COMMUNISM AND PUBLIC OPINION IN

QUEENSLAND 1939 - 1951 : AN

EXPLANATION OF QUEENSLAND S VOTE 1

IN THE 1951 ANTI-COMMUNIST

REFERENDUM.

Being a thesis presented fer the Degree ef Bachelor of Arts with Henours in History, at the University of Queensland , by James Beatson, 1974. Contents

Page No.

l=Teface

Introduction

Section 1 Overall Themes 1

Section 2 : Communism during the �Tar 1939-1 945 . Popularity and Cooper&tion

Economic and Soci�l Background 11 A.C.P. Popularity in North Queensland 14 Impact of \var 20 The Growth and Influence of Catholic Anti-Communism 30 A New Order? 35

Section 3 Communism in the Post-w"ar Period. Phase 1 : 1946-1 949 The A.C.P. on the Offensive.

Communist Party Nilitancy 46 A.G.P. Activity 51 Communism Attacked 67

Overt· 'NcCarthyism 1 and Harassment in Queensland 82 Communist Party Numerical Strength 85 A.C.P. Popularity in North Quemsland 86 A.C.P. Popularity in Queensland 91

Section 4 : Communism in the Post-1�ar Period. Phase 2:19 50-1 951 . The A.C.P. in Retreat.

105 Anti-Communism Institutionalized Communist Party Activity 11 4 The Referendum 124 The Referendum Results 133

Conclusion. 145

endices. App

Bi bliographl• (i ) Preface.

When researching for this thesis I found I had considerable trouble in obtaining access to some Right-wing sources. Not only were many of them reluctant to discuss their past activities but invariably no files of source material, records, correspond­ ence, minutes etc. were kept. Fortunately Leftist sources ranging from the Labor Party and the trade unions to the

Communist Party, were more confident of their historical import­ ance, but the fire bombing of the Communist Party headquarters

some years ago destroyed all of their remaining past office files

containing correspondence, records etc. They have, however,

largely restored their collection of pamphlets produced by the

Party, over the past thirty years, including some of the State

Conference Reports which I examined.

Locating source material covering Party activities in

Central Queensland was another difficulty, the Party's records

being incomplete as previously mentioned. Furthermore I was

unable to locate any Party members who were active in the area

during the period covered. I have attempted to compensate for

this through usage of local newspapers, publications of

organizations active in the area such as the Returned Soldier's,

Sailor's, Airmen's Imperial League of Australia and the

Australian Workers Union, and various secondary sources. (ii }

For the considerable help of the Communist Party

of Australia and some of its members I a.m grateful. I

should also like to thank Mss. Lesley Wenck, Menik& Berndt ,

and Margaret O'Baga.n, Jim Henderson and my supervisor

Ray Evans tor their help throughout the year. INTRODUCTION. 1

The starting point of this thesis was a desire to explain the rapid demise in the popularity which the Communist Party enjoyed in Queensland during the second world war. Wartime 1 Queensland gave the Australian Communist Party its highest state vote and six years later Queensland again gave the Com- munist Party its highest state vote - this time however, to ban the Party. From this I was led into exploring the changing policies, beliefs and strategies of the Party, as well as the many sub-groups on its periphery, and the shifts in public response to these.

In 1939 Townsville elected Australia's first Co:.mmunist alderman. Five years later, Bowen elected not only Australia's first but also the British Empire's first, Communist state gov- ernment member. Of the five electorates the Australian Corn- munist Party contested in the 1944 Queensland State elections, in none did the Party's candidate receive less than twenty per- cent of the formal vote. Not only was the Party seemingly enjoy- ing considerable popular support but this was occuring in a State which,but for the Depression years (May 1929- June 1932) had elected a Labor State Government at every state election since

1'915. In the September 1951 Constitution Alteration Referendum,

'Powe.flif To Deal With Communists and Communism 1, Queensland regist- ered the nation's highest "Yes" majority- 55.76% of the valid vote. Only two other states registered a majority in favour of the referendum's proposals, Western Australia and Tasmania. 2

As this research was undertaken it became evident that while

Tarious trends exhibited at the time, anti-Communism, the work of

the Industrial Groups, Labor opportunism, local area feelings,

ideological shifts of the Party, tactics of Communist-led unions,

etc., were present throughout the entire period, they were best

seen when divided into three chronological phases of the Party's

history and popularity.

The first period covers the consolidation of the Party's post­

Depression popularity during the war years as it benefited from

the Soviet Union's colossal contribution to the Allied war efforts,

and this support continued for some six months or so after the war.

Throughout the period Communist strength within the trade union movement greatly increased as did total �arty membership.

The second period was marked by a rapid series of events

starting in March 1946, vi th Winston Churchill's �.Official Opening'

of the Cold War by his sweeping attack on Communism and Russia,

at Fulton. Several days later the first of a series of long and

bitter strikes in Communist-led unions occurredas the Party mobil­

ized for what it believed would be a series of attacks on the

working class from a ruling class, defending a capitalist system

on the verge of an economic collapse. It was a period when the

Party believed this ruling class was using Labor reformism as a

last desperate 'carrot' to get workers to accept their lot within

a eapi talist economic framework. Out of the Meat Strike emerged

the Industrial Groups, who waged not only a determined war against

Commuadst trade uni�� leadership but also encouraged the A.W.U.­

intluenced State Labor apparatus to even greater anti-Communist

antagonisms. The Communist Party's increasing militancy and

Labor's resistance to it,ended finally in the collapse of the

Chifley Labor government.2 3

Characteristically the third period opens with the

Communist Party making an another about-face, desperately trying to form an alliance with the Labor Party and curbing its former adventurist industrial policy, as it prepared for

Menzies' direct assault. The Communist Party's activities were greatly reduced, a function of both a declining member­ ship and, furthermore, a membership reluctant to confront an

- increasingly hostile society.

In examining the changing policies, beliefs and strategies of the Party and the shifts in public response to these, I have tried to distinguish between general trends occurring within Australia and the national party, and trends peculiar to Queensland and the Queensland branch ;·of 'the Party.

The Communist Party suffered a decline in support and member­ ship right across Australia throughout this period as a r&"sult of the national policies of the Party, and the changing nature of world politics. There were particular features of this decline that were peculiar to Queensland.

I have, however, singled out three features of particular

i�portance throughout the period for a short but more spec­

ifically detailed analysis, than would be possible in a. purely

chronological study: i.e. the Party's structure, the Party's

ideological subservience to Noscow, and the general effect

upon it of the Cold War. These are dealt with in Section One. (1)

Footnotes.

1. The current name of the Party, the Communist Party of Australia (C.P.A.), was adopted at its inception. However, the Party renamed itself the Australian Communist Party (A.C.P.) in Janua� 1944 and kept that title until the 16th Party Congress in 1951 when it resumed its former title. Throughout this thesis I shall refer to it by the name it had for most of the period covered, the A.C. P.

2. This is not to say that Chifley's conflict with the Communist Party's trade union militancy was either the sole or major reason for its downfall. Continuation of petrol rationing and other wartime controls, the Bank nationalization attempt, rising inflation and many other factors contributed to the Chifley Government's defeat. 1.

Section

Onrall Themes. 1

For most of its life the Australian Communist Party suffered the effects of two integral characteristics, o.ne structural and one political, which undermined both the Party's ability to respond to contemporary popular sentiment, and to attract and maintain a wide membership. These were democratic

1 centralism, its organizational structure, and the A.C.P.'s consistent subservience to Moscow-directed policies, largely propagated through the (Third ) Communist International, or

Comintern,&nd the Communist Inform4tion Bureau, or Cominform.

Democratic centralism lent itself to a highly disciplined membership, since its vertical 'link' form of organization, combined with authority from above, prevented dissent in one branch from moving to another. Furthermore this organizational structure put great power into the hands of the Communist Party leadeuship. Ted Bacon, himself a former Queensland State

Secretary, commented,

In those days much more than today ••.• the Executives, both National and State had great power, too great

to row mind. All •••• policy decisions affecting the Party in all spheres would be taken by the State Executive and endorsed by the State Committee some time later.2

A requirement contingent upon this powerful leadership was the expressed urgency for information to be passed up and down the levels of communication. Frequently, as was the case during the parind of the militant post-war strikes, orders going down the chain proceeded more quickly than the information feeding upwards.

This was reinforced by the tendency for orders to become more authoritarian as they were delegated lower, while information passing up was liable to be moderated so as not to antagonize superiors. During the 1948 Railway Strike this resulted in the leadership of the Communist Party losing touch with the growing resentment and demoralization of the rank and file during its 3 prolongation. 2

The structure also tended to reduce local �arty initiative and to leave all decisions in the hands of the top party funct­

4 ionaries, as was also experienced in the Railway Strike.

Since the A.C.l:>. full-time functionaries who principally made up the Political Committee and Secretariat could themselves be dis- missed by the Party Leadership, this leadership was largely self- perpetuating. A Queenslander, J.B.Miles, and L.L.Sharkey held the leading posts in the Party until they retired, l4iles with ill

7 health in 1948 and Sharkey with age in the early sixties.

Nonetheless, the democratic centralist structure allowed the

Party a particularly functional tool to give the trade union movement firm direction and to maximize its membership ef fect- iveness within trade unions. It is significant that from the

Catholic Social Movement's inception in 1943, its early leaders,

B.A. Santamaria and Dr. P.J. (Paddy) Ryan also chose a. basica!1y

5 democratic centralist organizational structure.

As a party dedicated to the ending of the capitalist system, the Communist Party demanded of its membership a sense of per- sona.l discipline. Yet this was contradicted by the very loose membership requirements and the attempts at building a. mass membership in the years 1943-5. Middle class intellectuals, farmers and artists ('Red Army recruits' as they were called) , who swelled A.C.P. ranks during these war years were resigning at an almost equally rapid rate. The Communist Party national organ 'Tribune' disclosed that while in the six months ending in

December 1944, 3,500 new members had been recruited, total Party membership increased by only 2,042 members between Ma.rch�1943 6 and December, 1944.

Yet, in late 1944 this was the only time in the A.C.P's history 3 being studied,that it loosened the Party's structure in such a way that locality branches became more important than work place branches. This policy followed a run of successes and near- successes in state and local elections, when the A.C.P.

believed it could achieve meaningful reform.

Allied to the party structure, with its firm roots in the

job site, was a distrust of non-working class elements within

the A.C.P. All of the senior party functionaries with few

exceptions, came from the shop floor. Jim Henderson, when sec-

re:ta.ry of the Collinsville Mine Branch of' the A.C .P. in 1937,

was made to leave his job as a clerk with the mine to go down 8 to the pit with the men. Fred Paterson comments that,because

of' his intellectual background1the Party dispatched a worker in

the late 'thirties "to keep an eye on me because they feared 9 I was becoming too popular among the workers." During the war

when large numbers of middle-class writers, artists and musicians

joined the A.C.P., Bacon argued there were clashes between the

artists wishing to spend their time creatively,while the Party

desired their time doing more mundane tasks.

They were expected to proletarianize themselves ••••

••• this did lead to a feeling of uselessness to a lot of important people who could have been a

great asset to the Party ••• For instance some of Australia's best writers were in the Party and had to get permission to write poems and novels etc. 10 In some cases the Party branches would refuse this.

Although the National Congress recognized this problem and at

the . 14th Congress in 1945 established a Commission to deal

with it, the inherent conflict between the A.C.P.1s structure

and working class bias on the one h&nd, and the intellectual

freedom required by the artist on the other, meant that 11it did

11 not come to grips with the problem." The rigid Party dis-

cipline and its refusal to allow deviations from the 'official

line', resulted in resignations from intellectuals and others 4 over issues such as 'Titoism' and the Czechoslovak Coup' of

1948, which could have been better contained in a party with

12 a looser structure.

Por a party frequently threatened with illegality, democratic

centralism provided an excellent structure for going underground

very rapidly a.nd:�for participation in illegal (and revolutionary)

activity. This was proven in the A.C.P.•s period of illegality,

(17 June,1940 to 18 December, 1942) and its trial run for illegal- . 13 ity (10 December,1949 to 22 September,1951).

Because of the Australian Communist Party's smallness and strong centralist tradition it was always exceptionally sensitive

to changes in the 'international line'. In the aftermath of the

establishment of the 'Soviet experiment� socialism's historical

commitment to international solidarity reached a new peak. The

desire to defend Russia as she continued to face international

isolation and hostility created the intellectual framework within

which the Australian Communist Party defended her every action.

When the Molotov - von Ribbentrop Pact was revealed it could not be

presented as simply an end to Russia's confidence in collective

security, but had to be justified ideologically. Thus, while �

Courier-Mail was reporting stories like "Hass Terror Air Raids On

14 Britain, Women And Children Shot While Shopping" during the Battle

of Britain, the Australian Communist Party was content to mimic

Gerogi Dimitrov's (the leading functionary of the Comintern) des-

cription of the war as the 'Second Imperialist War'. Yet in the

period leading up to the pact, signed only eleven days before the

outbreak of war, the A.C.P. had habitually preached the line, "If

England is attacked by Mussolini or Hitler, Russia will come to her 15 aid." Following 22 June71941, the 'Great Patriotic War against

Fascism' was supported with such vigor that A.C.P. National

Secreatry Dixon declared even the objective of socialism was to 16 be "completely subordinated to the winning of the war." 5

Dixon also made it clear wh ere the Par ty' s priorities in thi s

fight should be. In hi s booklet, Knock Out Japan t Dixon warned against making an all-out effort against the Japane se

in the Pacific wh ich could lead to a we akening of the Soviet! 17 Uni on's defence against Germany.

The dissolution of the Comintera, pre sented the A.C.P. wi th

the dilemma of choosing between past policies or cre ating a new

one. Whi le the Party chose the latter, symbolized by its name

change in January 1944 and the adoption of an "Aus tralian Path

18 To Socialism" some months later, it was constantly bedevilled

' with concern that it did not fall into the danger of exception-

. '19 ' I al1sm. The C ommun1s• tPar ty 1 s 1'-AUS tra 1•1an path t o soc1a• 1• 1sm however, did not lead it �way from its role as Au stralian apo l-

ogist for all Soviet policies, both internal and external. The

Queensland Guardian, printing a photograph of a young Dman in a long evening gown, to show that the Soviet Union was not behind in the fashion worl4,commented, "This Soviet model was

11 19A one of those included in a post-war MOscow fashion parade.

The A..C.P. constantly took Russia's side on every Cold War

issue, from Rus sia's refusal to withdraw tro ops from Eastern

Europe to its failure to de clare a peace treaty with Germany.

The A.C.P. failed to criticize Ru ssia's acceptance of the crushing

of the Greek revolution by the We st between 1944 and 1946. Not

surprisingly, the Communist Party quickly regained its pre-war reputation as an 'alien' body. Sharkey and the other A.C.P.

leaders spent much time defending the Party against this accusat- ion, but as Playford noted Sharkey failed: 6

to distinguish betwe en defending the Soviet Union against the sweeping attacks of anti­ Socialists and the Australian Party's uncritical justification of all Soviet actions and policies.20

With the formation of the Cominform in October 1947, the A.C.P. was relieved of its fear of falling into 'exceptionalism' . Despite 21 the Australian Party's not being a member of the Cominform, it faithfully followed the latter's policies. Although Yugoslavia 1 had. been popularized by the A.C.P. as a model1workers state,1 with

Tito1s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia and

'Titoism ' were then viciously attacked. In late 1950 the Cominform began to soften the 'international line', presumably due to

Russian fears that the Korean war would spread1and urged Western Parties to desist from provocative aats.

The Australian Party immediately responded1ending the ir post- war series of prolonged strikes and trying to build a 'united front from below• with Australian Labor Party supporters. Yet, the increasing public resentment to the A.C.P. 's ladventurist' policies and the growing strength of conservative forces requiring this

strategy, had been glaringly obvious for over a year . The A.C.P. 's

total subservience to Moscow was such that it went to considerable efforts to popularize a quickly discredited breakthrough in 22 genetics, the Lysenko Theory.

While the Communist Party in the post-war era suffered from the se two self-inflicted wounds - democratic centralism and sub-

ordination to the Soviet Union - it wa s also victim of an inter- national movement for which it bore no direct responsibility.

From the dying days of the war, most of the major Western Powers

and the ir press, radio, te levision and film industries1together with one of the world 's richest and most influential churche s 7 waged one of the most bitter and prolonged campaigns in modern history. Their targets were Russia, 'World Communism,'

1 aetheistic communism, Marxism in genera and to a lesser degree 1 l, , socialism. The ferocity was such that no matter what the domestic policies of the A. C.P. were, the Party would have been the local reciptent of this hostility. Cold War incidents frequently co-incided with policies undertaken by the Party which were totally the unconnected, yet were affected by them - Czechoslovakian coup A and the Railway Strike of 1948, the Chinese Revolution and Coal

Strike and Federal elections of 1949, and the Korean War and

Referendum and Federal elections of 1951. It is apparent that in ma� cases newspapers and others used these Cold War events for precisely this purpose. On the day of the 1951 Referendum �

Courier-Mail's Denis Warner, in that paper's Page Four lead item

u reported: From behind barbed wire barricades surrounding their estate bungalows, Malayan planters today warned Australia of the

2) 23 evils and dangers of Communism. ·

�uriously, the Director-General of Ar� Recruiting chose the same day to run, for the first time in many months, a large advertisement stating :·� The proudest service a man can render to Australia and the ,, 24 free world Korea Force •••••

Thus, international citevelopments like those of the Cold War, Iran,

Poland, Berlin, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Korea,

'The Bomb,' the spy scares and McCarthyism - all of which were imperfectly understood in Australia and which were, moreover, overlaid through the media with the increasingly hysterical pro- selytism of the nation's Right-wing forces -would provide the perfect ingredients of a heightening of internal anti-Communist tension and feed the growing domestic hostility to the country's

Communist Left. 8

Footno tes

1. For exc ell ent descriptions of democratic centralism, see G.W. Gr ainger,'Oligarchy in the Br itish Communist Par ty,' Br itish Jo ur nal of Soc iology, June 1958, Vo l. IX No .2 p.ps. 143-58 and Maurice De verger, Po litical Par ti es The ir Organi zation and Activity in the Mo dern State , (Lo ndon, }�the un, 2nd . Ed., 1959} p.ps. 47-50, 57-8. Fmch of the detail in the fo llowi ng description of the Australian Party's structure comes fr om J.D. Playford, "Strate gic Pro blems of the Communist Party of Australia, 1945-62" (unp ubl ished Ph .D. thesis, A�;N.U. 1962). Th e c�nc ept of demo cratic centralism, is a natural extension of the the ory of the Bo lshe vic Party {both largely popular­ ized by Leni n) and was adopted by the Party in the mid 'twe nties. Under democratic sociali sm, the bas ic uni t of organi zation was the factory or locality cell, whi ch met at least weekly, and unlike the branche s of orthodox parties of the social democratic mode l, its members were organi zed at their place of work, thus maki ng contact between me mb ers eaa­ ier and mo re intimate. Lo cality cells we re designed for housewi ves, farmers, intellectuals, self-employed members and others who could no t join a factory cell. In the late :.c· 'thirties the Party cells be c ame known as branche s. The se branc he s were not allowed to communicate and work with each other but were connected by a series of ve rtical links to higher organs of the Par ty . Th us branche s only made official contact thro ugh the medium of the next higher organ composed of individual delegate s of other branches in that section. Se ctions in turn could only communicate with each other thro ugh their de legates at district level. Th e di stricts elected delegates to the State confe re nces and both of the se bodies sent delegate s to the supreme Party organ, the National Congress, wh ich met every three years since the early 'thirties. At each level be low the National Co ngr es s the various organs elected committees and executives. At all levels the decisions of highe r organs were binding on lower Party organs .

National Congress elected the Central Committee which met three times every year . From its members the Central Committee elected the Po litical Committe e, which me t wee kly and was in charge of its day to day activities, and the Central Control Commission which, although it received little publicity, po ssessed a considerabl e amo unt of power on matters of discipline, security and finance. The Ce ntral Committee was al so in charge of the various committees {Women', Arts, Sc iences and so fo rth) which catered for professional or social groups. The Po litical Committee elected the chief body of the Party, the Secre tariat, comprised of Ge neral Secretary, the President and two other me mbers. Alteratio ns in composition of th e leadership were decided by the leaders the mselves and approval was i4variably given by the Na tional Congr es s, many of who se delegates we re ful ltime Party functionaries who could be dismissed by the leadership and all of whom were as near to be ing complete ly reliable as the system could ens ur e. 9 Foot,notes.

2. Interview with E.A. Bacon, 21 September, 1974.

3. Ibid.

4. SeeR. Shea.rman,"The Politics of the 1948 Queensland Railway Strike" (B.A. Hons. Thesis Queensland University, 1 1973). p.ps. 98-112.

5. For a brief account of the Catholic Social Hovement's organizational structure see "Catholic Action at Work'� Ano�ous (A.C.P. Sydney, undated).

6. See Tribune 18 January, 1945 for the first figure and

7. With �tiles' retirement, Sha.rkey moved up to become General Secretary, R. Dixon became President and kept this post into the 'sixties, while the Queensland State Secretary J.C. Henry was promoted to Dixon1s old job, national organ­ izing Secretary, which he kept until an ideological split in 1954. Cla.ude Jones became Queensland State Secretary, a. position which he also. held for many years.

8. Interview with Jim Henderson?24 September, 1974.

9. Recounted in Shearma.n, Op. Cit. P.108.

10. Interview with Ted Bacon, 21 September, 1974.

11. Ibid.

12. See Ibid.

13. For details of effectiveness on Jim Henderson, Op. Cit. Also Bill Sutton's booklet The Champion Sticker Licker and Other Stories1 (Communist Arts Group, Brisbane, 1974.

14. · The Courier-Mail, 2 September, 1940.

15. Interview with Tom Aitkens, .{\i.L.A� 25 September, 1974, and others.

16. Sydney Norning Herald, 9 August, 1943.

17. R. Dixon, Knock Out Japan! (Challenge Press, Sydney, 1942-44?).

18. SeeRe ort of the Work of the Central Committee from the .13th to the 14th National Congress A.C.P. Sydney, June 1945).

19. The dangers of 'exceptionalism1 are frequently mentioned in A.C.P. publications between 1943 �nd 1947, when the Cominform was formed. 'Exceptiona.lism' is a. Bolshevic term popularized by the Comintern. It was used to describe national Communist Party policies, which in the eyes of the Comintern failed to carry out the Comintern's general policy on the false grounds.that their country experienced exceptional historical conditions. 10

19A. Queensland Guardian, 22 November, 1950.

20. John Playford, Op. Cit., P.52.

21. The Cominform only accepted membership from the Soviet countries and the two largest Western European Communist Parties, France and Italy.

22. Although quickly discredited in the West, the theory had a longstanding deleterious effect on the development of biology in the Soviet Union as .�ysenko enjoyed the support of S�alin for many years as President of the Soviet Academy of Science. Simply put, the theory argued that orthodox genetics was incorrect, and that genetic heredity had no basis in science, and that all living organismswere products of their environment.

23. The Courier-Mail, 22 September, 1951.

24. Ibid. Section 2.

Communism during the War 1939 - 1945.

P�pularity and Cooperation.

Russians Sweep Ahead On 5 Separate Fronts. The Red Army eTerywhere is proTing its superiority to the Wehrmacht in

generalship, organization and fighting ability•••••

The Courier-Mail� Page 1 lead,

21st January, 1943.

What our people most ar4ently desire is a new Queensland and

a new Australia based on the Atlantic Charter, the principles

of freedom from want and freedom from fear. A tueensland and

an Australia in which every man and woman will be able to

live a useful, happy and contented life.

Fred Paterson M. L.A.1}miden

Speech• .Q.P.D., Vol. CLXXX11,.

23rd August, 1944. 11

Economic and Social Background.

1947 of the In the Census Queensland again showed that, mainland states, it had the lowest percentage of its population living in metropolitan areas. In fact only 31.03% lived in such areas - more than 15% below the national average and that of New

South Wales, and over 20% lower than in Victoria. and South 1 Australia. While Queensland's provincial town population vas comparable with New South Wales, (around 21%}, it was substantially greater than that of the other major states. Ye� the rural sector provided the greatest contrast. As high as 46. 92% of

Queensla.nders resided in rural areas in comparison with 30. 57% of New South Welshmen, 34. 53% of Victoria.ns,a.nd 36. 97% of South 2 Australians.

Decentralization was a firm policy followed by the Queensland

State Government of Forgan - Smith and the following Labor Premier�,

Cooper and Hanlon. This policy did not attract interstate capital

tor industrial development as the diversification involved

frequently increased costs. High comp� and personal taxation

together with a low level of personal investment in the Sta.t� a.s

well as a reluctance on the part of the Government to borrow,

resulted in an absolute decline of the States population per

�apita engaged in factories. This contrasted with increases of

over 50% in South Australia and Victoria, and 66% in New South 3 Wales. William Jackson points out that Queensland was generally

a low technology manufacturer and that much of its secondary 4 production was in processing primary produce. Furthermore he

argues that the scattered nature of Queensland,�s resources,

especially its mineral deposits, mitigated against industrial

concentration. 12

The Queensland government! of the 'thirties and 'forties

also emphasized vigorous support for rural development. This

was particularly so in the coastal areas with dairying in

Central Queensland and avtu-� in the North. Not surprisingly,

this wa.s also the area where La.bor received its greatest

electoral support. The combination of Queensland's railway

system - where branch lines ran inland from the provincial cities,

unlike southern states where they radiated from the capital -

combined with the State Government's emphasis on ruralization

and decentralization, led to Queensland having a number of

comparatively large coastal provincial towns and cities.

Together with Brisbane and the Darling Downs, the vast bulk of

5 Queensland's population lived in these areas.

If none of the three population concentrations outside

Metropolitan Brisbane, - J..e. South Queensland, Coastal Central

Queensland and Coastal North Queensland - enjoyed marked industrial

activity, North Queensland's limited industrial development did9

nevertheles�involve workers with long traditions of working class

militancy. These were the meat workers, cane cutters, miners,

railwaymen and wharfies. B,y contrast�Central and South Queens-

land, with only odd exceptions, like the meat workers at

Rockhampton and some railwaymen at various junctions, had much

fewer industries which employed traditionally militant unions.

Furthermore, if one looks at the principal products of the three

areas - sugar in North Queensland, dairying in Central Queensland,

dairying and grain (particularly wheat) in South Queensland - it

becomes evident that North Queensland was the most severely

affected by the war. In the period 1939-1945, while the gross

value of the cane crop dropped from £10,42'1',600 to £9,693,000 , 13

wheat and other cereal crops rose from £2, 010, 000 to 6 £3, 560, 000. In dairy production, total output and income

rose slowly every year at an annual growth rate only marginally

7 lower than its normal growth rate.

North Queensland had always keenly felt what i� believed was

the State Government's lack of interest in Northern development,

symbolized annually whenever the North was isolated by the flooded

BurdekinRiver, still unspanned by a man-made bridge. This

feeling, allied to a strong sense of separation from the rest of

8 the State, led many of its people to develop strong regional

loyalties. Separatis� flourished to such a degree that in mid-1948

Premier Hanlon spoke of the likelihood of the future creation of

a North Queensland State. This mood was often reflected in the

North's political representatives who were sometimes known more

for their flamboyance, idiosyncrasies and local loyalties than

for any profound ideological connnitments. Tom Aitkens N.L.A.

remarked, "There was always a great feeling in the North for

the rebel, provided he was not exactly a man of substance but a

8 man he (sic) could reasonably trust."

North Queensland's radical tradition, (a suspicious attitude

towards authority, a tendency towards direct action to remove

grievances, a strong belief in the equality of all men) was

established in the early mining days with the growth of the

Australian Workers Association and the Australian Workers Union.

Radicalism was reinforced through the 'twenties and the 'thirties

with the great miners', meatworkers' and canecutters' strikes

which not only tied up the whole industry but also invariably

brought out the wharfies and railwaymen in support. Such was

the case with the great 1927 South Johnstone sugar strike and the

1931 Nt. Dobbyn miners' strike, both of which ended in physical

violence and, in the former, the death of an A. \v .u. picket. 14

Other than at Rockhampton and Ipswich there were few areas in the South which had either strong radical traditions or industries employing men from traditionally militant unions.

Economically stronger, and with a high proportion of snmll farmers amongst them, the people of Central and Southern Queensland - unlike their northern neighbours - "regarded themselves as part 10 of Queensland." While militancy was felt in Brisbane in various areas, this predominantly occurred in districts with a high proportion of industrial workers, like Paddington, Spring

Hill, Fortitude Valley and the Wynnum area. Not surprisingly in the ten years preceding the second world war, only in one State

Electorate south of Nackay (Bremer in Ipswich) did a Communist candidate poll over 10% of the vote.

A.C.P. Popularity in North Queensland.

On simple voting figures, Queensland, of all the Australian

States, easily gave Communists their highest votes during the war period. In the 1943 Federal election, in Queensland, the only

Communist Party candidate obtained 3.53% of the State vote, while in New South Wales five candidates together received only 1.25% of the vote. In Victoria, five candidates in total obtained 1.98%,

while two candidates each in each of the three States - South

Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania - received 2.63%, 2.56% 11 and 1.03% respectively. In Queensland State elections, Communists

similarly received higher vote percentages overall than in other

States during the war. While it is true that in Queensland the

A.C.P. was running candid�tes only in areas where it enjoyed its

greatest support, the Party was also trying to follow a similar

policy elsewhere. Analysis of the Queensland figures shows that in

both Federal and State elections a high A.C.l'. vote was recorded because of the exceptionally high support it received in North

Queensland.12 15

In the 1944 State Elections, the A.C.P. ran five candidates, 13 all save one of whom obtained over 20% of the formal vote. The candidate receiving the lowest vote -anot inconsiderable 15.16% from the strong working class electorate of Wynnum - was the only 14 candidate to stand outside a Northern electorate. Two of the 15 North Queensland candidates received over 40% of the valid vote, one of them, Fred Paterson becoming Australia's first Communist

Member of Parliament. In the previous five years, half a dozen

Communists had become aldermen in North Queensland municipal 16 e 1 ect. 1ons. North Queensland was therefore clearly the Australian

Communist Party's strongest and largest geographical area of support.

Following the Depression, the A.C.P. members in North Queens- land patiently and gradually built a radical organization which came to serve as a viable alternative to the comparatively con- servative Forgan-Smith Labor Government. Becoming known as the 17 "people you could trust," they championed the cause of the 18 'useful people' who were suffering from the economic conditions of the 'thirties, the seasonal nature of much of the employment in the North and the alleged neglect from State and Federal

Governments. The A.C.P. identified with the 'true socialists' who founded the labour movement in Queensland, allying itself with the struggle for the forty hour week, abolition o� �eli&f·vork, a permanent solution to the unemployment problem, and northern development. As Andrew Jones has noted, there was little in the

Communist election manifestos between 1938 and 1947 which could be interpreted as meaning that a vote for a Communist candidate meant commitment to Marxist economics or an overthrow of the capitalist 19 system. This is not to suggest that many who voted for the A.C.P. did not do so as conscious support for Narxism - Leninism. Yet the subsequent decline in the Party's vote in the 16

post-war era showed that this doctrinaire group was probably quite small in number.

The Communist Party's successful attempt to woo the working class vote was aided by the political complexion of the Labor

State members, described by Tom Aitkens in his maiden speech to the House as:

a motley crew, some of them absolutely

Francoites, some Fascists •••• He the Premier has with him some who are( absolute) Tories in their outlook and some who only a few years ago wo d not have been allowed in the A.L.P. �O

Many gained preselection through ballot rigging using The Worker facsimile voting tickets, as did many of the delegates to the triennial Labor-in-Politics Convention. B,y this method the

A.W.U. maintained conservative control of the Labor Party through the Conventions and therefore the Queensland Central Executive, as well as the Parliamentary Labor Party. The succession of four

Roman Catholic Premiers, (Ryan, Theodore, Gillies and McCormack , ) followed by a Presbyterian Forgan-Smith, leading a Cabinet with a majority of Catholics, was sufficient evidence to convince

large numbers of Protestants that Queensland was being deliberately

'taken over. '

Opposition to the conservative and Catholic nature of the

Labor Party induced maqy northern trade unionists to channel

support towards the Communist Party as it became identified as

a more responsible working class or'labor party' than the actual

Labor Party itself. Jack Pemberthy, a Communist active in BoweD.

at the time remarked, " in some ways we gathered the support

of people who might normally have supported the A.L.P. or the

21 A.L.P. of a different type." Voting figures in the working

class subdivision of Collinsville, in the electorate of Bowen,

however, show that as late as 1944 traditional working class 17 loyalty to Labor led its candidate to obtain a slightly higher vote than the Communist, Paterson. Urban areas like Bowen itself as well as in rural areas like Foxdale, revealed in voting figures that the conservative character of the Forgan-

Smith Government won Labor votes that might normally have gone to

22 a country or another conservative party.

As well as attracting the working man's vote the A.C. P. in

North Queensland worked to attract the vote of the farmer and small businessman. The Communist Party was the only political party that frequently published pamphlets on the sugar industry.

It campaigned vigorously for a sugar refinery and fertilizer plant (at a time when there was a grave shortage of fertilizer.to serve the sugar industry) in the area. Jim Henderson remembers,

"we used to hammer quite effectively the idea that a well-to-do

23 The A.C. P. working class meant a well-to-do businessman. " argued that the major companies in the area, Samuel Allen and

Burns Philp, exploited equally the farmer, the businessman and the worker. The fortunes of the A.C. P. rose in inverse pro- portion to the decline of the sugar industry during the war years.

On the local level:the A. C.P. absorbed itself in community

activities such as school committees and sporting organizations,

and rapidly became an integral and respected part of the society.

A mundane, though significant example of this acceptance was

revealed by the way that the Bowen Country Women's Association

when holding a large function would happily borrow the A. C.P's

24 crockery. On the Townsville Council, which was largely controlled

by the Communist Party and the expelled A.L. P. Deputy

Hayor Tom Aitkens, the A.C. P. received popular acclaim 18 and wide publicity for its involvement in the Municipal Ice

Works, Hunicipal Fruit and Vegetable outlet, wood depot,

�mnicipal Library and rest rooms.

The A.C.P. also benefited from the popularity of its candidates. Ralph Lienster, a tobacco farmer and the Party's candidate for the Tableland electorate, was Secretary o£ the local Tobacco Cooperati� and a Shire Councillor. Frank Falls, a small cane farmer in Babinda, was the Party's chief spokesman on the sugar industry, while Jack Henry and Les Sullivan, both canecutters, knew the sugar industry intimately. Clearly, however, the popularity of Fred Paterson outshone them all and he was the Party's greatest personal asset throughout North

Queensland. A non-smoker and non-drinker, and, as a skilled barrister, "so obviously honest," he gave his services freely to those who could not pay. Arriving in town to defend a litigant '> he would spend the evening engaged in publicly def,nding the

A.C.P. cause. He was renowned throughout the North as the man who postponed his Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford to enlist in the First World War. Capitalising on the hidden intellectual snobbery of the Northern people,the A.C.P. used to advertise him simply as "Fred Paterson, Bachelor of Arts, Rhodes Scholar.n25

Thus the A.C.P. succeeded in attracting considerable support from small businessmen and :farmers, reflected in the advertise- menta that sh�pkeepers placed in their windows and tradesmen

6 carried on the sides of their vans. 2 In Bowen the local cinema proprietor not only displayed free scxeen advertisements but also allowed the Party use of the theatre for meetings.27 Proof of the wide support the A.C.P. commanded can be shown in the sub- divisional voting figures of the 1944 State Election. 19

In Banana Pocket, a small sugar farming area containing seventy-three voters, Fred Paterson obtained 57.53% of them, 28 the Country Party 26.02% and Labor 16.43%. In the same electorate of Bowen, in the subdivision of that name, contain- ing a representative sample of the social classes to be found in any provincial town, the A.C.P. obtained 39. 29%, the Labor

Party 41 .24% and Country Party 19.45%. 29 In this subdivision,

Paterson received only 8% less than in the mining workers' subdivision of Collinsville (47.53% ) where Labor obtained 50 .89% and the Country Party a tiny 1.56%. Although Paterson's relatively low vote is explained by his Labor opponent's high vote, Paterson received a remarkable 10% higher vote from the 30 cane farmers of Banana Pocket than from the miners of Collinsville.

It must be admitted, however, that the political sophistic- ation of the small farmers support for the A.C.P. was low. Jack

Pemberthy recalled that in an effort to build A.C.P. member- ship and to consolidate electoral support, he and Paterson tried to establish a branch at Euri Creek (a sugar area ten miles from

Bowen) in 1944 where Pa.terson had received twenty-four of the forty-two votes cast.

We called a meeting and all twenty-four voters turned up at the local school hall where we held the meeting. Fred addressed them ••• �nd")then we told them they had to elect a Branch Secretary, President and Executive. This to people who had no political experience in their lives' l Well, that little branch struggled on for so�' �mal!) way before it just finally collapsed.

In his maiden speech in Parliament, after being elected in 1944,

Paterson argued the cause of the people who·, elected him. Although including some remarks upon the outlook of.the Communist Party, he did not use it as a platform for propagating ?4arxism-Leninism. 20

He spoke of the need to establish a sugar refinery in North

Queensland and the need to develop that area of Queensland,

concluding on the note that, 11 The Communist Party's programme is a programme of progress, it is a programme that every decent

2 Australian can support."3 Similarly, the Communist Party's pro- gramme for Queensland - which he delivered in Parliament some months later - involving nationalization of the banks and mono- polies, as well as improvements in housing, health and education was hardly more radical than Chifley's policies for Australia two years later.

Paterson, during his first term of office, proved to be an energetic and popular representative of Bowen's residents. He spoke three times more often than the avarage representative and asked five times as many questions.33 During his first fifteen months of representation, he toured the electorate five times leading the Home flill Observer to comment:

.Nr. Paterson :H. L.A. has certainly made an impressive start to his parliamentary work. He apparently believes that his parliamentary duties include much more than merely coming to electors on the eve 34 of an election�

Impact of War

No event in the history of the Australian Communist Party had a greater effect on its changing fortunes, than the Second

World War. The Soviet Union's changing relation to the War, combined with the A.C.P.'s strong identification with Russian policies1resulted in firstly the decline and then a great (though temporary) rise in popularity of the Party. J.B.�liles, the A.C.P.'s

National Secretary,recalled that at the time of the signing of the

1939, Holotov - von Ribbentrop Pact on 23 August, two weeks before the outbreak of war: 21

I was in Home Hill when the international crises

broke ••••and I found that when I was able to explain the Soviet peace policy and the respon­ sitility of the British ruling circles for the present s ituation the confusion in their minds was quickly swept away. 35

Miles was here painting a much brighter picture than the

situation warranted. Nor was it in accord with the experience of

others. In Mareeb�Paterson took a weapon for his protection

to a meeting he vas to address, while Pemberthy remembers, "there

were & great many attacks and many physical attacks on the Party

and its members.11 36 A circular from Balonne Shire Council to

the Townsville City Council in February 1940 called for the

banning of the Communist Party. Although rejected by all Aldermen9

Deputy Mayor Aitkens delivered a vituperative attack on Communism

3 in contrast with the unity policy of the 1939 elections. 7 The

Queensland Guardian commented:

The demeanor of the ••••"Labor" Aldermen indicated they would not be displeased were the A.C.P.

declared illegal ••••but they feared ••••such an 38 undemocratic procedure would be inopportune at present.

The political atmosphere indicated to the A.C.P. members the

likelihood of their being banned and was met with a detailed

progrAmme for establishing illicit printing presses, pamphlet

distribution outlets, means of communication and so forth. On

17 June 1940, the Menzies Government banned the Communist Party

and this was followed by raids on Party offices and officials by

9 State and Commonwealth police throughout Queensland.3 "In many � � cases they had no idea what they were after •••and lthoug some

40 got stuff back, very few did." At this stage, the A.C.P. owned

few capital assets and its only real loss was the seizure of the

1 printing press on which the Queensland Guardain vas printed.4

The banned Communist Party now began operating under the name

of the Queensland Political Rights Committee, concentrating much 22

42 of its efforts in campai gning for the restoration of legality.

The Communist Party 's condemnation of the 'Impe rialist War ' ended on 22 June 1941 with Russia 's entry into the struggle,

and from thi s time , it re sumed activity under its real name despite its technical ellegality. The Curtin Government sub-

sequently ended this illegality on 18 December 1942 . Because of the Communist Party 's increase in membership and activity during

its period of outlawry , contemporary Party officials claimed

4 that illegality did not produce deleterious effects . 3 National

A.C.P. President L.L. Sharkey later rejected thi s optimism, for as

Le icester Webb has since pointed out , the inc·reases in membership

44 and activity largely occurred after 22 June 1941 . Voting figure s fully sustain this view. Seven months before the German invasion

of Ru ssia, Fred Paterson, despite his strong popularity obtained 45 only 18.7% of the vote in the State seat of Herbert. At the 1944

State elections with a different candidate the A.C.P. obtained 46 almo st 43%. Simi larly A.C.P. Candidates standing as Independent

Socialists (because of illegality) for the 1941 State elections 47 obtained figures markedly be low the ir 1944 votes.

As the German tanks rolled across the Ru ssian border in

June:�-1941 ,.'tfie�:AP.e.P. 's identification with the beleaguered Soviet

state became its greatest asset. For some years the war on the

European Eastern Front was to dominate newspaper headlines and the view that the Russians we re the only ones really fighting Hitler became popular . The Courier-Mai l's cartoonists , who had previously depicted Russ ia as a huge bear, slightly stupid with viciously

long claws and a hammer and sickle emblazoned on its che st, now drew a beaming Stalin or a plucky peasant girl . 23

Provincial newspapers like the persistently anti-Communi st

Rockhampton Morning Bu lletin gave he roic ac counts of "The Red

Army is keeping the Germans on the jump by raining ha�r blows on their defences, at widely separated points on the Eas tern

48 front." The equally conservative Toowoomba Chronc ile took an exceedingly mild view of the Soviet reoccupation of Poland , in marked contrast with its later Cold War stance, stating in a

1944 editorial :

The Soviet Government laims stands for a strong independent Poland and l&for Rus�sian-Po lish frien�­

ship . This appears ••••to be a frank and re alistic policy. 49

At the 13th Na tional Congress in March 1943 , the A.C.P. declared its objective was to build an anti-facist National Front , an: alliance between the working class •••• and the working farmers and the mass of middle class people of the 50 towns , who together form the maj ority of the population.

A policy of mass recruitment was undertaken, which placed little emphasis on the level of political sophistication of prospective members. Ted Bacon recalled :

Forty to fifty would come to a meeting and hear a talk . At the end they would be invited to join the Party. Forms would be passed out and nearly 5 all would join up . 1

Booklets by various authors entitled Why You Should Join the

Communist PartY were distributed , which included perforated

5 2 Communist Party membership application forms . The influx of several thousand of the 'Red Army Re cruits ', together with the war time popularity of the A.C.P� provided it with a wide base of support.

53 The Eureka Youth League , establ ished in 1941 as the successor to the Young Communi st League and the League of Young

Democrats, was used as ano ther recruiting avenue during the war years . Although catering for youth between fourteen and thirty, many young people (over the A. C.P. 's age limit of eighteen) 24

"preferred to join the Party directly rather than through the

54 League . u At Queensland UniverSity, the Radical Club, active from 1936-1 939 , reactivated itself in late 1944 and early 1945

5 with great enthusia.s� .5 The political sophistication of student radicalism in that period throughout Au stralia was comparable with that of many who were joining the A.C.P.

Al astair Davidson describes the se students as being carried "on the crest of a. great wave of advanc ed democratic sentiments � and that many had an "advanc ed liberal democratic rather than a

56 revolutionary outlook."

Over 4,000 membe rs of the A.C.P. served in the armed forces during the war , a higher proportion of its membership than any

7 othe r political party, claimed Tribune ? This repre sented one in every five members, a. remarkable figure from such a. party, many of who se members were in protected occupations . Activists who joined the Army undertook recruiting within the armed forces, and formed groups at Enoggera , Gaythorne and Frazers Paddock training camps . They were aware that :

the old Army was reactionary and useless as far modern battle tactics and so on. We fought for the modernization and democratization of the Army, if it was go ing to play any serious part in the war eff .or:t. We raised issues of what the war was really about ••• �� exposed the real nature of German fascism. Also the nature of Japan­ ese fascism ••[!• at a time when Menzies' �licy was friendship .e. prior to Pe arl llarbou9 and on the re ality that Japan would attack us , wh ich was direct­ ly opposed to the official policy ••• [w i] were almost ••• � alone in this �nd brought out a great number of lea.flets.58

W.Elson Gre en 's booklet Soldier Defend Thyself de tailing the civil liberties of people in uniform, was one such item that

59 was printed and Ri stributed . Se cret conferences at the Divisional and inter -Divisional levels,like Atherton Tablelands Conference 25 he ld in 1944 from representative s of the 6th, 7th and 9th

Divisions , took place irregularly. Although the A.C.P. Army membership maintained secrecy, since such organizations were illegal , the Arrr.ry "never made a. great issue of membership in 60 the Party. "

If in the North, the A.C.P. became a legitimate part of an assumed egalitarian local community, the Party in industrial

Brisbane was more solidly class based. Wi:lih the slogan "Every 61 branch has its own programme ," the A.C.P. did attempt to

integrate itself into community activity. Ma.� of these programmes, howeYer, (such as one which envi saged that air raid

shelters in the post-war period would be turned into public

conveniences) were of little importance and of doubtful practicability.

On the political level the A.C.P. was more concerned with

the necessity of waging a. vigorous war against fascism. This was

translated at the factory floor level into making the capitalist

production machine more efficient . As late as 1. 945, the 5th State

Conference of the Queensland Branch of the A.C.P. directed:

In the industries greater attention must be given to organization and leadership. Causes of discontent must be recognized and taken up early and solutions found by negotiation beG�re the stage is reached where hold ups occur.

Aided by its attributes of industry and enthusiasm the �C .P.

in a. period of relative industrial harmony, also directed its

activities at winning leadership positions within the trade union

movement, and in this its success was considerable. It gained

leadership in the Storemen and Packers Union, the Australian

Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, the Amalgamated Meat

Industry Employees Union, the Queensland Colliery Employees Union 26 and the Hospital Workers Union, wh ile gaining the leadership posts in the Br isbane branches of the Au stralian Railway s Union, the

63 Seamen's Uni on, the Waterside Workers Federation and others .

Since the A.C.P. had already established leadership positions in a nu mber of important unions (such as the Building Workers

Industrial Un ion) , it entered the post-war era with a very strong union base indeed. This was be st illustrated at the Trade s Hal l whe re the A.C.P. was the dominant force on the Trade s and La.bor

64 C ounc�.1 , a pos�•t• �on �•t was t o ma�n . ta�n . f or mauy ye ar.s .

The 1945 State A.C.P. Conference offhandedly concluded, 11The growth of progressive trends within the Que ensland Trade Unions and the Labor Party noted at our Conference two years ago have

65 continued to develop. "

The Conference al so pointed out that the growth of pro- gressive forces within the Labor Party had occurred only at the rank and file level. Since the 1943 , 13th Na tional Congress, the �arty branches had attempted to build a united front with

66 the A.L.P. In Ne w South Wales it me t some temporary successes, wh ile in Queensland:

From time to time there have developed

good examp�es of joint ac tion •••part icularly •••• �urini) the Federal and State elections and in the referendum campaign . • • \!)u"€J the failure to pay attention to finding ways and

means of deve loping joint action •••remains the 66 most serious defect in the work of the Communi sts .

The political complexion of the leadership of the Queens- land branch of the A.L.P. was an insurmountable stumbling block in the path of a� formal cooperation. Since 1924, when the

Federal Conference of the A.L.P. declared itself against

Communist Party affiliation , and made Communi sts ineligible for

A.L.P. me mbership , little had happened in the State branch to soften this ho stility. 27

In 1933, e.G. Fallon, a bitter anti-Communi st, became the

A.W.U. State Secretary and later in the 'thirties, State

Pr esident of the A. L.P. and the dominant figure in the Party 's

State Organization. H.G. Sullivan concluded :

Fal lon and (Premier) Eo rgan�Smith were never friends ; but their relationship was always cordial, seldom ho stile . Each realized that he needed the other and upon this understand­ ing was founded the base of political power in Queensland for the next decade. 67

A.W.U. power within the State A. L.P. was augmented by influence from the equally conservative State Service (Pub lic Servants)

Uni on, and the Federated Clerks Un ion during the later war years.

Queensland Central Exe cutive me etings from 1940 onwards were he ld at Dunstan House , the A.W.U. bui lding and rival union headquarters to the Trades Hall, wh ile A.L.P. propaganda material was printed on the A.W.U. 's Worker pre ss. Many of the

Trade s Hall unions we re not affiliated with the A.L.P. as a

68 response to its right wing character . At the 1941' Southport

Labor - in - Po litics Convention, Forgan-8mith argued that "the chief enemy of the (tabor) Party was not the ttstraight out Tory" but the Communi st who would try to obtain trade union leadership

'' 69 positions by attacking the A.L.P. Not surprisingly a motion at t�e 1944 Bundaberg Labor - in - Politics Convention, calling for the establi shment of a liason committee between the Trade s 70 and tabor Council and the Parliamentary Labor Party , failed.

Following the German invasion of Ru ssia in June 1941 , the

A.C.P. in each State was instrumental in forming Au stralia -

Soviet Aid So cieties, called in Queensland the Me dical Aid to

Ru ssia As sociation. On the 17th August 1941 , the Catholic right-dominated Vi ctorian Central Exe cutive of the ALP banned 28 its Russian Aid organization. Several days later Fallon issued a statement that the Q. C.E. would act similarly,

71 which was implemented on 5 September, 1941 . The Q.C.E.' s press release stated:

We strongly disapprove the efforts being made by me mbers of or sympathizers of the former � .e. now illega1J Communist Party of Australia to capitalize on the Russian War situation on behalf of a movement which the A.L.P. has on many occasio ns stated to be opposed to the best interests of 72 the worki ng class.

Of the three State M. L • .A. members of the Medical Aid .Associat- ion, George Taylor, George Marriott and George Keyatta, only the latter made peace with the Q.C.E. Both Taylor and }mrriott defied the ban, holding public meetings at the Brisbane and

Ipswich Trades Halls, the Brisbane City Hall and in some pro-

73 v1nc1a. . 1 cent res. ��rriott, expelled from the Labor Party on

5 November 1941, was reelected in the 1944 State elections as an Independent Labor candidate for the working class seat of

Bulimba. Taylor, whose own position vithin Caucus was weaker because of his strong socialist stance in the Legislative

Assem9ly, was ex pelled from the Labor Party on 27 October, 1941.

He contested but lost Enoggera at the 1944 State election, despite being supported by Communists and radical unions like the

74 Australian Railways Union.

The controversy within the A.L.P. over the Medical Aid to

Russia Association erupted again in 1942 when a Hermit Park

(Townsville) A.L. P. branch member, having failed to obtain pre- selection of the 1942 Municipal elections, wrote to the g.c.E complaining that two who had obtaine d preselection, Corcoran

and Illych were members of the Medical Aid toRussia Association.

Given the great popularity of the Association in Townsville

where its publice meetings attracted overflow audiences, not 29 surprisingly the Hermit Park Branch of the A.L.P. refused the direction of the Q.C.E. to expel Corcoran and Illych.

The Branch, in response to the Q.C.E. decision to now suspend 75 the Branch as a whole joined with Tom Aitkens (who became its leader), calling itself the He rmit Park Labor Party, and in cooperation with the local A.C.P. Branch won control of 76 the Townsville Counci1. The Hermit Park Labor Party (later calling itself the North Queensland Labor Party) proved to be a continuing irritant to Labor. Deputy Premier E.M.Hanlon attempted to persuade the Q.C.E. to readmit the Hermit Park 77 Branch, but failed. At the 1944 Bundaberg Labor-in-Politics members Convention, a motion calling for "all A.L.P. wh o have been

expelled or denied membership for their activities ••••• be 78 readmitted" was defeated. Again, in January 1946 , the Q.C.E. 79 rejected a similar call from the combined Townsville branches.

Eventually a "group of catholics11 formed another Hermit Park 80 Branch of the A.L.P.

While the A.C.P. faced attacks from Labor throughout the war , these were mere pin-pricks in relation to the opposition campaign to be mounted in the post-war era. Similarly,while conservative political forces made no secret of their hostil- ity to the Communist Party during the war , the full impact of their wrath was held in abeyance. Consequently the A.C.P. at its 13th National Congress held in mid 1943 , made only one 81 p�ssing reference to anti-Communism. In fact views like those expressed by R.G. Menzies' Minister for Commerce and the Navy,

'Archie' Cameron, after the German attack on Russia: 30

From our point of view it does not matter who wins the Rus so-German War , because the British E�pire is committed to fight the

winner •••••Let us get very �!early in our heads that whichever side wins , we �ight .

were not popular and he lped speed thi s Government to the Oppos-

ition benche s. Menzie s, however, did not hide his views if

provoked. At a time when radio and newspapers were telling

of sweeping victories on the Eastern Front Menzies in July 1944, 1

at a Brisbane City Hall referendum rally, in reply to an inter-

jection of "Who tried to smash the Communist Party? " responded:

I did, I am proud to say. I regard them as the scum of the country. Don't talk to me about �Jparty that devoted its best efforts to lose the war for Australia until Russia came into it. Don't talk to me about the Communi st Party . I would treat it like typhoid fever. 82

In 1943 , the Queensland Institute of Public Affairs

was established under the directorship (until 1945 ) of Charles

Porter M. L.A. This body saw as its primary function propaganda �

activities for 'free enterprise ' and it acted as a cle aring

house and research centre for the Capitalist economic syste m.

Yet it saw 'fighting communism' during the war as only a peri-

83 pheral concern in contrast with its attitude in the post war era.

Its propagandist wartime work consisted ot opposing the 1944.

Referendum (Post War Reconstruction and Democratic Rights ),

printing and distribution of 'tree enterprise ' orientated stories

to provinc ial newspapers and producing radio plays deve loping 7 84 the same philosophical beliefs .

The Growth and Influence of Catholic

Ant i-Communism

As the war years passed so successfully for the Communi st

Party and the trade union movement , opposition to the A.C.P.

was neverthe less mounting . Yet, in general , this came no t so 31 much from its traditional enemy - the conservat ive political parties - but from various organs of the Roman Catholic Church.

Pope Pius XI in his 1931 Encyclical Letter, Quadrage simo Anno , after making a guarded defence of capitalism; with the view that the right to ownership of:

private property has been given to man •••• by the Creator Himself, not only in order that individ­

uals may be able to provide for their own ne eds ••• but also by means of it the goods whi ch the Creator has destined for the human race may truly serve this purpo se. 85 we nt on to denounce communi sm:

Communists shrink from nothing and fear no thing ; and when they have attained power, it is unbe liev­ able, indeed it seems portentous how cruel and inhuman they show themselves to be . 86

It was in the reign of Pius XI that the functions of the inter- national social movement, Catholic Action, "were expanded to make it an instrument for the conquest of the world for the

8 Catholic faith. 11 7 In Au stralia, Catholic Action was formed in 1937 , a time when international Catholic attention was firm- ly focused on the Spani sh Civil War , which the Church largely depicted as a war be twe en good and evil with the 'good' being represented as the Catho lic Franco and the 'evil ' being the athe istic Communists and Anarchists . False propaganda from both sides, embroidered with tales of gross atrocities did much to manouvre Communi sts and Catholics into diametrically opposed po sitions, whe re they were to remain for at least the next

88 twe nty years .

B.A. Santamaria was one Catholic greatly influenced by the Spanish Civil War . By 1941 the newspaper he edited, the

Catholic Worker had a circulation of 55, 000, a considerable

89 number of these reaching Queensland. The Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane , Jame s Duhig - a staunch opponent of communism - 32 had always entertained a keen interest in dome stic politics, and had "made it a practice to be friendly with all Cabinet 90 Ministers whether they were Catholic or Pr otestant. 11 wn ile ne ither Premiers Forgan-Smith nor Cooper were Catholics, both

Duhig, and Fallon of the A.w.u. (who were ), exercised great power over the State and Parliamentary Labor Parties. The embryonic Catholic Social Action Movement, emerged in mid 1942 from an alliance of Herbert Cremean (Leader of the Victorian

Parliame�tary Labor Party), B.A. Santamaria's anti-Communist grouping in Victoria and Dr . P.J. (Paddy) Ryan 's similar group- ing in Sydney. It started to make its presence felt in Queens­ land the following year, with speaking tours by Father Ryan and distribution of the ir newspaper, Freedom. Freedom (to be renamed '

.Newsweekly in 1947) labelled people 'Reds' or 'Pinks ' on the flimiest evidence while it "never referred to · the Mo!f'Pifi.� or its own Catholic origins. On the contrary, it continuously 91 used subterfuge to disgui se its own identity."

Queensland 's Catholic weekly newspaper the Catholic Leader responded to the growing anti-Communist pressure s within the

Church. While the paper printed only the occasional overt anti-Communi st story during 1944, by the following year most issues carried a.t least one anti-Communist article . In a

January 1945 Editorial headed "A Communist Conspiracy" the

Catholic Leader supported Fallon's a�ta.ck on the growing

Communi st power in the trade unions . Quoting a Readers' Digest article at length on the same topic in the United States, it concluded that wh ile the Nazis were being fought overseas "this 92 insidiously growing menace within, is all but ignored." The

Leader kept a. constant watch on events in Europe . In August

1945 it detai led the way in which the Young Catholic 'f orlters in

Belgium, as an arm of Catholic Ac tion, had provided a good example 33 93 of combatting communi sm. But the athe istic basis and therefore the fundame ntal incompatibility of Communism with

Catho licism was never forgotten:

Communi sm rejects God, and it comes to pass that in requiring of its followers a rigorous discip­ line , it imposes on them acts that are against the Commandments of God and must for this reason be 94 repulsed by the Christian conscience. ·J .:·. · ,

The A.C.P. concluded at its 1945 Que ensland State Conference, in language not designed to be �iplomatic :

The propaganda and activity of the hierarchy of the Roman Catho lic Church is a menace to the Queensland people who are completely ••• unmindful of the interests( of the ] Catholic people, these Clerico-Fascists and the dupe s organized around them. 95

The growth of ho stility betwe en Communi st and Catholic in the later war years can also be seen in the State Service

Union 's monthly journal . Unt il 1944 , The State Service was largely �olitical , aside from occasional articles di scussing politics on a philosophical level, and quite devoid of acrimo�.

Communi sts who wrote for the ournal like Ka.th Watson and Des l, Eaton, did so on their special are as of inte re st - women' s que stions and the problems of returning servicemen :.respectively.

From 1944, however, articles appe ared dealing with spe cific political topics strongly reflecting a Catho lic viewpoint. In

June , an anonymous author warned that Communi sts tried to 96 attract 'dupes' by playing nthe friendly, genial kindly fellow" while , two months later, another article sugge sted that 97 Communism and Socialism were responsible for the rise of Hitler.

Features like P. Fitzgerald 's "Devitalizing the Communi st Party11 which stated:

No virile Labor l'Iove ment can hope to exist until every Communi st has been removed from eve ry position of authority in every trade u�ion and as they are heretics from every­ thing that is Au stralian; all Australians should join the hunt. 98 34 appe ared with increasing frequency throughout 1945 .

Although Kath Watson and L.W. Kenyo n, another Cotrununi st, had articles published in 1945 , this situation came to an end at the start of 1946 .

When John Mul len, Queensland 's Attorney Ge neral from 1 91 9 to 1 941 (with the exception of Moore 's Premiership , de livered ) his retirement speech he conc luded:

I refer to the A.w.u•••• It has been the backbone of the Labor Movement in Aus tralia, and it has been particularly he lpful in Que ensland because it has had a sane and unc ompromising policy in respect of 99 •••• its opposition to communi sm.

Five years later Premier Cooper was even less circumspect when he bluntly remarked to '�e Courier Mail, "Red-baiting is an

100 A.W.U. habit ." As in the State Service Uni on and the Catholic

Church 'opposition to Communism' or 'red-baiting ' noticeably increased within the A.W.U. in the latter days of the war . At the end of 1 944 with e.G. Fallon's reelection to the National

Presidency of the A.W.U. he hit out at the "many small unions" controlled by "Communists and their captives11:

By captive s I mean those weak-kne ed stooges who try to sit on the fence and play hands with the Communi sts whi le retaining member­ ship in and enj oying the benefits secured for them by genuine working class organiz­ ations . 101

The Worke r carried a never ending series of articles on commun-

1 02 ism's evils : " Why Communists Are Against Full Employment;• 104 103 "Communi sm On The Waterfront, " "Commos Stir Up Fi lipinos •••"

Othe.r articles which The Worker printed lilie "Dr . Evatt' s

105 Oppo sition to the Phi losophy of Communi sm" were forerunners

to the Industrial Groups ' subsequent attempts to clothe the ir

activities with Feaeral Labor respectability. In December 1945,

The Worker accepted a series of full page advertisements from

the Institute of Public Affairs , attacking the A.C.P. at the 35 rate of one per week for three months . The copy for these advertisements was as crude as it was inaccurate . Proclaimed one : 11Communi sts Are AvowC!dly Anti-Bri tish. They Are Also

Anti-Australian! The Trojan Horse . Re ject The Red Fascists.

Australia's Fifth Column" wh ile another read "Engels: The simplest and mo st natural form of the division of labour is, in fact, slave�· ·· [Proof tha� Economic Slavery For Workers �s] 107 The Official Basis Of The Communist System. " �icJ

As if responding to the advertisements , Jack Bukowski , the

Catholic Southern District Secretary told the January 1946

A.w.u. State Conference: In fighting Co��nism it should not only be done in the industrial movement - the Govern­ ment should assist by expunging from the ir offices Communists who are entrenched in the

Public Service offices••• These stooges are defaulting their trust in that they are making ntormatio� avai lable o the A.c.!j. ...It must [l a � be ruthles r. They mu st be exterminated at f 0 � all costs.

The fti:Howing month, Acting Branch President Boland, another

Catholic , attempted to explain the pyschology of some people attracted to communism in thi s way :

A feature of the Com. attacks has been the

appe arance in the Corn. ranks •••of a few

intellectuals •••it too often happens that men who excel in one branch of arts or sciences are hopelessly inept in practical affairs. When they realise this, an inferiority complex develops and the natural reaction is to attract attention by any avai lable means in an endeavour to convince 109 themselves that they are, after all, practical men.

A New Order?

As early as 1942 , Queensland 's Deputy Premier E.:t-1. Hanl on, himself a returned soldier of the 1914-1 8 war with bitter memories of the figh.ing men' s experiences after the ir home coming, passionately told the House that anyone who thought simi lar treatment would be meted out to the returned men of the Second 36 110 World War "had another think coming. " The conv iction that the First World War's afte rmath experience would no t recur, led the troops, factory and office workers of all political complexions - communi st no less than conservative - to believe that the coming po st-war era would usher in a 'new order '

111 of social justice for the working people of Au stralia. As the war years passed, the promises about what this new era would surely bring 1fe re gradually expanded upon. In 1 946 Chifley declared that with the conclusion of hostilities:

Thi s country is about to enter the greatest era of her history. This country has come through two world wars and weathered the hardship and misery of a depre ssion all in the space of little more

than thirty years ••••Aus tralia has expanded tremendously her production capacity and we now stand on the thre shold of a wonderful cowmercial 11 and industrial age . 2

The 14th A.C.P. National Congress in Augu st 1 945, following upon the victory of the Allies in the European war , was conducted 113 in a "mood of triumph and punctuated by scenes of great rejoicing. "

Underlying the mood of the Conference , however, was a realiz- ation of the inadequacy of the A.C.P. 's response to the demands for a 'new order '. Its po licies, mere reiterations of earlier plans- themselve s largely subordinated to the war effort - were to langui sh six months more , before coming to terms with the new conditions . Pre sident Sharkey explained that in the internation- al sphere the A.C.P. should work for an EAst-We st detente , the only hope for any effective peace settlement; whi le domestically the Party should try to achieve a decision by a majority of

Australians "peacefully and democratically, to change the

114 existing social order and embrace Socialism. 11 The Party

Programme entitled "Jobs , Fre edom and Progress" called for the nationalization of certain key industries, continuation and 37

extension of the Government's wartime controls , an independ-

ent Australian voice in foreign affairs , and a continuation

of the wartime policy of a 'united front with the Labor Party ,'

115 under the slogan of "Support Labor Governments.n While

this had been the A.C.P. policy for the previo us two years;the

December 1 945 Queensland Conference of the A.C.P. noted that

the united front policy had only occasionally worked - and

even then only at a rank and file level .

One area where the A.C.P . could organize in support of

the emerging international forces at the conclusion of war

was around the Indonesian question . During the war Indo- 1

nesian seamen and others in Australia were interned at camps

including the ones at rvtackay and Bundaberg. Not only did the

A.C .P. support their determination to end Dutch colonialism ,

but as many of the interned Indonesians were Communists 7 close

links were maintained throughout the war. In late 1945 Indo-

nesian seamen walked off Dutch ships in Brisbane , Bundaberg

and other coastal ports. The A.C.P . offered solidarity in the

form of demonstrations and leafleting as well as turning over

the top floor of Trades Hall as dormitories. While the popular

press concerned itself with the question of the danger of Trades 116 Hall office girls contracting venereal disease, The Worker

pointed to "Comms Said To Have Dictated Indonesian Dispute in

Bundaberg11117 �.&nd T,he Courier-Mail later echoed this in an

Editorial asking1 11Has the unrest amongst Indonesians ••••been

8 largely inspired and encouraged by Communist agents! 11 11

Domestically the A. C.P. concerned itself with gra ss roots

issues. After the 1945 Congress it produced Civvy Street , a

booklet designed to help inform returned soldiers of the avail-

able benefits as well as of its own programme of improved 38 benefits, trade union assistance, vocational training ,

119 better pensions and so forth . The Party raised money ceaselessly for a fund to produce a Sydney daily newspaper.

Stress was laid on the use of 'front ' groups to attract middle class and 'inte llectual ' bodies closer to the Party, as internal Party discipline was relaxed/thus continuing the dominance of locality branche s over workshop branches. Despite this, however, A.C.P. membership declined by over 2,000 in 120 1945. Jim Henderson reflected that : "with the defeat of the Nazis many people in the Party who were not real Marxists

121 dropped into their old way of life .''

The A.C.P. Central Committee began to reappraise its policies within two months of the National Congress, as it came to grips with the realization that the 'new order ' might, if necessary, be created through the Communist Party's indust- rial strength. It moved sharply in support of the forty hour week. The Communist Party here realized that Communist-led unions enjoyed a tactical advantage over Labor Party controlled unions - they were not caught in the dilemma of having to strike against their own government. In October 1945, the Central

Committee issued a directive to Party members and the impact of document was to be felt quickly and decisive ly. This policy was to mark a turning point in the history of the Party and its deve lopment over the next five years. It stated:

Do not fritter away the workers' militancy and strength by petty stoppage s over relat­ ively minor matters . What is needed is a we ll co-ordinated, political and industrial campaign, combined with a mass educational drive by means of the union press, leaflets and pamphlets to make the public aware of the tnue industrial 122 position and the needs of the working class. 39

Thus as the war ended and the Communi st Party's 'phoney peace ' was drawing to a close , the �pparent Communist ponular­ ity in the State was a reality only in No rth Queensland .

Electorally the rest of the State showed no special sympathy for Communism, while in large areas south of Mackay , it had little membership or support. In large population centres, it enj oyed its greatest support {as it did outside of Queensland ) in the trade union movement . Eve n there , oppo sition to the

Communi st Party was we ll entrenched and girding itself for coming struggles. 40 Footnotes.

1. Commonwealth Year Book 1951 No .38(Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, 1952 JP.ps .525-5 27. 2. Ibid. 3. W. Jackson, The Governme nt and Economic Growth in Queensland 1946 - 1951, (B.A. Hons . Thesis, University of Queensland, 1968) P.ps . 15-1 6, 98. 4. Ibid. P.16.

5. Also see Nap . Distribution of Queensland 1 s Population 1 Appendix. F. 6. Queensland Year Book 1951 No .1 2. (Government Statistic­ ian's office, Bri sbane , 1952) P.160. 7. Ibid. See P. 153. 8. Same day deliveries of The Courier-��il,for example , did not occur until the late 'fifties wi th the introduction of aerial deliveries.

9. Interview with Tom Aitkens M.L.A. 25 September, 1974. 10. Ibid.

11 . See Appendix A (i) P.

12. See Appendix A (iH ) P. and B (i) P. 13. See Appendix B ( i) P. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Interview with Jim Henderson, Op .Cit. 17. Interview with Jack Pemberthy, Op .Cit. 18. A popular term in North Queensland meaning the great working mass of people as opposed to the owners of the means of production. 19. A.E. Jones, Electoral Support for the Communist Party in North Que ensland : A study of Fred Pater son's Victory in Bowen 1944 (B.A. (Hons . ) Thesis, University of Queensland , 1972) . 20. Q.P.D. Vol. CLXXXII, 1944-45, 8 August, 1944. P.74 21 . Interview with Jack Pemberthy, Op . Cit. 22. See Appendix B (iii ) P. 23. Jim lienderson, Op . Cit. wn ile this was justified by using Marx 's be lief that in the final battle between capital and labour, some elements of the petty-bourgeoisie would be won over to the side of the proletariat, the above quote does not really match this analysis. 41 24. Jack Pemberthy, Op .Cit .

25. Tom .A.itkens H.L.A. 25 September, 1974 . The paradox of No rthern anti-intellectualism, the suspicion of the outstanding individual who stood apart, and the pride Northerners took in having such a scho lar , is a characteristic still present in Northern Queensland ,

26. Jack Pemberthy, Op . Cit. The A.C.P. 's identification with the Ru ssian war effort was another vital aspect of the A.C.P. 's appeal to a wide cross-section of the community , which I wi ll examine in greater detail later.

27. Ibid .

28. Appendix B {iii) P. M& reason for concentrating subdivi sional analysis on the Bowen electorate was primarily because this was where the A.C.P. stood candidates over a long pe riod � not because this was whe re it enj oyed its greate st support.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31 . Jack Pemberthy, Op . Cit.

32. Q.P.D. Vo l. C�� 11, 1944-45, 23 August, 1944. P.172.

33. A.E. Jones. Op . Cit .

34. Home Hill Observer, 2 June , 1944.

35. From article in Tribune , 5 September, 1939.

36. Jack Pemberthy, Op. Cit.

37. Que ensland Guardian, 7 February, 1940 .

38. Ibid.

39. The Me nzies Government also banned the various Nazi and Fascist Parties. On 16 June 1940 the small Brisbane Fascist Offices were raided by police, seizing guns , ammunition, and uniforms . For further details see Clem Lack , Three Decades of ueensland Po litical Histor 1929 -1 960 {Government Printer, Brisbnae , 1962 See P. 184.

40 . Jim Henderson and Ted Bacon, Op . Cit.

41 . It was never recove red. Curiously the Government shipped the press to the Northern Territory where for many years •it printed the local Darwin paper.

42. In Brisbane it took offices in the Penneys Building, Que en Street. Three of its Committee members including Chairman were former A.C.P. full-time functionaries.

43 . Figures in the Ngrth Queensland Guardian {28 May , 1943) showed Queensland 's A. C.P. membership increased five-fold between June 1940 and May 1943 .

44. Leicester We bb, Communism and Democracy in Australia: A Survey of the 1951 Referendum, (Che shire , Me lbourne , 1954) See P.6. 42

45 . See Appendix B (i) �.

46 . Ibid.

47 . Ibid.

48 . Rockhampt on Morning Bulletin, 3 January , 1944 .

49 . The Toowoomba Chronicle , 28 January , 1944 .

50. L.L. Sharkey , "An Outline Hi story of the Au stralian Communist Party, Op . Cit. P.62.

5 1. Ted Bacon, Op . Cit.

5 2. For examp le Dr. G.P. 0'Day , Why You Should Jo in the Communi st Party, (A.C.P., Me lbourne , 1942) published in Ne lbourne , and Len Donald, Why You Should Join the Communi st Party, (A.C.P. , Sydney, 1944) publi shed in Sydney.

53. Whi le the A.C.P. at times disputed formal links with the Eureka Youth League it always acted as the youth organization of the Party.

54. Ted Bacon, Op . Cit.

55. See Semper Floreat , 11 April, 1947 for brief details on campus po litical groups, their formation, etc.

5 6. Alaistair Davi�son, The Communist Part of Au stralia - A Short History, (Hoover Institution Pre ss , 1969 P.1 5 .

57. Tribune,16 October, 1945 . For a complete list o:f A.C.P. membe rs killed in World War 11 see Tribune , 1 5 No vember, 1946 .

58. Ted Bacon, Op .Cit. Bac on was a Lieutenant in the Aus tralian Army for mo st of the war . I doubt if there were many, if any, racist implications in the ir propaganda, although it may have be en inte rpreted as such by the troops . Throughout the pe riod , the A.C.P. camp aigned against the White Australia po licy and strongly supported Indone sian independence , and was itself, therefore , subject to attacks from racists .

59. W.Elson Gre en, Soldier Defend Tbyself, (Edmonds Pub . Co., Br isbane , 1943.)

60 . Ted Bacon, Op .Cit.

61 . Jim Henderson, Op . Cit.

62 . Resolutions of the 5th All «ensland Conference of the A.C.P., A.C.P. Brisbane , April, 1945 ).

63 . Jim Henderson, Op .Cit.

64 . See Appendix C(i) P.

6 5 . Re solutions of the 5th All Que ensland Conference of the A.C.P. , Op .Cit. 43

66 . Ibid .

67 . H. G. S. ullivan , Dissent in the Labor l') a.rty 1933-44 , (B.A. (Hons . ) Thesis, Queensland University, 1968) P.60

68. This included the State branche s of the railways , plumbers and gasfitters, seamens, bui lders and iron-workers unions � For a complete list of unions in Trades Hall and tho se affiliated with the A.L.P. see Appendix C ( ii ) P,

69 . Report of the Labor-in-Politics Conve ntion, 17 February , 1941 , Southport. P.8.

70 . Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Convention, 14 February, 1944 , Bundaberg. P.6.

71 . The Worker, 25 August, 1941 .

72 . The Courier-Mai l, 6 September, 1941 .

73 . See M.G. Sullivan , Op . Cit. P. 1 47-1 50.

74 . See The Advocate , (Australian Railways Union) ,Mareh, 1944 .

75 . Tom Aitkens had been expelled some ye ars earlier allegedly for behaviour unbe coming to an A.L.P. member ( "alcoholism" ) . Aitkens argued that thi s was a technicality, and that he was re ally expe lled because he refused to take orders from Tom Dougherty , the local A.W.U. Branch Secretary � See Tom Aitkens ' Interview, Op . Cit. 76 . The two Parties, the A.C.P. and the Hermit Park Labor Party again cooperated for the 1944 State elections . For brief details see Tom Aitkens ' speech to Parliament . Q.P.D. Vo l. CLXXXII, 8 August , 1944 .

77 . According to Tom Aitkens N.L.A., the motion was lost 19 to 17 after Tom Dougherty, then Brisbane A.W.U. District Secre tary, spoke strongly against readmittance . See Inter­ view with Tom Aitkens , Op . Cit .

78 . Report of the Labor-in-Politics Convention, 14 February, 1944 . Bundaberg.

79 . The Q.C.E. cal led for members to reJ01n other branche s in the area, as it had done twi ce previously. See �li nute s, Que ensland Central Executive of the A.L.P. , 8 Ju ly, 1946 .

80. See Tom Aitkens , M.L.A., speech to Parliament. Op.Cit.

81 . See Report of the 13th A.C.P. N,ti onal Congress, March,1943 . Op .Cit.

82. The Courier-Mail ,25 July , 1944 .

83. See Interview with Charles Porter, M.L.A. 19 September ,1974 .

84. Ibid .

85 . �ope Pius XI, Re construc ting the Social Order : Encyc lical Le tter Qua.dragesimo Anno , (Australian Catholic Truth Society Record , "Nelbourne , 15 July 19l31 ) P.13. The letter does go on, however, to denounce unbridled monopoly capitalism as it promoted class war .

86. Ibid. P. 28. The letter also bitterly attacks and denounces socialism. "Socialism conceive s a society and a social character utterly foreign to Christian truth.11P.30 87. Tom Truman, Catholic Action and Politics, (Georgian House , Nelbourne , 1959) P.66. 88. Frank Waters, the N.L.A. for Kelvin Grove , recounted that during Wa eld War II, during a discussion in the Members Bar on the Sp ani sh Civil War , that the Catholic member for Carnarvon, Paul Hilton, became so heated that he had to be forcibly re strained from hitting Waters. See P.J. O'Farrell, The Catho lic Church in Au stralia - A Short History 1788-1 967 . (Ne lson, Me lbourne , 1968 } . 89. Ibid. P.263 . 90 . The Honorable F.W. Bu lcock quoted in M.G.Sullivan's Thesis, Op .Cit. •:s 91 . Paul Ormonde , The �vement , (Ne lson, Melbourne ,1972) P.11.

92. The Catho lic Leader,18 January , 1945 . 93 . Ibid . 19 April, 1945 . 94 . Ibid. 30 August, 1945. 95. Resolutions of the 5th All Que ensland Conference of the A.C.P., Op . Cit. P.8. 96 . The State Service ,June , 1944. 97 . Ibid . August, 1944. 98. Ibid. }fay , 1945 . 99 . The Worke r, 18 February, 1941 . 100. The Courier-Mail, 17 January, 1946 . 101. Thv Worker, 8 January , 1944.

102. Ibid . 29 Gatober , 1945 . 103. Ibid. 10 September, 1945 104. Ibid. 19 November, 1945 . 105. Ibid . 1 January, 1945 . 106. Ibid . 7 January, 1945. 107. Ibid . 18 February , 1946 . 108. Ibid. 21 January, 1946 . 109. Ibid . 4 February, 1946 .

11 o. Clem Lack , Op . Cit. P.21 2. 111:£., See Jim Henderson, Op. Cit. 45

112. The Courier-Mail, 13 September, 1946.

113. Ted Bac on, Op .Cit.

L. 114. Sharkey, R. Dixon, A Free World Wi thout Violence, (A.C.P. Sydney, 1945 ) .

115. Jobs, Freedom and Progress, Re solutions of the 14th Nati onal Congress of the A. C.P. , (A.C.P. Sydney , ' .August , 1945) .. 116. See Jim Henderson, Op.Cit.

117 . The Worker, 29 October, 1945 .

118. The Courier-Mail, 2 January , 1946 .

119. Ci!!Y Street, No author indicated, (A.C.P. Sydney,1945 ) .

120. See figures in .A. Davidson, Op .Cit. P.1 20 .

121. Jim Henderson, Op .Cit .

122. Document from the A.C.P. Central Committee, (A.C.P. Sydney, October , 1945 ) . Held by C.P.A. Brisbane office . Section 3.

Communism in the Post-War Periodo

Phase 1: 1946 - 194� The A. C.P. on the Offensive,

A defensist position in regard to our Party, and ' the basic interests of the great mass of the Australian people in the conditions of today� would be fatal to our work and to the in�erests of the Au stral ian people.

Jack Henry, State Secretary of the Queensland Branch of the A.C.P. at the 15th Nati onal A. C.P. Congress . May, 1948.

One-man crusade - Will Wage War On Reds - White haired 53-year old I•1r . H.G.Tomkins of .Ht . Gravatt, today wi ll start a one man crusade against communi sm. Ships ' fireman, farmer, engineer, vulcanizer and veteran of two war s, he thinks the world is losing ground to communism, and although he is in ill health, he wants to combat the trend. Hi s plan is to use logic and to get workers to think for themselves. v� . Torut ins has asked employers to allow him to lecture to men on the ir premises. He is meeting some opposition, but hopes to overcome it. Today he wi ll address shipyard workers.

The Courier-Mail 311 Photo feature . 15 July, 1949. 46

Communi st Party Ni litancy .

Despite the continuation of A.C.P. attempts throughout

1946 to seek the cooperation of the Labor Party, and to give electoral support to it, growing vo ices within the A.C.P. were hi ghly critical of Labor. In ��rch, 1946 , a leading Vi ctorian member of the National Executive , J.IJ·.Blake was 'di sciplined ' by

the Party for his opposition to a united front with the "class

1 collaborationist" A.L.P. leadership. Queensland Guardian cartooni sts invariably depicted a pipe-smoking Chifley taking orders from a fat , top-batted busine s sman, whi le Evat t was shown

with hi s trousers fall ing down, exposing underpants bearing 2 £ and $ symbo ls. Not surprisingly such irritants reinforced

traditional Labor Party ho stility to the A.C.P. at a time when

Labor 's ele ctoral strength was such that it was not in search of

allies. Consequently State A.L.P. Branc hes like New South Wal es rejected "without he sitation or qualification any pact, wo rking

3 agreements or association with the Communist Party " as proposed by the N.S.W. Communist Party in June 1946 . Several months later

in response to a simi lar Communi st ove rture to cooperate in the

1946 Federal Elections , the A.L.P. Federal Executive replied,

"no agreement can be reached between the .A.L.P. and the Communist

4 Party in this or any other electi on. " Despite this, the .A.C.P .

supported the A.L.P. electorally de scribing the reelection of the 5 Fecileral Labor Government in 1946 as 11a victory for the working class .

Industrially the Communi st Party was less conciliatory .

L.L.Sharkey in 1946 warned workers that while Chifley talked of

6 the 'new order ' as the birth of a "Golden Age " the employer

class preferred "a new disorder in whi ch wage cuts and depre ssions

7 wou ld enable them to do as they please ." In Queensland the A.C.P.

had embarked on the first of its maj or A.C.P.-led post-war strike s - the 1946 r'1e a t Strike which lasted from .tvfar ch to July. By

December 1 946, however, the Nati onal Executive itself had swung around to the political position that J.J).Blake had been disciplined over, nine months earlier, arguing that the A. L.P. no longer worked for the working class. As Au stralia entered a period of record employment wh ich, as Chifley explained, wo uld, with the implementation of K.eyne sian economic theories, re sult in a rise in living standards for al l, the Communi st Party war ned of a forthcoming world depression.

In early 1947 the State Secretary of the Queensland Branch,

Jack Henry, represented the A. C.P. at a London conference of

Communi st Parties of the British Empire . At that Conference, not only was the coming economic depression accepted as fact but also it was argued that since this would occur firstly within the weaker Britisl1 econo�, American capital would try to replace capital in the latter's spheres of intere st -namely Australia - as the British econo� entered its decline. In this process, the

Australian Labor Party was to prepare1 the way for the domination of U.S. capital by assaults on the living standards of the working 8 class. Thi s line of thinking was accepted by the National

11 Exe cutive and from mid 1947 'the direction of the main blow' was 9 against A.L.P. reformism. 11 In 1948 and 1949, despite immediate evidence to the contrary, the A.C.P. 's confidence about the coming economic crisis increased with belief that the Labor

Party was consciously attacking the living standards of the people .

L.L. Sharkey to ld the 1948 15th A.C .P. National Congress;

the struggle against reactionary parties must be placed in the forefront of the work of our Party . We must expose the lying propaganda and unmask before the people the leaders of reaction for what they are . In vi ew of the capitulation of the Labor Party before the reactionary offens ive , the main role in the fight to defeat _rea.ction falls to the lot of our Party . 10 Re lations between the Communi st Party and the A.L.P.

furthe r deteriorated as the former re sponded with longer and more bitter strike s to what it interpreted as Labor Party attacks

on the living standards of the working class . As long term

support for the se strikes increasingly depended on ever smaller

though more committed groups of its own supporters, the lesson

of each strike for the A.C.P. simply became t�t the A.L.P. could

not be trusted . Thus the A. C.P. failed to pe rceive the growing

divisions within Labor 's ranks , merely stating:

as the Rightwing of the Labor Party becomes more discredited, the more the ruling class re lied on the Leftwing to keep the mas ses in

cheek •••and hold back the movement towards

Soeialis;m •••in some conditions, the psuedo­ Leftwing of Social Democracy can prove to be more dangerous than the Right

No attempt was therefore made to usefully distinguish between the

Grouper Right and the reformist Left wings of the Labor Party.

By neglecting to exploit the divisions which troubled the A.L.P.

and the trade uni on movement, the A.C.P. , as Playford pointed out :

ensured not only this continued isolation within the Labor movement but the continued presence on the ir Right of a united Labor Party, still assured of the al legiance of tho se very social 12 groups to which the Communists were anx ious to appeal .

Only once after 1946 did the A.C.P. lend full politi cal support

to the Labor Party . Thi s was to support Chifley's attempt to

nationalize Australian banking in 1947,. but even then at public

meetings the A.C.P. combined such support with its forebodings 13 about Laborls role in the coming economic crisis. The eulmin-

ation of this growing A.C.r. - A.L.P. ho stility was the 1949

Federal Election whe re the A.C.P. failed to mobilize support

for the A.L.P. be cause it was guided in the election campaign

by such views as : "there was no basic difference between Labor ,

Liberal and Country Party on maj or issues and that the Communi st 49 14

]:>arty was the only real al ternati ve 11

Although the preponderance of National Executive members were men in the ir middle and late forties, the A.C.P. as a whole was a young and vigorous Party , and thi s was reflected in the age of its

Party func tionaries at the State level. Urged on by 'socialism' s victories' in Eastern Europe and later in China, the A.C.P. was optimistic that the ir historical mi ssion would soon be acc omplished, despite its reverses in the industrial field and the mounting Cold War hostility. Hence while the Queensland Gu ardian was suffering a declining readership, its size was doubled to eight pages in February 1946 . Yet when its editor, Ted Bacon argued that , since 5,000 copies we re returned unsold out of the

15,000 printed we ekly, the print run could be cut, the State

Committee was outraged at the suggestion, while others even thought

1 6 that, the overall number should actually be increased. In such an unre alistic atmo sphere , there deve loped two kinds of Communi sts :

The excessively militant type who regarded everybody who wasn't on the streets night and day organizing the workers for the coming struggle as loafers, and the people who fe lt they couldn't take the strain. 17

Gr adually the latter group dropped out, adding · to the toll that the loss of the 'Red Army Recruits ' had taken in 1945 . The militants easily resigned themselves to thi s decline . Said Ted Bacon:

We felt that those who weren't courageous now will find their courage and those who felt dis­ illusioned would come waltzing back 'when the revolution came . ' 18

Thi s mi litant and sometimes sectarian outlook particularly ( 19 present in Queensland s then State Secret;:try Jack Henry came 1 ) to dominate the A.C.P. from 1947 onwards as Party discipline was vigorously reasserted. The sectarian influence was clearly evident

in the A.C.P. 's propaganda . Both the journalists and ca�toonists of 50 the Party 's newspapers adopted a stilted and exaggerated style . In political cartoons , Nenzies was ali.erna tely caricatured as the weak puppet of Unc le Sam•, or a greedy and ruthless exploiter, frequently we aring a Nazi uniform. This sectariatu sm also took other forms . It resulted in the A.C.P. 's paying : insufficient attention to deve loping unity in action w·ith the big numbers of Labor Party members and supporters during the great strike s

••• That �Q:ope."'existed for a broader deve l­ opment of unity was shown by such facts as that during the coal strike a number of A.C.P. members resigned from the Party in prote st against the Government 's strike breaking and three large A.L.P. branches in Sydney had their charters withdrawn by the State Exe cutive for oppos ing the Government 's action . 20

The sectarian aggressiveness of the A.C.P. did little to mitigate against the continuing impact of the Cold War . Following

Chur�hill 's widely reported speech at Fulton in Mar ch 1946 , whe re he cal led for an anti-Communist alliance comprising of the British

Empire , Western Europe and the United States, the A.C.P. respo.D.ded

1 by cal ling for a personal "barrage against Churchill." 2

Thi s was also, in part, a result of "the general tendency of the

Party •••to under.estima te the effects of the Cold War and anti­

Communi sm. " 22 Conversely,the A.C.P. overestimated the extent of

radi calism among the working classe s, resulting in its advent�ist

strike tactics and rigid electoral stance. This overestimation,

J.D.Blake later explained, lfwas based on the mood of the more

advanced workers wh o were a smal l minority ; it did not give 23 due regard to the mood and understanding of the who le working class." 51

A.C.P. Activitz

March 1946 was to prove a traumatic turning point in the history of the A.C:.P. in Queensland. On 6 :r.1arch, Churchill 's

Fulton speech marked the unleashing of an onslaught by both press and politician against the threat of 'world Conwuni sm'

an onslaught whi ch was to continue , unabated, for over a decade.

The very next day saw Premier Cooper appointed Li eutenant -

Governor and the aseention to the Premiership of a man who wa.s ' to become a trete noir 1 to Queensland 1 s Communi st Party, E.H.

( 'Ned 1) Hanlon. Then on 17 March the Me at Strike comme nced, whi ch

would in turn become the main impetus for the formation of the

anti-Communi st Industrial Groups in Queensland .

In this post-war era, the Communi st Party devoted its

greatest efforts to the trade union movement, an area where

they _ were likely to be most effective -for here lay its widest

base of support. Between September 1945 and December 1947, the

26 .1% of Au stralian unionists led by Communi sts were responsible for 24 84% of the time lost by strike action. These strikes, although

partly an attempt to maintain wage levels in a period of rapid

25 . �n. fl a t.�on, were pr�mar�'1 y d.�re c t e d a t w�nn�ng . . �mpr . ovement s �n .

wages and conditions in a situation of economic boom (de spite the

A.C.P. 's belief to the contrary) and full employment. In

Queens land , the A.C.l'. concentrated much of its ammunition upon 26 achieving the 40 hour week and ending what it be lieved to be

27 Queensland 's lmr wage status. !4"a.j or disputes in this period we re

accentuated by the then popular tactic of calling out other unions

in solidarity in an attempt to force an early showdown, thus giving 28 the se strikes "something of the nature of a general strike ,u

The A.C.P. characterized its union leaders as low paid, hard

working , effieient militants who got results, unlike others who 52 were painted as incompetent 'bosses' who got drunk on members '

9 union dues. 2 Clearly, how·ever, the skill and determination of ·

Communi st union leaders, as Louise Overacke r observe d, "enabled the Au stralian Communi st Party to exercise influence in the labour

30 movement far greater than the size of its membership."

The walkout of 120 Mur.ar ri� bacon factoly workers over the

Co�pany 's fai lure to observe seniority dismissal rules, triggered off solidarity strikes by whar f workers and railwaymen to such a

31 degree that by mid-J.fay over 10,000 workers were out on strike .

Furthermore, the strike generated strong emotions in those involved, which often found an outlet in physical violence . On 14 May , a man was kicked unconscious and others beaten when groups of meat wo rkers invaded the Hami lton cold stores and attacked strikebreakers

32 loading pork from the Nurarrie factory. Punche s were again thrown as strikebreakers worked the rail link be twe en Cannon Hill

33 and the Abattoir.

The issue s over which the strike was fought were never made clear to many workers, and as more unions became in�lved, allegations that the strike was being 'manipulated by Communists for the ir own purposes ' became widespread . Certainly the Communist Party saw strikes as a means of raising working class consciousness, but,

like the non Communist originators of the strike , they also saw it as just. In various branches within the Amalgamated Neat Industry

Employees Union itself there were serious divisions which in 34 Rockhamp ton led to a breakaway union being formed . Attempts by the Au stralian Federated Uni on of Locomotive Enginemen to come out in solidarity with the meatworkers was reversed by a maj ority

35 of its members. Around the State there was considerable ho stility displayed towards the str ike . In Townsville , where the meatworkers

solidly supported the strike , the Clerk's Union organized a we ll attended me eting to protest against it. At Ro ckhampton and 5 3

Gladstone hundreds attended Communi st strike :public me etings

8 :princ ipal ly to disrupt the spea.k:ers. 3

Eventual ly the strike collapsed wi th Communi st union V�ade rs at Brisbane strike me etings be ing ho;..rled dmm for allowing the strike to drag on for so long and for involvi ng ever large r numbers of workers . 3 9 Ted Ba con also condemned such A.C.P. tactics later:

The C.P. is partly re sponsible for the de feat of the strike . The worke rs went back , bitter, disunited and

defeated ••• and it took years of patient >vork at the shop floor level to rebuild unity in the Heatworker's

Uni on itself - and amongs t its allies ••• who had come out in support of the meat>vorkers. 40

The Bacon fac tory owners as \ve ll as the pre ss wage d a wide and particularly fierce camp aign against the strikers. In a full page letter to the newspaper of the l-Le turned Soldier 's,

1 Sai lor 's and Ai rmen's Imperial League of Australia,4 The Oue ensland

Digger, the Chairman of Directors of the Bacon Cooperative

Associttti on explained that he and hi s fellow dire ctors we re all returned servi cemen and that they gave preferential treatme nt to returned soldier employees.42 The vo ice of Queens l and 's rur al industries, The queensland Country Life , ;.rarnedthat :

The fight that is going on within the me at industry

• • • is one that vi ll have to be waged sooner or later by every employer - for the right to conduc t his enterpr ise efficiently.43

The Toowoomba Chronli.cle went even further and saw the str:il\:e as a cunning Communist plot to establish itself within Au stralia 's powe r structure . In one of its long-wi nde d editorials (se emingly the hal lmark of Qu eens land 's provi nc ial press), it derc, ande

And. what are the real reasons for thi s strike? In our opinion they are no thi ng more or less than a concerted move on the r) art of' a section of the Com- munist agitators, '"ho have wormed themselves :i.nto office in so many trade union orgnnizations , to cripple 54

the existing trade union movement, to replace the se trade unions when they have di scredited them by Communi st directed and contro lled secret chapte rs to force Labor Governments - both State a,nd Federal to recognize them as an integral part of the Labor movement . 44

Even more significant was one of the Ca�holic Leader's rare overtly political editorials wh ich asked, 11'ri hence Th is

Insanity'?�� Its simple answer was 11Comrnuni sm is at the bottom

of this di sorder." 45 This new interest by the Le ader in local

Communi st ac tivi ty after many months of interna.tional reports

46 such as "China 's Reds Seek To Turn Nisery of War to Own Ends n

1 or "Communi sts Are Po tential Spies • •• • 1 47 was paralleled by,

and indeed prompted Catholic fears of Communism in Australia.

Such anxieties, in turn, resulted in the formation of the

Catholic Social Action Hove ment in Que ensland .

At me atworks around Queensland , Catho lics had taken leading

roles against the continuation and expans ion of the str ilte s.

They saw the escalation of the strikers ' demands and the

invo lvement of other unions as proof of the Communi sts ' attempt

to use the strike to bring about "economic chaos." 48 Such was

the case of Bill Thor h�q� ,a devout Roman Catholic, employed at

the Br isbane abattoir , who conc luded, "Within the unions there

49 was only one way to break them and thi s was ijQ) out-orga.nize them."

Subsequently he left his job to become the Catholic Social Action

Hovement •s (henceforth called The N:ovement ) organizer, as we ll

as corre spondent and distributor of its journal Freedom.50 The

political import of the Meat Strike was reemphasized by the

!·liners ' and Rai lwaymen's Strike which followed only days later .

This strike , conduc ted amid similar accusations of Conwunist

control, resulted in a State of Emergency declaration in June ,

51 1946 .

Further fue l was added to the 'Communist union conspiracy ' 5 5

theory whe n Queensland 's Communist Party revealed de tai ls

in Apr il and of the School ' it was establishing to 'Harx teach the scief.iaynce of Narxism-Leninism. The Sunday-i'1a.il

provided sensational information upon this when it printed

allegations by an anonymous brickworker that at one of the in-

terim Redc liffe study camps:

They taught how to influence the man against hi s boss and his fel low worke r, to disrupt peace in indus try. Once trained they are placed in factories by Con�unist unions. There they agitate . 5 2

The Communist Party's vote at the 28 September, 1946

Federal Elections mirrored this growing anti-Communi st sentiment

with its two candidates recording only 1.98% of the State 's vote .

Ne vertheless, the Party still did better here than in all States

53 except South Australia whe re its two candidate s obtained 2.77%£

Queensland 's relatively higher vote was due once more to its

large following in North Que ensland . Yet even there the A.C.P. 's

·aerber1candidate polled only 15.30% comp ared with 34.2'/o at the 54 1943 Federal election. In the conservative Wide Bay area, the

only other seat contested, the Communist vote was a mere 3.75%,

whi le the Labor vote of 28 .14%, given the relative strengths of

the Parties, was equally poor . 5 5 In this election, Que ensland

displaced Victoria as the mo st conse rvative State in Australia :

it gave the Labor Party its lowest vote - 4� .D5%�&<·huge 6.67'/o 56 below the National average . Queensland was to continue to

give Labor markedly lowe r votes than other States in the two

7 federal elections which followed. 5

In the aftermath of the elections , the Communi st Party

became invo lved in a more popular issue , albeit one which revealed

their 'lawlessness'. Faced with Brisbane 's acute housing shortage

the Communist Party supported the reoccupation of unused military 56 barracks by families in need. Under the leadership of

Communi st , Ron Haas , families moved into barracks at Ek.ibin,

Yeronga, Holland Park , Victoria Park and the Old Town Hal l

(now the Conservatorium of Husic ). Similar but much smaller

'squatting ' occurred in Townsville, as we ll as in the Southern capitals. The major 'squatting ' took place at Victoria Park , still partly occupied by the R.A.A.F. Here violence in the initial occupation was largely avoided, as the six bayonet-carrying guards · limited their attempts to repulse the invaders to the use of their . 58 rifle butts. As Town Clerk, �l aughter, took out an injunction against the Old Town Hal l 'squatters;' The Courier-�� i l's . cartoonist, Jack Lusby , depicted "Comrade Haas" standing on an

Aus tralian flag, defiantly running up a hamme r and sickle banner

59 over the Victoria Park 'squatters ' camp. On 31 January , 1947

The Courier-l1ail editorialized that the :

Red agitators now feel they have the right to go in anywhere and dare authority to put them out. 60 This nonsense must be ended before worse happens .

The paper concluded by call ing for the Federal Government to intervene as it was be ing "outwitted by Communists exploiting 61 the 'popular ' line 11 • The Courier-Mail correctly admitted, however, the issue was a popular one . Labor N.L.A's like Tom

��nn gave 'squatters ' support in Par liament and eventually the State Governme nt took over part of Victoria and Ho l land

Parks, turning on gas and power, collecting rents and officially

. C' 62 �n• vo 1 v�ng. th e I"�ous �n. g �omm1ss�on.'

Ye t, such an isolated :flOpular camp aign waged by the A.C.P. did little to revive its electoral fortune s. At the 3 :Hay, 1947

State Elections , the A.C.P. conte sted the Northern electorate s:'6f

Bowen, Herbert, Kennedy and the Tablelands, as we ll as the

Brisbane working class seat of Baroona. In all these seats with the notable exception of Paterson in Bowen - the A.C.P. received only half or less of its previous 1944 vote 1 a;ve ragin.g 7 5 betwe en 10% and 20% of the val id vote .63 Due to a combination

of factors discussed later, Pate rson reta.ined his Bowen seat,

losing only 6)b from hi s 44.41 7� vote in 1944. 65 In Baroona , the we ll known Communi st barriste r Hax Ju lius recorded the lowest

A.C .P. vote , 4.28%. 66 The falls in the Labor Party vote in

No rth Queensland indicated that past support of the farmers and

small businessmen for Communi st and Labor alike , was now being

7 given to the Country Party . 6

From mid-1 947 the Communi st Party became engaged in the

promotion of a number of international issues. Demonstrations

in solidarity with Indonesian independenc e were organized as the

Nationalists escalated the ir efforts . Le aflets were handed out

to Br isbane city-shoppe rs, an ac tion which me re ly encouraged the

Telegraph to remark with relish, "Host people ... (�fter receivin�

the Communi st lea.flet •••crum pled the leaflets and threw them into

7 the gutter. 11 0 The issue provoked little popular interest

other than from 'patriotic ' and conservative groups like the R.S.L.

who recollected for the Qu,e ensland Diggel:'.' s readers the Indo-

ne sian nationalist "collaboration with the Japs during World

71 War II ," whi le cartooni sts depicte'dTojo and Suk arno shaking hands .

Following Queensland A.C.P. Party Secretary , Jack Henry 's

vi sit to the British Empire Communi st Party Conference in Nay

1947 where the Briti sh Communi st Party leader, Po llitt, informed

Henry of the Briti sh working classes' urgent ne ed for food, the

72 A.C.J?. in Brisbane took part in a 'Bundles for Britain' Campai gn.

Ye t in so doing they were accused by The Sunday-Mail on one side

"of temporarily befriend�'-ng _ Britain •••• �nd s� helping in the

7 attack on the United States", 3 and by The Worker on the other

of "a Communist Party stunt to cash in on patriotic humanitarian 74 sympathy11 while the A.C.P. was in reality 11anglophobic . 11

In October 1947 , the No scov-c ontrolled Communist Information 58

Bure au was formed to replace the defunct Communi st International .

From October onwards the Au stralian Party followed the Cominform's

'international line, ' which explained that the world consisted

of two blocs .- the peace-loving anti-imperialist bloc led by the

Soviet Union, and the imperialist, colonialist wa�l ike bloc led

by the United State s. The former could keep the latter in check

only by forcing bans on atomic weapons and war preparations

and by achieving the withdrawal of troops enforcing colonial

repression. It was also explained that while the \'lest was on the

verge of economic collapse, vi olent revolutions of the Bolshevic

type were not the only path to socialism. The example of Eastern

Europe 's broadly based 'Peoples Fronts,' composed of Communists,

Socialists, radical intellectuals and progressive middle class

elements, was seen as a solution to be emulated in the We st.

Consequently the A.C.P. sponsored a series of specialist organ-

izations (ove r the next two years) to recruit these more diverse

elements. Prominant amongst the se were the Australian Pe ace

Council, (A.P.C.), the Australian Student Labor Federation (A.S.L.F.),

the New Housewive s' Association (N.H.A) , and the Au stralia-

Rus sia Society. Of these , the mo st important and successful was

the Au stralian Peace Council which "became a genuine mass movement"

. . 75 �n. w:h' 10 h var1ous Ch r1s. t• l.an- d enom1na. t. 1ons were a l so promn�n t ,

On 2 February 1948, a four month old demand for improved

marginal rates for semi-skilled workers by Amalgamated Engineering

Union members at the Ipswich railway workshop led to a walkout

of 3,000 men. By March thi s st�ppage had escalated to a point

where more than 20,000 raiLwaymen, miners, tra.mwaymen and wharfies

were on strike . Premier Hanlon declared yet another State of

Emergency. The then A.R.U. State leade�, Frank Nolan has since

claimed that only "a small minority on the Di sputes Committee � Ghich organized the stri were members of the Communist Party , 59

the maj ority we re A.L.P. me mbers ," 76 but in fact the day to day organi zation of the strike was largely performed by its

Communi st Se cretary , Alex Ha.cDonald, in consultation with other

leading Communi sts , including Jack Henry , Doug . Oliv�, and Ted Rowe

(who travelled from the Sydney A.C.P. to he lp direct the strike ).

The popular press were not slow in pointing out this "gathering

of top Reds �" 77

The Ro ckhampt on Bu lletin, adding a swipe at Chifley, noted, only

two days after the strike started:

Hanlon as always hasn 't received a scintilla of support

from Chifley. Chifley - 'Chiff ' to his press boy

flatterers - 'won't crucify the workers ' which freely translated means the Comrns have got him where they want him - scared stiff . 78

Jack Deveraux , A.L.P. leader of the Amal gamated Engineering Union denounced The Courier-f.1ai l over its claims of a 'Red plot; '79but

these complaints me rely fell on deaf ears as the Bri sbane paper drew dramatic editorial parallels be tw·e en the recent Czechoslovak

coup and the Queensland strike : "This is a tale of two cities

80 Br1s . b ane an d prague •••" Archbishop Duhi g also spoke out

against the str ike and declared Sunday, 29 February, a 'Day of

81 Prayer for Industrial Pe ace . 1

The Prernier1 however, relied on the more earthly powers of

the State of Emergency and the Industrial Law Ame ndment {anti- picketing ) Ac t introduced on 9 Narch. Eight days earlier, Hanlon,

on a twenty-eight radio station link. , struck. up the the me of the

importation of Communi st leadership , stating that the strike had

"all the elements of a civil war. .. Since the dis.pute began, the

82 high command of the Communi st Par ty has invaded Que ens land."

Views such as Hanlon's we re encouraged by reports like The Sunday-

�� s story, tha.t one of the strike 's leaders, Doug Oli� , had

"arr ived from hi s Conm;uni st l'arty haunts in Sydney, 11 whe n in 8 fact Oliv�e hacl never left Brisbane . 3 1'he Courier-1-iail r, roduced 60.,

an unendin::; seriHs of hum.:w dra,ma stories concerning co1mtry

On St . lo atricks Da.y 17 1·1arch, at [\. time ulwn union strike support vas declining, a number of militant str ikers held a march to go from the Trc;,de s Hall to Pe,r lie�ment . The march was quickly broken up by police, dur ing whi ch Fr ed raterson li.L.A. and anothe r man w·e re beaten up , in an. unprovoked attacl-:. by plain- clothes detectives. \'l hile Pater son 1-ras still in ho s:pita,l with concussion and a lac erated scalp , The Courier-f.-fail editorialized under the headline 11Asked For Itl' , : Communist d

Leaders Jnnd a Hartyr •••One gets the impre ssion the Reds ifere 86 sorry l'e"terson ivasn' t dead". Yet, there was some increase , though only temporary, in public: sympathy for the strike , evidenced by the 81000 strong solidarity demonstration held two days later .

The strike generated hec..ted de bate throught society .

On Queensland 's University Campus , Vi ce-Chancellor J.D. Story, banned a Radical Club ta.lk on the str ike by Communi st liai lvay Un ion 87 leader Hick O'Brien, and Disputes Secretary Alex !

Communist barrister Ivfax Jul ius did hov1ever, eventually speak ag::dnsi the ban on the second i·reek of i'Iar ch, On 22 A11 r il, during a Radical

Club Jmblic me eting on the strike , a me dical student 2eter Ro1.dand , rose and proposed a motion for the deportation of all Communi sts.

This was later reported by The Courier-:Hail {who , ac cording to

Semper J?loreat, had been ti:pped off to send a photogra:r_>her) as having been C£l.rried by a maj ority vote . 'fhe student ne wspaper later claimed th:-:_t its • letter to The Courier-H.ail on the subject went unreported. Jim Pomeroy, ivho stated in Semper Floreat theJt the rowdy law and medical stucients "were not fit to lick the boots of i'Ii cll:. O'Brienu a, fter1vards f'orced to 61

retrac t this statement following threats of a defamati on

90 suit .

For the R.S.L. the lesson of the Rail Strike was the same

as the one that 'The Novement ' took from the 1 946 Meat Strike .

As the Qu e ensland Digger told its readers in Apri l:

Sinc e it bec ame obvious that many of our unions had through the apathy of members been allowed to fall into the direction of the Communi stsp the League has stressed upon its members the ne cessity of taking an active interest and participation in the affairs of the ir respec tive unions . 91 It went on to congratulate nThe Digger'· Premier [fianlon w� was 2 always proud to say he stood for law and oi'der11 9 and to print

A.W.U. President e.G. Fal lon's condemnation of the strike . 93

From the strike 's onset the militants fully be l ieved , acc ord-

ing to Dick Shearman , "that if the economic demands were won, both the arbitration system and the Labor Gove rnment would be discredited

in the process. " 94 In fact the opposite occurred when Hanlon

:finally agreed to accept a :flow-on of marginal increases to semi and unski lled me n without resort to arbitration. The final victory of the strike had only occurred because of the she er dete rmination of the Communi st leadership to "hang on and hang on and hang on" at a time "when the workers had tired of the strike ." 9 5

This in turn :

led to a fair amount of pes s1m1 sm amongst the workers who had been involved. For many years after, railway­ men just didn't want to get involve d in struggl es of that type again . 96

In fac t the Railways 1-Iini ster, Duggan, was more accurate when he explained:

The longer the strike continued the more mile�fte could be gai ned by the Groups for developing anti-Communi st feeling in the communi ty . 97

Furthermore the dislocation and suffering, either real or imagined ; left unpleasant memories in the minds of many Queens landers .

Nany country towns "we re short of supplie s and couldn' t ge t their produce away . In towns like Bowen produce just rotted in the 62

8 stree ts ." 9 Incidents like the di sappearance of Sydney

Communi st organizer Ted Rowe whe n summoned to appe ar in Court

stuck in the minds of some as an example of the refusal of 99 Communi sts to "take punishment like a man. "

Be cause the strike ended in a te chnical victory, wo rke r

re sentment against it was undere stimated by the Communi st Party .

The false sense of optimism was further accentuated on 1 September

100 whe n Hanlon repealed the Industrial Law Amendment Act. Thu s

the 1948 strike was interpreted by the A. C.P. as showing:

that workers could successful ly take on rea tionary 1 a 1 governments and anti- strike laws and win:

In the aftermath of the strike , the A.C.P. was challenged

to debate the Queensland People 's Party (forerunner of the Liberal

Party) . The Communi st Party sent a ful l time member of State

Executive , Gi lbert Burns , on the evening of 15 September.

In reply to a que stion as to where his sympathies would lie in

a war between Russia and the We st, Burns answered, "We would 102 oppose that war ; we would fight on the side of the Soviet Union. "

For this statement Burns was prosecuted for sedition unde r Section

24D of the Commonwe alth Crime s Act and was sentenced to six

months jail , the Chief Stipendary Hagi strate f.lr . S. \H lson 103 commenting that he did uot fe el inclined to im1)ose me rely a fine .

'l' his was not the first such attack on the A.C.P. by the Federal

Labor Govern ,ment. • Lance Sharkey had been sentenced to three years hard labour for a milder , though similar statement, the previous month. In June 1947 in response to the Communist-led

unions ' threat to black ban the building of the lfoomera Research

Establishme nt , the Chifley Government passed the Approved Defence

Projects Ac t wh ich could impo se penalties of up to £5 ,000 fine

or twe lve months imprisonment for "any person who by speech or

. 104 wr iting ••• hinders any ap2rove d d fe ence proJeCt • 11 Clearly 63 the sedition. trial s were 1 as many academics and lawyers conc luded , part of a camp aign to harass the Communi st Party . An Indu strial

Group court Advo cate for many ye ars, J.H. \fo otten tacitly am;eed

with the vi ew by stating that the Chif'ley Govern!llent had "merely •••

sought political advantage ;· " 105 by the prosecutions .

Although the Communist Party disassociated itself from Burn's vi ew, with R. Dixon declaring , "The Au stralian Communist Party will

in all circumstances defend the independence of Au stral ia, " thi s

last statement received little publicity.106 Whi le groups like the Que ensland branomf the R.S.L. app lauded Burn 's imprisonme nt , 107

and The Courier-Nai l condemned the se ''potential fifth columni sts" 108 as exercising an "evi l influence" on societ;}) few conc erned the m-

se lve s with the que stion of civi l liberties invo lved; Burns ' defenders in Queensland were almost exclusively Communi st ins2ired,

like the 'Free Sharkey and Burns Committee' formed in Brisbane and To��svi lle , and the various Cornmuni st-led Trade and Labour

Counc ils which lent their support. 1 09

In September 1948 , the viewpoint that the A.C.P. was a Fifth

Column or ap ologi st for the Soviet Uni on was further reinforced by the demonstrations it organized against Wi lliam Wel lman 's

(artistically dismissed ) film 11The Iron Curtain. u Be fore the film was screened at the ."Regentn in Brisbane and at Townsville 's "Royal tt,

the Communi st Party and local Trade s and Labour Counc ils protested to both the distributors and the pre ss.110 .U though The Courier-

Jviail reported that at the demonstration outside Brisbane 's "Regent 111 Theatre11 the re were no arrests - only name s being taken by police,"

the Que ensland Guardian alleged police had allowed individual

theatregoers from the packed house to attack and mo lest the demo-

strators . 112 Not surprisingly , The Courier-Hai l1s film critic even found artistic me rit in t, he production, conc luding in his

review: Propaganda against a diseased ideology is dr a1fll home forc ibly by the camera. Fac t not fiction . 113 64

The A. C.f'. 1mlicy of industrial militancy in 1 948 sharp ened the following year as it began a determined campaigu against rising prices. Cal ling fpr both a th irty hour week Emd an end to 'the robbery of' the pe ople by the rich, ' it urged Communi st­ led unions , which had l' reviously rai d dues to and be en affiliated with the Labor Party , to end this re lationship .1 14 In early 1949 , the se unions conduc ted a series of sto:ppage s in su;.rport of the thirty hour we ek , wh ich did little to help the already severely strained relations between the Chifley Gove rnment and the A.C.P.

Thi s antago nism was greatly exacerbated some months later whe n the Communist-led Coal Hi ner 's union, having grown increasing- ly impatient wi th the inefficient mining methods employed by the collieries as we ll as the ir own wage s and conditions 1 called out its men in a nat ionwide strike on 29 June . In Queensland , the

State Cabinet, two days later, imposed cooking , lighting and heating re strictions resulting in a 50% State-wide power cut .

Thousands of employees we re stood down . Other rr.i litant bodie s like the Au stralian Rai lway's Uni on acted in solidarity in this case , refusing to haul coal from the mines. On 24 July Premier

Hanlon made another State-wide radio broadcast to attack the

Communi st union leadership and to appeal fruitlessly for the men to return to work .

Although the stoppage was supported and enc ouraged by the

Communi st Party, the variety of factors in the dispute prevented it be ing in any way the 'Red Plot' that it was dubbed by the press - atte sted to by the normally strongly anti-Commu nist organ of the A.W.U. , The Worker .1 16 Chifley, however, like the vopular press, was content to pre sent the str ike simply as such a

Communi st plot, placing large adve rtisement in all State newspapers , inc luding The Courier-Nai l, proc laimi ng "How· The l·iine rs Are Hi sled 65 11 By The ir Communi st Leaders;'" 7Chi fley himself was in turn under attack as the Liberal Party advertised in the same paper

uThe Chi fley Government Could Have l-Tevented The Communi st Coal

" 118 Strike ••• The bitterne ss of the mi ners towards the Chifley

Government greatly increased as the National Emergency Ac t, aimed at cutting off the union's finances essential for the

strike!s continuation, was followed by the sending of troops to

119 the mines . In such an�tmo sphere , the A.C.P. 's Queensland

Branch, in anti cipation of either polic e raids or suppre ssion

of the ir Party , removed files and rec ords from the ir Heindorff

House , Queen Street, he adquarters . The Courier-Mai l shared

thi s seige mentality7 edi torializing, 11l-le will lose them Le.

our freedoms all if •••we allow a fifth column to overthrow

120 our democracy. "

Other groups were equally concerned about the Communi sts .

As the strike was drawing to an ignominious end, the Que ensland

Presbyter ian Church established a comm ittee to uinve sti gate all 121 @:Spects of Communi sm, tt whi le State R.S.L. Pre sident, Raymond

Hu ish, comp lained that the Broadcasting Act was muzzling R.S.L.

efforts to combat Communism by stopping its prepared radi o

122 pr ogramme s. The film of Howard Spring • s novel Fame Is The Spur

wh ich told of a Labor l•i.P. who betrayed his striking vTe lsh mining

constituency, presented theatregoers with sufficiently pertinent

h and embarrassing parallels fo� �ovie to be wi thdrawn from 123 cJ.. rcu 1 a t•1.on.

As the full wrath of the Governme� and the pre ss turned on

the strikers , the unioni sts faltered, and although the A. C.P.

voted for its continuance , the strike collapsed on 10 August,

w-ithout the uni on 's demands having been me t. While the se lf-

inflicted suffering borne by the strike rs was great , as in the

case of the Neat Strike , the inconvenience experienced by the 66 general public was not accepted as gracefully. Coming right after the Queensland rail strike , it promoted the increas ingly popular view that the se strikes we re mere ly cynical attempts to gain power for an internationally expansive world

Communist move me nt . The Federal Labor Par ty' s angry response to the strike , equally gua:Danteed the emni ty of the .A.C.:P., a hatred wh ich was not to be resolved until after Labor 's 949 1 1 24 electoral defeat .

Not all clergymen) we re anti-Communist ho;-reve r. Responding to the Au stralian industrial situati on and the increasingly bellicose statements of Western leaders , the Reverend F.J. Hartley, of the Australian Counc il of Churche s condemned the "false slogan

of 'Blame the Communi sts • a condition of hys te ria •••be ing created

1 5 as part of the war drive ." 2 This wa s said at the October

2ue ensland Pe ace Conference , a conference attended by a number of prominent cle rgyme n. In Townsville the Au stralian Pe ace

Council directed its efforts to di stributing leaflets ;-rhi le a float depicting the evils of war toured the city. Howeve r the

Peace Council , although attracting individual clerieal support and sympathy from people totally removed from the Communist Party like Queensland 's Director General of Education, Hr . L.D. Is dwards , did no t generate widespread enthusiasm at a time wh en Communi sm,

7 internati onal ly, appeared at its mo st expans ive . 1 2

In fact it was the very success of the Chi nese Revolution, the strength of the anti -colonialist movements , and the Eastern

European situati on that convinced the Communi st Party that capitalism's economic collapse was just around the corner as the

Party approached the Decembe r Federal elections . The A.C.?. , partly in re s_Donse to its earlier experiences lli th the Pederal

Labor Party , and part:Ly as a re sult of the ne ed t, o build a strong and independent party in ca_pita.lism's eleventh hour , rej ected. 67 any com}_1romise with Labor . As Tribune declared three days before the election, " A sober analysis of the Labor ancl

'Liberal ' -Country Party policies shows only differences of 128 d egree. 11 Surprisingly, Communist leaders and publications paid almost no attention to Henzies pre-e lection promise to ban the Communi st Party. But it

On the day after the election, Jim He nderson 'disa,;_'peared 1 to he lp form the Queensland section of a national underground or­

. . 129· gan1zat 1011.

Communi sm Attacked

Throughout the pos.t-war period , one of the A.C.T'. 's mo st persistent critics was the Returned Servicemen's Lea�ue . .As a patriotic defender of law and order, the Que ensland State

Council of the R.S.L. identified with its friend and member, the "Digger Premier" Ned Hanlon. From the .Heat Strike onwards, the League interested itself in uni on affairs urging members to 1 participate in their industrial organizations, 30and at the

April 1947 State Conference appointed a committee to investigate 131 industrial unre st. The ultra-p atriotism of men in uni form, however, was not new. Sporadic incidents , such as the case

of Army office�s spontaneously demonstrating because a new

Commonwea.l th building in Townsville lacked a flag pole, had 132 occurred throughout the '\var .

The trade union militancy of the A.C.P., combined with the fear generated by the Cold War , provided -: :1. the main impetus for the Queensland 's R.S.L. branches concern with

Communism. Hence thi s coneern was expressed most passionately following the mas sive industrial disputes of 1948 and 1949 .

In the wake of' the Rail Strike, there was a flourish of calls for na.tiona.l action against Communi sm. In early Hay, Fred 68

Paterson f.I. L.A. had be en charged by the State Counc il of the

That you have be en guilty of bad citizenship in that you, during a period of industrial uphe aval which prevailed in Que ensland during February and Harch 1948 , did encourage orposition to the duly constituted author­

ity and during the State of Eme rgency •••act ively participated in demonstrations whi ch tended to embarrass the GoYernme nt . 1 33

Paterson refused to cooperate in the hearing and eventual ly the

1 4 Collinsville Sub-branch refused to expel him. 3 But at the annual Northe rn District Conference in Apri l a mo tion wa s passed calling for "a Royal Commi ssion to investigate un-Australi�

1 activities o:f the Communi sts within the Commonwealth. " 3 5 An

Ipswi ch Sub-branch made a simi lar call the following month . 1 3 6

The Central Di strict Conference , avoiding such a time -eonsuming activity, simply called for the Federal Gove rnment to outlaw the Corrununi st Party . 1 3 7 Responding to these calls, in June the

State Con£e rence of the R.S.L. put forward a five point plan to deal with Communi sm, including banning the A.C.P. , di smissal of all Communist Public Servants, prevention of Communi sts from holding trade union positions and the deportation of all fore ign­

8 born Communi sts . 1 3 The Conference also noted with suspicion 1 9 3 that 'White Au stralia's' greate st opponent was the A.C.P.

As no Government response was forthcoming, ti1e Federal

Executive altered its constitution in June 1948 to read: "No

Communist shall be permitted to become or remain a me mbe r of

4 the R.S.L." 1 0 To ensure that thi s was enforced , the Constit- uti on n()W directed.:

Al l Di stricts and Sub-branche s must

(1 ) Wr ite to all Communi sts •••re que sting their

res ignation and return of the ir Le ague badge ••• (2) Re que st any member suspected ••• to take the declaration of Loyalty, as follows 11 I hereby affirm

••• my loyalty to Austral ia, the King and the Eml>ire. " 141 It then on to stipula,te all Sub-branche s to went that had 69

reply to State Council c o ce i n whe the r this had been effe cted, rn indicating all nname s andg wh at action had been taken..

Comr�unist 8,000 As ro inted out earlier, over Co mu s s had served in m n i t the armed forces du i n the war and large numbers of ·the se r we re members , manyg being Sub-branch office bearers.

In somR.Se Sub-bran.L. ches, therefore , me mbers resp

tho se of Collinsville when Pater so n ' e x2ul siQn was sought . s Inde.ed Col linsville Sub-branch in June 1948 provoked further official wrath by awarding a Gold Life Hembership for service

�vo rk to member, Claxke . Redland s the Sub-branch R. At A.C.P. refused to expel Tobruk Bill Yarrow Ithaca,

Kurilpa and Wynnum Sub-bra'Ranchet' s rejected anyD.C such.M. action unless a plebisci-te was held, wh ile Ipswich, }fareeba and Tully Sub­

142 branches carried re solutions against the ban. The State

Council overrode mo st of these Sub-branch rebellions such as the case of Bill Yarrow. Most Sub-branches, however, gl adly complied with the Federal Council directive . In Gordonvale

Grammie was expe lled, while Tom Gorrage in Petrie ,

W.G.J.W. Peterson in MUdgunab& .!- Springbrook and many others were 143 also removed. The Que ensland Digger failed to print any details of opposition to �the ban other than editorializing :

Commos . know as well as Le ague members wh at led to the banning of the ir ilk from our Organization. It was the wishes of Sub-branches, expressed by their districts . and not [inereliJthe will of one or two 'big bad boys 1 1 44 The Que ensland R.S.L. State Council's anti- Co ism more mmun was pronounced than in other states, and even if it did not represent the views of all of its members, it did represent the maj ority viewpoint . This anti-Communist sentiment was amply demonstrated 0 7 at the De cember 1948 33rd Federal Conference of the League

wh en Queensland delegate s sponsored four of the seven re sol­

5 utions dealing with Communi sm. 14

R.S.L. Sub-branche s be came increasingly disquieted again

in 1949 with the continual militancy of the trade union movement

and the general sharpening of international tension. The State

Council proposed that R.S.L. Sub-branche s set aside the period

from 4 Augus t until 3 September 1949 as a month for anti-

Communi st activity. The Southport Sub-branch immediately responded

by organizing a planning committee , and prepared a-list of

ex-servicemen\·. who could act as special constable s 11in the event

. 1 46 o f a C ommunJ.. s t . r1.s1.n. g . 11 Bundaberg trade unions were

circularized by the local R.S.L. Sub-branch to participate , but,

vh ile some agreed, it was notable that mo st declined. The

.Au stralian Rai lways Uni on replied conde mning fJaotiD:ns . such as

your letter indicate s" and sugge sted "as a. maj ority of your

members are working people your time could be we ll spent assisting

the A.C.T.U. and other workers ' organizations on a £1 0 a week

basic wage claim. " 147 Although only relatively few Northern

Sub-branche s observed anti-Communi st month,at .Ayr , Inni sfail

and at branche s further south and west, such campaigns were

conducted with much enthusiaism. The Que ensland Digger reported

in agitated tones that :

Four years after the cessation of hostilities the Kingaroy �Marambi Sub branch of the R.S.L. and its 200 members are gearing themselve s up for ano ther war . This time a life and death struggle with Communism. 1 48

At the Rockhampton ant·i:fJommunist rally , gue st speaker •communist expert ', E. Hi skins spoke , using racist overtones , de signed to strike a re sponsive chord amongst his whi te audience . He warned of the real meaning of A.C.P. support for Indone sian �nationalism: 71

"�fillions of Communists in Indonesia were re� and willing to 149 overrun the empty holdings of a. we stern civilization." In ma� country centres like Gladstone , Stanthorpe and Rockha.mpton the local R. S.L. Executive was joined on the public platform by 150 the local Mayor and Catholic Priest. In the Brisbane City

Hall meeting, the audience of 2,500 were addressed by a similar as sortment of speakers including E. Hiskins who again to ld his audience this time : "The Au stralian Communist is a fifth colum- nist in our midst waiting for the time Russia wi ll attack us, 15' probably through Soviet armed Asiatics."

In the other, but much smaller, ex-servicemen's organization,

The Australian Legion of Ex-servicemen and Women, the dispute .' in the Queensland Branch between Communi sts and 'patriots ' was largely resolved in the Communists 1 favour by 1946 . At that year's Federal Conference it was decided despite the protest of

Que ensland 's delegation (eight of whose twelve man State 152 Executive had been described as Communists or sympathiz.e rs" ) that while the Legion allowed Communist membership, Communi sts could not hold office . The Queens land Branch ignored this ruling and at a Brisbane meeting shortly afterwards called on the

Federal body: "to declare that no test, either political or religious be applied to either membership or office within the 153 League ." As late as December 1949, when the State Conference reaffirmed this policy by a vote of 75 - 5, the Federal body, 154 though unhappy about its continuance, resigned themselves to it.

Of all the Communist Party 's ma� enemies, the most import- 155 ant and unrelenting one was the Catholic Church. From the pulpit, from its publioations from Freedom (later Newsweekly) to the

Catholic Leader on sale at church doors, and above all, from its most popular Archbishop, Dr . Duhig, came the view that the socialization of the means of production, distribution and 72

11 • . . . 11 1 56 exch ange 11as lrreconcJ.• 1�: :r, 'o l e 1<�"1th · . C'nr 1s. t ·la . n t e':tclnng •

The Archbishop 's every denunciation '''as entlms iastict�lly printed by a receptive pr ess .1 57 Occasional ly, the se 1ve re Emgrnented by vi siting Catho lic ant i-Communi st discii:le s, like the Kidely popular l!..merican Bishop , Fulton Sheen, who told a crowded Brisbane

City Hall me eting in .fvfay 1 948 , that he had evidenc-2 that , "Nevr

orders from Mo scoi·r had been sent to the ComJ1ru.ni st Party of

1 Au stralia in the l<�st thirty days 11 • 58 "I do no t", he conc luded,

· t1 1 9 on a h uman no t e, "h a t e C ommun1s' t s, 'ou t I rev1'l e C ommun1sm • 5

The provocative style of the Leader, the le ading Catholic

publication in Que ens land, he lped keep emotions high . For instance,

its front page lead stories in 1 948 to ld readers : 11Reds Lo ot

Chinese :t1i ssion.s 11 , 1 60 "Rights of Communi ty Ignored by \iorkers

1 61 Time to Ab andon High Handed Individualism" , "Jai ling of Englart,

1 Ju lius and He aly Ju stified11, 62 "Pope .Condemns Po litical Strikes11�63

1 4 "Re cord Cro''"d Hears :t�eds Trounc ed1 1 • 6 The A. C .P. had fe1v

opportunities to reply against such onslaughts. The pamphlets the

1 A.C.P. issued, Catholics and Communi sm, 65 (which game biographies

1 66 of prominent Catholic Communists ) i.�nd Catholic Action At \� ork,

reached as few�non-Communi st eyes as did its arguments that

Catholicism' s oppo sition to Socialism was based on its vast

. . 1 7 propert y owuershlp . 6 Catholic members within The Novement devoted their time to

1 distr ibuting Newsweekly 68 and exposing Communi sts in various

organiza-tions like the Pe ac e Council ; 1 69 but The l'•:lovement pr e-

dominantly 1vo rked in the trade union movement. In this 'lm rk , lay

1 Catholics had the official blessing of the Church. 70

The Indus trial Groups were not officially formed under the

aegi s of the State A. L.P. until the February 1 947 Labor-in-Po litics

Conve ntion at Townsvil1e . Ye t, unoficially, as part of

The l'Iovement , they b(-:gan to invo lve themselves in union activities

from the Strike ommrds . The Ho vement 's 73

Industrial Groups ' members were largely active in the coastal centres of Townsville, Gladstone , Rockhampton and Brisbane , and like the Communist Party, its membership was young , energetic

1 71 and enthusiastic. In the ir work , they received the encourage­

1 72 ment of anti-Communist unions like the A.w.u. and the

1 73 State Service Union. At the Townsville Convention both �tt .

Walsh l'l .L.A. (undoubtedly the mo st bitter anti-Communi st in

State Parliament ) and Hr. Bro snan �,Electrical Trade s Union) spoke

of the necessity for the A. L.P. to organize , propagandize and

seek full time positions within the trade union movement as did

the A.C.P. resulting in the formation of a three man Industrial

1 7 4 Group Committee. By 1948, under the three man leadership of

Bukowski (A.W.U. ) , Rasey (Transport Workers Union} and Brosnan

(E.T.U. ) the Industrial Groups were active in the meatworkers' , wharfies1, vehicle builders ', transport worker��, storemen and packers ', railwaymens 1, ironworke rs' and clerks ' unions in which

1 75 they won many pos1. t 1o· ns . The Groups were par t.1cu 1 ar 1y success- ful in Rock.hampton where by 1948 they dominated the Trades and

Labour Council and almost succeeded in banning Communi sts from 1 76 T.L.C. meetings . The internecine va.rt'a.r.thrithin the trade

union movement was accompanied by wide scale 1red baiting, ' much

of which was duly published in the press. Each Group victory

over the Communists was enthusiastically reported in the press:

for instance The Courier-Mail gave front page coverage to the defe at of Communist Ted Engla.rt from the not very important post

as delegate of the Brisbane Waterside Workers Federation Branch 178 under the headline - " Reds Lose Ballot. Englart Out As Delegate ".

The conflict between Groups and Communi sts was not free from victimization. Bill Thornton,himself a prominent Queensland

• Gr ouper, remembered: 74

I was once in the offic� of an A.W.U. member now dead who was instrumental in having a Com. dismissed from his job and I happened to be there at the time he took a 'phone message and when I said to hi m, "That 1 s a bit rough . lihat about his wife a,nd kids? They 've got to eat. He replied Why? To breed more of the bastards?" 179

As the Industrial Groups gained strength - so their confidence rose, such that they even attacked non-Communist 'Left ' A.L.P. 180 unions , actions which caused much resentment. Thornton 1 ' explained the Grouper mode of identitying such 'fellow travellers ':

"We had a saying. Walks like a duck� Quacks like a duck. Must be 181 a duck!" That many active in the Groups were not and never 182 had been A.L.P. members or supporters exacerbated this situation.

Much of the hostiiity was to find an outlet a.t 1he February 1950

Labor-in-Politics Convention. As Frank Waters (Postal Workers

Union and a former Labor 'H.L.A. ) concluded at the Convention

"The Courier-Mail gives good support to the Industrial Groups. 183 When a paper starts to speak we ll of me , I start to w.orry •••11

If these new anti-Communist forces within the trade union movement made a striking impression, the traditional anti-

Communist unions, the A.W.U. and more recently the State Service

Union similarly did not allow their efforts to slacken. Like the

Group, these unions, particularly the A.W.U. , obtained wide

coverage in the popular press -as in 1948 whe�,during the Rail

Strike, State A.W.U. President C.G. Fallon told The Courier-Mail

that the A.C.P. should be banned. This, he explained, could be done in one of two ways. Either a referendum could be conducted,

or the Government could act immediately and fight an election on 1 84 the issue later. The Courier-Mail was not, however, as qui ck to print Fallon' s attack on Menzies and Fadden's similar call the following week, as reported in The Worker. Here Fallon argued that Menzies and Fadden were "trying to cash in ·•• on the overseas situation �he Czecholovak �ou� and ••• the increasing 75 185 upsurge against Communism by the working class ••• unlike the A. \f.U. which had been the one body in Australia to consi stantly fight the A.C.P•• Both the organ of the A.W.u. ,

The Worker, and of the State Service Union, The State Service, were used as useful anti-Communist propaganda vehi cles. While both printed in full anti-Communist speeches made in State and 186 Federal Parliament by Labor men, The \�orker provided an endless series of stori es on the misery of the workers lot

187 'behi nd the Iron Curtain� • The State Service kept a more parochial eye on the issue even philosophically suggesting that

188 "Communism is really a cri me problem."

As the State Labor Parliamentary Party increasingly became the local focus for both A.C.P. hostility to Federal Labor economic poli cies and political reformism, so thi s hosti lity was reci procated by both the State Parliamentary Labor Party and the Party machine proper. The Queensland Central Executive

189 frequently received calls from Branches to ban the A. C.�. and

Hl) sup port for the work of the industrial groups, particularly from country branches who were also active in other antiCommunist activities, was given. At Gladstone and in other country centres, local Labor Branches participated in the R.S.L. 's mo nth of anti-Communist activi ties, while local Labor Councillors in

Gympie and Landsborough refused Eureka Youth League camping permits for its working class holiday camps, because it was lflaimed they were designed to "indoctrinate children with

192 Communism. n

Although the A.W.U. largely maintained its grip on the Q.C.E. throughout the period , Hanlon 1s 1947 Cabinet, with A.W.U. men holding only five of the ten posts, reflected a slight decline the 193 U. in the power of the A. \'{. upon,_.Parli amentary wi ng of the Party.

Hanlon himself, although a Catholic, was not a great su pporter of the Industrial Groups, and provoked the anger of both Fallon 76 and the Groups when he repealed the Industrial Law Amendment

!£! in 1948 fol lowing the conclusion of the Rai l Strike .

l?al lon claimed that Hanl on 1s action was "virtually wh ite- 194 washing Communi st lawb reakers.11 Such public di fferences

of opinion however, were infrequent ,and the overall pro-

Industrial Group stanc e of the 1950 Labor-in-Po litics

Convention in Toowoomba was matched in Par liament by outspoken

1 95 anti-Communi sts such as Walsh, Power, Rasey and others. This

feeling in State Parliament was reflected in the concern of the

State Education Hini ster (l'ir . Bruce ) when he suggested in

October 1948 :

Deprecating State School p�ent committees •••was dangerous to our political and social we ll being •••• and is Communi sm pure and simple •••the Soviet Union 196 did all it could to separate parents from ehildren.

The Communist Party naturally received no respite from the

State Opposition Coalition either. As well as frequently berating

the Labor Government for no t taking a firm enough line against

the A.C.P. , it too was greatly concerned about the influence

of Communi sm in State Schools. l

Toowoomba) tabled in Parliament a child 's slate1he had confiscated

after a school vi sit upon which were written the words "People 7

in Au s tralia rebel by going on strike ." He then sugge sted

that the Education !t inister should try 11to save the children from 1 97 Red evils." Other phrases on the slate were :

He favoured foreigners to please h�s wi fe. He was expected to pay upke�p of the Royal estate . The Great Counc il paid for the War s. � iC]19 8

By curious logic Chalk warned that "such instruction was degrading ,

and was training the children to be subj ect to socialism and 199 communism in the future.11

Ano ther anti -Cooonuni st group was the Institute of Public

Af fairs. Although it was primarily intere sted in, preserving 77 business from what it perceived as its greatest enemy - a bank nationalizing Labor l'a.rty - thi s did not cause it to hesitate in adopting the cause of labour in one particular respect. Workers were warned "Communi sts lead workers to

200 financ ial and political ruin. " In another series of advertisements in The worker , the I.F.A. claimed that workers could expect A.C.P. attacks on the ir living standards because

"Communists admi t the chief obstacles to their success ••• are workers wi th savings - regular jo bs - [an4J their own 11 201 home s ••• Communi st Party fears of a bourgeois alliance of Labor and Li beral �arties were not allayed by these I.P.A. advertisements - especially whe n thi s group , a front for the

Queensland People 's Party ( the Liberal Party forerunner in

Queens land) advertised: "Unity is strength. As the Labo r

Party has proved so often in its successful fight for better

202 conditions for the worker n .Although the Ins titute published this series of advertisements in pamphl et form and the A. C.P. subsequently produced a reply, it is doubtful if their respective circulations greatly exceeded the number of

203 their own faithful supporte rs.

The Institute of I>u blic Affairs was not the only bu sine s sman' s organization active in the anti-Communist fight ..

In 1948 , as a result of the Rail Strike , the Queensland

Chamber of rfunufacturers established a front organization, the Co-Ordinating Council of Commercial and Citizens

Organizations , who se aim was to "wrest the control of the

204 Trade Unions from the communistic element. n This organization printed pamphlets, offered to post the se direct to employees from name s supplied by employers, and printed pay enve lopes for sale to employers with the following 78 me ssage inscribed:

Communi sm threatens the very life of free trade uni oni sm in Au stralia: (1 ) You only can stop its growth (2) You should attend al l union meetings and insist on being heard . (3) You should insist on a secret bal lot whe n ne cessary. 205 Remember ----Your Interest ---For Au stralia.

Yet another group of businessmen, conc erned at the supposed growth of native Communist power banded together to champion 'traditional Au stralian value s�' Thi s was the

Freedom League, brainchi ld of Brisbane 's Conservative Lord

Hayor Al d. Chandler , and was formed in 1949 as a broadly based citizen's organization designed to combat Communi sm .

A widely advertised City Hall public meeting on 23 August was he ld to launch the organizati on. Among an audience of over 2 ,000 were many Communi sts who had come to heckle .

Thus the meeting, broadcast live over Chandler's radio station

4BH , was continually di srupted by Communi st interj ections .

The official speakers, �.S.L. State President , Raymond Huish,

National Council of Women President , Jl'ir s. G.L. Byth, Angli can

Archdeacon Hardi e and Jvfayor Chandler, whi le hea:rtily

denouncing Communi sm, failed, as its critics pointed out , to

condemn fascism equally. 207 The Worker darkly , and rather

curiously, commented, "Thi s smelled like the work of the

08 Institute of Public Affairs. 11 2

Because the Freedom League was not broadly based and

appeared keener to attack extreme s of the Left rather than

the Ri ght , it failed. Labor Party members had no intention

of joining with political conservative s and so aiding the

latter 's cause . Labor anti-Communi sts believed that such 79

action, unlike the work of the Industrial Groups, had only pe r ipheral effects 1n. any case. 209 Original ly , the City

Hall meeting had advertised both e.G. Fallon and Archbishop

Duhig as speakers, but following Vice Premier Gair 's attack

on the League as "New Guarders" and "vigi lantes", they 21 0 de clined to appear. Nonetheless, The Courier-Nail lent the

Freedom Le ague its support, editorializing :

If you still had aqy doubts about the need for a Freedom League take another look at accounts of the Le ague 's public meeting at the City Hall on Tuesday night. It is not P tY reading and is

strangely un-Australian •••2y f

Lord Nayo r Chandler's call for local government Councils to

form their own Freedom Leagues however� did no t obtain the

expected wide re sponse . Ho st Councils quietly ignored the

appeal . Some like Townsvi lle and Redlands Councils publicly

rejected the call. A Freedom Le ague sponsored meeting in

21 2 . La1 . dley a ttrac t e d on1 y seven peop1 e wh 1. 1 e 1n a numb er o f

to��s which did form such League s, like Dalby and Kaimkillenbun, 21 3 they were little mo re than anti-Communi st debating societies .

The se did, however , provide a focal point around whi ch anti-

Communi st propaganda could be inj ected into local communities.

As we ll as the maj or anti-Communist groups already

mentioned, there was a wide variety of small organizations , to

whom anti-Communism was only one aspect of a deeper concern -

such as rural development, re ligion, anti-Semitism, true

21 4 political conservati sm or Social Credit. Such organizations

and individuals printed and distributed publications ranging

21 from Noel Nyer' s Does Australia Ne ed Socialism 57 to A. W.

No a.ke 's Christianity versus Communism whi ch conc luded in an

, 21 6 attack on the "International Zionist Communi st Conspiracy . ; 80

While such organizations were useful vehicles for promoting anti-Communi st sentiment , clearly they were developed alongside the impact of the popular press.

Nowhere was thi s more apparent than in the State 's leading newspaper , The Courier r�i l. It refused to print A.C.P. advertisements217; when talking of Communi sm or the Conununi st

Party it alway s used lower case c1s and p's, even in election result columns wh ere it listed the political parties as 'Lab. ,

Li b. , C.P. , and com. 21 8; it frequently fat led to print stories on Co!l'.muni st or leftist activities of wh ich it disapproved,

such as the Que ensland Youth Charter Conference21 9 ; it did no t usually print 'Letters to the Editor ' from Communi sts220 ;

it used its cartooni sts continually to vilify the A.C.P. 221

its Indus trial Corre spondent (and Industrial Group membe r)

Bi ll was so consistent ly biased that from 6 the Thieme 1 94

Trade s and Labor Council placed a black ban on him. 222 No

jibe at the Communi st Party or Communi sm was too small to

make . 'ri hen printing the story of the birth of Princess

Elizabeth's baby it remarked that London' s Communi st daily,

The Daily Wo rke r, did not even print details of the birth, 223

whi ch, as Truth noted the following Sunday , was not possible

since the paper had gone to press before the birth was

announced.224 Ne ither did '11he Courier Nai l bother to

camouflage its bias . After a front page lead on the St •

.Patrick 's Day demonstration and the clubbing of Fred Paterson

N.L.A.7 its second lead story was headlined 111'oday ' s � News .

Sydney Anti-Red He eting. 11 225 Its Page 'l' wo features were

regularly anti-Communi st stories, ranging from Cecil Sharpley 's

revelations of A. C.P. union intrigue22� to denunc iations of

I�us sia's foreign policy by Uni ted States government spokesmen . 81

Its sister paper 's (The Sunday Nai l) style was a more sensational orche stration of the same tune , as ty pified in its Au &�st 1948 Page One Lead :

Surprise Di sclosure by C. I.B' s C @'ommuni s� -:t-len Secret Red Gang In The State Servi ce ••• Men and women some of high standing have been shown as ard.ent communi sts or fellow travellers . The ir live s were so rationalised that no one conne cted them with subversive elements until the C-men found them secretly me eting behind closed doors . 227

Although some provinc ial newspapers, like The Advo cate

(Ayr )� carried little political comment other than Country

228 Party branch meeting articles, in the main they were

little different from Bri sbane 's newspapers in the ir anti-

Communi st bias . Communi st complaints made of provincial papers we re similar to tho se made of Bri sbane 1 s papers, namely the refusal of some papers, for instance the

229 Stanthorpe Border Po st, to print letters from Communi sts, the downgrading or non-reportage of Leftist and Communi st

2 0 news , 3 and the eagerness to publish any anti-Communist story,typified in the case of a Dalby He rald feature article on a lvoman member of the Ne w York Soviet Consulate who , it al leged, threw herself from its fourth floor office "to . 2 1 escape Communi sm" . 3 If even the relatively mild Cairns

Po st talked of the "Communi st wreckers in the trade union

2"'2 movement," :> then the attitude of the Rockhampton No rning

Bul letin, which vied with the Toowoomba Chronicle as

Queehsland 's most outspoken critic of Communi sm, was quite understandable whe n, during the 1948 Rail Strike it sugge sted;

It would serve the Chi fley-Camerons right if the old digger Premier invoked Section 119 of the Commonweal th Constitution 'The Commonwealth shal l

protect every State against invas ion •••• He could fairly maintain that Queensland has been invaded by Ho scow agents from the South •••2 33 82

Such complimentary references to l) remier .Hanlon w·ere unusual in the Rockhampton Bul letin, a }�r ch 1949 Editorial being more typical when it complained of Communists in the Public

Service :

The Chi f'ley, the Hanl on and the HcGirr Governments having sold out to the lawless gang at Harx House ••• and with Communi sts occupying high admini strative posts in the Commonwe alth industrial services, another intriguing door is opened by which law can be defeated • ••n 234

Overt 1.tvicCarthyi sm ' and Harassment in Queensland

One of the inevitable results of' such an anti-Communi st atmosphere was the organized di srup tion of Communi st and anti-

Communi st meetings , although the former frequently took on a violent character lacking in the latter. Jim Henderson remembered in various towns throughout the State , particularly

Nackay, Cairns , Rockhampton, l'fareeba and Ayr , thrmdng fruit at Communi st speakers was a common occurrence.235 This physical animosity reached a peak in early 1949 . At a

Clayfield election meeting on 29 }mr ch, the Communist candidate for Lord l•Ia.yor, Hax Julius, .. was confronted with an audience of 200 , predominately ex-servicemen, who pushed,

• hooted, sang 'Rule Brit annia' , 'God Save the King' , and who f threw eggs and tomatoes.23 6 When the ex-servi cemen drove off in half a do zen waiting cars and trucks a J.vir . N. Gilbert warned Jul ius if he "ever returned, the Toombul R.S.L. would organize resistance.11 237 On the previous Friday night,

Communist Ted Crisp's election me eting, outside the City View

Hotel , Spring Hill, was di srupted by tomato throldng Emrnanue l

College University students . Thi s di sruption was later defended in Semper Floreat by an anonymous He di cal III student, 8 3 while a Science III student agreed Communi sts had no right to freedom of speech 11 since they denied others freedom when they went on strike .11 238

On 28 Har ch 1949 in Ro ck.hampton the mo st violent

confrontation of the period occurred w·he n, according to

the following day's Rockhampton Ho rning Bul letin:

About 1,500 people broke through a police cordon last night to attack Communists conduc ting an

open air meeting ••• The crowd punched and kicked the Communists and the police who tried to ho ld

them back ••• The cro\vd counted them out and sang 11There 'll Always be An England.n239

In the melee 'stink bombs ', fruit, including pumpkins (!) 0 were thrown24 leaving the speaker, Doug Olive , with a

black eye and cuts, and two others treated by ambulanc e-

41 me n f or b ru1 . se d r1"b s. 2 Later that night the Communist

Party rooms , where some Communi sts had sought she lter , had

242 the windows and a door smashed. Po lice made no arrests

. 43 1n. th e cour se o f th 1s" even1ng . 2 Again two weeks later in

1-fackay , A.C.P. speaker :Hrs . Gloria Phe lan, at a much smaller

but equally rowdy election meeting , was bombarded with fruit.

Direct attacks on the platform were checked by the presence

of police who stood in front of the speaker.244 In the wake

of these disruptions , the A.C.P. abandoned a planned Mt .

245 Morgan municipal election meeting, and led ��x Ju lius to

issue a statement that ,

If there we re any further attempt to break up our meetings, or attack our speakers, we wi ll defend ourselves vigorously .24 6

f.1ore effective in stemming the physical aspect of

Communist meeting disruptions, however, was Premier Hanlon's

condemnation of rowdyism, and his promise to provide greater

247 police attendance at such meetings. It did not stop the 84 verbal disrup tion of meetings , or the sentiment de scribed by Industrial Grouper, Bill Thornton as : "I had no objections to a bit of life at a meeting, 11 typ ifying the views of many

. 8 an t.1.- c ommun1. s t s. 24 Simi larly there was no end to isolated attacks on Guardian street sellers as , for example , when a

Nrs. Tagg had he r bundle of Guardians taken from her and torn up outside a city hote1 . 249

\•lh ile Mc Carthyi sm in Que ensland never plumbed the depths achieved in the United States, nonethe less the same elements were pre sent . Communists were smeared as ��en Mr . Power?

Labor N.L • for Baroona ,claimed before the 194 State .A. 7

Elections, that during the war whi le the A.C.P. was

clamouring for a Second Front its Party metnbers 11were safe

· « 0 , a t hom e 1.n prot t ec d e c. ccupat' J.on s . 2 5 In f ac t , as uescrl."b e d

earlier, the A. C.P. had an excellent war record. Communi sts were occasionally prosecuted on frivo lous charges as when

barrister Nax ·· Jul ius was taken to court in mid 1946 for

. 51 Jaywa lkl.n' g. 2 Communi sts and groups like the Australian

Peac e Council enc ountered occasional di fficulty in booking

halls for public me etings , particularly with Chandler 's

Brisbane City Council . 252 They also enc ountered censorship

troubles when trying to book advertising time on radio ;

significant in an industry where one comp any frequently owne d

a chain of radio stations . This was the case with Arn algamated

Wireless (Aust. ) Ltd . which controlled a number of North

Que ensland stations and who in mid-1949 refused to honour

long term contracts with the A.C.P.253 Communi sts

occasionally found that the ir Party membership denied them

the right to be members of community groups , such as t1-ro 85

A.C.P. Exe cutive members of the Ashgrove Child Care Centre

who , in October 1948 , '"e re compelled to re s ign by the

54 Centre 's other members . 2

Mo re serious from Communi st's personal viewpoint, was

job di scrimination practised against them. Some could not

5 get jobs25 while others , like Alec 1-l.obertson, the Kemsly

Journalism Scholar ship winner, who was told that if he

wished to remain an employee of The Courier Mai l he would

5 have to resign from the Au stral ian Peace Council, lost them. 2 6

Other employers, like some in the metal trades, al legedly

5 · . 7 k ep t bl ac k 1.1s t s o f c ommun1 s t un1. on1 . s t s. 2 It was also

alleged that the State Teachers Training College practi sed

58 an exc 1 us1on. 1s. t po 1"1cy. 2 Yet while numerous groups cal led

for all Communi sts employed within the State Public Servi ce

to be dismissed, no such po licy was ever implemented.

1\fe verthe less, the State Government was to stiffen its

employment regulations in early 1950 as Queensland 's

:Hc Carthyism moved into its most intense period .

Communi st Party Numerical Strength

In 1945 as the war ended national Communist Party

59 membership was 1 � 80 . 2 One year later, thi s had declined 6 2

to 1 3 ,450, reflecting the continuation of the previous years '

resignation rate of the 'Red Army recruits '. That the A.C.P.

in the following year , 1947 , suffered only a very slight

decline in Party membership to 1 ,100 revealed the 2

commitment of tho se who remained as the Party introduced

post-war policies. The huge drop in 1948 to just over 6 ,000

occurred as the A. C.P' s 'get tough ' policy in the trade union

movement became translated into reality.26° Fr om 1948 onwards,

the Party was to retain a fairly constant membership strength of 86

61 around 6,000 for the next five years. 2 Di s sention among the intellectuals within the movement occurred in mid-1 948 ove r the A.C.P' s de termination to follow the 'Cominform line ' with relation to Yugo slavia and the tightening of Party discipline . Ye t 1while thi s dis sention generated much

6 publicity and concern within the Party, 2 2 it was insignificant in comparison to the vast numbers of Party members who resigned in ones and twos, or merely let the ir membe rship lapse during the two years follo,dng the war . Jack Pemberthy recalled that although the latter practice was dominant , many probably for the sake of the ir personal standing· in the community, resigned

6 officially and publicly.2 3

A.C.P. Popularity in No rth Que ensland

As North Queensland ente red the immediate post-war period there was no noticeable de cline in membership numbers,

64 as later occurred in 1946 .2 The A.C.P. attempted to continue the community involvement policies it had followed during the war . In 11arch 1946 , the A.C.P. organized over three hundred Party volunteers to he lp in the To1msvi lle

. . . . 65 fl ood c 1 ean-up wh. 1c h rece1ve d w1'd es pr. ead c1v1c ace1 a1m. 2

Yet,as the effects of the chroni c 1946/47 drought gripped

No rth Queensland, there was little the A. C.P. could do . In that drought , the 1946 sugar tonnage was the lowest it had

66 b een 1n. t en years. 2 Neat and dairy production were greatly reduced, whi lst elsewhere in the State the wool clip was

6 halved.2 7 \vll at the farmers desperately sought was short- term assistance, but all the Communi st Party could offer were long-term programme s. In addition to the drought, came the .He at Strike , also in 1946, and whi le to the working class militants of the North this was just ano ther strike , it 87 adversely affected the consciousness of farmer and middle class groups as it became evident that it was the start of an A.C.P. supported period of industrial mil itancy. Thus ,

at the 1946 Federal Elections in the single Northe rn seat

contested by the A.C.P. , its vote declined from 34.2% to 268 15.3%.

As the North continued to feel disgruntled over 'Northern

Ne glect' the changes in national A.C.P. policy caus ed the l:1 arty increasingly to los� its status as a realistic champion

of the Mo rthern discontent. Into its place stepped the New

States movement , Independents such as Aitkens and Coburn,

and the Country Party. The local A. C.P. branches dilemma was

that on one hand ,they were trying to continue as a minor party of reform, supporting the ir member of Parl iament, whi le

on the other� they were urging class warfare in preparation for capitalism's collapse. The results of this paradox were

reflected again - but thi s time more clearly - at the lvlay

1947 State elections , when the A.C.P. recontested Bowen,

Herbert, Kennedy , and the Tablelands . In all electorates

save Bowen, the Party received half the vote it had obtained 269 at the previous 1944 election. Paterson in Bowen dropped

5% to 39%, although he managed to retain his seat. Sub-

divisional figures show, hmvever, that this mere :>Yb drop . . 27° d.�sgu�ses a maJOr c h ange �n. 1 oca 1 po l' � t'�ea 1 1 oya lt�e' s.

The sugar farmers of Banana Pocket who , in 1944 gave Paterson

a huge 57. 53% of the vote now gave him only 35.21%, a drop of

22%, largely transferring the ir support to the Country Party 271 who se vote rose from 26 . 02�� to 45.07% The militant mining

to>m of Collinsville , in 1944 had been unsure of Paterson, 272 and had given the Labor candidate 50. 89;''o and Paterson 47 . 537�, 88

Now recognizing Paterson as a loyal and hard working representative of the w·orking class 7it reversed the ir trend , giving Paterson 54. 4% and Labor 40 .11%.273 Local 7 conservatism, though still slight, increased as the Country

4 Party trebled its 1944 vote of 1.5 7·� to 4. 4;,:��7 In the 6 7 electorate 's large st to,m, Bowen, support for both Pater son

5 27 and Barry (Labor) declined approximately from 405·� to 34;lo.

It is like ly that the trends of Banana Pocket and Collinsville were both pre sent here - name ly an increase in support for

Paterson from trade unioni sts a. nd a decline from smaller businessmen. Yet the main ove rall trend was for both the

A.L.P. and A.C.P. vo ters to switch the ir allegience to the

Country Par ty, i

son1e of the se workers, knowing the impossibility of electing

another Communist, voted to ensure the election of a Labor

candidate .

The decline in A.C.P. fortune s accelerated in the next

two years as the Party became regarded as 'strike happy' .

Nowhere di d this happen with greater clarity than during the

1948 Rail Strike . The satisfying sight to industrial-

militant 's eyes7 of all Queensland being totally without

1 transport because of the strikes effectivene ss, (even

Townsville truck drivers ;v-ho tri ed to shift goods had sugar

emptied into the ir petrol taru�s277 ), was to farmers and

others of the No rth who •couldn't ship anything or bring 89

278 anything into the place,11 economic icliocy. Amo ngst mi litants , the police-bashing of Paterson brought a wave of support , but to many No rtherners it symbo lized his transition from local representative to Br isbane 's publ ic spokesman for the .A.C.l''s industrial policies. Indeed, when Hanlon introduced into Parliament the Industrial Law

Amendment Act anti-picketing legislation he referred to it

2 9 as the npater son Bill11 • 7 The Communi st Party believed that Paterson' s time was more profitably spent "appe aring in the stre ets with the strikers and representing the A. C.P's

280 National and State po licies publ icly, n instructions whi ch,

as a member of a highly di sciplined party , he followed.

During the series of prosecutions resulting from the Industrial

Law Ame ndment Ac t, and later the cases of Gilbert Burns , Lance

She.rkey and others in Sydney and He lbourne , Paterson, as instructed by the A.C.P. , spent mu ch of his time defending the se Communi sts in Southern capitals. Even amongs t the

Bowen rail strikers the attitude was expre ssed, "rlhy the

281 bloody he ll wasn't Paterson up here giving us a hand11 •

Al lied to thisproblem was the fact that Pate rson had never considered, or was never prevailed upon by the A.C. P. , to buy a re sidence in his Bowen seat at a time when other

Members like Aitkens were pioneering the later habit of country Members to live in the ir electorates.

By 1 949 , the Bowen Independent which had been gingijrly sympathetic to Paterson 's reelection in 1947 had totally repudiated him stating;

In Brisbane and similar distant centres they say: "Bowen ? Oh, Yes. 'f hats where you have al l the Communists.11 This impression has probably done the town a lot of harm since the war, by acting as a deterrent to the establishment of ne1v industries. 282 90

No ting this statement and others emin�ting from North

Queensland sources, the Communist Party , at its 1949

Queensland State Conference, conc luded:

Reaction has launched a powerful campaign around

the ne glect of North Queensland ••• The Party must take part in the movement for a better deal for the North, and win the North Queensland masses to fight against Australian monopolists, wh ich plunder North 283 Queensland •••

Although recognizing this situation, the Par ty lacked policies necessary to recapture its status as the spoke sman for Northern discontent. In any case, they were four years too late .

Aside from its mistaken po licies, the Communi st Party 's position in the North was undermined by the same features that had left the Party in a state of malaise throughout Que ensland1 namely : the Cold War ; the Party's subservience to Mo scow; the continuing campaign by the Pre ss, the R.S.L. , the Catholic

Church, the Industrial Gr oups, as well as Labor and conservative political parties alike ; the SUI>port that the Party gave to not- general ly-popular issues like Indonesian nationalism, South

East Asian liberation movements , and opposition to White Australia.

Thus the December 1 949 Federal Elections saw a further electoral decline when the A.C.P. stood a rec ord number of candidates. In the Northern seats contested, Rerbert (where the

A. C.F. gained 5.24% of the valid vote ), Dawson(4.17%) , Leichardt

(3.47%) , Kennedy (3.44%) and Capricornia (1 .27%) , it generally 284 received around double the vote of the rest of the state . Ye t this marked a serious slide when compared wi th the only Northern 285 seat contested in 1946 , Herbert, wi th 15.30%. For the first time in almost ten ye ar s the best Northern electorate , (Herbert) did not rec,live the highest vote of all Queensland 1 s electorate s 286 (which wa s obtained by Brisbane with 5.41%) . 91 A.C.P. Popularity in Queensland

As the A.C.P. geared itself for the 1949 ·Elections , it faced a deeply polarized electorate . If mo st Queenslanders did not quite see society in such simple terms>as did Catholic

Social J:l.fovement organizer Bill Thornton's "It was them or us, 11 2 Queenslanders clearly did not identify with 11them11 • 87 Throughout the State , conservative politicans used anti-Communi sm as a vote catching devic2 . Reg Swartz , Country Party candidate for the

Darling Do� advertised himself as "3iour official cand idate in 288 the fight against socialism and communism.", while the Liberal

Party in a full page advertisement in the Brisbane Telegraph stated. "Chifley Is Afraid To Smash Communism. Australia is sick 289 of feeble excuses." In fact the Liberal Party was - f-r equently confused as to who these Communists were . As one Liberal Party advertisement to the Queensland Times {Ipswich) a�gued:

This man is an avowed socialist. �hotograph of ChifleiJ There is no essential difference between Socialism and Communism /j.rawing of "Communist Manifesto - Karl :t-Iarx� Fight Chifley ' s Socialist Communist Party. Vote Liberal .289

Desp,ite the animo sity which the A.C.P. encountered from a ho stile societyr it continued optimistically to minimize this.

During election tours by A.C.P. State Central Committee members throughout all Queensland 's maj or centres, speru�ers were greeted with tomatoes, interjectors and firecrackers,yet in their reports to the Que ensland Guardian this was underplayed. For instance,

¥m x Julius reported from Gordonvale : The attendance was particularly good in view of the fact that many workers were on shift at the mill. {!his first sentence was in bold typ� • An ol"gani�ed band tried to wr eck the meeting by yelling and throw�ng eggs , many of which hit bystanders and a scuffle occurred after a woman remonstrated with them ••• a successful me eting . 291 92 This state of false optisism was largely generated by the recent success of the Chinese Revolution and the Cominform 1s conviction that more was to come as capitalism fast approached crisis. The like ly outcome of the elections - the banning of the Party, - was largely igno red within this atmosphere of conf. � d ence. 292 Henzies' declaration, however, was clear . If elected: The Communist Party wi ll be declared subversive and unlawful and dissolved •••No person now a member of the Communist Party shall be •••elig ible for any 3 office in a regi stered industrial organi zation. 29

Having no confidence in the Labor Party and still smarting from Chifley 's sending troo:ps to the coal mines, the A.C.P. stood a rec ord eleven candidates for Queensland in this election. Despite this, the A.C.P. obtained only 1.68% of the vote- a poorer performance than in any State save New South 294 Wales. In all Brisbane electorates�candidates received betwaen

1% and 2% except in Brisb�ne itself which topped the State 29.5 with 5 .41 %. The only candidate to stand in a Southern non- 296 metropolitan seat1Darling Downs , received a meagre .77%. The comb ined Liberal/Country Party vote in Queensland was significantly high�r than in any other State , polling almost

60% of the total vote!9 7 The process of banning the Communist

Party had now undoubtedly begun. 93 Section 3

Footnote s.

1. See A. Davidson, Op . Cit . P ps. 99-1 00

2. In fact the cartoonswere used over and over again from 1946 onwards.,as to engrave new cartoons every w.e.ek was too expensive .

3. The Worke r , 17 June 1946 .

4. Report of the Work of the Central Committee from the 14th to the 15th National Congress, (A.C.P. Sydney , Ap ri l 1948)

5. Ibid.

6. The Courier-}�i l, 13th September 1946

1. Australian Railway Union Pamphlet, Be Ready,(A.�.u. , Brisbane , 1946) Quoted in R. She arman , The Po litics of the 1948 Railway Strike (B.A. Hons . Thesis, Que ensland University, 1973}.

B. See A. Davidson, Op .Cit . P ps. 100-1 01 and Que ensland Guardian, 14 �� y 1947 .

9 . Jim Henderson, Op .Cit.

10. Report of the 15th A.C.P. National Congress, Op . Cit .

11. Tribune , 14 �ugust 1948 .

12. J. Pla,yford, Op .Cit. P.55

13. See Que ensland Guardian, 17 October 1947

14. Ted Bacon, A Post War Hi story of the C.P.A. , (Quality Pre ss, Sydney, 1965 } P.22.

15. Queens land Guardian, 1 August 1947 .

16. Addre ss by Ted Bacon. Toowong, 10 August 1974.

17. Ted Bacon, Op . Cit.

18. Ibid.

19. See A. D avidson, Op .Cit. P.117

20 . Ted Bac on. Postwar Hi story of the C.P.A. , Op. Cit. P. 19.

21 • Report of the Work· o.f the Central Comrui ttee from t�e 14th to the 15th National Congress, A.C.P. , Sydney, 1948 .

22. TeJ. Bacon� Post War History of the C.P�A. , Op . Cit. 1? . 14..

23 . ( J.D. Blake 7 Comruunist Party of Australia 1945-1 966 , C.P.A. Sydney , 1 966 P. 6 .. ) 94

24. A, Davidson, Op.Cit. P.132. By 1953� Davidson estimated that the percentage of Communist-led unionists had dropped to 12. 5%. P .1 39.

25. Between 1945 and 1948 retail pr ices increased by an ave rage 16% per annum . See T. She ridan in J. Irimonger, J. He rritt, G. Osborne (Eds .) Strikes: Studies in Twentieth Century Social Histor�, (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1. 973 ) P. 25. the 26 . The question ofA40 hour we ek was resolved in 1947 at the Townsville Labor-in-Politics Convention wh e n1 after John Hann M.L.A. and others had argued that the 40 hour we el'\. was ne cessary and that it had . help provide the A.C.P. with its union support, Hanlon announc ed that if reelected he would introduce the 40 hour week . Legislation was passed in Parliament on the 16 September 1947 .

27 . A.R.U. Union leader Frank Nolan remembered: At the be ginning of the year (1 948 ) the secretary of the South Au stralian Labor Council in a letter to the Queensland T.L.C. said , '�ou wi ll apprec iate that whe n one is negotiating with a Tory government which can point with delight to the low wages paidin . a State governed ' :by Labor, the task becomes very onerous and leaves one rather disgusted. While such low wages exist in one State the employers elsewhere take advantage of it." Frank Nolan You Pass This Way Only Once, (Colonial Press, Bri sbane , 1974.) In fact this was a rather distorted picture. Price controls, rent controls and other governmental regulatory powers in operation, meant that real wages in Que ensland were little different from other States.

28 . R. Shearman , Op.Cit. referr�g to comments on the topic by E.A.Bacon.

29. See H.E. 1ve iner, '!'he Reduction of Communist Power in the Australian Trade Unions in Politi cal Science Quarterly, Vo l. 69 No .3. 19·5 4. P .402 •

30. Louise Overacker, The Australian Party System, (Yale University Press, Yale , 1952. ) 1973 .

31 . This strike like others to come was comp licated by the overlap and integration of other strikes. On 1 Ap ril over 2,000 railwaymen went out on strilte over a lunchbreak dispute while on 8 May all 2,000 watersiders walked off the job over a black ban on double-dumped wool. Yet both rai lwaymen and warfies in the same period were involved in solidarity strike s with the meatworkers .

3 2. Clem Lack , Op.Cit. , P. 294.

33 . Ibid.

34. Frank No lan, Op .Cit. , P. 90 .

35. Ib:id. :P.89,

36. Jim Henderson, Op .Cit.

37. Ibid. 95

38. Ted Bacon, Op .Ci t.•

39. See The w·orke r, 15 Ju ly 1946 .

40 'fed Bacon, Op . Cit.

41 . He nceforth referred to as the R.S.L.

42 . The wueensland Digger, Apr il 1946 .

43 . Que ensland Country Life , Editorial , 4 Ap r il 1946 .

44 . Toowoomba Chronicle , 3 April 1946 .

45. Catholic Leader, 27 June 1946.

46 . Ibid, , 11 Ap ril 1946 .

47 . Ibid ., 30 Nay 1946

48 . Interview wi th Bill Thornton, 24 September 1974 .

49 . Ibid.

50. Ibid. Freedom became Newswe eklv in 1947 . Thornton is currently State l� esident of the Federated Clerks Uni or1.

51 • Clem Lack , Op .Ci t. , P.295.

52. See Appendix A ( i )

53 . The Sunda;}:· Nai 1 , 7 Ju ly 1946 .

54. See Appendix A ( iii )

55. See Ap pendix A ( iii)

56. See App endix A ( i )

.57. See Appendix A (i)

58. Interview with Ron Haas , 23 September 1974·

59. Ibid. , 31 January 1947 .

60 . The Courier-Hai l, 10 Fe bruary 1947 .

61 . Ibid .

62. Ron Haas , Op .Cit.

63 . See Appendix, B (i).

64 . This is discussed in de tai l in a later section.

65. See Appe ndix B (i).

66 . Ibid .

67 . See App endices B ( i ) and { ii) · 63 . See T)le 'Ju eensland Guardian, 1 August 1947 .

69. Ibid ., 8 Augus t 1947 . 96

70 . Br isbane Telegr r:tpl}, 2 August 1947 .

71 . Queensland Digger , January 1948�

72 . See Ted Bacon, Op . Cit.

73 . The Sunday l'iail, 15 June 1947 .

74 . The vl orker, 4 August 1947 .

75 . A. Davidson, O:p . Cit., P.105.

76 . Frank J\o lan, Op . Cit. , 1'.98.

77 . The Su:.iiday Nail, 22 February 1 948.

78 . The Rockhamuton Bulletin, 4 February 1948 .

79. Reported in the Queens land Guardiart, 20 February 1948 .

80 . The Courier-Mail, 28 February 1948 .

81 . The Courier-Mail, 27 February 1948 .

82. !bid, 2 Narch 1948 •

83 . The Sunday ·Hai l, 22 February 1948 , commented by the Qu eensland Guardian, 1 9 Harch 1 948 .

84 . The Courier-Nai l, 3 Nar ch and on 6 Harch 1948 .

85. Ibid ., 18 �larch 1948.

86 . Catholic Leader , 25 r�rch 1948 .

87 . Semper Floreat , 12 Mar ch 1948 .

88. Ibid., 18 Narch 1948.

89. Ibid .t 7 !�y 1948.

90 . Intervi ew with Dr . Ted Dturso, 13 August 1974.

91 . The Que ensland DigFer, Ap ril 1948 .

92. Ibid .

93 . Ibid.

94 . R. Shearman, Op . Cit. P.3.

95 . Jim Henderson, Op .Cit.

96. Jack Pemberthy , Op . Cit .

97 . Interview with Jack Duggan , in R. Shearman, Op .Cit. P.117.

98 . Interview 'vith Jim Henderson, in R. She arman, O:p .Cit., P.112.

99. Tom Aitkens H.L.A. , Op .Cit.

100. Though not without incurring the hostility of Fallon and other.See �H e1lOrt of the Labor-in-Politi cs Convention, Toowoomba,, 1950 · 97

101 . Ted Bacon, _fo s twar His tory of the Op . Cit. , P. 20. C�. , 102 . The Courier-f-lai l, 8 October 1 949 .

103. Ibid. , 13 October 1948. There was one other sedition trial beside s Burns and Sharkey and thi s occurred in We stern Australia.

104 . Quoted in A. Davidson, Op .Cit. , P.108.

105 . Quoted in J. Playford , Or .Cit. , P.44 .

106. Tribune , 18 September 1948.

107. See eensland Digger, October and November 1 948. Qu 108 . The Courier-Hai l,18 October 1949.

109. See eensland Guardian, 3 November 1949. Q,u:

110. See Queensland Guardian, 2 September and 11 November 1948 .

111 . The Courier-Mai l, 2 October 1948.

112 . The Qu�ensland Guardian, 7 October 1948.

113. The Courier-Hai l, 2 Oc tober 1 948 .

114 . Communist Review, July 1958, P. 207. In fact such uni ons had been a useful source of revenue for the A.C.P. and A.L.P. alike . It was the practice of Communi st led unions to give political donations to the A.C.P. and the A.L.P. in the ratio of 2 :3. J. Playford , Op .Cit. , P.79.

115 . Tribune , 9 Fe bruary 1949 .

116. The Worker, 11 July 1949.

11 7. The Courier-!•Iail, 13 July 1949 .

118. Ibid. , 1 4 July 1 949.

119. L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley, (Longmans , London, 1963 ) P.363.

1 20. The Courier-Hail, 15 July 1949.

1 21 • Ibid • ., 20 August 1949.

1 22. Ibid ., 1'( August 1949.

1 23. Queensland Guardian, 4 August 1 949.

1 24 . Jim Henderson , Op . Cit.

1 25. Que ensland Guardian; 6 Octobe r 1949. "The wardrive " is a reference to increasing Western politican� statements de­ manding a state of war preparedne ss for any coming battle with the Soviets . 98

1 26 . Ibid. 1 24 November 1949.

127. Ibid., 6 October 1949.

128. Tribune ,7 December 1949.

129. Jim Henderson, Op .Cit.

130. Que ensland Digger,April 1948 .

131. Ibid • ., April 1947.

132 Tom Aitke ns H.L.A. , Op . Cit.

133. Que ens land Guardian, 21 Hay 1948.

134. See Ted Bacon, Op. Cit.

135. Queensland Digger, April 1948.

136. Ibid, May 1948 .

137. Ibid.

138. Ibid. , July 1948.

139. Ibid.

140. Reprinted in the Que.ensland Guardian, · 4 June 1948 .

141 • Ibid .

142. See Que ensland Guardian, 1, 9 and 16 July 1948 .

143. Ibid.

144. QUe ens land Digger , Au gust 1948 .

145. Ibid. , December 1948.

146. The Courier-Mai l, 20 August 1949.

147. _Queens land Digger, September 1949 .

148. Ibid.

149. The Rockhampton Bulletin, 3 September 1949c

150. Ibid, and October 1949 and Que ensland Guardian 15 Septembe r 1949 .

151. Queensland Digger, October 1949.

152. The Worker, 11 ?-larch 1946 .

153. Ibid .

154. Que ensland Guardian, 9 December 1948 .

1 55. For example see details of Rev. H.a.whitney 's sermons . Ibid. � 11 January 1946 .

156. Ibid. , 9 Septe mber 1948 . 157. See, for example , The Courier -Hai l, 12 November 1946 ,

:30 and 31 December 1946 , 3 January 1947 , 4 April 1949, 1 No vember 1949, etc .

1 58 . l'he Courier-Nai l, 17 Hay 1 948 .

159. Ibid. 99

160. Catho lic Leader , 21 October 1948 .

161. Ibid. , 29 October 1948 .

162. Ibid ., 12 August 1�48 .

163. Ibid. , 19 August 1948 .

164. Ibid., 7 October 1948 .

165. \Hlliam Gallacher1 Catholics and. Communi sm, (Current Books ,

Sydney , Umla ted} •

166. Catho lic Action At liork, (A.C.J:'. , Sydney, Undated ).

167. Th is agreement was in Qu eensland Guardian,9 September,1948

168. Henceforth I >vi ll use News:W��kly when referring to Freedom or Ne ,vsweekl;y.

169. Bill Thornton, Op . Cit.

170. Ibid .

171 . An official statement released by Australia's Archbishops • and Bishops tentitled Catho lic Action_. rele.:tsed in 1947 read 11 If it is to fu lfil its mi ssion, the Church mus t play its part in creating the se conditions , the strictures of temporal life . Were she to confine herself to the role of me re observer she would resign herself to the situation forever beleaguered , an army constantly on the defensive , content endlessly to lose individual soldiers si since she had alloved the enemy to dictate the (very� conditions of her life and operations.11 Quoted in Tom Truman , Catholic Action and Politics, Op . Cit. P.29.

172. The '\vorker, · 29 April 1946

173. The State Service, July 1946 .

174. Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Convention, Townsville, 24 February 1947.

175. Bill Thornton, Op . Cit.

176. Que ensland Guardian, 28 illay 1948.

177. See , for example , Br isbane Telegraph , 16 June 1949 , The Courier-Hail , 3 September 1949.

178. The Courier-Hai l, 15 July 1949.

179. Bi ll Xhornton, Op .Cit.

180. Ibid ., and see Ni al l Br.ennan, The Politics of Catholics, (Hill, Me lbourne, 1972) P .8.

181. Bill Thornton, Op .Cit .

182. Interestingly all of the se people shared a conspiracy the ory of how the A.C.P. hoped to achieve l'ower. Stated 100

Bill Thorton; "You begin to realize its all part of a psttaFn. You had the strike s, mainly in the South , in 194'6 and 1947 . In 1948 the Rai l Strike in Queensland� and then the 1949 strike� all of which if you follow the pattern and its a very obvious pattern of the Corns . building up in the un ions to confront the Gover!lJMlnt •.• 11 which Chifley de scribed as a political conspiracy ."

183. He went on to accuse the Groups of receiving :funds from employers,which a later delegate ,Hr. Wn iteside (Federated Engine Driver's and Firemen's Association), admitted had occurred and gave details. See Report of the Labor-in­ Politics Convention, Toowoomba, 20 February 1950.

184. The Courier-Mail , 5 March 1948 .

185. The Worker, 15 1-farch 1948 .

186. The Worker, 15 Ju ly 1946 , for former A.W.U. State President, \{ .F. Edmonds l"J:.H.R. :for Herbert, speech to Parliament . See The State Service, June 1948 , :for Dr . Evatt 's speech on Communi sm.

187. See The Worker, 12 April 1948, or 18 Harch 1946 .

188. The State Service, Ju ly 1946 .

189. For instance see letter :from .fvlungungo Branch {Port Curtis) calling :for "the banning of Communist activities in 1 Au stralia 120 May 1948, in Jvli nutes Books Que ensland Central Executive, Australian Labor Party 1940-1 952. Also Letter from Emerald P�rk Branch calling for legi slation dealing with "Communists and fel low travellers .," Ibid, 7 October 1949.

190. See letter from Me rthyr Branch Salling :for formation of Industrial Groups ., Ibid., 8 July 1946 .

191 • See Que ensland. Guardian, 15 September 1949 .

192. Ibid., 24 February 1949 and 1 September 1949.

193. See R. Shearman, Op .Cit. P.114.

194. The Courier-Hail, 2 September 1948 .

195. See Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Convention, Toowoomba, 20 February 1950.

196. The Courier-Hai l, 23 October 1948 .

197. Ibid., 16 October 1948

198. Ibid.

199. Ibid.

200 . 'l' he �v orker , 25 November 1 946 .

201 . Ibid., 6 January 1947 .

202. Ibid.? 8 Fe bruary 1947 . 101

203 . They Li e Ab out Communi s.t s /A. C.P. , Br isbane , Undated) .

204 . See Queensland Guardi an , 16 April 1948 .

205 . Ibid .

206 . Virtually the entire Ex ecutive of the Freedom League was dr awn from the raru�s of leading Brisbane businessme n. See Que ens land Gu axdian , 15 September 1949#

207 . The 1vo rke r, 29 August 1948 .

208 . Ibid.

209 . See Bi ll Thornton, Op . Cit.

21 0. 2 1949· The Courier Hail, 3 August

21 1. Ibid. , 28 September 1949 ,

21 2. See �eensland Gu ardian , 3 November 1949.

21 3. See Dalby He rald, 28 Ap ril 1948 , and 21 Hay 1948 .

21 4. \'lhi lst du ring the war ye ars , particularly in North Que ens land , there was little emnity and frequent cooperation betwe en Social Credi tors and Communi sts, in the :po st 'var era,as Communi sm became less identified with rural dissatisfaction and more vi th urban

di slocationJ so relations betwe en the two deteriorated . See Jack Pemberthy10p . Cit.

21 5 . No el ��ers, Do es Austral ia Ne ed Socialism; (Economy Printers , Br isbane , Undated ) .

21 6. A.W. No �

21 7. 1 1949 . See Oue en.sland Gu ardian, 3 October,

218. For instanc e, see its coverage of the 1949 Federal Elec tion re sults . The Courier Hail 10 and 11 December 1949·

21 9. For detai ls 1 see Qu e ensland Guardian, 29 September 1948,

220. For example see Ibid.; report 2 February 1948 . 1 7

221 • For example, see The CouriBr l•Iail, 12 Ju ly 1947 and countless others.

222. For details1see The Worker, 25 November 1946 �

223 . The Courier ��il, 16 Nove mber 1948.

224. 2 , Sunday Truth, 3 November 1948

225 . The Courier Nai l, 20 Narch 1948.

226 . See Ibid ., 14 July 1949 . In fact as the Victorian Royal Commi ssion into Shc>zpley� allega.tions provecl7 mo st of what he saicl we� s untrue . See A. Davidson 102

Cp . Cit.1 P. 109.

227 . The Sunda.v ·Hail, 27 August 1948 ,

228 . See for insta.nce� The Advocate , 12 August 1948

229 . See com:plaints .in Oueensla.nd Guardian, 6 De cember 1946

230. This was clearly illustrated in the Ro ckhampton f,io rning, Bulletin, 3 Narch 1949 whe n on the same night, the 2nd , A. C . P . member l' 1.ax Ju lius adclressed over 800 people while less than 100 yards away in ano ther hal l,British Conservative H.P. Anthony Nutting_. addre ssed a meeting on Communi sm which had such a small audience (under 20 ) it had to be shifted to ano ther room. The Bulletin devoted 1t columns to Nutting 's address, none to .Tulius . !

231 . Dalby Herald, 13 Au gust 1948 .

232. The Cairns Po st, 3 Ap ril 1947.

233 . Rockhampton i'lo rning Bul letin, 4 February 1948 .

234. Ibid.9 29 Harch 1949.

235 . See Jim He nderson, Op . Cit.

236 . See The Courier :Hail, 30 }

237. Ibid.

238 . See Semper Floreat , 7 Apr il 1949 .

239 . Rockhampton l'·1o rning Bulletin, 28 Narch 1949.

240 . Que ens land Guardian, 13 April 1949.

241 . Rockhampton. Ho rning Bul letin, 30 1•1arch 1949,

242. · Oue ensland Guardian, 13 Apr il 1949·

243 . Ibid.

244. Ibid . , 28 April 1949 ..

245 . Rockhampton Horning Bulletin, 30 Narch 1949 .

246 . The Courier Hail , 31 Harch 1949,..

247 . Ibid .

248 . Bill Thornton, Op . Cit.

249 . See Queens land Guardian, 13 Agril 1949 .

250. Ibid. , 18 April 1947. 103

251 1 1946 . • The Courier Nai l, and 2 Apr il

252. See IJueensland Guardian, ove be 1949 . 10 K m r

253 . !bid �Jovember 1949 17 Februi1ry 1949 q 3 7 and 8 September 1949-

254. The Courier Hai l, 18 October 1948 .

255. instance;I'Ja.ureen SulliV!Ul the daughter of Fo r a pro mine nt Haclu-..y st vas denied employment Corrmmni , in Hackay as a shop as sistant . See Jack Pemberthy , Op . Cit.

256 . J. Pb.. yfor d , Op . Cit, F. 4JO .

257 . Ano the r example occurred when Rockhampt.on 1 s wholesale troMlers , De nhs,m Hros.;. dismissed a staff member be cause he was thought to be a Corrmmnist. , See Qu eens land Guardian 21 Nove mber 1947 . Fo r othe r exa.mrles see Jim Henderson, Op . Ci t. and Tecl Bacon, Op . Ci t.

258. See Ted Ba,c on;; Op . Cit.

259. Ibid .

F gures in A. v s n Op . Ci t. , 120. 260 . i Da id o , l' .

261 . Ibid.

262. Ibid. , ?. 104.

263. Jack T'emb erthy , O:p . Cit.

264. Ibid .

265. 15 See ·Jtieensland Guardian , Harch 1946 ·

266 . Se e J. Iremong�r,J. He rritt , G. Os bourne , Op . Ci t. , P. 230.

267 . Ibid.

268 . See Appendix A iii · ( )

269. See n i i . pe d x B Ap ( ) 270. Ibid .

271. Ibid ll iii , ( )

272 . This is de al t with earlier . See P.

en i iii . 273 . See p d x B .Ap ( ) 274 . Ibid .

275 . Ibid . 104

276 . Ibid.

277 . Jim Hende rson, O:p . Cit.

278 . . Jack l� e mberthy. , Op . Ci t In reaction to the strike a number of demonstrations a,gainst it took IJlace in country centres including TOlmsville . See Jim Henderscn, OlJ . Ci t.

279 . 317. See. J. :Pla.yford.., Op . Cit. 2.

280 . Jack :ee mbe rthy , Op . Cit.

281 . Ibid .

282. The Bo,¥e n Independe nt, 9 September 1949 ·

283 . Renort of the 1949 Al l Oueensland State Conference of the A.C.P. , (A.C.P. , Brisbane , Septembe r 1949)

284. See App endix A (iii) ·

285 . Ibid .

286 . Ibid.

287. Bill Thornton, Op . Cit.

288. Jo owoomba Chronicle , 1 October 1949 , ·

239. Brisbane Telegraph , 25 l• iarch 1949 .

290 . Queensland Times (Ipswich) , 2 De c ember 1949 ·

291 • Queens land Guardian, 17 November 1 949 ,

292. Thi s was clearly reflected in the almost total lack of di scussion in the Que ensland Guardian, conc e rning the like ly banning of the Party if i:'lenzies was elected. 'l' he Party . did, however, as reported in 1f he Courier Nai l, 14 July 1 949 , remove its files etc., from the Party headquarters in Heindorff House to s<1fe ke eping .

293 . 1) . 111. See A. Davidson, Op . Cit. ,

294. See ,Appendix A ( i ).

295. See Appendix A (iii ).

296 . Ibid.

297 . See Appendix A (i) . Section 4.

Communism in the Po st-liar Pe riod,

Phase 2: 1950 - 1951 The A. C.P. in Re treat.

The choice before us is a grim but a simple one . w·e can do nothing, and let a traitorous minority de stroy us , as they must or we can fight him (the Communist] whe rever w·e find him leaving him with no i�nunity or sanc tuary at all.

R.G. 'f.1enzies introducing the Communist Party l) i ssolution Act into Parliament . 27 Ap ril 1950 C.P.D. Vo l 207 . P. 1997.

The unity of the wo rking cla.ss through an alliance of the

A.L.P. and the A.G.P. is the path to achieving the aims of the "l'ro rking clas s ••• Unity of the working class and all peace loving people wi ll ensure the defeat of all the war plans of this Federal Government and save our youth from the fate of cannon fodder; unity of the working class wi ll defeat all plans to ban the Communi st Party and other organizations ; Unity of the working class wi ll guarantee the defence of the trade unions agai nst al l attacl�s of the Menz ies­

Fadden Government .

1\n open letter to the Q.C.E . of the A.L.P. from A. Robinson, State Secretary A.C.P. 23 February 1950 . 105

Anti-Communi sm Institutionalized

In marked contra,st to the scorn and fury with w·hich the A. C.l�.

had lashed the Labor :Party a,t the December 1949 Fe deral Elections ,

.Hax Julius 1 and other Communi sts appealed to A.L.P. members to join

with Communi sts in a united effort to de fea,t He nzies and to "defend

the worker 1 s wage s aml conditions and work for peace , and civi l

liberties11, only weeks afterwards as they went on extensive speaking

tours of Queens land . 2 In 1-' ebruary 19591 the Queensland State

Commi ttee of the A.C.P.,sent letters to the Queensland Central

Executive of the A.L.P. � and all Labor H. L.A' s, calling for the

formation of Uni ty Committees to "unite all worke rs irrespec tive of

their political or rel igious beliefs, in defence of their common

intere st" . 3 In approval of such a po licy, the Communist Party in

fv1arch called for the support of all Labor candidate s �A,t the Ap ril

State Elections in al l electorate s where the A.C.P. failed to stand

. 4 cand· 1aa.., t es.

It was a reflection of the qualitative change which had occurred

�in the anti-Communi st movement sinc e De cember 1949 7 that the

Communi st Party should adopt such a conciliatory tone in dealing

wi th the Labor Party . The me,ndate given to He nzies to suppress

the Communi st Party, provided the fi nal institutionalization of anti-

Communi sm at the Pederal leve l,which rapidly spilled over into the

othe r -levels of Government . Thi s insti tutionalizat].on '"a s further

revealed. in the behaviour of both old and new opponents of

Communi sm,who se actions at this time repay some examinR-tion.

In the forties, .the J:l.S.L. , one of the A. C.P's mo st persistant

foes, had let pass few opportunities to criticize the A.C.P. Now

in the fiftie s, with the problem being tackled for them by the

Coalition Government, it hardly bothe red any more . The Oue ensland

Digger7 once a farrago of all Communi st sins , only occasione, lly 106 me 1\tioned: Communi sm after J)ecember 1949. At . R.S.L. Congresses, its own ban on Com:nuni sts ,,ras reendorsed and support for the

5 Federal Gove rnment 's pro1;osed ban was expre ssed , while at the

1951 State Congress a \fe stern District de legate , J. Ke nnedy: , called 6 on the League to "belt the Communi sts at every chance . 11

But rank and file anti-Communi st activities, like the Au gu st 1949

'Anti-Communi st Nonth, ' were largely over. Odd Sub-branche s which still catered for thi s�type of activity were unusual in thi s regard and met with little enthusiasm from the ir members.

A Gympie Sub-branch whi ch organized an anti-Communist rally in

October 1950� attracted the attendance of only thirty-one of its several hundred members. No doubt this leack of enthusiasm was further enc ouraged by the A.C.P. 's reappraisal and rejection of the tactics ·of industry-,dde strikes. R.S.L. anti-Communi sm largely be came the province of its paid functionaries, like its

Sta,te Pre sident , Raymond Huish, who from time to time made public his view that after Nenzies' legislation ·w·a.s passed:, League 8 members "should dec lare " suspected Communists •

Similari ly , Lord Hayor ChandJ.er's Freedom League in 1950 fai led to catch the fire and excitement whi ch it had possesssed in the previous ye ar . A City Hal l rally in June , wide ly publicized in The Courier-Mai l as be ing addressed by a mystery

spe ake r and forme r Communi st, "1-ir•.

State Security police , as well as uniformed and plain clothed policemen, ap ologize to his audience for the fai lure of "Nr .X" to appear . He darkly sugge sted, 11He may have been si ck. But on 10 the other hand some one may have got at him. " 107

Follo>dng thi s farcical rF.l ly , nothing further was he ard. from the Freedom League .

A.nti-Comrnuni sm in the A •.• ; .U. also sharply decline d follmdng Nenzies' election - though not for the sa,me re�sons as its decline elsevhere . The Union became worried that the

Henzies 1 monster ·1vhi ch it had, by im"?lication, helped to create � had gone beyond election pledge s on anti-Communi st legislation, and it began to ask: llould this legislation 11ultimately be used

11 against the Labor Party11 ? Hence its newspaper , The \'l orker, became hi ghly critical of the ant i-Communi st legislation, whi le initially continuing support in principle for banning Communism

1 ") nin a democratic manner" ( sic) . �As the Federal Labor Party strengthened its opposition to the legislation, so the A.;i.U. follovred. suit, so that ';-�hen the Q.C.E. of the A.L.P. formed a Vote

No Co�ittee for the 1951 Re ferendum, Haro ld Boland , State

Secretary of the A."�i . U . , and Pre sident of the Q.C.E. , became its

Campaign Director. From 1950 onwards, The Worker curbed its output of re_petitive stories on the evils of Conununi sm, and by mid-1 951 these had completely disappeared. Interestingly, the tone

of The Worker approached that of the Oueensland Guardian, as it

condemned Menzies1 war plans and alleged economic attacks on the

1 ivorking class. 3 The State Service (the publicati.;>n of that Union) , which like The Worker, 1·ras a supporter of the Industrial Groups ,

also expre ssed doubts over Nenzies' anti-Comi'lluni st legislation,

asking itself if "damning and banning the A.C.P. vr ill only

14 strengthen them in the long run11 • It also later refused to

support a Ye s vo te .

Unlike the A.¥1 .U. which had always put unionism before anti-Communi sm, the Catholic Church's involvement in the labour movement had always had its focus firmly fixed on destroying

Communist power in th,tt movement . Thus, within the Industrial 108

Groups , many of the mo st hi tter anti-Comn•uni sts 11on the basis of emotionalism thought that it [the Henzies' Bi l � >v ould solve the :problem. Smash them. Some of the m argued that it 15 would make it difficult for them to or)erate " • Ar chbishop Duhig and othe r membe rs of the Que ensland Catho lic hi erarchy shared such sentiments . He nce , thr oughout the early 'fiftie s, mo st

Que ensland Catholic spokesmen and the Catholic Leader supported the Comwuni st _Par ty Di ssoluti on Ac t. De spi te thi s, the mood of the period was such that the Leader did not feel constrained to carry the he avy anti-Cornmuni st press content of the: 'forties.

In ·the State A.L.J:>. - the me eting ground of the trade unions of the Right (the A.\f.U. , the State Service Uni on, the Electrical

Trade Uni on, the Federated Clerks Uni on, etc.) and of·�the Left

(the Bo ilermake rs Society of Au str alia, Amalgamated Postal ivorkers

Union, etc . } -the critics of the Industrial Groups grew ; but the se critics were unable to defe at the Groups . At the February

1950 Labor-i n-Po litics Conventi on, a,_ mo tion calling ur on Ha.nlon to introduce comple:mentary, though mo re democratic, legislation , failed . But mo tions congratulating the work of the Industrial

Groups we re passed, although not without some ranc our being 16 expressed. Yli nute s of the Que ensland Central Exe cutive also reflected this difference , >v i th mo ti ons from five branche s in late

- 1950 pr ote sting the fai lure of Federal Labor to take a firm 17 enough stand against l'·-!e nzies' Bi ll , and others expressing support. 18 for the work of the Industrial Gr oups . In the latter� the A.L.P. continued to receive the patronage of the State 's pres s"- �

Courier-Nai l in July 1951 congratulating the :

He n whose loyalty is to Au stralian trade uni oni sm, not to international Comr:'uni sm, (irho 1 have so far succeeded in frustrating y§mmuni st. efforts to wi n [trade union 1 control ••••

At the State level, the Parliame nt£try Party continued to attack Communism through its legislative prograwme . Th is time , 109

hovrever, rc�ther than using 1 gisl ·,.t ion de si[;ne d to combat

Communism in a particular strike , the Labor Government aime d its

enactments against the d.&,y-to -t:ay behavi our of the A. C .P. and

its members . In Narch 1950, it extens ively revised and strengthened

the Traffic Ac t. \4here once placard-carrying ;;md leafletting

had be en legal , no1v any form of demonstration, ral ly, or me e ting, picketing , placard-c arrying or me rely leafleting only became

legal , if gra,nted a police permit. A plicati ons had to be made

a fortnight in adva.nc e, and we re to be gr ct.nted only at the

20 discretion of the po lice , 'v ith no appeal to the Courts . Later

that year the Hanlon Governme nt introduced the Pub lic Servi ce .1.ct

Amendment Bi ll whi ch gave the Government the power to demand

that any public servant or intending Government emr) loyee swe ar

an oath of allegianc e to the King . Although Op_)osition Leader

Ni ckl in called for stronge r legislation, more in tune >dth Me nzies 1

O\

eye'i'ra sh for the public11 , the legislajlion formalized the popular

21 conception of the di sloyalty of Conununi st employees. Whi le

be ing so attacked as 'soft on Communi sm' , the Parliamentury Labor

Party replied by actually attempting to link Cormnunism \vith the

Li beral and Country Partie s. At the Apr il 1950 State Elections ,

Labor adve rti sed , "'i'lho Are The Co llaborators J.•. Lib erals and

Communists Have A Common Obj ective . Defeat of The Labor Govern-

22 me nt", • Simi larly , at the Labo r-i n-Politics Conve ntion two

mo nths ear lier, whe n reintroducing the socialization pl ank into

the Party platform, the Conve ntion incorporated a reference to the

23 "gross materialism of Tory and Communi sts alike ".

The harassment and intimid.\tion of Communists also bec,:tme

more noticeably instituti omtl ized . \-/uereaB in the _previous decaiLe

the behaviour of Queensland 1 s Po lice De_:

Tr d'fic Ac t. Under thi s Ac t, regular Guardian city street S·9ller, 24

Pe ter Bang , was prosecuted for not having a permit - a situation which was to recur regularly- for, as Maryborough Communi st street speF<..ker H. HcElligot discovered when told · by a de tective visiting his home in August 1950, no more permits were to be issued to his,

5 or similar, meetings .2 The police did not bother to hide the reason for permit refus�ls. Thi s was revealed in a pro secution of an

Australian Pen,ce Counc il leafleteer in September. As the

Prosecuting Cou11C il, Sub-Inspe ctor Re idman intimated, whe n tabling the documents Ban the A-Bomb and The Truth About· Korea, "This is

6 the kind of leaflet the [P olic�] Department is trying to stamp out� "

No re insidious still, was the pr actice of police surve illanc e1 and name takings/of people attending Communi st or Le ftist meetings . For instance , name s were taken in August 1950 by police,who watched

Building 'rlorkers Industrial Union officials inform apprentices out- side the Queensland 'l' e chnical College ::>of a Trades and Labour Council mee t.J.ng 27. The pr actice of standing police outside mee tings 1•n1s primarily directed at intimidating people from attending for fear

" 28 o f h av1ng . theJ.r . name s re corue d • Union protests to the Minister of

Health and Home Affairs over thi s practice failed to achieve ��ny

29 results . Individually , police also exercised their power in attacking Communism. Cojnmuni sts comp lained thc.t after a seaman had ch��lked 11Peace", "No Conscriptionn , and 11Go Home Dulles11 o.n Cltrs bearing United States number plate s whi ch we re parked at the w·h u·ve s, the se

. . 30 b ac k" • D esp1.. t e cornp l aJ.n . t s 11oweve r, th e J.ssue went un1nve s t.J.g . a t ed.. 111

Anti-Communism in the media, reinsti tutecl as we h�.ve seen frorn the end of the Second \iorld }far onw·ards , worsened in the early 'f ifties. F'ollowing the introduction of the Communi st Party

Dissolution Ac t in Federal Parliament , many provincial ne1v-spapers, like the Maryborough Chronicl�1 and the Ipswich Oueensland Time s� 2 repeatedly refused to print letters signe d by Communi sts . On radio , the Communi st Party and other radical groups encounte red di scriminatory censorship . Townsville 's 4 TO , in early J�nuary

1950 , refused Communi sts the right . to pur chase advertis ing time , 33 and again in February refused to sell the Townsville Trade s ,md

4 Labor Council broadcasting space� These examples we re followed in Ap ril by numerous stations at Cairns, Ha ckay , Rock.hampt on,

Townsville and elsewhere , which all refused to sell time for the

Au stralian Peace Council to broadcast the speech of the vi siting : Dean Hewlett Johnson of Canterbury3 - a policy 'vhich was to prevail

6 for some time . 3 In Bri sbane , The Courier-Mail continued to ignore events about whi ch it did no t approve , like the me eting of over

1,000 people at the City Hall on 6 June 1950 to oppo se the Nenzies'

Bill . The Courier-Mail 's barrage of anti-Communi st stories in- creased in 1951 as the Referendum approached. In May 1951 , it publ ished a leading feature article by an obscure Spani sh Jurist,

Dr . Salvador de Madariaga who revealed that :

Communism is Fascist in its politics. It is, in fact, the mode l of all Fasci ts and Na zis who all copied their , technique from Lenin.3

Closer to home , the Courier sent its Canberra staff reporter,

Elgin Re id , on a mission to reveal the "Communi st conspiracy to sabotage our shipping11• Hi s report maintained:

the Communi st Party , through sabateur agents is using merchant seamen as its instrument of sabotage in a successful endeavour to tie up the nations tranSllort, ra,i se freight costs, forward inflation and create economic chaos.J8

In August, one month prior to the Referendum , Sir Kei th Jlfuruoch, part owne r of The Courier-Hai l, di spatched a series of derisive 112

39 feature articles whilst on hi s tO·\ r of Eastern Europe . At the

same time , the much publicised East Berlin Youth Peace Festival , attended by representatives of Bri sbane 's Eureka Youth Le ague , had the Festival 's me ssage described by the newspaper as : "Hate : The

. lt 40 Red go spel g1ven to Youth . The newspaper 's mo st imaginative _

opponent of Communi sm, however, was its Page One Column, 'Day by

Day' . Its items ranged from the 'humorous ': In the Eaton court cas$ ye sterday hen the Peace Council President was prosecuted for leaflet� distributio the Guardian re11orter took hi s note s in red ink..4 1 §J

- through comlescension: To the Communi st newspaper The Gu ardian , for slap­

happy optimism, we award our special prize - a mildewed print of Stalin. The Anti- Red Act seeks to outlaw the paper ; Canberra 's best security agents are gunning for it. Yet - It came out as usual yesterday with a para­ graph hopefully urging subscribers to take advantage of

the special long-term subscription offer - 12/6 yearly (Payable in advance of cour se).42

- to high drama : Sc ientific investigation (inc luding violet ic and X­ rays ) ofmaterial seized here and in the southj! inJ raids [from the Communist Party under the Communi st Party Dissolution Act 43J hasn 't yielded much information we hear . But Security didn't expect anything more, after helplessly watching the Commies remove vital documents weeks before the Anti- Red Bill went through . The Security boys haven 1t been wasting th·: d.r time crying about it; have a fair idea ic. of -w·he re mo st of the stuff is hi.dden.44 � j The Courier;;,.Ha il was very quick thr oughout thi s period to point

the finger of gui lt in a predictable direction for all industr ial

disJ:mtes. Any uni on with a Co E'muni st leader vlc>, s a 'Red Uni on 1,

while the motives of any strike tarred with the Communi st brush were

suspect , such as a March 195 1 \'1.\f.F. str ike which was fal sely

labelled as "red" and over whi ch The Courier-Mail expressed dark

45 hints t1. S to its "real motives". In thi s labelling, they ive re

echoed by many of society• s leac.ing figures. Senator Ne al 01 Sul li van

warned a Ju ly 1951 meeting of the Queensland 'i'Jomen'_:;> Electoral League 113

tha,t : 11::mstru.lia1 s economy •w uld break down unless Communi st

influences we re beu.ten11 •46 No hint of Communist influence in a

strike w·as unworthy of Courier-Nail headline s. Dur ing "" 1 950 tram

di spute , one of the newsjXtper 1 s drama tic introductory paragraJJh' s

read : " 'T here was no doubt th

clever and unscrupulous Communi sts'r the Lord Nayor (A.ld. Cha.ndler )

said last night 11 •47 At the bottom of the arti cle , Alderman

Chandler 's quotD.tion:: became more specific :

I do not sugge st that the tramw·ay employees generally ar e Conununist - far from it - but I am advi sed that there are some men very close to the executive , men who are playing quite a part in thi s dis ute, who are either � Commuui st or fello1v travellers. 4

As the cry of 'Communist ' was extended to all dissidents49 ,

so individuals like the Re v. T.Rees Thomas who warned that many

loyal Au stra.lians were afraid to voice the ir vie�1s lest they be

branded Communists - "an intolerable si tu<:ttion11 - became rare . 50

Thus, the dismi ssal of Communi sts from their places of work , like

Bruce Ha1-;kins of the Brisbane City Council 's Town Plamling Staff ,

who ac c ording to Town Clerk Slaughter, was dismissed because of hi s

1 po litical beliefs, 5 and the simi lar sacking of Sol Ridgeway from

01ymp1 . c Tyre s, 52 me t pro t es t s on ly f rom C ommun1. s t s. The Brisbane

City Council 's refusal to allow the \vynnum Communi st-led Sub-Branch

of the Le gi on of Ex -servicemen ' and \'Iomen ,to use a Counc il hall for

me e tines �simil�rly was criticized only by Communi sts.53

In f:1ct, while }. ustra.lht had been a pione er in social reform,

it had no great traditions of abstract libera,lism. The preserv.:ction

of civil liberties •::..nd the right of dis sent were not we ll received

in a society, whi ct1 "had,i n some respects, a pronounced liking for

::mthoritarianism and strict maj ority rule tt . 54 Blaming al l of

society's ills upon subversive s of the Left, had been an Au stralian

tradition since the att;J. cks up on the 'Raving I�ed Soc i}1lists 1 of' the 1 1 4

pre-1 91 4 clays and the Industrial w- orkers of the World during �ro rld

War One - a tradition wh ich the Communi st Party logically inherited.

'l' hus , >dth the elevation of He nzies to Prime Ninister, the noted

Pr:>fessor of Philosophy at Sydney University, John Anderson - whi le supporting the outlawing of the Communist Party - wa s moved to admit that "the pr esent Qeriod is a period of decay of democratic sentiment

55 and thus f'��vourable ••••to the advo cacy of banning ••••Co mmunism11•

Communi st Party Activity

It was natural in such an atmosphere , that the A. C .P. should

defensively turn to a po ssibly al ly on the Le ft, the Labor Party , for support. Given the recent hi story of the Labor Party and the general unpopularity of the A.C.P. at that time , it was equally natural that the Labor Party should repudiate this approach. Thus a

letter sent by the A.C.P. in February 1950 , calling for a united front , along with similar appeals made in virtually every issue of

the Que ensland fu1ardian until the State Elections in Ap ril 1950 , were

56 overlooked . Neverthe less , as in the 1949 Federal Elections , the

1950 State Elections provided another occasion for the Coal ition

Parties to berate Labor for its supposed link s with Communism. Said

one Liberal Party advertisement : "Now turn the key on the Que ensland

socialists •••Close the bolt-h ole against socialism u.nd Communi sm in

Qu eensland11� 7 wh ile another Liberal prochtimed, "Hear John Aboud ,

Liberal candidate for K,ar ilpa. Sensati onal Exposur es of Labor and ""\.. 8 Communi sm11•5 Individual Laborite s and unioni sts, however , did re sr;on

favourably , and Uni ty Committees, though dominated by Communi sts and

Communist-l ed unions , were estfJ,b lished in coastal provincia,l centres�

The Brisbane Committee held its first City HaLL rally on

60 23 January 1950. As the State election polling

day moved closer, Communist Party members 115

integrated their election efforts into the anti-Communist Party

Dissolution Act movement .

\fith the introduction of the anti-Communi st Bill into Federal

P:.,rliament t1¥o days prior to the State Election, the issue was

naturally very much al ive in the minds of the voters on polling

day. In this El ection, the Communist Party stood 'seven candidates,

tvo more than in the previous 1947 campaign. Five of the seats

contested \ve re in North Que ensland , 'iihile the remaining two '"ere

the working class Brisb21cne electorates of Baroona, and Fortitude

Valley. The A.C.P. in all No rthern electorates suffered massive

falls from their 1947 votes, such that , with the exception of

Paterson's electorate , the Party 's vote was eoually low throughout ' 61 . Queensland - i.e. between two and four per cent. This signified

for the first time that the base of support -the Party had once

enjay ed in North Qu eensland had now completely disappe<:tred .

Interestingly, the A.C.P. for the first time in 1950 , did worse at

a. State election than at a previous Federal election. This

obviously reflectedthe psychological impact of the victory by anti-

Communi sm in December 1949 , and , to a lesser degree, the electorates'

realization that any Communist elected would probt�,bly uo t be able 62 to take his $eat in any case. In thi s election, Fr ed Paterson

could no longer stand for Bowen, as this electorate -despite vigorou:

local opposition by both conservative s and Communi sts alike - had

been sub-divided into three new electorates at the 1949 redist-

ribution. In the electorate Paterson did contest - \1fb.itsunday -

which contained a portion of the old Bowen electora.te, a vo te of 63 12.7 % was recorded. As in previous State elections , sub-

divisional figures prove to be more revealing of the changes

occuring in voter patterns . The svdng a. ged nst Paterson >·ms mo st

pronounced among B�nana Pocket's sugar farmers, who gavd him 5.5� 116

of the ir vote , reduc ing it from 35 .21% in 1947 , while the Country 64 :Party vo te there rose from 45 .071; to 77 . 77";�. Clearly, Fred

Paterson had almo st completely lost his reputation as a spoke sman

for Northern rural discontent . His vote in the \�hitsunday portion

of Bowen itself, suffered a similal' drop from 34. 22% to 6.66%,

with both Country Party and Labor gaining almost equally at hi s

65 expense . It was almo st solely the militant mi ners in Collinsville

who provided Paterson with his relatively hi gh vote over other

Communi st candidate s. In Collinsville , he polled 35. 83% compared

with hi s 54. 94% in 1947 , a signif icant d1.'op, but pr01)Qrtionally . 66 much smaller than elsewhere . Jack :Pemberthy , A• C .P. candidate

in the adj oining electorate of Burdiken remembered that. rlhile the

A.C.P. worked equally as hard in t. ;e 1950 election as previously,

there were fa.r fewer supporters wi lling to camp aign, wh ile the

67 Party itself had fewer members.

As the A.C.P. confronted an increasingly ho stile society, so

it progre ssivelyturned in upon itself, shrinking away from the

outgoing policie s of the 'forties, �md , according to Vi ctorian

State Executive member Blake , sought "the comfort of being among

68 like-minded people ". Jim Henderson concurred with this view,

adding that one A.C.P. member at the time said:

lie don 't 1;1,sk anyone to join the Party in case they ar e a copper , and i� anybody wag s to join the Party , then � we are � he 1s a copver .

This timidity of the A.C.P. and its determination to seek a

compromise ;d th the Labor Party was clearly illustrated when the

Communi st Party agreed that if a joint Trades Hall-Labor Pa.rty

'Hay Day' took place, it would be wi lling not to partici11ate .

Brisbane 's annual May Day procession had been a sore :p oint ,.,ith 1 1 7

Labor since the 1946 march wh en the newly declared Pr emier,

Hanlon, led a procession which he later described as "60?� anti- 70 Labor, pro-Communi st". From then on, the Labor Party and the

Trades Ha ll he ld sep�1rate !>Jay Day celebrations (the Labor Party organi zation, the Australian Labor Day Celebration Committee, calling its celebrati ons 1 Labor Day ' ) . In 1948, a.n A.L.D.c.c. offer to hold a joint procession without the Communi st Party, was

1 rejected by Trade s Hall! At the 1950 Labor-in-Po litics Convention,

Jack Egerton of the Boiler-makers Union, called for a similar offer to be made in 1950 , and thi s was supported by Hanlon along with a maj ority of delegate s. When the Eureka Youth League members on the day of the 1950 celebrati ons, insisted upon parti cipating at the sports meeting and pushed into the Carnival against the wishe s of organizer, Brosman, it prompted Courier-Hail A.L.P. .... 72 headlines of "Reds 'Crash In ' on !'-fay Day11• The Industrial Groups, who had oppo sed the offer to the A.C.P. and T.L.C. in the first place, also reinforced their anti-Communi st hostility at thi s point.

Yet in comparison with earlier A.C.P. attitudes, and the symbolic importance of May Day to Communi sts , the larger question of the official non-A.C.P. participation was of considerable significance.

Another defensive struggle in which the A. C.P. employed a large proportion of its energy concerned the Au stralian Peace

Council. Since Henzies1 election when he had spoken of the necessity to achieve preparedness for 'war in three year s ', the

A.C.P. had recognized the ne ed to bui ld a mass base against

Henzies ' bellicose stand - a stand which wa s to be echoed by such prominent citizens as Dr . Colin Clark , who said in January 1950 , tt i think anyone vho ignores the warning th,._t the Soviet attack may­ 73 he only two or three years a'''ay, do es so at his :;_; eril". Federal government nev:rspaper adverti sement s like;.rise stated: The best safeguard of Pe�ce is preparedness for \.Jar . \>e 118

mu st snap out of the comfortable postwar idea tha.t we as a nation can sit down in our own corner ••• [and] be left to live in peace. Anybody ifho thinl..;.s we are living on a ni ce little island continent ''here nob ody •d ll touch us is living in a lost world. The dark for<:es of inter­ national Con�uni sm are not only sini ster but active .

They have their wo rld plans •••I f we are to survive ,

Au stralia mu st be ready •••Every -v;orker mu st contribute to Au stralia's industrial strengti.:. by increasing his individual production. Every employer must plan for greater output of goods , whi le enc ouraging hi s staff to enlist for service as sailors , soldiers or �irmen.74

The Peace Counc il and many of its Communi st members therefore, expended gr eat efforts in early 1950 to gather 150,000 signatures

5 calling for the banning of atomic '\-Teapons . 7 The opposition to this vie,., was sufficient to make the ir obtai ning this figure a demanding and time�consuming effort . Opposition to the cause of wo rld peace within Que ensland a.t -the '.time was such that the Que ensland

Un iversity (Student ) Uni on dis-affiliated the Uni on's Pe ace SocietyT£

In Apr il 1950 , Dean Hewlett Johnson of Canterbury , vi sited

Au stralia on behalf of the A.P. C. and , on the 25 Ap ril addre s sed

3,500 people in the City Ha ll, wi th & further 1,500 listening out-

side through loudspeaker s. The Courier-Mai l whi ch had reported all

of the Freedom League 's mu ch smaller me e tings on Page One , reported

De an He•·il ett ' s up on Page 'rh ree . 77 The newspaper a.lso surrounded

the item with statements from the R.S.L. 's l'resident , Hui sh: 11No

No re .Ap peasements , No Hore f.funi cl1s 11 ; Lord Hayo r Chandler 1 s: "the

gre:o.test threat was from tho se urging peace whi le preparing for war 11 ; and a Fa.ther G. Lo..ke 's .�-\nzac Day address : "Reds Worse Than

8 Japan". 7 It reserved }'age Two for a pro-war Fe ature entitled

11The Cold War Hay Soon Be Hot", whi le its cartoonist, Inn Gal l,

satirized Herllett 1 s arri vs, J. . Two days later in Pedert:d Pa.r liament,

He nzies attacked clergymen like Dean Hewlett as 11wo olly-he aded

dupes •••" , and a few minute s Lcter , when introduc ing the Communi st

Par ty Di ssolution Ac t, intimated th2"t Senator Ho rrow and Eddie

\� ard. H.H.R. could be 'n�:.med1 as Comnmnists under the Act . 79 119

�;i th the outbre ,;.k of the Ko rean \�ar in June 1950 - a war in whi ch the Pe ac e Council and the Communi st Party h:,d distinct symp ..dhi es ·with the North - enmity betwe en such L,� ftists .::.nd

1 society' as a ·1;hole nu.rke

Communists a.t home �•hile young me n enlisted to "Volunteer To Have

80 A Crack At Reds n, became logical in the minds of many ''ho accepted the Cold War's black-and-white interpretati on of world politics. Ten leading Que ensland clergymen in July refused to sign a Peace Counc il Petition - the :EGeverend Pa shen stating , uTheir intention could be to lu.ll us into a false sense of security, of

81 whi ch the enemy might take advanta.ge 11; whi le the Qu eensland

Central Exe cutive of the .c>. .L •.P. on the 1 Augu st pr oscribed a Pe ace

82 Counc il Conference later that month • In No vember , the Pe ace

Council orge.nized an anti-Korean 1v-ar speald ng tour of No rth

Que ensland by jour:llalist 1H lfred Burchett . Throughout IIJ"o rth Que ens- land Bur chett ran'into protests and police intimidation ( as at

Inni sfail where police tried to frighten off potential listeners by standing uniformed officers directly on either side of the meeting�

83 entrance ) • \'lith Nenzi es' introduction of conscription in November

1950 , the Peace Counc il and the Communi st Party began camp aigning in opposition to it, integrating the conscription issue into the

A.C.P. 's central camp aign against the Communist Party Dissolution

Ac t.

Realizing the impossibility of officially invo lving the :l. .L • .P . structure in the largely A.C.f'.-sponsored Unity Committees, with their implied Communist invo lvement , the A.C.P. in mid-1 950 formed

Democratic Rights Committees organized ar ound the A.C.J:.'s tracle union leade r ship bu.se . The function of the se organi z<:ttions "1-l aS to draw in many disparate grou1,; s whi le retaining Communi st uni on 120

leaders expe rti se and dr ive in key executive _positions . To

create a c

of Conferences and public meetings were held in June 1950.

National ly , the A.C.P. establ i shed a Defeat the Bi ll Fund designed 84 to raise £3 5,000 . The Que ensland target wa s £6 , 500. Over-

vthe lmingly , the A.C.P. 's main sup;·ort in oppo sition to the

legislation came from unioni sts, and thi s lvas reflected in the

re soluti ons issued by Trades �nd Labor Counc ils and unions across

8 5 the State . Hine rs at mo st Ip swich Coal mine s we"nt on stril�e for

a day on 3 May in prote st against the Act, and other isolated

stoppage s took place around Queensland in the mid-year .86 In

July , the Q.C.E. of the A.L.P. resolved that the Democratic

Rights Committee \v as a 11 0ommuni st Subsidiary " and pr oscribed it , 87

leading The Courier Nail 's Ian Gall to depict an A.L.P. door

slamming in the face of a smarting Communi st

holding a sign saying , "Disarm and make yourself easier for Unc le

11 •8 Joe 8 A now cautious Communi st Party made little response to

thi s A.L.P. rebuff , and conc entrated on letter-boxing leaflets ,

printing stickers, and distributing the publications of Victoria's

Au stralian Council for Civil Liberties - the re being no such

Queensland organi zation extant .

Although the Ac t never actually came into force, it did

severely di srupt the A.C.P. 1s organization and machinery .

Remembering the Commonwe alth's seizure of Communist pr operty

during its wartime illegality, the Party was determined that the

its considerable capital assets should not again become the

property of the State . On the Nati onal Exe cutive , Queensland 's

Jack Henry forcefully and suc cessful ly argued for the selling of

89 all A.C.P. property. 1' he selling at bargain prices of the J..��� 11t.V;r( IUI6 W�� IT� MEJII\Sf1Z<; ��'fJ.,.JA.,_.,90t'l� A�hto$.T fA.�ItiJ!Ifo.'l'lO� l'-1 �t.Mt!:l �EA..CE�Afc.i1l� � #oTJ; ..__.....=111

I I I

Ion Gall OUTSKI !------by

The Courier-Nail, 3 August 1950. 121

A.C.P. 's large Ade laide St . premises (oppo site the pre sent site of the State \i .w.F. offices) , together with its printing presses and typ e-setting machine s, vhich had been bought at a time "hen the Party was both stronger and wealthier, had a long-tern· damaging effect on the Party . Similarly, the extensive preparations the Party made for illegality: the building of a parallel organizati on, the creation of new identities for Party members who had gone- 'underground ', and the manufacture of flat- bed di smountable printing presses, ac counted for an enormous amount of time which the Party wo uld have other>d se expended upon campaigning against the Act. None the less, the Communi st Party

"worked like never before11•90 As the legislation passed through its various stages, Communi sts, through the Democratic Ri gi;.t s

Committees, successfully encouraged many unionists and Laborite s to pre s sure the equivo cating Federal Labor Exe cutive to use its

Senate maj ority to deny final assent. 91 Although when introducing the Bi ll into Parliament , Menzies had be en careful to punctuate his speech with many quotations from Labor attacks upon Communi sm, he had subsequently outraged many Labor ite s inside and outside

Parliament by his presentation of a detailed list of over thirty leading 'Communists ' and of the various uni on positions which they held.92 As Chifley stated in hi s reply six days later , no t only was thi s "one of the most pathetic uttera,nc es in thi s Parliament ", but , in typical Mc Carthyi st style, the list was in many cases factually inc orrect .93 On the day following Me nzies' speech, The

Courier-Mail, along with many other newspapers, had publi shed the list in fu ll upon its front page .94 Other Branche s of the Labor

Party remained firm in their support for the legislation. This was true particularly of tho se dominated by the Industrial Groups, 122

like the Haryborough Hr ;:;,nch which called on the Federal Party to · help suppress "the se Fifth Columni sts".95 Such views did not augur we ll for the A.C •.!! . in any future referend.um campaign on the issue . Final Senate assent vas give n, after much wrangling by the Fede ral Executive , on 20 October 1 950. The Communi st

Party took heart, how·ever , from the immediate and successful

injunction agai.ust tl:1e Act 's implementation and the equally

successful High Court challenge against the Act 's validity by a number of uni ons , as vre ll as the Party itself. The W.\LF. 's case had been presented by none other than the Deputy Leader of the

Opposition and former High Court Judge , Dr . H.V. Evatt.

The High Court 's rebuke of Me nzies' legislation, provided the basis around which the Prime Iv!i nister correctly calculated that he could win a double dissolution election upon the theme of

giving his Government the power to deal with Communism. 96 Under-

standably, the Labor Party chose to fight the electiou on dome stic

economic issues, rather than embroil itself in the Communi st question. The Communist Party fought the election by engaging in a broad attack on conscription, Korea, inflation, Japane se rearm- ame nt and democratic rights. During the campaign, Nenz ies and the

Liberals clearly made the running 'dth vigorous me etings , displaying the fact th,ct voters overwhelmingly saw· fighting

7 C ommun�. sm as t• h e ma�n . 1ss . ue . 9 In this they were aided by constant headlines generated over the Korean war and the development of the

United State s 'containment ' foreign po licy. Two days before the poll, The Courier-Mail 's headlines'screamed' the Chinese involve- me.nt in the Korean war with 11REDS PUSH lvi!GHTY DiUVl!; Po ured Across liiver 'Thick As Fleas ' "9�

Despite 'thi s, the Communist Party vo te in all State s, other than Queensland , increased marginally as vote rs in predominantly 1 23

working class electorates expressed solidarity �ori th the plight of a Party fighting for its life .99 Such was the case in metropolitan

Brisbane , where in all seats contested except No reton, a higher vote was registered than in 1949 . The best result, in Brisbane itself, increased the Communi st vote from 5.41 �·� to 6.41 7� , whi le 1 the w·orst, Oxl ey, rose from 1 .62% to 1 .65%. 00 In Horeton, with the highest Li beral vote in any of the metropolitan Brisb�tne seats contested by the Communist P<::.rty, the A.C.P. 's vote slightly 1 1 slipped from 2. 2% to 1 • 78'f� . 0 The principal reason for the marked rise in Bowman (up from 1 . 74% to 3.91 %) was probably that the Party obtained the 'donkey vote ' as the A.C.J?. moved up from t!:drd place on the ballot paper to the first . 1 02 The reason, how­ ever, for Queensland's status as the only state to experience an absolute drop in Communi st votes (down from 1 .68% to 1.2�fo) was due to the Party 's continued fall in fortunes in North Queensland . 1 03 1 4 For instance, in Herbert it dropped 2% from 5 .24% to 3.31 %. 0

Overall, Queensland 's increasingly conservative rural community in this, the mo st rural sta·te in Au stralia, ensured that Queens­ land continued to be the nation's most anti-Labor State , with an 1 A.L.P. vote (39.5470 - over 6.5% lower than the national ave rage. 05

On the day following the election, the Ro ckhampton Mo rning Bulletin emitted a distinct sigh of relief, congr<.ttulating the voters for rejecting 11Chifley ' s Communism11 ,

'l' he A.L.l'. at the Nay Day procession, three days after polling d.a;y, had no intention of' allowing the festivitys to be used as yet another Communi st cane \d th which to be beaten, as in the previou 1 24

year 1 s march. The Lahor Counc il was refused permission Trade s to join the procession, anda.nd, to ensure thi s, 800 police, brought

from as far away as Cairns, in what The Courier-Hai l dubbed

"Operation Anti-Red", encircled the traditional T.L.C. gathering

107 position, Trades Hal l. Trades Hall itself had been scaled the

previous evening by four Regular Army men who tore down the Red li' lag traditionally flown for Ha.y Day, distributing "pieces of it to friends in the Army , Navy and Airforce , who were waiting for

108 them in the streets.n Po lice presence at the Union head-

quarters did not me et with s�pport from all A.L.P. members, however, prominent Labor Unionists , Ja.ck Egerton and Bill Hc Cormack joined

the T.L.C. Communist leaders and denounced 11the Hanlon Government 's

1 09 police-state methods" from a Trade s Hal l balcony . Communi st

speakers were more circumspect in their choice of words : however ,

not wishing to provoke Labor on the eve of the Referendum

campaign. De spite the T.L.C. having a much larger contingent of

marchers outside Trades Hall than the official procession,

110 Communi sts went home vowing "1 952 lvould be different11•

The Referendum

Popular newspapers informed their eager readers in early

111 July "Gov 1 t To Steam.-H.oll Pas sage of Enabling Bill 11 , and "Nust

12 Have Power On Reds.1Will Do Our Duty ' Packed House Hears Jvlenzies11! as the Constitution Alteration {Powers to deal with Communists and

Communism Act 1 951 replaced the failed Communist Party Di ssolution ) Bill. The Courier-Mail congratulated the Federal Government - as

did other newspapers - by editorializing:

The reason why the Commomreal th needs special pow·er to deal with Communism is because Communi sm is an Australia­ wide cons:tdracy with international affiliations . It is plotting and working as in other democratic countries to destroy a system of government based on the wi ll of the maj ority and to substi tute the dictatorship of a mi nority . 1 ·1 3 \ihile thi s .newspaper 1 s dome stic political interests i•rere 125

focussed on the Re ferendum , in its foreign ne1·is , it blazoned front

page stories on "Russia,' s Black ,ail :Me thods . 'l' ruman denounces

114 Soviet as main da-nger to world }!eacen. The A.C.P. 's continued

justification and glorification of all things Rus sian, as reflected

in Party newspapers, clearly helped feed the fear s that the Party

was the agency of a foreign power. In the same week as the

Constitution Alteration Act passed through Parliament , the

Que ensland Guardian reproduced highly idealized photograpl1s of

Soviet wome nhood! 15 It would continue to print such photographs

and stories throughout the camp aign in the same manne r as it had

116 celebrated Stalin's 71 st birthday only months before .

In his first direct address on the Referendum campaign to the

Corrununi st membership in Ju ly 1951, A.C.P. General Secre tary Party Lance Sharkey stated:

The Communi sts do no t intend to make formal proposals to the A.L.P. for united front against the referendum ; a nevertheless, the united front in practice from below ;:-must be made a living reality if Me nzies is to be defeated •••The Party must guard itself against sectarian­ ism. In building the united front and peoples front against the referendum proposals, and in the setting up of "No " Committees, we are not asking the masses to accept materialist philosophy or the objective of the Party - we want to unite all of t.ho se who , for one reason or another, �pposed to fascist and warmongering legi s lation. tf7

Following this, Que ensland A.C.r. State Secretary Alex Robinson

pledged his State to distribute 270 ,000 copies of the A.C.P. 's

Vote No Case, adding :

we are just as interes-ted in making Dr . Evatt 's meetings into !nighty demonstrations against fascism as are membe rs . 1le recogni ze tlutt despite his anti Communi sm, A.L.P. he is striking real blows in defence of Capitalist democracy in Australia, blows whi ch inevitably are blows at fascism and war sic • •••Nor must there be any grabbing of the leadership of such "No 11 Committees for fear Labor Party people may gain prestige . Labor P;J.rty workers who gain prestige in the fi�ht a�;ainst war and fascism1 �l:e worthy of our wholehear�ed praise for the ir work . �� 126

In response to these calls, the Queenslanit Party set about est<1b lishing 'No 1 Committees, ei the.r basing them on the old

Democn;.tic .H.igLts Committees, or creating entirely new ones, usually at job sites. Le icester >iebb 1 s statement, made two ye::�rs

19-ter , that :

Those >·iho to ok their impressions of the referendum campaign from newspape rs , broadca,sts and public me etings , might have been tempted to assume that the Au stre,l ian Coro..munist p,�rty as such was not a very active particic;ant. In fact, it was :probably the m �t efficiently active of' 1 � al l the gi·oups who took part. '::J certainly applies to the Queensland Branch of the A.C.P. It tirelessly organized and addressed meetings, sent members on spe aking tours throughout Queensland , produced broadsheets , dodgers, stickers (some bearing cartoons , some slogans ), Hhite>> .,,shed 'No' signs over roads , wa.l ls and b,dldines (including the Brisbane Storey

120 Bridge 's main cross member ), letter-boxed and canvassed thousands of Queensland households, produced 'No' buttons and collected money f'or the camp aign. To facilit�.te the se activities, the Party produced a booklet, U\fhat A !'arty Branch Hust Do", which meticul- ously detailed how houses '-rere to be canvassed, how to man booths ,

1 21 a,nd h ow t o use H ow T o V o t e car d s mo s t ecouom1. ca11 y. Party propaganda continued the April 1951 election policy of uniting the issues of inflation, conunodity short�kges, conscription, peace, the

Korean war and democr;o,tic rights.

Although Chi fley had opposed Henzies ' f(.e ferendum prouo sals , after hi s fatal coronary in June and with the elevation of Evatt to leadership of the Labor Party, the campaign at last obtained a leader equal to the cause . Unfortunately, for Ew�tt, he did not lead a

Party equal ly pre.pared, for as the Sta.te Libera.l I'arty Pr esident,

G.G. 'ti anstall pointed out, '-rith a f<.'tir measure of truth, uThe Labor

Pa1·ty was deeply embarrassed by the Federal Executives decision to MAY: Gennan Lahor Party JULY: Hitler banned the Catholic Party AUGUST: Hitler.brunnedthe fViiddle Class Party

. '

DOrJ'T LET IT t�APPEit liEftEI

. ' ----� :. . · J -� Vr l '' 1-· - � fl_ ,:n_ ''.

· . ti' } \'v' .

AuthorisedA COMMUNIby V. Bonner,S'!' 49 PUBLICATION Elizabeth St., Melbourne.

Printed by G. Whc··l<•r. 16 Curr·s f.

r :-�·:

Au stralian Cunununi st Party lerdlet distributed by the Que ensLu1Cl Branch. 'No' > I I. ' ' • FASCISM IN AUST RALIA No · . .

HIS MASTER'S VOICE

NO Attacks on NO Added Powe

Trade Unions and to Menzies ! - B

other Organisations Added Power fo r t

of the People ! People

::; : : : :"'""

THE Msnzies' Government's Refer.endum for additional Freedom of thought and expression in the struggle : powers is the spearhead of this Government's drive better life-fought for by our forefathers, and tradition' cgainst freedom and democracy in Australia. In their mad all Australians, is threatened by rvienzies' Referendum. drive towards Fascism and the Police State, the Menzles Government walks in the footsteps of Hitler, Toio and Mus­ These are the Issues solini---in their plans to destroy freedom of speech, assembly, orgc:nisot!on and tb� Press they seek to ach1eve a form of The issue in the Referendum is not for or against < dictcttc:-ship which the second world war was fought to munism-it i.s an issue for or qgaioot democracy-fc de�troy. c:gainst the Police State--for or against Trade UnioJ dependence and. the right to improve the well-b&ing o: people. L�st We Forget The Refer.sndum is aimed o:t the people-the people In Germany, Itdy, Japan and other countries which and will defeat the Referendum. suffered under the iron heel cf fascism-where millions died in concentrations camps, torture chambers, Gestapo prisons ·and gas oven-Fascist dictators first attacked the Communist Why the Referendum Party, then . attacked the Labour Party (Socicl Democratic Party), the 'frqde Unions, the churches and other people's with its Fascist Power! organisations At the behest of American big business and warmon The aHqcl<: on the Communist Party is the smokescreen Menzi·ss and Coy. are preparing madly for war. L-1 pre1 for wider attacks on people's liberty-'-is simply an excuse for lion for aggressive wc:r, the rights and liberties of the u carry;ng o:ut Menzies' Pc:sdst pl�ns. History proves this. people are to be casualties. FOR F(lEEDOM AND E 0! D.I_MOQueCRACensland TradeYs and Labour Council 'No'

propaganda leaflet. eferendu Is Step Towa re • F seas

in · That is why April 1950, Menzies introduced the Com- munist Party Dissolution Bill, which, on being passed by Standards Parliament, was challenged in the High Court. This "gun Living butt" on the door legislation was branded by the High Court as illegal in every clause. In Jeopardy Now, cfter introducing other freedom-destroying legisla­ The drive to war, with chronic shortages due to tion, Arbitration Act amendments, Conscription Act, War piling and diversion of men and materials for war r:u Preparations Bill, Menzies s.seks a Referendum which would is causing great hcrdship for the people. High price legalise the Communist Party Dissolution Act-already de­ real wages, . higher direct and indirect taxes, short clared illegal by the High Court. homes, all flow from war policy, The Trade Unions en gressive people struggle against these injustices. A "Yes'.' vote would give Menzies powers additional lv k> more "powers" to smash the Unions those sought in the CP Dissolution Act - would validate seeks whi struggling to prevent war, and for better life. the Arbitration Acts cm::mdments, Conscription Act and War a Preparations Act-would give Menzies and his Star Chamber If Menzies has his way, men and women \vorke: fight for lower prices-higher wages--against longer of 20 Cabinet Ministers all the, Police State powers of a Hitler, 1: Tojo, or Mussolini. for trade union freedom-w Hl be jailed for years. Menzies wants Fascist Police State power because :­ The fight for fr·eedom today is the fight to clef� Referendum. The War Prepa-rations Act-Threatens Australia with Fascist controls over our jobs, industries and farms, over the For Peace, Freedom and .a:• Better Life, we mu$t c people's food and shelter for their families. the Referendum I

A A - The rbitratio n Act mendments Threatens to smash the Trade Union Movement-the main dsfence of Australiari living standards-end gives power to jail for life or fine up to any amount, any unionist who resists unjust awards. Let Us Remember The Conscription Act-Threatens to send Australian youth to foreign battlefields, to intervene against Asian peo­ Recent ple. struggling for national freedom-to act cs satellite troops History Thouscnds of Australians died to destroy tyranr in an American war of aggression. "Yes" vote would give tyrranical power to politiciar ·- · A VOTE WILL DEFEAT MENZIES' PLAN TO TURN 20 "NO" comprise Federal Cabinet. This would be unref AUSTRALIA INTO A POLICE STATE-into. a nation of "liars, authority similar to that used by Hitler. pimps and perjurers," os the. late B. Chifley stated in Par- · J. The power sought in the R-eferendum negates recc liament. · principles of British justice.

• Peace IS Paramount Defeat Menzies' The Menzies' Government declares that war is inevitable because they desire war and are consciously preparing for Fraud aggressive war. Menzies' slogan of "\ Var in Three Years'' Political shows that he and his Government are determined to have Our Unions, Executives, Shop or Job Committees, : war at any price-even at the price of Hbsrty and justice. Councils, A.C.T.U., Progress Associations, Peace Grou Menzies wants war-the people want peace, economic free­ Serviosmen's Organisations, Wome':l's, Youth, and S· dom and extension of democratic freedom. Orga isations - are oll threatened by Menzies' n · i Referendum.

Let us defeat Menzies' Referendum-go on tc Third World War Can Freedom, Higher Living Standards. ORGANISE-on your job-your family and frienc Be Prevented get every freedom-loving person to VOTE ,NO". DEFEAT MENZIES' REFERENDUM-PRESERVE AUSTR The Trade Union Movement does not agree thct a Third DEMOCRACY ! World War is inevitable, but, on the contrary, the Trade Unions place on record the desire of the people in the inter· ests of world peace, that the five great powers; United States of America, the Soviet Union, th9. Chinese People's Republic, Great Britain and France-should meet and conclude c Pact .v TE 0! of Peace. Vve believe that such a Peace Pact would assist in ensuring world peace, which the psople of the world · M. HEALY, General Secrete: earnestly wish.

We call upon all peoples to work towards this objective. Authorised by the Trades and Labour Ccu VIe call upon the Menzies-Fcdden Government to work Queensland. within the British Commonweal� of Nations for such a Pact.

Que ensland Trade s and Labour Counc il propaganda leaflet. the attack that the Menzies Govern'ment making upon them is but a prelude to another depression that the Government is endeavouring to foist upon the country, and, per mediumis of the Referendum, they intend to strengthen their hands against Organised Unionism, and it is Organised Unionism which the Gov

At a well-attended meeting of over Commonwealth employees, held in Brisbane on the 17th August, the following resolution was carried unanimously: "That in view of 500the wide powers contained in the Government's proposed legislation if the Referendum is carried to dismiss Public Servants without trial on the information of unknown COMMONWEAL,T H persons and deny them Long Service Leave rights, and deprive them of Superannuation benefits, as well as reducing them to second-class d' citizenship, and believing, further, that the re.al aim of the Government 1:/l is to attack Organised Trade Unions, and thus lower the living standards c+­ p:> of the people, we call upon all Public Servants to vote "No" in the 1-' fortlicoming Referendum, and to render all assistance in their power "'� 0 PUBLIC to any organisation of their choice to ensu re the defeat of the 1-j Referendum. ;;r, l1l l"l Ul There is every reason to believe that Menzies and Fadden will

I-'• • defer fhe sacking of Commonwealth employees· until after the � Referendum, hoping to lull their victims into a sense of false· security. 0 SERVAN TS. ;:I 10,000

However, as Merizies point-blank refused to consider the tepresenta­ tions of .the Joint Committee, comprising delegates from the High . Council and the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union, to . review the to matter, it is clear that Menzies and Fadden carry out their threats '1 after September a� hould Vo te will 1:1' ...... If the Menzies-Fadden Government gets with this Referendum - it may be the last t!me on which Commonwealth employees will have � the right to protest against any wrong that hasaway been done to them by the Government, so, in order to protect the interests of yourselves and l"{j your workmates, we call upori you . to vote "No" on Saturday, '1 · 0 September l-cj p:> iJ\;1 [0 If Menzies and Fadden are given the green light by the passing p '! p.. of the Referendum it will encourage them to dismiss more employees p:> ' in the Commonwea lth Service, including permanent officers, and none 1-' l1l • wi ll be free from the fear of unemployment should the police state !-� l:ll t'hat Menzies n wish to impose the community be J-l(Jl brought about. This is all the more reason why all Commonwealth - c+- . Public Servantsa shod uldFadd voteen "No" on Septemberupon . "Throughout of 'English criminal otw olden be seen-tftat is tlw dnty of the prosecutionJaw. to r e is � 22. guilt, tosubject the tl'el, de]ence of insanproveity andthread subjecto ' alwarsalso to t.o it to the p is n r s any statutory· what except:umI have said. aR the "No m t or where principle • "�"'�' ·"� ·,· •· at e1 ,r ·r� l t7 ...... t. ...,.. .. , ..,. 1 ,.z."" 1,.., what the charp;l' , : the trial,,.... the th.at the , ;

------__ ... . :_: � -:-- - �-�;;t.: ,::. :..�_.7-; �:.... :-

·{

. . �i

THAN sn: BOND"OLO[R� SHO� I WOUt.D PRH t R �Ek AU�TR'AUANS �TA R'J E/�

�( �fl(O M£O .. n ...... -­ VDK UJ(t W\TH OP£ H ARMS TO SMA�H All OPPOSI TO 1.115 POLICIES 7 1 2

oppo se the anti-Red Referendum11 • 1 22 A numb er of branches , like

the H::;_ryborough 's Branch (,.,rhich pas sed a resolution of A.L.P.

concern that a Federal Executive committed to the transfer of

S-tate povers to the Commonwealth , had. reversed its stand on thi s particular issue ) openly or covertly criticized the decision to

fight the Referendum.1 23 The selection of Harold BoLmd ,

State Secretary , as the Cam}_mign Director , revealed this A.\i .U.

contradiction. Al t:i1ough he and hi s union had opposed Ivlenzies 1

legi slation since its introduction into Parliament , the fact that

he , the , and the State Lab or :Party spent as mu ch time A. w' . U.

condemning Communi sm as they did in defending its right to exist,

seriously undermined the ir own crtse. In additi on to tho se like

Boland , many Industrial Group me mbers dominated Branche s.

Some of the se me n refused to wo rk for the campaigA.L.P.n outr ight , and

openly stated the ir intenti on to vote 'Yes'. The situation w-as

not helped the absense of a ho spitalized Hanlon in who se place

by . . . 1 s . t rong I G rouper I sympa t'n1zer • • G a1r . was Ac t 1ng pren iler. 24

As in other predominantlyV cCo mmuni st campaigns , the gr eatest

effective energy was expended through the trade union movement .

Vo te No Referendum Committees were established in a number of

Tr2.des and Labour Councils, but mo st suc cessfully in Brisbane . On

August, Brisbane 's mo st active A.C.P. union organizers, along wit8 h many officials, formed the Br isbane T.L.C. Committee .1 2 5 A.L.i'.

It concentrated its activities on unionists , distributing propaganda

organi zing job me etings and speaker 's note s. It coordinated the

State camp �ign with daily Executive me etings , and it spent

<.W' consider<'l_b sums on radio, ne,.;srla]�er and cinema screen adverti se-

i · ment s.1 26 {.1·lo s t 1n · un1 ons , l" 1k e th e e 1c e ers, rllners , ·aJ.Vl· ··nu,· c:, bUl

Engineers , 1 so on, establishedvh the· 1ir ·"own ·1 Voa te No.,. ltai hmymeu

Com..'llittee s, \ehi le thousm1.d s of poun(i.s :poured. in from job site Vote ') '' 1 •• o

1 No me e tings throughout the State . 27

E.' vatt opened the Federal A.L.P. 's camp aign rd th a quiet public meeting in Ca.irns on 1 7 August, vlhere he struck up what was to become hi s main campaign theme - that the legi slation was

"unnecessary , unj ust and totalitarian11 •128 Nenzies ' more rowdy audience of 3,000 at Brisbane City Hall three weeks later , reflected the A.C.Y. 1s frequent confusion of equating its own infl icted

. 29 rowd yn ess w1. th ma ss unpopu1 ar1. t·y o f tl1e ll.s. -sue J.n . ques t 1on. 1 In reality, the effect of thi s tacti c was to guar antee Henzies' meeting�:

Page One coverage across the nation, v.rhile Evatt 1 s quieter meetings were usual ly relegated to later pages. In The Courier-}�i l, this resulted in four Page One stories compared with one for Evatt .

The certainty of bias however, was implicit in the fact that the same paper printed 'Yes' and 'No''Letters to the Editor ' in the ration of 2:1 , and in the partiality it showed to the 'Yes' cause in editorial s and cartoons . In its first feature article on the

Referendum, The Courier-Nail juxt::tposed 11Lc�bor 1 s Case for a 1 No 1

Vo te" with its second fe::tture "The l� eds Are Hoving Into Paki stan11! 30

On the following day, an editorial urged voters , after two elections to "Finish the Job111 31 - a constant theme , whi ch was pursued along with such continual epithe ts: 'Fifth Columni sts ' '"ill expose

Au stralia to deadly peril · in \var 1• 'Yes 1 editorials were served out at a stea(ly quota of betw·een one and thre e per week. Carto onists

Ian Gal l and Jack Lu sby - concocting pictorial comrn entry like Evatt telling a citizen, w·hile looking at a rathe r harmless Communi st: "Not a bad fellow really. \'lhy eve n if he shoots you its only for your

1 own good'' - had cartoons printed at a similar rate • 32 The

Referendum 1 s cri tics were l1o less dramatic in their cLdms , ' . , J-.lot a. W Sal"to) tllow.�e�IG . ..._W�,evel'\if h€ .skoot� �·�� IJ 01\ �" ·, t.Sow� ljf'd Fat\) ijOLir

O NOT WHAT TH E D CTO R. ORDERED ------

The Courier-lllai l, 17 August 1 951 • .EAVI NG TH E DOOR OPEN

The Courier-Mail, 6 April 1951 . LE. � ,.�/ ---'�' 1-3 A M'B ft 0oT S'( A-esoP) 0 Ot\C..e�pol\ a tivne 0 ,Jus� . � .about the p,.ese��.t, � u.Mg 1-'• (I) ·· \"ed To )<. wa.o:. lul'kil\d 'raw..d 1"1 I &bouts.vb.!ua ble p�u !trH fa """· '?' pr wa? 1-'• Thefo x,�s �- told �ou1 1-' ,. ! . · \)el'�·\Jtv � wily,a� 1'1\ore th�� ... · · N I . a�·w rone.::1 erto ..t�.t o.·· � ca.tc.h k'i w. . 1-' '<

'-0 VI ... • • �.' ' ' �-...... �"� -i · . . fufarft\er,)\Ot ;t;� k ' So C&n'ied awe.�- w6' •.

· 1 . .• .. \\Ol'5� 'Vo 06 re \" 'Z>prf)V\d to the. . JU�� [oiJ.ed 6uch. prctectlar- 1 .. 1 .�fox- ·. _.:.... As fov the. vt�t of tk-e f. ar�r� · , · ; ,}:t \,.. -CJQfe�c.� of1J..e · • lus wti:fierif �) , ·t{l! tt1 11 )'· _C:_ 'takiiJit"fvllo'�"" · · �koci

· .

· . � 'Srealhe<�So 1kevea ma\\ witk 6ou\ so dead

wko l'!evel"1o hil\\�elf ha.1 k �aid :

ih.i-6j$ W\� OWl'\ ,

M� 'N>1 ive land/ 11

,

LETS DO ' THEN . - SOMtTH. I,.SG NOW TO 'HOLD IT/ - · ....

The Courier-��il, 14 July 1949 . I I .

· KiNG BIG TENNIS-. ------� . _:_TAL OF ....,...._ by lan Gall

The Courier-Nail, 6 September 1951 . 130

full 'Yes ' endorsement , 'expo sed ' the we n.k.ne ss in "Narxist

1 1 philosophy and beliefs11• 4

1 Unl ike the 'No proponents , tile Coalition P.. "r ties did little campaigning other than occasionally di stributing leaflets and placing advertisements in newspapers. Their firm confidence in a swe eping 'Yes ' victory wa s suffici ently buttressed by a strong if 142 declining Gallop .Po ll maj ority for the ir cause . Hany Labor

Brrmches expended little more energy, as Jack :Pemberthy noted in

1 4 3 the Bowen Branch c:;�,mpaign . 'ivhile this was less signi ficant in North Queensland \·rhere Communi sts could comp ensate for A.L.P. inactivity, in Central and Southern districts, thi s inactivity was mo re serious . Tramway s Union organizer , B. l'icCabe , ivho toured the

Da.rling Down� , noticed the "apathy of A.L.P. elements ••• the A.L.P.

144 in some towns 1vouldn't handle the camp aign at all". At the

1953 Labor-in-Politics Convention, a !-Jr . Stoko e remonstrated, 11I talked in the hus tings in oppo sition to the 'Red Bill ', but how

145 many [others] did you see there?" Communi st Ted Bacon declared that it ivas Labor Branches like Rockhampton, dominated mor e by

• the Industrial Groups than by the A • ,.-.U., that "stood as ide from

146 the campa1g. n 11 • This al so appl ied to a number of H.L.A. 's with

'Grouper ' loyalties like Tom Rasey of Windsor . Prominent

'Industrial Group ' supporter Hick Brosnan M.L.A. , told a fellow

A.L.P. member, Manfred Gross he intended 11working for the c.:w1paign

1 7 'vith all the strength of ••• [hi s] little finger". 4 Other

Catho lic or 'Grouper ' N.L • .A . 's like Gair, Condon Byrne and Pover

148 did, however, ;v ork in the campaign. Prior to polling day , ne ither the �ue ensland Guardi an nor the Communi st Party, :pub licly complained of the failure of large sections of the A.L.:?. to work for a 'No' vote . The -""- •C-.P. in Que ensland was sufficiently aware 131

of feeling prior to the cn.mpai gn to anticipate inactivity , butA. prL.P.im��r ily it did not wish to expo se any chinks in the 'No armour on the eve of poLl ing day. 1

In fact, despite a number of setbacks in the camp�ign

(demoralizing Gallup Polls results, hostile pre ss, and the non- a cooper

Street C'lllllvassers re.ported to the paper: 1' Policemen have been friendly and helpful. 'I d.on 't think many of them will be voting

1 for l\fe nzies1, one said11 , 50 while one of the Guardian 's favourite story lines was the political conversion argument typified in a statement from a shopper on 12 September, voted for He nz ies

1 1 last time , but there 'll be very few vo ting 11!'Y es' now11 • 5 On another occasion, the paper recorded opinion poll taken in the an streets of Co llinsville(!)ivhi ch gave 'No' 72.Z/o, 'Yes' 16.7%,

1 'No ansvler ' 3.7%, 'Don't 1;:noiv ' 3.7%. 5 2 The Party did justifiably take credit for its own work noting for instance, that August,

1 g2,000 of the A.C • 's Vote No )_)amphl et had been distributed in

1 3 Que enslana . 5 In Au.P.gust, the 16th Na tbnal Congress of the was held in Sydney. Formally , it marked a maj or moderation A.C.in P. policy outlook since the 1 5th Congress, pledging i tsel:f "to worlt

1 for the peLtceful transition to Socin.lisrn11 • 54 Yet, in fact, thi s emergenc e of moderate policies had occured in mid.-1 950 as the ultra-Left mi stak es of the previous five years w·ere recognized.

During the last t1vo we eks of the campaign , the 'Yes 1 proponents as w·e ll 11-s the 'No' campaigne rs intensified their activities. Dr. Duhig 18 September told his congregation, "I on believe that in voting 'No', I would be voting agu.inst the best

1 intere sts of Au stralia11 • 5 5 In case some were still unconvinced, I !BE MAN BEHIND THE BILL I Die for this or I'll "declq:.:e"youl

Que ensland Guardian, 15 August 1951. Queensland Guardian, 22 1951 .

August 132

t1-ro days la.ter The Courier-Hail published a letter from him; stating "The Referend.um is surely a choice bet,.re en Stalin and 15 Christ11 • 6 At the same time in its only Editorial on the

Referendum, the Catholic Leader concluded:

Au stralia has before he r the example of the mi splaced trust on the part of England, and the United States, where the very liberty vl:dch the He nzies Government now desires to curb, begat nests and nests of Communists who

actually betrayed their 01m country, and it mu st, regretfull be said that such people are not wanting in ;57 Au stralia.

In the press, the constant cry of editorials that Communi sts vould be voting 'No' was answered on all A.L.P. advertisements ,

'"hich now carried the slogan: "Every Fascist wi ll, of course, Vote 5 1Yes1111 8 Stories from Ko rea and other areas of Asia on the nature of Communi sm there, filled the front page s of the popular press.

As journalist Denis Warner declared: "New Drive by Cornmunists in 159 South East Asia11 , The Courier-Nail 's leading feature writer,

H.J·. Summers� tried to allay Evatt- induced fears of a post -

Referendum radical re:pression by telling readers , "Nobody but Reds 1 0 need fear result", 6 'vhich "'"'s corroborated by Institute of l'ublic

Affairs advertisements declaring "Remember only the Guilty Need 161 Fear a 'Ye s' :t·:laj o rity 11 • With seven days to go before the

Referendum, Liberal advertisements depicted the image of a Chine se soldier, ugly and with a gun, bearing the simple caption, "The 1 Communi sts are at war with Australia11• 62 The very day before the

Referendum, the front page of The Courier-Nai l revealed 11North

Korea has rejected all International Red Cross proposals for 163 providing comforts for Al lied prisoners of war". 'l' hen, on polling day itself, Denis '\·l"arner outdid previous efforts and described the heartrending tribulations of Nala;yans : "From behind barbed-wire bctrrac ades, surrounding their estate bungalOi¥s , 11alayan planters today ivarned Australia of the evils n.nd danger·s of 1 4 Communism", 6 while the Army carried a large display <'A:ivertise- ·--:-··:-·--...,...--....,._.__.. -�·--- .. ------.

� . - - � _ . -�-:--.----:r--, ___ . t" .,,. , . · n. ' . ·.. ·�J.) _:· t;_,J ' '·._.: . '",.·' .. ,. · . �r. c>''o 1 · "? 'f':r � � ) ··- . . ��:.J.,� �·�" � � 'R\;-.:.' u· "Y\""""'1� ·.'i '�"""� t. �� (�'· - , w· J:.\.:_· {• cl/ a·· ... � � 6..�\j �t ' -�' . :� · : c ··�t · t_"�� . : · ·� 1"":"7.:) � ,!,.; _., )' 1_9· : I.Z�' · l,,,·< . . .•• '· �""' "'"'� ,,·, ' .. . �� : �: ·= - � . ,�lI {� Y) a 'V'" .· NO I: _:. \·..;- · f; :J �� t '�Z' :: dnily paper in Australia published·n& · in .. : . . , >�" � A the. terms Referendum Ac:t. :Ji· ; has f�U �:::;:q · --- -·,-.�;;:;;� by;:�����,;::;.,::����;ed.t� . -··----�----�-,...--�ll:·==�-:::::-:m ?f the �� tors ? pas_s�cl .: �CD sugr.cstm�r•·thot lhe.�Menz.•�,'. ;i)_) t-�' � ·-on!;• po\�cr rc·ena� � ct. the-� ·Pa rt}<. CD have -brtef wordmg,t.o S�pt�n>b�r)I�[·· ���<�!-! 1:::1 CovcrnmclltDissolution seck.w hich .High' Couri. Cbmmunr"t (/) . nnd· f�audulent_ · �l 1-' 1\ct,: .. , the : � : : · in ei " · ;�';s; �;:[· ;_;:;;�;;;jf,:<;i' � . 'J:Iere is7th b�llot �-. pe�:'w!th : ·. declaredQfie�()lf in.valrd;J�� . �, � , ..�.:;,, wc>rdtng� · .'. · �, .. · . · ' · · f:· .· -� ·.-··:::�··;�::...:-..:· "-: � · . :. , :: ,::.r�_�!� .·"�f:�< �, ,,clause. . · � · � . i g. ..� :·::• . < . . : ;_pp�ove· > ·.of iiii{prhit�·:·sirictl!p();i ed 1-3 . Cons!ii:Otion ·· . . '.'.:::· -.:! entitled ·-�� . 1-j .. ,.:...'.'Do law. <. \ �-.,.....J ��-� of q,.>you' 'Col).!ititutio11Fo�c1Jl Alb:!rat �( !l1 i I - .... CD� o ''" . (/) is#!�f . ·'· \ to- •)cal�rn �L 'l·� Co:mnunisbtES: . - � :..�· r-: �r and C�mni�i:lm.�.:::·;;_; >:;�:,t.::-:}��l.$5l (;� :\ �" > ·/.('c ·.- . ... ·.-:�· ... ��J1 1»JL.J :• ,� [ . ''. � D. no!..NO , �-� : .. :·..::.,.it'-::�:::;'-, t"' . . � -t"� fliaii��nt )n�'J_ul�;:tdl�?; boVftnt. ,tl(e: ��V ,, , ..- 0" d�es ���-qh·e;t�r���·�� : th-�l��1�1\'dii'' 0 as . Thebnllot , •, ... .� P""�d;'by � .. -�as thQ'U)ph;�beti;�Lorde� . 1>��;;:.��:�· so ;����:�� �I��p�'�,,� c .abolish �d�·nd����t{ ti�if;��::�rll¥ki��:��· 0 ,'! "·:,,;:d.� :····;: be� .. .. · 0 . . . - . . . 1, .. § . .·.· · · · .1 . . ' . · f-1· 'I · ' >· 1-' • .. · . . · : . - - �· ® :j ,_ ,u.J · "::PJ;.inly, rhe C�vernnient ' � : . ,; :::c - ) ris��d' tlie m --�' r · · Cf!! . Jl: 'l, t.• • 0 • \,. ' . ,. I"� - · into · :f1 i . : �eferepdum: has1;.: eO:;-�qid�J! ba_tn�.lfonjt; S11th� P'e1'r-� t� i .:. ·>'; ' · G.,ver-nrn'ent'would�live. fJ,!." . �lfort'to' �: t �p.,. (/) · ··

...... -�- �--... , . ... ·• · ' .. _, -�·- :_;�.-� . . : '{,_...._ : ·.:. .t.'_ . ·• -:- : }, ;,,,,. ;;��;: . Lliorlscd L\!. 0 · :.�� ·tr��;'·�;�¥ . . ·:.-:-· t�_·f r;,l . ·, g · An �.$ by ·� �� · �.• L!.J. i' �� .

strali • ANO TUE REST O'FTHE �RE E WORLP They are carrying out the Moscow plan for World domination. 't-hey1re already fighting our soldiers in Korea and Malaya -- and even more dangerously, they1re betraying us at home. _ They1re slowing down production, ·forcing up prices. They1re infiltrating our Trade in Australia

;cd by Heath . · a . '"· .• one�rt St

ON. 5£111. 33 1

ment 11Korea I!' orce - The proudest service a man can render to

65 Au stralia and the free world11 •1

As pol ling began, de spite the Q.C.B. rejection of joint

A.L.P./A.C.P. mam1ed pol ling booths , some individual

66 A.L.l". mem ers ' . d coo:perat e 1n . t'-u1s. J>J.a s h.l.On . 1 Large numbers of eL l. boothsb , in Central and Southern Queensland however, lacking either

an or a willing branch, failed to have anybody

6 handingA.C.P. out ttHow To VoteA. L.P.'No'" cards . 1 7 At Liberal and Country

Party booths , Austr},l:i..an flags and Union Jacks w·e re flown as

1Yes1 cards were handed out by canvassers saying, perhaps somewhat·

6 confusingly, 11Vote No to Jo e !!1 8

The Referendum Results

Although Me nzi es lost the Referendum by narrow margin, the a results in Queensland were a further setback for the A.C.J?. and

its supporters. Of the three State s recording a 1Yes1 vote

Queensland, Western Au stralia and Tasmania - Queensland recorded

the nation's highest tally of 55.76% (,>fith the other 'Yes ' State s

6 being 55.09% and Tas . 50. 26;7�)1 ? Queensland 's vote reflected

\f.A. the continuing electoral decline of both the A.C.P. and the A .L• .P. in this State , as well as the essentially conservat ive values, in

this, the mo st rural and. decentralized State in Au stralia. At

every Federal election in the post-war era, the vote had

A.L.P.7 been between 6% and 7% behind the national average .1 0 This

recurred at the Referendum , the 'No' vote of Que ensland being

6.32?6 below tl.!.e Nat ional vote .171

On an electorate analyses , Queensland 1 s higt,est 1 No ' vote

district, Kennedy {57 .037h) , w·a s significantly lower than that of

the highe st Victorian, New South ale s r.nd. South Au stralian 1 No '

\'I" 72 sea,ts, which all recorded just over 70%. 1 lf ithin Queensland , at 1 3 4

electorates 1-�here the combined A.L.?./A. C.P. vote in the 1951

Pederal Elections was lo.w , the 1No' total ;{as slightly h:igher ,

173 al t1wugh still sma11. Again in electorates w-here the combined

A.L.P./A.C .P. vo te in the 1951 Federal Election wa s high , the 'No'

174 total was only slightly lower, although still rehtive ly

Thus, there was a tendency for all electorates to approach a me an in comparison with performanc es at Federal elections. Overall, the Que ensland 'No' vo te at 44 . 24% , Wets 2Y� higher than the

1 A L P A . . P 75 combined 1951 . . . / C . vote of 42.23��.

De spite the now complete electoral disenchantment of the

No rth with the Commw1i st Party, the banning of the A.C.P. evidently did no t receive the support of many who had so recently held some sympathy with the Par ty . Thus, the Northern 'No' vote

176 averaging around 517b, was we ll above the State 1 s average . In

Central and non-me tropolitan Southern Queensland , the fact that

W<:L s the 'No' case had barely been put reflected in the low . 'No' vote , which var ied from 30.127� in MCPherson to 46 . 26?� in Wide 1 7 Bay . 7 Brisbane electorate s, whose 'No' vote ranged from .54% in Brisbane to 3 9.34% in Li lley, had a negative average of ar ound 7

Because of the enthusiasm with '.Jhich the Queensland Sta:te

A.C.P. greeted the 'No' victory , it spent little time w·orrying over the State 1 s poor vo te, other than taking a few· shots at the

A. L.P. 's lack-lustre camp ai gn effort in the Queenslcmd Guardian.

In fact, the final Financ ial Statement of the A.L.I>. 's campaign reve aled that of its total receipts of £4 ,272, it spent only 1 9 £2, 890 , leaving nea,rly £1 , 500 unu sed! 7 In comparison, the

1 Commurli st Party in Que ensland spent between £1 0,000 � ;�1 2,000 . 80 1 35

.As lvell as this , Brisbane Trades tend Labour Counc il s:lent

181 £5 , 3 55 through its Vo te l;io Committee.

Unl ike the Southern States, ivhe re the Vote 'No' Cc>m_paig:tl received strong support from a variety of acad.er:i cs, churchmen/ and I civi l liberties organi zations , Queensland 's campaign received little aid from such org"'-nizations or individuals. 182 Rence, in QueensL:.md,

the 'No' campaigr.c 1Vas waged almo st solely by the 'r r;j,(le Unions , the

Communi st 2arty and a section of the Labor Party.

An additional factor in this campaign vras the role of the

Catho lic Church. In Vi ctoria 11here the A.L.P. '.ras even mo re strongly tlividecl than Queer.ts land, the influential Archbishop

Mannix Et nd other leadiltg members of the hierarch�efused to commi t themselves, vhile in Queensland , the Church and. Dr . Duhig enthusiastically threw· themselves into the 'Yes ' c .mpaign. Aus tralian Public Opinion Po lls several days before the 1�eferenctum revealect that a higher perceut ..Ee of Catholics intended voting

No {46?�) than those of the maj or .Protestant religions (Church of

Engl and 36%, .Presbyterian 36�b and He thocl.ist 337;)• 1 70 Unfortunately, the figures did not give a State by State breakdown, hut it would appear likely that the Queensland Catholic 'No 1 vote 1VOttld be lo"�>rer than in other states.

Cle::.crly, the overriding factor ": as the politically conservative character of the State of Queensland, a func tion of a decentraolized society which produced a cons ervative Labor Party and Liberal/

Country Party as its representatives. The conformi st educational system, the culturo.l backwardne ss , and the conservative character of the meuia reflected a.nd interacted id th this political · cons ervatism to j?roduce an overa.ll relative ''e litkness in the 136

condition of intellectual and socio-political rt�,dicalism in the

State of Que ensland . 137

Footnotes.

1. See for eX

2. A. Robinson Queensland A. C.P. State Secretary in Ibid. , 23 :tvfarch 1950.

3. Ibid. , 23 February 1950.

4. Ibid ., 23 March 1950.

5 . The gueensland Digger , July 1950.

6. The Courier-�h i l, 28 July 1951 .

7 . See The Queensland Guardian, 5 October 1950.

8. �he Courier-Mai l, 22 May 1950.

9. Ibid ., 13 June 1950.

10. Ibid. , 14 June 1950.

11. The \'lorker, 15 May 1950.

12. Ibid. ' 8 1-'Iay 1950.

13. For instanc e see Don Cameron H.H.R. 's article in Ibid ., 2 October , 1 950.

14. The State Service, August 1950.

15. Bill Thornton, Op .Cit.

16. See Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Convention, Toowoomba, 20 February 1950, Op . Cit. At the Conference, among those opposing the Industrial Groups, w,.,, s Labor ve teran, Earnie Lane , who angrily told the Convention "Communists are elected to leading po sitions in their unions because the workers see that Communi sts are capable leaders , ;Iho really work in the interest:: of the ir members11• See Que ensland Guardian, 2 March 1950.

1 7. See Ninute s. of the Q.C.E. of the A.L.P. , Op. Cit"' 1 September 1950, and Queensland Guardian, 8 No vember 1950.

1 8 . For example see Collinsville motion,�linutes of the Q. C.E. of the A.L.P. , 20 June 1951 , Op . Cit.

19. The Courier-Mail, 5 July 1951 . The Courier-Nail did use Tapitals for Communi sm and Communi st Party wh ere it was more effective as in this case . Furthermore , where Communi sts were defeated by Industrial Groups , The Courier-Nail continued to give them complimentary publicity. See Ibid. , 19 July 1951 .

20. For simp le details see Queensland. Guardian, 30 Harch 1 950.

21 • See Q. 1:'.D. , Vo l. 199, 1950-51 , p .1681 . 138

22. The Courier-Hail, 26 Apr il 1 950 .

23 . Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Convention, Toowoomba, 20 February 1 950 , Op . Cit.

24 . Queensland Guardian, 27 April 1 950.

25. Ibid. , 24 August 1 950.

26. Ibid. , 7 September 1 950 .

27 . Ibid ., 31 .August 1950.

28 . This intimid:l.tory practice was to continue for al most another tw·enty year s before 11 rotests, largely conduc ted by University stude nts in 1 967 and 1968, focused attention 011 it�such that it ended.

29. Qu eensland Guardian, 1 5 No vember 1 950 .

30. Ibid. , 23 Harch 1 95 1 .

31 . See Que ensland Guardian, 24 August 1 950.

32. Ibid. , 5 October 1 950.

33 . See Que ensland Guardian, 1 9 January 1950 . Thi s station in the same month also banned the Labor l'arty, but thi s ban -.;ms subsequently lifted. Ibid., 26 January 1950.

34. Ibid.. , 1 6 February 1 950.

3 5. Ib id. , 20 Ap ril 1 950 .

36 . Ibid. , 7 September 1950 . For instance in Se1)tember 1 950 , 4 CA Cairns refused time to the Pe ace Counc il. Hovever this, like 4 TO i' o,msville9 did sell time to the var ious Vote No groups at time of the Referendum as did al l other stations . See Report of the Brisbane Tr a,de s and Labor Counc il 'Vote No ' Committee .

37. The Courier-t.� i l, 7 ��y 1951 .

38. Ibid. , 20 July 1951 .

39. Ibid ., starting 13 Au gu st 1 951 .

40 . Ibid. , 1 5 Au gust 1951 .

41 . Ibid., 1 August 1 950.

42. Ibid. , 26 October 1950 .

43 o Although the High Court issued. an injunc tion conce.rning the legality: of the Ac t t. after representations by Ev;"'tt on behalf of the ti . \'1 .:£.'. , the tJourt ruled. that the police could lavfully seize Communist Party documents ::.md. re c ords :pending the results of the Court 's case on the legal ity of the Act. 139.

44 . Ib id. , 2 November 1950 .

45. Ibid. , 6 }�rch 1951 .

46 . Ibid. , 26 July 1951 . 47 . Ibid. , 1 '{ November 1950 .

48 . Ibid.

49. l<'or example see re:;:>ort of Ne nzies�4 September 19 51 t City Ha ll me eting The Courier-Hai l, 5 September 1951 . 7 50. Ibid. , Au gust 1 950 .

51 • Le c;i onnaire , (Journal of the Que ens land Legion of :Ex-service­ me n and Women) , Ju ly 1 950 .

52. Que ensland Guardian, 1 Nove mb er 1950.

5 3 . Ibid. , 7 February 1951 .

54. John Playford, Op . Cit. , p.109.

55. Quoted in Norman Cowper9 Ac tion Against Communi sm in Au stralian Quarterly, Vo l. X::GI, No . 1 , Nar ch 1950, p.20.

56. For example see Queensland Guardian, 5 April 1950 .

The Courier-�fuil , 28 Apr il 5 7 . 1950.

58. Ibid.

59. Q,ueensland Guardian, 11 Nay 1950. Al so 2 and 23 l1ar ch 1 950 .

60. The Courier-, 24 January 1950 . Its coverage of thi s rally of over 1,000 people was a one inch single column on Page 3 .

61 • See Appendix B ( i ) . Al so see B ( ii ) where the State _:L.C.l�. vote is show·n as dropping from • to • 1 26% 37%.

62. 1-rhi le thi s is an appe a,l ing argume nt , I don 't think that vas very significant for rea.sons I wi ll explain \fhen looking later at the re sults of the April 1 951 Federal Election resultE r-"·�-:>I 63 . See Appendix B ( i ) .

64. Ibid., B(iii) .

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

Jack P.emberthy , Op . Cit. 67 .

Communi st Review·, October P. 68. 1 951 , 947 . 140.

69. Jim Henderson, Op . Cit.

70 . Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Conve ntion, Toowoomba, 20 Pebruary 1950.

71 . See The worker, 26 Ap ri l 1948 .

72 . The Courier-Nai l, 2 .May 1950 .

73 . The Que ensland Digger, January 1950.

74. The Courier-Hai l, 28 No vember 1950. Intere stingly in a Gal lop Po ll survey of 10 maj or \'le stern J:'o wers on the likl ihood of another world war breaking out within ten ye ars, Austral ia registered the hi ghe st numb er of agr eements

75 . Ralph Gi bson, !·ty Years in the Corrununist .Party , ( International Bo okshop , Me lbourne , 1966) , P. 164.

76 . See Semper Floreat, 21 I>far ch 1951 .

77. The Courier-Nai l, 26 Apr il 1950.

78 . Ibid .

79. See C.P.D., Vo l. 207 , 27 Ap ril 1950, P. 1995 .

80 . The Courier-r·fa il, 8 Au gu st 1950.

81 . Ibid., 31 July 1950.

=:,§;,S 82. Ibid. , 2 August 1950.

83 . Queensland Gu�rdian, 8 November 1950.

84. Ibid. , 13 Ju ly 1950 .

85 . See any Que ensl and Gu ardian issue from Nay 1950 onwards.

86 . Ibid., 3 May 1950 .

87. �linutes of the Q.C.E. of the A.L.P. , Op . Cit. , 27 Ju ly 1950.

88 . The Courier-Nai l, 3 Au gust 1950 .

89. Ted Bac on, Op . Cit. The Vi ctorian representative o no t only spoke against thi s decision but refused to carry it out .

90 . Interview with Bi ll Sutton 17 Apr il 1974.

91 . The Qu eensland Guardian, 8 November 1950, stated th::J, t five A. L.P. branche s, as vre ll as a number of trade unions and the Democratic Right s Committee, called on the Federal A.L.J:'. to reject the Bill in the Senate .

92. C.P.D. , Vo l. 207 , 27 April 1950 , P. 2000 . 141.

93 . Ibid., 9 £.. 1ay 1950, P. 2, 260.

94. The Courier-�1ai l, 28 Apr il 1950.

95 . }finutes of the �.C.E. of the A.L.P. , Op . Cit. , 1 Se2tember 1950.

96 . Governor General NcKell granted. a double dissoluti on on the dubious constitutional question of the fai lure of the Senate to pass some Banking legislation, since Labor macie it clear it •w uld no t rej ect the Na tional Service legislation.

97. According to the Gallup Po ll (The Courier'""f!Ia il 18 .April 1951 ) over 30% of' Liberal vo ters considered Cormnuni sm the main election issue , 15;& ahe ad of all others .

98. Ibid., 26 Ap r il 1951 •

99. See A1:=_penci.ix A (i) .

100. See Apgend. ix A (iii).

101 . Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. See App endix A (i) .

106. The Ro ckhampt on Bul letin, 1 Nay 1951 .

107. The Courier-Hail, 1 Hay 1951 .

108. Ibid.

109. Que ensland Guardian, 2 l•1ay 1951 •

110. Ibid.

111. The Co�rier-}1a il, 3 July 1951 .

112. Ibid.. , 6 July 1 951 •

113. Ibid. , 12 July 1951 .

114. Ibid ., 24 July 1951 .

11 5. Oueensland Guardian, 18 July 1 951 •

a 116. Ibid., 1 Q Jan11 ry 1951 •

117. Ib id. , 18 July 1951 .

118. Ibid. , 15 A�;.gust 1951 .

119. Leicester \·iebb , rrcomi!1Unism a.n(]. Democracy in Au stralia: A �urvey of the 1951 li.efere�, {Che shire , r·!e lbourne , 1954). 142.

1 20 . The Courier-Hail , 22 September 1 951 •

121. No Author. 'i- .C.P. Sydney , 1951 ).

122. The Courier-Ivlai l, 20 July 1951.

123. Ibid. , 19 July 1951 .

124. Hanlon. did give w-r itten SUJ?port to the 'No' Cc],[npaign . See

The \·iorker, 13 Aug-u.st 1 951 •

125. See Appendix D ( i ) .

126. See Appendix D ( ii ) .

127 • Ibid.

1 28. The Courier-Hail, 1 8 August 1 951 •

129. Ibid. , 7 Septembe r 1951 .

130. Ibid. , 10 August 1951 .

131 . Ibid. , 11 August 1951 .

132. Ibid. , 17 August 1951 .

133. The ·, ro rker, 13 .August 1951 .

134. Leicester Webb, Op . Cit. , P. 112 .

135. The Courier-Hail, 4 August 1951 .

136. ��ier-.f1ai l, 9 Aue;-ust 1951 .

137. Ibid. , 1 6 Augu st 195 1 .

138. Ibid. , 17 August 1951 .

139. Ibid. , 10 September 1951 .

140. Ibid. , 21 Se:Jtember 1951 .

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid. See 24 August 1951 and 21 September 1951 . A joint table of the se results shows :

June August J>lid . SeJ?t . 'Yes ' 80�� 73% 53% 'No 1 1 2;,0 1 7% 405� 8,� 'Undecided ' ;o 10jb 7;1,

143. Jack .Pemberthy , Op . Cit.

144. Oueensland Guardian, 26 Septe!llber 1951 . 143.

145. Report of the Lab or-in-Po li -::.ics Convention, l{ockh'."-l!il1ton,

23 t>iar ch 1 953 o

146. Ted Bacon, Op. Cit.

147. Intervievl >vi th Hanfred Cro ss H.n.r;;,. , 20 Septet:lber . 1 '774 .

148o Intervie>v llith Bart Lourig

149. Queensland Gm-:.rdian, 15 August 1951 .

150. Ib id., 12 September 1951 .

151 • Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Ib id. , 22 Au gust 1951 .

154. Report of 16th Nat ional Congress of the A.C.P. , (A.C.P. Sydney, August 1951 ) .

155. The Courier-f.-Iai l, 1 9 September 1951 .

156. Ibid. , 21 September 1951 .

157. The Catho lic Le ade r, 13 September 1951 •

158. Ibid. , 20 September 1951 .

159. Ibid ., 15 September 1951 .

160. Ibid. , 17 September 1951 .

161. Ibid •.

162. Ibid. , 15 September 1951 .

163. Ibid ., 21 September 1951 .

164. Ibid ., 22 September 1951 .

165. Ibid.

166. Qu eens li:md Guardian, 26 September 1951 .

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid.

169. See Appendix A (i ) .

170. Ibid.

171. Ibid.

172. Ibid. 144.

173 .. See (iii ).

174. Ibid . A

175. Ibid.

176. Ibid.

177. Ibid .

178. Ibid.

179. �finut es of the Q.C.E. of the A.L.P. , 30 November 1951 .

180. Oue ensland Guardian, 26 September 1951 .

181. See Appendix E. 182. Tr.lb ile few junior academics at Que ensland University campaigneda for a 'No' maj ority, they lacked the status of Southern professors , like He lbourne 's Profe ssors Naxwe ll, Cowan and vlright , who spoke the legislation. Similarly unlD.ike the Southern capitals, no leadingI. Brisbane prz. otestant cleric camp aigned for a 'No' vote .

183. See Table in L. Webb, Op . Cit. , P. 96. Conc lusion 1

If the exigenc ies of the ''I'ruman Doctrine 1 demanded a

Western population willing to picture the Soviets as the

1 craftsmen who 11mad.e perfect the te clmi ue of the 'Co lcl \{ar '", then in Au stral ia, and varticular ly �ue enslancl , there exi sted a pol i tic<'tl climate in 'll hich the seeds of anti-Commu nism found fertile gr ound .

O:p era.t ing in Que ensland were a number of groups 'llhich , for

a variet;;r of reasons , had H. ve sted. interest in damn :lng the ideolog:y

of communi sm and the policies of the Au stral ian Communi st Party .

The Au stralian 1dorkers Union sa1v both the Communi st l'arty and the

Communi st-led unions as threats to its o>vn leaders and

entrenched industrial po sition. The Catholic Church pictured the

'holy war against athiestic-Communi sm ' as a mi sson for Go d. The

Returned Servicemen's Le R.gue recognized in the Communi st Party 's

beliefs , characteristics at od

of the business commu nity, who feared or had alre ady felt the

impact of Communi st support for industrial stoppage s, had economic

reasons to seek its c!.emise . The conserva,ti ve political ?arties

and organizations vie1ved the Communist Party as a threat to the

very political social and economic status quo in vh ich the se

organizations existed. The Labor Party contained a mixture of people with notions me ntioned above and tho se •n1o , from a sometimes

so:phisticated ideological perspective , rejected the domimmt

totalit rian spirit of the Au stralian Communi st Party e-nd its

ide al - Stalin 's Ru ssia. Final ly, the strong anti-Communi st

pr ejudices of the 2opular press reflected the beliefs of the

01mers of the State 's news.t•e,pers, lii-te Sir Ke ith Hurdoch, part­

ow·ner of 'r he Courier-Ht-. il and of a number of provincial ne·�<' sri?.pers. 146o

Al l of the se groups 1-rere all r)resent in a society economic who se and de mogra,phi c fe ature s were at variance 1.,rith the industrial bia,s

of the Au stralian Communi st Party .

:E.'v en without the industrial policies of the Communi st Party

and the predilection for 'Red-baiting ' by many Queensland gr oups,

it voulcl have _proven impo ssible to insulate Queens landers from

overseas (pa,rticularly American anti- Corrununi st scares' 'i'Ihich saw

the ' Red hand ' in everything from homo sexmt.li ty to 1 racial integration.

It was the importation of the se 'scares' as we ll the manufacture

of dome stic one s which resulted in the near impossasibil ity of

tuning into a Que ensland radio news service broad.ca,st or reading a

local newspaper without he a,r ing of the 1Red. menace '. Furthermore ,

Au stral ia 1 s geographi c location and its historic apr>rehension of

the 'As ian hordes ' then fre shly fired th revolutionary aspirations

in Indone sia, Indo-China , Korea China'd , ensured a glowing and concern among Que enslanders. Nat iona,lly, :E.' vatt s to chart

an inde:::l endent course in foreign affairs increas1 atteminglypt drow-ned w-as the chorus of vo ices calling for 1var preF:,redne ss the standard-

beeby ,rer of thi s approa,ch having been elected Prime liiini ster in

December As Pr ime Hini ster, He nzies stated:

19It49 is. my belief thc.,t the state of the vrorld is such that we canno t, and mu st not, give ourselves mo re than three years in which to get reddy to defend ourselves. Inde ed, tl�ee ye ar s is a liberal estimate . No body can guarantee tht�t it may not be t;.ro years or one yecLr . Certainly, nobody can say with authority tht"t we have a day more I\th ree years . 2 any The absurdities of Cold liar logic typified in Ne nzies state- ment could not and dicl ;,ot displace overnight the wartime irrk•,1 ge of

the Soviet Uni on as he roic and fi'iendly al ly . Similarly, the a, pa,-Gr iotic ima ,e \·rhich the Communi st Party had. tried to 11 roject

foll01dng s invasion of Rus sia,�to oh_ some time to eval)Or!:l.te .

Germai>y 1 147.

'l' his transition \.,r as only ac complished by a grttdua.l :process \vhich

\fO n over people 1 s ' e art 1 only ye u,r s of the constant

pressure of propagandh a. s Yet

existed in Queensland throughout the stmlied, ,,�hich,

nurtured in a sym:pL'"thetic c.1 .tmo sghere , provided the base from ;.rhich

more widespread <'L nti-Communi sm could grow. Sociologists Elihu an<�

Lazalsfel

others in C.e terwining the vay peor•le made up the ir ahea.d was

r> ersonal influenc e They then vent on to say 111.ii mindthins small socit�l

groups (families, cl11 •3ubs , \vork_places) are opinion le<',d ers and ,- -.. �

that ic1eas often seemed to flov from ratheredio and to oginion

leaders cmd from them to the sections of ·hhe po_pulation11 � ··�hilst this pattern of colessmmuni actcaivetion was

established society, a simi lar process of attitude reinforcement

was taking place -;vit�1in the social context of the Communi st Party

itself. As its members in the late 'forties becarae :progressively

isolate(i from the society in w·hi ch it was implanted ; so the

increasingly and paracloxically :fulfille-d social functions normallyA.C.P.

provided by outside society. The Co�nuni st rarty scre0ned Soviet

films and it organized trips to Russia. Its members read Russian

newspapers and. maga.zines and followed Russian sporting teams .

It would be false, how·ever, to picture the as being

purely the victim of external Cold. \far tensions . .ti.The.C. P.dir ections of

its o-vm political policies s•·mng wil(ily as it continually adjusted

to the changing demands of Ru ssian foreign _policy. The se swings

w·ere invariably unconne cted 1v i th dome stic political events, yet

they were implemented and justified as if they vr ere responses

to .Aus tra.lian conditions . Indeed, me rr:bers overl·rhelmingly and 1 48 .

unc ri tic al ly ac c epted the se vol te-faces as such. 'i!he A. C .l:'. 1 s policy of support for industrial mi litancy, founded on the false

Sovi et premonition of vrorld capitalist economic collaJ_}se , guaranteed the ho stility of a maj ority· of Qu eensland 's population

1vho >d shecl to go about the ir dai ly activities uninterrupted by frequent anct bitter industria.! (l isputes . It also exacerbated the already tense relationship bet1>1e en the Communi sts and tho se who had to deal directly vr ith them - the State Par liament a.ry Labor Party .

It was hardly surr1rising th<:;,t this Government responded 'vi th

legislative powers armed at 's;;atting the Communi st pest 1• It was also natural that a maj ority of the communi ty apr1lauded their efforts and took a simi lar stance at the 1951 Referendum.

Formulating effective domestic policies within a generally prosperous co!P. muni ty was a probler:t vh ich plagued the Communist

Party from the end of the Second 1iiorld \>f ar omlezds . rTatering down socialist obj ective s and integrating the Party into the local community (even if successfully ac compl ished, as it was in w-artime

North Que ensland), merely created ano ther ;!_Iinor party of reform _ which could easily be ac comodated into the capitalist economic structure . Hindsight shows that the Communi st Party's rej ection of such a policy and its embarka,tion on a programme of industrial mi litancy, gained it little . No t only did it he lp to bring down the Federal Labor Goverr�ent , but it also di s inc lined Labor

Parliamentarians to work for continued Communi st Party legal ity later. Because of the A.C.l'. 's strict adhe rence to the 'inter­ national line ', only once (in the wartime No rth) did the

Cownunist Party in Que ensland attempt to relate its policies to the peculiarities of the Stf.tte 's conclitions . The maj or thrust of the A.C.l-'.1 s post-war policies iva,s cl irectecl at the urban indu strial 149.

population.

In September 1951 , the Aus tral ian Cor:mmni st .Pa rty hai led the

national Ii eferenctum results as a sweeping vi ctory for Au stro,lia's

democratic sensibilities . Anti-Communists in Que ensland on the other

hand , claimed that their State 's vote reve aled its greater

a]_)pre cie,tion of Communism' s evils . In fact, throughout Au stralia

and in every State , both the 'Yes' and 'No' cases attracted a large 5 (over 44J'a) percentage of the vote s cast. In the Re ferendum , a gre at

many registered a vote not in response to an ab stract conflict over

the rights of an allegedly to tal itarian Party to exist vli thi n a

capitalist tl emo cracy, but for numerous reasons , ranging from the

influence of peer group attitude s to Nenzies ' inabi lity to de al

satisfactorily with domestic economic problems.

\'iith the anti-Communist H.e ferendum, the pe ndu lum of

° Communi st popularity in Que ensland had comp leted its 180 swing .

The Party 's a·t.tempt to find the viable .Po licy to fit the obj e ctive

social conditi ons of the period totally fai led. Ye t there was little

evidence to sho•-r that even if the Communist Party had adopted policies

in keeping with Queensland 's socio-e conomi c structure , and presented

a genuinely critical attitude towards the Soviet Uni on, it would

have be en either appreciably more suceessful, or any less likely

to have escaped its public image as the servile stooge of Mo scow.

For it is certain that the amalgam of conservative and anti-

Comnrunist forces w·hi ch Que ensland forged in the post-war era . po ssessed

both sufficient force and ranc our to destroy the viabi lity of any

truly ra.dic ,.1 party of the Left. 150.

Footnotes

1. From a speech Prime r·Iini ster Nenz ies made in Parliament . C.P.D. , Vo l. 207, 27 Ap ril 1950, P. 1995.

2. C.P.D. , Vo l. 21 2, 7 Narch 1951 , P. 78 .

3. Elihu and Lazal sfe ld Katz , Personal Influence ,(Collier­ lviacNi llan , 'I' o ronto , 3rll Edn . 1 966) .

4. Ib id.

5. See Appendix A (i) . --- _.-... ;; August September December Ap ril September t;11�5 j C1 "0 w 10 28 22 (I) l"'J REFER.E1Will1 C) 1 �(I) l-.;..j ;b obtain No . 19,') 43f f%ob tain Order 1946 949 1951 1951 YES J�? -" � e-t- ::cJ -ed by A.C .P. red by of i" Oi of of Cl ST.ltTJ-2� f� t · . Val id No I r:; f�J- j tTj A.C .P. Candid A.L .P. A.L.P. DER Val (D ::u "yJ rR j -ates VOTE . Vote Vote l j ·; tJ> ------+----+- � ' I •...... 3 eT iJ:-' C'wealth � I I 89 .oo I 5o .56 ,----� 0 f-3 1 .98 17 49. ;1.49 114,49.71-1 . 135 145.981 11 27 147.63 i-'it!< txj • ! 1L I ·;r,�· I I . 1.25 5 5.3.79 4 1.48 5 1 51.371411.14 114 146.8915 !1.17 9 149.14!5152.83 6 17' t'.:. VIC . 4 I Ti !,.13. 1.98 5 43.36 1 1.23 47.89 2 .52 6 46.80 4 • 7 149.1415151 .29 4 I Qld. 3.53 1 47. 2 1 .98 2 43.05 1 1.68 11 39.54 1 11.22 6 141 • 01 11 144.24 1' 55.76 Qld less I l l C 11.:.Jealtb -2.1 -6.661 I I 1-6.44 -6.621 l-6.32 <' 3 ',,}_. 2.6.3 2 54.39 5 2.77 21 54.49151 • .38I 2 149.691 6 l .71 .3 !48.92!4152. 5 47.29 l;J .A. 2.56 2 55.53 6 .74 1 1 ! 54.80!6! .J9 J 2 145.39121.67 12 !43• j2!4L;.o91 2 55.09! 11\S. I 1 .03 I 2 149.32 3 I I 5 .8:T 46. 21 3 148.23: 3� 1..9 .7 4 3 50 �------5 � -· __ ,__.,,-· _..-. , --.--�-·---�-1 .. 0 .. Th.e bulk o:f tbe percent�:s es c;:m tained :i..n the .Appendices He re calcul ated from app ead.ng in m , St&te and Federal Parl iamentary Papers . Additiunal fisures Here drawn fr�Jm , C .A. , and Graba B .D. , Canberra, 1968. AJiandbo ok of Au str?-U:9:!.:t_.f��y e:cnmef1t a. £ld P0 liticr� 1929-1 96Q, A.N.U. PreBs --!• . - ---- ·-:---- ·------I 194j 1946 1 951 I d C':' (]) /0 Position lNo. of obta:tn Order % obtained Order tained "' Cl -... ed by of by A.I...F. of C .P. on �A.C .P. ([) • p • J.·p • . • A.L.P Ballot Candid � I� . I. p c+ I' !).) r-cJ Vote J Vote Paper 1-ates , ;n l ,_ . _____ ,eo .., ....,. Ol .. .t:::. t;J "'' Q H • 88,-· l 2 11 }> ...f .j 155.09 52 . 06 45 .98 1�--.89 .35 !1.5 . 24 1-t,) l;q c+ Q • l 1 .3.59 I 1\. 6 H. 1_,-.,J 54.99 2 51 .JJ. 3 43 . 86 1 l 1 .70 D 4 44.27 3 ! c+ !ll I 1-' ' I 6 1. 7 I B 6 . iTIC . 52 . C6 1 55.44 5 45 .46 .3 .3. 53 A 4 50.17 I 4

-:::v ·r�11� .. rl... . ;;;:, c+ lesfi �� 2 � 1Heal ·l ·1-J ,12 -9.41� -1 .83 -5 .7 I .6 F 3 ! 49.541 5 .,36 1 s . .li . 58.49 6 56.94 6 47 . 5 8 6 9

'J, • ...- • A 1 2 B .I 56.39 .3 55.31 l 4 46 . 10 5 1 . 81 3 43 . 75

1' :\ Q �1 J.,.<;,!-)"1. 50 .54 c 2 47 .49 B 2 57.34 4 . 81 2 /+ 5 · 79 4 4 1 4 I . I ------·------+--- -- ..J___ --. 21 Aug . A�c.fl. 28 ?':' �� up the.. I';. j �,c, l".. '- ··- :.Je_· Lo�T 7.; • ; Sept� A-.Lf. 1 De�.1 949 28April ,195) �:E1�Ef. J. t-1 ...... 1\.(1(\".C..P.i.., • , J I p,"';;.Af' ! COr>d;:, \1'\U1:8Pf1:l I . P. 0.. 1'1.�{ C\ 1946[··--10 M'\� ()(\ !;?.( A .C 194.3 . I C p 1' p Q!?.l:'AP 'ta0 1:'"} � T" ·o c t.n::,n• �A c p 1\ ·r p A:)�.i:o fA •c • p rLP cn-�t�· 'TO . y-,. ... of'cloo�J,_..._;::ll}-'' L • · - · • � .� v-. l'.u.; . . : , n ----�:'..::S 11• _ � A...!!;• • nL )..?, !!=· ·""·-- - .�·;.;u �- - VJ t9 ':? ') aw · �. � . -- -��1 1? 1 Br •. ne .. ; -; :i.tan isb�:�- fl.._:_�-�--- ..!'-��----f.;�.!. . .. ! J I \52, r5 7 . 71 ' j IQ 'retropol ,. - !60.90 I r 4 I:5 ,£41 ,30 6.411"5'3.57 159.98 52.54l/}7 .46 1-7.1;4 . lfr} 3r.isb.ane . -1 -561 --> I . • 48 [ - .32 • 1 - I 6 t4(·/.:2'6 +2.11 ! : 57 ! 1 ! l � I i - 14! 6.2 .3'7 '5I 1.63 I ;:r : .44 l l :50.14 : :2.04 ,46.28 1 42> ; 1 j I t'R ,,·: 1 Grif:fith · 1 ...> l • f LUley : I I. ''U � l I , !.39.34 16o.66 -t·1 ./.;.1 · : l I I I I j . lug L] " ·1 _ 1.45 .66 i l- lL�5 .?6 .1• '"' : I f't>-';;. · . • :40 . 1 l p7.9.3 l u 1 '"'? i'? 1 � •• . · on 1 :, 0'"' r:�.: 1 . '' .-:'> , ..., ,; . ...;. ?(: ' tw,,J o!!Ore ·.'"+1 · ·.J I ! �-'·- ·:1). l �"-· '..) • '-'')•o"" l • o i ;> u• • .� • - •-) -�'>+.25 ! I. i-:l · t'l..,::;_. � 6 1 "' "71 14' r" 19 44 71 I . "' I L I I I 1 w 1 1 7 '+ I ':! . t:.:l t . Bor,.nnan l : . ' . I I 9 I I 1� ! ! i1 . 74 l4i l, .8'7!' 46 .61 I!J. 1 !4i 2.01 Ii4 5.92 45.oe; 1' 54.92 11 -.84 !''' i . . t:;! ' . __ �'J xl e;y:: _ . . . ;::-r- 1 J!,1 . 8 5_5_. 1 2 t-' ' � �t • i t ' � � � l � !*• '] ._Qj__ � 1 •..Z:l.L .l..4.9-�J 6 M��� g;� i I i ! J..L._6 2 U-! P .fr.L02.J.J�92. l 4----....;- --1----L-l � f � c ' ' l ' f ' l i ! i I ' i l I 1 lJide ,Bay - !36.52 t l3 .75 12.B.14 i.31 .89 ! l32.57l - l >t-,3 1 !-'· j l I I I ' ! !-'• .� entral ! l i "' i 14J.Or1 46 .26 5'];.74 . 6 • I · � t4 -' · · l ' / - r<·,- l • · · 143.08 ( "' jtcc-1 ...... , p,,t 1 o 1 . ·' ;l Haronoa ' nn - • rr ':\'7 o. 4.3 .95 5 1.05 -+o . 2b - •4'7• -"- , i u; : 11 !_.. • 1'. g l: ! • . ao.a ''::!':',. 1 1 ' ':Jr.:. ,• �• c�. . 1 ' ' �J ! : ·-n ·�2?�,-��i . 79· 0 1 - l ;:! ) 7t0 64 • .q , ., 1 l. - t:; I i l �·.) • / I I • 4 • ; • I ,.., 0 ' 7'7 '.31 ! ' ot:-! �, .... ·� 9 1 D ar_lng D 1 . r.. .. �- 1 i - , ! '·' . crwn s 1 , : .3 1 • cl- �outhern i ' ' I ' ' : I ' I " •' . t I I ? ,.. c;o ') c:: • (V" 1 ...... (i) I i i , _)\?"). ..�. • '"-.;_. � ' � .....:; • 0\ : M.;,I ...;� : � : ) �_:; t ' i t 1 1 : i r: ' ? 60 1 ��-c.; �ueensland I I I i f l l l 1 I l . j ! ! l I • I l?? j j r /.QI ; I · -;.C: f,) · sh� --··· -·,---· _..!...-- "L •.±::L6._., \ ---""..!-=:.:.±--- l . . ;:- .. - . ? 5 6 '?· 1 6t\ .JJ. ' , ----:-' ···--·-- r ---..-� 1· r r- ! � I i f=-I '=-!-� ·-�--1·.,!..._._... 1 ' ' i. - r-l ; • i I I i ; I i i i l. ;' ilerbert .3 57.!,.?. 5'2 . 76 -.�.• . ! �71 I 54.6.3 .J1 5/t. 1 1 . .24 t iJ!, . l 62 � . i:15 .J $ 46.03 ;I 61 .331I 5.24 l 49.391I !j l l · li 47 • l 2!I .37. I �" ! i , . ! J i . ?!1. J? ., ,.{- t'r I tJ7 t:-. ' I ')( \ t:''l- ?Q · 6"· '·/ 5'...,l • • Ci"f i ..., • � i 0 :J • , i 1! .) 1.•:J1 i � ;) • H � • ', ) 1 J 0 • 1 - , • •... \. .1 • ... "+ ... / i , - ;) • TD rt.h 1 ' · I � I 7 ' I I I I i I l : . i . , � •• , i r? '1 ':1 ?(-. ,., .. • 1 r.c:. <:1-t J 1 r:. eH> I rr:;• I i 1.3 1 _,':I l'c:.nrlCd!'lll,q );J oOU l -· ' 4_.JoUj) I ··- I·;6+ o),' j ,. • i - ! 0 • ' '+' . ):- •:-_; :- ._.,; - I ' 1'1 I I •1 ' ! ' 1 ?7 I j 7 i i ' 77 i ' lUe cnsland . I j 4° 5 . 75 .56 I .n;; 46 . • I 1 I! i: l ! ! I I: i.3. I 1.;7 t 42 .:Wt jI J.8? I Il Leicb bardt ! ' ! I 4 152.69 1 I n"• 1· "'�)n ' ' !/.17 '??.10 l1 . r:: '3t - !f.-:J,.66 il1.6C 52 .69 ! -,-·�.6:::: li . . '7�1' l I --- ��--�12.���r.:=--��--r�:��-�--�-�? �-----��-- ) 1. -; - . �-.-1 •. - ! . ;----· ' • :; ' -r-- : ) 'hole · c; JJ t \...:� 1 . :;. ,. • ··•+ --�-c • , '+·� ·-:;-r��;-���--r · - . 1 1.. 1 5 -" •1-o ' 1 1 • 6 8. • • ... • 2 2 ! .,./� .c.. ' � • '_,.!.•' t i } t (: ' . ) J • .., -" j_ n -·-·· Df I I I ! .. . 1 I J- --- -...L.---- "_"______I _L______----4':1 1 ! J .....-'·----fI _,...J,...... _._ -·----·--�- f I 1 ����;-�·---�------=----;·----15��-;------T---?z�;··---·--- ·---- 291 . 1 I� ! l crn,1B­ lI ,....._ •• __ • __ __ ��.LP..!...... Jr•: £D __ --� I H C/Jl·IB - I r.::s: -..,.:;;;IN=EEL " ! 1 .F.I _ __ '"O _ ; I I (,; _.25.48 5 61 .�3 _.!:J � _J " j 9.76 1 2.14.-+-- J a -� _,_ " " .. (I) "' 44.r·O �T.34 - 3.54 __J_ ------� �., �·-- , n �" ;oo; Pn -L ------ji ci- ·-=t=··-- f'1 P.n "3nHen . -i (i.:· +-� � I 17 ·-+---- Ul �;: . Eerbert _ -.r--) (f""0 ! 1--'J ru ---'""'1'\J --- ' ------· · - ---+---t---t ls-'1�'­ ---- j -· , .. ;If · ' • • lt:"··"' ':" "', _j_I '?" -3.1I- ;� 54o7.6 0 2 l 1 --4I H:. ,t,:· :p; - - " -- - -- I � 1'' - 1!: -· l '7 · - 7' - f 60"+ .72 U -i-- --1-··""'r'""'t) ---r-:�-----+--r-r-r! - · u':J -;- m ' ci- j

.....------. ------,----· -- · r -·------! ---g:-4-- 'T5 . -::67-!5T.�?33------· -- -- �Jynnum =t �. 3 - -- * -t':..• r�'Fu."+u ,�* that the /I..C.P' c��U�at� wa� Op Jooed -+ �"' andl.dat onl� � e s. by the A;L.F. r !I I . l �n��cates -"� ·'hP. d A.L.I r I -- _ �- 7.03 43 .58 I IP-87 iI 1 �no.J..cates js a _144i -67 J__ I .62 2.02 , To tal ]. -- 7.'!1 .64 ------·---·-I 48- 89 I percentages I ' - ·- • and ---··------·- .D A.St ate Parl iamentaryGovernmen t Ha.ndbook of ll.u stral ia.n Politics 47.16 .J7 o4J -, -, ---· -----+

+=>E; l e l::s 12 I I I I. ------.. .. �---�·-··-·-�,.--.� -·-···rw.7.-- -·------l--·------19Lf�·-:�--·-·-·-----�------T950 I . - · • '·. ..-.. ·- ,...... , --� ·: ' ... "; t"i ·r..... · >' · •. .•T · .. • ·, · Y) ·n ItF· • ; ,J .i�. '' " · .. �- }...} l t· . . Co: :l�:i_�ntl.r.-:.·,.Gri1.x·.1_e I 1 · . ".C 1 I . j f.. C.:· . II ij 139/,_ j . !890� 1� .•Va�L id Jj \,_I ,c,,. ,.�.L. .P. 1. i . Val id Vot1 es 1 54. 94 otes 1Ja l id • I I I � I, Po1-reh 1 I 50 .89 I 35 . 3. f�· . *60 !(I) _, I • I 1 4· 94 ! 40. 1 I • 0 ° -·- ! ? 0 j O 4r:. ?: 1 4 74 1 • • iJ) I j·1 I+ ·-'+ / 11I 3 3 ,4.3 ?/ id ?? V.Y tes Val � . 794 V al. , ') -·4 j _.) ' ,:) id Votee 1 1 1 1 ':> 1 6.66 jf-J· ! Fo:x:dale 12,0I 51 l .::3 66 I 1--..S·' 44 1 lg��f� · !'2 l 0 "l "' 1I I y3.63 j . 31 .81 I (; I 28 V a! id Vo s Va1. Votes Valo:),;id Vo te e l�,er . 71 I 29 8. 69 l f �t>):) I _ l 42_ .85 12l 1,42 I 54 i I '1 I I I . E·anana Pocket i Votf:-' k.. 6 .4 i1f li:/i.,_ 1 3 . . ' • 73 Val Votes Val id , Val I r0 I I 11 1 21 7 16 11 _ ... I � 119.71 145.0? 15.50 \7'7.77 ! 1: I . 1 j • • • • I J. . 'L vo HtlEln : 1 ., .. I .. . .. I �.)... :Mt,rp l. I I '"1\ J. r.llG tne C)n sU•.l .liT1810ne e ! a J.n m.J mucrJ D:L vc'n;e.rs. l \.' J y d • group] t ho-wevl er,t as Bowen "13.J,;:r: c,1e�128 provincial 0 nse ct- ni''CW·'f:'::'FJ to is the only "nedium sized ��1....:::� .. ---- ____ .• .. -----··--- j (-'• to1m ��=-:h�-- ����.:.__B:_e�� ·------t:��r' ��_::- _!.��u::_ =�----_: _ ---� l��:.�- �: ;.J iJays l(l} APPENDIX C (fJ. TRADES A.f\! D LABOR COUNCIL EXECUTIVES, ill& President H.J. Harvey Miscellaneous A.L.P. Workers' Union Vice-president G.:Z.1. Dawson Carpenters ' Uni on A.C.P. Treasurer F.O'Brien Sheet Me tal Workers' Union A.L.P. Secretary 11. Hiil.ly Waterside Workers ' Union A.C.P. Executive N. O'Brien A.R.U Members B. Hough Transport Workers ' Union A.L.P.

1947 President H.J.Harvey A.L.P. Vice-president G.M.Dawson A.C.P. Treasurer F. O'Brien A.L.P. Secretary M. Healy A.C.P. Executive M. O'Brien Members A..H. Dawson E.T.U. A.L.P.

1948 President G. :e.-1 . Dawson A.C.P. Vi ce-president }f . O'Brien Treasurer F. O'Brien A.L.P. Secretary M. Healy A.C.P. Executive A.H. Dawson A.L.P. Members A. Macdonald Ironworkers' A.C.P. Union

1949 President G.M. Dawson A.C.P. Vice-president M. O'Brien Treasurer F. O'Brien A.L.P. Secretary l.f .Hea.ly A..C.P. Executive A. Macdonald A.C.P. Me mbers Not filled

1950 President G.M. Dawson A.C.P. Vice-president N. O'Brien Treasurer F. O'Brien A..L.P. Secretary M. Hea.ly A.C .P. Executive A. Ma.cdonald A.C.P. J>fe mbers c. Bushe l! Bricklayers' Union A. L.P. T. �1illar , iJ 1Bri.en, 1-.. . ':facdona1d,

F. 1'1 L)lan, E. ,J. lianson, C . G· . ·��ie stbrook.•

F .G. Jolan, J. Egerto n, :S. C:rinLm, C. Bola.,:.' ld , 1-�. Grahar1, 1�. l:Iacclonalcl,

1. :Tc .. ,i illa.n.

'Jr.r,;anisation T. Eayt·!Dod, P. Campbell, T. Lambert, E. J. Hanson, C. Murp hy, V. D. Crooks . •,': c:

� • • n Gasfitters o. .c:..lnong; J.Cl 6. -'0 Se amens 1�. o. 5. • Scu�en Ormiston 1 : :� 1 .3.o. ,?e·, ::: rnen Dn l\aierniAa noor<� £2 . 0 • :•Iac hlnery 2. 11 0

s. ; . IJ�;�n:) orc. Co:;ks . I.o.J 0 . :SheetSbeet ;'·le:1ettal2l 1 ,3. 2 '"" 6. 5 - �{e ll -(�te1-rt:.u·cl Co:)ks n . 0 .1-\ust. Cvmpany • 1 :)

IromI:Lr�ers,J·.J rk Un.ersion £500. • 0 ,3. ('I'··' . :Lnc� �-Jor kers £600 . o. 0 2n.ir.tters • SeamenfPendle3 T.J nion Cv""D niss 1 o. 0 Union C) 0 \{J.t0rside -��IJ rkP.rs 4·) . ('I Ino:bfail 'T 3: L Councll () Ship Palr..TJnters:i.o11 £1 18. 0 ;·r. Groveley H. J.. '1 4.0. ,, -----.--...-..... ,_ . _ ._, _ r. , ·; ...... ! �c Docl-;:ers 'J . 0 Ship './ (,- , 16. ;� : 0 • /0 , !>Il-d, "'I 0 (' • 6 Painters(D.d �-l bane & Dockers 10. 18. : ... o. 0 Bri.sbo.ne Trarr.ways 9 1�' ::1 A.s.u. 5. 1 o. !) ,;; ; I·l. 6. 12. 0I' ' r 0 ) • Sheet �"[e tal .3 1 Trade Un ion o. 0 } ? 5. ..1 2.. 2. 0 ------·------,. "+• 1 Un ion ' Ii.h,J ::Ldes s Buil ding 1 o.• o. 0 Seamen 1 00. o. 0 Cbristy Eristane • :J. [3.Denman 'vJork.ers 1 14. 3

. I·b sp . 5.• 5. ;) CrevJ 16. .3.(1 . 0 Total Po tsl 1.-J cH':-:ers o. 0

1 • • 0 D. cctricity Dep t. :· rayn.ete 1_ ::rwet Jc teJ. Un i.)n rs 2. 9.. 2 �-J . Shell bDurne-J?s.in 1. �,) ') ------,353. 2. 9 .! .C , Brj_tton '7. 7. ;J APPENDL'C 1'' .

Distribution of Queen sland 's Population.

· -_ -__ ---- ·;:=====-=-== =- �- -- ______I r j QUEENSLAND Disuibution of Popula1i.:;.n l al 30 -6-47 = I l Doe 500 Pcr>on< !

I I'

.... � . .. . .

. .:

.· ..

. . : ·-· �--j___ _ _ , --- !

I I i i i • .. -· - ! -·- ·-·-· -- - --·-· -·---· -- --- ... 1---·-. - - - i ! ! I ... l

From Queensland Year Book , 1951 , No . 12, (Government

Statistician 's Office, Brisbane, 1952), P.44. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ( 1 }

BIBLIOGRAPhY.

FR HW.t.Y SOURCES.

Interviews: Tom .Aitkens H.L.A. , (Deputy Nayor Townsville 1939-1 944. Expelled from .A.L.P. 1941 . Elected to State Parliament 1944). Interviewed by J.M. Beatson 25 September,1974 . On tape. Located U/G Library , Audio Vi sual Section University of Que ensland . Ted Bacon, (Editor 'Guardian' 1946 State and National Committee Member 1948 ). Interviewed by J.N. Beatson 10 August and on 21 September , 1974. Second Interview on tape . Located U/G Library, Audio Visual Section, University of Queensland .

Manfred Cross N.H.R. (A.L.P. Vote No campaign worker 1951 ). Interviewed by J.M. Beatson on 20 September,1974 .

Dr . Ted D'Urso , (Radical Club Ac tivist,University of Que ensland ; Assistant Editor Semper Floreat 1950) . Interviewed b� J.M. Beatson, 13 August 1974.

Ron Haas ,(A.C.P. Activist and Brisbane Squatters Movement leader). Interviewed by J.:t>I.Beatson, 23 September, 1974.

Jim Henderson, (A.C.P. Alderman Wang�ratta Shire 1939-1 944. Assistant Party State Secretary 1944-46 . ·North Queensland District Secretary 1946-48 . Coordinator illegality 1949-1951 ). Interviewed by J .Iv1.Beatson 14 August and 24 September. Second Interview on tape . Located U/G Library, Audio Visual Section, University of Queensland .

Bart Lourigan, (Secretary of Enoggera Branch of A.L.P. and Delegate to the F.D.E. Currently State Secretary A.L.P. Queensland Branch ). Interviewed by J.M. Biatson on 20 September, 1974.

Brian Mullins , (Currently organizer National Civic Council). Interviewed by J.H. Beatson 16 September, 1974.

Fred Paterson, M.L.A. Interviewed by Mr. Fisher. On tape. Located U/G Library, Audio Visual Section, University of Que ensland .

Jack Pembertby, (Joined A.C.P. 1944 . Active in Party in North Queensland throughout period. Candidate for A.C.P. in 1950 State Election) . Interviewed by J.H.Beatson on 22 September 1974. On tape . Located U/G Library , Audio Visual Section, University of Que ensland .

Charles Porter 1'·1.L.A. , (Director Que ensland Institute of Pub lic Affairs 1943-1 945 . General Secretary Queensland Peoples Party 1945-1 950). Interviewed by J .N.Beatson 19 September 1974 (2) Bill Sutton, {A.C.P. activist. Currently manager Peoples Bookshop, owned by the Communist Party) . Interviewed by J.N.Beatson 16 September, 1974.

Bill Thornton, {Organizer Catholic Social Ac tion Hovement 1946-1 966. Currently State President Federated Clerks Union. Prominent 'Industrial Grouper • throughout period). Interviewed by J.M. Beatson 24 September, 1974. On tape . Located U/G Li brary, Audio Visual Section, University of Queensland.

Pamphlet and Correspondence Collections.

Communist Party of Australia. Queensland State Committee offices, Brisbane .

Primary source pamphlets he ld.

Bla.ke , J.D. War . What For? Federal Press, He lbourne ,1949. Churchward ,Rev.Dr.C.I"i. The Plight of Soviet Russia. Alert Press, Brisbane , 1942. Churchward ,Rev. Dr .C.M. The Rising Tide of Commu nism. Argus Print, Parramatta , 1943 . Donald, Len. Why You Should Join The Communist Party of Australia. A.C.P. Sydney, 1944. Dimitrov, Gorgy, The War and the Working Class. Forward Press, Sydney, 1941 ? Dixon, R. Knock Out Japan! Challenge Press, Sydney , 1942-43 Elson-Green, W. Soldier Defend Thyself. Edmonds Publi. shing Co ., Brisbane , 1943'? Henry, J.C. Demand Legality for the Communist Party . Queensland Political Rights Committee,Brisbane ,1941 . O'Day , Dr .G.P. !Qy You Should Join The Communist Party of Australia. A.C.P. Melbourne , 1942. Ryerson, Stanley R. Why Be A Doormat? Progress Books, Toronto , 1948. Sharkey,L.L. Co�nunist-L§bor Affiliation. Prestige Printing, Sydney, 1944 . Sharkey,L.L. Lift the Communist Party Ban. Legal Rights Committee, Sydney, 1942. Sutton, Bill The Champion Sticker Licker and Other Short Stories.Communist Arts Group, Brisbane , 1974 . Anonymous. Civyy Street. A.C.P. , Sydney, 1946. Anonymous. Communists in Unions Press for �usery, Chaos and Revolution. Institute of Publi-c affairs, Brisbane , 1946 . Anonymous. The Crimes Act. A.C.P. Sydney, 1950? Anonymous. They Lie about Communists. A.C.P. Brisbane , 1946? . Anonymous. Warningt A.C.P. Brisbane , undated. Resolutions of the Fifth All gueensland Conference of the Australian Communist Party. A.C.P. , Brisbane , April 1945_.: Resolutions Adopted by the 1949 Queensland State Conference af the Australian Communist Party. A.C.P.,Brisbane , September 1949. (3 )

Secondary Source pamphlets he ld.

Bacon, E.A. The Postwar History of the Communist Party of Australia.Quality Press,Sydney, 1965 . Blake , J.D. Communist Party of Australia 1945-1 966. A.C.P. Sydney, 1966. Fry, Dr . E.C. The Communist Party in Australian History (A Paper to a Symposia of the History of the C.P.A. since Warii). A.C.P. Sydney, Undated.

Communist Party of Australia. National Committee offices, Sydney.

Sharkey- , L.L. An Outline History of the Australian Communist Party. Current.:; Books , Sydney, 1944 . A United Working Class and a National Front for Victory. Resolutions of the 13th National Congress of the A.C.P. A.C.P. , Sydney.March 1943 . Report of the Work of the Central Committee from,�the 13th to the 14th National Congress. A.C.P. Sydney June 1945 . Jobs, Freedom, Progress Resolutions of the 14th National Congre ss of the A.C.P. A.C.P. , Sydney ,August 1945. Report of the Work of the Central Committee from the 1 4th to the 15th National Congress.A.C.P., Sydney, 1948. The Way Forwara_ . Resolutions of the 15th National Congress of the A.C.P. A.C.P., Sydney, May 1948 . Report of the Work of the Central Committee from the 15th to the 16th National Congress. A.C.P. , Sydney, June 1951 . Australia's Path To Socialism.Resolutions of the 16th National Congress of the A.C.P. A.C.P., Sydney, August 1951 .

Australian Labor Party. Qneensland Branch offices,Brisbane .

Minute Books . Queensland Central Exe cutive . Aus tralian L"bor Party,. 1940-1 952. Report of the Labor-in-Politics Convention. 6pened 1 7 February 1941 , Southport. Report of Labor-in-Politics Convention. Opened 1 4 Febru­ ary 1944, Bundaberg. Report of the Labor-in-Politics Convention. Opened 24 February 1947, Townsville . Report of the Labor-in-Politics Convention. Opened 20 February 1950 , Toowoomba . (4)

Report of the Labor-in-Po litics Convention. Opened 23 }Rrch 1953, Ro ckhampto n.

Que ensland Trade s and Labor Council.

Corresponde nce leaflets etc . on Indone sian nationi sm

From various T .D.C. etc . rone od sheets , job __ site dodgers .

Corresponde nce �eaflets etc . on the Press. From various , T.L.C.szRoneod sheets .

Corre spondence leaflets etc . on Aus tralian Peace Council From Chifley, v�rious T.L.C. 's etc .

Corre sponde nce on jailing of Burns and Sharkey. From Chifley, Evatt , various T.L.C's etc .

Correspondence on Organi zed Disruption Communi st Party Election Me etings 1949 . From A.R.U. Rockhampton T.L.C. , various T.L.C. 's etc .

Correspondence on the Democratic Rights Committee . From Hanlon, various T.L.C. 's etc .

Correspondence , leaflets etc . on T.L.C. Vote "No " Committee. Correspondence from Evatt , A.C.T.U., various T.L.C. 's etc . Balance sheets , minute s, radio scripts , screen advertisements , speakers note s etc . !

The Oxley Library, Brisbane .

Po litical Pamphlet Collection .

Dixon, R. and Sharkey ,L.L. A Free World Without Violence . A.C.P., Sydney , 1945 .

Hanson,�. He aly, M. and Brown,R. The Truth About the Meat Strike .Que ensland T.L.C. , Brisbane , 1946 .

��ers, No el Does Aus tralia Ne ed Socialism. Econo� Printers , Br isbane , Undated.

No ake s, Christianity Versus Communi sm . Rallings and Rallings , Brisbane , 1945 . .A.W. Paterson, Fred Speeches in Parliament. Ne ws letter Printan,g, Sydney, 1945 .

Various Authors . The Fight Against Communi sm. A series of pamphlets . Newsweekly Printers, Sydney , Und ated.

Various Authors . Judge Brennan Expo sed. Economy Printers . Brisbane 1945 .

The Mitche ll Library , Sydney .

Pamphlet Collection.

"No" case in the 1951 Referendum Na tional .

"No" case in the 1951 Referendum Queensland . (5)

}tiscellaneous Pamphlets.

Fitzpatrick, B. The Unne cessary Police State Bill. Au stralian Counc il for Civil Liberties (A.C.C.L. ) 1950, :!>1e lbourne , Distributed around Australia by the Rationalist Society. Galla�her, William , Catholics and Communi sm. Current Books, Sydney1 Undated. Pope Pius XI Encyclical Letter:Quadrage simo Anno .1931 The Australian Catholic Truth Society,

:Me lbourne , 1931 • Democratic News l�o .1 June 1950. Leaflet of the ProvisJion­ al Demo cratic Rights Committee, Brisbane .

The League of Rights: Obj ections and Hi story. W.& J.Barr , He lbourne , Undated.

Official Printed Records.

Commonwe alth Parliamentary Debates.1949-1 951 .

Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers: Statistical returns for the 1943 , 1946 ,1949 and 1951 Common­ wealth Elections , and 1951 Constitution Alteration referendum .

Commonwealth Year Book 1951 • No . 38 . Commonwe alth Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 1952.

Queensland Parliame ntary Debate s 1944-1 952.

Queensland Year Book 1951 No .12.

University of Que ensland Senate Reports 1941 -1 959

Newspapers .

The Advocate (Ayr). 1944-1 951 . Odd issues. The Advocate 1945-1 950. Monthly Organ of the Au stralian Railways Union. Odd issues. Bowen Independant 1943-1 951 . Odd issues The Cairns Po st. 1944-1 951 . Odd issues. Catholic Leader. 1944-1 951 . Weekly ergan of the Arch- · diocese of Brisbane . Central gueens land Herald(Rockhampton). 1951 . Odd issues. The Courier-Mail. 1942-1 951 . Dalby Herald. 1945-1951 . Odd issues.

The Home Hill Observer. 1944-1 947 . Odd issue s North Que ensland Guardian.1943 Organ of North Queensland Branch of The Australian Communi st I'arty . (6)

Queensland Country Life .1945-1951 . Odd issues.

Queensland Times (Ipswich} . 1945-51 .�· Odd issues.

Ro ckhampton Horning Bu lletin. 1944-1 951 . Odd issue s

Sempe r Floreat. 1946-1 951 . University of Queensland Union newspaper.

Stanthorpe Border Post. 1945-1 951 . Odd issues .

The Sunday ��i l. 1944-1 951 .

Sydney Morning Herald. 1941 -1 951 . Odd issues.

Telegraph {Brisbane ). 1945-1 951 . Odd issues.

Toowoomba Chronicle . 1944-1 951 . Odd issues .

Truth .(Brisbane }. 1944-1 951 . Odd issues.

�e ensland Guardian. 1946-1 952. Weekly Organ of the Que ensland Branch of the Au stralian Communist Party.

The Worker. 1944-1 951 . We ekly Organ of the Au stralian Workers Union.

Periodicals and Contemporary Journal Articles.

Communi st Review. 1947, 1949. Monthly theore tical journal of the Australian Communi st Party .

Galmahra. 1940-1 951 . Monthly literary publication of the University of Dueensland Uni on.

Q:le ens land Digger. 1945-1951 . Honthly Organ of the Queensland Branch of the R.S.S.A.I.L.A.

The State Service . 1944-1 951 . Honthly Organ of the State Service Union.

Cowper, Action Against Co ism. Aus tralian Quarterly. Vol .XXIImmun No .1 , March 1950. N'. Starke , J.G. Constitutional Aspects of the Communist Party Dissolution Ac t. Australian Quarterly. Vol. XXIII No .3 September,1951 .

Storey, H.M. The Anti-Communi st Bill in the House of Representatives. Australian Quarterly Vo l.XXII No .2 June 1950.

Primary Source Books .

Ellis, H.H. The Garden :Path . The Land Newspaper Ltd., Sydney, 1949 . (7 )

Fadden, Sir Arthur , They Called Ne Artie . Jacaranda Press, Brisbane , 1969. Gibson, R. �W Years in the Communist Party. Inter­ national Bookshop, Me lbourne , 1966 . No lan, Frank You Pass This Way Only Once . Colonial Press, Brisbane , 1974 .

SECONDARY SOURCES . Books . Brennan, Niall The Politics of Catholics. Hi ll Publishing , Me lbourne , 1972 . Childe, Vere Gordon How Labour Governs . Me lbourne University Press, Ne lbourne . 2nd Edn. 1964. Crisp. L.F. The Australian Federal Labor Party 1910- 1951 . Longmans , Green & Co., London,1955. Crisp, L.F. Ben Chifley. Longmans , London, 1963 . Daverger, Maurice, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State . Methue n, London, 2 Edn. 1957 . Healy, George A.L.P.i The Story of the Labor Party . Jacaranda Press, Brisbane , 1955 Hogan, E.J. What 's Wrong With Australia. Che shire , 11e lbourne , 1953. Hughe s, C.A. and Graham B.D. A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1929-1 960. A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1968. Iremonger J; Merritt, J; Osbourne , G. (Eds .) Strike s: Studies in 20 Century Australian Social History. Angus and Robertson, Sydney,1973.

Katz, · Elihu, and Lazalsfeld. Personal Influence. Collier-Mac Ni llen, Toronto , 3rd.Edn. 1966. Klink, F. Tichenor G. and Phi llip J. (Eds .) Current Perspectives in Mass Communication Re search. Sage Publications , Beverley Hills, California. 1972. Lack , Clam Three Decades of Queensland Political History 1929-1 960. Government Printers, Brisbane , 1962. l•lc Quail , Denis Towards a Sociology of Nass Communications . Collier - Nac Nillen, London, 1969 . HacKerras, Nalcolm Australian General Elections. Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972 . .J. O'Farre ll, P The Catholic Church in Au stralia: - A Short Hi story 1788-1 967. Ne lson, f.1e lbourne , 1968. (8}

Ormonde , Paul The :Movement . Ne lson, Ne lbourne ,1972 .

Overacker, Louise The Au stralian Party System. Yale University Press , Ne w Have n, 1952.

Richards , H, and Wi tton, R. {Eds . ) The American Connect­ MacMillan, He lbourne , 1974 . �· Tennant , Kylie . Evatt : Politics and Justice . Angus and Robertson, Sydney , 1970 .

Truman Tom Catho lic Ac tion and Politics. Georgian l'Iouse . He lbourne , 1959.

We bb , Le icester : Communism and Democracy in Au stralia: A Survev of the 1951 Referendum . Cheshire ; He lbourne , 1954 .

Journal Articles .

Barcan, A • �ociali�t ).�e ft AL.t�.At!�}ral}.�-- U:i9.-1_9_5_9. .fh:�-An Au stralian Political Studies As sociation Occasional Monograph No .2. Sydney, 1960 .

Grainger, G.W. Oligar chy in the British Communi st Party . B.t.i:l;bh J.gnrna1 of SncioJ ogy , June 1958, Vol. IX. No . 2 Rawson, D.W. The A.L.P. Industrial Groups -AnAs sess­ ment . Australian Qu arterly 1954. De cember V.26 N.4 We iner, H.E. The Reduction of Co�uuni st Power in the Australian Trade Unions . Political Science Quarterly. Vol . 69 No . 3. 1954

Rawson D. W. Labour , Socialsim and the Working Class. Australian Journal of Politics and History Vol. VII No .1 , l4ay 1961 .

Thesis. Guyatt, J. Trade Unions and the Au stralian Labor Party in Que ensland 1947-1 95JUnpub lished M.A. Thesis. University of Queensland , 1971 .

Jackson, William The Government and Economic Growth in Queensland , 1946 -1951 . Unpublished B.A. { Hons . ) Thesis, University of Queens land , 1968.

Jones, A. E. Electoral Support for the Communi st Party in North Queensland : A Study of Fred Pa.terson's Vi ctory in Bowen 1944 . Unpublished B.A. { Hons . } Thesis, University of Que ens­ land , 1972.

Playford J.D. Doctrinal Strategic Problems of the Communist Party of Au stralia, 1945-1 962. Unpublished Phd . Thesis, A.N.U. , 1962. (9}

Shearman, Richard, The Po litics of the 1948 Queens­ land Railway Strike . Unpublished B.A. (Hons ) Thesis, University of Queensland , 1973 .

Sullivan, H. G. Dissent in the Labor Party 1938Tto 1944 Unpublished B • .A. (lions ) Thesis, University of Queensland,1968.

Svensen T.W.W. The Liberal Party 's Years 0£ Opposition Ia· :Queensland 1943 - 57. Unpubl ished

H • .A. Au st. Thesis, University of Que ensland , 1971 .