Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process Author(S): Dale Jamieson Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol
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American Academy of Political and Social Science Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process Author(s): Dale Jamieson Source: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 545, Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management (May, 1996), pp. 35-43 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American Academy of Political and Social Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1047890 Accessed: 05/06/2010 19:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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Sage Publications, Inc. and American Academy of Political and Social Science are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. http://www.jstor.org ANNALS, AAPSS, 545, May 1996 Scientific Uncertainty and the Political Process By DALEJAMIESON ABSTRACTIn this article, a notion of scientific uncertainty is sketched that is in many ways different from the prevailing view. Scientific uncertainty is not simply an objective value that can be reduced by science alone. Rather,scientific uncertainty is constructed both by science and by society in order to serve certain purposes. Recognizingthe social role of scientific uncertainty will help us to see how many of our problems about risk are deeply cultural and cannot be overcomesimply by the application of more and better science. Dale Jamieson is professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and adjunct scientist in the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. He received his Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and previously taught at North Carolina State University and the State University ofNew York.He has also held visiting positions at Cornell, Oxford, and Monash University in Australia. He is the editor of five books and has published many articles on ethics, science policy, and environmental philosophy. 35 36 THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY of the most controversial The conventional wisdom about SOMEpublic policy decisions in Ameri- why science is often so ineffective in can society involve risks that are pri- providing solutions to problems with marily understood through scientific important scientific dimensions fo- processes and institutions. The evi- cuses on the role of uncertainty. In dence for climate change, for exam- this view, problems such as climate ple, comes mainly from experiments change are characterizedby high lev- run on highly complex climate mod- els of scientific uncertainty about the els rather than from our everyday likelihood and effects of key events, experience. Other issues with impor- and so partisans of various policies tant scientific dimensions include can use-or misuse-scientific infor- ozone depletion, biodiversity loss, mation and authority for their own acid rain, and exposure to radon and purposes. For example, although the various toxic chemicals. Without sci- weight of scientific evidence suggests ence and scientists, there would be that large-scale emissions of green- little public concern about a wide house gases are likely to change cli- of range important issues. mate, there are so many uncertain- science has been ef- Although very ties about the roles of clouds, carbon fective in these issues into bringing sinks, and various possible feedbacks the it has been public arena, quite that both greenhouse "hawks" and ineffective at solutions. providing "doves"can reasonably enlist science There are a number of views about as an ally while accusing their oppo- this is the case. Over lunch and why nents of misusing The at scientists science.3 only professional meetings, way out of this situation, some argue, often complain about the lack of un- is for uncertainties to be reduced to derstanding or downright perversity the at which science can deter- the of leaders who point on part political mine a rational What is scientific information. On the policy. ignore needed is a new of other generation super- hand, many policy analysts remote fault scientists for to each computers, greater sensing talking and a and more ac- other rather than capability, larger producing "policy- tive research relevant" own community. science.1 My view, In the conventional uncer- which cannot be view, fully developedhere, is seen as an is that the characteristics of sci- tainty objectivequantity very whose value can be reduced in- ence that enable it to have its unique by vesting in more science. While this cultural authority as a knowledge may usefully be thought of as one of producer disable it from bringing several understandings of uncer- public decisions to closure.2 tainty, it is at best simplistic and mis- 1. See, for example, E. S. Rubin, L. B. Lave, and M. G. Morgan, "Keeping Climate 3. The typology of greenhouse "hawks," Research Relevant," Issues in Science and "doves," and "owls" is developed in Michael H. Technology, 8(2):47-55 (1991-92). Glantz, "Politics and the Air Around Us: Inter- 2. I have developed this view more fully in national Policy Action on Atmospheric Pollu- a number of papers. See, for example, "Ethics, tion by Trace Gases," in Societal Responses to Public Policy and Global Warming," Science, Regional Climate Change: Forecasting by Anal- Technology and Human Values, 17(2):139-53 ogy, ed. M. Glantz (Boulder, CO:Westview Press, (1992). 1988), pp. 41-42. SCIENTIFICUNCERTAINTY 37 leading to think of it as the only or the recognition of the chronictoxicity most important one. Rather than be- of DDT.6 ing a cause of controversy,scientific Fallibility looms large with re- uncertainty is often a consequence of spect to many health and environ- controversy.4This suggests that the mental risks. In some cases, we may social world is active in the construc- know that various exposures are as- tion and characterization of uncer- sociated with harms, but we may tainty, and if we want to understand have little idea ofwhat causal mecha- uncertainty, we need to understand nisms are at work. Although the sta- the socialfactors that help to produceit. tistical evidence may be strong enough for some to attribute causal- FALLIBILITY,UNCERTAINTY, ity, even in these cases we may worry ANDINDETERMINISM about the fallibility of such claims. Ourview of the matter may simply be The first in step understanding wrong-not in details, but thor- uncertainty involves distinguishing so. We not even be in a it from some related notions with oughly may position to assess the probability of which it is often confused.5 our The fact of our fal- is often conflated being wrong. Uncertainty is often with relates to libility usually-indeed, fallibility. Fallibility must but it the fact that we could be about be-ignored, constantly wrong the of to which we presents possibility bringing virtually any proposition down an entire edifice of our from the most knowledge. give assent, arises from (for "Iknow how old Uncertainty ignoring homely example, We take various features of I am")to the most exotic (for fallibility. example, a as and focus on other "I know how old the universe is"). problem given dimensions. For it is Fallibility lurks in the backgroundof example, widely scientific claims and moves to the agreed that the case for climate is weakened the fact that foreground when new evidence change by we are uncertain about the effects of comes flooding in that suggests that clouds on the climate The our previous views about some mat- system. solution is more intensive of ter were not just wrong, but deeply study cloud formation and effects. But to and profoundlywrong. The discovery clouds as an area of of the ozone hole, which was not pre- identify uncer- is to dicted by any of the atmospheric tainty presuppose that our gen-- models, is one example of this, as is eral knowledge of the climate system is not uncertain, that the climate 4. This point is argued forcefully in Brian models are and so L. Campbell, "Uncertainty as Symbolic Action basically correct, in Disputes Among Experts," Social Studies of on. This background knowledge is Science, 15:429-53 (1985). "blackboxed"--it is taken as a set of 5. Although I draw the distinctions in a assumptions from which we proceed somewhat different discussion in this way, my to try to reduce uncertainty.This ap- section is indebted to Brian Wynne, "Uncer- tainty and Environmental Learning: Recon- 6. For discussion of these cases, see D. ceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive Budansky, "Scientific Uncertainty and the Pre- Paradigm," Global Environmental Change, cautionary Principle," Environment, 33(7):4-5, 2:111-27 (1992). 43-44 (Sept. 1991). 38 THE ANNALSOF THE AMERICANACADEMY proach of taking some propositionsas or other failings.7 fixed while interrogating others is a Uncertainty should also be distin- fundamental part of scientific prac- guished from indeterminacy.