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The Nuclear Threat to Canada in the 1980s Implications and Planning Data
DOCUMENT EPC 2/81 LIBRARY1 Eiti31.10THEQUE EMERGENCY PLANNING CANADA PLANIFICK: ■ D'URGENCE CANADA OTTAWA, ONTARIO
UA 929 Emergency Planning Planification d'urgence .C2 Canada Canada N83 1981
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Prepared by the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Consultant Department of National Defence for Emergency Planning Canada
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Came' AMENDMENTS
NO. DATED CONCERNING SECTION (S ) AMENDED BY DATE TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
AIM
LAYOUT 1
PART I - DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREAT 2
Background 2 Possible Attacks 3 Strategic Warning 3 Possible Further Developments 4
PART II - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREAT 5
Weapon Trends 5 Agreements 5 Basic Characteristics 5 Other Considerations 6
PART III - RISKS AND RISK AREAS 7
Likely Canadian Targets 7 Fallout Risks 8 Effects in Canada 9
PART IV - PLANNING DATA - DIRECT EFFECTS 10
Preliminary Data 10 Damage Criteria 11 Casualty Criteria 12 Scales and Templates 12
PART V - PLANNING DATA - FALLOUT 14
Variability 14 Approach 14 Criteria 14 Idealized Fallout Contours 15 Overall Fallout Risks 15
ANNEX A - LIST OF POTENTIAL CANADIAN TARGETS 16
ANNEX B - PRIME US MILITARY TARGETS 17
ANNEX C - AVERAGED FALLOUT FROM NUCLEAR STRIKES ON US ICBMs 18
ANNEX D - RELATIONS BETWEEN PEAK OVERPRESSURES AND STRUCTURAL FAILURE 19
ANNEX E - RELATION BETWEEN CASUALTIES AND DISTANCE AND 22 DIMENSIONS OF CASUALTY ZONES PAGE
ANNEX Fi - WINNIPEG, MANITOBA - EFFECT OF 1 MEGATON AIRBURST 23
ANNEX F2 - CHARLOTTETOWN, PEI - EFFECT OF 1 MEGATON SURFACE BURST 24
ANNEX G - BASIC 7 DAY DOSE FALLOUT CONTOURS 25
ANNEX H1 - FALLOUT FROM ATTACK ON US STRATEGIC TARGETS 26
ANNEX H2 - FALLOUT FROM ATTACKON US STRATEGIC TARGETS 27
ANNEX 113 - FALLOUT FROM ATTACK ON US STRATEGIC TARGETS 28
ANNEX I - OVERALL PROBABILITY OF FALLOUT ON PRAIRIE CITIES IN EVENT OF ATTACK ON U.S. MINUTEMAN COMPLEXES (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VARIABILITY IN WIND DIRECTION) 29
TEMPLATES - Inside back cover 1 THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO CANADA IN THE 1980s IMPLICATIONS AND PLANNING DATA
AIM
1. The aim of this paper is to provide civil emergency planners at all levels of government with an understanding of the implications of the threat to Canada resulting from a nuclear weapon attack on North America, and to provide data to assist them in preparing the programs and contingency plans for which they are responsible.
2. Maintenance of deterrence through the strategic nuclear balance is a dynamic process in which the probabilities and patterns of possible attacks change over time as policies, intentions and weapon developments are modified in the light of changing circumstances. This paper attempts, by following recent trends, to present a realistic picture of possible attack patterns affecting Canada in the eighties and to provide means of estimating the casualties and damage which will ensue. The intention is to provide data that decision makers will need when making plans to cope with likely attacks while leaving them free to make the decisions necessary for detailed planning. LAYOUT
3. The paper updates and supersedes document EPC 2/78 "The Nuclear Threat, Its Implications and Planning Guidance" and follows a similar layout. It consists of five parts:
I - DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREAT
II - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREAT
III - RISKS AND RISK AREAS
IV - PLANNING DATA (DIRECT EFFECTS)
V - PLANNING DATA (FALLOUT) o)âceacp:pmânr1 ef Vae Maremt =`,-Pffirt 1U 2
PART I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREAT
1. This paper is concerned with possible nuclear attack on North America. At the present time there are sufficient varieties of nuclear weapons, nations possessing them and others capable of acquiring them in the near future, to permit an almost unlimited range of possible attacks and attack patterns on North America during the eighties. By far the largest probability is that none of them will occur, but it is nevertheless necessary to determine which types of attack have a significant probability so that emergency protection can be planned.
BACKGROUND
2. It is still a fact that the United States and Soviet Union between them own more than 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world so that the possibility of initiation of nuclear war,and still more,of its escalation, depends on the capabilities and intention of these superpowers. However, the possibility of a direct nuclear exchange between them has been materially decreased by the existence of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the continuing secretariat set up for negotiations. Although formal agreements from the talks have so far not been comprehensive, the continuing negotiations have led to a much better understanding of each other'scapabilities, a strong commitment to parity leading to a substantial degree of convergence in weapon development, and to marked reduction in the possibility of surprise attack. This convergence in development is leading both sides to a dependence on smaller,more accurately delivered warheads which makes the utilization of nuclear weapons for purely military purposes more credible.,and using them to devastate an opponent's territory less so. The recently announced U.S. policy of giving priority to Soviet military targets rather than cities,in their targeting policy,is evidence of this trend.
3. Unfortunately, the move towards parity at the superpower exchange level has tended to decrease stability elsewhere, particularly in Europe. Soviet medium and short range nuclear missiles targeted against NATO, which are not included in the strategic balance, were previously compensated for by a superiority in U.S. strategic forces which may no longer exist. The need to negotiate some kind of nuclear balance for Europe, which is necessarily as much tactical as strategic,is pressing. However the rate of progress in SALT, and in the Mutual Force Reduction negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pacç,suggests that progress towards a negotiated nuclear balance in Europe will be slow and perhaps unlikely to be achieved in the eighties. In the meantime both alliances are showing signs of political unrest which could lead to conflict.
4. If there should be a war in Europe in the eighties it is quite likely that one side or the other will see an advantage in using nuclear weapons in a quasi-tactical role, that is primarily against military targets. Canada and the U.S. would necessarily be involved through their NATO commitments and their Atlantic supply lines would be liable to attack. Nuclear war could extend to the Atlantic and possibly to North American ports and supply points. In such a case an enemy would be less inhibited in attacking Canadian targets than U.S. targets since attacking the latter could escalate directly into a strategic exchange. 3 5. In spite of the pressures for arms reduction there is likely to be little change in the level of strategic nuclear weapons in the inventories of the USA and USSR. Any marked reduction depends on first achieving a satisfactory nuclear balance in Europe and, in the case of the USSR, with China in the far east. Neither of these agreements seems imminent. On the other hand the motivation for SALT is largely economic and economic pressures are increasing. This is likely to discourage any significant increase in the nuclear weapon inventories of either the USA or USSR.
6. Little has been done, or perhaps •can be done, to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries. However, most countries which have indicated interest in acquiring them régard them as an insurance against aggressive neighbours in local conflicts. Such conflicts can probably be confined unless they involve conflicting superpower interests, in which case the possibility of escalation exists. Canada can probably avoid involvement unless escalation occurs.
7. Finally, if there is a strategic nuclear exchange between superpowers, it must not be assumed that'all danger of nuclear attack will disappear for the rest of us. Some nuclear weapons will remain and the inhibitions on their use which deterrent forces exerted will no longer be there. There will be inci.easing competition for survival and superiority. Neighbours of the former superpowers, such as Canada, could well be specially vulnerable in such unsettled conditions.
. . . POSSIBLE ATTACKS " • . . . . .. • • . . .. . ' . . . . 8. In the light Of the abOve discussion the possibilities of nucléa.' attack on North America involving Canada are as f011ows', in descending ordei of likelihood: — ' • '
a. nuclear attack arising from maritime warfare in the North Atlantic in a NATO context. This could involve nuclear attack on shipping, Atlantic ports and air bases involved in airlift operations. Canadian targets might be given priority as targets over U.S. ports as being both nearer to Europe and less likely to lead to further escalation;
b. a strategic nuclear éxchange between USA and USSR resulting from the escalation of éonflict begun in Europe or the Middle East and concentrating primarily on strategic military targets in the U.S. There are no comparable targets in Canada, although a few might possibly he considered as borderline cases. The risks to Canada would arise primarily from secondary effects, such as fallout;
c. extension of thé strategic nuclear exchange to cities and industrial targets, again primarily in the USA. Some Canadian targets would be included, particularly the larger cities close to the U.S. border;
d. direct attaék on Canada in a post strategic exchange conflict for living space and survival.
STRATEGIC WARNING
9. It will be noted that all the possible attacks listed occur as a 4 follow-up of previous incidents. There will be a period of tension, a period of conventional conflict and a prior use of nuclear weapons elsewhere before the stage of a nuclear attack on North America is reached. This will constitute a fairly lengthy duration of strategic warning before an attack. In the present state of sensitivity regarding maintenance of a strategic balance it does not seem feasible to plan and carry out a large scale surprise attack, nor would it appear very advantageous to do so. But if there is to be no large scale simultaneous attack, the timing of attacks on individual targets becomes somewhat unpredictable and there is a greater need for tactical warning. POSSIBLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
10. The trend to high accuracy nuclear warheads,previously noted,has greatly increased the vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles and has thrown some doubt on their usefulness as part of the strategic weapons inventory. However, they do form a substantial part of that inventory and having been recently upgraded by MIRVing are unlikely to be phased out in the near future. Nevertheless there has been a renewal of interest in more mobile launchers and more transportable missiles. The high accuracy cruise missile is now being developed but it will still have a relatively small warhead, and even if it comes into service it will not materially change the analysis given in preceding paragraphs. The most important change as regards the threat to Canada might come with the phase-out of fixed missile silos which are the strategic targets attracting the greatest concentration of enemy attack in surface bursts and hence are the source of heavy fallout. It is perhaps unlikely that they will disappear in the eighties; it may be something to look forward to in the nineties. Clerneteneotftgo ef crae Mareffit=:ftzt UU 5 PART II
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREAT
WEAPON TRENDS
1. The trend in nuclear weapon development towards larger size and more extensive mass destruction seems to have had its day. It may be an effect of deterrence that there is more concern over what damage an enemy may inflict on us than over what damage we can do to him, but whatever the cause, the recent trend in weapon development has been towards weapons more suitable for attacking an enemy's strategic and other military strength than for devastating his territory. For this purpose the large inaccurate warhead is very inefficient. It is easy to show that improving accuracy is much more efficient than increasing warhead size for attacking "small" hard targets; "small" in this context meaning something smaller than a large city.
2. Over recent years both sides have been increasing accuracy towards the physical limit,with the result that aiming accuracies have decreased from a probable error of several miles down to around one tenth of a mile. With this accuracy a small warhead,of considerably less than one megaton,can destroy the most hardened missile silo. Efficiency of delivery can be still further increased by placing several of these smaller warheads with independent terminal guidance on one missile: the development described as MIRV, for Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle.
AGREEMENTS
3. The SALT agreements so far concluded have done a good deal to perpetuate the present situation. There is a limitation on the overall number of delivery vehicles each side may possess and,in particular,on the number of large missiles,such as the USSR% SS18,that can be included in the total. The agreement permits the use of MIRVs, since both sides recognized that it was impossible to tell from observation of deployed missiles whether they were MIRVed or not. Under these conditions a side which does not go to multiple warhead is at a serious disadvantage in the numbers game. Advantage in numbers offers a real military advantage; advantage in size is of doubtful value since a one megaton warhead is enough to destroy nearly all likely targets. Both sides are therefore taking full advantage of the MIRVing possibilities.
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREAT
4. The threat for the eighties will consist almost exclusively of small accurate warheads delivered as multiple warheads from land-based or submarine- launched missiles. In the case of a Soviet attack, the warhead size will be in the range 0.5 to 1.0 megaton with an aiming error (CEP) of 200 metres,or slightly less. The total number of such warheads they will have available could be of the order of 10,000,which seems more than adequate for any conceivable plan of attack on North America. These warheads can be used in an airburst or surface burst mode.
5. It would perhaps be unwise to assume that all large warheads will be phased out immediately. The USSR may retain a few of the large SS18 warheads (approximately 20MT) for use against specially difficult targets or for special purposes. However there do not appear to be any targets in Canada which merit such. treatment. 6. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
6. If, as expected, priority is given to military targets,it may be that a substantial fraction of the 10,000 warheads available is used up in attacking these targets,or is destroyed on the ground before attack on cities is contemplated. However,about half the total number of warheads is deployed in submarines which are difficult to find and destroy, except
possibly , when on base. It is a firm tenet of deterrence philosophy that enough of them will survive any exchange to permit a retaliation against cities. Itat this stage,damage has been largely confined to military targets,it seems reasonable to expect a further round of negotiating between governments before proceeding to retaliation against cities, but if it does take place,it will no doubt be directed primarily against the superpower itself,rather than its neighbours or allies. Moreover,it seems most unlikely that all remaining warheads would be employed.
7. A minor disadvantage of multiple warheads is that the individual warhead does, not have unlimited travel after dispersion from its parent missile, so one missile may be expected to deal with a group of targets. This may sometimes mean that a target of lesser importance is targetted merely because it happens to be reasonably close to another important target and there are no other priority targets in the neighbourhood.
8. Finally there is the question of nuclear bursts in unexpected places through failure of guidance or intervention of defensive systems. One of the agreements reached through SALT was to limit anti-ballistic missile defence to one site on each side. Those sites are of very limited effectiveness. Moreover, the Soviet Union has shown little inclination to use bombers against North America,and anti-bomber defences have become relatively, weak. It is therefore considered that the influence of active defences on the threat is negligible and that it will not attract additional warheads. As regards the attack itself, it must be expected that there will be occasional failures in guidance but that the large majority of warheads will end up exactly where intended. Those which do go astray are likely to end up well outside priority target areas and should be relatively easy for emergency services to cope with. :litoMo inzDA :IDUDoM A rem
-D ten not =1 7 PART III
RISKS AND RISK AREAS
LIKELY CANADIAN TARGETS
1. The term "likely", in this heading,should be taken to mean most probable in the event of a nuclear attack on North America; it should not be interpreted to mean, for example, that such places are more likely to be attacked than not during the eighties. As regards risk, all targets will be attacked by 1 megatori warheads,if they are attacked at all. The possible variations are that in some cases it may be more appropriate to use a surface burst than an airburst; it may be considered worthwhile to use two or three warheads against the larger cities; and to use two or more warheads against the most important strategic targets to guard against failure. Canadian targets are considered in three groups; east coast targets, strategic military targets,and other targets, mainly cities.
2. East Coast Targets. As explained earlier,east coast ports could be regarded as tactical targets in a NATO/Warsaw Pact war, the objective being more to interfere with transport of supplies across the North Atlantic rather than to destroy the ports themselves. Likely targets are Halifax, N.S., Saint John, N.B. and St. John's, Nfld. In these cases,it is considered that a surface burst in the harbour would be most appropriate for meeting the enemy objective of interference with shipping and would,in any case,be powerful enough to destroy the cities concerned. If,af ter an interval for recuperation, it should prove possible to use the harbours again,a repeat attack might be mounted. Other possible targets in this category might be Quebec and Montreal, but since these are large cities,it would be more profitable to attack the cities with air burst warheads rather than the port facilities with surface bursts. It is not considered that the Canadian airlift is large enough to justify nuclear attack on the airfields it usesso these have not been included as targets.
3. Strategic Military Targets. It was stated earlier that Canada has no strategic military targets of importance comparable to those recognized in the USA. The one possible exception is the Canadian Federal Warning Centre, North Bay,which is a potential alternative HQ for North American defence. This could only be attacked by a surface burst warhead and might be of sufficient importance to warrant two warheads to make certain of destroying it. Other possible candidates are Ottawa, as the national HQ Capital, and three other cities which contain the headquarters of Canada's equivalent to the land, sea and air elements of the military forces; Montreal (Mobile Command - Land), Halifax (Maritime Command), and Winnipeg (Air Command). The fact that these are large cities perhaps warrants their inclusion in this category. All would be most vulnerable to airbursts. Vancouver as Canada's most important west coast port could also be considered in the category of a strategic military target.
4. Other Targets. The other targets are those which might be hit in the event of a strategic or retaliatory attack against U.S. cities. It is not considered likely that such an attack would be accompanied by a parallel attack designed to destroy Canada, but there could be some misunderstanding concerning the interdependence of the Canadian and U.S. economies and the assistance Canada might provide for U.S. recovery. It seems probable that the larger Canadian cities, say those with populations over 100,000,would be regarded as potential targets. 5. A further factor is the target grouping associated with multiple warhead missiles. Because of this,an isolated city is a less attractive target than one of comparable size with other cities near it,even if they are somewhat smaller. The major cities already mentioned, namely Vancouver, Winnipeg, Ottawa, Quebec, with the addition of Toronto,are obvious targets. In addition,there are a number of somewhat smaller cities which are possible targets and are made more likely because they can form convenient grouping with other cities. Thus,
• Windsor with Detroit,
Mississauga with Toronto,
Hamilton, Kitchener, London and St. Catherines,
Edmonton with Calgary,
Regina with Saskatoon,
Vancouver with Victoria.
It is likely that all cities would be attacked by air burst warheads unless there are special reasons for requiring a surface burst.
6. A list of potential or "likely" targets is given at Annex A,together with an indication of the kind of attack they could experience. It is necessarily a somewhat speculative list, but it is hoped that those who have followed the arguments so far will see reasonable justification for the choices made.
FALLOUT RISKS
7. In earlier analyses of the threat to North America it was sometimes assumed that all cities would be attacked by surface burst warheads so that maximum fallout would occur. This was perhaps justified when the attacking warhead was considered to have .a 10 megaton yield, because the extra area of damage produced by an airburst was not needed for most cities and the fallout from ground burst was a bonus which cost nothing. Now that the warheads employed are 1 MT rather than 10 MT,fallout from a surface burst is much less. The extra damage and casualties to a city and its suburbs, produced by using an airburst rather than a surface burst, far. outweighs the fallout casualties in the more sparsely populated countryside , that a surface burst would produce. It is therefore assumed that airbursts will be used for all city targets and other targets unless there is a special requirement for surface bursts.
8. Chief among the targets which require surface burst are the Minuteman silos which are hardened to an extent that only a close surface burst can destroy the missiles they contain. A Minuteman complex may contain 200 silos in an area ,roughly 200 miles by 100 miles, the silos being spaced so far apart that each must be treated as a separate target. Assuming that two warheads are directed at each silo to ensure a greater than 90% chance of destroying the missile it contains, this means that 400 one megaton warheads will be burst within the 200 x 100 mile area of the complex. Since the warheads were developed primarily for this purpose there is little doubt that they would be so used in a strategic exchange between superpowers., . 9 The fallout pattern from such a concentration of bursts is very extensive; the patterns from individual bursts would merge to produce a contour of the order of 900 miles downwind by 200 miles wide for casualty production. Since two of these complexes are sited with parts of the complex less than 100 miles from the Canadian-US border, it is clear that they create a potential fallout hazard in Canada. The areas which may be affected are the prairie provinces and some parts of northern and western Ontario.
9. Other strategic targets in the U.S. are the strategic bomber bases and nuclear submarine bases. Airfield runways can be more seriously damaged by surface bursts but one,or at most,two warheads are sufficient to put them out of action. There are several such bases within a hundred miles of the Canada-US border which,if attacked,might or might not give rise to a small amount of fallout in Canada,depending on wind conditions. The nuclear submarine bases are comparable in importance with the Minuteman complexes since there will normally be some submarines on base which might be destroyed. However,they are much less extensive than a Minuteman complex and we have estimated that 20 MT,probably surface burst,would be a representative attack. Only the west coast base at Bremerton, Washington, is near enough to the Canadian border to contribute to fallout risk.
10. If U.S. cities are attacked it is expected to be by 1 MT airburst warheads. This means that risks will only arise in Canada from US target cities on the border; Detroit and Buffalo seem the only likely ones. A map showing the principal strategic targets in the US is shown at Annex B. This is taken from an unclassified publication,"The Defence Monitor", published by the Centre for Defence Information,of Washington, D.C. Those which represent a potential fallout risk to Canada are as indicated in the Annex.
EFFECTS IN CANADA
11. It is well known that winds are variable,and if it is assumed that they can blow in any direction there are very few parts of populated Canada that are free of any risk of fallout from one or other of the targets described earlier as likely to be attacked by surface burst. However,it is quite impossible that all these areas will receive fallout simultaneously from an attack; indeed only a small fraction of the area at risk is likely to receive fallout. Annex C shows a U.S. version of the fallout risk resulting from a nuclear attack on their ICBM sites,which indicates no casualty producing fallout in Canada at all. This was no doubt prepared to indicate the extent of the problem to U.S. emergency planning authorities but it seems to be based on most likely wind patterns, and therfore is a real possibility. It presents much too optimistic a picture for Canadian planners who must pay attention to those situations where weather conditions are such as to bring the fallout into Canada. Some of these situations are examined in the later section on planning data for fallout. As indicated earlier, the greatest risk appears to be in the prairie provinces. >nmwe'mg D)mtm CA3regt DIffeete=:ftrt UT 10 PART IV
PLANNING DATA - DIRECT EFFECTS
1. The previous sections have discussed the kind of nuclear attacks on North America that might involve Canada,and have given an indication of what targets are likely to be hit,and with what kind of warheads. This part and the next are concerned with planning data, that is,information which will enable planners to proceed from a description of an attack to an estimate of the damage and casualties that will result from it. For this purpose it is necessary to provide some firm numerical values for the damage and casualties associated with a burst,or a burst pattern,although the user must bear in mind that there can be a substantial variation from place to place and from time to time. The figures given here derive from the third edition of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" issued in 1977 and are also consistent with Emergency Planning Canada's Document 11/79.
PRELIMINARY DATA
2. Tactical Warning. Although it is believed there will be adequate strategic warning of a nuclear attack on North America, there may be little indication of what kind,or how extensive an attack it will be. Efficient emergency operations require a good dealof detailed information about the locations of bursts, weather conditions, etc., at the time of the attack. It would be wise for planners to at least'contemplate the possibility that an intending attacker would try to interfere with the process of passing and interpreting information. Tables XXXII to XXXIV of EPC 11/79 show that a high altitude burst at 150 kilometres would produce substantial EMP effects within a radius of about 1400 km, and could also black-out radio communications for an extended period,up to a few hours. Two such bursts could produce an EMP in all parts of Canada and the U.S. subject to attack. The effects of such precursor bursts can be circumvented by careful planning but could be serious if this is not done.
3. Weapon Characteristics. The evidence induced from weapon development trends leads to the conclusion that throughout the eighties the "standard" warhead size will be one megaton and that guidance will be sufficiently accurate that it can be placed precisely on the intended target. Damage and casualty figures will be given for this warhead and can be used for most planning purposes. It would be too dogmatic to assert that no other size of warhead could be used in small numbers. Consequently some figures have also been given for warheads of 100 KT and 10 MT which seem reasonable upper and lower limits for possible warhead size under present conditions.
4. Units. Owing to the fact that Canada is more dedicated to metric conversion than the U.S., there is some uncertainty regarding the units which would be most helpful to emergency planners. Recent Canadian publications such as "11 Steps to Survival" and the predecessor of the present paper EPC 2/78, are solidly metric. On the other hand "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" continues to use miles, and many maps show their scale in miles. Maps which express their scale proportionally, e.g., 1:2,000,000, are more conveniently used with metric measurements. The method used here is to give all distance measurements in kilometres, but it has not been thought necessary to translate physical measurements such as pounds per square inch (psi) into metric units when the relationship between overpressure and damage is better known in the former units, and we have given distance in miles also for those who may find it more convenient..
DAMAGE CRITERIA
5. A wide variety of damage criteria may be needed by emergency planners,depending on the services which are needed. However,for assessment of damage, blast effects on buildings are the most important. Apart from the loss of buildings themselves,the debris produced affects possibilities for movement of rescue and firefighting services and is an important factor in producing casualties. It is true . that,in special conditions,fire damage may occur beyond the blast damage area, for example in exceptionally dry conditions, or when high winds spread fire rapidly, but in most circumstances blast effects predominate. Table 1 of Annex D taken from Document EPC 11/79 related damage to a variety of buildings to the overpressure in pounds per square inch. Cities are composed of a mixture of buildings in different proportions; taken to its logical . conclusion this would imply different criteria' for building destruction in each city. It is therefore usual to derive a more general approximate set of criteria common to all cities, as is done in "11 Steps to Survival". This lists four different levels of destruction and the approximate distances from, an airburst warhead at which they , will occur,as follows:
complete destruction - out to 3 km from ground zero;
beyond repair - 3 km to 5 km from ground zero;
major repair required - 5 km to 10 km from ground zero;
light damage - 10 km to 15 km from ground zero.
6. Table 2 Annex D shows the relationship between overpressure and distance from a one megaton air burst warhead. Using this and Table 1,a criterion for , the levels of damage listed above can be derived which can be used to obtain similar damage zones for other warhead sizes. For conciseness ,these four zones have been labelled complete, severe, moderate and light damage; the criteria and a description of the corresponding damage is given below:
Complete . (complete destruction - approximately 16 psi) All builtlings including . reinforced concrete. structures collapsed. ,
Severe - (beyond repair - approximately 8 psi) All individual residences and small apartments destroyed; large wall bearing buildings severely damaged, moderate damage to reinforced concrete buildings.
Moderate - (major repairs required 3 psi) Moderate to severe . damage to.wood frame buildings; moderate damage to - other individual residences and small .apartments; large buildings mostly unaffected,except for windows.
Light - (Light damage - 1.5 psi) Damage to wall panels and windows. 12 7. Dimensions of these damage zones for 100 KT, 1 MT and 10 MT warheads, in both airburst and surface burst mode,are given in Tables 3 and 4 of Annex D. Table 3 gives dimensions in kilometres, Table 4 in miles.
CASUALTY CRITERIA
8. Casualty distribution around a burst can also be divided into zones similar to those used for damage. Immediately surrounding ground zero there is a zone,corresponding roughly to the zone of complete destruction,in which virtually everyone is killed. Surrounding this we can define other zones in which a lesser proportion of casualties and deaths occur. The only firm evidence in these zones comes from the wartime use of nuclear bombs against Japanese cities which is summarized in Table 1 of Annex E. The figures given there describe the effect against an unprepared population, and being based on evidence collected after theevent,can not be assigned a high accuracy. However they are supported to some degree by theoretical analysis and they are used here as the basis for those casualty zones as follows:
90% zone - More than 90% of people within this zone will be casualties and more than 90% of these casualties will die.
50% zone - Approximately 50% of people within this zone will be casualties and about 50% of the casualties will die.
10% zone - Approximately 10% of people within this zone will be casualties and about 10% of the casualties will die.
9. It should perhaps be emphasized that casualties within the nominal 50% and 10% zones can be modified by warning and preparedness,because of the possibilities for sheltering,to avoid debris, fire fighting, protection against radiation, and opportunities for rescue. However,little can be done to decrease casualties in the 90% zone.
10. Dimensions of the casualty zones for 100 KT, 1 MT and 10MT warheads, in both airburst and surface modes, are given in Tables 2 and 3 of Annex E. Table 2 gives dimensions in kilometres, Table 3 in miles.
SCALES AND TEMPLATES
11. It is necessary to use maps to estimate damage and casualties and for the preparation of emergency plans. The choice of scale is a compromise; it must be large enough to show the details necessary for planning but small enough to show the whole area of interest, which includes safe areas as well as areas of damage. A scale of 1:500,000 is frequently used and an example is given in Annex F. This shows the extent of the damage and casualty zones resulting from 1 megaton airburst over Winnipeg.
12. A second example shows the damage and casualty zones associated with a 1 megaton surface burst in Charlottetown harbour on a scale of 1:250,000. This shows how a surface burst in harbours can destroy a fairly large city and also shows why we have not included Charlottetown and other small ports in the list of Canadian targets.
13. It would be convenient to have a set of templates showing damage and casualty zones for appropriate warheads on a scale corresponding to map 13 used so that they could be applied to any likely target, and could be moved about to determine probable aiming points, particularly in the case of large cities where two or more warheads might be used. Templates have been prepared showing damage and casualty zones on a scale of 1:500,000 for the following:
1 megaton airburst; and
1 megaton surface burst.
These are included with this report and can be found in pocket on back cover. Templates on other scales, or for different sizes of warhead can readily be prepared if needed. 'Amg :r Ceanount) c=cTffizt 14
PART V
PLANNING DATA - FALLOUT
VARIABILITY
1. It must be stated firmly at the outset that even if the exact location and size of bursts during an attack are known,it is impossible to predict exactly the distribution of casualty producing fallout. This would require accurate prediction of wind conditions at the time of the attack,and of their variation for some hours after the attack. The method usually adopted for demonstrating fallout patterns is to assume a constant windspeed and direction and to assume that the wind will remain steady during the deposition of fallout. This gives the maximum downwind distance for the pattern but usually underestimates the lateral spread. In emergency planning to deal with fallout it is essential to have some means of measuring or estimating wind speeds at the time of an attack and desirable to have some means of tracking and measuring the deposition of radioactive particles.
APPROACH
2. The basic patterns normally used for fallout protection planning are idealized dose contours calculated by methods set out in "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons". It is usual to assume a constant effective wind which is averaged over height and assumed constant in direction. In the past, when preparing overall dosage contours for a large scale attack,it has been usual either to take a sample of possible wind direction,or allot probabilities to wind directions, and then to average results. This may be misleading because a particular location could receive lethal fallout under 10% of possible conditions and nothing in the other 90%; the average may indicate that the location is always safe or perhaps always in danger. Another approach is to use the average wind direction all the time (Annex C is an example); this can easily suggest that certain locations are safe when they are not. The approach taken here is to take specific examples of possible wind directions to illustrate potential risks, and to estimate the probability that these risks will actually be experienced. This is considered more useful for planning purposes since it indicates what kind of plan is needed and leaves the decision whether it needs to be put into effect until wind direction can be measured at the time of an attack.
3. The calculation of contours is straightforward for individual bursts where contours do not overlap, which is the normal situation for the kind of attack envisaged here, except for the ICBM complexes in the U.S. where there is a large and dense pattern of bursts which may occur independently. The contours for such an attack on a complex have been derived by integrating overlapping contours; this results in a shorter downwind and broader crosswind contour than the one which would have occurred if allburstshad been amalgamated into one large burst.
CRITERIA
4. One of the requirements in planning is to estimate casualties. The relationship between total dose and becoming a casualty,or dying,varies between individuals and the average dosage required can only be estimated roughly. The criteria used here are derived from Table XXVI of EPC 11/79 15 and are as follows for unprotected persons:
Accumulated 7 day dose 200 rem - 50% casualties;
Accumulated 7 day dose 500 rem - 50% deaths.
These levels allow for a small amount of natural protection in the environ- ment, but no planned shelter or avoiding action. In addition, the contour for 2000 rem is given so that some estimate can be made of the level of fallout protection required.
5. Wind Velocity and Direction. The equivalent effective wind is an average wind speed from the ground surface up to the stabilized cloud height. For the prairies and parts of the U.S. south of them an equivalent effective wind speed of 30 miles per hour seems more appropriate than the 15 mph often taken as standard. It varies, seasonally being somewhat higher in winter and lower in summer. Average wind direction is reasonably constant throughout the year at about 280°, that is, from a direction slightly north of west.
IDEALIZED FALLOUT CONTOURS
6. Idealized 7 day/dose contours for various sizes of warhead and for a typical ICBM complex are described in Annex G. This gives the downwind length and maximum breadth for 200, 500 and 2000 rem contours.
7. One major threat to the prairies by fallout comes from attack on the five U.S. Minuteman complexes. Examples of its extent are given in Annex H, maps 1 and 2. Map 1 shows the threat when the wind direction is 1800 , that is, from due south. Map 2 shows the threat when the wind direction is 2400 . The fallout from other strategic U.S. targets and certain Canadian targets, where surface bursts may be used, seems relatively insignificant.
8. An example, representative of these lesser targets, is given in Annex H, map 3. This represents fallout from a 2 megaton warhead (or two one megaton warheads) on a U.S. strategic airbase. OVERALL FALLOUT RISKS
9. Estimates of the overall risk from fallout in various prairie cities, and one in southern Ontario, are given in Annex I. This is obtained from the idealized contours for the U.S. Minuteman sites and the distribution of wind directions. Other U.S. targets could only contribute a very small amount to these probabilities and may be neglected in this application. m«.. ...... 16 ANNEX A
LIST OF POTENTIAL CANADIAN TARGETS
_ P TARGET TYPE LOCATION NO. OF TYPE OF WARHEADS BURST
East Coast Halifax, N.S. 1 Surface Ports Saint John, N.B. 1 Surface St. John's, Nfld. 1 Surface Quebec 1 Air
Strategic North Bay 1-2 Surface Mil/Civ Ottawa 1-2 Air Montreal 2-5 Air Winnipeg 1-2 Air Vancouver 2-3 Air/Surface
Cities and (Toronto 2-5 Air City Groups (Mississauga 1 Air (Hamilton 1 Air (Kitchener 1 Air (London 1 Air (St. Catherines 1 Air Windsor (with Detroit) 1 Air (Edmonton 1 Air (Calgary 1 Air (Regina 1 Air (Saskatoon 1 Air Victoria (with Vancouver) 1 Surface . ,
All warheads may be taken as 1 megaton. 17
ANNEX B
PRIME U.S. MILITARY TARGETS All could be attacked in a LIMITED nuclear war
Targets affecting Canada 8 Targets not affecting Canada 18
ANNEX C
1 S
L
'v.*"
4 vic ro • 19LAND Pee C •••■3 1669
• ,e0ee
WWI rrà
1. t It R a 1. O k
Chun 611113
CameleNV,. r•-• La ■ r.---.'" wpm. .991 *Ill , , /rife -..,,,,,,• .d., Z. ■,..n Ct;S■7 ( -*le 1111 MUM,/ ON---- • a -___44A-lient..1 „, . ....,:--,.... y ÂTIt b it . ----er U o h IIIMWrile ea.Tiee* _ ....,.. E I rnOWILMIMIII' 6,- .--e.z,:e-,:e-,-sult. -«"Illr478; . and of qmaquity , der .111, itsiwtme _ Neeettbtettsod , ' here4.%.(716. illi «-e 4e-n7zeY"-.. lie_lnibiee, „dijaete. ...etodle, e".= USS, »tit% .Issia. v.— ■ NORTH - • ', ,l.,...... I. ••••■■• , ball, WWII tr Ilr iedi --r.
■ ■ ,à....,- --(iv1/ .. ,. - . , . . %de e#444 es"-- g■ aid eur .,,,, » › II ,Pgil.! 40 ..-- , ...eilifm2MIS■ . iy...... . meerek.,__ , .. - - pit — 16691664' AMeRI ...., / t 46T ON , ! San'francis'e
I I Um. ,• »et sàion Th newt,' erf” a.' i..ston- -t11 `tee Chrtotl St IttolorulTtl Par., bloc hi btrotost t M E er Ley,1% nee AVERAGED FALLOUT FROM NUCLEAR STRIKES ON U. S. ICBMs >200 >500 >2000 19 ANNEX D TABLE 1
RELATIONS BETWEEN PEAK OVERPRESSURES AND STRUCTURAL FAILURE
Structure or Damage Approx structural element overpressure p.s.i. Glass windows Shattering; occasional frame failures 0.5 to 1 Corrugated Shattering 1 to 2 asbestos siding Corrugated steel Connection failure followed by buckling 1 to 2 or aluminum panel Brick wall panel Shearing and flexure failures 3 to 10 8" or 12" thick (not reinforced) Wood siding panels Usually failure occurs at the main 1 to 2 standard house connections allowing a whole panel construction to be blown in Concrete or cinder Shattering of wall 1.5 to 5.5 block walls 8" or 12" thick (not reinforced)
Wood frame Moderate: Wall framing cracked; roof 2 to 3 building, resi- badly damaged; interior partitions dential type blown down Severe: Frame shattered so that 3 to 4 for the most part collapsed Wall-bearing Moderate: Exterior walls badly cracked, 3 to 4 masonry building interior partitions badly cracked or apartment house blown down type Severe: Total collapse of structure 5 to 6 Multistorey wall Moderate: Exterior walls facing blast 6 to 7 bearing building badly cracked, interior partitions badly monumental type •cracked Severe: Some of bearing walls collapse 8 to 11 Reinforced con- Moderate: Exterior walls badly cracked, 8 to 10 crete building, interior partitions badly cracked or concrete walls, blown down, frame distorted, spalling small window of concrete area Severe: Walls shattered, incipient 11 to 15 collapse
20 ANNEX D
TABLE 2
RELATION BETWEEN OVERPRESSURE AND DISTANCE
FOR 1 MEGATON AIRBURST
OVERPRESSURE (psi) DISTANCE (km)
16 3.4 * 12 4.1 10 4.5 8 5.2 * 6 6.1 4 8.0 3 10.1 * 2 12.9 1.5 15.5 * 1.0 21.4
* Taken as Zone Boundaries
• 21 ANNEX D
TABLE 3
DIMENSIONS OF DAMAGE ZONES
RADIUS IN KILOMETERS
AIR BURST SURFACE BURST DAMAGE ZONE 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT
Complete 1.6 3.4 7.5 1.1 2.4 5.0 Severe 2.4 5.2 11 1.6 3.4 7.5 Moderate 4.7 10.1 22 2.8 6.1 13 Light 7.2 15.5 33 4.3 9.2 20
TABLE 4
DIMENSIONS OF DAMAGE ZONES
RADIUS IN MILES
AIR BURST SURFACE BURST DAMAGE ZONE 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT
Complete 1.0 2.1 4.6 0.7 1.5 3.1 Severe 1.5 3.2 6.9 1.0 2.1 4.6 Moderate 2.9 6.3 13.6 1.8 3.8 8.2 Light 4.5 9.6 20.7 2.7 5.7 12.3 22 ANNEXE
TABLE 1
RELATION BETWEEN CASUALTIES AND DISTANCE
20 KT AIRBURST WARHEAD
DISTANCE % CASUALTIES RATIO OF OVERPRESSURE (psi) (MILES) DEATHS & INJURED DEATHS TO INJURED TO OUTER EDGE
0-0.6 90% 10 to 1 16 0.6-1.6 50%-60% 1 to 1 3.5 1.6-3.2 10%-25% 1 to 10 1.2 ■
TABLE 2
DIMENSIONS OF CASUALTY ZONES
KILOMETERS TO OUTER EDGE
CASUALTY AIR BURST SURFACE BURST ZONE 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT
90% Zone 1.6 3.4 7.5 1.1 2.4 5.0 50% Zone 4.2 9.1 20 2.6 5.6 12 10% Zone 8.5 18 40 4.9 10 23
TABLE 3
DIMENSIONS OF CASUALTY ZONES
MILES TO OUTER EDGE
AIR BURST SURFACE BURST CASUALTY ZONE 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT 100 KT 1 MT 10 MT
90% Zone 1.0 2.1 4.6 0.7 1.5 3.1 50% Zone 2.6 5.6 12 1.6 3.5 7.5 10% Zone 5.3 11.4 25 3.0 6.5 14
a
1,1h , I rune?
WO OdrOyd Libau &btu. 838 Clandeboye
Food! eau I s Sempk
East Selkirk
Fort Garr Tyndall Kea hu rn Lockport Steen Carson o two in Beauséjour tJ St. Ouens
1? / .11,1,1014, Lvdiatt , \, 4,01 1_.L .• Fer& _i_.„....,__ittirii, _Le,‘_.1_1_1__1_14_1_ ,."---- 501 Con im-Xv ' 41111 e• S;1". 1. 4i " ' • fr. • Birrlç ./N :el ridge '‘. ' R, / V ..' r, L. , • ... %N. / ‘, 1 4 \s, 40 %L. • «gu4, N,St'igi ...... _.1...... - ,... f iit I MINIOUP111.°7- 1,...... 4.MI Blelealli °abbot! k "- 0 - 1 Wrier rd ‘ • - 1) . AbielON . N A T. Sta. R Y S. l .re; ; 1. 1111 • edil a1vor ■■ zhI /--) Craig -"...... ,.... I fi ' "1,4 er-li • • Mill brook 1 lig e. .•Xy4 /el 4 j., EA rEir le/117,17PEC . • V 7‘ : ort W 11,ye 1 • Spri ngstei tz Prairie Lorene Sta. \Grove i Oak BI uff St ti . À rbert 795 31*.5 .1- • i Ste. Genevid Sin rime k
WINNIPEG MANITOBA, Scale 1.500,000 La Salle Cartier EFFECT OF 1 MEGATON AIRBURST Sad 'on!
OletzleaY DAMAGE (Solid line) CASUALTIES (Broken line)
WITHIN RING 1 COMPLETE RING 1 90% d SEVERE RING 2c 50% Ste. ; ga#ljg RING 1-2 Idol herd Osborne RING 2-3 MODERATE RING 3c 10% Union Point RING 3-4 LIGHT Homewood 1: Brocklesby Head
Black Pt
vernor
Mlle doo° Gallows St Peter— Pt e e OrweII Pt
CHARLOTTOWN P. El, Scale 1:250,000 Buchanan EFFECT OF 1 MEGATON SURFACE BURST
DAMAGE (Solid line) CASUALTIES (Broken line)
Prim Within RING 1 COMPLETE Within RING 1 90% Pt Pinette RING 1-2 SEVERE RING 2c 5Q O/ Pt RING 2 -3 MODERATE RING 3c 1O °/o RING 3-4 LIGHT 2510
ANNEX G
BASIC 7 DAY DOSE FALLOUT CONTOURS
FOR CONSTANT AVERAGE WIND 30 MPH
CONTOUR DIMENSIONS CONTOUR DIMENSIONS I TOTAL KILOMETERS MILES WARHEAD 7-DAY DOWNWIND MAX. DOWNWIND MAX. DOSE LENGTH BREADTH LENGTH BREADTH
1 MT 200 260 20 160 13 500 160 15 100 9 2000 69 8 43 5
2 MT 200 320 32 200 20 500 190 23 120 14 2000 84 15 52 9
10 MT 200 560 87 350 54 500 34p 69 210 43 2000 160 45 100 28
20 MT 200 710 130 440 82 500 430 110 270 70 2000 230 80 140 50
400xIMT 200 1400 350 900 220 on ICBM 500 1100 320 700 200 Complex 2000 550 290 350 180
CONTOUR CRITERIA
200 rem contour: 50% casualties in unprepared population. 500 rem contour: 50% deaths in unprepared population. 2000 rem contour: 50% casualties in sheltered population (Protection factor 10) 26
ANNEX Hi
:I:island of
Neff«le:UM • 1,nt
AMERI
FALLOUT FROM ATTACK ON U.S. STRATEGIC TARGETS
> 200 rem
> 500 rem
> 2,000 rem 27
ANNEX H2
-1.441wte.s., %Nolen 1.4OKAPOK
SAtteltielfVeÂ
■ -,.. iZS,.•. 5C0-04 Stet:, -•••, \ f.ac ,e t i \ •
\
rCheeleslon
«Jaàmonelle
FALLOUT FROM ATTACK ON U.S. STRATEGIC TARGETS
> 200 rem
• 500 rem
> 2,000 rem U
o
TORONTO
'Pea-eat
N.9.271
Negara Falls N
P Buffalo
FALLOUT—FROM ATTACK ON U.S. STRATEGIC TARGETS
elltene 200 rem
> 500 rem
2,000 rem 291
ANNEX I
• OVERALL PROBABILITY OF FALLOUT ON PRAIRIE CITIES
IN EVENT OF ATTACK ON U.S. MINUTEMAN COMPLEXES
(TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VARIABILITY IN WIND DIRECTION)
CITY PROB. OF MAX. INTENSITY FALLOUT OF FALLOUT (rem)
Winnipeg 30% >2000
Brandon 30% > 2000
Regina 15% > 2000
Saskatoon 8% 500-2000
Edmonton 2% 500-2000
Calgary 1% > 2000
Windsor 10% 200-500
Notes: 1. Probability for prairie cities decreases from east to west, and intensity is affected by distance north of border.
2. Windsor can be affected by the extreme downwind tip of fallout from the most easterly minuteman complex. PSEPC/SPPCC LIEVBIBLIO I IJ!!!!1521 UA 929 .C2 N83 1981 The Nuclear threat to Canada in the 1980s : implications and planning data
DATE DUE SLIP
F255 o
1