and perceived as corrupt and unable to bring bullying superpower. Consider the contrast: while either citizen security or gainful employment. U.S. diplomats threaten aid cutoffs for the ASPA, drug certification and other requirements, the Instead, hardliners’ rhetoric has been Bush Administration’s main rivals in the region— increasingly confrontational. So far, we have yet particularly populist leaders like Venezuela’s to see this rhetoric translate into an aggressive Hugo Chávez—are winning support through and potentially counter-productive containment offers of increased aid and solidarity. Finally, policy. For instance, we have not documented the extension of ASPA sanctions to economic a significant move toward employing military funding further guts the already insufficient U.S. assistance as a bulwark against these political economic support for the region. movements. We continue to warn against such a move, however, as it would repeat one of the most serious mistakes of the Cold War. 10. U.S. policy fails to comprehend rise of Andean populist movements Venezuela. Venezuela is the current flashpoint in U.S. security policy with Latin America. As it has since the launch of Plan Colombia in The country is now receiving almost no U.S. 2000, the Andean region – Colombia, Ecuador, security assistance. The cutoff occurred at the Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela – still accounts for initiative of the government of Hugo Chávez, more than 85 percent of all military and police which has steadily increased the tone of its assistance to the hemisphere, and more than 44 criticisms of the United States, often eliciting 70 percent of all trainees. strong responses from Bush Administration officials. For their part, administration officials This sub-region makes by far the most frequent have regularly expressed concerns about appearances in U.S. policymakers’ statements concentration of power in Venezuela’s executive of concern about Latin America. Officials worry branch, a potentially restrictive new law about drug-trafficking; the Colombian conflict; governing media, the formation of a national the presence of all four of Latin America’s guard, and increased arms purchases by the designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations; and Chávez government. “I think we have to view, presidential elections to be held in every country at this point, the government of Venezuela as a in the region next year (starting in Bolivia in negative force in the region,” Secretary of State December). Colombia is discussed separately in Rice said in her February confirmation hearing. section 11. The U.S.-Venezuela relationship could be a Above all, 2005 saw dramatically increased case study in unhelpful tit-for-tat diplomacy. In expressions of concern about so-called “radical May 2004, President Chávez ejected the U.S. populist” movements in the Andes. The Bush Embassy’s Military Group from its offices in Administration uses this term to describe left- Venezuela’s Fuerte Tiuna military headquarters. leaning governments in Venezuela and now In August 2005, Chávez expelled the U.S. Ecuador, which whom relations are souring, as Drug Enforcement Administration from the well as movements that helped force presidents country, claiming that its agents were spying out of office in Ecuador and Bolivia this year. In for the United States, allowing them to return President Bush’s November speech in Brasilia, a few days later. The Bush Administration he warned of a trend that “seeks to roll back the responded in September by de-certifying democratic progress of the past two decades.” Venezuela as a partner in the drug war; of all countries in the world, Burma was the only U.S. policy toward the rise of populism in the other to be singled out. Andes is confused and at cross purposes. It has been unable to address a rising popular U.S. officials have made several unspecific frustration with democratic institutions which, in allegations that Venezuela may be assisting Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 15
Colombian guerrillas by tolerating their presence regard the country as the likely next domino to on the Venezuelan side of the two countries’ fall to “radical populism.” They are outspoken long, remote border. “There is concern that in their opposition to former coca-growers’ narco-terrorist groups consider the areas of the leader turned presidential candidate Evo Venezuelan/Colombian border a safe area to Morales. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense rest, refit, and transship drugs and arms,” said for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Pardo- Southern Command chief Gen. Bantz Craddock Maurer, the most senior civilian Defense official in March. 45 for Latin America, said in a July 2005 speech that Bolivia may be the first target of a Cuban- It is not clear, however, that the guerrilla presence Venezuelan attempt to remake Latin America on the Venezuelan-Colombian border is different along radical-leftist, anti-U.S. lines. “I’d like to from what one might find in the border zones of draw your attention to the place where I think any of Colombia’s neighbors. Carlos Palacios, the set—if you’d like—the set battle piece in the governor of Putumayo, Colombia, described what’s truly going on right now, which is the a situation in Ecuador in July that sounds no battle for the future of Latin America, where different than what Venezuela is accused of I think this is happening—Bolivia—and what tolerating. “For years, this entire border has been Cuba and Venezuela are doing there.”49 A a corridor of FARC activity. They constantly go Defense Department news release published to Ecuador, that is where they do all of their during Secretary Rumsfeld’s August 2005 trip to logistics, their stockpiles of food, and where Peru and Paraguay reported, “A senior defense they have some encampments.”46 Moreover, the official told reporters traveling with Rumsfeld rightwing Colombian paramilitary forces, the that Cuban ideology, backed by Nicaraguan AUC, also find a home on the Venezuelan side financing, is targeting nations like Bolivia that of the border, suggesting problems with a porous are teetering between democracy and leftist border rather than, necessarily, political support governments and could go either way.”50 for one faction.47 Though Bolivia may see a 25 percent Ecuador. U.S. relations with Ecuador changed decrease in ACI military and police assistance sharply with the hasty April 2005 exit of between 2004 and 2006, non-drug missions, unpopular President Lucio Gutiérrez. His particularly counter-terrorism, are increasingly replacement, former vice-president Alfredo taking precedence. U.S. military and police Palacio, has taken a much more critical stance aid to Bolivia is presented to Congress both toward the United States. Palacio has promised as combating narcotics and as ensuring “that closer oversight of U.S. activity at the Manta Bolivia does not become an active transit point naval base, where U.S. military and contract for international terrorism.”51 In February 2005, personnel maintain a presence under a 10- U.S. assistance helped the Bolivian Police to year counternarcotics agreement. The Palacio inaugurate a new elite “counter-narco-terror” government has taken a stronger line on aerial unit within its Special Force for the Fight Against herbicide spraying in Colombian coca-growing Narcotrafficking (FELCN), known as the Special areas near the Ecuadorian border, alleging Operations Force (FOE). Equipped with high-tech that it is causing damage in Ecuadorian gear and manned by some of the country’s most territory. The Ecuadorians have increasingly experienced police agents, the 700-man FOE criticized Plan Colombia itself; “Plan Colombia “has everything necessary to carry out high-level … has not achieved its desired results, and operations to dismantle the cartels that are trying the situation remains as it was before,” said to establish themselves in the country, such Interior Minister Mauricio Gándara.48 The new as the Mexican and Colombian organizations,” government has flatly refused to seek an article according to FELCN commander Luis Caballero.52 98 agreement, triggering a significant cutoff of non-drug military aid. U.S. policymakers have expressed interest in helping the Bolivian government obtain riot gear Bolivia. Bolivia has become a particular focus and crowd-control equipment. The 2006 Foreign for Bush Administration security officials, who Operations Congressional Presentation indicates 16 Erasing the Lines
that Foreign Military Financing (which in fact drift away from the original impetus for Plan remains frozen by the ASPA) would be used to Colombia, counternarcotics. The drug war still “provide equipment and training assistance to accounts for the majority of U.S. assistance to Bolivian Armed Forces and to military police units Colombia, with large outlays for aerial herbicide to increase their effectiveness in their traditional fumigation, the maintenance of planes, national security role and ensure effective control helicopters and boats used on counterdrug of crowd disturbances in urban settings.”53 This missions, and support for an “airbridge is probably the most significant example we have denial” program to interdict drug trafficking yet seen of military and police assistance being on planes. Every year, Colombian police and directed against “radical populism.” U.S. contractor pilots set a new record for the number of acres fumigated. However, cultivation While there is cause for serious concern over the of coca, the plant used to make cocaine, is no weakness of democratic institutions in Bolivia, longer decreasing; State Department data show U.S. security officials unfortunately seem to that record spraying in 2004 failed to decrease be casting about for external explanations of coca plantings by even one acre.54 the level of popular discontent rather than the abundant internal reasons, including historic Meanwhile, non-drug military aid programs neglect of poor and indigenous populations. continue to receive increasing focus. U.S. Special Forces remain in Colombia’s In Bolivia and elsewhere, the Bush northeastern department of Arauca, supporting Administration should be less concerned about Colombian military and police units who are Venezuelan influence and recognize instead that protecting oil infrastructure from sabotage populist movements are homegrown phenomena. in this guerrilla-heavy zone. The initial U.S. If it wants to keep such movements from turning training of thousands of members of the virulently anti-American, it will have to respond Colombian Army’s 18th Brigade and 5th Mobile with very different methods than visits from Brigade has been completed; the end of Rumsfeld and gifts of riot gear. It is time to try this effort accounts for much of the drop in smarter diplomacy, less high-handedness and Colombian military trainees from 12,947 in bullying, a principled focus on the importance of 2003 to 8,801 in 2004.55 Delivery of eight continuity of democratic institutions, and more UH-1 Huey and two UH-60 Black Hawk economic aid to help democratic governments helicopters to Arauca is nearly complete, while become more responsive, more accountable, and in mid-2005 the Colombian military launched better able to deliver basic services. a U.S.-backed offensive, called “Operación Escudo” (Operation Shield), aimed at re-taking territory from guerrilla groups in the zone.56 11. U.S. drug policy in Colombia at standstill, involvement in war grows Meanwhile, U.S. logistics and intelligence personnel continue to support a major offensive Colombia continues to be by far Latin America’s begun nearly two years ago in a vast area of number-one recipient of U.S. military and police southern Colombia. Known as “Operation JM” assistance, with over $600 million expected to or “Plan Patriota,” this offensive involves over be delivered in 2005. This makes Colombia, by 15,000 Colombian troops and hundreds of U.S. a wide margin, the world’s largest military-aid military personnel and contractors. Supporting recipient outside the Middle East. Aid levels “Plan Patriota” was the principal reason given have been steady between 2003 and what for the Defense Department’s successful 2004 is anticipated for 2006. As in previous years, request to Congress to raise the legal limit on this military assistance is four times the United the U.S. military presence in Colombia, from States’ contribution for economic, humanitarian 400 to 800. While combat remains frequent, and institution-building aid. critics of the operation point out its failure to capture senior guerrilla leaders; its heavy-handed The United States’ close partnership with treatment of the civilian population, including the Uribe Administration is contributing to a reports of human-rights abuses; and the lack of Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 17
Top Ten Trainees, 2004
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1975 2000 1282 1281 1241 876 647 612 549 0 Afghanistan Colombia Bolivia Thailand Israel Egypt Mexico Argentina Ukraine Philippines
planning to increase social investment in “re- than the one it is on now. But the general taken” areas. Other critics question the choice trend that we have observed for several years to carry out a costly offensive in an area where continues: gradually increasing U.S. military few people live, and argue that the FARC has attention and training programs for the region, responded by stepping up its attacks in other while U.S. civilian government attention and parts of the country. Indeed, guerrilla attacks economic programs lag behind. increased in scale during 2005. One of the hardest-hit zones has been Putumayo province, At the October 2005 Summit of the Americas, the very place where U.S.-funded operations the dissatisfaction with neoliberal economic under Plan Colombia kicked off in 2000- policies that have failed to visibly improve 2001. Moreover, while over 10,000 rightwing the lives of the poor and middle class in Latin paramilitaries have demobilized following peace America was voiced emphatically not only talks with the Colombian government, there in the alternative civil society meetings but is a high degree of skepticism about whether also in the official summit by several Latin the paramilitaries’ underlying financial, military American governments, resulting in a summit and drug-trafficking structures are being fully declaration that described two separate views. and permanently dismantled. An intensive The rise of center-left and populist governments investment of resources, Plan Patriota seems to and movements that offer to address this be producing limited lasting results. inequality—whether or not they are successful in doing so—needs to be understood by the United States as a response to economic and Conclusions political realities, and not as a security problem. From the global perspective of U.S. military personnel, policy makers and analysts, Latin Drug trafficking, organized crime and corruption America couldn’t be on a farther back burner limit democracy in significant ways in many 18 Erasing the Lines Soc Econ/ Mil/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Mil/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Econ/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Mil/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Econ/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Econ/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Mil/ Police /Soc Econ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Econ/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Econ/ Mil/ Police Soc Econ/ Econ/ 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 est 2005, req 2006, 9.500.53 0.000.33 0.15 1.62 1.02 1.100.20 0.00 0.390.62 0.19 4.68 6.06 0.98 1.65 0.90 3.46 0.000.20 0.70 0.51 0.06 12.660.52 7.87 1.94 1.029.72 14.60 1.13 1.28 5.82 0.00 0.330.76 0.54 17.48 0.00 10.90 0.30 1.39 1.560.54 12.14 1.08 1.23 0.69 14.11 2.36 3.07 2.441.53 27.22 0.00 0.45 2.76 13.65 0.40 1.610.29 1.76 29.61 0.00 0.20 2.28 0.62 14.84 0.663.25 13.54 1.28 5.38 0.00 2.99 3.55 2.93 2.16 32.04 0.00 123.500.50 5.27 1.06 12.87 2.31 0.82 1.16 53.89 0.18 0.00 0.061.35 0.78 27.37 12.48 3.29 0.50 20.82 0.41 29.10 1.403.38 0.00 2.85 13.44 3.46 38.13 2.55 2.91 12.58 95.95 0.72 15.40 0.00 2.960.00 1.69 64.36 0.82 2.46 2.74 17.25 0.28 0.82 0.00 1.49 0.06 28.14 0.94 7.010.00 3.62 13.70 22.08 0.50 3.23 79.04 24.97 1.46 36.48 0.00 13.23 104.03 4.02 3.150.19 14.42 2.92 2.82 4.98 1.99 1.65 0.06 80.20 24.19 16.27 0.00 4.34 1.69 2.60 0.55 0.86 25.77 0.47 0.00 4.15 6.96 20.05 27.30 0.05 19.14 2.38 26.08 0.490.15 3.44 36.96 13.29 88.38 2.05 0.00 1.01 3.71 3.72 1.58 1.23 16.37 2.39 10.780.36 18.77 0.07 63.25 4.09 1.30 2.76 0.73 3.15 2.55 1.14 85.92 2.39 0.00 0.371.38 0.00 19.10 34.15 21.30 8.11 31.92 0.88 10.75 0.00 3.35 2.59 55.04 0.90 12.42 78.99 0.15 1.33 0.50 36.76 4.20 4.26 1.20 9.33 2.46 0.74 0.64 0.00 1.59 57.76 10.05 0.57 18.54 4.70 2.98 2.06 1.61 1.15 33.45 0.80 32.62 2.72 0.59 16.68 0.00 54.40 0.35 88.96 9.25 3.66 22.50 0.00 14.86 1.55 73.33 0.00 3.63 6.68 0.80 1.78 0.08 16.31 1.22 40.64 5.37 0.50 0.45 64.53 2.27 0.68 1.15 5.57 2.70 1.70 3.30 2.63 6.37 17.80 4.14 35.82 27.64 0.00 0.75 1.72 31.49 35.81 0.69 0.91 2.70 1.20 2.90 7.88 15.56 55.52 0.00 40.41 0.00 5.71 20.71 1.76 0.00 6.68 31.00 0.12 1.70 0.80 0.55 5.18 35.90 0.00 0.57 2.90 0.00 54.98 1.40 40.12 54.30 3.37 0.74 6.30 17.57 4.79 8.49 3.26 0.86 35.03 0.00 28.50 1.69 16.67 0.75 23.85 1.91 9.10 0.91 71.44 1.84 0.00 2.10 3.40 26.99 37.09 0.69 1.09 0.00 37.68 1.95 29.68 2.85 0.00 1.15 7.70 6.92 1.30 52.41 1.73 47.78 45.65 3.67 0.89 5.10 3.27 2.73 25. 26 12.97 0.00 27.95 0.41 19.83 11.58 0.00 0.51 131.58 0.96 7.26 25.98 1.84 37.15 0.15 4.61 28.89 0.00 1.00 11.14 0.00 55.48 1.36 3.18 50.94 16.69 3.37 11.14 0.74 1.63 52.16 47.09 12.85 2.96 0.81 5.85 33.65 163.15 0.00 21.42 27.9 1 0.45 2.82 0.36 3.02 2.70 1.40 0.00 57.82 0.00 11.14 17.47 0.82 3.17 45.65 18.15 267.99 0.84 42.49 11.93 1 81.26 33.00 1.90 0.00 8.78 20.40 0.45 3.12 0.44 2.57 50. 55 0.00 0.79 0.87 2.69 26.82 48.79 9.80 224.69 1.00 32.89 1.72 12.47 17.09 0.00 7.75 1.62 0.29 1.30 0.00 11.56 43.84 0.49 11.83 1.21 0.55 6.04 0.00 0.70 0.27 11.73 0.00 0.47 13.73 1.26 0.97 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.42 1.25 0.62 0.00 0.00 13.27 64.93 17.9554.15 76.89 0.62 33.81 88.56 65.85 43.51 0.00 112.44 75.82 49.91 0.52 159.77 309.18 35.32 8.75 73.33 765.49 214.31 51.85 242.97 105.67 5.65 53.47 401.93 109.79 120.3027.85 55.07 620.98 80.88 102.72 136.70 34.18 52.07 555.07 93.34 1 03.38 134.9813.01 38.32 45.89 641. 6017.46 0.10 106.53 104.31 103.38 131.29 40.07 5.76 641.15 19.37 115.75 138.52 0.05 85.90 58.43 20.73 7.18 107.08 114.61 26.06 0.41 37.41 108.63 4.43 135.07 78.26 21.21 0.08 160.67 122.57 64.49 6.68 23.44 144.39 0.58 132.56 68.87 27.69 3.26 137.02 116.39 0.20 18.56 54. 00 5.46 189.55 98.69 2.12 14.48 54.00 3.76 178.71 98.69 0.89 9. 63 132.20 4.10 12.26 3.75 158.07 3.69 1.17 3.77 1.14 Mil/ 161.02 547.01 269.89 585.15 298.23 634.26 504.89 783.35 983.89 952.82 434.16 693.38 716.42 963.80 874.63 1,017.03 85 4.17 1,003.06 904.25 950.72 907.79 958.13 Police Last updated 11/11/05 Argentina Bahamas Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Eastern Caribbean Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Suriname and Tobago Trinidad Uruguay Venezuela Regional Programs Total w/out MCA Total and HIV-AIDS 161.02 547.01 269.89 585.15 298.23 634.26 504.89 783.35 983.89 952.82 434.16 693.38 716.42 963.80 874.63 1,017 .03 854.17 1,021.20 904.25 1,393.25 907.79 1,026.49 U.S. Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996-2006 Aid to Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. All numbers in millions of U.S. dollars. Source: All aid numbers used in this chart and reporthttp://ciponline.org/facts/sources.htm are official U.S. government figures. See sourc es at Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America 19
parts of Latin America. But instead of turning government. Only by assisting Latin American to the region’s militaries for answers to human civilian governments in addressing these chronic security or citizen security challenges, the U.S. failures—not by increasing arms and training— government must see these “emerging threats” can the United States improve its standing in the for what they are: problems caused by a historic region. Doing so will allow the United States to be lack of economic opportunity, a weak rule of a full partner in a historic effort to bring human law, and the absence of the civilian part of the security to all of the hemisphere’s citizens.
17 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Endnotes Defense (Public Affairs), Press conference following the US/Central 1 H.R. 1815, Sec. 1201, 109th Congress. America ministers meeting, 13 October 2005, http://www. 2 Bradley Graham, “Defense Dept. Seeks More Aid Capability,” defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20051013-secdef4062.htm. Washington Post, October 29, 2005, p. A18. 18 Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana, “Ayuda Memoria: Reunión 3 United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign de la Comisión Regional Fuerza de Respuesta Rápida,” Tegucigalpa, Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal 18-19 April, 2005, p. 1. Years 2004 and 2005: A Report to Congress (Washington: April 19 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Speech before the plenary 2005)
that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, Lisa Haugaard with Jay Greer, public affairs officer, Political/Military unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees Affairs, State Department, August 29, 2005. on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking 40 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. aid threatened by global compact,” Miami effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security Herald, 23 October 2005. forces unit to justice: Provided, That nothing in this section shall 41 Juan Forero, “Bush’s Aid Cuts on Court Issue Roil Neighbors,” The be construed to withhold funds made available by this Act from any New York Times, 19 August 2005. unit of the security forces of a foreign country not credibly alleged 42 Juan Forero, “Bush’s Aid Cuts on Court Issue Roil Neighbors,” The to be involved in gross violations of human rights: Provided further, New York Times, 19 August 2005. That in the event that funds are withheld from any unit pursuant to 43 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. aid threatened by global compact,” Miami this section, the Secretary of State shall promptly inform the foreign Herald, 23 October 2005. government of the basis for such action and shall, to the maximum 44 Trainees: United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, extent practicable, assist the foreign government in taking effective Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces to in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005: A Report to Congress (Washington: justice.” While the Foreign Operations law covers both training and April 2005)
Written by Lisa Haugaard, Adam Isacson and Joy Olson
© 2005 by LAWGEF, CIP and WOLA. Any material herein may be quoted without permission with credit provided to the three organizations.
Latin America Working Group Education Fund Center for International Policy Washington Office on Latin America 424 C Street NE 1717 Massachusetts Ave NW, Suite 801 1630 Connecticut Ave NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20002 Washington, DC 20036 Washington, DC 20009 202.546.7010 202.232.3317 202.797.2171 www.lawg.org www.ciponline.org www.wola.org